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Development Co-operation Report 2015

Making Partnerships Effective Coalitions for Action

Please cite this publication as:
OECD (2015), Development Co-operation Report 2015: Making Partnerships Effective Coalitions for Action, OECD Publishing, Paris, http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/dcr-2015-en.

Metadata, Legal and Rights

ISBN: 978-92-64-24027-8 (epub) - 978-92-64-23312-6 (print) - 978-92-64-23314-0 (pdf) - 978-92-64-23542-7 (web)

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/dcr-2015-en

${periodicity}: Development Co-operation Report

ISSN: 2074-773X (print) - 2074-7721 (online)

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Foreword

The world has made great progress since the Millennium Development Goals were put in place a decade ago. Poverty has been cut in half. Illness and early deaths have been significantly reduced, particularly among women and children. Despite these achievements, huge challenges remain if we are to meet the new and ambitious set of Sustainable Development Goals by 2030. These truly universal targets involve – and depend on – all nations, leaders and peoples for their successful realisation. Likewise, we must address climate change and ensure that our actions to combat it are fully aligned with common development objectives.

The stakes are high. If we are to succeed, we must raise the level of ambition and strengthen the capacity of the international system to support universal, inclusive and sustainable development.

Only through joined up action guided by an effective system of global governance will we be able to make the Sustainable Development Goals a break-through success. And that is what this Development Co-operation Report 2015: Making Partnerships Effective Coalitions for Action is all about. Based on analysis and experience, it draws out ten success factors that will enable us to ensure, as we go forward, that partnerships function to their maximum potential and that they are fit-for-purpose in addressing the imposing challenges of the post-2015 world. Among these success factors, strong leadership, country ownership, right-sizing partnerships to the challenge at hand and a focus on results are key. This is a powerful model – and one that the global community cannot afford to ignore.

The OECD hosts various initiatives to advance effective and coherent development policies, and is a front-line player in ongoing efforts to improve global governance mechanisms. With our work on taxation, private investment, smart use of official development assistance, and combating bribery – just to name a few – we stand ready to join with all stakeholders in producing “Better Policies for Better Lives” and making the new goals reality through common action. This Development Co-operation Report 2015 is an important contribution to that mission.

Angel Gurría OECD Secretary-General

Credits

Report by Erik Solheim, DAC Chair

Conceptual and project leader

Hildegard Lingnau

Lead analyst

Julia Sattelberger

Senior editor

Christine Graves

Production manager

Elizabeth Del Bourgo

Profiles analysts

Ida Mc Donnell (lead)

Yasmin Ahmad

Willem Luijkx

Valentina Sanna

Chantal Verger

Statistical annex lead analyst

Yasmin Ahmad

Copy editing/proof reading

Fiona Hinchcliffe

Jennifer Allain

Cover and design of selected graphics

Stephanie Coïc

Co-ordination for the DAC Chair’s Office

Erlend Haugen

The team wishes to thank all others who played a part in producing the Development Co-operation Report 2015 and regrets any omissions.

Acronyms and abbreviations

AAA

Accra Agenda for Action

AfDB

African Development Bank

BRICS

Brazil, Russian Federation, India, China and South Africa

CPA

Country programmable aid

CSO

Civil society organisation

DAC

OECD Development Assistance Committee

DCF

United Nations Development Cooperation Forum

ECA

United Nations Economic Commission for Africa

EU

European Union

EUR

Euro (currency)

FTI

Fast Track Initiative of Education for All

G20

Group of Twenty

Gavi

Global Alliance on Vaccines and Immunisation

GDP

Gross domestic product

GEF

Global Environment Facility

GFATM

Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria

GNI

Gross national income

HIPC

Heavily indebted poor country

IAEA

International Atomic Energy Agency

IDA

International Development Association

IFAD

International Fund for Agricultural Development

IHP+

International Health Partnership+

ILO

International Labour Organization

IMF

International Monetary Fund

IRENA

International Renewable Energy Agency

LDC

Least developed country

LIC

Low-income country

LMIC

Lower middle-income country

MDG

Millennium Development Goal

MOPAN

Multilateral Organisation Performance Assessment Network

NEPAD

New Partnership for Africa’s Development

NGO

Non-governmental organisation

ODA

Official development assistance

OOF

Other official flows

PARIS21

Partnership in Statistics for Development in the 21st Century

PISA

Programme for International Student Assessment (OECD)

PPP

Public-private partnerships

PRESS

Partner Report on Support to Statistics

REDD+

Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation

SAGCOT

Southern Agricultural Growth Corridor of Tanzania

SIDS

Small island developing states

UAE

United Arab Emirates

UMIC

Upper middle-income country

UN

United Nations

UNAIDS

Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS

UNDP

United Nations Development Programme

UNECE

United Nations Economic Commission for Europe

UNEP

United Nations Environment Programme

UNESCO

United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization

UNFCCC

United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change

UNFPA

United Nations Population Fund

UNHCR

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

UNICEF

United Nations Children’s Fund

UNPBF

United Nations Peacebuilding Fund

UNRWA

United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East

UNTA

United Nations Regular Programme for Technical Assistance

USAID

United States Agency for International Development

USD

United States dollar (currency)

WFP

World Food Programme

WHO

World Health Organization

WTO

World Trade Organization

Editorial

by

Erik Solheim

Chair of the OECD Development Assistance Committee

The global development progress over the past decades has been unprecedented in human history. Extreme poverty has been halved and in the People’s Republic of China alone, more than 600 million people have been brought out of poverty. Child mortality has also been cut in half, with 17 000 fewer children dying every day. Almost all children now go to school. Children born today can expect to live for 70 years on average, 20 years longer than those born 50 years ago. They are also growing up in a world that, contrary to what many people think, is much more peaceful than ever before.

The remaining challenges are undeniably huge. More than 1 billion people still live in extreme poverty, on less than USD 1.25 per day. We need to produce more food and more energy for more people than ever before while protecting the planet. The world is now embarking on the historic mission to end extreme poverty by 2030 and to implement the new Sustainable Development Goals.

We know that today, for the first time ever, humanity has the capacity, knowledge and resources we need to end poverty and green our economies. What we need is to go ahead and do it. We cannot wait for a master plan or for everyone to agree before we take action. The planet and its people who are living in poverty cannot wait for the slowest, the undecided and those least willing to act. Nations, organisations, companies and individuals who are willing to address specific development challenges need to get started – now! For this, we need to mobilise political will behind coalitions for action.

All the great success stories have happened because someone had a goal and pulled people together to get it done. Ethiopia’s Prime Minister Meles Zenawi chose sound policies and mobilised the necessary assistance and investments to set his country on a path to implementing the Millennium Development Goals and becoming a middle-income country without increasing greenhouse emissions. Bill and Melinda Gates made the initial investments to energise the Gavi Vaccine Alliance, a successful partnership that has vaccinated 500 million children and saved millions of lives. Brazil, Indonesia, other rainforest nations and a few providers of development assistance inspired the UN-REDD rainforest coalition to reduce deforestation. So far Brazil has reduced deforestation by 80% and Wilmar, Asia’s largest palm oil producer, has promised not to contribute to any further deforestation. African governments and over 200 companies are working together through Grow Africa to expand and green African agricultural systems. The United Nations Sustainable Energy for All initiative is mobilising the financial resources and political will to provide green energy for 1.3 billion people who lack access to electricity and billions more with insufficient access.

These are just a few of the many success stories that are teaching us through their example. And there are plenty of other coalitions for action just waiting for leadership. Here are some suggestions for ways we can make change that really matters.

We need a coalition against fossil fuel subsidies, which cost developing countries around USD 500 billion annually. Some poor countries spend more on subsidising cheap petroleum than on health and education combined. Fossil fuel subsidies are expensive, mainly benefit the upper middle class and increase pollution. A financial front-loading mechanism would allow governments to provide benefits – such as cash disbursement schemes and better public services for the poor – before removing the inefficient, but sometimes popular, fuel subsidies.

We need a global coalition to protect our beautiful oceans, currently under threat from climate change, pollution and overfishing. Developing countries are losing billions of dollars from illegal and unreported fishing while sustainable fishing could increase the value of global fisheries by more than USD 60 billion. The world’s coral reefs – which are home to many unique species and help protect coastal communities from extreme weather – are threatened by climate change and pollution. Protecting the oceans is a win-win for humanity and the environment.

We need coalitions to better manage the magnificent rivers of the world, crucial to providing clean hydropower, irrigating agriculture to feed a future 9.6 billion people by 2050 and managing increasing floods resulting from climate change. International expertise and front-loaded financing could help balance immediate costs with the longer-term benefits of river management.

These are just some of the many potential coalitions for action that would be highly beneficial for people and the planet.

This report shows how partnerships and coalitions for action can contribute to ending poverty and implementing the Sustainable Development Goals. It offers a theoretical framework for making partnerships coalitions for action and gives many inspiring examples of successful partnerships. The key insights are that effective partnerships must:

have strong leadership

be country-led and context-specific

apply the right type of action for the challenge

maintain a clear focus on results.

Most important is leadership. Leadership is the rarest and most powerful natural resource on the planet. Unless someone leads, nothing will happen. But when someone leads, everything is possible!

Executive summary

The development efforts made by the international community over the past 60 years have had measurable impact on reducing poverty, improving human health and tackling other pressing challenges. Yet fragmented initiatives, conflicting priorities and uncoordinated approaches continue to hold back progress.

At the same time, in our increasingly interconnected and globalised world, national boundaries are blurring; the notion of state sovereignty that underpinned traditional forms of international co-operation is increasingly challenged.

The need for co-ordinated action is more urgent than ever. The United Nations has led the formulation of 17 ambitious, universal and far-reaching Sustainable Development Goals to be achieved by 2030. Improved and expanded international co-operation, within a system of global governance underpinned by appropriate mechanisms of mutual accountability, will be essential to achieve these goals.

Partnerships are powerful drivers of development

While most agree that partnerships are crucial for driving collective action to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals, the term “partnerships” encompasses diverse approaches, structures and purposes, making it difficult – if not impossible – to generalise about them.

At the same time, while universal in nature and applicable to all countries, the Sustainable Development Goals are founded on the respect for diversity – of contexts, needs, capabilities, policies and priorities, among others. To be effective, it is essential that partnerships addressing these global goals be driven by the priorities of the individual countries.

Within this context, three guiding principles can help to realise the full potential of partnerships post-2015:

Accountable action. Accountability means being responsible for one’s action or inaction and, in the latter case, accepting potential sanctions for lack of compliance with commitments.

Although accountability provided by governments will remain at the core of post-2015 action, today’s development partnerships bring together a range of stakeholders: national governments, parliaments, civil society, philanthropies, multilateral organisations, businesses and many others – not least among them the communities affected by development initiatives. While drawing on common development effectiveness principles, many of today’s accountability frameworks are founded on the recognition that different stakeholders may approach a common development agenda in different ways. This recognition builds trust and mutual respect, two characteristics that are at the core of accountability.

So how do we manage accountability within the increasing complexity of international co-operation? New ways of holding each other to account are needed, in combination with measurable commitments and standards that are continually reviewed and updated to keep them relevant and responsive, and to maintain shared commitment and political momentum. It is also fundamental to ensure that all partners are represented within governance mechanisms and that all voices are heard.

Co-ordinated and effective action. With the growing diversity of partners involved in development co-operation, it is more important than ever to avoid duplication of effort and fragmentation – problems that have long challenged the effectiveness of development co-operation.

While effective action post-2015 can be greatly facilitated by focusing partnerships on specific issues or sectors – such as health, education and sustainable energy – this does not mean that more and bigger partnerships are the best solution; experience demonstrates that this can actually hinder rather than promote progress. Streamlined partnerships – integrating existing actors and structures – reduce fragmented or overlapping action and ease the reporting and administrative burden on developing countries, thereby improving both delivery and impact.

Partnerships – including between the public and private sectors – can also help take solutions to scale, expanding the reach of development solutions to large numbers of beneficiaries in ways that individual governments, businesses or philanthropies are usually not capable of doing on their own. Finally – but by no means least important – strong, committed leadership gives partnerships the momentum they need to tackle complex development challenges, stay on course and mobilise the human and financial resources required to get the job done.

Experience-based action. The reform of global development co-operation to meet today’s development challenges calls for changes in behaviour and mind-sets. Dialogue and learning from experience are essential to produce these changes. The 11 case stories included in this report represent diverse partnership experiences and approaches, yet there is at least one thing all of them share: an emphasis on the importance of learning from experience, knowledge sharing and the distillation of lessons and good practice. South-South co-operation is an important vehicle for knowledge sharing, enabling countries to apply lessons taken directly from the experience of others to inform their own policies and programmes.

Accountability mechanisms contribute to learning from experience, enhancing the quality of development co-operation to improve its impact and relevance. These mechanisms range from peer reviews that focus on how development co-operation is framed, managed and delivered, to monitoring, reporting and evaluation cycles that are used to support continuing adaptation.

Post-2015 partnerships will bring new and evolving roles

Achieving the Sustainable Development Goals will require strong involvement by many actors, including:

the private sector, for job creation, technology development and investment

civil society for holding development co-operation partners to account, pushing for action on national and global commitments and scrutiny to ensure productive and accountable investment of public resources.

This implies a changing role for governments, which have traditionally been seen as the main providers of finance for development.

A policy framework for post-2015 partnerships

The Development Co-operation Report 2015 explores the role of partnerships in providing the necessary balance of sovereignty and subsidiarity, of inclusiveness and differentiation, of coherence and specialisation for delivering the Sustainable Development Goals. Drawing lessons from experience, it proposes ten success factors that provide an implementation and monitoring framework for making partnerships effective coalitions for action:

Secure high-level leadership.

Ensure partnerships are country-led and context-specific.

Avoid duplication of effort and fragmentation.

Make governance inclusive and transparent.

Apply the right type of partnership model for the challenge.

Agree on principles, targets, implementation plans and enforcement mechanisms.

Clarify roles and responsibilities.

Maintain a clear focus on results.

Measure and monitor progress towards goals and targets.

Mobilise the required financial resources and use them effectively.

Infographic: Success factors for effective post-2015 partnerships

Note: For further information see Chapter 1 section “A framework for post-2015 partnerships builds on proven success factors”.

Chapter 1.

Making partnerships effective coalitions for action

by

Hildegard Lingnau

and

Julia Sattelberger

Development Co-operation Directorate, OECD

The universal, transformative and inclusive agenda defined by the new Sustainable Development Goals means that the need to co-operate and work effectively is more urgent than ever. Partnerships are the way forward for effective development. This overview chapter of the Development Co-operation Report 2015 proposes a new, multi-level system of accountability to guide effective partnerships in implementing and monitoring work to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals. It defines three core functions of partnerships that are central to the successful implementation of the new goals: accountability, co-ordinated action and knowledge sharing. Drawing lessons from 5 concept chapters and 11 diverse case stories of partnerships from around the world, it defines a framework for effective post-2015 coalitions for action based on 10 success factors.

For more than 60 years the international community has engaged in development co-operation and although great strides have been made, countries are still struggling to apply the widely agreed principles of effective development co-operation (see Annex D). Conflicting national interests, fragmentation of effort, rapidly changing priorities and uncoordinated approaches are among the elements that continue to undermine global progress.¹ The need to co-operate and work effectively is thus more urgent than ever.

This co-operation will be driven by a new framework of universal, transformative and inclusive Sustainable Development Goals containing a number of high-level political commitments (see Box 2.1 in Chapter 2). Yet these commitments imply only a moral obligation and are not legally binding. Their successful achievement over the coming 15 years will clearly require improvements in global governance,² underpinned by strong, appropriate mechanisms of accountability³ and by effective international co-operation.

The need to co-operate and work effectively is more urgent than ever.

The Development Co-operation Report 2015: Making Partnerships Effective Coalitions for Action explores the potential of networks and partnerships to drive the delivery of the post-2015 goals. Part I looks at what makes different types of partnerships effective in generating global, local and regional goods (see Chapter 2). The term “partnership” is used widely to refer to diverse groupings of stakeholders and purposes. This report looks at this diversity to draw conclusions about the essential elements of post-2015 partnerships. It zeros in on the Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation and how this very inclusive alliance of development partners can help to provide direction and purpose (see Chapter 3). It explores the growing role of the private sector, and how its potential can be maximised for international development (see Chapter 4). And finally, it reviews the concept of accountability within the current complex system of international development co-operation and the mechanisms by which appropriate systems of accountability can be put into practice (see Chapters 5 and 6). Part II brings together case stories from 11 existing partnerships, sharing views on what has worked for them, as well as what has not – and why.

This overview chapter begins by examining the current system of checks and balances for the governance of international development co-operation, proposing a new multi-level system of accountability to guide the implementation and monitoring of the Sustainable Development Goals. It draws out success factors from the chapters and case stories in the report to illustrate the potential elements of such a system and concludes by recommending ten success factors that can help to make post-2015 partnerships the effective “coalitions for action” called for by Erik Solheim in the Editorial.

Global governance has not kept pace with globalisation

Observations of growing global interdependence are nothing new. Since the 1970s, scholars have noted an increasing “multidimensional economic, social and ecological interdependence” (Keohane and Nye, 1972: 4). This interdependence is exemplified by the universality of the new Sustainable Development Goals. More recently, however, the notion of interdependence has evolved into a similar, but more challenging, concept of globalisation: while “interdependence refers to a growing sensitivity and vulnerability between different units, globalization refers to the merging of units” (Zürn, 2013: 401).

Globalisation brings with it an increasing blurring of boundaries that is challenging the notion of state sovereignty.

Globalisation brings with it an increasing blurring of boundaries that is challenging the notion of state sovereignty and transforming traditional forms of international co-operation into a more complex system of global governance (Zürn, 2013: 408). This is evidenced by the proliferation of global regulations in many issue areas (Goldstein et al., 2000: 385), with a growing number of commitments, principles, rules and declarations emerging to steer and govern the behaviour of a range of actors.

Key among the principles and standards that provide guidance on how to best co-ordinate behaviour and work together effectively are the Bali Guiding Principles, agreed in 2003 to guide partnerships focused on the Millennium Development Goals,⁴ and the series of principles for effective development co-operation that culminated in the Busan Partnership in 2011 (see Annex D). Yet, as the United Nations (UN) Committee for Development Policy has noted, “The unbalanced nature of globalization implies that important areas of common interest are currently not covered, or sparsely covered, by global governance mechanisms, while other areas are considered to be overdetermined or overregulated” (UNCDP, 2014).

At the same time, the United Nations has “almost no means at its disposal to effectively motivate or urge Member States to implement sustainable development measures” (Beisheim, 2015). Inge Kaul notes that despite increasing globalisation, states’ reactions to global challenges remain bounded by traditional notions of sovereignty. This results in a “sovereignty paradox” in which states hold on to conventional strategies of international co-operation such as bilateral North-South development co-operation via project approaches. She notes that this kind of behaviour undermines policy-making capacity and suggests a new approach to global governance, based on “smart sovereignty” (Box 1.1; Kaul, 2013).

Box 1.1. Six principles of smart sovereignty

Discourage free-riding.

Correct fairness deficits through incentives and sanctions.

Consider the external effects of state and non-state decisions.

Focus on producing results using innovative mechanisms.

Recognise, promote and use synergies to address global challenges and modernise the UN system.

Recognise and manage the interdependence of policies.

Source: Adapted from Kaul, I. (2013), “Meeting global challenges: Assessing governance readiness”, in Anheier, H.K. (ed.), The Governance Report 2013: Sovereignty, Fiscal Policy, Innovations, Trade-Offs, Indicators, Oxford University Press, Oxford.

Finally, progress in effective global governance is also hampered by persisting imbalances:

uneven performance by many development partners in putting commitments into practice

insufficient harmonisation of development co-operation actions, as well as of alignment with developing country priorities (OECD, 2012)

unequal levels of influence exercised by development co-operation partners.

In the face of these challenges, it is appropriate to ask whether we have what it takes to improve global governance. What are the mechanisms that will provide, in the complex post-2015 world, the necessary balance of sovereignty and subsidiarity, of inclusiveness and differentiation, of coherence and specialisation?

What makes a partnership model fit-for-purpose?

Partnerships have the potential to contribute to a global governance system and it has been generally agreed that partnerships are crucial for achieving the Sustainable Development Goals:

The United Nations Open Working Group on Sustainable Development Goals (2014) proposed two dedicated targets for partnerships: one to “mobilise and share knowledge, expertise, technology and financial resources, to support the achievement of the sustainable development goals in all countries, in particular developing countries” (SDG 17.16); and another to promote “effective public, public-private and civil society partnerships, building on the experience and resourcing strategies of partnerships” (SDG 17.17).

The UN Secretary-General’s synthesis report on the post-2015 sustainable development agenda, “The road to dignity by 2030: Ending poverty, transforming all lives and protecting the planet”, emphasises that “inclusive partnerships must be a key feature of implementation, at all levels: global, regional, national and local” (UNGA, 2014).

The revised zero draft of the Addis Ababa Accord, focused on a global framework for financing sustainable development post-2015, states commit to “reinvigorate the global partnership in support of sustainable development” (UN DESA, 2015: para. 8).

The United Nations Sustainable Development Solutions Network states that “[g]lobal partnerships around the SDGs [Sustainable Development Goals] can help develop the strategies and mobilize the financing, technologies and PPPs [public-private partnerships] needed to meet the goals” (UNSDSN, 2015: 16).

Civil society actors argue that “[c]ross-sector partnerships […] are one of the primary modalities through which the necessary innovation could be created and delivered” (World Vision, 2014: 1).

Yet the term “partnerships” encompasses a range of approaches, structures and purposes that make it difficult – if not impossible – to speak of them as an homogenous whole. At the same time, experience demonstrates that more partnerships and initiatives in international co-operation do not automatically translate into more or faster progress. A study commissioned by UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN DESA), for example, states that there is “a plethora of partnerships [which] should be streamlined [building] on already existing and successful mechanisms and processes” (Dodds, 2015).

Experience with implementing the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) has provided valuable lessons in partnership (see “Learning from experience with the Millennium Development Goals as policy and advocacy tools” in Part III of this report). The MDG framework called for a “global partnership for development” (MDG8), but its implementation was hampered by a traditional North-South view of the world that did not reflect 21st century realities, a narrow issues-based focus, and a failure to clearly establish responsibilities or provide an appropriate monitoring and accountability framework (UN System Task Force on the Post-2015 Development Agenda, 2012, 2013; Kenny and Dykstra, 2013; Bester, 2015).

So how do we move from the general endorsement of the partnership concept to an effective working mechanism – one that is fit-for-purpose in the post-2015 world?

In Chapter 2, Homi Kharas and Julie Biau stress the importance of choosing the right partnership for each challenge. They point to the need to:

ensure a strong connection between global strategy and local implementation

agree on clear, ambitious and attainable targets

base funding allocation on performance

provide inclusive representation by all stakeholders.

The Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation, described in depth in Chapter 3, is built on ample experience and buy-in regarding what makes development work. As a flexible and open forum, it promotes innovation by creating a space for exchange and experimentation based on the range of experience and approaches of its partners. It is designed in a way that encourages leadership by diverse stakeholders, benefits from the support of key international organisations, and encourages politicians and decision makers to take action on pressing issues.

It is important to remember that accountability is not a one-way street.

Achieving the Sustainable Development Goals will also require strong involvement by the private sector, in particular for job creation, technology development and investment. In Chapter 4, Alex Evans looks at what is needed to create the right type of public-private partnerships and how governments can help to avoid risks and maximise potential (see also Box 1.2).

Box 1.2. The growing role of government in mobilising the private sector

As described in Chapter 4, achieving the Sustainable Development Goals will require a lot of heavy lifting by the private sector. This is a shift from the paradigm of the past, in which governments were seen as the main providers of development finance. Yet this does not mean that the role of governments will diminish. Rather, they have a distinct role to play in aligning business interests with sustainable development requirements, and in encouraging private financing and investment.* For instance, they can create appropriate policy frameworks, incentivise and regulate private investment (especially in the least developed countries and for global public goods), and help tackle market failures (e.g. by making advance purchase commitments, taxing unsustainable resource use and ending distorting subsidies that create perverse incentives for companies to behave in unsustainable ways). Governments can also help to hold businesses to account – for example by establishing and monitoring an international registry of commitments by companies.

Part II of this report showcases many effective partnerships that are already bringing in finance and expertise from philanthropies, foundations and the business community, as noted in this chapter. Yet much remains to be done to make the most of opportunity – and to bring together the resources that will be needed to finance the ambitious post-2015 agenda.

The OECD has numerous efforts underway to contribute to mobilising private sector investment for sustainable development, for example by promoting the “smart” use of official development assistance (ODA) to catalyse private sector resources; making available more and better data on private sector instruments; and conducting a survey to take stock of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) members’ work with and through the private sector. The survey aims to engage members in a process of peer learning on private sector strategies, objective setting, implementation and impact measurement. The Development Co-operation Report 2016 will focus on the role of the private sector in supporting the implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals.

* The Development Co-operation Report 2014: Mobilising Resources for Sustainable Development (OECD, 2014), examines in depth the ways in which public funds can be used to mobilise resources from the private sector.

Whichever the model applied, partnerships will need to ground their action in accountability to their stakeholders, and in particular to those affected by development co-operation. Although accountability provided by states will remain at the core of post-2015 action, a global, multi-layered accountability framework would include information collected at numerous levels, from diverse actors and around specific themes to add value and perspectives.

Above all, it is important to remember that accountability is not a one-way street. Governments established the high-level biennial Development Cooperation Forum (DCF) to respond to the needs of developing countries and, as a United Nations focal point, to discuss key trends and progress in international development co-operation (Box 1.3). The DCF has begun exploring the characteristics of a multi-layered monitoring, review and accountability architecture for development co-operation in the post-2015 era, with emphasis on promoting knowledge sharing and mutual learning for better development results (Bester, 2015). The UN General Assembly Resolution 67/290 also created a High-Level Political Forum on Sustainable Development (UNGA, 2013: 1). The exact role and function of this forum is still taking shape, but it should bring the highest level of political support to the implementation and monitoring of sustainable development commitments (UN System Task Force on the Post-2015 UN Development Agenda, 2013: 23). It could also take the lead on thematic reviews and provide a platform for discussing lessons learned in each country’s efforts to implement the Sustainable Development Goals (Dodds, 2015: 14-15).

The new global system of accountability will depend on tested as well as innovative means of holding actors to account.

Box 1.3. The United Nations Development Cooperation Forum promotes mutual accountability in development co-operation

Mutual accountability encourages delivery on development co-operation commitments and improves results. The concept of mutual accountability emerged as a means of addressing imbalances in the relationships among development co-operation partners and initially was largely focused on official development assistance (ODA) (see Chapter 6). The concept is now broadening, however, to include more actors and forms of development co-operation.

Since 2008, the United Nations Development Cooperation Forum (DCF)¹ has contributed to mutual accountability by conducting independent and comprehensive reviews of international and national mutual accountability mechanisms and aid transparency initiatives, involving regular global surveys and exchanges with stakeholders.

The mandate for these reviews originated from a two-fold concern about:

the lack of symmetry in the monitoring and reporting on commitments and results by provider-country governments, as compared to countries on the receiving end of development co-operation

the limited participation of parliamentarians, civil society and other stakeholders in development planning and monitoring.

The reviews improve results by fostering knowledge sharing, co-operation and trust; encouraging behaviour change; and supporting delivery on quantitative and qualitative development commitments.

As the DCF Secretariat, the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN DESA)² carries out these broad-based surveys with the support of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), focusing on their implementation of “enablers” of mutual accountability, including:

guidance on how ODA should be used, in the form of an aid or a broader “partnership policy”

country-driven monitoring frameworks, including targets for individual providers

availability of information

use of independent analytical inputs from civil society and parliament in monitoring and review exercises.

While the enablers above are considered to be key,³ other national factors, such as stability and rule of law, are important determinants of successful development co-operation.

UN DESA publishes analyses based on these reviews on its website,⁴ unpacking the complex web of accountability relationships in development co-operation. UN DESA also regularly reviews regional and global monitoring and accountability mechanisms, highlighting their strengths and challenges, assessing the interaction among them, and indicating their usefulness to country-level policy makers and practitioners.⁵ The fourth DCF survey on global accountability, conducted in 2015, assesses the challenges national actors face in effectively monitoring and strengthening mutual learning for better development results. The DCF is expected to play an even more significant role in the post-2015 era.

1. The Development Cooperation Forum is a core function of the Economic and Social Council and global multi-stakeholder policy forum. It has a distinct multifaceted mandate on international development co-operation and links to the broader intergovernmental processes and to the normative and operational work of the United Nations system.

2. For further information on the work of the DCF and UN DESA on accountability and transparency, and for access to all documents referred to, please see: www.un.org/en/ecosoc/newfunct/dcf_account.shtml.

3. See DCF Accountability Focus Area: www.un.org/en/ecosoc/newfunct/dcf_account.shtml.

4. A note reflecting the outcomes of the 2013 DCF survey provides guidance on how policy makers and practitioners can support the design, implementation and use of different enablers at the country level: www.un.org/en/ecosoc/newfunct/pdf14/ma_guidance_note.pdf.

5. See King (2014).

Source: Box provided by Office for ECOSOC Support and Coordination, United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs.

While most development co-operation commitments are voluntary in nature, and thus not legally binding, this does not necessarily mean they are ineffective. The new global system of accountability will depend on tested as well as innovative means of holding actors to account and of encouraging the application of voluntary agreements on policies, norms and standards (see Chapter 6).⁵

Partnerships build accountability, co-ordination and knowledge sharing

The 11 case stories included in Part II of this report represent diverse partnership approaches, some of which have been more successful than others. While the selection is not intended to be fully representative of the variety of partnership models existing today, they illustrate many of the opportunities and challenges of partnerships explored in Part I. Together, they contribute to the distillation of success factors and lessons that can feed into a post-2015 implementation and monitoring framework.

