

*OECD Member country governments in the DAC have expanded their work in situations of potential, current, and recent conflict, often in countries where they have been working for many years. Experience shows that preventing violent conflict would bring enormous benefits in terms of human life, poverty reduction and growth. Substantial progress has already been made on some fronts, while other challenges remain to be addressed. The DAC High Level Meeting, the UN and the G8 have all reaffirmed conflict prevention as a long-term engagement central to poverty reduction and sustainable development.*

### **1. Violent conflict and development: Towards a shared vision of the role of international co-operation**

Over the last decade, widespread violent conflict, with destructive impact on development, forced the international community to widen and deepen its understanding of conflict prevention and peace-building and to develop appropriate policies to increase the effectiveness of its action. Though the human tragedy caused by conflict cannot be measured, it damages the lives of millions of people for generations. Human suffering, extreme violence, civilian casualties and population displacement are only some of the consequences of violent conflict. Its impact on production, livelihoods and infrastructures, at both national and regional levels, has serious negative effects on the economy and the environment, often reverting decades of positive and promising development efforts.

Since the end of the Cold War, violent conflict has caused over 5 million casualties, 95% of whom are civilians. Out of the 38 poorest countries of the world, 20 are in conflict. Over the last 20 years, conflict has escalated in sub-Saharan Africa. Ten of the 24 most war-affected countries between 1980 and 1994 were African. In Rwanda alone, an estimated 800 000 people were killed in the 1994 genocide, 1.5 million people were internally displaced and a further 800 000 made refugees. The Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict has estimated that the costs to the international community – in addition to the costs to the countries actually at war – of the seven major wars that occurred in the 1990s, excluding the Kosovo conflict and calculated before the close of the decade, had been USD 199 billion.<sup>1</sup> It also stated that, had effective preventive measures been taken, more than USD 149 billion could have been saved.

1. Michael E. Brown and Richard N. Rosecrance (eds.), *The Costs of Conflict. Prevention and Cure in the Global Arena*, Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Lanham, 1999, page 225. The calculation is based on the estimated costs of the following wars: Bosnia, Rwanda, Somalia, Haiti, the Gulf War, Cambodia, and El Salvador.

Conflict also contributes to unsustainable debt. For example, approximately USD 1.4 billion of external debt arrears to the International Financial Institutions (IFIs), plus more than USD 9 billion to the Paris Club owed by the Democratic Republic of Congo, is estimated to arise indirectly from military expenditure.<sup>2</sup> As of June 2001, twenty-three countries<sup>3</sup> had reached their decision point under the Enhanced Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative and two countries<sup>4</sup> reached the completion point under the original HIPC Initiative. About 35 HIPCs could ultimately qualify for HIPC assistance, but roughly a dozen of them – mostly in sub-Saharan Africa – were yet to qualify because they were conflict-affected or suffered from governance problems, which had foreclosed the possibility of effective debt relief.<sup>5</sup>

#### Work in the DAC and links with work elsewhere

The Development Assistance Committee has addressed the role of development co-operation in conflict situations since 1995. As the post-Cold War crises became more and more prevalent, it decided to take a closer look at the nexus between development and conflict-torn countries, recognising how devastating violent conflict is to a country's people and development efforts. With the policy document "Conflict, Peace and Development

Co-operation on the Threshold of the 21st Century", approved by the High Level Meeting of the DAC in May 1997, a first roadmap was made available to the international community to consider the role of development co-operation in preventing conflict and enhancing peace building in conflict-prone areas.

The DAC guidelines have helped to raise awareness in the international community of the role of development co-operation in conflict situations, in bringing together donor policies addressing conflict and in building partnerships and fostering donor co-ordination for conflict prevention and peace-building. Such themes are crucial in the current debate on development co-operation effectiveness and impact, as reflected by a set of statements and reports on conflict-related issues by international institutions and donor organisations (see Box V-1).

#### Poor performers

DAC work on the role of development co-operation in conflict-prone countries is now being considered more widely in the context of donor action in fragile and volatile situations characterised by a poor policy environment. Donor co-ordination in the so-called "poor performing countries" is especially challenging. Building partnership approaches, a key element of the DAC

2. *The Causes of Conflict in Africa*. Consultation Document, DFID; Foreign and Commonwealth Office; Ministry of Defence, London, March 2001, page 12. On the same issue, see also the UN Secretary-General's Report to the UN Security Council on *The Causes of Conflict and the Promotion of Durable Peace and Sustainable Development in Africa* (16 April 1998) available at [www.un.org/ecosocdev/geninfo/afrec/sgreport/index.html](http://www.un.org/ecosocdev/geninfo/afrec/sgreport/index.html).
3. Benin, Bolivia, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, The Gambia, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Guyana, Honduras, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, São Tomé and Príncipe, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia.
4. Bolivia and Uganda.
5. For more details on the HIPC Initiative see [www.worldbank.org/hipc](http://www.worldbank.org/hipc).

Box V-1.

**Recent trends in the policy debate on conflict prevention**

**The United Nations**

In 2000, the Brahimi Report<sup>1</sup> provided the opportunity to reconsider and discuss the implications of UN peace operations (conflict prevention and peacemaking, peacekeeping and peace building) in light of the experience of the last decade. Many of its recommendations, which call for a radical rethinking of the whole UN system, are highly relevant for development co-operation. They propose the adoption of a holistic and integrated approach that goes well beyond the traditional peacekeeping wisdom. Some of them refer to a challenging new ground for action, such as the call for a doctrinal shift in the use of civilian police and related rule-of-law elements in peace operations, to focus primarily on the reform and restructuring of local police forces in addition to traditional advisory, training and monitoring tasks, and the recommendation for a better integration of electoral assistance into a broader strategy for the support of governance institutions.

Following the Security Council discussion on the role of the UN in conflict prevention held on 20 July 2000, the UN Secretary-General submitted a comprehensive report on the prevention of armed conflict,<sup>2</sup> a major policy-oriented document calling for a shift from a culture of reaction to a culture of prevention. The UN Secretary-General's report reviews the progress achieved in developing the conflict prevention capacity of the UN and presents specific recommendations on how the efforts of the UN system in this field could be further enhanced. The analytical framework provided by the DAC in its policy orientations on conflict, peace and development co-operation is fully consistent with the UN Secretary-General's analysis on a number of key issues. These include the need to address the root causes of conflict through structural prevention, the close links between conflict prevention and sustainable development, and the importance of greater coherence in donor action and within the UN system, as well as enhanced co-operation between the UN and other actors, such as regional organisations, NGOs, civil society and the business community. It is worth mentioning that the ongoing debate on conflict prevention and peace building is also involving UN specialised agencies, which are reconsidering their respective strategies within the new conflict prevention framework.<sup>3</sup>

**The European Union**

Another example of the importance attached to conflict prevention in the donor community is provided by the European Commission's approval of a communication on this subject<sup>4</sup> stressing the European Union's role in projecting stability by supporting regional integration and building trade links. The communication calls for mainstreaming conflict prevention in EU's development co-operation policies and programmes and greater co-ordination between the Commission, EU member states and other actors.

In 2001, the EU agenda attributed a high priority to conflict prevention, along the lines developed in the DAC work. In June 2001, the Göteborg European Council approved the EU Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts, that committed the EU to set clear political priorities for preventive action, improve its early warning action and policy coherence, enhance its instruments for long and short-term prevention, and build effective partnerships for prevention. The implications of this approach for development co-operation are far-reaching. For example, the EU Programme calls upon the European Commission to ensure that its development policy and other co-operation programmes are more clearly focused on addressing root causes of conflicts in an integrated way within the framework of poverty reduction strategies. A related initiative was the seminar held in October 2001 on the pertinent

## Box V-1.

**Recent trends in the policy debate on conflict prevention (cont.)**

instruments of co-operation to be implemented in fragile countries, leading to operational conclusions concerning co-operation with Africa, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries in conflict, based on the analyses carried out by the European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM) at the request of Portugal, Sweden and Belgium.

**The G8**

The G8 consideration of conflict prevention and the role of development co-operation, as well as the need for enhanced coherence of donor policies, has increased over the last years since the approval of the 1997 DAC policy orientations. The 1997 Denver G8 already recognised the relevance of the original guidelines for peace-building initiatives at the regional, sub-regional and national levels in conflict-prone situations. The G8 Foreign Ministers' Miyazaki Initiatives<sup>5</sup> (July 2000), and more recently the G8 Roma Initiatives on Conflict Prevention<sup>6</sup> (July 2001), have both stressed the importance of DAC work. At the Rome meeting of G8 Foreign Ministers, progress was registered on the various issues addressed by the Miyazaki Initiatives, and namely small arms and light weapons; conflict and development; "conflict diamonds"; children in armed conflict; international civilian police. Co-operative and sustainable water management and disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants were also mentioned, on which the G8 will continue to focus attention. At the same time, new initiatives were launched on strengthening the role of women in conflict prevention – building, *inter alia*, on the October 2000 UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on women, peace and security – and on corporate citizenship and conflict prevention. The DAC 1997 guidelines and the 2001 statement on *Helping Prevent Violent Conflict* substantively contributed to the analytical framework for these important initiatives.

