

Chapter 4

A new way forward: transition compacts

The chapter pulls together the ideas of the previous chapters to present a way forward for transition. This involves the development of a “transition compact”: a country-specific, light and flexible agreement between national and international partners. A compact allows for agreement on critical transition priorities with an explicit financing strategy through a mix of funding sources and instruments. Compacts can improve the coherence and effectiveness of aid, thus reducing the risk of strategic failure, improving results focus, and providing real steps towards stronger national engagement and leadership. They allow for joint prioritisation between national and international actors and frequent reviews of progress, thus addressing donor concerns about capacity, legitimacy and risks of engagement.

Can mutual accountability work in transition?

The evidence presented in previous chapters is clear: there is a need for serious and significant reform to allow faster, more flexible and predictable financing to implement a more coherent and prioritised strategy, even where the legitimacy of a government and its institutions might be in question. Similarly, the countries that have emerged from conflict are also clearly asking donors and the international community to come together to nurture their state capacities and help to build peaceful and resilient states and societies through broad consultation and engagement. The *New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States* specifically calls for the use of compacts as a key mechanism to focus support and allow greater country ownership of transitions. This calls for increased emphasis on mutual accountability.¹ Yet a recent monitoring survey of how donors are implementing the Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations (Box 1.2) has highlighted the challenges ahead: 12 of the 13 countries surveyed suggested that the lack of mutual accountability for results was a major obstacle to more coherent and co-ordinated support (OECD, 2011e). Furthermore, none of the 13 countries had functioning co-ordination mechanisms to bring government and donors together for strategic discussions about how to deliver development.

Significant work has been done by the OECD and others to explore mutual accountability frameworks as part of the aid effectiveness agenda, but it is clear that such frameworks need to be better adapted to the specific challenges of transition countries (OECD, 2008; Wood et al., 2011). This guidance suggests that the best way forward is through mutual agreements labelled “transition compacts”. These can bring coherence to the diverse interventions, objectives and funding streams involved in transition situations. Specifically, compacts can:

- **Deliver better results by targeting evolving and realistic priorities:** To ensure that international assistance is targeted in response to the most urgent priorities across sectors and population groups, compacts provide a framework to agree and revisit collective priorities based on participatory approaches and to respond to changing situations, thus guiding sector planning processes.
- **Enable collective risk management:** Compacts help individual donor agencies and their implementing partners to identify key contextual risks effectively and to “pool” programmatic and institutional risks. In constantly changing circumstances, this should help donors to take strategic and informed decisions about the level and type of risks that they can tolerate.

- **Strengthen country-level ownership:** Transition takes a long time;² compacts can provide strategic focus from the outset, gradually increasing aid through country systems while simultaneously ensuring that access to basic services is maintained.

The four elements of a transition compact


Compacts are tools to link national priorities with an explicit strategy that includes relevant funding sources and instruments. They combine four basic elements: i) agreement on a limited set of priorities; ii) transparent overview of funding sources and flows; iii) a strategy for how to finance agreed priorities; and iv) a very basic monitoring framework to facilitate accountability for results (Figure 4.1). Each of these is discussed in turn in the following paragraphs.

There is no single blueprint here — compacts need to be designed based on the local context, dynamics, existing capacities and structures. The international community should not impose external models or political solutions on partner countries, but rather seek to engage in open discussions about what framework would best capture issues arising from internal political dynamics and circumstances. Nonetheless, recent work by the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding suggests that compacts have the highest chance of success if: i) agreed in-country between national governments and key international partners; and ii) based on broad consultations and feedback from civil society and other stakeholders, including at the local level (IDPS, 2011a). As a result, the national government will be better placed to provide at least a minimum level of strategic direction for the national transition strategies — even in contexts with extremely weak institutional and human capacity. Nonetheless, in complex emergency and conflict contexts and/or in situations where governments are particularly weak or illegitimate, compacts could still provide the basic organising and co-ordination framework for development partners on the ground, and will ensure that rapid financial support is configured in a way that does not undermine sustainable recovery efforts.