In the next section, we look at how the case stories in this report exemplify three core functions of partnerships that are central to the successful implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals: accountability, co-ordinated action and knowledge sharing.

Partnerships foster a culture of accountability

The first key function of partnerships is providing accountability. This report defines accountability as being responsible for one’s action or inaction and, in the latter case, accepting potential sanctions for lack of compliance with commitments (see Chapter 5). Building on this definition, it asks how accountability can best be provided in the current complex environment of development co-operation, involving so many levels and actors. This is especially important at a time when more and better co-operation is needed across the board. Yet while systems for providing accountability and enhancing trust are crucial, they must be appropriate to the context, balanced in their application (i.e. not unilateral) and accepted by all.

The Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation (see Chapter 7) complements the work of the UN Development Cooperation Forum (Box 1.3) and the UN-led process for the post-2015 agenda through its monitoring framework.⁶ This framework tracks development co-operation providers’ progress on implementing the development effectiveness principles agreed at the Fourth High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Busan in 2011 (see Annex D and Box 3.1 in Chapter 3). Key among these principles is ownership by developing countries of their own development programmes, priorities and plans (Box 1.4).

Box 1.4. The Africa Global Partnership Platform

At the African Union Summit (Malabo, Equatorial Guinea, 26-27 June 2014), African leaders endorsed the establishment of the Africa Global Partnership Forum (AGPP) – a new partnership and dialogue mechanism comprising African Union member states and approximately 25 of their major trade, investment and development partners (AU, 2014). The African Global Partnership Platform grew out of the Africa Partnership Forum, a G8-initiated mechanism created at the Evian Summit in 2003 to structure and broaden the dialogue between the G8 and Africa.

Throughout its ten-year existence, the African Partnership Forum provided a space for senior experts to address topical themes of importance to African development, delivered high-quality policy and monitoring reports and brokered agreements to improve the forum’s effectiveness. Over time, however, members recognised the need to bring the forum up-to-date with changes in the global economy and in Africa itself. As a result, the African Partnership Forum members commissioned an external evaluation in 2012 to assess the forum’s effectiveness and make recommendations on its future. The evaluation recommended broadening membership and taking measures to strengthen African ownership of – and links into – African Union, G8 and G20 processes. Following discussion of these findings, African leaders adopted the Dakar Reform Proposals (Hayford and Kloke-Lesch, 2013), setting out their decision to create a new partnership platform. The mechanism originally established by the G8 was thereby replaced by a partnership platform established by African leaders themselves.

The Africa Global Partnership Platform responds to changing patterns of global relations since the early 2000s, in particular:

the growing importance of emerging economies

the G20’s emerging role in steering the global economy in lieu of the G8.

The new platform will enable stronger integration of Africa’s priorities within the global political and economic agenda. It is expected to focus on priority issues of economic co-operation between Africa and its international partners, as defined by the African Union and the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), and as set out in Agenda 2063¹ and in policy frameworks such as the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme² and the Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa.³ It will also address sustainable development and climate change, as well as global governance issues.

With a senior official representing each of its members, the Africa Global Partnership Platform’s inaugural plenary meeting is expected to be held in October 2015, addressing the priority themes of agriculture and food security, and infrastructure financing.

1. See: http://agenda2063.au.int/en//vision.

2. See: www.caadp.net.

3. See: http://pages.au.int/infosoc/pages/program-infrastructure-development-africa-pida.

Civil society organisations (CSOs) have a strong voice in the Global Partnership (see Figure D.1 in Annex D), and in general play an important role in holding development co-operation partners to account and pushing for action on national and global commitments. Scrutiny by civil society also helps to ensure productive and accountable investment of public resources. In Chapter 15, Winnie Byanyima, the Executive Director of Oxfam International, emphasises the role that civil society needs to play in the definition, delivery and monitoring of goals. She cites the example of Ghana, where despite a Petroleum Revenue Management Law requiring transparency in the management of oil revenues, the funds raised – some USD 2 billion – were not translating into increased public investment. This changed in 2013 when CSOs launched the Oil4Food campaign, prompting the government to commit 15% of oil revenues to smallholder agriculture.

Civil society often lacks access to the information needed to hold governments to account effectively.

One of the problems CSOs often face is lack of access to the information they need to hold governments to account effectively. Data are a crucial component of actionable information for evidence-based decision making. The United Nations Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel has called for a “data revolution” to promote transparency and ensure accountability (UN, 2013). The Sustainable Development Goals also highlight the need for better statistics and statistical capacity in developing countries (United Nations Open Working Group on Sustainable Development Goals, 2014: Goal 17). To support this need, the Busan Action Plan for Statistics is mobilising a broad partnership of existing institutions and agencies, co-ordinated by the Partnership in Statistics for Development in the 21st Century (PARIS21; see Chapter 15). Their aim is to fully integrate data into decision making, promote open access to statistics by all users, and increase resources in support of statistical systems, both to build new capacity and to maintain current operations. PARIS21 brings together diverse stakeholders, from national statistics offices to multilateral and bilateral agencies, academia and the private sector, benefiting from the vast and diverse expertise of these partners.

Partnerships support co-ordinated action

The second key function of partnerships is facilitating co-ordinated action. In Chapter 7, Lilianne Ploumen, Co-Chair of the Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation, asks how the Global Partnership can help to achieve the objective of ending poverty. In her view, it is only through combined efforts that the change needed can happen and better results can be achieved.

The Global Partnership captures and disseminates evidence of good practice among its diverse members, providing a laboratory of ideas – and action – to spur innovation. Its first High-Level Meeting, held in Mexico in April 2014, saw the launch of almost 40 initiatives on topics as diverse as tax, climate, gender equality and inclusive business. The Partnership for Climate Finance and Development (see Box 3.2 in Chapter 3) and the Gender Initiative led by OECD’s GENDERNET and UN Women (Box 1.5) are two examples.

Building partnerships on agreed principles helps to underpin co-ordinated action.

Box 1.5. Harnessing effective partnerships to raise ambition for gender equality and women’s rights

Smart partnerships have been essential in bringing gender equality and women’s rights to the heart of the development effectiveness agenda. Remarkable gains have been made since the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005), which contained just one obscure reference to gender equality. By the time of the adoption of the Busan Partnership agreement (2011), gender equality was recognised as critical to achieving development results. The Global Partnership indicator on gender equality – one of just ten global indicators to monitor progress on the implementation of the Busan commitments – signalled clear recognition of the priority placed on gender equality (see Annex D).

This progress did not happen by chance. For over a decade the OECD-DAC’s Network on Gender Equality (GENDERNET) has worked with UN Women (formerly UNIFEM) and other women’s organisations, including the Association for Women’s Rights in Development, to strengthen commitments on gender equality at the international level. These partners joined strategic forces ahead of and during the Paris (2005), Accra (2008) and Busan (2011) high-level forums on aid effectiveness, and more recently at the first High-Level Meeting of the Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation in Mexico (2014). Based on a shared vision, complementary strategies and mutual respect, the partners have worked together to raise the visibility of gender equality as an integral component of development effectiveness and sustainable development.

Several ingredients have been critical to the success of the partnership, notably:

defining a common vision of the changes needed and joint messages to mobilise political support

having diverse partners that bring complementary strengths and mobilise broad constituencies spanning developing country governments, development co-operation providers and civil society

underpinning political actions with evidence

keeping a sharp action orientation – for example, launching a voluntary initiative on gender equality at the Mexico High-Level Forum to mobilise wider momentum around the concrete efforts needed to increase accountability and transparency in financing for gender equality

having an awareness of changing contexts and the flexibility to respond to new opportunities as they arise

sustaining the partnership over the long term and building change incrementally.

The journey has been a long one, but it is clear that the engagement with the development effectiveness agenda is paying off. The ambitious post-2015 sustainable development agenda has gender equality at its core. Working in partnership will be more critical than ever to mobilise the political support, finance and expertise required for the implementation of the new commitments – indeed, it will make the difference between success and failure.

Building partnerships on agreed principles helps to underpin co-ordinated action. For example, the International Health Partnership+ (see Chapter 9) is a voluntary coalition that aims to make development co-operation more effective in improving health in low and middle-income countries. Its partners – 35 countries, 28 development co-operation agencies and a range of CSOs – all adhere to a set of 7 agreed “behaviours” founded on the development effectiveness principles of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (see Annex D). They support co-ordinated, streamlined and sector-wide action, reducing the burden on partner countries of reporting and administrative requirements.

Building partnerships around specific issues or sectors – such as health, education and sustainable energy – and ensuring the participation of all stakeholders can also make things happen in a co-ordinated fashion. For example, over the past decade, mortality from HIV, tuberculosis and malaria has decreased by 40% as a result of initiatives such as the Global Fund to Fight Aids, Tuberculosis and Malaria (see Chapter 8). The Global Fund’s partnership model brings together provider and recipient governments, civil society, the private sector, private foundations, and communities of people living with and affected by its target diseases. Country plans are developed through an inclusive process that supports consensus on national strategies for each disease.

Another partnership featured in this report – the Global Partnership for Education – combines long-term multilateral development co-operation flows with the domestic resources mobilised by developing countries (see Chapter 10). This joined-up effort has resulted in the fourth-largest source of external financing for basic education in low and lower middle-income countries. A new funding model introduced in 2014 builds on success by providing incentives for countries to demonstrate progress in providing equity, financing efficiency and learning achievements.

Co-ordinated action is also central to the Sustainable Energy for All initiative, which is helping to create enabling conditions for a massive scale-up of public and private investment in energy access and clean energy solutions (see Chapter 11). The initiative leverages the global leadership and unparalleled convening power of the United Nations and the World Bank through a unique model that has already secured pledges of tens of billions of dollars to support its objectives. With inclusiveness at its core, the initiative takes a people-oriented approach to sustainable energy, viewing it as a development enabler for other crucial goals, such as poverty reduction, health, gender equality, as well as access to food and water. In her opinion piece in this chapter, Mary Robinson states: “activities at all levels need to understand the needs of people on the ground, taking into account their circumstances and their ability to access technologies, knowledge and financing.”

The REDD+ Programme (Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation), presented in Chapter 17, co-ordinates action among a broad range of stakeholders – provider and developing countries, multilateral organisations, civil society, indigenous groups and other forest-dependent communities, academia and the private sector – to provide incentives for developing countries to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from their forest sectors. These stakeholders are all included in REDD+ planning and implementation processes, creating a framework for success that is extremely attractive to the communities who depend on forests for their livelihoods. In the words of Bharrat Jagdeo, former President of Guyana, “Cruelly, the most vulnerable communities and poorest countries in the world are the ones that suffer the most from climate change, despite the fact that they have done almost nothing to cause the problem” (see Chapter 17).

Action involving co-ordination between the public and private sectors will also be essential for the implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals (Box 1.2). The Grow Africa partnership is enabling African countries to realise the huge potential of public-private partnerships in the agricultural sector, generating economic growth and creating jobs – particularly for farmers, women and young people (see Chapter 16). Grow Africa incubates new public-private partnerships and also strengthens existing ones. To make these partnerships work, it insists on clarity from the outset about the motivations and expectations of each of the partners, and about who is accountable for what within the partnership. This involves consultation with all stakeholders along the agricultural value chain, particularly smallholder producers and local communities.

Streamlined partnerships that integrate existing actors and structures can reduce complexity while improving delivery and impact. The Aid-for-Trade initiative, for example, does not seek to set up new mechanisms, but rather delivers implementation through existing instruments (see Chapter 12). The initiative adds value by:

promoting coherence and dialogue between the trade and development communities

monitoring actions by developing countries and their partners to help make trade work for development

making the case for additional, predictable, sustainable and effective financing

acting as a forum for dialogue and sharing of results.

Partnerships can help to take solutions to scale.

Partnerships can also help to take solutions to scale, expanding the reach of development solutions to large numbers of beneficiaries in ways that individual governments, businesses or philanthropies are usually not capable of doing on their own (Chandy et al., 2013).

Partnerships promote knowledge sharing

The third key function of partnerships is promoting knowledge sharing. Dialogue and learning are essential to produce the changes in behaviour and mind-sets that permit the effective reform of global development co-operation (Box 1.6).

Box 1.6. The OECD’s Knowledge Sharing Alliance

The post-2015 sustainable development agenda highlights the shared responsibilities of all states and societies. It promotes a broader understanding of the “universality” of sustainable development, which requires transformational change in how countries and societies live together, consume and do business. At the same time, while universal in nature and applicable to all countries, the Sustainable Development Goals are founded on the recognition of and respect for the diversity of national circumstances, policies and priorities.

Knowledge sharing is essential to underpin this heightened co-operation, understanding and respect. The OECD Knowledge Sharing Alliance, established in partnership with the German and Korean governments in 2013, provides a platform for sharing OECD knowledge within and beyond its membership. It also promotes the revision of OECD instruments to enable their broader use and applicability beyond the Organisation’s member countries. A few examples help to illustrate this work:

The Urban Green Growth in Dynamic Asia project explores ways to promote the greening and competitiveness of fast-growing Asian economies, improve environmental performance in cities, promote urban quality of life and increase institutional capacity to achieve green growth. While the initial focus was on Bangkok and the Malaysian region of Jahore Baru, their experiences are now being used to help other Asian cities move in the same direction.

The OECD Eurasia Competitiveness Programme helps economies in Central Asia, Eastern Europe and South Caucasus to develop vibrant and competitive markets. They are applying OECD knowledge to enhance competitiveness and generate sustainable growth. This platform has consolidated regional co-operation and increased peer dialogue.

Source: This box was provided by the OECD’s Knowledge Sharing Alliance Team. For more information see: www.oecd.org/knowledge-sharing-alliance.

The creation of the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding (see Chapter 14), for example, was triggered by the need to find new ways of sharing knowledge and working together to address the special circumstances and challenges of countries affected by conflict and fragility. The International Dialogue promotes trust and mutual respect through frank and open exchange, bringing together conflict-affected and fragile countries, international partners and civil society. It enables members to learn from each other using tools such as the Fragility Assessment and the Fragility Spectrum – national consultations on the drivers of conflict.

The Effective Institutions Platform supports knowledge sharing among its over 60 members – high, middle and low-income countries; multilateral and bilateral development agencies; civil society organisations; and think tanks – to strengthen public sector institutions (see Chapter 13). It encourages innovation through Learning Alliances on Public Sector Reform and uses peer learning tools – such as communities of practice, peer reviews, twinning arrangements and exchange visits – to test and institutionalise public sector reform.

To respond to the demand from countries beyond its membership to take advantage of the OECD’s analytical work and policy advice, the organisation is also creating new synergies and expanding its reach through innovative knowledge-sharing platforms (Box 1.6).

Partnerships require careful calibration

While this report documents many ways in which partnerships can be a powerful force for change, there are important challenges that must be kept in mind if they are to support the implementation of the post-2015 agenda effectively.

More is not always better

The international community does not need a multitude of actors, funds and frameworks adding to the already overcrowded development landscape – especially when developing countries continue to be challenged by unpredictable and fragmented funding. An OECD study of development assistance to the health sector, for example, found that “the complexity of the aid architecture, lack of donor alignment with country priorities and systems, poor donor harmonisation and difficulty in maintaining momentum” are hampering success (OECD, 2012: 13). This is why the Busan Partnership agreement (see Annex D) emphasises the importance of “effective use of the existing multilateral channels, focusing on those that are performing well” (OECD, 2015).⁷

We must ensure that international partnerships support rather than undermine national systems.

Evidence from the health sector also suggests that the establishment of “vertical funds” – for example, which focus on specific diseases – can have unintended negative consequences: they can lead to a “neglect of broader health objectives or systems” and contribute to “a greater fragmentation of an already highly fragmented organizational framework” (Bezanson and Isenman, 2012: 21). In this context, it is crucial to ensure that international partnerships do not undermine national systems, but rather support them.

Global partnerships are not always the solution

Better understanding of the interplay between the geographical scope and the particular policy challenge of each partnership can help guide decisions on just what is appropriate (see Figure 2.1 in Chapter 2). While basic needs are very amenable to multi-stakeholder collaboration at the global level, traditional public-private partnerships at the local level may be more suited to tackling issues of infrastructure. Global intergovernmental negotiations continue to be the best mechanism for addressing the free-rider problems associated with biodiversity, peacekeeping or climate change mitigation, while multilateral structures and channels are very effective in using official development co-operation and public finance.

There are internal challenges to effective partnerships

Finally, as the cases stories in this report illustrate, making partnerships work as real coalitions for action often involves a balancing act among numerous factors, including:

the priorities and objectives of diverse members

the benefits of dialogue and discussion versus the push for progress on the ground

the need to combine flexibility with accountability.

How can these challenges be met?

A framework for post-2015 partnerships builds on proven success factors

While co-ordinating mechanisms and governance structures may vary widely, successful partnerships have several important things in common (see Infographic: Success factors for effective post-2015 partnerships). Analysis of the chapters in this report yields ten key actions for ensuring success:8

Secure high-level leadership. Game-changing leadership is crucial for capturing the political and financial buy-in needed to mobilise a critical mass of support, encourage investors to take risks, unblock barriers to action, keep up political momentum and scale up public and private resources.

Ensure partnerships are country-led and context-specific. A good balance between global strategy and local priorities, contexts and implementation is fundamental to make partnerships relevant, effective and fit-for-purpose.

Avoid duplication of effort and fragmentation. To the extent possible, existing instruments and partnerships should be used to reduce complexity while improving delivery and impact.

Make governance inclusive and transparent. Ensuring that the voices of all stakeholders carry equal weight, and that they have the information needed to make informed choices, will build trust while helping to deliver better, more appropriate results.

Apply the right type of partnership model for the challenge. This can be achieved by making a strong connection between global strategy and local implementation.

Agree on principles, targets, implementation plans and enforcement mechanisms. Common principles create clarity on motivation while agreed targets promote concrete follow-up in terms of implementation, reporting and monitoring. Soft enforcement mechanisms such as peer reviews provide opportunities for learning and are also valuable tools to assess and encourage progress.

Clarify roles and responsibilities. Avoid duplication of effort, maximise comparative advantage and define who is responsible for what through well-defined accountability mechanisms.

Maintain a clear focus on results. The ability to demonstrate a straightforward link between resources and outcomes helps to bring actors on board and to keep them committed.

Measure and monitor progress towards goals and targets. Data on progress provide information for evidence-based decision making and support accountability.

Mobilise the required financial resources and use them effectively. Ensuring predictable funding enables partnerships to spur innovation and develop and implement long-term planning strategies that can bring solutions to scale. Pooling funds reduces parallel implementation and reporting approaches and also creates an important incentive for joint action.

These success factors can provide a framework for effective post-2015 partnerships of all types, ensuring that they function as effective coalitions for action. They can help to set in motion a virtuous circle of action, by which achieving results on agreed objectives and reporting accountably on those results creates trust and encourages further engagement (see Infographic: Success factors for effective post-2015 partnerships).

The alternative is business as usual, which could result in a vicious, inverse cycle, weakening global governance, diminishing trust and limiting results.

Partnerships and networks are here to stay; they are the norm for effective development co-operation and for achieving the Sustainable Development Goals. This report proposes an approach to partnership founded on co-ordination, led by developing countries, fuelled by valuable knowledge and experience, and powered by collective strength and mutual accountability. This is a powerful model – and one that the global community cannot afford to ignore.

Notes

 1. See the Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation Monitoring Report, Making Development Co-operation More Effective, which draws data from 46 developing countries and 77 providers of development co-operation (including bilateral and multilateral providers as well as global funds and programmes (OECD/UNDP, 2014: 16).

 2. Defined as the totality of institutions, policies, norms, procedures and initiatives of international co-operation (see UNCDP, 2014).

 3. Mutual accountability promotes equal partnership among development co-operation providers and their partners in achieving – and holding each other accountable for – development goals. Until recently, mutual accountability specifically referred to the relationship between development co-operation providers and their partner countries. The concept has now been broadened to reflect changes in the international development co-operation landscape, and so includes stakeholders and contributions beyond official development assistance (ODA).

 4. The Bali Guiding Principles can be viewed at: https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/dsd/dsd_aofw_par/par_mand_baliguidprin.shtml.

 5. “The OECD-DAC peer review is the best mechanism in place, in which incentives to comply are generated by peer pressure and strong surveillance, and should be the benchmark to design the global framework” (Ocampo and Gómez Arteaga, 2014: 2).

 6. See: http://effectivecooperation.org/files/about-trackingprogress/INDICATORS.pdf.

 7. The OECD Multilateral Aid 2015: Better Partnerships for a Post-2015 World also strongly recommends that development actors apply the lessons of the past and think twice before establishing new funds and institutions (OECD, 2015).

 8. Some of these success factors have also been proposed by the UN System Task Team on the Post-2015 UN Development Agenda (2012 and 2013) and confirmed at the 2014 Wilton Park Conference on “Increasing the effectiveness of multi-stakeholder initiatives through active collaboration” (Wilton Park et al., 2014).

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UN DESA (2015), Addis Ababa Accord: Addis Ababa Outcome Document, revised draft 6 May 2015, United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, www.un.org/esa/ffd/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/revised-draft-outcome.pdf.

UNGA (2014), “The road to dignity by 2030: Ending poverty, transforming all lives and protecting the planet”, synthesis report of the Secretary-General on the post-2015 sustainable development agenda, A/69/700, 4 December, United Nations General Assembly, New York, www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/69/700&Lang=E.

UNGA (2013), “Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 9 July: Format and organizational aspects of the high-level political forum on sustainable development”, A/RES/67/290, United Nations General Assembly, New York, www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/67/290&Lang=E.

United Nations Open Working Group on Sustainable Development Goals (2014), “Open Working Group proposal for Sustainable Development Goals”, United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Division of Sustainable Development, New York, https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/focussdgs.html.

UNSDSN (2015), “Key elements of a successful Addis Ababa Accord on Financing for Sustainable Development”, UN Sustainable Development Solutions Network Working Paper, 19 March, http://unsdsn.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/20150331-key-elements-for-addis-ababa-accord.pdf.

UN System Task Force on the Post-2015 Development Agenda (2013), A Renewed Global Partnership for Development, United Nations, New York, www.un.org/en/development/desa/policy/untaskteam_undf/report2.shtml.

UN System Task Force on the Post-2015 Development Agenda (2012), “New partnerships to implement a post-2015 development agenda”, Discussion Note, United Nations, New York, www.un.org/en/development/desa/policy/untaskteam_undf/global_partnerships.pdf.

Wilton Park et al. (2014), “Increasing the effectiveness of multi-stakeholder initiatives through active collaboration”, WP1314 Conference Report, www.wiltonpark.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/WP1314-Report1.pdf.

World Vision (2014), “Reaching the unreached: Cross-sector partnerships, business and the post-2015 development agenda”, The Post-2015 Agenda: Policy Paper, World Vision, www.wvi.org/justice-children/publication/reaching-unreached-cross-sector-partnerships-business-and-post-2015.

Zürn, M. (2013), “Globalization and global governance”, in Carlsnaes, W. et al. (eds.), Handbook of International Relations, 2nd Edition, Sage, London, www.wzb.eu/sites/default/files/u13/globalization_and_global_governance.pdf.

Further reading

Anheier, H. (2013), “The challenges of interdependence”, in Anheier, H.K. (ed.) (2013), The Governance Report 2013, Hertie School of Governance, Sovereignty, Fiscal Policy, Innovations, Trade-Offs, Indicators, Oxford University Press, Oxford.

Bester, A. (2014), “Accountable and effective development cooperation in a post-2015 era”, Third Global Accountability Survey on Mutual Accountability, www.un.org/en/ecosoc/newfunct/pdf13/dcf_germany_bkgd_study_2_ma_survey.pdf.

Bester, A. (2014), “Mutual accountability: A guidance note for national policy-makers and practitioners”, ECOSOC, United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, BMZ – German Federal Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development, www.un.org/en/ecosoc/newfunct/pdf14/ma_guidance_note.pdf.

De Milly, H. (2012), “From aid effectiveness to development effectiveness: Paying tribute to the WP-EFF”, www.hiidunia.com/wp-content/uploads/downloads/2012/06/120614-Celebrating-Busan.pdf.

GPEDC (2015), “Strengthening the Global Partnership Monitoring Framework”, Global Partnership Steering Committee, The Hague, 19-20 January, http://effectivecooperation.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/Document-3-Strengthening-the-Global-Partnership-Monitoring-Framework.pdf (accessed 3 March 2015).

Kharas, H. et al. (2014), “Financing the post-2015 Sustainable Development Goals”, Overseas Development Institute, London, www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/9374.pdf.

MDG Gap Task Force (2014), “The state of the Global Partnership for Development”, United Nations, New York, www.un.org/en/development/desa/policy/mdg_gap/mdg_gap2014/2014GAP_FULL_EN.pdf.

Rose, P., L. Steer with K. Smith and A. Zubairi (2013), Financing for Global Education. Opportunities for Multilateral Action, Education for All Global Monitoring Report, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2013/09/financing-global-education/basic-education-financing-final–webv2.pdf.

The Reality of Aid (2014), Rethinking Partnerships in a Post-2015 World: Towards Equitable, Inclusive and Sustainable Development, Reality of Aid Report 2014, The Reality of Aid, Philippines.

UN DESA (2014), “Global sustainable development report – 2015 edition”, draft outline, United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, New York, https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/1758GSDR%202015%20Advance%20Unedited%20Version.pdf.

UN DESA (2014), “Sustainable development in action: Special report on voluntary commitments and partnerships for sustainable development”, United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Division for Sustainable Development, New York, July, https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/1479SD%20in%20 Action%20Report%20final%20(1fv).pdf.

UNDG (2014), “Post-2015 dialogues on partnerships with civil society”, Global Meeting Report, United Nations Development Group, New York, www.un.org.jo/publications/post-2015-dialogues-partnerships-civil-society.

UNOIOS (2014), “Thematic evaluation of the monitoring and evaluation framework for tracking progess on the MDGs”, Office of Internal Oversight Services, United Nations, New York, July.

Part I.

The power of partnerships for achieving the Sustainable Development Goals

Chapter 2.

The promise of partnerships in a post-2015 world

by

Homi Kharas

with

Julie Biau

The Brookings Institution

While partnerships are generally recognised as a promising vehicle for delivering the new Sustainable Development Goals, this chapter emphasises the importance of choosing the right partnership for each challenge. For instance, broad co-operation at the global and country levels can be useful in ensuring basic needs, but public-private partnerships at the local level may be more suited for tackling issues of infrastructure. To address free-rider issues associated with biodiversity, peacekeeping or climate change, global intergovernmental negotiations continue to be the central mechanism. Not all sectors and challenges have been equally successful in galvanising the level of international co-operation necessary to achieve a focused response. Success factors for partnerships include ensuring a strong connection between global strategy and local implementation; having clear, ambitious and attainable targets; using performance-based allocation models; and ensuring that the governance structure is participatory, including representatives of all stakeholders.

The Sustainable Development Goals, the centrepiece of the post-2015 development agenda, are broad and ambitious in scope (Box 2.1). Achieving these new goals will require combining the skills and resources of many different partners in ways that drastically reconfigure the business-as-usual approach to development co-operation. Multi-stakeholder partnerships¹ – involving governments, development agencies, civil society, philanthropists and business – are emerging as the key means for implementing the Sustainable Development Goals.

Box 2.1. The Sustainable Development Goals¹

Goal 1 | End poverty in all its forms everywhere.
Goal 2 | End hunger, achieve food security and improved nutrition and promote sustainable agriculture.
Goal 3 | Ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages.
Goal 4 | Ensure inclusive and equitable quality education and promote lifelong learning opportunities for all.
Goal 5 | Achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls.
Goal 6 | Ensure availability and sustainable management of water and sanitation for all.
Goal 7 | Ensure access to affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy for all.
Goal 8 | Promote sustained, inclusive and sustainable economic growth, full and productive employment and decent work for all.
Goal 9 | Build resilient infrastructure, promote inclusive and sustainable industrialisation and foster innovation.
Goal 10 | Reduce inequality within and among countries.
Goal 11 | Make cities and human settlements inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable.
Goal 12 | Ensure sustainable consumption and production patterns.
Goal 13 | Take urgent action to combat climate change and its impacts.
Goal 14 | Conserve and sustainably use the oceans, seas and marine resources for sustainable development.
Goal 15 | Protect, restore and promote sustainable use of terrestrial ecosystems, sustainably manage forests, combat desertification, and halt and reverse land degradation and halt biodiversity loss.
Goal 16 | Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels.
Goal 17 | Strengthen the means of implementation and revitalise the global partnership for sustainable development.

1. This is the list of the proposed Sustainable Development Goals at the time of the publication of this report.

Source: United Nations Open Working Group on Sustainable Development Goals (2014), “Open Working Group proposal for Sustainable Development Goals”, United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Division of Sustainable Development, New York, https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/focussdgs.html.

For the most part, the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) were largely addressed through government structures and agreements; with the exception of selected areas, particularly health, business participation has been modest. Yet business involvement in initiatives such as Gavi (the Vaccines Alliance) or the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (GFATM) has been instrumental in providing better access to vaccines and critical medicines, including through cheaper pricing (see Chapter 8). In turn, this has created opportunities to accelerate public finance for health. While the results of similar efforts in other sectors were not as good, there are lessons to be learned from the diverse array of partnership experiences to date. After all, the top ten global funds accounted for over 14% of total country programmable aid² in 2010 (Gartner and Kharas, 2013).

Multi-stakeholder partnerships are emerging as the key means for implementing the Sustainable Development Goals.

Private sector engagement in the pursuit of development objectives is far from a new idea: this is a field with over 100 years of experience, starting in 1910 with the establishment of the Rockefeller Sanitary Commission for the Eradication of Hookworm Disease as a public health initiative in the United States (Rockefeller Archive Center, 2013). But much has been learned since that time, and partnership models are changing. Recently, partnerships have started moving beyond traditional public-private structures to increasingly bring government together with multiple stakeholders; and instead of operating only locally or nationally, they are becoming more global in scope.