1. *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations*, A/55/305-S/2000/809, 21 August 2000. The report is available at [www.un.org/peace/reports/peace\\_operations/report.htm](http://www.un.org/peace/reports/peace_operations/report.htm).
2. *Prevention of Armed Conflict. Report of the Secretary-General*, A/55/985-S/2001/574, 7 June 2001. The report is available at [www.un.org/Docs/sc/reports/2001/sgrep01.htm](http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/reports/2001/sgrep01.htm).
3. See, for example, the paper by Bernard Wood on *Development Dimensions of Conflict Prevention and Peace-building* (June 2001) prepared for the UNDP Emergency Response Division.
4. *Communication from the Commission on Conflict Prevention* [COM(2001)211 final, dated 11/04/2001]. The text is available at [www.europa.eu.int/comm/external\\_relations/cfsp/news/com2001\\_211\\_en.pdf](http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/cfsp/news/com2001_211_en.pdf).
5. Statements and background documents on the Miyazaki Initiatives are available at [www.mofa.go.jp/policy/economy/summit/2000/documents/index.html](http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/economy/summit/2000/documents/index.html).
6. Statements and background documents on the G8 Rome Initiatives are available at [www.g8italia.it/\\_en/docs/JZWRMI29.htm](http://www.g8italia.it/_en/docs/JZWRMI29.htm).

strategy *Shaping the 21st Century*, proves particularly difficult in situations of poor governance. Such efforts should be considered as work in progress. Much has to

be learned from the experience gained so far. The DAC has been addressing these issues through a series of workshops and commissioned work in 2001.

## 2. The new DAC Guidelines on Helping Prevent Violent Conflict: Orientations for External Partners

### Background

In compiling the 1997 guidelines on *Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation on the Threshold of the 21st Century*, DAC Members recognised how violent conflict in developing countries touches on the basic values and interests of their societies, and reaffirmed their commitment – within the international community – to find better ways to help prevent such conflicts at their roots. Work in war-torn or conflict-prone societies must be seen as an integral part of the co-operation challenge. Helping strengthen a society's capacity to manage conflict without violence is a foundation for sustainable development. Structural stability and the role development actors play in strengthening it is a central focus of the 1997 guidelines. Structural stability embraces the interdependent and mutually-reinforcing objectives of social peace, respect for the rule of law and human rights, social and economic development, supported by dynamic and representative political institutions capable of managing change and resolving disputes without resorting to violent conflict.

Knowledge and practice have evolved since the 1997 DAC guidelines were published. In the past five years, OECD

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### New Policy Guidance on Conflict Prevention

In April 2001 further policy guidance – *Helping Prevent Violent Conflict: Orientations for External Partners*<sup>6</sup> was approved by the DAC High Level Meeting. The new policy document updates and amplifies the initial guidelines for DAC Members and their work, particularly in the areas of poverty reduction, gender, governance and environment, with government counterparts in other ministries, the international community and partners in developing country governments, civil society and business. It draws on three main sources derived from the intensive projects of the Task Force<sup>7</sup> set up to investigate linkages between conflict, peace and development co-operation:

- *Studies in several fields*: The influence of development co-operation activities in

6. "External partners" refers to any actor (government, NGO, multilateral institution, development bank, bilateral aid agency, private sector representative) that has a legitimate partnership with the developing country in question. In this context it also indicates that different OECD government ministries or departments, not just their development agencies, can have a role to play.

7. The DAC Task Force on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation (CPDC) was established in 1995. As of 2001, the Task Force is called the DAC CPDC Network. The Network aims at giving DAC Members a chance to work together more proactively on conflict prevention, post-conflict reconstruction and peace building, and to make efforts to mainstream conflict prevention into their policies.

conflict situations based on case studies on Afghanistan, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Rwanda, and Sri Lanka; security, development and security sector reform; and the uses of aid to help prevent violent conflict.<sup>8</sup>

- *Regional consultations with developing country actors:* Informal consultations were held in 1999 and 2000 with a wide range of practitioners and experts in Africa, Latin America, and Asia-Pacific. They provided distinct and compelling perspectives from the diverse vantage points of different groups and interests in many developing countries. They involved dialogue with representatives of partner countries, civil society organisations (CSOs), research institutions, as well as international organisations and aid agencies active in the three regions. They gave tangible reinforcement to the 1997 original guidelines and subsequent DAC-commissioned work.<sup>9</sup>

- *Evolving experience* on the ground and in international action.

These efforts attest to the deepening interest in conflict-related development assistance since 1997. They also demonstrate how much remains to be done in implementing the stated commitments and best practices identified by the DAC in the 1997 guidelines.

In adopting the new guidelines, the DAC HLM issued a statement on *Helping Prevent Violent Conflict* (annexed to Chapter I). DAC

Members agreed on some key messages covering eight broad areas, across which the issue of policy coherence is constantly stressed.

1. *Basic guiding principles, i.e.* seeing conflict prevention as central to poverty reduction and sustainable development and as a long-term engagement rather than a short-term response.
2. *Integrating a conflict prevention “lens”, i.e.* creating a “culture of prevention” in development co-operation and foreign policy action.
3. *Security and development*, where security is considered as an essential component of good governance and initiatives to ensure peace and sustainable development.
4. *Supporting regional co-operation and consultation, i.e.* addressing the regional dimensions of conflict and strengthening regional approaches and regional response capacities.
5. *Peace processes, justice and reconciliation, i.e.* making sure that peace processes address differing viewpoints on issues of justice and reconciliation in order to avoid the recurrence of violence.
6. *Engaging in partnerships for peace*, by building partnerships with states and the civil society.
7. *Working with business*, by raising awareness of conflict prevention issues

8. Peter Uvin's synthesis report on case studies of aid incentives and disincentives, entitled “The Influence of Aid in Situations of Violent Conflict”, is available as DCD(2000)16, as is Dylan Hendrikson's commissioned report on security and development co-operation [DCD(2000)4/REV2]. Both documents have been published in the *DAC Journal*, Vol. 2, No. 3. The work on conflict prevention and development co-operation, prepared by a team led by Peter Wallensteen, was reviewed in a consultative workshop held in Sigtuna (Sweden) in August 2000. The report – *Conflict Prevention through Development Co-operation: An Inventory of Recent Research Findings – With Implications for International Development Co-operation* – was published by the Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University, 2001.

9. Reports on these consultations in Addis Ababa, Cartagena de Indias and Bangkok are available as documents DCD(2000)5, 17 and 18. A synthesis of main lessons and common themes can be found in DCD(2000)19.

among the national and international business communities.

8. *Countering negative economic forces*, and addressing the political economy of war and violent conflict.

This work carries partnership a step further to recommend that donors explore alliances with the private sector to battle against “bad” business practices while working with “good” business. Other key areas covered include: supporting inclusiveness for peace building; minimising detrimental consequences to civilian populations of the suspension or withdrawal of aid; and exploring innovative aid modalities and mechanisms.

### Basic guiding principles

Violent conflict and its ruinous impact on people’s lives demands that the development co-operation community renew its commitment to peace and prevention. To prevent violent conflict, societies must build voluntary co-operation that results in peaceful co-existence among diverse communities within and between nations. Conflict prevention is central to poverty reduction and sustainable development. In this respect, “conflict prevention” means the prevention of violent disputes, controversies and conflict. It includes the notion of long-term engagement, not only short-term response. Non-violent conflict is a normal part of social and economic change. What has to be prevented is the use of large-scale violence to address conflict as well as activities that can destabilise and lead to collective violence. The DAC statement and policy guidance relate primarily to collective conflict

– conflict among groups within or across nations. It also covers, to some extent, state violence against groups and individuals.

Development agencies now accept the need to work *in* and *on* conflicts rather than *around* them, and make peace building the main focus when dealing with conflict situations.<sup>10</sup> This is a significant step towards long-term engagement and away from an earlier short-term concentration on post-conflict recovery and reconstruction efforts.

To move effectively towards peace, development agencies need to work alongside partners in developing countries before, during and after conflict. Promoting peace building and conflict prevention requires that donor agencies work with other relevant branches of their governments and other actors in the international community. With a “culture of prevention” and in-depth analysis such as peace and conflict impact assessments and scenario building, donors can work better together to achieve sustainable peace. Policies also need to be clear, coherent, comprehensive and co-ordinated in order to improve effectiveness in conflict prevention and management. Relevant policy areas involve trade, finance and investment, foreign affairs, defence, and development co-operation. Responding to this imperative, development agencies are accepting the risks of moving more deeply into this sensitive political terrain.

Economic well-being, social development and environmental sustainability and regeneration are major goals of development co-operation that require structural

10. When development agencies working in crisis or in pre-war situations circumvent conflict-related issues they are, in the terms of the DAC guidelines, “working *around* conflict”. When they modify their programmes and make efforts to recognise the conflict they are “working *in* the conflict”. When there is an attempt to proactively prevent, mitigate or resolve the conflict(s) this is “working *on* the conflict”.

stability. Experience and research point to some basic principles for preventing conflict that call on the development community to:

- Recognise the potential – and limits – of the international community to take actions that favour peace and discourage violence.
- Use constructive engagement and creative approaches that provide incentives to peace (see Box V-2).
- Act on the costly lessons learned concerning the importance of consistent, coherent policies and comprehensive tools in order to do maximum good and avoid unintended harm.
- Be transparent, communicate intentions, and widen and deepen dialogue with partners at all levels in order to ensure ownership.
- Support peace-building initiatives early on and continue even when peace processes are perceived to have been achieved.
- Actively engage women, men and youth in peace-building and policy-making processes. All actors need to take better account of the pervasive linkages between gender differences and violent conflicts and their prevention and resolution.
- Work in a flexible and timely manner, guided by long-term perspectives and political and socio-economic analyses of regional, national and local situations, even for short-term actions.
- Reinforce local capacities to influence public policy, and tackle social and political exclusion.