Agree on transition priorities

Compacts should be based on strict prioritisation across sectors, as discussed in Chapter 2. This will require complementing humanitarian needs-based approaches with explicit efforts to prioritise peacebuilding and statebuilding activities based on more realistic assumptions about available resources. Prioritisation should ideally be done on the basis of a national plan (e.g. Sierra Leone), but could at a minimum be agreed based on international

Figure 4.1 Elements of transition compacts



transition objectives (see Chapter 2), a national transition strategy and joint contextual risk analysis.

The compact process ensures that prioritisation is done in partnership with the government and other relevant country actors, rather than by donor staff and consultants (g7+, 2010; IDPS, 2010a). Where national governments lack the appropriate systems, capacity or legitimacy to effectively manage and guide international support, compacts allow for a more flexible and gradual application of development principles to ensure the prioritisation and sequencing of interventions to support the establishment of functioning country systems. This in turn would allow donors to accept a higher level of simplicity in plans than would normally be expected.

Priorities will need to be revisited annually to ensure flexibility and continued relevance. As explained in Chapter 2, high-level priorities can provide the basis for development of a single, annual plan and more detailed sector and sub-national plans. Plans and implementation strategies will still be the responsibility of clusters and sector working groups, which bring together different actors and agencies for strategic discussions about how to best address a specific thematic area.

Allow transparency in resource flows

Compacts should map expected funding levels and flows and set out a strategy for how funds will be used to implement agreed priorities. National governments and donors should agree how different resource flows (domestic resources, humanitarian and development aid, non-ODA) will support specific priorities (Chapter 3). Local aid information management systems should be charged with mapping resource flows against priorities, based if possible on local budget categories to facilitate links with national budgets (Box 4.1).

Identify a coherent mix of instruments

Greater coherence between domestic revenues and external financing — mixing and matching the available tools — will result in a more coherent response and aid that is catalytic and responsive to changing circumstances (see Chapter 3). Compacts can help by identifying the financing instruments that are best suited to implement priorities, enable rapid release of develop-

Box 4.1 Aid information management systems in transition

Aid information management systems (AIMS) are designed to assist developing countries to manage their aid flows, incorporate them into their national budgets and improve the overall alignment of assistance with country priorities. AIMS can thus fulfil two purposes at the same time: i) strengthen government capacities to plan, implement, monitor and evaluate the use of public resources; and ii) enable aid co-ordination and information sharing.

In transition contexts, these two purposes can potentially be at odds because national governments may not have the immediate capacity to manage and co-ordinate the use of resources. In such environments, the international community might take on certain AIMS responsibilities to support and strengthen government-led co-ordination and management structures and capacities. However, AIMS can only respond to a small part of international development actors' needs for fast and reliable information on financial flows in post-conflict contexts. It is thus important that processed, illustrative information and sound data analyses are available in the form of documentation and reports, alongside public access to the database itself. The better the reporting, the more likely it is that the AIMS will serve as a credible and useful decision-making tool for recovery planning as well as for longer-term institutional development.

Source: UNDP (2010), *Aid Information Management Systems in Post-Conflict and Fragile Situations. A Comparative Study*, Draft, UNDP, New York.

ment funding, and ensure increasing levels of ownership. They do so by developing a strategy that identifies the different instruments needed to implement different transition objectives. The mix should include instruments that can facilitate off-budget delivery, including for humanitarian aid, gender and human rights activities, and support to civil society. Pooled funds and dual-objective aid instruments will likely play an important role in the delivery of transition priorities given their potential for coherent and co-ordinated support. Sequencing such pools is of critical importance, as explained in Chapter 3. Similarly, global pooled and specialised funds should be relied upon to kick-start the establishment and implementation of agreed priorities.

Define monitoring and accountability arrangements

Monitoring frameworks can easily become big and bureaucratic, preventing rather than facilitating progress. Compacts should include a few basic indicators to measure and assess progress against agreed priorities. Three basic types of indicators should be considered:

- i) **Progress indicators:** These assess progress against agreed priorities and help understand whether priorities are still relevant. They could track specific project deliverables (e.g. number of staff trained, soldiers demobilised) or broader strategic objectives, and could also be used to highlight new and emerging risks.
- ii) **Process indicators:** These can be a mix of quantitative and qualitative indicators that track the transition towards national ownership and institutional transformation. They could track capacity and use of local institutions, the extent to which different instruments deliver agreed results, and whether risks are effectively managed.
- iii) **Compliance indicators:** These indicators should be based on a resource map that outlines likely multi-annual flows and how and when international and national actors disclose information on volume and allocations of aid. Indicators could be used to assess actors against results and the outcome could be published and reviewed annually.