There is still much room for experimentation in using partnerships as an effective instrument for delivering the Sustainable Development Goals. Gavi and the GFATM revolutionised the relationship between public health and pharmaceutical companies by introducing advanced market commitments. These complement research and development funding by building a market that will provide acceptable commercial returns if a vaccine is developed (Levine et al., 2005). In the case of agriculture, an increasing number of technology start-ups are providing tools that allow farmers to optimise farming decisions based on real-time yield monitoring, or to conserve water and cut costs based on live information on over and under-watering (Jahangir Mohammed, 2014). This co-operation goes far beyond the basics provided by the typical partnership modalities in development finance: the bilateral development co-operation project or public-private partnerships in infrastructure. It shifts away from these business-as-usual approaches to include a greater focus on innovation and comparative advantages, making an important commitment to scale.

Experience testifies to key elements of success for global partnerships

Inclusive global partnerships and coalitions are not a silver bullet. While Gavi and the GFATM accounted for one-third of the quadrupling of official development assistance (ODA) to health between 2002 and 2013, other initiatives such as the Global Partnership for Education or the Global Agriculture and Food Security Program have remained modest, handling only 10-20% of resources in their respective sectors (Gartner and Kharas, 2013). As expressed by Patscheke et al. (2014), “the development field is littered with aspirational partnerships that fall short of executing their ambitious goals”.

Gavi and the GFATM accounted for one-third of the quadrupling of ODA to health between 2002 and 2013.

What, then, do successful partnership structures look like? And how can they become more effective at leveraging international resources for the post-2015 agenda? The mixed record of success amongst current initiatives offers some lessons as to the distinctions between a highly effective partnership and a poorly performing one. First, ensuring a strong connection between global strategy and local implementation is critical. Patscheke et al. (2014) explain that partnerships need a “multi-layered backbone structure” that provides coherence around a common agenda, establishes shared measurement systems and facilitates continuous communication, with each layer – global, regional, national and local – playing a different role. Nelson (2011) outlines how these layers of global partnerships can interact. Strong collaborative mechanisms at the country level can draw upon private-sector leadership to address specific challenges. Country teams can design a context-specific implementation plan, using private finance, networks and technology to reach their target beneficiaries; they can build coalitions with local stakeholders to work towards a common agenda with agreed targets and standards. At the global level, a central structure is needed to sustain political interest in the common agenda, conduct campaigns, build an evidence base for the partnership’s approach, mobilise resources and human capital, provide technical assistance to country-level coalitions, prioritise interventions, track progress, and experiment and innovate to inform the partnership’s future strategy.

The experience of vertical funds such as Gavi and the GFATM in the social sectors suggests several additional elements of success:

the ability to articulate a simple mission, and to demonstrate a straightforward link between resources and outcomes

action around clear, ambitious and attainable targets

an emphasis on results

the ability to scale up accomplishments

the participation of multiple stakeholders in designing solutions and in the partnership’s governance structure

access to organised communities of experts to provide an evidence base for the design of strategies

the ability to self-renew and innovate.

Furthermore, a comparative analysis by Gartner and Kharas (2013) finds that the better-performing vertical funds tend:

to have relatively greater independence from bilateral and multilateral providers

to use performance-based models to a greater degree for allocating funding

to have inclusive governance structures encompassing representatives of civil society and other stakeholders.

Partnerships work when all participants are committed to finding solutions to common problems.

These findings reflect the fact that partnerships work when all participants are committed to finding solutions to common problems. Sometimes, however, this requires changes in behaviour and mind-sets. For example, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) frequently see themselves as whistle-blowers, whose role it is to hold businesses and government accountable; as members of a multi-stakeholder partnership, however, their approach may need to be more collaborative, advocating for their principles from the inside. There may also be differing expectations about what each partner can, or is willing to, contribute. The difficulties faced by the Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation in forging a genuine partnership among all development co-operation providers shows that this sort of transformation is often a long-term process (see Chapter 3).

Each challenge demands a different type of partnership model

The post-2015 Sustainable Development Goals coalesce around three main themes:

basic needs and social progress

infrastructure for sustainable development

global public goods.

The Intergovernmental Committee of Experts on Sustainable Development Financing estimates that although global public and private savings are, in theory, sufficient to cater to needs in all three of these categories, financing remains well below optimal levels (ICESDF, 2014). This suggests that current financing and investment practices will need to change if the post-2015 agenda is to succeed (Kharas et al., 2014).

To date, most of the experimentation and advances that have taken place with global multi-stakeholder partnerships have been in the area of basic needs. Ending hunger, providing inclusive and equitable education or ensuring healthy lives for all have already generated considerable activity from structures such as the Global Alliance for Improved Nutrition, the Global Partnership for Education or the Global Fund, and these are likely candidates for renewed global initiatives. On the other hand, efforts to achieve goals such as resilient infrastructure, access to affordable and sustainable energy, and safe and inclusive cities have not given rise to the same level of broad coalition building. Likewise, the global public goods that are to be tackled by the Sustainable Development Goals have not succeeded in galvanising the level of international co-operation necessary for a focused response (e.g. peacebuilding, biodiversity or climate change).

To some extent, these patterns simply reflect the fact that the MDGs themselves placed far greater emphasis on basic needs than on other areas. Unsurprisingly, global partnerships have also tended to focus on highly visible sectors that are relatively easy to raise money for, and where the link between resources and results is clear (Kharas et al., 2014). More fundamentally, however, questions of infrastructure and of global public goods may not lend themselves well to the global vertical fund approach. Infrastructure finance tends to be project-specific, with large investments being raised on a case-by-case basis (ibid.), and this does not align well with the notion of financing an ongoing national plan. Additionally, with the exception of a few regional projects, infrastructure initiatives tend to have most relevance at the national or local level due to the idiosyncrasies of each country’s or region’s infrastructure network and service delivery structures. There is, therefore, little value to be gained from adding a global dimension to infrastructure discussions, except perhaps in fields such as clean energy, where there is more scope for innovation and global co-operation.³ Likewise, while traditional public-private partnerships are very important for infrastructure, they are usually focused on achieving specific project objectives and do not aspire to the level of innovation, scale and impact that characterises a global partnership.

The international approach to climate change, biodiversity loss and peacekeeping has faltered over the difficulties in agreeing on how to share the financing burden.

Global public goods, on the other hand, are more systemic and could theoretically benefit from international inclusive co-operation. They have, however, been heavily underfunded so far. The international approach to climate change, biodiversity loss and peacekeeping has faltered over the difficulties in agreeing on how to share the financing burden, with intergovernmental discussions revolving around how to sort out responsibilities and agree on adequate financing levels (ibid.). These complex and politically sensitive debates are more political than technical. Because their solutions lie mainly in improved co-operation among national governments, they may only marginally benefit from the inputs of a more diverse array of stakeholders and are more effectively addressed through international negotiations than in global multi-stakeholder forums.

Global multi-stakeholder partnerships are thus better suited to addressing certain kinds of problems than others. Their success in the field of basic needs is no coincidence: this area covers problems where governments and non-governmental entities can pool their diverse resources, skills and potential for innovation to tackle relatively straightforward and visible issues (hunger, water and sanitation, education, health, and, possibly, poverty).

More contained questions of human settlements, on the other hand (such as urban planning, energy provision and building resilient infrastructure), are probably best handled at the local level through traditional public-private partnerships, whose objectives are country and project-specific.

Therefore, while the three main categories of Sustainable Development Goals all require some form of partnership, each type of problem demands a different type of partnership model. Figure 2.1 maps out the Sustainable Development Goals according to geographic scope and possible partnership models: global-government (the best fit for global public goods), local-private sector (the best fit for infrastructure) and global multi-stakeholder (the best fit for basic needs). Socio-cultural goals – such as inequality, gender empowerment and employment – are best handled through local multi-stakeholder partnerships because of their country-specificity.

Figure 2.1. A matrix of partnership approaches for the Sustainable Development Goals

Global partnerships can help to support disenfranchised groups

Looking ahead, there is one more dimension of basic needs in which global multi-stakeholder partnerships may have the most to offer: the establishment of a global social floor,⁴ which would require reaching millions of people in multiple sectors. Global multi-stakeholder co-operation in each of the basic needs sectors could clearly identify gaps at the global level. This, in turn, could reduce fragmentation and inefficiency in mobilising, allocating and implementing international development finance. Such partnerships could also increase the efficiency of delivery in each country (especially if they are based on specific, action-oriented goals) and may help to overcome policy constraints.

Global partnerships are especially valuable for decisions that cannot be left to individual countries’ discretion.

Indeed, the global partnership approach is especially valuable for decisions that cannot be left to individual countries’ discretion, particularly when dealing with global targets that concern marginalised or disenfranchised groups with low political support in their home countries. This is the case, for instance, with HIV/AIDS, where the affected population includes a large proportion of sex workers and drug users. Global partnerships can bring to the table civil society groups that may be able to speak for such people. They also can create global peer pressure to ensure that domestic planning processes and international financing channels are put in place to achieve global targets. Additionally, while all countries have the opportunity to participate in global partnerships, the partnership’s decision to focus on a given set of countries is driven by the nature of the problem that the initiative has set out to tackle. Country allocations, therefore, are focused on the problem and determined by its location, rather than each country deciding how it will allocate a pre-determined ODA envelope; this allows programmes to continue through the twists and turns of the political cycle. In this way, multi-stakeholder partnerships hold much potential for keeping the Sustainable Development Goal promise of “leaving no one behind”.

New modes of co-operation will be essential for meeting the ambitious goals of the post-2015 agenda

Global multi-stakeholder partnerships and vertical funds are bringing together expertise and financing from governments, development agencies, civil society, philanthropies and private corporations to address international development challenges in new ways. These partnerships are an important innovation that can help to correct some of the historical shortcomings of the development co-operation system, such as fragmentation, duplication and volatility.

The Sustainable Development Goals provide considerable room for the emergence and strengthening of global multi-stakeholder partnerships. These coalitions can be instrumental in pushing for successful outcomes on questions of education, health and food security – and can help achieve results even in countries where these issues, for political reasons, have been relatively neglected so far. Many lessons can be drawn from experience in improving the efficiency and impact of partnerships. A good understanding of the interplay between the geographic scope and the level of stakeholder involvement in partnerships can help guide decisions on which partnership model to use.

Recommendations for partnerships in a post-2015 world

Create a “multi-layered backbone structure” that provides coherence around a common agenda, establishes shared measurement systems and facilitates continuous communication, with each layer – global, regional, national and local – playing a different role.

Ensure that all participants are committed to finding solutions to common problems.

Promote changes in behaviour and mind-sets where needed to ensure that multi-stakeholder partnerships function well.

Articulate a simple mission with clear, ambitious and attainable targets.

Put in place a participatory governance structure encompassing representatives of all stakeholders.

Ensure the type of partnership is suited to the development goal:

Basic needs are very amenable to global multi-stakeholder co-operation, which can be stepped up to ensure a global social floor.

Traditional local public-private partnerships may be better suited for infrastructure.

Global intergovernmental negotiations are the best mechanism for addressing the free-rider problems associated with biodiversity, peacekeeping or climate change mitigation.

Socio-cultural goals are best handled through local multi-stakeholder partnerships.

Notes

 1. The term “multi-stakeholder partnerships” is used to describe groupings of civil society, the private sector, the public sector, the media and other stakeholders that come together for a common purpose, pooling their diverse resources, expertise and experience to achieve common goals.

 2. Country programmable aid is aid allocated to a specific country (see Glossary).

 3. Hence the existence of a global partnership for Sustainable Energy for All (see Chapter 11), whereas no such partnership exists for traditional infrastructure sectors.

 4. A social protection floor is defined by the International Labour Organization as a set of basic social security guarantees that should ensure access to essential healthcare and to basic income security, which together secure effective access to necessary goods and services.

References

Gartner, D. and H. Kharas (2013), “Vertical funds and innovative governance”, in Chandy, L. et al. (eds.), Getting to Scale: How to Bring Development Solutions to Millions of Poor People, Brookings Institution Press, Washington, DC.

ICESDF (2014), “Report of the Intergovernmental Committee of Experts on Sustainable Development Financing”, Final Draft, 8 August, Intergovernmental Committee of Experts on Sustainable Development Financing, United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, New York, https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/4588FINAL%20REPORT%20ICESDF.pdf.

Jahangir Mohammed, J. (2014), “Surprise: Agriculture is doing more with IoT innovation than most other industries”, VentureBeat.com, 7 December, http://venturebeat.com/2014/12/07/surprise-agriculture-is-doing-more-with-iot-innovation-than-most-other-industries.

Kharas, H. et al. (2014), “Financing the post-2015 Sustainable Development Goals: A rough roadmap”, Overseas Development Institute, London, www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/9374.pdf.

Levine, R. et al. (eds.) (2005), Making Markets for Vaccines: Ideas to Action, Center for Global Development, Advance Market Commitment Working Group, Washington, DC, www.cgdev.org/doc/books/vaccine/MakingMarkets-complete.pdf.

Nelson, J. (2011), “The private sector and aid effectiveness: Toward new models of engagement”, in Kharas, H. et al. (eds.), Catalyzing Development, Brookings Institution Press, Washington, DC, www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2010/9/development%20aid/09_development_aid_nelson.pdf.

Patscheke, A. et al. (2014), “Shaping global partnerships for a post-2015 world”, Stanford Social Innovation Review, Leland Stanford Jr. University, Stanford, California, www.ssireview.org/articles/entry/shaping_global_partnerships_ for_a_post_2015_world.

Rockefeller Archive Center (2013), “Eradicating hookworm”, The Archive Center, New York, http://rockefeller100.org/exhibits/show/health/eradicating-hookworm.

United Nations Open Working Group on Sustainable Development Goals (2014), “Open Working Group proposal for Sustainable Development Goals”, United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Division of Sustainable Development, New York, https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/focussdgs.html.

Chapter 3.

Inclusive partnerships for effective development co-operation

by

Brenda Killen

Development Co-operation Directorate, OECD

The first decade of this millennium saw consensus growing around the need to heighten the effectiveness of development co-operation. An evolving series of declarations – from the Paris Declaration to the Accra Agenda for Action and the Busan Partnership agreement – set out and reaffirmed underpinning principles and set measurable indicators of effective development. These, in turn, were endorsed and taken up by an increasingly diverse range of development partners. The process culminated in 2011 with the creation of the Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation: an alliance of 160 developing and developed countries, more than 45 organisations, civil society and the private sector. This chapter highlights why this Global Partnership can be part of the “how” of implementing and measuring progress towards the Sustainable Development Goals and makes recommendations for successful partnerships post-2015.

 1 

While visiting a colleague at the Ministry of Health and Sanitation in Freetown, Sierra Leone, I was struck by a quote on the wall: “One boat, one direction”. When I asked her about it, she explained, “It helps me keep the focus on why we’re here – and how we should be working”. This quote has become my favourite way of describing the power of development partnerships.

Partnerships lie at the heart of most success stories in achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) – such as getting children into school, slowing the rate of deforestation, and caring for people affected by HIV/AIDS and malaria. Successful partnership models need to be replicated and scaled up as we face an even more ambitious set of global challenges post-2015: the Sustainable Development Goals. We need to ensure that we have the means of achieving the outcomes we aspire to. This means looking not only at the what, but also at the how of international development co-operation – its quality and effectiveness.

A strong post-2015 development framework will need to include incentives for effective development co-operation that reach beyond national governments.

In a multipolar world, we must harness and harmonise the resources of a diverse range of actors involved in development – including civil society, businesses, philanthropists, local governments and parliaments – recognising their differences as well as the comparative advantage of each. International development co-operation can be a powerful tool for countries working to realise their own goals and ambitions through partnership (OECD, 2014a). A strong post-2015 development framework will need to include incentives for effective co-operation that reach beyond national governments to build solid and diverse partnership arrangements.

The widely endorsed Busan Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation (see Annex D) offers principles to underpin such partnerships, ensuring that the how of the post-2015 development framework meets widely agreed standards for success. It led directly to the establishment of the Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation,² which aims to take these principles to practice. Made up of a broad political coalition of stakeholders, the Global Partnership can drive progress towards the Sustainable Development Goals. This chapter outlines its role and progress to date, and draws lessons for the future. It is complemented by a case study chapter on the Global Partnership later in this report (see Chapter 7).

The Busan Partnership endorsed the development effectiveness principles

In 2000, the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC) embarked on a process involving an ever-widening diversity of development partners with a common objective: to formulate a set of development effectiveness principles, build consensus behind them and promote their wide implementation to underpin accountable development co-operation (see Annex D).

The consensus-building process was articulated around a series of high-level forums, each of which produced important partnership agreements (see Annex D). It culminated in 2011 when the international development community convened in Busan, Korea, for the Fourth High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness. Participants in that forum were acutely aware of the changes that had occurred in the global economy and the development landscape since the process began. For development co-operation to increase its effectiveness as a catalyst for poverty reduction, a bolder, much more inclusive partnership structure was required, recognising the range of actors in development and the important – but different – role played by each.

The Busan forum was unprecedented for its inclusiveness.

The Busan forum was unprecedented for its inclusiveness: more than 3 000 people from the private sector, civil society, philanthropies, emerging development assistance providers, developing countries, development agencies and multilateral organisations took part. Their discussions gave rise to the 2011 Busan Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation Agreement (see Annex D). The Busan Partnership highlighted four principles – distilled from the development effectiveness principles defined in the Paris Declaration and reaffirmed in the Accra Agenda for Action – to guide future action on common development goals: ownership of development priorities by developing countries, a focus on results, inclusive development partnerships, and transparency and accountability (see Annex D).

In adhering to the Busan agreement, partners recognised that different stakeholders may approach a common development agenda in different ways. Thanks to this recognition of “differential commitments”,³ Brazil, the People’s Republic of China and India endorsed the Busan principles and agreed to use them as a reference point for South-South co-operation.

Participants in Busan took stock of progress in delivering on existing commitments through a monitoring exercise involving 78 countries. The exercise made it clear that the performance of the traditional development co-operation community had lagged. In contrast, developing countries had gone far in following through on their commitments to improve their institutional capacity, to strengthen their national systems and to exercise ownership and leadership of their own development strategies.

Despite this uneven progress, however, an in-depth evaluation of the implementation of the Paris Declaration confirmed the validity of the principles, commitments and implementation processes set out in this declaration (OECD/UNDP, 2014). It also pointed out that the implementation of these principles had helped to strengthen standards of partnerships, and legitimised demand from developing countries that good practice be observed. While it found that more time was needed to produce the substantial and lasting results envisaged in the Paris Declaration, it argued that pressure to perform against existing commitments should not be abandoned.

The Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation responds to today’s challenges and opportunities

The Busan Partnership agreement set in motion the constitution of a “new, inclusive and representative Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation to support dialogue and learning, strong political attention and momentum, and ensure accountability” (Fourth High-Level Forum, 2011). In the six months following Busan, the Global Partnership took shape with continuous support from the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the OECD. Negotiations to define its governance structure, operating modalities and aims were led by a Post-Busan Interim Group of representatives from 26 development constituencies and countries.

Today, the Global Partnership is an alliance of 160 countries and more than 45 organisations (see Chapter 7 for more information). It functions as:

a platform where all stakeholders can come together voluntarily to track progress, hold each other to account and learn lessons for improving the way they work at the country level

a mechanism for monitoring implementation of commitments, using developing countries’ own data and processes to track progress at the global level

a business model that sustains political focus on high-quality development partnerships, ensuring that co-operation is based on developing countries’ ownership, transparency and accountability for delivering tangible results

a light-touch organisational structure for brokering and cultivating individual member-led initiatives to improve development co-operation on the ground.

To carry forward work on the “unfinished business” of previous agreements and guide efforts on new and emerging commitments, the Global Partnership agreed on a monitoring framework made up of ten global indicators (Box 3.1).

Box 3.1. Ten quality indicators for development co-operation

The work of the Global Partnership is guided by 10 indicators that have been endorsed by 54 international organisations; 161 nations and territories, representing developed and developing countries as well as providers of South-South co-operation; and representatives of civil society, parliamentarians and the private sector.

Development co-operation is focused on results that meet developing countries’ priorities.

Civil society operates within an environment which maximises its engagement in and contribution to development.

Engagement and contribution of the private sector to development.

Transparency: information on development co-operation is publicly available.

Development co-operation is more predictable.

Aid is on budgets which are subject to parliamentary scrutiny.

Mutual accountability among development co-operation actors is strengthened through inclusive reviews.

Gender equality and women’s empowerment.

Effective institutions: developing countries’ systems are strengthened and used.

Aid is untied.

For further details on the goals and indicators, see: www.effectivecooperation.org/files/about-trackingprogress/INDICATORS.pdf.

The Global Partnership conducted a first review of progress against these goals in 2013/14 (OECD/UNDP, 2014). The report, based on data provided by 46 countries, reveals that despite global economic turbulence, new conflicts, changing political landscapes and budgetary pressures in many high-income countries, commitment to effectiveness and continued reform remains strong.

The potential of the Global Partnership lies in its ability to address the reality of today’s world.

The potential of the Global Partnership lies in its ability to address, through its wide and diverse mandate and membership, the reality of today’s world. Development today, especially in the context of the Sustainable Development Goals, involves responsibilities and challenges that are shared by the entire global community, and that require action and accountability on all sides (see Chapters 5 and 6). At the same time, the Global Partnership can play a key role in ensuring that core development co-operation resources – not only funds, but also the knowledge that has been built up over more than 50 years – are used in the “smartest” way possible to address the particular challenges many developing countries face. These include improving tax systems, curtailing illicit financial flows, addressing corruption or strengthening fragile governance structures (OECD, 2014a). These issues concern not only national governments, but civil society and the private sector as well. Creating a political space where all can interact is an important step towards effective development co-operation.

What is the role of the Global Partnership post-2015?

The first High-Level Meeting of the Global Partnership (Mexico City, 15-16 April 2014) demonstrated that it was ready to move from words to action. Participants agreed on a forward-looking communiqué backed by almost 40 initiatives to address specific development challenges, such as the one described in Box 3.2 (see also Chapter 7 and the Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation, 2014).

Box 3.2. The Partnership for Climate Finance and Development

For developing countries to mitigate and adapt to the impacts of climate change, it will be necessary to mobilise USD 100 billion in international public and private climate finance every year until 2020. It is essential that these international public funds be accessed, managed and used effectively. To ensure this, the aid effectiveness principles must also apply to international public climate finance.

Public climate finance was signalled as a priority for effective international development during the Busan forum, leading to the creation of the Partnership for Climate Finance and Development. This initiative brings together the international development co-operation and climate change communities to apply lessons from development co-operation to the use of climate finance. The partnership helps diverse actors in climate-related development co-operation work together and learn from each other in an environment that is external to the climate change negotiations. The focus is on national capacity building to support prioritisation and planning, as well as effective allocation, management and tracking of climate finance. The partnership also aims to build readiness to gain access to international climate finance, for example through the Green Climate Fund. The OECD supports this initiative in partnership with the UNDP and 28 other countries and international organisations, focusing its current contribution on creating and strengthening regional platforms for dialogue and peer-to-peer learning. Regional dialogues in Asia-Pacific and Latin America are expected to serve as models for the launch of a platform in the African region.

Source: OECD (2014b), “Partnership for Climate Finance and Development”, webpage, www.oecd.org/development/environment-development/climate-partnership.htm (accessed 10 September 2014).

Development today calls for brave new models that can drive diversity for the common good. The meeting in Mexico evidenced the ways in which the Global Partnership can contribute to addressing the challenges of the post-2015 world:

An inclusive discussion. More than 1 600 participants from 156 national governments and 25 international organisations attended the conference: representatives of development assistance providers, middle-income and low-income country governments, multilateral development organisations, UN agencies, civil society, private enterprise, philanthropic foundations, parliaments, think tanks and trade unions.

A frank conversation about official development assistance. Discussions and agreements in Mexico underlined that official development assistance (ODA) has unique features – predictability, flexibility, timeliness and a focus on poverty reduction – that contribute to making it the most important source of development finance for poor, fragile and vulnerable states. In this context, concern was raised about the fall in ODA to Africa.

New alliances. The agenda that emerged from the meeting builds on the partnership’s diverse membership to make real progress in breaking down silos among different forms of development finance; these alliances will ensure that countries (and communities) receive the mix of assistance they need, in the right way and at the right time.

Recognition of the role of the private sector. Open deliberation on the role of the private sector centred on how to ensure business has a stronger positive impact on driving progress. Private sector leaders were clearly interested in discussing their contribution to development and building bridges with vastly different constituencies – but they were also challenged by their colleagues to live up to their commitments.

Accountability at the core of development. The meeting made it clear that an increasing number of partners are applying the principles of accountability and transparency, including development assistance providers who are new to the monitoring process, private foundations and business leaders (see Chapters 5 and 6).

Political will into action. The Mexico meeting positioned the Global Partnership as the “go-to” forum where political will turns into action. The almost 40 ”voluntary initiatives” agreed there are now being implemented – for example the extension of the OECD work on automatic exchange of tax information and base erosion and profit sharing (BEPS) to address important concerns of low-income countries (Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation, 2014).

A place to “do business” on development. In his opening speech, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon stated that the Global Partnership “has a crucial contribution to make” to informing and implementing the post-2015 agenda; for example, discussions in Mexico on development finance helped build relationships and trust while sharing lessons on good practice.

The Global Partnership can drive diversity for the common good

Development today calls for new models that can drive diversity for the common good. The Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation has been recognised as part of the how of post-2015 implementation and accountability (for example, see Gondwe et al., 2014; Alisjahbana et al., 2013; UN, 2013; UNGA, 2014). It is built on ample experience and buy-in regarding what makes development work. As a flexible and open forum, the Global Partnership promotes innovation by creating a space for exchange and experimentation based on the range of experience and approaches of its partners. It is designed in a way that encourages leadership by diverse stakeholders, benefits from the support of key international organisations, and encourages politicians and decision makers to take action on pressing issues.

The Global Partnership has been recognised as part of the how of post-2015 implementation and accountability.

Returning to my initial metaphor, although the boat may rock at times, the Global Partnership is a shared vessel, with room on board for all kinds of development actors – from North and South, and with vastly different development issues and capabilities – and developing countries are clearly at the helm. Its course is fixed on a horizon of shared principles, maximising the complementarities of those on board and recognising their diverse ways of contributing to moving forward – together.

Recommendations for inclusive partnerships for effective development co-operation

Ensure partnerships are inclusive. Put in place working practices that facilitate participation, ownership, dialogue and mutual learning.

Make governance arrangements representative to enhance legitimacy and strengthen buy-in. Take a flexible, open approach to participation and membership – all partners need to have equal standing, rights and ability to influence outcomes.

Anchor the partnership to agreed principles to provide focus, a shared language and common objectives, while simultaneously acknowledging a diversity of approaches and means for accomplishing them. Complement political engagement with implementation on the ground to avoid turning the partnership into a “talk shop”.

Put in place a mechanism for monitoring progress on promises and commitments – based on empirical data and clear metrics – make these results public and facilitate open dialogue around them to enable mutual learning. The political will to be held to account builds trust, which is the starting point for genuine partnership.

Notes

 1. The author wishes to thank Christine Graves, Raundi Halvorson-Quevedo and Farida Tchaitchian Bena for their contributions to this chapter.

 2. For more details, see: http://effectivecooperation.org.

 3. These commitments have been formalised by civil society organisations (CSOs) through the Istanbul CSO Development Effectiveness Principles (Open Forum for CSO Development Effectiveness, 2010) and by foundations through the Guidelines for Effective Philanthropic Engagement (OECD Development Centre, 2014).

References

Alisjahbana, A. et al. (2013), “The Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation: Perspectives for a post-2015 development framework”, www.effectivecooperation.org/files/Letter%20to%20the%20High%20Level%20Panel %20--%20Okonjo-Iweala_Alisjahbana_Greening%20--%2024Mar13.pdf.

Fourth High-Level Forum (2011), Busan Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation, Fourth High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness, Busan, Korea, 29 November-1 December 2011, www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/49650173.pdf.

Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation (2014), “First High-Level Meeting of the Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation: Building towards an inclusive post-2015 development agenda”, Mexico High level Meeting Communiqué, 16 April, http://effectivecooperation.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/FinalConsensusMexicoHLMCommunique.pdf.

Gondwe, G. et al. (2014), “Ensuring quality of development co-operation post-2015”, Inputs to the UNSG synthesis report from the co-chairs of the Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation, October, http://effectivecooperation.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/GPEDC-Input-to-UNSG-Synthesis-Report.pdf.

OECD (2014a), Development Co-operation Report 2014: Mobilising Resources for Sustainable Development, OECD Publishing, Paris, http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/dcr-2014-en.

OECD (2014b), “Partnership for Climate Finance and Development”, webpage, www.oecd.org/development/environment-development/climate-partnership.htm (accessed 10 September 2014).

OECD/UNDP (2014), Making Development Co-operation More Effective: 2014 Progress Report, OECD Publishing, Paris, http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264209305-en.

OECD Development Centre (2014), Guidelines for Effective Philanthropic Engagement (GEPEs), OECD Development Centre, Paris, www.oecd.org/site/netfwd/GEPES-September2014.pdf.

Open Forum for CSO Development Effectiveness (2010), “Istanbul CSO development effectiveness principles”, Open Forum for CSO Development, Istanbul, http://cso-effectiveness.org/IMG/pdf/final_istanbul_cso_development_ effectiveness_principles_footnote_december_2010-2.pdf.

UN (2013), “A new global partnership: Eradicate poverty and transform economies through sustainable development”, report of the High-Level Panel of Eminent Persons on the Post-2015 Development Agenda, United Nations Publications, New York, www.un.org/sg/management/pdf/HLP_P2015_Report.pdf.