#### **A conflict prevention “lens”**

“Moving upstream” to help prevent violent conflict at its source is a shared goal of the development co-operation community. Donors are learning to apply a conflict

prevention “lens” to policies in many departments to make them coherent and comprehensive. The conflict prevention lens is a metaphor for looking at how conflict prevention can be incorporated into all arenas of policy, *e.g.* from development to trade, investment and foreign policy. This can also be referred to as building a culture of prevention. Concrete actions such as analysing and monitoring developments in conflict-prone situations are steps towards detecting and curbing conflict early on. Growing evidence suggests that early preventive action that works is far less costly than coming in later to stop violence and repair damage. Working with a human rights focus as part of a conflict prevention lens is important and helps minimise potential negative side effects of development co-operation in conflict situations. This includes: working with international refugee law; international humanitarian and human rights law and conventions including the convention on the rights of the child; and the convention on eliminating all forms of discrimination against women.

Donors recognise that all aid can influence conflict situations and create incentives or disincentives for peace. They are taking steps to better understand, monitor and foresee how development programmes affect divided societies by dealing with peace-building both at the national/regional and project level. In looking at the national level, donors address democracy, security and better governance as major issues. To do so, they need to:

- Disentangle and analyse factors of grievance and greed at play as conflict situations evolve.
- Devise appropriate ways to evaluate, monitor and assess their action and its impact in close collaboration with



Box V-2.

**Incentives for peace**

Incentives for peace are all purposeful uses of aid that strengthen the dynamics that favour peace. This could include: influencing actors' behaviors; strengthening pro-peace actors' capacities; changing the relations between conflicting actors (ethnic groups, the state and civil society); and influencing the social and economic environment in which conflict and peace dynamics take place.

Aid creates incentives and disincentives for peace or for violent conflict regardless of whether these effects are deliberate. How can incentives be managed so as to promote conditions and dynamics propitious to peaceful conflict resolution? Numerous alternative or complementary approaches for constructive influence are available for external actors, including donors, to try to mitigate conflict and reinforce peace building. These include the following examples:

*Long-term, coherent and constructive engagement.* This allows donors and their governments to engage in policy dialogue and use a wide range of other incentives for peace. Long-term engagement can be misinterpreted and carries risks with it. For example, continued engagement could appear to be tacit endorsement of unacceptable practices, even where it is intended as an attempt to mitigate or stop them. In some circumstances actions can appear to be impotent at least in the short run. Dilemmas arise on how, or in extreme cases whether, to engage with governments that set aside the rule of law, commit gross and systematic human rights abuses, target civilian populations and foster or wage war in neighbouring countries. This includes situations where legitimately elected governments are overthrown or governments maintain armed intervention in other states, unrelated to a clear case of self-defence as recognised by international law. But such risks are worth running in some cases. External actors must be clear, including with their own publics, about their assessments, concerns, and goals.

*Negotiated benchmarks.* Donors should seek to negotiate political benchmarks for improved governance in the context of their long-term commitment.

*Transparent and co-ordinated conditionalities.* Where specific conditionality on aid flows is still to be applied, as part of a broader framework of incentives for peace, a more explicit policy should be articulated. It should be explained as clearly and transparently as possible to minimise misunderstanding. Broader experience with conditionality demonstrates that it rarely works unless linked to domestically-owned reforms. In conflict-related situations specifically, experience suggests that conditionality for aid needs to be:

- Based on clear analysis and specified conditions.
- Co-ordinated among donors to prevent inconsistencies.
- Used as a last resort, rather than regularly employed.
- Based on ethics of responsibility, with provisions for transparency and accountability.
- Monitored and evaluated clearly, and preferably jointly.
- Part of a broader strategy of using incentives for peace.
- Anchored in civil society, with a strong domestic base for the policy goal sought.
- Exercised in compliance with humanitarian principles.
- Consistently applied across cases.

*Sanctions.* Controversies over sanctions as an instrument to influence the course or prevention of conflict are based to some degree on their potentially adverse impact on social and economic welfare of people in the country in question. "Smart" sanctions that are clearly targeted against those individuals responsible for atrocities might minimise adverse social and humanitarian impact. These include, for example, freezing individual bank accounts, blocking entry visas, and other such personalised, tailor-made sanctions.

developing country partners, particularly since this type of development co-operation work does not always fit a general framework for “results-based management”.

- Extend this concern for the impact of aid on conflict to the design of policies aimed at macroeconomic stability and structural adjustment in order to encourage growth in incomes, employment and public services.
- Target assistance to help strengthen democratic systems to achieve the structural stability that allows for the non-violent resolution of conflicts, taking account of the distribution and the transfer of power, as well as the protection and inclusion of minorities and marginalised groups.
- Recognise how important it is for countries to form political parties and support this step as part of a democratic process and as a way to promote the transformation from violent conflict to peace. The perspective of democratic, inclusive governance is an important aspect of this dynamic process.
- Maximise opportunities to help strengthen state capacity to respond appropriately to conflict, including support to a range of state functions and activities as well as partnerships with CSOs.
- Promote multiculturalism and pluralism by reinforcing activities that have a high degree of cross-ethnic group involvement and support partners working towards this goal.

Setting up monitoring and evaluation systems presents a challenge in these complex new areas of development

co-operation. Sharing results, establishing benchmarks and evaluating lessons are vital to improving approaches and co-ordination.

### **Ensuring peace through security and development**

Security, including “human security”, is a critical foundation for sustainable development.<sup>11</sup> This implies protection from systematic human rights abuses, physical threats, violence and extreme economic, social and environmental risks, and territorial and sovereignty threats. It is a primary pre-condition and goal for poor people to make lasting improvements in their lives (see Box V-3). The DAC *Guidelines on Poverty Reduction*, and consultations with the poor in all regions, have underlined how critical basic security is for them.<sup>12</sup>

Poverty and insecurity systematically reinforce each other. The requirement for security in this context has to go beyond the classic requisites of defence from military attack and extend to the well-being and the protection of persons and property. Actors in international, national and local government and civil society have thus come together around a changing concept of security aimed at freeing people from pervasive threats to their lives, safety or rights. This is especially critical for the poor.

Helping developing countries build legitimate and accountable systems of security – in defence, police, judicial and penal systems – has become a high priority, including for external partners, even though there are risks involved. Security system reform should be treated as a

11. The DAC statement on conflict prevention addresses security reform processes, one key aspect of providing human security, but does not discuss the security, sustainable development and human security linkages at any length.

12. See also The World Bank Report, *Voices of the Poor*, Oxford University Press, 2000.

**Box V-3.**  
**Security**

“Security” is increasingly viewed as an all-encompassing condition in which people and communities live in freedom, peace and safety; participate fully in the process of governance; enjoy the protection of fundamental rights; have access to resources and the basic necessities of life; and inhabit an environment which is not detrimental to their health and well-being. Underpinning this broader understanding is a recognition that the security of people and the security of states are mutually reinforcing. It follows that a wide range of state institutions and other entities may be responsible for ensuring some aspect of security. This understanding of security is consistent with the broad notion of human security promoted by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and widely used by development actors.

The “security sector” includes security forces and the relevant civilian bodies and processes needed to manage them and encompasses: state institutions which have a formal mandate to ensure the safety of the state and its citizens against acts of violence and coercion (e.g. the armed forces, the police and paramilitary forces, the intelligence services and similar bodies); judicial and penal institutions; and the elected and duly appointed civil authorities responsible for control and oversight (e.g. Parliament, the Executive, the Defence Ministry, etc.).

“Security sector reform” is the transformation of the “security system” which includes all the actors, their roles, responsibilities and actions, so that it is managed and operated in a manner that is more consistent with democratic norms and sound principles of good governance, and thus contributes to a well-functioning security framework.

Security is an essential component of good governance and initiatives to ensure peace and sustainable development. Recognition is growing that what happens in this sector has a significant impact on a country’s overall prospects for development as well as the effectiveness of international assistance provided in other sectors. Many in the international community and conflict-prone countries increasingly recognise that direct measures to help improve governance and accountability in their security sectors are a high priority for conflict prevention and development. These measures are also a focus for international co-operation among some donors and other parts of their governments, with a recognition that this work needs to be undertaken in a spirit of partnership and sustained joint effort. Actors involved from both partner and donor countries range from the military and the police, and the judicial and penal systems to government, ministries of foreign affairs, trade and commerce, as well as from the media to civil society organisations and the business community.

normal part of work on good governance. Though this is a vital area for donors, not all development agencies are equally ready or have the mandate to engage in activities directly related to improving security systems. Development agencies are working together to define agreed uses of ODA in such activities.

Donor assistance can help improve the capacity of relevant civilian bodies in government to manage the security forces more effectively. Within developing countries, there is growing recognition of the need to use the same principles of good public sector management in the security sector as apply to all public sectors. These principles

include transparency, accountability and informed debate and participation and are key to getting military expenditure and other security-related spending planned and implemented effectively. Reinforcing legislative capacity to conduct effective oversight of security forces, in particular the role of relevant parliamentary committees, is one such area for assistance.

### **Supporting regional co-operation**

Even with the predominance of intra-state conflicts, there are cross-border and regional linkages in conflicts. Strategies for prevention, peacekeeping, and recovery can be regionally designed. Many national conflicts can only be dealt with effectively in their regional contexts, taking account of cross-border influences. Regional co-operation and integration – through economic, environmental and other measures – can contribute to peace building, particularly around scarce common goods such as water. Donor support should focus on strengthening the capacity of relevant regional institutions.