Donors should consider using and strengthening local systems from the start to provide independent oversight of government-executed activities as part of the compact monitoring framework, including through the establishment of joint oversight and dual accountability mechanisms. Local accountability structures and capacities play critical roles in monitoring and holding national governments to account by allowing citizens to participate and provide feedback on progress. The 2011 WDR recognises that such systems

should be strengthened at different levels, including through “community-driven development programs and direct contracting to NGOs using results-based financing” (World Bank, 2011).

A key element will be to ensure that monitoring and accountability structures are used to support the statebuilding process. The massive aid inflow during transition can overwhelm systems with limited absorptive capacity or limited capacity to meet onerous donor requirements. The burden to co-ordinate the ensuing fragmented international response is often placed on the government, putting further strain on its limited resources and capacities. Donors must recognise the transaction cost of co-ordination and find ways of addressing this, including through the very early establishment of aid co-ordination units within the government (UN Senior Advisory Group, 2011 and Box 4.2) and through specific capacity development efforts. Donors should agree to align their work with these units, provide staffing support on request, and should comply and respond fully to data requests for aid management systems to improve government planning.

Lessons from recent experiences with compacts

There are several examples from the past five years where national-international agreements, sometimes explicitly referred to as “compacts,” have attempted to align and co-ordinate international and national peacebuilding efforts and funding for a set of priorities. This section describes some of the most notable experiences and draws out some lessons.

The **Afghanistan Compact** covered the period 2006-10 and was endorsed by 61 countries and international organisations. This five-year political agreement and strategy provided the framework for the partnership between the Afghan Government and the international community, outlining specific, measurable, time-bound targets in three interdependent areas: i) security; ii) governance, rule of law and human rights; and iii) economic and social development. The compact was significant in that it integrated security, governance and development. It also set out mutual commitments, which, while not legally binding, provided the basis for a more coherent and strategic approach to providing assistance to Afghanistan. The compact set up a Joint Co-ordinating and Monitoring Board (JCMB) co-chaired by the Government of Afghanistan and the UN, as well as associated sectoral working groups, to hold the government and international community mutually accountable to their commitments. The Afghanistan Compact gained added legitimacy by being endorsed by the UN Security Council.

The International Compact with **Iraq** (ICI) was an initiative of the Government of Iraq. It sought to achieve a national vision to facilitate, between 2007 and 2012, the consolidation of peace and the pursuit of political, economic, and social development. Domestically, the ICI aimed to build a national compact around the government's political and economic programme and to restore the Iraqi people's trust in the state and its ability to protect them and meet their basic needs. Internationally, the ICI established a framework of mutual commitments to support Iraq and strengthen its resolve to address critical reforms. The ICI was premised on the belief that peacebuilding and economic prosperity maintain a symbiotic relationship. Developed in close partnership with the United Nations and World Bank — as well as with other international partners — the ICI built on and aimed to enhance existing national planning and aid co-ordination mechanisms, such as the National Development Strategy for Iraq, Sectoral Working Groups, and Cluster Teams. In direct support of government-led reform efforts, the ICI established a schedule for the proposed actions of international partners, including tangible financial commitments.

Compacts in the **Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)** and **Southern Sudan** provide evidence of how governance can be improved through better interaction and coherence among different modalities and actors. There are early indications that such planning and co-ordination tools have encouraged better prioritisation of activities and improved how governments and international partners interact. This is helping increase the accountability between government and donors and to their citizens (IDPS, 2010).

A statement on mutual commitments on peacebuilding in **Liberia** was agreed between the Government of Liberia and the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) in October 2010. Based on the *National Vision for 2030* it identifies three critical peacebuilding priorities: i) rule of law; ii) security sector reform; and iii) national reconciliation, and sets out commitments by the government and the PBC to deliver on these priorities.