UNGA (2014), “The road to dignity by 2030: Ending poverty, transforming all lives and protecting the planet”, synthesis report of the Secretary-General on the post-2015 sustainable development agenda, A/69/700, United Nations General Assembly, 4 December, New York, www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/69/700&Lang=E.

Chapter 4.

Private sector partnerships for sustainable development

by

Alex Evans

Center on International Cooperation, New York University

The post-2015 Sustainable Development Goals will require contributions from all countries and all actors: public and private. Progress will need to be made in three key areas: fragile states, inclusive and sustainable growth in middle-income countries, and domestic policies in developed countries that affect poverty reduction and sustainable production and consumption. Many of these areas imply a strong role for the private sector, through job creation, technology development and investment. However, partnerships with the private sector come with some caveats that need to be addressed. This chapter explores the role of the private sector in delivering the post-2015 sustainable development agenda, focusing on what business can do (and what it cannot do) and the role governments need to play to avoid risks and maximise potential.

Whether for good or ill, 2015 is a milestone year for gauging whether governments and other key stakeholders are serious about co-operating with each other to tackle shared global challenges.

The new Sustainable Development Goals enshrine the twin objectives of ending extreme poverty and doing so while shifting decisively towards sustainable development (a synthesis that was supposed to have been agreed at Rio in 1992, but which has, in practice, remained elusive over the ensuing two decades).

This new agenda will need to focus on making much faster progress in three key areas: supporting fragile states (or parts of states); shifting towards inclusive and sustainable growth in middle-income countries; and addressing the global trends that matter for poverty, especially in OECD countries’ domestic policies – above all, those related to sustainable consumption and production.

Expectations are high for a breakthrough in multi-stakeholder partnerships as a key means of implementing the post-2015 development agenda. But what exactly does partnership mean? Where does the private sector – in particular – fit in, and what are its roles in relation to those of governments? Above all, what would a breakthrough on the partnership agenda actually look like?

Most of the heavy lifting on the post-2015 agenda will need to be done by the private sector.

This chapter explores these questions. It stresses that partnerships with the private sector do have considerable potential – in fact, most of the heavy lifting on the post-2015 agenda will need to be done by the private sector. Yet governments still have the crucial role of setting the policy framework within which the private sector operates.

The role of the private sector post-2015 carries great potential – but also risks

The idea of partnership has been around for a long time in sustainable development circles. Agenda 21, a key outcome of the Rio Earth Summit in 1992, placed great emphasis on the formation of community partnerships that could bring together different kinds of actors in driving change on the ground (UN, 1992).

Ten years later, the World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg again stressed the limits to what governments could achieve without bringing civil society, local government, academia, faith communities, trade unions and numerous other actors on board.¹

Among these “other actors”, it is the role of the private sector that is most controversial in development partnerships. Yet at the same time, this is the area where arguably the greatest potential lies.

Business is already a crucially important player in driving development.

It is worth noting at the outset that business is already a crucially important player in driving development. The private sector typically accounts for 60% of gross domestic product (GDP) in developing countries, 80% of total international capital flows to these countries (including foreign direct investment, portfolio equity flows, commercial debt and remittances) and 90% of jobs (IMF, 2013; Adelman, 2013; Creative Associates, 2014; European Commission, 2014).

As we move forward, the private sector will need to play a pivotal role in delivering the Sustainable Development Goals. The International Labour Organization estimates that around 670 million jobs need to be created over the next 15 years to keep up with the growth of the global labour force (ILO, 2014). The International Energy Agency suggests that meeting future energy needs (and doing it sustainably) will cost USD 48 trillion between now and 2035 (see Chapter 11; IEA, 2014). In both cases, it is the private sector that will need to do most of the heavy lifting.

There is, nonetheless, much unease and wariness about this new partnership agenda. Many developing country governments fear – with some justification – that the enthusiasm of some developed country governments for partnerships is a fig leaf to cover their under-achievement on official development assistance (ODA) spending targets. A focus on the potential of voluntary partnerships to drive progress could also obscure governments’ role in setting the policy framework within which the private sector operates – for instance, by putting a price on carbon as an essential prerequisite for reducing greenhouse gas emissions – and this provides real grounds for concern.

A strategy is needed to maximise the contribution of business

So what are the key elements of a strategy to maximise the potential contribution of business while minimising the risks – and how should policy makers think about the role of the private sector in delivering the post-2015 sustainable development agenda?

First, get the basics of good business right

A good way to start is by looking at ways in which business can contribute that are relatively uncontroversial. First and most fundamentally, of course, there are the essentials of responsible business (Box 4.1), which all companies ought to observe (irrespective of whether or not they are interested in social impact, long-term sustainability or the “triple bottom line”²). This includes obeying the law; observing core human rights and labour standards; not paying bribes; paying tax (and playing fair about tax jurisdiction, including not making use of exotic approaches to transfer pricing); and being transparent and accountable for their actions.

Box 4.1. Responsible business conduct

Responsible business conduct is founded on the idea that businesses can do well while doing no harm. It encompasses two complementary aspects of the business-society relationship: promoting sustainable development through the positive contribution businesses can make to economic, environmental and social progress; and avoiding negative impacts and addressing them when they do occur through risk-based due diligence.*

The OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises are the most comprehensive set of recommendations on responsible business conduct. Endorsed by governments, businesses, trade unions and civil society, the guidelines cover topics such as information disclosure, human rights, employment and labour, environment, anti-corruption, consumer interests and others.

Each adhering country sets up a national contact point to promote the guidelines, handle inquiries and help resolve issues that arise from non-observance of the guidelines by multinational enterprises that operate in or from the adhering countries. The guidelines are the only government-backed international instrument on responsible business conduct with a built-in grievance mechanism. Through this mechanism, national contact points provide a platform to help stakeholders resolve responsible business conduct issues. The national contact points are not judicial bodies, but instead focus on facilitating consensual and non-adversarial procedures such as conciliation or mediation. Any interested party – including individuals, workers, consumers and local communities – can file a request with the national contact point to review a specific incident.

For more information about the guidelines and national contact points, please visit http://mneguidelines.oecd.org.

* Risk-based due diligence refers to the steps companies take to identify, prevent and mitigate actual and potential adverse impacts and account for how these impacts are addressed. The OECD is currently developing industry-specific guidance on the application of risk-based due diligence in the textile and garment, agriculture, extractive and financial sectors.

The other basic starting point is for governments to get the enabling environment right for private sector growth – for example by ensuring that contracts are enforced, corruption is not allowed to run rampant, customs systems function as they should, workforces are educated and skilled, energy and transport infrastructure is in place, and so on.

There is also much that can be done to ensure that developing country governments have the capacity to maximise the development dividend from foreign direct investment. For example, many low-income countries would benefit from support to build up their skills in negotiating complex deals with multinational companies for infrastructure or investment. Countries also could use support in expanding the pipeline of “bankable projects”, for instance by making available more funds for preparing projects, undertaking feasibility studies and developing national infrastructure strategies.

But the debate about private sector partners really begins in earnest beyond these relatively straightforward nuts and bolts. What about all that remains to be done in terms of actual implementation?

Use real cases of sector-specific partnerships to demonstrate the power of partnerships

In practice, discussions about the role of the private sector in development are often simply too broad to offer much guidance about where the greatest potential lies or what kinds of approach countries should follow.

It often makes more sense to look at what the private sector is already contributing to development goals in specific sectors or value chains. Existing partnerships that can help deliver on the Sustainable Development Goals include, for example, the Sustainable Energy for All partnership (see Chapter 11) and, at a more granular level, the Global Alliance on Vaccines and Immunization (Gavi, see Chapter 8).

How to avoid perceptions that partnerships are about little more than photo opportunities?

In the same way, partnerships will usually seem more tangible when they are about implementation on the ground in real places. At present, much of the profile of partnerships is generated around high-level events in capitals, as is the case for the Clinton Global Initiative (a non-profit foundation that “convenes global leaders to create and implement innovative solutions to the world’s most pressing challenges”).³ This risks feeding unease that partnerships offer little more than photo opportunities.

To avoid such perceptions, it could be useful initially to use a small number of partnerships in selected countries to demonstrate what a partnership approach can deliver on the ground. This approach could, perhaps, function in a way similar to the Millennium Village Project – launched in 2005 by Columbia University, the United Nations Development Programme and Millennium Promise – which targeted assistance to a small number of communities as a way of showcasing what could be achieved in rural development contexts.⁴

Ensure private financing and investment supports sustainable development needs

Providing financing and investment for development will be one of the most important roles the private sector has to play in the post-2015 agenda.

As mentioned earlier, today the private sector is already a key source of development finance: while total global ODA flows in 2013 came to USD 134.5 billion, foreign direct investment to developing countries in the same year amounted to USD 758.2 billion, remittances to USD 318.2 billion and portfolio equity flows to USD 70.1 billion (OECD, 2014a; World Bank, 2014a, 2014b, 2014c).

Even so, these numbers are but a fraction of what they could be. There is no shortage of capital looking for yield: global equity markets are worth around USD 50 trillion, while worldwide sovereign and intergovernmental debt is worth about double that (WFE, 2013; TheCityUK, 2011).

Pension funds invest just 3% of their assets in much-needed developing country infrastructure.

Yet in recent years, private flows have often fuelled problems rather than financing global solutions. For example, they have funded the exploration and production of fossil fuels that can never be burned if global average warming is to be kept below 2°C, or have been used to create subprime property bubbles. On the other hand, pension funds invest just 3% of their assets in much-needed developing country infrastructure (UN Intergovernmental Committee of Experts on Sustainable Development Financing, 2014).

Many steps can be taken to better attune financial sector investment to long-term sustainable development needs and goals. For instance: 5

examine whether current fiduciary responsibility rules, securities regulations and consumer protection laws give institutional investors enough leeway to invest sustainably

encourage stock markets to promote environmental, social and governance reporting by companies listed on them (as the Istanbul stock exchange has already done)

incorporate sustainability criteria into credit ratings agency decisions.

Use accountability mechanisms to ensure companies deliver on their promises

Another area where more could be done to maximise the potential of private sector partnerships is by identifying ways to improve accountability – a key priority for allaying scepticism about whether companies really deliver on their promises. At the 2006 Clinton Global Initiative, for example, Virgin Atlantic Chief Executive Richard Branson garnered plaudits for promising to spend USD 3 billion on fighting climate change, but by mid-2014 he had spent less than one-tenth of this, according to the activist and author Naomi Klein (Klein, 2014).

One way of improving accountability would be to set up an international registry of companies’ pledges to invest or undertake other actions (whether as part of specific partnerships or made at summit meetings such as the UN Secretary-General’s Climate Summit 2014 in New York), and to follow up on them at regular intervals. A scorecard of the companies that do most and least against their commitments could then be published.

More broadly, there is much that companies could do to improve reporting on their social impact, resource footprints, and so on. Accountancy bodies could set the standards for this reporting, including standardised country-by-country breakdowns for multinational companies.

The role of governments is to tackle market failures

Perhaps the most fundamental area where a partnership approach is needed is in tackling market failures – a challenge that highlights the critical overlap between what companies do, on the one hand, and what governments do, through public policy, on the other.

Companies’ own self-interest can lead them to undertake a wide array of voluntary actions to promote sustainable development – reducing their waste footprint, say, or developing products and supply chains that have a high social impact. Yet it is important to be clear that in many cases, there is no business case for such activity.

As a result, while many developing countries have greatly improved their capacity to access private sector finance over the past decade, this is not often the case for the least developed countries. Likewise, businesses often lack real incentives to invest in global public goods – such as researching and producing vaccines, or agricultural research and development. In the environmental context too, there are hard limits to what companies can do to improve their sustainability if basic price signals fail to reflect environmental costs, such as those associated with climate change mitigation and adaptation, or fresh water extraction.

Government policy can ensure that prices for goods and services “tell the truth” about environmental impacts.

All of these cases highlight where governments’ responsibilities can complement those of companies. Government policy can ensure that prices for goods and services “tell the truth” about associated environmental impacts, for example. Governments that provide ODA can also target the most concessional flows to those countries or global public goods where the case for private sector investment is least clear or risks are highest, as OECD Development Assistance Committee members have pledged to do (OECD, 2014c). Governments can create advance purchase commitments for new vaccines. Or they can, simply, abolish subsidies that create perverse incentives for companies to behave in unsustainable ways.

In the end, then, the biggest mistake with the new partnerships agenda would be to somehow regard it as an alternative to more traditional, state-led interventions in ODA spending, fiscal policy, regulation or other areas. Rather, the real breakthrough will come from a partnership approach that is sophisticated and holistic, that recognises how different actors can contribute in different ways, and that uses the intelligent design of markets and incentives as the best means of going about this.

Recommendations for private sector partnerships for sustainable development

Get the basics right – ensure businesses play by social responsibility rules, that governments create an enabling environment and that developing countries have the capacity they need.

Target specific sectors or value chains.

Focus initially on a small number of partnerships to demonstrate results on the ground.

Monitor businesses’ performance on their commitments and make the results public.

Put in place rules, regulations and measures to encourage and enable sustainable private sector financing and investment.

Ensure governments provide incentives for the private sector to invest in the least developed countries and in global public goods.

Eliminate perverse incentives.

Notes

 1. See: www.johannesburgsummit.org/html/basic_info/basicinfo.html.

 2. A measure of sustainability that includes financial, social and environmental performance measures.

 3. See: www.clintonfoundation.org/clinton-global-initiative.

 4. See: http://millenniumvillages.org.

 5. Many additional examples of how to mobilise private investment in developing countries can be found in OECD (2014b).

References

Adelman, C. (2013), “Emerging economies bring new life to philanthropy”, RealClearMarkets online, 29 November, www.realclearmarkets.com/articles/2013/11/29/emerging_economies_bring_new_life_to_philanthropy_100766.html.

Creative Associates (2014), “Survey of Trends in Private Sector Partnerships for International Development and Modalities for Engagement”, Trends in Global Development, Creative Associates International, Washington, DC, www.creativeassociatesinternational.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/Survey_Of_Trends.pdf.

European Commission (2014), “Boosting private sector growth in developing countries”, News, 14 May, European Union, Brussels, http://ec.europa.eu/news/external_relations/140514_en.htm.

Greenhill, R. and A. Prizzon (2012), “Who foots the bill after 2015? What new trends in development finance mean for the post-MDGs”, ODI Working Paper, No. 360, Overseas Development Institute, London, www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/7905.pdf.

IEA (2014), “World needs $48 trillion in investment to meet its energy needs to 2035”, Press Release, 3 June, International Energy Agency, Paris, www.iea.org/newsroomandevents/pressreleases/2014/june/name,72035,en.html.

ILO (2014), “Inclusive growth and decent work proposed for new development goals”, ILO news, 21 July, International Labour Organization, Geneva, www.ilo.org/newyork/news/WCMS_250039/lang--en/index.htm.

IMF (2013), “IMF facilitates debate on private sector, growth, jobs in Mideast”, IMF Survey Magazine: Countries & Regions, 27 November, International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC, www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/survey/so/2013/car112713a.htm.

Klein, N. (2014), “The hypocrisy behind the big business climate change battle”, The Guardian, 13 September, www.theguardian.com/environment/2014/sep/13/greenwashing-sticky-business-naomi-klein.

OECD (2014a), “Detailed aid statistics: Official and private flows”, OECD International Development Statistics (database), http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/data-00072-en (accessed on 16 February 2015).

OECD (2014b), Development Co-operation Report 2014: Mobilising Resources for Sustainable Development, OECD Publishing, Paris, http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/dcr-2014-en.

OECD (2014c), “Measures to improve the targeting of aid to countries most in need”, Annex 1 in DAC 2014 High Level Meeting Final Communiqué, 16 December, OECD, Paris, www.oecd.org/dac/OECD%20DAC%20HLM%20Communique.pdf.

TheCityUK (2011), “Global bond market up 5% in 2010 to record $95 trillion: More than two-thirds the size of equity market”, Press Release, 4 July, TheCityUK, www.thecityuk.com/media/latest-news-from-thecityuk/global-bond-market-up-5-in-2010-to-record-95-trillion-more-than-two-thirds-the-size-of-equity-market.

UN (1992), Agenda 21, United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro, United Nations, New York, www.un.org/esa/sustdev/documents/agenda21/english/Agenda21.pdf.

UN Intergovernmental Committee of Experts on Sustainable Development Financing (2014), “Report of the Intergovernmental Committee of Experts on Sustainable Development Financing”, advance unedited version, 8 August, https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/4588FINAL%20REPORT%20ICESDF.pdf.

WFE (2013), “World Federation of Exchanges publishes 2012 global market highlights”, 23 January, World Federation of Exchanges, London, www.world-exchanges.org/insight/reports/wfe-publishes-2012-global-market-highlights.

World Bank (2014a), “Foreign direct investment, net inflows (BoP, current US$)” (indicator), http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BX.KLT.DINV.CD.WD (accessed on 16 February 2015).

World Bank (2014b), “Personal remittances, received (current US$)” (indicator), http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BX.TRF.PWKR.CD.DT (accessed on 16 February 2015).

World Bank (2014c), “Portfolio equity, net inflows (BoP, current US$)” (indicator), http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BX.PEF.TOTL.CD.WD (accessed on 16 February 2015).

Chapter 5.

The concept of accountability in international development co-operation

by

Philipp Dann

Humboldt University of Berlin

and

Julia Sattelberger

Development Co-operation Directorate, OECD

Accountability is about setting clear goals and targets, being responsible for delivering on them and accepting potential sanctions for lack of compliance with commitments. With the growing number of stakeholders actively engaging in development co-operation, implementing accountability is becoming increasingly complex. This chapter clarifies the concept of accountability in today’s development co-operation context. It outlines its main functions: clarifying roles and responsibilities, encouraging responsible action, and building legitimacy and trust. It also discusses some areas where improvements are needed to provide objectivity, to balance the means of enforcement among partners and to ensure that key stakeholders are able to make their voices heard. It concludes with recommendations on how to design accountability mechanisms that will enhance the effectiveness of development co-operation.

Within the international community there is broad consensus that stronger accountability mechanisms are needed to achieve the post-2015 Sustainable Development Goals. In the words of Ban Ki-moon, Secretary-General of the United Nations, “we need an inclusive, robust yet flexible accountability framework” (Ban, 2014). But what exactly does accountability mean? Despite having received great attention over recent years, there is little clarity over what accountability is in practice. Most agree that in the context of development co-operation, accountability is about setting clear goals and targets and being responsible for delivering on them. Yet this definition remains rather vague and does not fully capture the diverse aspects of the concept.

This chapter clarifies the concept of accountability as it applies to development co-operation, examines its essential elements and explores how these various elements interact. It also looks at some of the challenges involved in ensuring accountability and offers recommendations on how to enhance accountability in the context of global co-operation. Chapter 6 moves beyond concepts to describe some practical applications and tools for accountability, and what an accountability framework for the Sustainable Development Goals could look like.

What are the components of accountability in development co-operation?

On a basic level, accountability means “to have to answer for one’s action or inaction, and depending on the answer, to be exposed to potential sanctions” (Oakerson, 1989). In order to provide accountability in practice, it needs to be clear who is accountable for what and to whom, and mechanisms need to be in place to provide clear review procedures for monitoring and evaluating the behaviour of those who are held accountable, and demanding sanctions for those who do not comply (Dann, 2013).

It is essential to clarify who is accountable to whom

Today, an increasing number of stakeholders are active in development co-operation, making the question of to whom development actors are accountable increasingly complex. States’ activities are complemented by the engagement of non-governmental organisations (NGOs), foundations and, increasingly, businesses that all aim to – or at least claim to – contribute to the provision of sustainable development. In order to hold these different actors to account, answering the questions of whose accountability is at stake and to whom actors are accountable is a crucial first step.

New forms of accountability are emerging in which the global public plays an increasing role.

Providers of official development assistance (ODA) are often governments in developed countries, where – at least in democracies – accountability is typically provided through mechanisms of parliamentary oversight. Governments in developed countries thus provide accountability to their taxpayers. In the context of multilateral development co-operation, organisations report to executive boards, which offer some form of checks and balances. Today, however, development co-operation is increasingly delivered through partnerships involving diverse stakeholders – including states, as well as non-state actors – and new, innovative ways of holding partnerships to account are needed. In this context, new forms of accountability are emerging in which the global public plays an increasing role.

An equally important question is how can developing country governments be held accountable for their use of the public money provided as ODA? In a development contract between partners, countries usually enter into a relationship of “mutual accountability” between both contracting parties (described further in Chapter 6). At the same time, people in developing countries who are affected by development projects should also be able to activate accountability mechanisms.

In order to provide accountability in global governance, the complex relationship between those who need to be held accountable and those who must answer needs to be clarified from the outset.

Standards of accountability should be based on shared principles

Another crucial step for the provision of accountability in international co-operation is to define and agree on clear standards based on common principles, against which the activities of the various actors can be assessed. Over the past two decades, advances in the field of global development co-operation have contributed to a set of standards to guide actors’ behaviour.

At the turn of the millennium, the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) outlined eight global targets and a number of clear indicators, as well as the responsibilities for achieving them (UNDP, 2001). Standards for the effective management of development co-operation took shape further during the “aid effectiveness” efforts facilitated by the OECD DAC (see Annex D), whose underlying principles were set out in the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness in 2005 (see Annex D). These principles were reviewed at the Fourth High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Busan, Korea (2011) and merged into four principles for achieving common development goals (Box 5.1).

Box 5.1. Shared principles for achieving common development goals

Ownership of development priorities by developing countries: countries should define the development model that they want to implement.

A focus on results: having a sustainable impact should be the driving force behind investments and efforts in development policy making.

Inclusive development partnerships for development: development depends on the participation of all actors, and recognises the diversity and complementarity of their functions.

Transparency and accountability: development co-operation must be transparent and accountable to all citizens.

Source: OECD/UNDP (2014), Making Development Co-operation More Effective: 2014 Progress Report, OECD Publishing, Paris, http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264209305-en.

Sanctions are neither prevalent nor equally distributed

The concept of accountability is typically based on the recourse to sanctions in cases of non-compliance. However, many development co-operation commitments are voluntary, and therefore not legally binding (Ocampo and Gómez Arteaga, 2014), but even where legal obligations exist (for example from loan agreements), hard enforcement mechanisms for sanctioning misbehaviour, in particular by providers of development co-operation, are often lacking (e.g. multilateral or bilateral development agencies or financial institutions). Yet just because accountability mechanisms in development partnerships are often built on “soft” rules and standards, this does not automatically mean that such mechanisms are less effective. In the context of global governance, a number of soft sanctioning mechanisms – ranging from public blame for not living up to commitments to peer review, monitoring and reporting – can be very effective (see Chapter 6). OECD-DAC members, for instance, undergo regular review (every four to five years) through the DAC Peer Reviews (detailed in Chapter 6).¹

“Soft” sanctioning mechanisms such as peer reviews can be very effective.

On the other hand, when developing countries do not meet specific criteria, providers can threaten to withdraw or at least postpone the transfer of ODA – cases of them having done so in the past are well known (Dann, 2013). This can make the relationship between providers and recipients of assistance asymmetric.

Some developing countries have found ways to hold all partners accountable. In an unprecedented move in 2003, a number of African countries created the Mutual Review of Development Effectiveness in Africa (Box 5.2).

Box 5.2. The Mutual Review of Development Effectiveness in Africa

This annual review is a joint exercise in accountability undertaken by the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa and the OECD. The call for such a mechanism dates back to November 2002 when the NEPAD (the New Partnership for Africa’s Development) Heads of State and Government Implementation Committee underscored the need to review the progress of development partners on their commitments to Africa. In June 2003, the Economic Commission for Africa’s Conference of Ministers of Finance, Planning and Economic Development endorsed the Mutual Review of Development Effectiveness.

The review covers 19 topics organised around 4 broad pillars: sustainable economic growth, human development, good governance and financing for development. For each topic, it reviews the main commitments by Africa and its partners, looks at whether these have been delivered, examines the results achieved and outlines key future policy priorities. It focuses on commitments made collectively by political leaders, rather than those made by national governments individually, recognising that there is large variation in progress among individual countries.

The report is distinguished by its strong ownership by African leaders, its joint character, its comprehensive coverage and its symmetry in reviewing commitments by both African countries and their partners. It has a strong evidence base, relying heavily on empirical data, and links effective delivery of results with future priorities. It is written in a concise style and intended to be accessible both to senior policy makers and a wider audience. This has all contributed to the review’s good track record in commanding the confidence and support of all parties.

The annual reports of the Mutual Review are available at: www.oecd.org/dac/mutual-review-africa.htm.

What are the specific functions of accountability?

Achieving the new Sustainable Development Goals will require stronger and more effective action by a wider range of partners than ever before. Accountability mechanisms will need to be strengthened to help boost the effectiveness of international development co-operation around the global goals. The following three functions are of particular importance.

The Sustainable Development Goals will require stronger and more effective action by a wider range of partners than ever before.

Accountability can clarify roles and responsibilities and enhance learning

By clearly defining who is responsible for what, accountability mechanisms create a clear framework for action. They also give stakeholders the opportunity to denounce non-compliance, to follow up on action after a complaint and to monitor the results produced. In this way, accountability mechanisms also help to determine what worked – and what did not. This cyclical process of monitoring, reporting and evaluation contributes to learning, thereby enhancing the quality of future development co-operation.

Accountability can offer incentives for responsible action

Accountability mechanisms are designed to ensure that the relevant actors live up to their commitments. In the context of development co-operation this means, for example, that ODA is provided and used as agreed, that programmes and projects are implemented as planned, and that all partners in development co-operation pursue the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals. Subjecting progress on commitments to regular monitoring and evaluation – and making the results available – creates incentives for responsible action. Even in the case of merely being “named and shamed” for failing to deliver, the threat of negative publicity or sanctions enhances the likelihood that promises will be kept.

Accountability can create legitimacy and trust

Much like the rule of law, accountability generates legitimacy based on fair rules and compliance with them. By involving all stakeholders in identifying and (ideally) solving problems, and by providing the opportunity to name those who misbehave, it fosters trust in procedures or organisations. The enforcement of accountability mechanisms, however, depends on the availability of relevant information on applicable standards and performance. This underscores the need for quality data (see Chapter 15).

There are three key challenges to implementing accountability

While accountability is widely recognised as an important pillar of effective development co-operation, its implementation is challenging. In particular, it can be hampered by lack of objectivity, weak enforcement mechanisms, and the inadequate representation and participation of key stakeholders.

Lack of distance and objectivity

In order to ensure accountability, independence is needed between the actors held accountable and those who monitor their performance. Yet accountability is often measured by internal control units within development co-operation agencies, or by external consultants. This has its drawbacks. On the one hand, it is doubtful that these actors have the necessary distance from the actual power wielders to provide an objective analysis. What’s more, standards are often set by the same actors who are to be held accountable, creating a closed system of self-reporting and self-evaluation that reduces the credibility of monitoring and evaluation mechanisms (Dann, 2013).

Credibility is undermined when standards are set by the same actors who are to be held accountable.

Things may be changing. An OECD study finds overall improvements in the evaluation of development assistance amongst members of the DAC Network on Development Evaluation thanks to “improvements in independence of the evaluation function, the diversification of actors involved in evaluation and increased co-ordination between evaluation departments” (OECD, 2010). Effective independent evaluation and monitoring is also taking place in multilateral development institutions such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and regional development banks. These institutions have created comprehensive independent evaluation procedures to enhance credibility and corporate learning, and to promote public trust and integrity in decision making (Picciotto, 2012). Independent networks such as the Multilateral Organisation Performance Assessment Network (MOPAN) have also emerged to assess the effectiveness of major multilateral organisations working in the field of development co-operation (Box 5.3).

Box 5.3. A network approach to assessing the effectiveness of multilateral organisations

The Multilateral Organisation Performance Assessment Network (MOPAN) is an independent network that works to strengthen the contribution of multilateral organisations to development and humanitarian results. It does so by supporting member governments in assessing the effectiveness of the multilateral organisations through which they channel their official development assistance (ODA).* MOPAN’s 19 members provide almost 95% of all ODA channelled through multilateral organisations (USD 57 billion annually from 2009 to 2011).

The network generates, collects, analyses and presents information on:

strategic management: mandate and strategic direction; cross-cutting themes and priorities (e.g. gender equality and environment); governance arrangements

operational management: cost and value-consciousness; transparency; internal and external evaluation

relationship management: alignment with country priorities and capacities; partnerships with other actors

knowledge management: presentation and dissemination of performance information and evaluation findings

development results: achievement of development and humanitarian objectives and results, including contribution to national goals and priorities (e.g. the Sustainable Development Goals); relevance of interventions; and sustainability.

Data are collected through surveys of governments, partners and other stakeholders; review of documents published by the multilateral organisations; and consultations with staff members from the multilateral organisations under review.

The assessments generate relevant and credible information on multilateral organisations to assist MOPAN members in making strategic policy decisions and meeting their domestic accountability requirements. MOPAN does not rank the performance of multilateral organisations. Rather, it uses the findings of its work to promote dialogue about improving organisational learning and effectiveness among members, multilateral organisations and partners. Since its creation in 2002, the network has assessed some 17 organisations, many several times.

* In 2014, MOPAN assessed the Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations (FAO), the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN Women), the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR); see: www.mopanonline.org.

Source: Box provided by the MOPAN Secretariat.

Unbalanced enforcement mechanisms

As we have seen, hard sanctions for providers do not exist in the context of development co-operation, while sanctions for those who receive development co-operation can include funding cut-offs, or even demands to pay back funds received (Dann, 2013). The World Bank, for instance, has put in place an extensive reporting system to supervise the implementation of Bank-financed projects. The system spells out the procedures the developing country has to follow and what it needs to report back to the World Bank. Instances of corruption or fraud in the recipient country, or non-compliance with reporting requirements, carry the possibility of sanctions that include the suspension or even termination of project financing (Dann, 2013).