Co-ordinated foreign policy actions are needed to support regional and sub-regional co-operation in combating drug trafficking, organised crime and terrorism (see Box V-4), and controlling illicit or irregular arms trade, as well as the flow of arms generally. Such co-ordinated action can also underpin peace negotiations and regional peacekeeping capabilities, help build regional networks for the protection of human rights, refugees, peace initiatives, and democratisation, and establish security reform processes. The business sector, including foreign investors, also has a role to play in regional co-operation.

While pursuing “regional solutions for regional problems” is a good principle,

there are situations – like those in East Timor, Kosovo, Sierra Leone, the Great Lakes and central African regions and others – which call for a response by the whole international community to support regional actors.

### **Peace, justice and reconciliation**

The international community, including donor agencies, can assist peace building before violence erupts, support peace processes and opportunities, help societies grapple with the complexities of justice and reconciliation in the wake of violent conflict, and encourage fundamental principles of democracy. There are no easy formulas, but there are ways to support national solutions that respect basic international legal norms.

Once the peace is deemed won, donors tend to focus their support more on the state, away from civil society. This happens even when donors have channelled support exclusively to civil society during the conflict. But donor support to civil society peace-building initiatives should begin early and continue. Further efforts are required to include marginalised or weakened segments of society in peace processes and to recognise women’s abilities to manage survival and negotiate and implement peace at the local and informal levels. More can be done to involve women in national level peace negotiations (see Box V-5).

A cardinal rule in post-conflict justice and reconciliation is to promote open and continuing communication as a key potential antidote to lingering grievances and recriminations, and to avoid relapses into violent conflict. Support for non-partisan and peace-building media is important here.

Box V-4.

**Development co-operation and terrorism**

**Terrorism with global impact: implications for development**

The tragic terrorist attack of 11 September 2001 has inflicted a severe shock on the global economy, sharply reducing confidence and creating considerable uncertainty about the outlook for global economic activity. The global economic downturn of the second half of 2001, aggravated by the aftermath of the attack, has worsened terms-of-trade and growth prospects for developing countries, with adverse implications for poverty reduction world-wide. World economic growth will be reduced to levels not seen since the early 1980s.\* For countries that are important tourist destinations, heightened safety concerns about air travel are seriously affecting foreign exchange earnings, incomes and employment. The prospects for continued growth of export earnings are being doubly impaired – both trade volumes and commodity prices are declining, in particular for low-income countries dependent on raw material exports and thus most vulnerable to terms-of-trade deterioration.

These global economic developments in turn have severe consequences for development that go well beyond the immediate impact of economic devastation and human suffering in Afghanistan and dislocations in surrounding countries. These consequences include setbacks to the achievement of country Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs), and the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Debt servicing will be harder and debt relief needs may increase for several Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPCs) unless current world trends can be reversed soon. Emerging market and middle-income countries are also being hit by a drop in foreign direct investment, in response to the slowdown in growth in world trade and, since 11 September, increased concerns about security.

In addition to these losses to the world economy and poverty reduction, estimates of additional aid requirements for reconstruction in Afghanistan and for complementary support for surrounding countries run over two billion dollars per year. There is much dispute among analysts about how terrorism in its various manifestations can best be defined. Recent events have brought to the fore concerns about the possible spread of terrorism that aims at international targets and that uses modern technology, possibly including nuclear or biological weapons. These severe consequences of the Afghanistan crisis and risks for the future make it more important than ever to move from a “culture of reaction” to a “culture of prevention”, using the full range of instruments available to OECD countries, including development co-operation. At a time when the donor community is considering the amount of additional aid required to meet the MDGs, it is all the more important that development assistance to help prevent terrorism and respond to its consequences be additional, and not diverted from other countries and regions fighting poverty.

**Sources of terrorism in the context of development**

Terrorism, like other forms of violent conflict, has a variety of sources. Following is a set of plausible factors suggested in recent analyses, which in combination can give rise to or support terrorism: a sense of marginalisation; isolation and exclusion; lack of representative institutions capable of providing for political expression, maintaining public security and resolving disputes peacefully; widespread corruption; widespread unemployment or underemployed of young males; perceptions of extreme inequality, both at domestic and

\* Overall, OECD-wide growth is now estimated in the last two quarters of 2001 to have been pushed into negative territory for the first time since 1982. (“General Assessment of the Macroeconomic Situation”, *OECD Economic Outlook*, Vol. 2001/2, No. 70, p. 1.)

## Box V-4.

**Development co-operation and terrorism (cont.)**

international levels; political instability; polarised identity politics; religious and ideological extremism; deep-seated grievance; long-term conflict; and availability of financing and weapons. Analysts are only beginning to understand the relative importance of these factors and how they interact.

Poverty *per se* is not a necessary condition for the support of terrorism. However, many of the factors above are linked to relative and absolute poverty. Action on such dimensions of poverty as lack of opportunity for education, livelihoods and voice can help diminish feelings of exclusion and isolation, and dampen religious and political extremism. When considering the implications for development co-operation in the medium and long-term, the link between coherent poverty reduction policies and the need to address destabilising social conditions, such as extreme political and social inequality, should be emphasised.

**Roles for development co-operation**

Violent conflict has become a major development challenge in the post-Cold War era, currently affecting over 30 countries and costing huge numbers of deaths and crippled lives. The DAC Statement and *Guidelines on Helping Prevent Violent Conflict* focus on the role of development co-operation in conflict prevention and peace building. Though they do not specifically address terrorism, they implicitly deal with it as a means of violent conflict and indirectly address some of its key domestic dimensions and spillover effects on neighbouring countries. Review by the DAC Network on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation on 27-28 November 2001 suggests that almost all the recommendations from the guidelines are relevant to terrorism as an important form of violent conflict – although there are other critical steps, such as law enforcement action against terrorist leaders, and financial and other support structures, that the guidelines do not cover.

Addressing terrorism and other forms of violent conflict in a development context requires a complex set of actions. As the guidelines indicate, aid agencies, bilateral and multilateral, need to consider how development co-operation can help prevent situations of violence and terrorism. One lesson that the Afghan crisis underscores further is that OECD Member country governments cannot afford to ignore even the most “difficult partnerships”, given that states that become isolated and excluded are more likely to support terrorism. *Helping to Prevent Violent Conflict*, as well as the *DAC Poverty Reduction Guidelines*, emphasise that co-operation with partner countries can help reduce the potential for violent conflict within societies. Both guidelines explore and define ways for promoting better governance and broad-based economic development, reducing poverty in all its dimensions, and building democratic institutions. Development co-operation agencies can also play a supporting role in their governments’ efforts to help curb sources of terrorist financing – e.g. money laundering, harmful tax practices, and excessive bank secrecy. They can also work with Diasporas to engage them in finding peaceful solutions for grievances rather than supporting conflict. More generally, there is an urgent need and an opportunity to strengthen international co-operation for development by integrating conflict prevention into policy formulation and implementation.

This increases the importance of making globalisation an “inclusive” process, spreading and deepening its contribution to addressing the causes of terrorism. To do this, donor agencies need to work with other branches of government so that their actions are properly framed in coherent policies. Development co-operation agencies have an important role in being the “voice of development” and representing longer-term development interests within governments. This implies commitment at policy and operational levels to working hand in

Box V-4.

**Development co-operation and terrorism (cont.)**

hand with the trade, defence and foreign policy communities, in relationships often involving difficult but creative tensions. Donor agencies, and donor governments overall, also need to be realistic about what their actions can achieve, recognising the limited role that aid can play, particularly in the short term, in reversing negative factors.

While *Helping Prevent Violent Conflict* provides a good source of guidance relevant to preventing terrorism, it is planned to revisit as well as extend it, along with the ongoing work on “difficult partnerships”, employing a terrorism-prevention “lens”. Using this lens could help deepen understanding about how to: *i)* address the roots of support for terrorism; and *ii)* constructively engage with fragile states whose collapse can favour the establishment of havens for terrorists.

To avoid the recurrence of conflict, long and short-term peace rely in part on:

- Demobilisation and disarmament of ex-combatants.
- Reintegration of all people uprooted and affected by conflict – women, men, youth, children and ex-combatants.

In supporting peace processes, donors, the international community and developing countries need to realise that while the challenge of reintegration depends on jobs and growth, it can only be fully achieved with reconciliation.

**Partnerships for peace**

Peace building hinges on trust and co-operation among groups and is reinforced by wider and deeper partnerships. A legitimate state authority and a healthy civil society ultimately need each other. However, a crisis of legitimacy exists in many states, not only in “failed” or “failing” ones. Signs of this can be seen when the state takes on an oppressive and predatory role in relation to society,

fosters internal conflict and abrogates its core functions as “protector”. Donor engagement with oppressive regimes can be problematic. At the same time complete withdrawal of donor involvement may have negative impacts and be interpreted as a signal of external indifference. Normal partnerships are difficult or impossible to maintain in some conflict situations. But experience and realism now suggest that external partners, including multilateral institutions, can play key roles in encouraging partnership between government and civil society organisations, including with those who are excluded or in opposition. The extent and types of partnership must be gauged by the country situation.