Ingredients for success

Several reviews have been undertaken over the past years in order to learn from experiences with this “first generation” of compacts (PBSO, 2009; IDPS, 2010; Bennett, 2012). These reviews have shown that experience with compacts has not been uniform, and that their nature and extent varies widely. There is a clear consensus, however, that without an instrument that provides both a framework and a forum for prioritisation and allocation of funding, international assistance will remain fragmented. Key factors that help make compacts successful include:

- **Timing and political will:** Compacts are likely to be more effective if pursued when basic security is in place and humanitarian indicators are improving. They work best when they operate on short (fewer than five years) timeframes, so that those who champion the agreement are still in office during its implementation. They are likely to gain more political and practical traction if signed by elected, rather than transitional, governments.
- **Mutual and costed commitments:** Where both sides are committed to achieving shared goals, there is more understanding of risks and challenges, and a more honest dialogue about how to overcome these. Commitments in the compact need to be costed and integrated into the government's budget framework, including those actions not financed from the budget, with sufficient clarity to monitor outcomes, final and interim outputs, inputs and organisational responsibilities for delivery.
- **Explicit prioritisation:** Focus the compact on a small number of key, high-level goals and priorities necessary for peacebuilding and state-building. These goals should encompass and bring together actions by all relevant policy communities — diplomatic, security, humanitarian and development — at both local and national levels. Other subsidiary goals should be delegated elsewhere, *e.g.* to the PRSP process (Box 2.2), policy-based financing from international financial institutions, or sector aid co-ordination groups. Regular compact round-tables or high-level decision-making fora can intervene when subsidiary processes don't work.
- **Link priorities to financing:** Through a transparent overview of resources, a compact can guide the choice of aid instruments to use for delivery, as well as provide a basis to determine the allocation of national and donor resources.
- **Focused participation:** Only the most critical international actors are needed at the outset (possibly based on funding levels, political leverage, etc.) to ensure focus and speed, although compacts should include provisions to broaden membership over time.
- **Senior and serious support:** Effective decision making and support require a forum with enough seniority and diversity to make decisions and work through problems, and the support of a technically competent secretariat that can manage policy and implementation and advice on adjustments as necessary. Ensure that the high-level forum is well-led on both government and international sides and

that the secretariat has the technical capacity to present well formulated options to the forum.

- **Inclusivity and the role of civil society:** All compacts studied were contracts between governments and their international partners, with little involvement in the negotiations by regional organisations, and virtually none by civil society. The role of these actors should be considered from the outset in terms of galvanising international and local opinion around compact debates, in creating an enabling environment for compact negotiations and in helping to hold compact signatories to their word.
- **Flexibility:** Compacts should be light on formalistic agreements and detailed negotiations. They should focus on main lines of accountability and be allowed to evolve and develop with the context. Com-

Box 4.2 Learning from the “first generation” of compacts

The International Peace Institute (IPI), in collaboration with the UN and the INCAF Secretariat, conducted a study in October 2011 on UN experiences with compacts in Afghanistan, Democratic Republic of Congo, Iraq, Liberia, and Timor-Leste. The findings were presented to senior UN officials and member states at a workshop on 2 November 2011 in New York. The study and workshop highlighted many of the conclusions contained in this chapter, and in particular explored the different roles that the UN has played in previous compacts. Participants highlighted the fact that the UN has played a catalytic and facilitative role in convening key stakeholders and has used its good offices with host governments, other member states, and regional organisations to galvanise support around compact initiatives. Similarly, the UN has provided technical and capacity support to host governments in the past to develop and implement compacts, and has even staffed and managed compact secretariats in certain cases. The UN Security Council has also helped legitimise compact processes by endorsing compact documents and including compact support in mission mandates.

Going forward, the workshop suggested that the above lessons should be used to develop a “second generation” of compacts that would be lighter and more flexible and focussed. The role of the UN in initiating, developing and managing compacts should be considered along with that of other actors and organisations, and global funding sources such as the UN Peacebuilding Fund should be looked to for initial seed funding to establish and build national capacities for compact management.

Source: Bennett, C. (forthcoming, 2012), *Aid Effectiveness in Fragile States: Lessons from the “First Generation” of Transition Compacts*, Policy Report, International Peace Institute, New York.

pacts need to be flexible and context-specific. By focussing initially on a small number of key priorities, a general commitment to transparency on resource flows and a certain level of multi-year financial commitments, compacts could hold a lighter footprint and be adjustable to dynamic situations and varying needs.