Hard sanctions do not exist for providers.

Key stakeholders have little voice

Perhaps the core challenge for accountability in development co-operation is ensuring that all stakeholders’ voices are heard, in particular those of the people affected by development projects. Sometimes development co-operation can have a negative impact on the lives of people who are expected to benefit from it – for instance, they may be dislocated by infrastructure projects. Research demonstrates that these people are often not involved in decision making and have limited opportunity to challenge and question the practices of providers of development co-operation (Dann, 2013). Similarly, taxpayers in provider countries are often barred from full access to information, or have limited opportunity to influence decision-making processes. For example, many of the existing rules and agreements establishing accountability mechanisms are not geared to public scrutiny (reports, evaluation or audit results, peer reviews). While the search for transparency continues to evolve, much remains to be done to make information accessible – and meaningful – to all audiences.

How can we deepen accountability in development co-operation?

This chapter demonstrates that the complexity and changing nature of the international system raise challenges to enabling and providing accountability in the context of global development co-operation. A lack of distance and objectivity, weak enforcement mechanisms and inadequate representation and participation of key stakeholders still hamper its provision. Accountability mechanisms that fulfil the criteria outlined below have the potential to create legitimacy and trust and enhance the effectiveness of development co-operation, which is essential to achieve sustainable development in the decades to come.

Recommendations for accountability in international development co-operation

Define who is accountable to whom and ensure some independence among those parties.

Formulate precise standards of expected behaviour and performance.

Provide the possibility of sanctions in cases of non-compliance.

Ensure objectivity of evaluation.

Make sure accountability is demanded equally from all partners.

Put in place the mechanisms needed to give all stakeholders a voice.

Note

 1. See: www.oecd.org/dac/peer-reviews.

References

Ban, Ki-moon (2014), “Secretary-General’s remarks at the Interactive Dialogue of the President of the General Assembly on elements for an accountability framework for the post-2015 development agenda”, United Nations, New York, www.un.org/sg/statements/index.asp?nid=7638 (accessed 11 August 2014).

Dann, P. (2013), The Law of Development Co-operation, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom.

Oakerson, R.J. (1989), “Governance structures for enhancing accountability and responsiveness”, in Perry, J.L. (ed.), Handbook of Public Administration, Jossey-Bass Publishers, San Francisco, California, pp. 110-125.

Ocampo, J.A. and N. Gómez Arteaga (2014), “Accountable and effective development cooperation in a post-2015 era”, Background Study 3: Accountability for Development Cooperation, ECOSOC, UNDESA and BMZ, www.un.org/en/ecosoc/newfunct/pdf13/dcf_germany_bkgd_study_3_global_accountability.pdf.

OECD (2010), Evaluation in Development Agencies, Better Aid, OECD Publishing, Paris, http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264094857-en.

OECD/UNDP (2014), Making Development Co-operation More Effective: 2014 Progress Report, OECD Publishing, Paris, http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264209305-en.

Picciotto, R. (2012), “The logic of evaluation independence and its relevance to international financial institutions”, in Lamdany, R. and H. Edison (eds.), Independent Evaluation at the IMF, The First Decade, International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC.

UNDP (2001), The Millennium Development Goals, United Nations Development Programme, New York, www.undp.org/mdg (accessed 11 August 2014).

UNGA (2001), “Road map towards the implementation of the United Nations Millennium Declaration”, Report of the Secretary-General, A/56/326, United Nations General Assembly, www.un.org/documents/ga/docs/56/a56326.pdf (accessed 26 February 2015).

Chapter 6.

Accountability mechanisms in development co-operation

by

Rahul Malhotra

with

Megan Grace Kennedy-Chouane

and

Hanna-Mari Kilpelainen

Development Co-operation Directorate, OECD

Development co-operation today involves many levels and actors. How can accountability be achieved in this complex environment? This chapter reviews the existing instruments and mechanisms for ensuring accountability in development co-operation, which are useful in establishing shared goals and commitments, measuring progress and creating incentives to spur behaviour change and improved performance, despite (and perhaps because of) the lack of hard enforcement mechanisms. The chapter concludes with a set of priorities for increasing the relevance and impact of the existing accountability measures in the post-2015 framework of Sustainable Development Goals.

The terminology around development co-operation is ever changing. In many development circles, “aid” was first superseded by “development assistance”, and now by “development co-operation”. This is about more than mere semantics. It reflects the recognition that development in one country is not best served by a series of parallel, voluntary transfers from several other countries or organisations, acting as “patrons of progress”. Instead, what is required is a shared commitment to development across the globe, giving each country the right and the responsibility to take ownership of its own processes and strategies. Co-operation is, therefore, an apt and necessary attribute in what is a complex and often messy policy space. These concepts have important consequences for the notion of accountability in development co-operation.

As this thinking has evolved, a set of obligations, norms and standards has emerged to guide providers of development co-operation (see Annex D). Instruments and mechanisms have been developed to measure and monitor compliance against these norms and standards. As discussed in the previous chapter, however, the assessment of compliance is not generally accompanied by means of hard enforcement or sanction.

No other public policy sphere is subject to such a range of accountability efforts.

This chapter examines in depth the existing accountability instruments and mechanisms in the field of global development co-operation. These include a range of efforts and approaches, reflecting the motivation on the part of various actors to continue to improve their co-operation against agreed goals, standards and norms. Indeed, no other public policy sphere is subject to such a range of accountability efforts and approaches as is development co-operation.

This chapter argues, like Chapter 5, that soft enforcement mechanisms are appropriate for the co-operative and voluntary nature of development co-operation. It concludes, however, with a set of priorities for increasing the relevance and impact of existing measures, which is particularly important within the post-2015 framework of Sustainable Development Goals, where co-operation amongst a diverse set of actors will be essential for promoting universal, shared and sustainable development.

The basics of an accountability mechanism are goals, measurement and incentives

Figure 6.1 illustrates the practical functioning of the concept of accountability, which comprises three basic interacting elements, or “gears”: shared goals and commitments; ways of measuring and understanding progress; and means of spurring action or encouraging stakeholders to change behaviour in order to improve progress.

Goals: Agreeing on goals or making commitments is the starting point for accountability – setting the benchmarks against which actors will be held to account.

Measurement: Measurement approaches must be agreed so that progress can be monitored and evaluated, producing evidence of results.

Action: Incentives for action can encourage a change of strategy where progress is lagging. Dialogue, learning from experience, peer pressure, sanctions and arbitration can all function as incentives for action. The incentives chosen should reflect the reasons why goals have or have not been achieved. For instance, if the problem in achieving the goals is a lack of political will, peer pressure could be a suitable incentive. If limited progress has been made because the solutions are not well known, learning from experience and communicating the results of that experience could help move things forward.

Figure 6.1. The elements of an accountability mechanism

While accountability mechanisms can be stronger in one or another of the three basic elements outlined above, all three are necessary for accountability to be realised. If it is unclear what actions or results are expected, there can be no accountability. Likewise, if there is no agreed way of determining progress (or the lack of it), there is no basis upon which to encourage further action. If information is available about what has not been achieved, but there is no means of recourse or applying pressure, the responsible actors cannot be held to account.

Accountability in development co-operation works across levels and actors

Development co-operation involves many levels of activity as well as diverse actors. How is accountability achieved in this complex environment? This section describes the main accountability mechanisms and instruments currently in use in development co-operation – for international, mutual, peer and domestic accountability (Figure 6.2) – and assesses their strengths according to the three elements outlined above.

Figure 6.2. The accountability landscape in development co-operation

IHP+: International Health Partnership.

International mechanisms establish goals and norms

At the international level, a number of development co-operation accountability mechanisms put into play the interacting elements of goals, measurement and action:

The Millennium Development Goals have helped to establish high-level goals and targets for developing and developed countries alike (see Chapter 5).

The aid effectiveness forums and their associated processes, declarations and principles have established commitments and standards for government development co-operation providers and partner countries.¹ These international efforts have helped to strengthen the standards that guide partnerships and have legitimised demand from developing countries that good practice be observed by development partners (Wood et al., 2011).

Specific principles and guidelines for clusters of actors or sectors, which reflect the increasingly diverse development co-operation landscape, include: the Istanbul Principles, which guide civil society organisations in putting the principles of development effectiveness into practice;² the Guidelines for Effective Philanthropic Engagement;³ the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States (see Chapter 14); and the International Health Partnership (IHP)+ Global Compact (see Chapter 9).

Indices have been designed that rank providers’ performance on shared goals and commitments, such as the Commitment to Development Index co-ordinated by the Center for Global Development.⁴

Forums for dialogue and learning, which aim to encourage behaviour and policy change. They include the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC), the Development Co-operation Forum,⁵ and most recently the Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation (see Chapters 3 and 7) and the United Nations High-Level Political Forum on Sustainable Development.⁶

As seen in the previous chapter, compliance with these mechanisms, and their associated indicators and targets, has been encouraged largely through soft enforcement in the form of monitoring and evaluation. A good example is the recent joint OECD-United Nations Development Programme assessment of progress towards the goals of the Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation: Making Development Co-operation More Effective: 2014 Progress Report (OECD/UNDP, 2014; for details see Chapter 3).

Mutual accountability means everyone is accountable to each other

Enshrined in the declarations, principles and standards described above is the idea of “mutual accountability”. In line with the move away from traditional aid donor and aid beneficiary relationships, mutual accountability is intended to promote equal partnership among providers and recipients in achieving – and holding each other accountable for – development goals. Mutual accountability spurs action through mutual learning and pressure. Some recipient countries, for example, have developed systems to measure progress by their partners in practising effective development co-operation; the Donor Performance Assessment Framework in Rwanda⁷ and the Development Effectiveness Report in Cambodia (Royal Government of Cambodia, 2011) are two examples.

Mutual accountability is still “work in progress”.

Nonetheless, these remain isolated examples. The most recent global survey of mutual accountability by the United Nations Economic and Social Council concludes that at the country level, this is still very much “work in progress”. Only 31% of respondents felt that mutual accountability was strong in their countries and 53% indicated that it was of moderate strength (ECOSOC, 2014). Similar conclusions emerge from the 2014 report by the Building Block on Results and Accountability:8 “… many national mutual accountability agreements have still to be established […] and monitoring and performance assessment remains mainly focused on the recipient side, less on the provider side” (OECD/UNDP, 2014). More, therefore, needs to be done to establish mutual accountability systems at the country level which are genuinely reciprocal and which incentivise action.

The Mutual Review of Development Effectiveness in Africa is an example of mutual accountability at the regional level (see Box 5.2 in Chapter 5). Undertaken jointly by the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa and the OECD since 2003, its purpose is to assess achievements by Africa and its development partners in delivering on their commitments to contribute to the continent’s development.

Joint evaluations involving multiple development partners are another concrete instrument of mutual accountability, providing shared understanding of what has been achieved and how. The importance of involving all stakeholders in evaluations of development activities was first outlined by the DAC in its 1991 Principles for the Evaluation of Development Assistance (OECD, 1991). There are many examples of joint evaluations in development, such as the recent multi-stakeholder evaluation of budget support in Tanzania led by the government of Tanzania together with four development partners: Denmark, Ireland, the Netherlands and the European Commission (Itad et al., 2013).

Peer reviews offer critical support and contribute to learning

Peer reviews are a well-established approach to accountability. The OECD DAC has conducted peer reviews since 1960 to focus on how development co-operation is framed, managed and delivered by its members.⁹ Each DAC member country¹⁰ is peer reviewed every five years with two main aims: to help the country understand where it could improve its development strategy and structures so that it can increase the effectiveness of its investment; and to identify and share good practice in development policy and strategy. Led by examiners from two DAC member governments, the process typically takes around six months to complete and culminates in the publication of the findings. Effective peer review mechanisms tend to be characterised by strong shared goals and agreed means of measuring progress. The incentives or triggers to spur action are created through peer pressure and dialogue, and contribute to learning through exchange of experience and lessons.

Innovative peer review mechanisms have also been developed at the regional level. As we saw in Chapter 5 (Box 5.2), NEPAD has created the African Peer Review Mechanism to ensure that the policies and practices of participating African countries conform to “mutually agreed goals” in the areas of democracy and political governance, economic governance, corporate governance and socio-economic development.¹¹

In August 2009, the Pacific Islands Forum established a process of regular peer review of forum countries’ national development planning and budget processes.¹² These countries are now also starting to review their development co-operation providers, in an effort to bring development partners into their accountability frameworks and to further mutual accountability (Box 6.1).

Box 6.1. Country leadership and ownership in action in the Pacific region

There is much to be learned from some of the smallest countries in our global community. Small island developing states face particularly severe and complex challenges in the pursuit of sustainable development. Their small size and isolation, and their particular susceptibility to the effects of climate change – including rising sea levels and exposure to natural and environmental disasters – are compounded by their often limited human and institutional resources. People living in the Pacific region are addressing these pressing issues by combining ingenuity, innovation and traditional knowledge based on experience.

One of the best examples is the Cairns Compact on Strengthening Development Coordination¹ (known as the Forum Compact), adopted by Pacific Forum leaders in 2009 to reinvigorate development progress in the region. Peer reviews of country systems are the cornerstone of the Forum Compact’s success, and 13 of the Pacific Forum’s 14 small island developing states have undergone peer reviews since 2010.2 The groundswell of evidence from the peer reviews has enabled countries to exercise stronger leadership, setting their own priorities with widespread consent from parliamentarians, public servants, civil society and the private sector. Countries also are showing strong commitment to these priorities, from allocating appropriate resources to implementing agreed strategies, and monitoring and reporting results. They are using robust national and sector development plans to define where development resources can be best used and are most needed, providing clarity for themselves and development partners. This is country leadership and ownership in action.

This work has produced beneficial and comprehensive results. South-South exchanges of solutions to common and long-standing development co-ordination issues have been particularly valuable. For example, Tuvalu’s Joint Policy Matrix focuses government and development partners’ action on agreed, time-bound policy imperatives linked to clear monitoring frameworks and results. This has strengthened the Tuvalu government’s leadership in defining where resources are most needed. Similar joint policy matrices are now central to many Pacific governments’ arrangements with their development partners, who are encouraged to deliver assistance through the countries’ preferred means. Intensified efforts to co-ordinate and harmonise support have also resulted in notable improvements in joint planning, delivery and monitoring of results.

Yet despite this evident progress, significant challenges remain. Institutional and human resource capacity issues are one of the biggest challenges. Limited staff, high turnover and overwhelming workloads are compounded by frequent overseas travel as well as the need to attend to a high number of in-country missions by development co-operation providers. In some cases, lack of skills and experience can hold back or even derail progress on key government initiatives.

From development co-operation providers, efforts are still needed to reduce fragmentation, improve predictability and transparency of official development assistance flows and make greater use of recipient countries’ systems. The complexity, volume and rigidity of some development partners’ procedures also continue to overwhelm small island administrations. As a means of addressing these issues, the Pacific Islands Forum began to conduct peer reviews of development partners in November 2014. In a significant and welcome move, New Zealand volunteered to be the first to be peer reviewed and Australia has become the second.

1. Details are available at: www.forumsec.org/pages.cfm/strategic-partnerships-coordination/pacific-principles-on-aid-effectiveness/forum-compact.

2. See: www.forumsec.org/pages.cfm/strategic-partnerships-coordination/pacific-principles-on-aid-effectiveness/forum-compact/peer-reviews.html.

Source: Box provided by the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat.

Domestic accountability is integral to democratic governance

Domestic accountability involves internal, national accountability systems and often covers the entire range of public policies. Domestic accountability mechanisms in both provider and recipient countries include parliamentary oversight and national audits, which increasingly scrutinise both international co-operation and domestic policies. Many domestic accountability mechanisms are built into democratic governance, including legal enforcement of rule of law, media scrutiny, civil society and non-governmental organisation advocacy, elections and public engagement.

Can soft enforcement create change?

Together, the instruments and mechanisms described above represent a range of efforts and approaches that can contribute to accountability. By establishing goals and gathering evidence and data on performance in development co-operation, they enable stakeholders to hold each other to account transparently and to continue learning and improving. Given the voluntary nature of development co-operation, however, the incentives or triggers through which actual changes in policy and behaviour are encouraged are inevitably soft; and because development co-operation is governed by soft law, the mechanisms for monitoring and reviewing compliance cannot force actors to change.

Overly rigid enforcement could undermine governments’ motivation and political will to engage constructively.

Simply because enforcement measures are not rigid or binding does not mean that they do not have any impact. In fact, soft enforcement mechanisms can have some advantages. As with all areas of public policy, if not more so, development co-operation is subject to short-term political cycles and imperatives, unpredictable local and global economic circumstances, and fluctuating levels of domestic public support. In this context, it could be argued that overly rigid enforcement mechanisms could undermine the motivation and political will of governments to continue to engage constructively. In recognition of this tension, the Synthesis Report of the United Nations Secretary-General on the post-2015 Sustainable Development Goals refers to “preserving the important political balance” when devising indicators consistent with standards and agreements (UNGA, 2014).

Soft enforcement mechanisms create conditions for accountability rooted in specific contexts, as noted by the OECD in relation to peer reviews: “… in many contexts, the soft law nature of peer review can prove better suited to encouraging and enhancing compliance than a traditional enforcement mechanism. For example, unlike a legal enforcement body, examiners in a peer review have the flexibility to take into account a country’s policy objectives, and to look at its performance in a historical and political context” (OECD, 2003). Soft enforcement mechanisms also facilitate learning and positive incentives for change in ways that hard sanctioning would not achieve. The good compliance with DAC peer review recommendations testifies to the relevance and impact of such peer pressure and learning (OECD/UNDP, 2014).

Trust is essential to genuine partnership.

In summary, the readiness to be monitored and to engage in dialogue with partners on fulfilling commitments demonstrates the political will that is essential to building trust – and which in turn is essential to genuine partnership. In this context, creating rigid enforcement mechanisms for what should be a co-operative policy space is not a priority and could even be counter-productive.

What would the ideal accountability system for post-2015 look like?

The post-2015 agenda is universal and inclusive, encompassing multiple policy areas and stakeholders that reach well beyond national governments. With their diverse operating rationales and contexts, different stakeholders will have specific paths for reaching the global goals. With this in mind, four priorities can be outlined for building on the strengths of existing development co-operation accountability mechanisms and accelerating progress – each is explained in the sections that follow:

continually refresh and contextualise measurable commitments and standards

consolidate existing accountability mechanisms

link actions more clearly to impact

use global forums to contribute to learning.

The new goals need relevant and measurable commitments and standards

Experience from the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and from the aid and development effectiveness agendas confirms the power of global goals, indicators and targets. They provide a crucial reference point for encouraging countries and stakeholder groups to set detailed and relevant frameworks for their own development activity. For the future, robust global indicators offering standard definitions and methodology will need to be integrated into national and regional accountability frameworks as well as aggregated to provide global snapshots of progress. This will ensure a degree of consistency and comparability while avoiding the creation of parallel monitoring tools and cycles. To be effective, this will require a neatly designed, global methodology that is easy to adapt to diverse country, policy and institutional contexts (see Chapter 15).

Measurable commitments and standards for effective development co-operation must also be continually reviewed to keep them relevant and responsive, and to keep alive the shared commitment and political momentum behind them. They should not only apply to intergovernmental relationships, but also to the range of actors involved in development, including the private sector. They should include ambitious targets against which progress can be transparently measured and communicated.

Existing accountability mechanisms should be consolidated

While there are individual and collective strengths in the existing instruments for assessing performance, some need to be further developed (e.g. mutual accountability mechanisms). There is also scope to identify synergies across the several international, regional and national institutions that have built up competence in deploying and using evidence from these instruments to enhance their impact and collective contribution to mutual learning and accountability.

The post-2015 accountability framework should emphasise the important roles of regional bodies, such as the United Nations (UN) regional commissions, in adapting peer and mutual review mechanisms to their own contexts, with the full participation and ownership of their member countries. Internationally, the OECD and UN play important roles in setting standards, measuring progress and incentivising action. Both will need to increasingly contribute to and draw on the mechanisms being developed both regionally and nationally.

Actions need to be better linked to impact

Despite much rhetoric about results in development co-operation, few accountability mechanisms actually link particular actions to the achievement of specific development goals. This is because the established mechanisms tend to monitor inputs (levels of official development assistance, spending against targets by sector, etc.) and process indicators (use of country systems, etc.), and because of the numerous methodological challenges in correlating inputs with outcomes and impact. Yet failing to review the impact of development co-operation weakens accountability between development partners and the people who are meant to benefit.

Few accountability mechanisms link actions to the achievement of goals.

Continued effort is needed to expand the use of evaluation that provides evidence of development effects and impacts. More joint evaluations at the national level, for example combining an understanding of national efforts with international support, could strengthen instruments and evidence of results. This will require greater investment in data collection and capacity.

Global and regional forums contribute to learning

Although different actors may have their specific policy contexts and operating rationales, global goals can only be achieved if stakeholders work together in coalitions for action – and if they do so in a transparent way. While evidence on progress is essential, it is dialogue and learning that change behaviour and mind-sets. Therefore, global and regional platforms are vital. Global and regional platforms are the glue that binds together diverse actors, linking national, regional and international mechanisms and evidence (see Chapter 3). By bringing together diverse stakeholders and providing an inclusive space to review progress and have an open dialogue on what works, what doesn’t and what can make things work better – politically as well as technically – they set in motion a “race to the top”.

Global and regional platforms are the glue that binds together diverse actors.

Recommendations for accountability mechanisms in development co-operation

Continually refresh and contextualise measurable commitments and standards to keep them relevant and responsive.

Consolidate existing accountability mechanisms to maximise their collective contribution to mutual learning and accountability.

Focus on results and on evidence of what works.

Deploy global and regional platforms for mutual learning and dialogue.

Notes

 1. These principles are brought together in the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, the Accra Agenda for Action and the Busan Partnership agreement. For more information, see Chapter 3 and Annex D.

 2. Available at: http://cso-effectiveness.org/IMG/pdf/final_istanbul_cso_development_effectiveness_principles_footnote_ december_2010-2.pdf.

 3. Available at: www.oecd.org/site/netfwd/GEPES-September2014.pdf.

 4. See: www.cgdev.org/initiative/commitment-development-index/index.

 5. The biennial high-level Development Cooperation Forum reviews trends in international development co-operation, promotes greater coherence among the development activities of different development partners and helps to promote policy integration and to strengthen links in the work of the United Nations. The office of ECOSOC in the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs serves as the forum’s secretariat. See ChapterInfographic: Success factors for effective post-2015 partnerships in this report and www.un.org/en/ecosoc/dcf.

 6. The High-level Political Forum on Sustainable Development is the main UN platform dealing with sustainable development. It provides political leadership and guidance; follows up and reviews progress in implementing sustainable development commitments; addresses new and emerging sustainable development challenges; and enhances the integration of economic, social and environmental dimensions of sustainable development. See: https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/hlpf.

 7. See: www.minecofin.gov.rw/index.php?id=51&L=1.

 8. The Building Blocks were launched at the Fourth High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Busan, Korea (2011) to enable development partners and organisations to unite behind pressing development issues and to make concerted efforts to further progress in key areas. For the Building Block on Results and Accountability see: www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/49476682.pdf.

 9. See: www.oecd.org/development/peer-reviews.

 10. See: www.oecd.org/dac/dacmembers.htm.

 11. See: http://aprm-au.org.

 12. Details are available at: www.forumsec.org/pages.cfm/strategic-partnerships-coordination/pacific-principles-on-aid-effectiveness/forum-compact/peer-reviews.html.

References

ECOSOC (2014), Accountable and Effective Development Cooperation in a Post-2015 Era, Background Study 2, Third Global Accountability Study on Mutual Accountability, United Nations Economic and Social Council, New York.

Itad et al. (2013), Joint Evaluation of Budget Support to Tanzania: Lessons Learned and Recommendations for the Future – Final Report: Volume 1, independent evaluation jointly managed by the European Commission, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, Irish Aid, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands and the Ministry of Finance of Tanzania, Itad, Hove, United Kingdom, http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/evaluation/evaluation_reports/reports/2013/1321_vol1_en.pdf.

OECD (2003), “Peer review: An OECD tool for co-operation and change”, OECD, Paris, www.oecd.org/investment/anti-bribery/anti-briberyconvention/1955285.pdf.

OECD (1991), Principles for Evaluation of Development Assistance, OECD, Paris, www.oecd.org/development/evaluation/2755284.pdf.

OECD/UNDP (2014), Making Development Co-operation More Effective: 2014 Progress Report, OECD Publishing, Paris, http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264209305-en.

Royal Government of Cambodia (2011), The Cambodia Development Effectiveness Report 2011, Royal Government of Cambodia, www.cdc-crdb.gov.kh/cdc/aid_management/DER%202011%20FINAL%20%2831%20Oct%202011%29.pdf.

UNGA (2014), “The road to dignity by 2030: Ending poverty, transforming all lives and protecting the planet”, synthesis report of the Secretary-General on the post-2015 sustainable development agenda, A/69/700, United Nations General Assembly, 4 December, New York, www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/69/700&Lang=E.

Wood, B. et al. (2011), The Evaluation of the Paris Declaration, Phase 2, Final Report, Danish Institute for International Studies, Copenhagen, www.oecd.org/derec/dacnetwork/48152078.pdf.

Part II.

Development partnerships in action

Chapter 7.

The Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation

by

José Antonio Meade Kuribreña

Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Mexico and Co-Chair of the Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation

The Global Partnership for Development Effectiveness is already helping to build a holistic, inclusive and action-oriented post-2015 development framework. From its inclusive governance structure to its role in creating a space for exchange among the full range of development actors, it is proving to be particularly effective as a transformative tool on the ground. This chapter outlines some of its practical achievements to date, which include tracking progress on the implementation of the development effectiveness principles, organising a widely attended high-level forum in Mexico, and supporting nearly 40 practical initiatives to enhance development effectiveness around the world.

This chapter also includes an opinion piece by Lilianne Ploumen, Dutch Minister for Foreign Trade and Development Co-operation and one of three Co-Chairs of the Global Partnership.

The Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation was established to help development partners improve the way they work together, co-ordinating funding, knowledge and policy expertise to deliver better results in poverty reduction and ensure maximum impact for development. It brings together the range of development partners, from governments, the private sector and civil society to parliaments, foundations, development banks and international organisations. While Chapter 3 describes the role of the Global Partnership within the overall context of the post-2015 agenda, this chapter looks at its achievements to date.

The Global Partnership’s governance structure is highly inclusive; the Steering Committee has 21 members representing its major constituencies, offering a platform for exchanging a wide array of views on development priorities. As co-chairs, the Ministers of Malawi, Mexico and the Netherlands are at the forefront of the political process (see the “In my view” box).

How does the Global Partnership have impact on the ground?

The Global Partnership is proving to be particularly effective as a transformative tool on the ground, supporting nearly 40 practical initiatives to enhance development effectiveness. These include programmes in diverse national, regional and global focus areas, such as Tax Inspectors Without Borders (OECD, 2014), the Learning Alliances on Public Sector Reform, the Partnership for Climate Finance and Development (see Box 3.2 in Chapter 3), the Africa Action Plan on Development Effectiveness, Development of Country Roadmaps for Local and Regional Governments, and the Civil Society Continuing Campaign for Effective Development (for more details on these initiatives see Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation, 2014a, 2014b).

The Global Partnership is proving to be particularly effective as a transformative tool on the ground.

In addition, the Global Partnership provides an inclusive space to review progress, based on quantitative data, experiences and lessons from the field. The Global Partnership monitoring framework tracks progress on implementing the agreed development effectiveness principles that underpin it – national ownership, focus on results, inclusive development partnerships, and mutual transparency and accountability (see Chapter 3 and Annex D) – holding all partners to account through peer pressure. This enables the Global Partnership to capture and disseminate evidence of good practice, while providing a laboratory of ideas to spur innovation as well as synergies to improve development co-operation in diverse contexts.

The Global Partnership monitoring framework holds all partners to account through peer pressure.

In my view: The Global Partnership can help achieve the Sustainable Development Goals

Lilianne Ploumen, Minister for Foreign Trade and Development Co-operation, the Netherlands and Co-Chair, Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation

As co-chairs of the Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation, my Mexican and Malawian colleagues and I have a huge task – and a huge opportunity – ahead. A new, truly universal development agenda is taking shape and it holds out to all people on this planet the promise of a more equal and sustainable world, with less conflict and less poverty.

The international community must come to agreement on the challenges we will meet and set the goals, targets and indicators to guide this joint effort. I hope to contribute to solidifying the Global Partnership as a unique platform that will make a decisive contribution to realising the promise of these Sustainable Development Goals.

It is clear that we have to act collectively and without hesitation. For the first time in history, ending poverty within one generation is within our grasp. We have a historic opportunity to change the lives of billions for the better, and for the sake of the hundreds of millions of people still facing malnutrition, unemployment and inequality, we must grasp it.

How can the Global Partnership help to achieve this objective? In my view, it is only through combined efforts that the change needed can happen and better results can be achieved.

The Global Partnership can pave the way for enhanced co-operation among governments, companies, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and other stakeholders, which is fundamental for improving the effectiveness of development co-operation. With its long legacy of joint work on development effectiveness, the Global Partnership also is well placed to support transparent and accountable action among the partners working to achieve common goals. The Global Partnership can also facilitate the sharing of knowledge and expertise, providing models of good practice from its in-country monitoring of progress against key indicators.

During my tenure as co-chair over the coming two years, I aim to provide political guidance and strategic direction to the Global Partnership to ensure that it continues to foster open interaction among equals and explore new, innovative forms of collaboration. This is an unprecedented opportunity and there is no time to lose. Let’s get to work!

The principles of development effectiveness embodied in the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and the Busan Partnership Agreement (see Annex D) have proven useful in enhancing the quality of development co-operation in general – and of partnerships in particular. They have also been instrumental in supporting developing countries’ demands for improved practices by development partners, orienting development co-operation around each country’s own development priorities and strategy, and thereby strengthening development results as defined by developing countries themselves.