For donors to enter into effective partnerships for conflict prevention with developing countries, a pivotal requirement is greater coherence and co-ordination among donors themselves. The recent pursuit of better co-ordinated partnership among development co-operation actors offers an important opportunity to address conflict issues and co-ordinate

## Box V-5.

**Understanding gender issues in violent conflict and peace building**

War itself is a “gendered” activity. But analysis and policy relating to violent conflict and peace processes are often gender blind. To try to prevent violent conflict and mitigate the social, political and economic consequences of war, the strengths and needs of men and women should be addressed. This does not always occur because it is assumed that gender differences are not relevant at this level.

Some governing systems use coercion to engineer consent and acquiescence in society. To create more participatory frameworks of governance, such methods may need to give room to alternative models that lead to voluntary conflict resolution and alternative discourses on issues of justice and reconciliation. Women’s initiatives for peace and conflict resolution are collective and collaborative in nature, often focused on the principle of community action, across ethnic, linguistic, religious and other divides. This is in part because their principal objectives are to fulfil the practical needs of households and the community, and to maintain security and livelihoods. Women’s individual and collective experiences of building co-existence within and among communities during conflict, coupled with social and gender analyses, should provide donors and developing country governments with a useful resource base, especially for the post-conflict and reconciliation phases.

In heavily militarised or insecure societies, the general level of violence, including domestic and gender-based violence, increases and becomes a major source of insecurity for women, men and children all over the world. Children, men and women undergo sexual and physical violence and abuse, as well as psychological and emotional trauma as a consequence of long periods of living in insecure conditions, witnessing extreme forms of violence and being victims of violence themselves. Human rights violations include rape, harassment, beating and other forms of torture, arbitrary arrest and detainment, and various forms of sexual servitude.

Violence, especially sexual, can undermine one’s role and position in the household and the community, and undermine confidence. In conflict situations people experience increased levels of gender-based violence in their daily lives. In former Yugoslavia, many thousands of men and boys were rounded up, murdered and imprisoned just because they were men. Thus, special programmes should be designed to raise awareness and sensitivity to these issues and to deal with all aspects of violence. These should focus on the causes of violent acts and the psychological traumas leading men (and women) and groups in power to become more violent. Special ways of dealing with victims of violence and abuse as a consequence of conflict need to be supported and examples include the *ad hoc* Tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda as well as the statute of the International Criminal Court. Donors should support building databases and gender-specific statistical material.

Focusing on women solely as victims of violent conflict can obscure their roles as potential peacemakers in reconstruction and rebuilding processes. Around the globe, women and their organisations have initiated dialogue and reconciliation in communities and villages. Their coping experiences during war provide them with specific perspectives and insights that should not be lost. Indeed, their voices and viewpoints regarding peace and security issues are essential to the peace and policymaking processes at all levels.

Donors are currently redefining their policies for conflict reduction strategies to include the relevant gender perspectives and identify requirements for specific attention to women or men. As reflected in the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325, reinforcing security and peace requires integrating a gender perspective at all levels of conflict prevention, rehabilitation, peace negotiations and operations.



more effectively (*e.g.* Comprehensive Development Frameworks, country-produced poverty reduction strategies and the UN Development Assistance Frameworks).

It has become clear that a constructive relationship between humanitarian assistance and development co-operation entities requires shared objectives, common approaches to planning processes, and co-ordination mechanisms. In harmonising these efforts, donor and humanitarian assistance agencies entrusted with these responsibilities cannot escape the need to work together better through quite long transition periods.

#### **Working with business**

Another widening space for stronger partnerships is with business – local, national and international – to help maximise its positive economic and social contributions and to ensure against feeding into the negative dynamics of conflict. At times this involves dialogue between external partner governments and firms that are taking actions that worsen violent conflict.

Virtually all developing countries are now convinced they need the vitality, know-how and efficiency of a vigorous private sector to generate strong enough economic growth for sustainable development. Fostering private sector-led growth in jobs and incomes within a rights and

rules-based approach is a basic long-term component of conflict prevention.

A widening community of business actors internationally is already moving to adopt new approaches to corporate social responsibility, and pursuing a “triple bottom line” of profitability, social responsibility and good environmental practices. Enlightened economic self-interest of firms can lead them to engage as corporate citizens working to help solve local problems, including the threats of violent conflict. Donors should support these trends by taking steps such as raising awareness of conflict prevention issues among national and international business communities.

#### **Countering negative economic forces**

However, external partners – public and private – need to help combat illicit trafficking, rent-seeking and corrupt resource deals that fuel and thrive on conflict. This can be done through G8 and UN embargoes such as those on “conflict diamonds”<sup>13</sup> and be supported by other international instruments.<sup>14</sup> Donors must take account of the political economy of violent conflict in which powerful groups and networks, using violent and non-violent means, develop a vested interest in their perpetuation, as well as the corrupt and ethnically-biased economic practices that can help start them.

13. Prospects of serious action on these issues by the international community have been heightened by UN Security Council action against embargo-breaking trafficking in diamonds and subsequent measures undertaken by the main actors in the international diamond trade to stifle the traffic in conflict diamonds.

14. Including, *inter alia*, the *Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Officials in International Business Transactions*; *OECD Principles of Corporate Governance*; *OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises*; and the *DAC Recommendations on Anti-Corruption Proposals for Aid-Funded Procurement*.



## Glossary of Key Terms and Concepts

(Cross-references are given in CAPITALS)

**AID:** The words “aid” and “assistance” in this publication refer only to flows which qualify as OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE (ODA) or OFFICIAL AID (OA).

**AMORTIZATION:** Repayments of principal on a loan. Does not include interest payments.

**ASSOCIATED FINANCING:** The combination of Official Development Assistance, whether grants or loans, with any other funding to form finance packages. Associated Financing packages are subject to the same criteria of concessionality, developmental relevance and recipient country eligibility as TIED AID CREDITS.

**BILATERAL:** See TOTAL RECEIPTS.

**CLAIM:** The entitlement of a creditor to repayment of a LOAN; by extension, the loan itself or the outstanding amount thereof.

**COMMITMENT:** A firm obligation, expressed in writing and backed by the necessary funds, undertaken by an official donor to provide specified assistance to a recipient country or a multilateral organisation. Bilateral commitments are recorded in the full amount of expected transfer, irrespective of the time required for the completion of disbursements. Commitments to multilateral organisations are reported as the sum of *i*) any disbursements in the year in question which have not previously been notified as commitments and *ii*) expected disbursements in the following year.

**CONCESSIONALITY LEVEL:** A measure of the “softness” of a credit reflecting the benefit to the borrower compared to a loan at market rate (*cf.* GRANT ELEMENT). Technically, it is calculated as the difference between the nominal value of a TIED AID CREDIT and the present value of the debt service as of the date of disbursement, calculated at a discount rate applicable to the currency of the transaction and expressed as a percentage of the nominal value.

**DAC (DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE COMMITTEE):** The Committee of the OECD which deals with development co-operation matters. A description of its aims and a list of its Members are given at the front of this volume.

**DAC LIST:** See RECIPIENT COUNTRIES AND TERRITORIES.

**DEBT REORGANISATION (also: RESTRUCTURING):** Any action officially agreed between creditor and debtor that alters the terms previously established for repayment. This may include **forgiveness** (extinction of the loan), or **rescheduling** which can be implemented either by revising the repayment schedule or extending a new **refinancing** loan. See also “Notes on Definitions and Measurement” below.

**DISBURSEMENT:** The release of funds to, or the purchase of goods or services for a recipient; by extension, the amount thus spent. Disbursements record the actual international transfer of financial resources, or of goods or services valued at the cost to the donor. In the case of

activities carried out in donor countries, such as training, administration or public awareness programmes, disbursement is taken to have occurred when the funds have been transferred to the service provider or the recipient. They may be recorded **gross** (the total amount disbursed over a given accounting period) or **net** (the gross amount less any repayments of loan principal or recoveries on grants received during the same period).

**EXPORT CREDITS:** Loans for the purpose of trade and which are not represented by a negotiable instrument. They may be extended by the official or the private sector. If extended by the private sector, they may be supported by official guarantees.

**GRACE PERIOD:** See GRANT ELEMENT.

**GRANTS:** Transfers made in cash, goods or services for which no repayment is required.

**GRANT ELEMENT:** Reflects the **financial terms** of a commitment: interest rate, MATURITY and grace period (interval to first repayment of capital). It measures the concessionality of a loan, expressed as the percentage by which the present value of the expected stream of repayments falls short of the repayments that would have been generated at a given reference rate of interest. The reference rate is 10% in DAC statistics. This rate was selected as a proxy for the marginal efficiency of domestic investment, *i.e.* an indication of the opportunity cost to the donor of making the funds available. Thus, the grant element is nil for a loan carrying an interest rate of 10%; it is 100% for a grant; and it lies between these two limits for a loan at less than 10% interest. If the face value of a loan is multiplied by its grant element, the result is referred to

as the **grant equivalent** of that loan (*cf.* CONCESSIONALITY LEVEL). (Note: the grant element concept is not applied to the non-concessional (“hard window”) operations of the multilateral development banks.)

**GRANT-LIKE FLOW:** A transaction in which the donor country retains formal title to repayment but has expressed its intention in the commitment to hold the proceeds of repayment in the borrowing country for the benefit of that country.

**LOANS:** Transfers for which repayment is required. Only loans with maturities of over one year are included in DAC statistics. Data on net loans include deductions for repayments of principal (but not payment of interest) on earlier loans. This means that when a loan has been fully repaid, its effect on total net flows over the life of the loan is zero.