Recommendations: Making transition compacts happen

This final section outlines the steps needed by the international development community and national governments to make compacts happen within the legal requirements that guide bilateral development assistance. Table 4.1 summarises the roles of the key actors in the compact and the benefits of becoming involved.

i) Formalise and fund compacts as an integral part of the global response

- *Compacts should be formalised as an approach*, including by the UN Security Council when it adopts resolutions setting up UN missions.
- *Provide funding to establish and run compacts*. Donors should provide the resources necessary to enable compacts to be established and to operate, including by strengthening the authority and capacity of multilateral agencies to provide rapid support. Up-front investments should support and strengthen national engagement, deploy critical staff, and set up administrative and fund management structures. In particular, funding is required to support continued political dialogue to strengthen political settlements. The financing for compacts should initially be provided by global funds such as the UN Peacebuilding Fund (Box 4.2), the UN DOCO Country Co-ordination Fund and the UNDP/BCPR Thematic Trust Fund. Donors need to recognise and accept the higher administrative and co-ordination costs of working in transition contexts. They should also be willing to finance the deployment of specific expertise to facilitate inclusive political processes that are meaningful and legitimate in the eyes of the population; to conduct context and risk analysis, strategic planning, resource tracking and monitoring; and to manage pooled funds.

ii) Establish effective management and accountability structures

- *Ground national government leadership in the compact* and ensure commitment to reach out and consult broadly with civil society and other relevant stakeholders, to monitor performance, and strengthen

legitimacy over time. International engagement should initially be limited to key actors (based on the government's level of confidence, perceived legitimacy and authority, funding, etc.), with the explicit goal of rapidly scaling up participation over time. Governments should indicate which international actor would be best placed to act as convenor of the international community, based on demonstrated competence and engagement.

- *Agree leadership structures among international actors.* The capacity of the United Nations to act as a proxy for the international community in UN mission settings will need to be strengthened, and the UN should clearly outline what is needed to perform this role in an effective and efficient way. In non-mission settings, international actors should appoint a lead donor, strengthen the division of labour among the donors involved, and define the specific leadership roles expected from the UN and World Bank resident representatives (Box 4.3).
- *Identify innovative ways of managing the “dual accountability dilemma”* (Box 3.3). Compacts should recognise the need to adapt approaches to better manage accountability pressures and allow actors to communicate on results and risks of engagement. This will include identifying dual purpose results that would show the value of investments to both country population and donor constituency more quickly (World Bank, 2011).

iii) Ensure that donor policies enable more flexible and predictable financing and engagement

- *Devolve more decision-making authority to country-based staff.* This will give country actors the required mandate and expertise to engage in designing and implementing compacts. Field-level staff should have greater discretion over short-term spending decisions through the use of *ex post* justifications for reallocating project activities during the budget year.
- *Nurture closer co-operation between donor staff in different policy communities at both headquarters and in the field.* Co-ordinated engagement will require a specialised approach to staffing, including closer co-operation between humanitarian and development staff in-country, and mixed teams of humanitarian and development specialists. Expertise should be drawn from different policy communities to ensure holistic context analyses and programming. Humanitarian desk officers should automatically be transferred to country teams during

Box 4.3 Managing transition compacts

Multilateral and bilateral lead donors must be able to hold their peers accountable to the commitments made in compacts. Options to enable this include:

- Establishing aid co-ordination units within government as the main focal point for compacts, and aligning behind these from the outset. These units should be integrated into government structures and report directly to the relevant minister, but could be staffed by international technical assistance if required.
- Giving the DSRSG/RC enough authority and resources to support the capacity development of national and local civil servants, and/or hiring the expertise needed to support the political dialogue, management of compacts, and negotiations over evolving priorities. The relevant co-ordination mechanisms of the United Nations need to be strengthened for this purpose.
- Developing terms of reference jointly with national responsible authorities and concerned civil society stakeholders, which set out the process for decision making, rules and responsibilities, and accountability criteria (following OECD, 2011b).
- Spelling out which domestic institutions will be used to facilitate monitoring, reporting and auditing of various modes of engagement, as well as any additional arrangements required to strengthen these institutions. International actors should favour the use of country accountability institutions.