These qualities make the Global Partnership a significant player in maximising the impact of international development co-operation.

The First High-Level Meeting of the Global Partnership provided some key insights

Mexico’s dual character – as both provider and recipient of development co-operation (see Part III of this report) – enables it to understand the perspectives of many of its members. Mexico is a responsible global actor, is highly committed to development and has an acute sense of solidarity towards other countries. The First High-Level Meeting of the Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation was held in April 2014 in Mexico City.

The meeting provided an opportunity for more than 1 600 delegates to review evidence of development success to date and to explore critical areas for future action, including:

strengthening the capacities of developing countries in domestic resource mobilisation, e.g. in consolidating fiscal systems, fighting corruption and tax evasion, and promoting the recovery of illicit assets

promoting South-South and triangular co-operation¹

improving co-operation with middle-income countries, including through establishing and using methodologies to assess countries’ development status in a way that captures more than per capita income

exploring the role of the private sector as a key driver of development and emphasising the importance of placing socially and environmentally sustainable practices at the centre of business strategies

recognising the importance of all development partners, including civil society, parliaments, foundations, local governments, development banks and international organisations.

The High-Level Meeting provided a space for non-traditional actors to interact with each other, and collaborate with the most relevant decision makers in governments, many of whom are directly responsible for allocating financial resources for development co-operation. In this context, the dynamic format of discussions, the diversity of the panelists and the thematic richness of the sessions can offer models of good practice for other partnerships (Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation, 2014a).

Delegates to the meeting adopted a communiqué: Building Towards an Inclusive Post-2015 Development Agenda, in which they agreed to advance co-operation on various concrete commitments (Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation, 2014b). These centre on five topics: progress since Busan and inclusive development, domestic resource mobilisation, South-South co-operation, middle-income countries and working with the private sector.

The on-the-ground initiatives launched in Mexico City provide an engine for driving future implementation efforts.

This communiqué, along with the on-the-ground initiatives referred to above, will help to strengthen the quality of development co-operation, contributing to the establishment of a holistic, inclusive and action-oriented post-2015 development framework.

What will be needed to turn the vision into action?

The first High-Level Meeting confirmed that the focus of effective development co-operation should be on country-level implementation. The nearly 40 on-the-ground initiatives launched in Mexico City provide an engine for driving future implementation efforts. As we move forward, it will be important for the champions of the various initiatives to identify opportunities for feeding information on this work into other major development forums so as to benefit from global development dialogue. Alongside these specific initiatives, however, individual action from all Global Partnership stakeholders will continue to be essential in reaching collective, global development goals.

Note

 1. See the Glossary for details of these terms.

References

Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation (2014a), “First High-Level Meeting of the Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation”, Summary Report, Mexico City, 15-16 April, http://effectivecooperation.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/MEMORIA-FINAL.pdf.

Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation (2014b), “First High-Level Meeting of the Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation: Building towards an inclusive post-2015 development agenda”, Mexico High Level Meeting Communiqué, 16 April, http://effectivecooperation.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/FinalConsensusMexicoHLMCommunique.pdf.

OECD (2014), “Tax Inspectors Without Borders. A learning by doing approach to tax audit assistance”, Briefing Note, OECD, Paris, www.oecd.org/ctp/tax-global/tax-inspectors-without-borders-summary.pdf.

Chapter 8.

The Gates Foundation’s experience with successful development partnerships

by

Mark Suzman

President of Global Policy, Advocacy, and Country Programs, Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation

Over the past 15 years the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation has built up a wealth of experience in working through global partnerships to produce a dramatic impact on people’s lives. This chapter draws lessons from this experience, looking at partnerships – such as Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance; the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria; Family Planning 2020; and Every Newborn – to identify success factors. While the co-ordinating mechanisms and governance structures of these partnerships vary, they all have certain characteristics in common: a shared sense of purpose, a unified mission, action plans, well-defined targets and agreed accountability mechanisms.

When Bill and Melinda Gates decided 15 years ago to make global health and development the focus of their philanthropic efforts, they knew that they wanted to build on – rather than replicate – the good work others were already doing. They believed they could make the most meaningful contribution by identifying critical gaps standing in the way of a better life for the world’s poorest and catalysing innovative partnerships to address them.

It didn’t take long to pinpoint the first opportunity: tackling the disparity in immunisation rates between rich and poor countries. The triggering event was a newspaper article about the hundreds of thousands of children in the developing world dying every year from rotavirus disease – the leading cause of severe diarrhoea in children. A promising vaccine was on the horizon and Bill and Melinda Gates decided to do everything they could to help get the vaccine to every child who needed it.

As they soon learned, new vaccines often take upwards of 20 years to reach children in the developing world. And there was an even bigger problem: by the 1990s, a global immunisation push had stagnated and many developing countries were struggling to immunise children with even the most basic vaccines. Yet in the United States and other wealthy countries, children were getting nearly a dozen immunisations that significantly reduced their exposure to life-threatening and debilitating diseases. This inequity motivated them to establish the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation and to begin conversations with key players in the global immunisation community.

This chapter outlines the partnership experience built up over the years by the Gates Foundation, shedding light on some of the success factors that make partnerships work – and save lives.

Gavi has increased global vaccine access and equity

Encouraged by the strong interest in moving forward on a global vaccine effort, in 2000 the Gates Foundation pledged USD 750 million to seed the launch of the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization – now known as Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance.

The idea behind Gavi was simple, yet powerful. By aligning the interests and financial resources of providers of development co-operation with the demand for vaccines among dozens of the world’s poorest countries, Gavi would increase the predictability of demand and supply for immunisations.¹ This raised the interest of manufacturers in producing vaccines for the developing world, which in turn, spurred them to offer vaccines at dramatically lower prices to the world’s poorest countries.

Gavi’s unique model of global partnership has enabled it to reach half a billion children with lifesaving vaccines.

Over the past 15 years, Gavi’s unique model of global partnership has enabled it to reach half a billion children with lifesaving vaccines, and it will immunise another 300 million children by 2020. Gavi’s efforts to date will prevent 7 million future deaths, and the investments it makes between 2016 and 2020 alone will avert 6 million more.

Empowering developing countries to take the lead in building their own sustainable immunisation systems was another revolutionary aspect of Gavi’s business model, which provided governments with ambitious but achievable co-financing and graduation mechanisms. Twenty-two countries are expected to “graduate” from Gavi support and take over full financing of their immunisation programmes by 2020.

Inspired by Gavi’s efficient and effective model of global partnership, the Gates Foundation has pledged more than USD 4 billion to the alliance over the past 15 years, making it the foundation’s single largest investment.

The Global Fund is bending the curve on HIV, tuberculosis and malaria

The Gates Foundation also lends strong support to the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, another highly effective partnership that is transforming the global health landscape. When the idea of a global “war chest” to fight three of the world’s deadliest diseases was first conceived in 2002, 6 million people were dying from HIV, tuberculosis and malaria every year – and there was no workable plan to change the upward trajectory of these epidemics.

Over the past decade, mortality from HIV, tuberculosis and malaria has decreased by 40%.

Working in partnership with other major providers of development co-operation, United Nations (UN) agencies and national governments, the Global Fund has played a vital role in making lifesaving antiretroviral therapy available to 7.3 million people with HIV, testing and treating 12.3 million people for tuberculosis and distributing 450 million insecticide-treated nets to protect families from malaria. Over the past decade, mortality from all three diseases has decreased by 40% as a result of the scaling up of effective prevention and treatment efforts with funding provided by the Global Fund and its key partners.

The Global Fund’s unique partnership model helped make this possible. Its board includes voting representation by provider and recipient governments, civil society, the private sector, private foundations, and communities of people living with and affected by HIV, tuberculosis and malaria. Country plans are developed through an inclusive process that aims at achieving consensus on national strategies for each disease. An ability-to-pay formula based on each country’s per capita income and disease burden encourages countries to develop strong national plans.

Family Planning 2020 is increasing access to contraceptives

Family planning is another area where the global community is aligning efforts and resources to help the millions of women worldwide – mostly in poor countries – who don’t have access to voluntary family planning information, contraceptives or services.

Building on the commitments made by world leaders at the 2012 London Summit on Family Planning, the global community came together to create Family Planning 2020 with the goal of increasing access to contraceptive information and resources to 120 million more women in 69 of the world’s poorest countries by 2020.2

Through the co-ordinating efforts of Family Planning 2020, more than 30 developing countries have made bold commitments for addressing the policy, financing and delivery barriers that women face in accessing contraceptive information and tools. Over half of these countries have developed costed national family planning plans.

In 2013, bilateral funding by governments for family planning programmes was up nearly 20% over the previous year and 8.4 million more women and girls gained access to modern contraceptives (Family Planning 2020, 2014).

The Every Newborn partnership is reducing infant mortality

While significant progress has been made reducing child mortality, the Gates Foundation has aligned with key stakeholders around a global action plan to accelerate progress in combating newborn mortality. Each year, nearly 3 million children still die within the first month after birth. The vast majority of these deaths can be prevented with proven, cost-effective interventions, such as drying the baby immediately after bathing to prevent hypothermia, and using an inexpensive antiseptic to clean the umbilical cord and prevent infection.

Each year nearly 3 million children still die within their first month.

In 2014, the World Health Assembly – the decision-making body of the World Health Organization – unanimously endorsed the Every Newborn Action Plan, which provides every country with evidence-based policy recommendations and a roadmap to accelerate progress on newborn survival. The global action plan also includes more than 40 commitments by governments, civil society, international organisations, professional associations and the private sector covering financing, policy and service delivery.

Countries like Ethiopia, India and Nigeria have recently announced ambitious efforts to accelerate progress in newborn health. Together, their efforts alone could save the lives of nearly 1.3 million women and children every year.

Experience in the health sector sheds light on what works in global partnerships

As we shape the post-2015 development agenda, we can draw on the experience of the past 15 years in the health sector – including the examples above – to identify some of the most important and effective aspects of global partnerships:

The best partnerships understand the limitations of global action.

Country leadership. Today at the global level, there is much better understanding of what is needed to address the big challenges in health. At the end of the day, however, getting solutions to the people who need them and sustaining these measures over time is a “local” challenge. The best partnerships understand the limitations of global action and are able to identify when the focus needs to shift to the local level, with countries taking the lead in designing their own programmes and ensuring their implementation.

Strategic planning. The development community is great at setting goals, but these goals have not always been linked to actionable strategic implementation plans. One of the most exciting aspects of the evolving global partnerships in the health sector is their plans-based approach – with roadmaps, timelines and hard targets. To ensure that we are solving today’s problems and anticipating and preventing tomorrow’s challenges, it is essential that these approaches take into account anticipated demographic changes and the needs associated with them.

Data and measurement. Good data are a cornerstone of effective development. They help to ensure the global community holds itself accountable, but most importantly, they enable countries to practise evidence-based decision making. Partnerships like Gavi and the Global Fund have shown the value of data and measurement in providing information to drive informed decisions about strategy, priorities and action plans.

Financing. As fiscal constraints threaten support from traditional providers of development co-operation, it is important that implementing governments prioritise the use of limited domestic resources for human development investments in areas such as health and agricultural development. Effective partnerships help governments prioritise the allocation of scarce resources, develop costed plans and identify the resources required from external providers, the private sector and other stakeholders.

We must invite – and expect – the full participation of private sector partners.

Private sector involvement. Development has only begun to tap the innovation, expertise and resources available in the private sector. Inviting – and expecting – the full participation of private sector partners can lend significant strength to efforts to tackle the urgent issues addressed by the post-2015 development agenda (see Chapter 4).

Pulling together means faster progress

Over the past 15 years, the Gates Foundation has been fortunate to play a part in creating and implementing global partnerships such as the ones described above. The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) that emerged following the UN’s visionary Millennium Declaration in 2000 created the enabling environment for these partnerships.

Partnerships can help improve poor people’s lives faster over the next 15 years than at any other time in history.

Understanding what has worked well offers the best opportunity in the years ahead to build on the success of the MDGs. In fact, we are optimistic that these partnerships can help improve the lives of people in poor countries faster over the next 15 years than at any other time in history.

While their co-ordinating mechanisms and governance structures vary, they all have a few important characteristics in common: a shared sense of purpose, a unified mission, action plans, well-defined targets and agreed accountability mechanisms. Thanks to these characteristics, each global partnership ensures that everyone is pulling from the same end of the rope.

Global partnerships are a proven tool to achieve a world where every child and adult has the chance to live a longer, healthier and more productive life. Not only is this the right thing to do; it is also the smart thing to do in the drive to build strong economies and more stable communities.

Notes

 1. Chapter 15 of the Development Co-operation Report 2014: Mobilising Resources for Sustainable Development (OECD, 2014) describes how these innovative financing mechanisms work for immunisation production.

 2. Details are available at: www.familyplanning2020.org/about.

References

Family Planning 2020 (2014), FP2020: Partnership in Progress 2013-14, Family Planning 2020, United Nations Foundation, Washington, DC, http://progress.familyplanning2020.org/executive-summary.

OECD (2014), Development Co-operation Report 2014: Mobilising Resources for Sustainable Development, OECD Publishing, Paris, http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/dcr-2014-en.

Chapter 9.

The International Health Partnership+

by

Tim Evans

Senior Director, Health, Nutrition and Population, World Bank

and

Marie-Paule Kieny

Assistant Director-General, Health Systems and Innovation, World Health Organization

The International Health Partnership+ is a multi-stakeholder partnership focusing on improving health in developing countries. It provides a platform for co-ordinating and aligning efforts, for sharing knowledge and for holding each other to account. The partnership has agreed on seven “behaviours” for effective co-operation in the health sector, building on the principles of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness; these emphasise support for national health sector strategies and the use of country systems. This chapter explores some of the strengths and challenges of the partnership, and concludes that as the development context becomes increasingly complex, its role is as relevant as ever.

Improving health and health services is a complex task in any country, involving governments, health workers, civil society and other stakeholders. In developing countries, it is even more so, as money for health comes from both domestic and external resources. This means governments have to work with a range of international development partners who use different funding streams and make diverse administrative demands. As a result, efforts can become fragmented, governments’ capacities are frequently overburdened and resources can be wasted. At the same time, funding from outside sources can often be unpredictable.

The International Health Partnership+ (IHP+) is a voluntary coalition of international agencies, partner countries and civil society organisations (CSOs) that aims to make development co-operation more effective in improving health in low and middle-income countries by putting the principles of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (see Annex D) into practice in the health sector. In 2007, when the partnership was established, the number of funding streams and agencies for health was growing rapidly. To accelerate progress towards achieving the relevant Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), partners realised that it was imperative to make better use of the available resources.

Since then, the partnership has grown from 8 countries and 19 bilateral and multilateral agencies to 35 countries, 28 agencies and a range of CSOs. Participating governments and development agencies adhere to the IHP+ Global Compact,¹ which commits them to co-ordinating their support to countries, to using the countries’ national health systems and to being mutually accountable. The IHP+ also encourages partners to develop and adhere to country-specific memoranda of understanding, or compacts.

Since late 2013, the partnership has been governed by a Steering Committee of senior officials from partner countries, development agencies and CSOs. This Steering Committee offers a space for debating key issues, enabling the partnership to build strong alliances among key players in the health sector and providing a voice for developing countries on co-operation in health. Every two years, a team of government, development agency and CSO representatives is invited from each partner country to discuss mutual accountability and exchange experiences. The World Health Organization (WHO) and the World Bank support the partnership through a small secretariat, which adds value by encouraging close working relationships between these two key agencies.

The IHP+ reinforces existing commitments to effective development co-operation within the health sector and by all development partners (Box 9.1). The partnership also promotes country-level accountability and transparency in numerous ways. For example, developing principles and practical tools for joint assessments of national strategies helps ensure that development co-operation provider efforts are better aligned with developing countries’ own national plans (IHP+, 2013).² CSO engagement is encouraged in policy and review processes, as is a single framework for monitoring and evaluating health sector performance, including joint annual reviews (IHP+ and WHO, 2011).

Box 9.1. The seven IHP+ behaviours for effective co-operation in health

In 2012, the IHP+ outlined the core elements of effective development co-operation for development partners in the health sector. These seven ”behaviours” incorporate commitments from the Paris Declaration, the Accra Agenda for Action and the Busan Partnership (see Annex D):

support a single national health strategy

record all funds for health in the national budget

harmonise and align with the national financial management systems

harmonise and align with the national procurement and supply systems

use one information and accountability platform

support South-South and triangular co-operation

provide well-coordinated technical assistance.

Source: IHP+ (2012), “Seven behaviours: How development partners can change for the better”, International Health Parntership+, www.internationalhealthpartnership.net/en/about-ihp/seven-behaviours.

The IHP+ has also commissioned independent monitoring of partners’ performance against their commitments, adapting the indicators used for monitoring the Paris and Busan commitments (see Annex D). The results, including data by country and by development agency, are published periodically (IHP+, 2015).

The IHP+ has many strengths, and some challenges, in supporting effective co-operation

In each country, the IHP+ focuses on development co-operation at the health sector level, rather than around a particular health priority. This supports the emergence of comprehensive and coherent approaches to achieving national health objectives, including the MDGs; it also contributes evidence for global and national discussions on how to tackle ineffective or inefficient ways of working.

At the global level, the IHP+ brings together diverse types of agencies – not only agencies that focus on health, but also multilateral and bilateral agencies that work across sectors, on issues such as strengthening financial management and procurement systems. Most major development agencies are now in the IHP+. This mix not only helps to keep health-specific national agencies informed on wider issues, but also provides a lens for multi-sector agencies to see the combined impact of different institutions’ programmatic and fiduciary requirements on ministries of health.

While early IHP+ signatories were mainly countries already well advanced in implementing effective development co-operation, often with sector-wide approaches in place,³ newer members include many countries that are classified as fragile and conflict-affected. The diverse experience these members bring to the table makes the partnership an excellent platform for enhancing South-South co-operation, with lessons and approaches being widely shared through meetings and reviews.

At the global level, the seven behaviours outlined in Box 9.1 have helped focus the attention of global health and development agency leaders on practical targets and actions. By agreeing to tackle these one at a time, they have been able to make concerted headway. Box 9.2 contains one example.

The growing number of countries joining the IHP+ suggests it is valued as a forum for exchange and accountability.

Box 9.2. Reducing the reporting burden

Global action by a range of agencies in monitoring and evaluating health programmes has resulted in large numbers of indicators, diverse indicator definitions, multiple reporting periods and fragmented data collection, causing an unnecessary reporting burden for developing countries. Likewise, uncoordinated efforts to strengthen countries’ institutional capacity have generated inefficiencies (WHO, 2014a). Nonetheless, the number of requests for data appears to be increasing. A review of indicators across a selected number of partners, programmes and resolutions revealed that countries are requested to report on as many as 600 indicators – and this is a conservative estimate (WHO, 2014a). To reduce excessive global reporting requirements and encourage joint investment in national health information platforms, in September 2014 IHP+ working groups endorsed a Global Reference List of Core Indicators comprising 100 indicators: a significant reduction from the previous number (WHO, 2014b).

Yet while there has been progress in monitoring expenditure by development co-operation providers against financial commitments (through annual health reports, for example), making mutual accountability effective among partner countries remains a challenge. It is difficult for developing country governments to hold international funders to account in an explicit way (see Chapters 5 and 6). This involves getting development agencies and partner governments to change their behaviour, which is not easy given that organisational decisions are driven by political as well as technical issues. The commitments in the IHP+ compacts are not legally binding, nor does the partnership provide funding to encourage changes in behaviour. To leverage change, therefore, the IHP+ relies on peer pressure, on demonstrating implementation at the country level and on focusing attention on progress through periodic monitoring exercises. The growing number of countries joining the IHP+ suggests that the partnership is valued as a forum for exchange and accountability.

Civil society also can play an important role in holding all development co-operation partners to account and pushing for action on national and global commitments. Governments need to be willing, however, to engage with CSOs, even though these organisations may be critical of them at times. CSOs with sufficient technical understanding to engage in policy debates play a particularly important role, although in many countries it has been challenging to find CSOs with the expertise and interest in sector-wide policies and plans, and especially in effective co-operation. The IHP+ has a grants scheme to support selected CSOs in this area, but it has reached only 13 countries so far.

The IHP+ is even more relevant for the post-2015 era

New global initiatives in the health sector are arising constantly. Although these bring many benefits, without good management they may also complicate matters for developing countries, leading to duplication of effort and fragmentation (Box 9.2). The commitment to effective co-operation through the IHP+ can help to mitigate this. For example, the partnership can point out the implications of proposals while they are still in the pipeline, try to ensure good alignment with existing structures and systems, and assess the impact of their requirements for the country.

The need to champion effective co-operation in health will be even greater post-2015.

Development co-operation is changing rapidly. More countries are progressing to middle-income status, with some becoming providers of development co-operation themselves. It is important to complete the unfinished business of the development effectiveness agenda while making the most of new and evolving forms of development co-operation. The inclusion of targets for non-communicable diseases in the proposed post-2015 goals, as well as the unfinished agenda of the MDGs, will add complexity to the development co-operation system. Looking forward, the need to champion effective co-operation in health in the post-2015 era will be even greater than in the past. We believe the IHP+ is as relevant as ever for meeting these challenges.

Notes

 1. See the latest signed version at: www.internationalhealthpartnership.net/en/about-ihp/a-global-commitment.

 2. It is recognised that the joint assessments of national strategies tool and guidelines for joint assessments have improved the quality of sector plans, although their impact on funding decisions is less clear (IHP+, 2013).

 3. A plethora of individual projects funded by different provider countries places unrealistic demands on developing countries’ limited economic and human resources, and leads to fragmentation and duplication. This realisation prompted the international community to reform its methods of development co-operation delivery to take a sector-wide approach (SWAp). Under a SWAp, partners agree to support a national sector strategy and its priorities; in some SWAps, some of the international funding is pooled and managed by government in support of that strategy. Like the IHP+, a SWAp calls for a partnership between government and development agencies.

References

IHP+ (2015), “IHP+ results: Progress in the International Health Partnership & related initiatives (IHP+), 2014 performance report”, International Health Partnership+, www.internationalhealthpartnership.net/fileadmin/uploads/ihp/Documents/Results___Evidence/IHP__Results/2014_Monitoring_Round/IHP_report-ENG-WEB.PDF.

IHP+ (2013), “Joint Assessment of National Health Strategies (JANS) Tool & Guidelines”, webpage, www.internationalhealthpartnership.net/en/tools/jans-tool-and-guidelines.

IHP+ (2012), “Seven behaviours: How development partners can change for the better”, International Health Partnership+, www.internationalhealthpartnership.net/en/about-ihp/seven-behaviours.

IHP+ and WHO (2011), Monitoring, Evaluation and Review of National Health Strategies: A Country-Led Platform for Information and Accountability, World Health Organization, Geneva, www.internationalhealthpartnership.net/fileadmin/uploads/ihp/Documents/Tools/M_E_Framework/M%26E.framework.2011.pdf.

WHO (2014a), “A rapid assessment of the burden of indicators and reporting for health monitoring”, World Health Organization, Geneva, www.internationalhealthpartnership.net/fileadmin/uploads/ihp/Documents/Tools/M_E_Framework/Rapid_Assessment_Indicators_Reporting_report_for_WG_revised_03Mar14.pdf.

WHO (2014b), “Global Reference List of Core Health Indicators”, Working Version 5, World Health Organization, Geneva, www.internationalhealthpartnership.net/fileadmin/uploads/ihp/Documents/Key_Issues/One_M_E_Platform/Global_RefList_Core_Indicators_V5_17Nov2014_WithoutAnnexes.pdf.

WHO and The World Bank (2013), Better Results through Effective Development Co-operation: The Heart of the Work We Do, World Health Organization, Geneva, www.internationalhealthpartnership.net/fileadmin/uploads/ihp/Documents/Results___Evidence/HAE__results___lessons/IHP_better_results_en_2013.pdf.

Chapter 10.

Development partnerships in education

by

Manos Antoninis

Education for All Global Monitoring Report

While development partnerships in basic education have taken many forms, the Education for All Fast Track Initiative and its successor, the Global Partnership for Education, have best expressed the aspirations of the international community. Unlike in the health sector, these education partnerships did not initially establish a global fund. Instead, they sought to establish a compact among development co-operation providers and governments to catalyse increased contributions by both. In practice, the formation of the partnership had a long gestation period. Despite improvements in the governance arrangements and operational procedures, the question remains open whether the promise of a catalytic effect has been realised. Building on lessons learned, it is clear that partnerships after 2015 will need more funds and better evidence to deliver improved education outcomes.

This chapter also includes an opinion piece by Qian Tang, Assistant Director-General for Education, UNESCO.

 1 

The main development partnerships in education since 2000 find their origins in the Education for All (EFA) movement, which put in place a global commitment to provide quality basic education for all children, youth and adults. The five conveners of the Education for All movement were the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the World Bank.

While the Education for All movement predated the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) by ten years, the first decade of its existence was characterised by disappointingly slow progress. In April 2000, participants in the movement assembled in Dakar, where they pushed for a breakthrough. They adopted the Dakar Framework for Action, founded on 6 goals – ranging from early childhood education to adult literacy – and on 12 strategies (Box 10.1). Three of the goals – Goals 2, 4 and 5 – had concrete global targets. The framework also included six regionally specific frameworks for action, covering sub-Saharan Africa, the Americas, the Arab states, Asia and the Pacific, Europe and North America, and the E-9 countries.²

Box 10.1. The Dakar Framework for Action: Goals and strategies

Goals

Expanding and improving comprehensive early childhood care and education, especially for the most vulnerable and disadvantaged children.

Ensuring that by 2015 all children, particularly girls, children in difficult circumstances and those belonging to ethnic minorities, have access to and complete free and compulsory primary education of good quality.

Ensuring that the learning needs of all young people and adults are met through equitable access to appropriate learning and life skills programmes.

Achieving a 50% improvement in levels of adult literacy by 2015, especially for women, and equitable access to basic and continuing education for all adults.

Eliminating gender disparities in primary and secondary education by 2005, and achieving gender equality in education by 2015, with a focus on ensuring girls’ full and equal access to and achievement in basic education of good quality.

Improving all aspects of the quality of education and ensuring excellence of all so that recognised and measurable learning outcomes are achieved by all, especially in literacy, numeracy and essential life skills.

Strategies

Mobilise strong national and international political commitment for Education for All, develop national action plans and enhance significantly investment in basic education.

Promote Education for All policies within a sustainable and well-integrated sector framework clearly linked to poverty elimination and development strategies.

Ensure the engagement and participation of civil society in the formulation, implementation and monitoring of strategies for educational development.

Develop responsive, participatory and accountable systems of educational governance and management.

Meet the needs of education systems affected by conflict, natural calamities and instability, and conduct educational programmes in ways that promote mutual understanding, peace and tolerance, and that help to prevent violence and conflict.

Implement integrated strategies for gender equality in education that recognise the need for change in attitudes, values and practices.

Implement education programmes and actions to combat the HIV/AIDS pandemic as a matter of urgency.

Create safe, healthy, inclusive and equitably resourced educational environments conducive to excellence in learning, with clearly defined levels of achievement for all.

Enhance the status, morale and professionalism of teachers.

Harness new information and communication technologies to help achieve Education for All goals.

Systematically monitor progress towards Education for All goals and strategies at the national, regional and international levels.

Build on existing mechanisms to accelerate progress towards Education for All.

Source: UNESCO (2000), “The Dakar Framework for Action – Education for All: Meeting our collective commitments”, UNESCO, Paris, http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0012/001211/121147e.pdf.

Much like the MDGs, the goals of the Dakar Framework proved difficult to reach in the timeframes allotted. Nonetheless, since 2000 the world has advanced in education beyond where it would have been if the trends of the 1990s had persisted.

Accounting for this progress is, however, very difficult. Some of it may be attributable to a more favourable environment in developing countries, including a resumption of economic growth across regions as well as increased public revenue and expenditure (IMF, 2014). In order to assess the role played by the Education for All goal-setting process and the related institutional partnership mechanisms, this chapter will concentrate on Strategy 1 of the Dakar Framework, which called on partners to “enhance significantly investment in basic education”.

Progress on Strategy 1 is assessed here mainly in terms of the Education for All Fast Track Initiative (FTI) and its successor, the Global Partnership for Education (GPE). While these two initiatives have provided only a small part of total support to basic education since 2004, they are the mechanisms that best exemplify the aspirations of the international community for a partnership approach to achieving Education for All.

The Global Partnership for Education grew out of the Fast Track Initiative

The core idea behind the Dakar Framework was that “the heart of EFA activity lies at the country level”, but that much “can be achieved through strong national strategies supported by effective development co-operation” (see the “In my view” box). For that purpose, partners would “strengthen accountable international and regional mechanisms to give clear expression to these commitments” (UNESCO, 2000). The framework claimed that “no countries seriously committed to education for all will be thwarted in their achievement of this goal by a lack of resources” (UNESCO, 2000).

Much can be achieved through strong national strategies supported by effective development co-operation.

In my view: New partnerships offer much needed support to education for all

Qian Tang, UNESCO Assistant Director-General for Education

External support continues to play an important role in funding education – particularly in the least developed countries. In the aftermath of the global financial crisis, with the development assistance provided by many countries stagnating and even declining, countries are seeking new sources of funding.

In this context, UNESCO has been experimenting with a novel type of partnership that is showing promise. The four-year UNESCO-China Funds-in-Trust project, which began in 2012, aims to support eight African countries* in their efforts to accelerate progress towards education for all by using new technologies to develop capacity in teacher education and training institutions.

What makes this project particularly innovative is the fact that it is being implemented through a platform, managed by UNESCO, that attracts funds not only from the government of the People’s Republic of China – with President Xi Jinping having publicly committed to the project – but also from Chinese enterprises based in China and/or in the beneficiary countries, such as the telecommunications giant Huawei. Each actor brings unique contributions – be they funds and/or technical know-how – to the table. Drawing on the competencies of each partner allows for effective use of human and financial resources.