**LONG-TERM:** Used of loans with an original or extended maturity of more than one year.

**MATURITY:** The date at which the final repayment of a loan is due; by extension, the duration of the loan.

**MULTILATERAL AGENCIES:** In DAC statistics, those international institutions with governmental membership which conduct all or a significant part of their activities in favour of development and aid recipient countries. They include multilateral development banks (*e.g.* World Bank, regional development banks), United Nations agencies, and regional groupings (*e.g.* certain European Community and Arab agencies). A contribution by a DAC Member to such an agency is deemed to be multilateral if it is pooled with other contributions and disbursed at the discretion of the agency. Unless otherwise indicated,

capital subscriptions to multilateral development banks are presented on a **deposit** basis, *i.e.* in the amount and as at the date of lodgement of the relevant letter of credit or other negotiable instrument. Limited data are available on an encashment basis, *i.e.* at the date and in the amount of each drawing made by the agency on letters or other instruments.

**NET FLOW:** The total amount disbursed over a given accounting period, less repayments of loan principal during the same period, no account being taken of interest.

**NET TRANSFER:** In DAC statistics, net flow minus payments of interest.

**OFFICIAL AID:** Flows which meet the conditions of eligibility for inclusion in OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE, except that the recipients are on Part II of the DAC List of Aid Recipients (see RECIPIENT COUNTRIES AND TERRITORIES).

**OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE:** Grants or loans to countries and territories on Part I of the DAC List of Aid Recipients (developing countries) which are:

- Undertaken by the official sector.
- With promotion of economic development and welfare as the main objective.
- At concessional financial terms (if a loan, having a GRANT ELEMENT of at least 25%).

In addition to financial flows, TECHNICAL CO-OPERATION is included in aid. Grants, loans and credits for military purposes are excluded. For the treatment of the forgiveness of loans originally extended for military purposes, see "Notes on Definitions and Measurement" below.

**OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT FINANCE (ODF):** Used in measuring the inflow of resources to recipient countries: includes *a)* bilateral ODA, *b)* grants and concessional and non-concessional development lending by multilateral financial institutions, and *c)* those Other Official Flows which are considered developmental (including refinancing loans) but which have too low a GRANT ELEMENT to qualify as ODA.

**OFFSHORE BANKING CENTRES:** Countries or territories whose financial institutions deal primarily with non-residents.

**OTHER OFFICIAL FLOWS (OOF):** Transactions by the official sector with countries on the List of Aid Recipients which do not meet the conditions for eligibility as Official Development Assistance or Official Aid, either because they are not primarily aimed at development, or because they have a grant element of less than 25%.

**PARTIALLY UNTIED AID:** Official Development Assistance (or Official Aid) for which the associated goods and services must be procured in the donor country or among a restricted group of other countries, which must however include substantially all recipient countries. Partially untied aid is subject to the same disciplines as TIED AID CREDITS and ASSOCIATED FINANCING.

**PRIVATE FLOWS:** Consist of flows at market terms financed out of private sector resources (*i.e.* changes in holdings of private long-term assets held by residents of the reporting country) and private grants (*i.e.* grants by **non-governmental organisations**, net of subsidies received from the official sector). In presentations focusing on the receipts of recipient

countries, flows at market terms are shown as follows:

- **Direct investment:** Investment made to acquire or add to a lasting interest in an enterprise in a country on the DAC List of Aid Recipients (see RECIPIENT COUNTRIES AND TERRITORIES). “Lasting interest” implies a long-term relationship where the direct investor has a significant influence on the management of the enterprise, reflected by ownership of at least 10% of the shares, or equivalent voting power or other means of control. In practice it is recorded as the change in the net worth of a subsidiary in a recipient country to the parent company, as shown in the books of the latter.

- **International bank lending:** Net lending to countries on the List of Aid Recipients by commercial banks in the Bank of International Settlements reporting area, *i.e.* most OECD countries and most offshore financial centres (Bahamas, Bahrain, Cayman Islands, Hong Kong, Netherlands Antilles and Singapore), net of lending to banks in the same offshore financial centres. Loans from central monetary authorities are excluded. Guaranteed bank loans and bonds are included under OTHER PRIVATE or BOND LENDING (see below) in these presentations.

- **Bond lending:** Net completed international bonds issued by countries on the DAC List of Aid Recipients.

- **Other private:** Mainly reported holdings of equities issued by firms in aid recipient countries.

In data presentations which focus on the outflow of funds from donors, private flows other than direct investment are restricted to credits with a maturity of greater than one year and are usually divided into:

- **Private export credits:** See EXPORT CREDITS.

- **Securities of multilateral agencies:** This covers the transactions of the private non-bank and bank sector in bonds, debentures, etc., issued by multilateral institutions.

- **Bilateral portfolio investment and other:** Includes bank lending and the purchase of shares, bonds and real estate.

**RECIPIENT COUNTRIES AND TERRITORIES:** The DAC List of Aid Recipients used to compile the statistics in this volume is shown separately at the end of this publication. Some details about recent changes in the List are given in the “Notes on Definitions and Measurement” below. From 1 January 2000, Part I of the List is presented in the following categories (the word “countries” includes territories):

- **LLDCs:** Least Developed Countries. Group established by the United Nations. To be classified as an LLDC, countries must fall below thresholds established for income, economic diversification and social development. The DAC List is updated immediately to reflect any change in the LLDC group.

- **Other LICs:** Other Low-Income Countries. Includes all non-LLDC countries with per capita GNP \$760 or less in 1998 (World Bank Atlas basis).

- **LMICs:** Lower Middle-Income Countries, *i.e.* with GNP per capita (Atlas basis) between \$761 and \$3 030 in 1998. LLDCs which are also LMICs are only shown as LLDCs – not as LMICs.

- **UMICs:** Upper Middle-Income Countries, *i.e.* with GNP per capita (Atlas basis) between \$3 031 and \$9 360 in 1998.

• **HICs:** High-Income Countries, *i.e.* with GNP per capita (Atlas basis) more than \$9 360 in 1998.

Part II of the List comprises "Countries in Transition". These comprise *i*) more advanced Central and Eastern European Countries and New Independent States of the former Soviet Union; and *ii*) more advanced developing countries. See also OFFICIAL AID.

**SHORT-TERM:** Used of loans with a maturity of one year or less.

**TECHNICAL CO-OPERATION:** Includes both *a*) grants to nationals of aid recipient countries receiving education or training at home or abroad, and *b*) payments to consultants, advisers and similar personnel as well as teachers and administrators serving in recipient countries (including the cost of associated equipment). Assistance of this kind provided specifically to facilitate the implementation of a capital project is included indistinguishably among bilateral project and programme expenditures, and is omitted from technical co-operation in statistics of aggregate flows.

**TIED AID CREDITS:** Official or officially supported LOANS, credits or ASSOCIATED FINANCING packages where procurement of the goods or services involved is limited to the donor country or to a group of countries which does not include substantially all aid recipient countries. Tied aid credits are subject to certain disciplines concerning their concessionality levels, the countries to which they may be directed, and their developmental relevance so as to avoid using aid funds on projects that would be commercially viable with market finance, and to ensure that recipient countries receive good value. Details are given in the Development Co-operation Reports for 1987 (pp. 177-181) and 1992 (pp. 10-11).

**TOTAL RECEIPTS:** The inflow of resources to aid recipient countries (see Table 1 of the Statistical Annex) includes, in addition to ODF, official and private EXPORT CREDITS, and long and short-term private transactions (see PRIVATE FLOWS). Total receipts are measured net of amortization payments and repatriation of capital by private investors. **Bilateral** flows are provided directly by a donor country to an aid recipient country. **Multilateral** flows are channelled *via* an international organisation active in development (*e.g.* World Bank, UNDP). In tables showing total receipts of recipient countries, the outflows of multilateral agencies to those countries is shown, not the contributions which the agencies received from donors.

**UNDISBURSED:** Describes amounts committed but not yet spent. See also COMMITMENT, DISBURSEMENT.

**UNTIED AID:** Official Development Assistance for which the associated goods and services may be fully and freely procured in substantially all countries.

**VOLUME (real terms):** The flow data in this publication are expressed in US dollars. To give a truer idea of the volume of flows over time, some data are presented in constant prices and exchange rates, with a reference year specified. This means that adjustment has been made to cover both inflation in the donors' currency between the year in question and the reference year, and changes in the exchange rate between that currency and the United States dollar over the same period. A table of combined conversion factors (deflators) is provided in the Statistical Annex (Table 36) which allows any figure in the Report in current United States dollars to be converted to dollars of the reference year ("constant prices").

## Notes on Definitions and Measurement

The coverage of the data presented in this Report has changed in recent years. The main points are:

### Changes in the ODA concept and the coverage of GNP/GNI

While the definition of Official Development Assistance has not changed for over 25 years, some changes in interpretation have tended to broaden the scope of the concept. The main ones are the recording of administrative costs as ODA (from 1979), the imputation as ODA of the share of subsidies to educational systems representing the cost of educating students from aid recipient countries (first specifically identified in 1984), and the inclusion of assistance provided by donor countries in the first year after the arrival of a refugee from an aid recipient country (eligible to be reported from the early 1980s but widely used only since 1991).