transition. This might mean revising current bilateral policies and procedures. Follow-up work to this guidance should map these reforms against principled and mandated activities and roles of the various contributing actors.

iv) **Support the government in establishing aid tracking and co-ordination mechanisms to enable more clarity of resource flows**

- Set up aid tracking and co-ordination mechanisms that are government-led and anchored in existing inter-governmental co-ordination mechanisms and constitutional divisions of responsibility. Support the setting up of aid co-ordination mechanisms and databases, and explore incentives to encourage different communities to use these mechanisms for reporting.

- Be transparent about the likely levels of aid from different budget lines across years. National and international stakeholders should be open about the likely level of support that can be expected in different sectors and how this will be used to support the transition. Such an up-to-date mapping of resource allocations to support funding of identified priorities would provide a hard budget constraint and baseline for agreeing on priorities and the right level of ambition.


Notes

1. Mutual accountability can be explained as follows: “In the current aid system, recipients are highly accountable to donors, but donors are seldom accountable to recipients. Making donors more accountable to recipients could encourage them to improve their aid practices, and more leadership by recipients in the aid relationship itself could promote better country ownership” (ODI, 2006).
2. The *World Development Report 2011* (World Bank, 2011) suggests that it takes 15-30 years for a country’s institutional performance to improve from the level of a fragile state like Haiti to the level of a functioning state like Ghana.

Table 4.1 Transition compacts: roles, benefits, contributions and actions*

	Host government / country stakeholders	Multilateral and operational agencies	Donors
Roles	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Provide strategic leadership to compact Provide vision and engage in priority setting Reach out and bring in views and input from local communities and civil society through appropriate mechanisms Lead annual participatory reviews of progress as basis for revisiting priorities and ensuring compliance 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Manage day-to-day operation of compact in partnership with national and international stakeholders Participate in collective priority setting and undertake more detailed sector/cluster planning Contribute to design of aid instruments – assess transition strategies for increased use of country systems Provide catalyst funding from global pooled and specialised funds Support the execution of annual monitoring exercise 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Provide external resources for transition objectives Contribute to political negotiations Participate in collective priority setting based on relevant analysis Contribute to and approve mix of instruments Participate in collective monitoring exercise Contribute to joint result reporting and communication
Benefits	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Coherent international support Alignment and harmonisation of resources (domestic and foreign) Opportunities for constructive dialogue Forum for taking stock and reassessing results against priorities 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Increased coherence in funding streams Rapid access to flexible development funds – less strain on humanitarian funding for recovery Collective engagement with government and donors Accountability for transition results Opportunity to highlight and address key risks and implementation challenges 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Collective understanding and management of risks Improved transparency, co-ordination and coherence of efforts Accountability for results Collective strategic thinking and greater inter- and intra-ministerial co-ordination of international transition engagement
Contributions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Domestic financing for agreed priorities Aid co-ordination and management Regular consultations with local communities and civil society on priorities Transparency on flows and willingness to be held to account 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Co-ordinate multilateral system and provide co-ordination role on behalf of international system Use core funding and existing funds to facilitate rapid delivery and staff deployment 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Financing – predictable and early release of development funding Overall coherence between different objectives Transparency in flows and actions and willingness to be held to account
Major actions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Initiate discussions to establish compacts Identify necessary capacity gaps and request support as needed to fill these Allow collective prioritisation and external delivery if needed 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Reform procedures to allow automatic use emergency procedures to deliver results during transition Reform existing funding sources (core funding, specialised funds) to provide interim funding for immediate staffing and delivery Implement existing agreements that regulate co-operation between UN and WB Sequence the establishment of pooled funds based on objectives and level of external oversight required 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Devolve responsibility to empower country-based actors Integrate whole-of-government thinking in transition operations Allow collective prioritisation of funds Facilitate early release of development funding – establish specialised funds if needed Contribute to or align with country pooled funds

*The following should be understood within the context of existing planning and co-ordination systems and taking into account existing legal requirements that guide bilateral donor funding decisions and allocations.



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