What have we seen so far? For the beneficiary countries, learning from the development experience of another country has created a sense of joint purpose and helped overcome the mistrust between governments and the private sector that can sometimes impede action.

There have also been numerous benefits for China. This is the first time that the country has provided funds-in-trust via an international organisation for the development of education in Africa. The project has enabled China to demonstrate that it is a committed stakeholder in the global community. At the same time, it is allowing this new provider of development co-operation to become familiar with international practices and standards. The impact on Chinese enterprises is also important, helping them to gain awareness of their social responsibility towards the African communities in which they operate.

Of course, challenges remain. In order to ensure lasting impact, it will be important to integrate the project within national education development plans – an aspect that has not yet been sufficiently addressed.

For now, UNESCO is working to sustain the momentum of this new partnership and extend its reach. Building on the initial success, a number of additional Chinese donors from the public and private sectors have signed agreements with UNESCO: for example, Hainan Airlines and the Hainan Foundation are focusing their attention on girls’ and women’s education in Asia and Africa; the Shenzhen government is developing higher education in Asia and Africa; and Huawei is using new technologies to promote equity and quality in education in the least developed countries.

* The African countries supported by the UNESCO-China Funds-in-Trust project are: Côte d’Ivoire, Ethiopia and Namibia (first round), and the Republic of Congo, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Liberia, Tanzania and Uganda (added in the second round).

The Fast Track Initiative was established in 2002, following the development consensus reached at Monterrey;³ its design was finalised in a framework paper published in 2004. The first paragraph of this paper described the initiative as “an evolving global partnership of developing and donor countries and agencies to support global Education for All goals by focusing on accelerating progress towards the core Education for All goal of universal primary school completion, for boys and girls alike, by 2015” (EFA-FTI, 2004).

The Fast Track Initiative was not initially intended to operate as a vertical global fund. Rather, it was premised on country-based processes. Providers of development co-operation in a country would assess and endorse the national education-sector plan if it satisfied certain criteria. A mutual compact would then commit the national government to working towards improved planning, monitoring and increased domestic expenditure, while committing development partners to scaling up funding, supporting capacity enhancement, and aligning with the government’s priorities and systems.

Throughout the 2000s, however, the Fast Track Initiative was plagued by criticisms for its operational dependence on the World Bank, which slowed down disbursement; its focus on primary education, which lessened attention to other Education for All goals; and its exclusion of some of the countries with the greatest need, either because they were fragile and conflict-affected or because they had not been able to come up with a solid plan (Cambridge Education et al., 2010). At the same time, the financing expected to come through regular bilateral and multilateral development co-operation was not meeting expectations. In 2003, a Catalytic Fund was established to fill short-term financing gaps; it was expanded in 2007 to provide longer term and more substantial volumes of funding.

The Fast Track Initiative was transformed into the Global Partnership for Education in 2011 with several reforms in its goals and objectives, as well as its governance and operational procedures (GPE, 2012). Its secretariat was strengthened to improve its capacity to respond to country needs and greater emphasis was given to supporting fragile states. By the end of 2013, more than 40% of Global Partnership for Education disbursements were going to fragile and conflict-affected countries (UNESCO, 2015).

By 2012, the Global Partnership for Education had become the fourth-largest source of external financing for basic education in low and lower middle-income countries.

There was also a gradual expansion in Global Partnership for Education direct funding. In 39 countries, the share of Global Partnership for Education disbursements for basic education increased from 4% between 2004 and 2006, to 16% between 2010 and 2012 (UNESCO, 2015). By 2012, partly as a result of improved disbursement rates, the Global Partnership for Education had become the fourth-largest source of external financing for basic education in low and lower middle-income countries.

Assessing the real impact of the Global Partnership for Education is difficult

The question remains, however, whether and to what extent the Global Partnership for Education had a catalytic effect on overall education finance.

On the domestic financing side, low-income country governments have allocated up to 1% more of GDP to education since 1999. And yet, this has been driven mainly by increased domestic resource mobilisation and the fact that the share of education in the overall budget was already high in these countries (UNESCO, 2015).

On the development co-operation side, official development assistance to basic education more than doubled in real terms between 2002 and 2010, which might suggest success. Yet the share of education in total development co-operation portfolios actually fell slightly over the same period – and since 2010, support to basic education has declined⁴ (UNESCO, 2015).

The Global Partnership for Education has shown its commitment to improving its effectiveness, notably through a new funding model introduced in 2014 that includes performance incentives: countries that can demonstrate progress towards equity, financing efficiency and learning achievements are eligible to receive 30% of the total funding package of the Global Partnership for Education.

Very few countries have structures in place to assess achievements in learning.

In the case of learning, however, few countries have structures in place to assess achievements (Box 10.2). Even where information on learning levels is available, it is important to be cautious in its use. Learning results improve slowly, making it difficult to attribute measureable changes to specific disbursements.

Box 10.2. PISA for Development

PISA for Development aims to improve learning outcomes worldwide by enhancing one of the OECD’s most successful policy instruments to make it more relevant to developing countries. Through this project, the OECD is also contributing to the UN-led discussions about education in the post-2015 agenda.

Since its launch in 1997, PISA (the OECD’s Programme for International Student Assessment) has become a leading reference on the quality of education systems worldwide. Every three years, PISA assesses the knowledge and competencies of 15 year olds in three subjects: reading, mathematics and science. To date, more than 70 countries have taken part in the assessment, comparing results and learning from one another through PISA’s collaborative global network. The next round of results (PISA 2015) will be published in December 2016.

PISA is a powerful tool for policy making. Participating countries receive a comprehensive assessment of the quality and equity of their education systems, which helps them to benchmark their progress over time, set national goals, and chart paths to better and more equitable learning outcomes. Countries also see where they stand in comparison to their regional and global peers – an opportunity for mutual learning and inspiration.

Since its founding, the number of countries benefiting from PISA has grown to include about 30 emerging and developing countries. Brazil, Indonesia, Tunisia and Viet Nam, for example, have drawn on PISA to support their national policy efforts.

In 2014, the OECD and a number of partners (including the participating countries listed below) launched the four-year PISA for Development initiative. This initiative aims to identify how PISA can best support evidence-based policy making in emerging and developing economies, while contributing to the UN-led definition of global learning goals within the post-2015 Sustainable Development Goals. These objectives will be achieved by 2018 in three main ways:

developing contextual questionnaires and data-collection instruments that better capture diverse situations in emerging and developing countries

adjusting the PISA test instruments so that they are sensitive to a wider range of performance levels, particularly basic knowledge and skills

establishing methods and approaches to include out-of-school students in the PISA assessment.

The project will also contribute greatly to capacity building for large-scale student learning assessment in the participating countries: Cambodia, Ecuador, Guatemala, Senegal, Tanzania and Zambia.

A key feature of the project is peer-to-peer learning, which will be achieved through bringing together the 30 emerging and developing countries already participating in PISA with the 6 PISA for Development countries to share experiences and learning.

PISA for Development is guided by an International Advisory Group composed of representatives of the partners supporting the project, as well as the participating countries. In addition, technical experts meet regularly to develop survey instruments and methodologies.

The OECD and its partners expect that from 2018 onwards, these efforts will enable more countries to use PISA to set national learning targets, monitor progress towards them, and analyse the factors that affect student outcomes, particularly among poor and marginalised populations. Countries will also have greater institutional capacity to help track post-2015 global education targets that are focused on access to education as well as learning.

Source: www.oecd.org/pisa/aboutpisa/pisafordevelopment.htm.

In conclusion, while the establishment of the Fast Track Initiative and the Global Partnership for Education, in line with the spirit of the Dakar Framework, can be considered a success, experience shows that it can take considerable time for such efforts to take shape and bear fruit. More than a dozen years later, lack of data and the complexity of attributing results to interventions make it still difficult to establish that the partnership has made a palpable difference in education outcomes in its partner countries. However, it has created strong momentum and the 2015 milestone provides a great opportunity to build on its lessons.

An effective post-2015 partnership in education needs more resources and better evidence

Two parameters need to be examined carefully. The first revolves around financing for education in the context of the post-2015 Sustainable Development Goals. Clearly, to achieve quality basic education for all by 2030, there will be a need to mobilise far more funds to close the financing gap. There have been calls to support the Global Partnership for Education and to expand its scope towards a global fund analogous to those that have been credited with changing the public health financing landscape (SDSN, 2014; and see Chapter 8). Nonetheless, caution should be exercised in applying the experience of the health sector to education.

Secondly, the evidence base will also need to drastically improve, from information on inputs – such as finance – to evidence on outcomes to support policy and programme decisions. Outcomes in education are particularly hard to monitor and verify, and much more effort needs to go into measuring them. Initiatives such as the OECD’s PISA for Development (Box 10.2) can make a solid contribution to fulfilling this need. More recently, the Global Partnership for Education has paid closer attention to the quality of the evidence it uses and to the way in which it attributes progress in education to its own interventions (GPE, 2014). These developments are a source of optimism that partnerships to implement the post-2015 education agenda will keep improving.

Notes

 1. The opinions expressed and arguments employed are those of the author and do not represent the official views of the Education for All Global Monitoring Report team.

 2. The E-9 Initiative is a forum for nine high-population countries of the South (Bangladesh, Brazil, the People’s Republic of China, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Nigeria and Pakistan) to discuss their experiences in education, exchange best practices and monitor progress on achieving Education for All.

 3. The 2002 United Nations International Conference on Financing for Development held in Monterrey, Mexico.

 4. Despite major improvements in the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) database, the Global Partnership for Education is not yet identified as a separate donor – a fact that has hampered related analyses.

References

Cambridge Education et al. (2010), “Mid-term evaluation of the EFA Fast Track Initiative. Final synthesis report: Volume 1 – Main report”, Cambridge Education, Mokoro Ltd and Oxford Policy Management, www.camb-ed.com/fasttrackinitiative/download/SR_Final_Feb2010z2.pdf.

EFA-FTI (2004), “Education for All – Fast Track Initiative: framework”, Education for All – Fast Track Initiative, Washington, DC, https://commdev.org/userfiles/file_FrameworkNOV04_0.pdf.

GPE (2014), Results for Learning Report 2014/15: Basic Education at Risk, Global Partnership for Education, Washington, DC, www.globalpartnership.org/2014-15-results-for-learning-report.

GPE (2012), Strategic Plan 2012-2015, Global Partnership for Education, Washington, DC, www.globalpartnership.org/content/strategic-plan-2012-2015.

IMF (2014), World Economic Outlook Database, April, International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC, www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2014/01/weodata/index.aspx (accessed 12 August 2014).

SDSN (2014), “Financing for sustainable development: Implementing the SDGs through effective investment strategies and partnerships”, draft for public consultation, Sustainable Development Solutions Network, New York, http://unsdsn.org/resources/publications/financing.

UNESCO (2015), EFA Global Monitoring Report 2015: Education for All 2000-15 – Achievements and Challenges, UNESCO Publishing, Paris.

UNESCO (2000), “The Dakar Framework for Action – Education for All: Meeting our collective commitments”, UNESCO, Paris, http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0012/001211/121147e.pdf.

Chapter 11.

Sustainable Energy for All

by

Kandeh Yumkella

United Nations Secretary-General’s Special Representative for Sustainable Energy for All

Poverty and climate change are the two major challenges of our time. Sustainable energy holds huge potential for tackling these two challenges together, supporting action across all three pillars of sustainable development: economic growth, environmental protection and social progress. Energy is a development enabler for other crucial goals, such as health, gender equality, and access to food and water. The Sustainable Energy for All initiative is a unique partnership between the United Nations and the World Bank, along with a remarkable network of leaders from developing and developed country governments, the private sector, civil society, and multilateral and national financial institutions. This chapter describes how together they are catalysing action and investment to achieve three ambitious goals: ensuring universal access to modern energy services, doubling the global rate of improvement in energy efficiency and doubling the share of renewable energy in the global energy mix.

This chapter also includes an opinion piece by Mary Robinson, President of the Mary Robinson Foundation-Climate Justice and member of the Sustainable Energy for All Advisory Board.

© United Nations 2015 for this chapter.

If there are two things that stand out as the grand challenges of our time, they are poverty and climate change. And if there is a master key that can unlock the enormous potential of solving both of these problems at the same time, then sustainable energy for all it is. The task at hand is clearly both in need of, and worthy of, a mega-partnership.

In 2011, United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon launched the Sustainable Energy for All initiative, which sets three objectives to be achieved by 2030:

ensuring universal access to modern energy services

doubling the global rate of improvement in energy efficiency

doubling the share of renewable energy in the global energy mix.

Experts say these objectives are ambitious, but achievable (Sustainable Energy for All, 2012: 2); that it is more feasible to achieve them jointly than individually (Sustainable Energy for All, 2013: 33); and that they are compatible with the target of keeping global warming below 2°C (Rogelj et al., 2013).

How does Sustainable Energy for All work?

The Sustainable Energy for All initiative provides a clear, concise global vision around its set of integrated objectives, supporting action across all three pillars of sustainable development – economic growth, environmental protection and social progress. Its strength lies in addressing all of these crucially important issues in an integrated way: not just renewables, not just efficiency, not just energy access, but all three together.

The initiative leverages the global leadership and unparalleled convening power of the United Nations and the World Bank through a unique partnership. With their different but complementary strengths, these two major institutions are ideally placed to lead the charge against energy poverty and climate change.

Sustainable Energy for All is also helping to create the enabling conditions for a massive scale-up of public and private investment in energy access and clean energy solutions. Tens of billions of dollars are already pledged towards the initiative’s objectives and – most importantly – these commitments are already being delivered. Meanwhile, new pledges keep coming in.

The initiative also has brought together a remarkable network of leaders who can catalyse action and investment to transform the world’s energy system. They represent developing and developed country governments; the private sector, including big players such as Royal Philips and Bank of America; civil society networks, such as the Self-Employed Women’s Association in India and the ENERGIA International Network on Gender and Sustainable Energy; and multilateral and national financial institutions, such as the Brazilian National Development Bank.

Sustainable energy is a development enabler for other crucial goals, such as health, gender equality, and access to food and water.

Sustainable Energy for All mobilises these partners to use best practice and innovative solutions in target areas with high-impact opportunity. One example is phasing out gas flaring from oil production: in sub-Saharan Africa alone, the amount of gas flared every year is equivalent to half the sub-continent’s annual power consumption. Another target is the universal adoption of clean cooking solutions, which would prevent 4 million premature deaths every year, mostly among women and children. These high-impact opportunities highlight the potential of sustainable energy as a development enabler for other crucial goals, such as health, gender equality, and access to food and water, to mention just a few (see the “In my view” box).

In my view: Leaving no one behind means ensuring access to sustainable energy for ALL

Mary Robinson, President, Mary Robinson Foundation – Climate Justice and member of the Sustainable Energy for All Advisory Board

Work to provide access to sustainable energy for all lies at the intersection of development, human rights and climate change: the building blocks of a climate justice approach.

The focus on sustainable energy, in particular renewables, is fundamental for the transition to a carbon-neutral world – an essential path to avoid dangerous climate change. The focus on ALL, on universal access, recognises that access to sustainable energy is both a driver of development and an enabler of human rights, from the right to health to the right to food.

The report of the High-Level Panel on the Post-2015 Development Agenda and the discussions of the Open Working Group on Sustainable Development Goals highlight the need for the international community to commit to leaving no one behind.¹ In this sense, there is no one-size-fits-all approach to ensuring universal access to sustainable energy; it will require a continuum of approaches, from market-based ones to those supported by the public sector.

This is no surprise to development practitioners, who know the importance of specialised approaches for reaching the poorest and most marginalised communities. Social protection, including social safety nets, prevent chronic food insecurity and enhance health and education outcomes by targeting public resources to those most in need.² Targeted approaches are also fundamental to ensuring that the transition to a sustainable, zero-carbon world is fair and inclusive (Mary Robinson Foundation – Climate Justice, 2013). Market-based solutions will deliver sustainable energy services to the majority, but the majority is not our goal; the goal is ALL. Targeted solutions, based on social protection for example, will help ensure that the extreme poor, women, marginalised communities, displaced people and refugees reap the benefits of the transition to clean, renewable energy.

The Sustainable Energy for All initiative encourages governments, businesses and civil society to work in partnership to make universal access to sustainable energy a reality by 2030. The United Nations General Assembly unanimously declared the decade 2014-24 as the United Nations Decade of Sustainable Energy for All, underscoring the importance of energy issues for sustainable development and for the elaboration of the post-2015 development agenda.

Women are a fundamental part of the ALL. When enabled to realise their rights, women will be the entrepreneurs, technicians and primary users of sustainable energy. But all too often women are not included in decision making on energy supply and access, despite the fact that their energy needs are different than those of men. Women prioritise energy for schools, health centres and productive uses over men’s preference for enterprise-based activities (Mary Robinson Foundation – Climate Justice, 2012). This is the reason behind the decision to focus the first two years of the decade of Sustainable Energy for All on women, energy, children and health. This focus presents a real opportunity to place women and gender equality at the heart of all activities – national and international – that contribute to fulfilling the goals of the initiative.

Sustainable Energy for All gives us the opportunity to deliver climate action, enable development, protect human rights, and galvanise the resources and political leadership needed to make universal access to sustainable energy a reality. To do so effectively, actors at all levels need to understand the needs of people on the ground, taking into account their circumstances and their ability to access technologies, knowledge and financing. This understanding must inform the design of all energy service delivery.

The goals of this initiative will only become a reality by ensuring the right to participation, so that people’s voices are heard and access to sustainable energy does, indeed, reach ALL.

1. The Report of the High-Level Panel of Eminent Persons on the Post-2015 Development Agenda is available at: www.un.org/sg/management/pdf/HLP_P2015_Report.pdf. The Sustainable Development Goals Open Working Group discussions can be found at: https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/owg.html.

2. This is an important theme in the OECD Development Co-operation Report 2013: Ending Poverty (OECD, 2013).

Momentum, and impact, are growing

The initiative tracks progress toward its three objectives in a transparent and accountable manner. The first Global Tracking Framework report was launched in 2013, with the second one launched this year.¹ Compiled by experts from more than 20 organisations and led by the World Bank and the OECD’s International Energy Agency, these reports provide a comprehensive snapshot of countries’ status in energy access, efficiency and renewables, as well as energy consumption. The framework provides the energy sector with a tracking capability that could serve as the tracking framework for the Sustainable Development Goal on energy, described below.

European and US commitments alone mean that energy poverty can be halved by 2030.

The progress we have seen so far exceeds expectations. Here are just a few highlights:

The European Commission and individual European countries have committed, as part of Sustainable Energy for All, to support developing countries in their efforts to end energy poverty for 600 million people within two decades. On 22 September 2014, Sustainable Energy for All signed an Aide Memoire for Cooperation with the United States’ Power Africa initiative to forge stronger co-operation in sub-Saharan Africa. These two European and US commitments alone mean that energy poverty can be halved by 2030. Such contributions are complemented by many strong domestic actions, such as Brazil’s Light for All programme, Saudi Arabia’s USD 109 billion solar investment and Denmark’s plan to reach 100% renewable energy by 2050, to mention a few.

Thirty countries have been identified for initial Sustainable Energy for All country-level action; in many more, partners are helping to develop agendas, investment prospectuses, energy policies, rural electrification plans, and strategies for increasing access to modern energy services and clean cooking solutions. Of particular note are the European Union’s EUR 40 million technical assistance facility for Africa and its recently launched rural electrification financing scheme in support of Sustainable Energy for All; Norway’s Energy+ initiative; and the World Bank’s Energy Sector Management Assistance Program’s technical assistance facility.

Sustainable Energy for All has built a new Global Energy Efficiency Accelerator Platform, a unique public-private platform for promoting energy efficiency in appliances, buildings, district energy, industry, lighting and transport. Targeted energy efficiency measures have the potential to reduce global energy-related emissions by many gigatonnes and generate hundreds of billions worth of savings every year. The platform was successfully launched at the UN Climate Summit in September 2014.

The International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) – Sustainable Energy for All’s renewable energy hub – has launched the Small Island Developing States Lighthouse Initiative and the African Clean Energy Corridor to provide significant assistance for investments in renewable energy. Islands are especially vulnerable to price fluctuations in imported fossil fuels. The Lighthouse Initiative aims to mobilise funding and political will to advance renewable energy deployment in island settings around the world, maximising the use of indigenous, clean and plentiful renewable energy and capturing invaluable lessons for the rest of the world. The African Clean Energy Corridor calls for accelerated deployment and cross-border trade of renewable power in a continuous network from Egypt to South Africa.

Sustainable Energy for All has built a network of regional and thematic hubs within existing institutions: for example, the African Development Bank acts as an African hub; the Inter-American Development Bank as a hub for the Americas; the Asian Development Bank as an Asian hub; IRENA as a renewables hub; the United Nations Environment Programme and Technical University of Denmark’s Copenhagen Centre on Energy Efficiency as an efficiency hub; the World Bank as a knowledge hub; the Energy Conservation Center of Japan as an energy efficiency facilitating centre; and the Energy and Resources Institute as a capacity-building hub. We have also built an Energy Access Practitioner Network, comprising more than 1 900 civil society representatives and entrepreneurs delivering small-scale off-grid energy solutions in 170 countries. Led by the United Nations Foundation, the network is applying innovative business models and capacity building to address the energy poverty challenge.

In short, Sustainable Energy for All, and its networks of thousands of multi-stakeholder partners, is already making inroads into implementing the initiative’s key objectives around the world.

Sustainable energy for all is an idea whose time has come

Sustainable energy for all is an idea whose time has come, and this has helped this initiative to quickly attract a formidable level of partnership during the few years since its inception. But we know that energy transitions take time. The focus on the post-2015 agenda must now be used to ensure that the momentum is maintained.

The Sustainable Development Goals contain a global goal on sustainable energy, including targets on access, efficiency and renewables (Goal 7 – ensure access to affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy for all; see Box 2.1 in Chapter 2).² The goal and its targets are fully compatible with the objectives of the Sustainable Energy for All initiative, and so will ensure that this fundamental need remains deeply embedded in the next development framework. During the important year of 2015, Sustainable Energy for All is building new relationships with the G20 through its Turkish Presidency, particularly on securing energy access in Africa. Sustainable Energy for All’s relevance is also evidenced by its close co-operation with the French Presidency towards the United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP21) in December. The Sustainable Energy for All initiative and our partners stand ready to play our part.

Notes

 1. For more information see: http://trackingenergy4all.worldbank.org/reports.

 2. For details see: https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/focussdgs.html.

References

Mary Robinson Foundation – Climate Justice (2013), Meeting the Energy Needs of the Poorest: A Role for Social Protection, Mary Robinson Foundation – Climate Justice, Dublin, www.mrfcj.org/media/pdf/2013-Energy-Needs-Position-Paper.pdf.

Mary Robinson Foundation – Climate Justice (2012), Access to Sustainable Energy: The Gender Dimensions, Policy Brief, Mary Robinson Foundation – Climate Justice, Dublin, www.mrfcj.org/pdf/Policy-Brief-Malawi-Access-to-Sustainable-Energy-the-Gender-Dimensions.pdf.

OECD (2013), Development Co-operation Report 2013: Ending Poverty, OECD Publishing, Paris, http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/dcr-2013-en.

Sustainable Energy for All (2013), “Global Tracking Framework”, Sustainable Energy for All, United Nations, Vienna, www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2013/05/28/000112742_20130528084417/Rendered/PDF/778890GTF0full0report.pdf.

Sustainable Energy for All (2012), “The Secretary-General’s High-Level Group on Sustainable Energy for All: Report of the co-chairs”, September, United Nations, New York, www.se4all.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/9-2012-SE4ALL-ReportoftheCo-Chairs.pdf.

Rogelj, J. et al. (2013), “The UN’s ‘Sustainable Energy for All’ initiative is compatible with a warming limit of 2 °C”, Nature Climate Change, Vol. 3, pp. 545-551, http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/nclimate1806.

UN (2013), “A new global partnership: Eradicate poverty and transform economies through sustainable development”, report of the High-Level Panel of Eminent Persons on the Post-2015 Development Agenda, United Nations, New York, www.un.org/sg/management/pdf/HLP_P2015_Report.pdf.

Chapter 12.

The Aid-for-Trade initiative

by

Yonov Frederick Agah

Deputy Director-General, World Trade Organization

The powerful developmental role of trade has been recognised by the inclusion of trade objectives – and of aid for trade – in preparatory work on the Sustainable Development Goals. Yet developing countries – especially the least developed – require help in building their trade-related capacities. This chapter describes the Aid-for-Trade initiative, launched in 2005 as a partnership to build the supply-side capacity and trade-related infrastructure of developing countries. This chapter explores the initiative’s strengths and weaknesses, concluding that ten years after its launch, it has firmly established itself in the international policy environment and remains as relevant today as when it was first launched.

The Aid-for-Trade initiative was launched in 2005 at the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) 6th Ministerial Conference in Hong Kong, China. The aim was “to help developing countries, particularly the least developed countries, to build the supply-side capacity and trade-related infrastructure that they need to assist them to implement and benefit from WTO Agreements and more broadly to expand their trade” (WTO, 2005: para. 57). The Ministerial Conference further mandated the Director-General of the WTO to establish a task force to operationalise aid for trade.

The success of the initiative is attributed to the strong partnerships it has formed within the trade and development policy communities. It has brought together numerous stakeholders – particularly developing countries, providers of development co-operation, academia and the private sector – with the common goal of helping to make trade work for development. Ten years after its founding, the initiative has firmly established itself in the international policy environment and remains as relevant today as when it was first launched.

The WTO periodically hosts a multilateral forum to explore trade and development issues. The 2015 WTO Global Review of Aid for Trade, with the theme of “Reducing trade costs for inclusive, sustainable growth”, examined how aid for trade can help connect developing countries – and in particular the least developed ones – to global trade by promoting inclusive, sustainable growth, a core principle of the United Nation’s (UN) post-2015 development agenda (OECD/WTO, 2015). It was designed to contribute to policy dialogue with deep, continuing relevance for the trade and development communities. Value chains are the dominant feature of global trade; in these, intermediate products account for 70% of all trade flows. Many developing countries, however – particularly the least developed ones – still face difficulties in connecting to value chains and adding value to their exports.

The least developed countries account for only 1.23% of global trade.

The Global Review examined in detail how aid for trade can contribute to the post-2015 development agenda – indeed, how to ensure that it plays an important role. With the least developed countries accounting for only 1.23% of global trade, it is clear that the initiative still has a very important role to play. To this end, the inclusion of trade objectives – and of aid for trade – in the outcome document of the Open Working Group on Sustainable Development Goals is a welcome development (United Nations Open Working Group on Sustainable Development Goals, 2014).

The contribution of aid for trade has grown over time

In 2006, the WTO task force reported its conclusions to the General Council on how to “operationalise” the Aid-for-Trade initiative. It recommended strengthening the demand side (i.e. encouraging developing countries to prioritise trade in national development plans); increasing provider response (i.e. encouraging providers of development co-operation to prioritise trade and mobilise resources to this end); and bridging the gap between demand and response (i.e. encouraging better dialogue on trade and development). It also recommended that the Global Reviews promote transparency and accountability – central features of the initiative.

Since 2005, successive biennial Global Reviews have tracked progress on key themes, demonstrating clear trends:

1.  Trade is being prioritised. In 2011, 55% of developing countries reported that they had fully mainstreamed trade into their national development strategies and a further 41% reported that they had partially mainstreamed it. Providers of development co-operation have also made progress in integrating trade into their development co-operation programmes and aligning their support to developing country needs.

Aid for trade has more than doubled since 2005, reaching USD 55.4 billion in 2013.

2.  Resources are being mobilised to support aid for trade. Annual flows in support of trade, measured by the OECD, have more than doubled since 2005, reaching USD 55.4 billion in 2013. Aid for trade to the least developed countries has almost tripled, reaching 32.8% of total aid for trade in 2013. Likewise, regional aid for trade has tripled, reaching USD 6.7 billion in 2013. South-South co-operation in aid for trade is also gaining prominence and importance.

3.  A growing body of evidence, both quantitative and qualitative, indicates that aid for trade is improving the trade and development prospects of developing countries. A joint OECD-WTO study indicated that USD 1 invested in aid for trade is on average associated with an increase of nearly USD 8 in exports from developing countries (OECD/WTO, 2013). Furthermore, there is growing consensus that aid for trade has a positive impact on growth in both exports and imports, which in turn raises productivity, increases income and contributes to poverty alleviation. In 2011, some 275 case stories were submitted as part of the Third Global Review, highlighting the impact of aid for trade on the ground (OECD/WTO, 2011). The 2015 Global Review adds to this inventory of achievement.

What are the strengths and challenges of the Aid-for-Trade initiative?

One strength of the Aid-for-Trade initiative is that it does not try to duplicate existing mechanisms. Though it is led by the WTO, implementation is delivered by others through existing instruments. The initiative adds value by promoting coherence and dialogue between the trade and development community; monitoring actions by developing countries and their partners to help make trade work for development; making the case for additional, predictable, sustainable and effective financing; and acting as a forum for dialogue and sharing of results.

The WTO and the OECD framework for monitoring and evaluation allows for objective analysis of global aid-for-trade flows and their effectiveness. Each Global Review is informed by a monitoring exercise in which developing countries respond to a series of self-assessment questionnaires and also submit case stories. This enables them to highlight not only their progress, but also the obstacles they face in striving to participate effectively in the multilateral trading system.

The success of the Aid-for-Trade initiative also stems from the strong partnerships it has built with other development partners and academia – a point underlined by an independent evaluation of the OECD’s contribution to the Aid-for-Trade initiative conducted in 2014 (Saana Consulting, 2014).