Precise quantification of the effects of these changes is difficult because changes in data collection methodology and coverage are often not directly apparent from Members' statistical returns. The amounts involved can, however, be substantial. For example, reporting by Canada in 1993 included for the first time a figure for in-Canada refugee support. The amount involved (\$184m.) represented almost 8% of total Canadian ODA. Aid flows reported by Australia in the late 1980s, it has been estimated, were some 12% higher than had they

been calculated according to the rules and procedures applying fifteen years earlier.\*

The coverage of the national income has also been expanding through the inclusion of new areas of economic activity and the improvement of collection methods. In particular, the new System of National Accounts (SNA) co-sponsored by the OECD and other major international organisations broadens the coverage of GNP, now renamed GNI – Gross National Income. This tends to depress donors' ODA/GNI ratios. Norway's and Denmark's ODA/GNI ratios declined by 6 to 8% as a result of moving to the new SNA in the mid-1990s. Finland and Australia later showed smaller falls of 2 to 4%. All DAC Members are now using the new SNA.

### Recipient country coverage

Since 1990, the following entities have been added to the list of ODA recipients at the dates shown: the Black Communities of South Africa (1991 – now simply South Africa); Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan (1992); Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan (1993); Palestinian Administered Areas (1994); Moldova (1997). Eritrea, formerly part of Ethiopia, has been treated as a separate country from 1993. The former United States Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands has been progressively replaced by its independent successor States, viz. Federated States of Micronesia and Marshall Islands (1992);

\* S. Scott, "Some Aspects of the 1988/89 Aid Budget", in *Quarterly Aid Round-up*, No. 6, AIDAB, Canberra, 1989, pp. 11-18.



Northern Marianas and Palau Islands (1994).

Over the same period, the following countries and territories have been removed from the ODA recipient list: Portugal (1991); French Guyana, Guadeloupe, Martinique, Réunion and St Pierre and Miquelon (1992), Greece (1994).

From 1993, several CEEC/NIS countries in transition have been included on Part II of a new List of Aid Recipients (the List is given at the end of this volume). Aid to countries on Part II of the List is recorded as "Official Aid", not as ODA. To avoid overlap, Part II of the new List does not include those CEEC/NIS countries which have been classified as ODA recipients.

From 1996, the following High-Income Countries were transferred from Part I to Part II of the List: Bahamas, Brunei, Kuwait, Qatar, Singapore and United Arab Emirates. From 1997, seven further High-Income Countries were transferred to Part II: Bermuda, Cayman Islands, Chinese Taipei, Cyprus, Falkland Islands, Hong Kong (China), and Israel. From 1 January 2000, Aruba, the British Virgin Islands, French Polynesia, Gibraltar, Korea, Libya, Macao, Netherlands Antilles, New Caledonia and the Northern Marianas progressed to Part II. The List will be modified in 2001 to reflect the fact that Senegal transferred to the group of LLDCs, and will be reviewed again in 2002.

Data on total aid to Part I countries (ODA) and total aid to Part II countries (OA) follow the recipient list for the year in question. However, when a country is added to or removed from an income group in Part I, totals for the groups affected are adjusted retroactively to

maximise comparability over time with reference to the current list.

### Donor country coverage

Spain and Portugal joined the DAC in 1991, Luxembourg joined in 1992 and Greece joined in 1999. Their assistance is now counted within the DAC total. ODA flows from these countries before they joined the DAC have been added to earlier years' data where available. The accession of new Members has added to total DAC ODA, but has usually reduced the overall ODA/GNP ratio, since their programmes are often smaller in relation to GNP than those of the longer-established donors.

### Treatment of debt forgiveness

The treatment of the **forgiveness of loans not originally reported as ODA** varied in earlier years. Up to and including 1992, where forgiveness of non-ODA debt met the tests of ODA, it was reportable as ODA. From 1990 to 1992 inclusive it remained reportable as part of a country's ODA, but was excluded from the DAC total. From 1993, forgiveness of debt originally intended for **military** purposes has been reportable as "Other Official Flows", whereas forgiveness of other non-ODA loans (mainly **export credits**) recorded as ODA is included both in country data and in total DAC ODA in the same way as it was until 1989.

The effect of these decisions on ODA figures can be summarised as follows:

a) **Countries' ODA:** Forgiveness of all non-ODA debt reportable as ODA through 1992. From 1993, forgiveness of military debt may only be reported as OOF.

b) **DAC total ODA:** Equals the total of countries' reported ODA, except for the exclusion of the following:

- 1990: \$1.2 billion of forgiven United States military debt and \$334 million of various countries' forgiven claims in respect of export credit and structural adjustment lending.
- 1991: \$1.9 billion of forgiven United States military debt and \$28 million of various countries' forgiven export credit debt.
- 1992: \$894 million of forgiven United States military debt and \$975 million of

various countries' forgiven export credit debt.

The **forgiveness of outstanding loan principal originally reported as ODA** does not give rise to a new net disbursement of ODA. Statistically, the benefit is reflected in the fact that because the cancelled repayments will not take place, net ODA disbursements will not be reduced.

#### Reporting year

All data in this publication refer to calendar years, unless otherwise stated.

## DAC List of Aid Recipients – As at 1 January 2000

Part I: Developing Countries and Territories (Official Development Assistance)					Part II: Countries and Territories in Transition (Official Aid)		
LLDCs	Other LICs (per capita GNP < \$760 in 1998)	LMICs (per capita GNP \$761-\$3 030 in 1998)	UMICs (per capita GNP \$3031-\$9 360 in 1998)	HICs (per capita GNP > \$9 360 in 1998) <sup>1</sup>	CEECs/NIS	More Advanced Developing Countries and Territories	
Afghanistan	* Armenia	* Albania	Palestinian	Botswana	Malta <sup>1</sup>	* Belarus	● Aruba
Angola	* Azerbaijan	Algeria	Administered	Brazil	Slovenia <sup>1</sup>	* Bulgaria	● Bahamas
Bangladesh	Cameroon	Belize	Areas	Chile		* Czech	● Bermuda
Benin	China	Bolivia	Papua New	Cook Islands		Republic	● Brunei
Bhutan	Congo, Rep.	Bosnia and	Guinea	Croatia		* Estonia	● Cayman
Burkina Faso	Côte d'Ivoire	Herzegovina	Paraguay	Gabon		* Hungary	Islands
Burundi	● East Timor	Colombia	Peru	Grenada		* Latvia	Chinese Taipei
Cambodia	Ghana	Costa Rica	Philippines	Lebanon		* Lithuania	Cyprus
Cape Verde	Honduras	Cuba	South Africa	Malaysia		* Poland	● Falkland
Central African	India	Dominica	Sri Lanka	Mauritius		* Romania	Islands
Republic	Indonesia	Dominican	St Vincent and	● Mayotte		* Russia	● French
Chad	Kenya	Republic	Grenadines	Mexico		* Slovak	Polynesia
Comoros	Korea,	Ecuador	Suriname	Nauru		Republic	● Gibraltar
Congo, Dem. Rep.	Democratic	Egypt	Swaziland	Palau Islands		* Ukraine	● Hong Kong,
Djibouti	Republic	El Salvador	Syria	Panama			China
Equatorial Guinea	* Kyrgyz Rep.	Fiji	Thailand	● St Helena			Israel
Eritrea	* Moldova	* Georgia	● Tokelau	St Lucia			Korea
Ethiopia	Mongolia	Guatemala	Tonga	Trinidad and			Kuwait
Gambia	Nicaragua	Guyana	Tunisia	Tobago			Libya
Guinea	Nigeria	Iran	* Uzbekistan	Turkey			● Macao
Guinea-Bissau	Pakistan	Iraq	● Wallis and	Uruguay			● Netherlands
Haiti	Senegal <sup>2</sup>	Jamaica	Futuna	Venezuela			Antilles
Kiribati	* Tajikistan	Jordan	Yugoslavia,				● New
Laos	* Turkmenistan	Macedonia	Federal				Caledonia
Lesotho	Zimbabwe	(former	Republic				Northern
Liberia		Yugoslav					Marianas
Madagascar		Republic)					Qatar
Malawi		Marshall Islands					Singapore
Maldives		Micronesia,					United Arab
Mali		Federated					Emirates
Mauritania		States					● Virgin Islands
Mozambique		Morocco					(UK)
Myanmar		Namibia					
Nepal		Niue					
Niger							
Rwanda							
Samoa							
Sao Tome and							
Principe							
Sierra Leone							
Solomon Islands							
Somalia							
Sudan							
Tanzania							
Togo							
Tuvalu							
Uganda							
Vanuatu							
Yemen							
Zambia							

\* Central and Eastern European Countries and New Independent States of the former Soviet Union (CEECs/NIS).

● Territory.

1. These countries and territories will transfer to Part II on 1 January 2003 unless an exception is agreed.

2. Senegal became an LLDC in 2001.

**The Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC)s** are: Angola, Benin, Bolivia, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo (Rep.), Congo (Dem. Rep.), Côte d'Ivoire, Ethiopia, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Honduras, Kenya, Laos, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nicaragua, Niger, Rwanda, São Tomé and Príncipe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Viet Nam and Zambia.

**List of acronyms<sup>1</sup>**

<b>ACP</b>	AFRICAN, CARIBBEAN AND PACIFIC COUNTRIES
<b>ADR</b>	AMERICAN DEPOSITORY RECEIPT
<b>AERA</b>	ACCELERATED ECONOMIC RECOVERY IN ASIA
<b>AfDB</b>	AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK
<b>AfDF</b>	AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT FUND
<b>AsDB</b>	ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK
<b>AsDF</b>	ASIAN DEVELOPMENT FUND
<b>ASEAN</b>	ASSOCIATION OF SOUTH-EAST ASIAN NATIONS
<b>BIS</b>	BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS
<b>BHN</b>	BASIC HUMAN NEEDS
<b>BSS</b>	BASIC SOCIAL SERVICES
<b>CCA</b>	COMMON COUNTRY ASSESSMENT
<b>CDE</b>	CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT IN ENVIRONMENT
<b>CDF</b>	COMPREHENSIVE DEVELOPMENT FRAMEWORK
<b>CEC</b>	COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES
<b>CEDAW</b>	CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WOMEN
<b>CEECs</b>	CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES
<b>CFA<sup>2</sup></b>	AFRICAN FINANCIAL COMMUNITY
<b>CIS</b>	COMMONWEALTH OF INDEPENDENT STATES
<b>CMH</b>	COMMISSION ON MACROECONOMICS AND HEALTH (WHO)
<b>CPE</b>	COUNTRY PROGRAMME EVALUATION
<b>CPIA</b>	COUNTRY POLICY AND INSTITUTIONAL ASSESSMENT
<b>CRS</b>	CREDITOR REPORTING SYSTEM (of the DAC)
<b>CSO</b>	CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANISATION
<b>DAC</b>	DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE COMMITTEE
<b>DOI</b>	DIGITAL OPPORTUNITY INITIATIVE (REPORT)
<b>DOT Force</b>	DIGITAL OPPORTUNITIES TASK FORCE
<b>EBRD</b>	EUROPEAN BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT
<b>EC</b>	EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
<b>ECHO</b>	EUROPEAN COMMUNITY HUMANITARIAN OFFICE
<b>ECOSOC</b>	THE UNITED NATIONS ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL
<b>EDCPM</b>	EUROPEAN CENTRE FOR DEVELOPMENT POLICY MANAGEMENT
<b>EDF</b>	EUROPEAN DEVELOPMENT FUND
<b>EFA</b>	EDUCATION FOR ALL
<b>EU</b>	EUROPEAN UNION
<b>FDI</b>	FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT
<b>FfD</b>	FINANCING FOR DEVELOPMENT
<b>FSAP</b>	FINANCIAL SECTOR ASSESSMENT PROGRAMME (of the IMF/World Bank)
<b>GSP</b>	GENERALISED SYSTEM OF PREFERENCES
<b>GNI</b>	GROSS NATIONAL INCOME
<b>HICs</b>	HIGH-INCOME COUNTRIES
<b>HIPCs</b>	HEAVILY-INDEBTED POOR COUNTRIES (see DAC List of Aid Recipients in this annex)
<b>HPI</b>	HUMAN POVERTY INDEX

<b>IBRD</b>	INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT
<b>ICB</b>	INTERNATIONAL COMPETITIVE BIDDING
<b>ICT</b>	INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY
<b>IDA</b>	INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATION
<b>IDAI</b>	INTEGRATED DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITY INFORMATION
<b>IDB</b>	INTER-AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK
<b>IDGs</b>	INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT GOALS
<b>IECDF</b>	INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION DEVELOPMENT FUND
<b>IF</b>	INTEGRATED FRAMEWORK FOR TRADE-RELATED TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE FOR LEAST DEVELOPED COUNTRIES
<b>IFAD</b>	INTERNATIONAL FUND FOR AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT
<b>IFC</b>	INTERNATIONAL FINANCE CORPORATION
<b>ILO</b>	INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANISATION
<b>IMF</b>	INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND
<b>IMSG</b>	INFORMAL MULTILATERAL SECRETARIATS GROUP
<b>ITC</b>	INTERNATIONAL TRADE CENTRE
<b>JBIC</b>	JAPAN BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION
<b>JITAP</b>	JOINT INTEGRATED TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAMME
<b>KfW<sup>2</sup></b>	BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT (Germany)
<b>LDCs</b>	DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
<b>LICs</b>	LOW-INCOME COUNTRIES
<b>LLDCs</b>	LEAST DEVELOPED COUNTRIES
<b>LMICs</b>	LOWER MIDDLE-INCOME COUNTRIES
<b>MDBs</b>	MULTILATERAL DEVELOPMENT BANKS
<b>MDGs</b>	MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS
<b>NEPAD</b>	NEW PARTNERSHIP FOR AFRICA'S DEVELOPMENT
<b>NGO</b>	NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATION
<b>NIS</b>	NEW INDEPENDENT STATES (of the former Soviet Union)
<b>NSSDs</b>	NATIONAL STRATEGIES FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT
<b>NTBs</b>	NON-TARIFF BARRIERS
<b>ODA</b>	OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE
<b>ODF</b>	OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT FINANCE
<b>OECD</b>	ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT
<b>OLICs</b>	OTHER LOW-INCOME COUNTRIES
<b>OOF</b>	OTHER OFFICIAL FLOWS
<b>PDGG</b>	PARTICIPATORY DEVELOPMENT AND GOOD GOVERNANCE
<b>PRGF</b>	POVERTY REDUCTION AND GROWTH FACILITY
<b>PRSPs</b>	POVERTY REDUCTION STRATEGY PAPERS
<b>RBM</b>	RESULTS-BASED MANAGEMENT
<b>S-21</b>	21st CENTURY STRATEGY
<b>SAF</b>	STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT FACILITY
<b>SDR</b>	SPECIAL DRAWING RIGHT

<b>SNA</b>	SYSTEM OF NATIONAL ACCOUNTS
<b>SPA</b>	STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP WITH AFRICA (formerly Special Programme of Assistance for Africa)
<b>SPS</b>	SECTOR PROGRAMME SUPPORT
<b>SSA</b>	SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
<b>SWAps</b>	SECTOR-WIDE APPROACHES
<b>TC</b>	TECHNICAL CO-OPERATION
<b>TRIMs</b>	TRADE-RELATED INVESTMENT MEASURES
<b>TRIPs</b>	TRADE-RELATED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
<b>UMICs</b>	UPPER MIDDLE-INCOME COUNTRIES
<b>UN</b>	UNITED NATIONS
<b>UNCED</b>	UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT (Rio de Janeiro, 1992)
<b>UNCTAD</b>	UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT
<b>UNDAF</b>	UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE FRAMEWORK
<b>UNDP</b>	UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME
<b>UNEP</b>	UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME
<b>UNESCO</b>	UNITED NATIONS EDUCATIONAL, SCIENTIFIC AND CULTURAL ORGANISATION
<b>UNFCCC</b>	UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE
<b>UNFPA</b>	UNITED NATIONS FUND FOR POPULATION ACTIVITIES
<b>UNHCR</b>	UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES
<b>UNICEF</b>	UNITED NATIONS CHILDREN'S FUND
<b>WFP</b>	WORLD FOOD PROGRAMME
<b>WHO</b>	WORLD HEALTH ORGANISATION
<b>WID</b>	WOMEN IN DEVELOPMENT
<b>WSSD</b>	WORLD SUMMIT FOR SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT (Copenhagen, 1995)
<b>WTO</b>	WORLD TRADE ORGANISATION

1. This list is not exhaustive. It provides the most common development co-operation related acronyms, including those referred to in this report. Acronyms for country Ministries and Aid Agencies are provided in Chapter IV.
2. Denotes acronym in the original language.

# DAC GUIDELINES

The OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) adopts policy guidance for Members in the conduct of their development co-operation programmes. These guidelines reflect the views and experience of the Members and benefit from input by multilateral institutions and individual experts, including experts from developing countries.

## Shaping the 21st Century: The Contribution of Development Co-operation

Approved by the DAC High Level Meeting of 1996, *Shaping the 21st Century* sets forth strategic orientations for development co-operation into the 21st century. The report recalls the importance of development for people everywhere and the impressive record of human progress during the past 50 years. It suggests a set of basic goals based on UN Conference outcomes – for economic well-being, social development and environmental sustainability – as a vision for the future, and proposes strategies for attaining that vision through partnership in support of self-help efforts, improved co-ordination and consistent policies. These goals, and the partnership approach, have since been widely adopted in the international development system.

In this context, DAC Members have developed a series of guidelines for attaining the ambitious goals set out in *Shaping the 21st Century*.

## The DAC Guidelines (2001):

- Poverty Reduction.
- Strategies for Sustainable Development.
- Strengthening Trade Capacity for Development.
- Helping Prevent Violent Conflict.

## Previously Published DAC Guidelines

- DAC Guidelines for Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment in Development Co-operation.
- Support of Private Sector Development.
- Participatory Development and Good Governance.
- Donor Assistance to Capacity Development in Environment.
- Guidelines on Aid and Environment:
  - No. 1: Good Practices for Environmental Impact Assessment of Development Projects.
  - No. 2: Good Practices for Country Environmental Surveys and Strategies.
  - No. 3: Guidelines for Aid Agencies on Involuntary Displacement and Resettlement in Developing Countries.
  - No. 4: Guidelines for Aid Agencies on Global Environmental Problems.
  - No. 5: Guidelines for Aid Agencies on Chemicals Management.
  - No. 6: Guidelines for Aid Agencies on Pest and Pesticide Management.
  - No. 7: Guidelines for Aid Agencies on Disaster Mitigation.
  - No. 8: Guidelines for Aid Agencies on Global and Regional Aspects of the Development and Protection of the Marine and Coastal Environment.
  - No. 9: Guidelines for Aid Agencies for Improved Conservation and Sustainable Use of Tropical and Sub-Tropical Wetlands.

**Visit the OECD/DAC web site at**

*[www.oecd.org/dac](http://www.oecd.org/dac)*

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