Aid-for-Trade commitments to the least developed countries were 32.8% of total aid for trade in 2013.

Nonetheless, like any on-going initiative, the Aid-for-Trade initiative faces challenges. Aid-for-Trade commitments were not spared by the global economic crisis, with flows dropping by about 13% between 2009 and 2010. While aid-for-trade commitments recovered in 2012 and 2013, they included a higher proportion of loans – as opposed to grants – in the total mix. From 2011 to 2012, aid-for-trade commitments to the least developed countries, the group most critically in need of assistance, fell by 5.5 percentage points before recovering again to reach 32.8% of total aid for trade in 2013. The Aid-for-Trade initiative is working to ensure that flows are maintained for the most vulnerable. Instruments such as the G20’s pledge to maintain aid-for-trade resources beyond 2011; the UN Open Working Group on the Sustainable Development Goals’ calls for increased aid-for-trade support; and the Decision on Aid for Trade taken by trade ministers at the 2013 WTO Ministerial Conference in Bali, Indonesia reaffirm the importance of following through on aid-for-trade commitments.

Finally, Global Reviews have amassed a broad range of data on the quantity (flows) and quality (surveys and case stories) of aid for trade, and its results. Nonetheless, the cross-cutting nature of trade not only makes it difficult for governments to ensure policy coherence; it also complicates the task of tracking cause and effect in development impact.

The Aid-for-Trade initiative has a lot to offer in the way of examples of best practice in global partnerships. In particular, it has countered the neglect of trade in the global development discourse by promoting dialogue among the trade and development policy communities. The initiative also has been successful in providing a platform for non-traditional actors to engage with the development community, including providers of South-South co-operation who are using the initiative to highlight their aid-for-trade support. Private sector participation in the monitoring exercises also provides valuable perspectives.

The WTO Global Review of Aid for Trade in mid-2015 has contributed further examples of best practice, highlighting the contribution that trade can make to the UN’s post-2015 development agenda (OECD/WTO, 2015).

References

OECD/WTO (2015), Fifth Global Review of Aid for Trade 2015: Reducing Trade Costs for Inclusive, Sustainable Growth, World Trade Organization, Geneva 21/OECD Publishing, Paris, www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/devel_e/a4t_e/global_review15_e.htm.

OECD/WTO (2013), Aid for Trade for Trade at a Glance 2013: Connecting to Value Chains, World Trade Organization, Geneva 21/OECD Publishing, Paris, http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/aid_glance-2013-en.

OECD/WTO (2011), Aid for Trade for Trade at a Glance 2011: Showing Results, World Trade Organization, Geneva 21/OECD Publishing, Paris, http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264117471-en.

Saana Consulting (2014), “Evaluation of the OECD Development Assistance Committee contributions with the Trade Committee to the WTO-led Aid for Trade Initiative”, Final Report, Saana Consulting, London, www.oecd.org/development/aft/OECD%20AfT%20Final%20Report%20Submitted.pdf.

United Nations Open Working Group on Sustainable Development Goals (2014), “Open Working Group proposal for Sustainable Development Goals”, United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Division of Sustainable Development, New York, https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/focussdgs.html.

WTO (2005), “Doha Work Programme: Ministerial Declaration”, World Trade Organization Ministerial Conference Sixth Session, Hong Kong, China, 13-18 December, World Trade Organization, Geneva, www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min05_e/final_text_e.pdf.

Chapter 13.

The Effective Institutions Platform

by

Steve Pierce

United States Agency for International Development

with

Neil Cole

Collaborative African Budget Reform Initiative

Effective national institutions and systems are vital for achieving sustainable development. The Effective Institutions Platform supports countries in strengthening their public sector institutions through initiatives such as the two described in this chapter. Learning Alliances on Public Sector Reform offer – to collaborative groups of institutions, practitioners and researchers – organised, hands-on opportunities to learn from each other’s experiences with the challenges, risks and pitfalls of public sector reform. Country Dialogues for Using and Strengthening Local Systems promote greater use of country systems by development co-operation providers as a means of building capacity and accountability. Together, they demonstrate practical ways in which collaborative working can have greater impact.

Today’s most intractable global development problems – climate change, extreme poverty, conflict, and diseases such as HIV/AIDS and malaria – are so challenging, widespread and complex that they require the concerted efforts and resources of many stakeholders and actors. They are problems that do not fit within neat boundaries – geographic, programmatic or other.

Today’s most intractable global development problems do not fit within neat boundaries.

To achieve the new Sustainable Development Goals, stakeholders from across society and the development community will need to collaborate through effective and inclusive partnership models that are attractive to all, particularly to businesses looking to create both commercial value and social benefit. In fact, business is especially adept at innovating to meet society’s needs while building profitable enterprises and vast opportunities for growth (see Chapter 4). Co-operation among diverse stakeholders has often led to breakthroughs and innovations that have greatly increased the scope and scale of development programmes, as well as the sustainability of gains, while maximising the impact of scarce resources.

Multi-stakeholder alliances also reinforce shared values and principles, such as those that will be needed to guide the new models of development co-operation:

local, inclusive ownership of development goals and practices, with an emphasis on building local capacity

co-operation among a broad range of stakeholders – including business, traditional development agencies, emerging providers, foundations, multilateral development banks, civil society, local government and parliaments – leveraging the resources and unique skills and advantages of each

equity, transparency and accountability among partners to build the confidence and generate the resources necessary to achieve scale and sustainability, ensuring that development outcomes last beyond the life cycle of the alliance

innovation through investment and mutual learning to bring successful efforts to scale.

Effective institutions are critical for sustainable development

National institutions and systems are vital to the achievement of sustainable development. The Effective Institutions Platform supports countries in strengthening their public sector institutions, as outlined by the New Consensus on More Effective Institutions for Development endorsed at the Fourth High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Busan in 2011.1 With over 60 members – including high, middle and low-income countries as well as multilateral and bilateral development agencies, civil society organisations and think tanks – the Effective Institutions Platform has four specific objectives:

to host a new type of conversation on public sector reform amongst a diverse group of stakeholders

to capture innovative and effective approaches to public sector reform through knowledge sharing, the exchange of practical experiences and collective learning

to stimulate country-driven reform initiatives and experiment with better adapting reforms to context

to influence the international policy discourse so as to promote contextually appropriate support to institutional reform.

The platform implements these objectives by promoting learning and innovation, and by supporting the use of countries’ own public sector systems by development co-operation providers.

Learning alliances can help to take promising pilots to scale

Innovation requires the capacity to learn, to share the results of that learning effectively and to manage change as needed. The Effective Institutions Platform has launched a learning alliance initiative to share experiences on public sector reform, capture innovative and effective approaches, and stimulate country-driven reform initiatives based on the evidence acquired.

Learning Alliances on Public Sector Reform are collaborative groups of institutions, practitioners and researchers who are willing to share experiences and learn from each other’s public sector reform efforts. The alliances provide organised, hands-on opportunities to share experiences with the challenges, risks and pitfalls of public sector reform.

Focusing on a specific learning topic, stakeholders use tools – such as communities of practice, peer reviews, twinning arrangements and exchange visits, as well as more informal forms of co-operation – to test and institutionalise reform efforts (Box 13.1). This gives members the opportunity to conduct problem-driven, iterative experiments, and helps local actors identify why and how they want to make reform happen. The stories of change and organisational reform emerging from the alliances are subsequently made available to the broader Effective Institutions Platform membership and beyond.

Impact can be multiplied when people work together.

Box 13.1. The value of peer learning initiatives in public sector reforms

Until recently, many areas of public sector reform in development have emphasised standardised solutions, drawing on what was thought to be globally relevant technical expertise. The track record of such reforms has been distinctly modest, giving rise to a new realism that builds on the tacit, experiential knowledge of practitioners. The Effective Institutions Platform is engaging practitioners who are actually carrying out reforms and helping them learn from others. This fosters a contextually appropriate reform agenda, rather than a technically driven one.

A review of peer facilitation initiatives, a survey of practitioners and a range of new case studies all point to growing enthusiasm for peer learning, as evidenced in the following quotes from peer learners:

“Peer learning is a way of exchanging experiences between colleagues doing a similar job but working in different contexts, with the aim of unblocking reform obstacles and avoiding traps.” (Democratic Republic of the Congo)

“The long-term personal relationships established through the peer learning facility were of great value. In addition to the technical support, peer learning was helpful in reviewing options for forming and operating the change team.” (Hungary)

“It helped me to learn about prioritising change, identifying the immediate challenge amongst a long list of problems, and reflecting on how to strike a balance between whole-of-government reforms and a narrower focus on specific reform adaptation.” (Nigeria)

The review shows that peer learning on public sector reform is seldom achieved in a one-off event – instead, it happens over time through repeated engagements (group meetings, knowledge products, training sessions, assessment products and more).

Peer exchange can also foster learning about “soft” issues of reform, such as building teams, managing political tensions, maintaining political support and dealing with cultural challenges. Such learning is extremely difficult to codify and formalise in documents. Finally, the review on peer learning highlights that more work is needed to measure the results of peer learning.

To support the establishment of peer-to-peer learning alliances, the Effective Institutions Platform is developing a Toolkit on Peer Learning in Public Sector Reform. This reflects the growing awareness that effective and sustainable development solutions emerge when those actually doing development discover new ideas and adapt them to their contexts.

Source: Andrews, M. and N. Manning (2015), Mapping Peer Learning Initiatives in Public Sector Reforms in Development, Effective Institutions Platform.

In their pursuit of transparent, effective and accountable governments, supreme audit institutions can benefit from civil society inputs. Although the nature and scope of this co-operation can vary, the impact can be multiplied when the two work together. The Effective Institutions Platform has been working to support increased citizen engagement with supreme audit institutions. This work has highlighted the role of the media, the institutionalisation of follow-up on audit recommendations, and the risks and benefits of using information and communications technology. Pilot learning alliances between civil society organisations and the supreme audit institutions of Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, the Philippines, South Africa and Zambia have shown promising results in this respect.

Country dialogues strengthen national institutions and promote their use

The use of partner countries’ own administrative and financial systems by development co-operation providers – one of the agreed principles of effective development co-operation (see Annex D) – is key for sustainable development. It is important because it aligns development co-operation support with partner country policies; increases country ownership of the development process and ensures domestic accountability; contributes to stronger national systems, including a more stable macroeconomic framework and greater efficiency of public expenditure; improves the co-ordination, predictability and sustainability of development co-operation programmes; avoids duplication; and lowers the costs to partner countries. In fragile and conflict-affected states, the use of country systems can also contribute to another strategic aim: developing or improving state capacity to respond to the needs and priorities of its population (see Chapter 14). This, in turn, builds state legitimacy and public trust over time, which may be especially important in politically sensitive areas.

Progress in fulfilling international commitments to use country systems has been mixed.

Despite these recognised benefits, progress in fulfilling international commitments to use country systems has been mixed (CABRI, 2014; OECD/UNDP, 2014). While there is a strong demand from developing countries for the use of their systems – and concrete progress in improving them – development agencies’ concerns about the potential misuse of public money has stalled progress across the board.

The Effective Institutions Platform’s Country Dialogues for Using and Strengthening Local Systems aim to promote greater use of country systems and better integration of development finance within them. Led by partner countries, the initiative aims to involve a broad range of stakeholders in:

mapping local systems and achieving a common understanding of each country’s priority systems

identifying opportunities for and constraints to strengthening and using the priority systems

defining joint targets and next steps for achieving progress on strengthening and using priority systems.

Country dialogues offer a unique opportunity to bring together national governments, local communities and development partners in a shared learning process to look at how tangible progress can be made within the local context.

Collaborative alliances are the way forward

Sharing good practice on inclusive partnerships and the mechanisms that work best to address implementation challenges effectively will be critical for defining and implementing the strategies required to eliminate extreme poverty and achieve the new set of global Sustainable Development Goals.

By bringing together diverse partners to solve complex social problems, collaborative alliances like the Effective Institutions Platform will help to provide answers to critical development questions and deliver development results.

Note

 1. The consensus can be viewed at: www.effectiveinstitutions.org/documentupload/New%20Consensus.pdf.

References

Andrews, M. and N. Manning (2015), Mapping Peer Learning Initiatives in Public Sector Reforms in Development, Effective Institutions Platform.

CABRI (2014), Towards a Greater Use of Country Systems in Africa: Recent Trends and Approaches, Synthesis Report, August, The Collaborative Africa Budget Reform Initiative, Pretoria, www.cabri-sbo.org/component/phocadownload/file/149-towards-a-greater-use-of-country-systems-in-africa-recent-trends-and-approaches-synthesis-report.

OECD/UNDP (2014), Making Development Co-operation More Effective: 2014 Progress Report, OECD Publishing, Paris, http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264209305-en.

Chapter 14.

The International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding

by

Kaifala Marah

Minister of Finance, Sierra Leone and Chair, g7+

Countries affected by conflict and fragility need new ways of working that are better tailored to their specific challenges. The International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding was created in 2008 to bring together conflict-affected and fragile countries, international partners and civil society to catalyse successful transitions from conflict and fragility. The International Dialogue also established the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile and Conflict-affected States as an innovative way of promoting development and measuring progress in these contexts. This case story reviews the achievements and challenges of both the International Dialogue and the New Deal to date.

The notion of peacebuilding and statebuilding in countries affected by conflict and fragility has risen up the agenda recently, coupled with a recognition of the constraints that instability poses for development progress. Yet despite a range of responses in fragile environments by development and security actors alike, sustainable progress remains elusive. New ways of working are needed, better tailored to the situations and challenges of fragile contexts.

Trust and mutual respect are the foundation of partnerships working in fragile states.

Economies and countries affected by conflict and fragility require approaches that reinforce and bolster state stability, capacity and credibility; in particular, they need support to strengthen institutions and systems, reinforce the social contract and promote resilience. In order to be sustainable, these approaches must respond to the local context, capacity and expertise. And finally, the nexus between security and development calls for a co-ordinated approach involving a large number of actors. Overall, experience over the past 10-20 years has demonstrated that trust and mutual respect are the foundation of such partnerships, which implies the need for frank and open dialogue among all stakeholders.

To address these needs, members of the OECD Development Assistance Committee’s (DAC) Network on Conflict and Fragility (INCAF)¹ joined with seven countries affected by conflict and fragility² and the members of the Civil Society Platform for Peacebuilding and Statebuilding to form the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding.³ Officially launched at the High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Accra in 2008 (see Annex D), the International Dialogue is the first forum for political dialogue to bring together conflict-affected and fragile countries, international partners and civil society to catalyse successful transitions from conflict and fragility. It drives political momentum for change through strong partnership, innovation and mutual accountability for results. It also provides support to the global voice of fragile and conflict-affected states – such as the g7+ group of fragile and conflict-affected states⁴ – and promotes solutions based on country ownership and a comprehensive approach to development and security issues. Today the International Dialogue is made up of 44 countries, 9 multilateral organisations and members of the Civil Society Platform on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding.⁵

What has the International Dialogue achieved so far?

The challenges faced by fragile states are better understood

High-level strategic engagement within the International Dialogue has improved understanding of the unique challenges faced by fragile and conflict-affected states; as a consequence, the quality of engagement among partners has improved.

Externally, the International Dialogue has ensured that peacebuilding and statebuilding gain global prominence and that the voice of fragile states is heard. The g7+, which brings together fragile and conflict-affected countries, is today a highly recognised forum; it has contributed, for example, to ensuring prominence for peaceful societies and effective institutions (see below) in discussions on the post-2015 global development agenda. Together, the g7+ and the International Dialogue are now recognised as important platforms for global political dialogue.

There is a new consensus around the need to adapt development thinking and practice

There is emerging consensus on the need to adapt development approaches to the particular conditions of fragile situations; for example, it is important to take a political and a humanitarian approach to engagement in fragile states. The International Dialogue has played a critical role in shaping development thinking and practice in this direction.

Supporting countries’ own solutions in fragile situations requires a willingness to take risks.

At a time when public appetite for value for money and immediate results is growing more acute, the International Dialogue has pushed for recognition of development goals that are longer term and perhaps less tangible than others, but that are critical in helping countries exit fragility. These Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Goals include:6

legitimate politics: foster inclusive political settlements and conflict resolution

security: establish and strengthen people’s security

justice: address injustices and increase people’s access to justice

economic foundations: generate employment and improve livelihoods

revenues and services: manage revenue and build capacity for accountable and fair service delivery.

As in other development contexts, supporting country-owned and context-led solutions is vital; in fragile situations, however, this implies a willingness to take risks coupled with the recognition that the risk of inaction often outweighs the cost of action. Helping countries move out of fragility also calls for a willingness to engage in contexts where results are not always immediate.

Experience and knowledge are being shared productively

The International Dialogue enables members to learn from each other. Tools such as the Fragility Assessment and the Fragility Spectrum – national consultations on the drivers of conflict – help a country identify where it stands on each of the Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Goals and measure its progress. They also help to identify areas where practical changes on the ground can help a country move out of fragility towards greater resilience, for instance by adopting compacts and mutual accountability frameworks aimed at improving transparency and accountability, or at strengthening country systems. Development partners, in turn, have put in place innovative approaches – for instance pooling financing mechanisms or ensuring greater funding transparency – that pave the way for even better results.

Mutual understanding is flourishing

In the long term, perhaps the most significant contribution of the International Dialogue is its role in increasing mutual understanding. Better understanding of the context, incentives and political realities of each actor – and of the knowledge and expertise each brings to the table – allows effective partnerships to flourish by promoting mutual respect, co-operation and ultimately, better outcomes.

What challenges does the International Dialogue face?

Fragility needs to stay high up the political agenda

At the Fourth High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness (in Busan, 2011 – see Annex D), the International Dialogue launched the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile and Conflict-Affected States.⁷ The New Deal, endorsed by 40 countries and organisations, offers an innovative framework for doing business in fragile states. It commits signatories to ways of working that are highly political, and channels efforts across all government sectors (foreign affairs, defence, justice, finance, etc.) in both fragile and provider country governments. The International Dialogue complements this framework, providing a platform for open and accountable engagement and guiding the practical implementation of the New Deal using specific tools and indicators to monitor progress.

Quick results cannot be expected in fragile states.

However, because the New Deal was to be piloted in seven countries over a three-year trial phase (2012-15), there is the risk that impatience or frustration with the pace of change over such a short period of time may cause partners to disengage or de-prioritise it. Quick results cannot be expected in fragile states – creating a new mode of engagement to achieve long-term resilience is clearly a process that requires more than three years. Yet because the International Dialogue has become inextricably linked to the New Deal, this presents a challenge in keeping the issue of fragility high on the global agenda.

Implementation needs to be demonstrated on the ground

If dialogue and discussion are not channelled towards practical changes and progress on the ground, the International Dialogue risks becoming irrelevant. The recent New Deal monitoring report paints a mixed picture (International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding, 2014). While providers of development co-operation have made some progress in reforming behaviour – in particular regarding pooled funding – huge gaps remain, especially in committing to increase the use of country systems and reducing parallel implementation mechanisms. Capacity development efforts also tend to be poorly co-ordinated. Governments of fragile states are still struggling to obtain timely and predictable information about official development assistance flows for their national budgets. And within g7+ countries, the sense of ownership of the New Deal and its principles remains limited to ministries of finance and planning, making it hard for its proponents to advocate for changes in policies at headquarters and to bring country offices along. Finally, civil society engagement in countries is often limited to International Dialogue focal points, whose resource constraints mean they are often unable to reach out to wider civil society constituencies. The result is that key issues may not be acted on at the community level, hampering implementation on the ground.

Trust and co-operation must be maintained

Differences in perspective have emerged among the members of the International Dialogue. Whilst some push for a pragmatic, problem-solving and action-oriented approach (“less paper, more action”), others prefer to focus on improving tools and guidance. If the latter prevails, the International Dialogue could risk being perceived as overly technocratic, producing guidance notes without tackling the complex issues that hamper real progress. These differences also could lead to a breakdown in trust and co-operation within the group – core principles of the New Deal itself.

Commitment and focus are crucial for lasting change

New Deal implementation was always meant to be “country heavy and global light”. The International Dialogue needs to take the New Deal beyond rhetoric to achieve change on the ground, and this requires frank and open dialogue, strong political will, and commitment and mutual respect among all members.

The International Dialogue needs to take the New Deal beyond rhetoric to achieve change on the ground.

Another key to the success of the International Dialogue will be ensuring – at the highest levels of all member governments – genuine political leadership and commitment to achieving lasting change in fragile and conflict-affected states. This means securing buy-in to the New Deal, not only in development agencies and ministries of finance but also within other government departments that play a key role in shaping development in fragile states. This will no doubt take time.

Meanwhile, the International Dialogue must remain focused on achieving practical results on the ground through open exchange amongst actors about their experiences, knowledge, successes and failures. This mutual learning has characterised the International Dialogue and embodies the spirit and principles of the New Deal itself. It is the key to making progress towards peace and stability in all parts of the world.

The International Dialogue is more than an instrument for implementing the New Deal; it is a platform for global dialogue on issues that matter to us all. The value of the International Dialogue goes far beyond fragile states; it is a new way of working together in a multi-actor, multi-polar, multi-perspective world.

Notes

 1. See: www.oecd.org/dac/governance-peace/conflictandfragility/aboutincaf.htm.

 2. Afghanistan, Central African Republic, Côte d’Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Haiti, Sierra Leone and Timor-Leste.

 3. For details see: www.pbsbdialogue.org.

 4. The g7+ is a voluntary association of 20 countries that are or have been affected by conflict and are now in transition to the next stage of development. The main objectives of the g7+ are to share experiences and learn from one another, and to advocate for reforms in how the international community engages in conflict-affected states. See: www.g7plus.org.

 5. For the list of countries and organisations involved, see: www.pbsbdialogue.org/about/participatingcountriesand organisations.

 6. The goals are available at: www.newdeal4peace.org/peacebuilding-and-statebuilding-goals.

 7. See: www.newdeal4peace.org/new-deal-snapshot.

Reference

International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding (2014), “New Deal monitoring report 2014”, Fifth International Dialogue Working Group Meeting on New Deal Implementation, 17 June, Freetown, Sierra Leone, www.pbsbdialogue.org/newsandevents/specialevents/RD%201%20New%20Deal%20Monitoring%20Report%20 2014%20FINAL.pdf.

Chapter 15.

The Partnership in Statistics for Development in the 21st Century (PARIS21)

by

Ola Awad

President, Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics

and

Leslie Rae

PARIS21

PARIS21 is an established multi-stakeholder partnership that contributes to building statistical capacity in developing countries through support for the production of high-quality and timely statistics; co-ordination among providers of development co-operation, policy makers, and data users and producers; and support for documenting, archiving and disseminating data. It also helps to forge strong alliances among key players in statistics, data and development, and has provided platforms for developing countries to make their voices heard. A data revolution will be required to achieve and track the implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals in developing countries. This chapter outlines the strengths of PARIS21 in partnering with the global community to support this data revolution, as well as the challenges it faces.

This chapter also includes an opinion piece by Winnie Byanyima, Executive Director of Oxfam International.

Poverty reduction cannot be achieved without improving governance in developing countries, and good government policies depend on good statistics. Statistics provide a basis for evidence-based decision making and enable citizens to hold governments to account for their activities (see the “In my view” box). Statistics are also essential for monitoring progress on development targets.

In my view: Civil society involvement must be harnessed for productive and accountable development

Winnie Byanyima, Executive Director, Oxfam International

Despite the remarkable progress made in reducing poverty over the past two decades, continuing on the current path will not allow us to end extreme poverty by 2030. To do so, the global community will need to unlock greater resources for development – including official development assistance (ODA) and other official flows, domestic resources, and private flows like foreign direct investment and remittances. They will also need to ensure that those resources are invested more productively than ever before.

Civil society has a pivotal role to play in achieving this. Experience shows that the involvement of civil society can lead to more productive and accountable investment of public resources to achieve long-term development impacts. To give some examples:

After discovering oil, Ghana passed a Petroleum Revenue Management Law requiring transparency in the management of oil revenues. Despite this law, the USD 2 billion subsequently raised did not translate into increased public investment until 2013, when civil society organisations launched the Oil4Food campaign. This campaign prompted the government to commit 15% of oil revenues to smallholder agriculture.

In Zambia, the Vote Health campaign organised during a pre-election period called for a dramatic increase in health spending. Following the elections, the new government raised health spending by 45%, removed health facility user fees and employed 2 500 additional health workers.

In some areas of Burkina Faso, community committees trained by non-governmental organisations (NGOs) have a mandate from the central government to oversee local spending on schools. In these areas, education budgets have increased by up to 5% and classroom conditions have improved, as has the supply of materials for students and teachers.

Citizens have the right to know and decide how development resources are spent. Through civil society organisations (CSOs), informed citizens can offer independent perspectives and suggest new approaches, helping to maximise development impact and fuel innovation. The independent critique provided by CSOs can also enhance accountability, uncovering false assumptions and weak systems that put progress at risk.

Unfortunately, civil society often lacks access to the information and tools needed to play this vital role. The United Nations Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel has called for a “data revolution” to promote transparency and ensure accountability (UN, 2013). Yet governments – in both developed and developing countries – are moving too slowly on making data available. Fearing criticism, instead of providing and protecting a space for civil society, many governments actively seek to restrict their access. This not only prevents civil society from holding governments to account; it also limits its ability to support governments in achieving better development outcomes. By pushing back on civil society, governments contribute to social marginalisation and exclusion – and thereby amplify poverty and injustice. In particular, the marginalisation of women locks a full half the population out of development and restricts their ability to contribute potential solutions to poverty.

If governments wish to harness civil society’s potential to help end extreme poverty by 2030, they will need to actively invest in transparency, civil and political rights, and in the participation of marginalised people and groups.

Participants at the Fourth High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in 2011 recognised this essential role of statistics when they endorsed the following commitment: “We will partner to implement a global Action Plan to enhance capacity for statistics to monitor progress, evaluate impact, ensure sound, results-focused public sector management, and highlight strategic issues for policy decisions” (see Annex D). This commitment gave rise to the Busan Action Plan for Statistics, built around existing institutions, partnerships and agencies. The Action Plan has three broad objectives (PARIS21, 2011):

integrating statistics into decision making, especially in developing countries

promoting open access to statistics within governments and by all other users

increasing resources for statistical systems, including both investment in new capacity and maintaining current operations.

The Partnership in Statistics for Development in the 21st Century (PARIS21), hosted in the Development Co-operation Directorate of the OECD, acts as the secretariat for the Busan Action Plan and contributes to several of its key activities. This chapter outlines the role, strengths and challenges of PARIS21, and in particular its potential for supporting the data revolution that will be required for achieving the Sustainable Development Goals.

PARIS21 brings together experts and policy makers in national, regional and international development data and statistics. They work together to improve decision making in developing countries by strengthening statistical capacity.¹ More concretely, the partnership assists countries in designing, implementing and monitoring their own National Strategies for the Development of Statistics (Box 15.1); advocates for improved use and production of high-quality and timely statistics; co-ordinates efforts among providers of development co-operation, policy makers, and data users and producers; and supports improved documentation, archiving and dissemination of data.

Box 15.1. PARIS21 and the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics

National strategies for the development of statistics have been adopted in almost all low-income and lower middle-income countries. They help countries to build the skills of national staff and to bring together diverse stakeholders around one agreed plan.

After helping to develop the national strategy in Palestine, PARIS21 provided technical support for the creation of a national data archive. This web-based cataloguing system serves as a portal enabling researchers to browse, search, compare, apply for access to and download relevant census or survey information. PARIS21 has helped the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics to document, archive and disseminate its national surveys and censuses; establish a National Archive Catalogue in English and Arabic; and build capacity to systematically document, archive and disseminate microdata. Employees of the bureau were also trained in the management of microdata. The bureau has successfully documented all national surveys conducted between 2000 and 2013. Finally, PARIS21 has played an important role in financing the participation of the Palestinian Bureau in important regional events and discussions on statistical capacity building.

The activities of the partnership are carried out by a broad network of agencies and organisations. The general work programme is guided by a board made up of 46 international stakeholders, including representatives from developing countries, bilateral providers of development co-operation, multilateral institutions and other key partners. An executive committee with a small number of members selected by the board provides light co-ordination of the activities of the partnership and its secretariat, serving as an accountability mechanism and offering guidance for the secretariat’s work.

What are the strengths of PARIS21?

Fifteen years after it was founded, PARIS21 continues to deliver on its mandate and play a prominent role in integrating statistics and reliable data into decision making. The partnership has several strengths that contribute to its success, summarised in its six behaviours for effective co-operation in statistical capacity building:

remain neutral and focused on clearly defined objectives

create an inclusive environment for all stakeholders

promote southern participation and South-South co-operation

adapt to an ever-changing environment and emerging issues

promote light co-ordination of activities within the partnership

provide well-coordinated technical assistance to those who need it most.

PARIS21 brings together diverse stakeholders – from national statistics offices to multilateral and bilateral agencies, academia and the private sector – enabling them to work across sectors on capacity building, data and development. The partnership benefits from the vast expertise of these partners, facilitating joint projects and avoiding duplication of effort.

The partnership’s bottom-up approach is largely based on country requests. Plans are discussed in detail with the partner country prior to intervention and PARIS21 also ensures that partner country voices are heard through board and executive committee membership.

PARIS21 acts as a sounding board and honest broker for partner countries.

PARIS21 is a neutral agency that provides assistance to the countries that need it most (Box 15.1). It also acts as a neutral forum where providers and developing countries, producers and users of statistics, can meet; and acts as a sounding board and honest broker for partner countries.

To promote effective collaboration, PARIS21 publishes the Partner Report on Support to Statistics (PRESS). This annual report presents data on technical and financial support to statistical development worldwide, and is a valuable tool for collaboration. Developing countries can use results from PRESS as a basis to improve the mobilisation of resources by identifying possible financing sources in particular areas. For co-operation providers, the results are useful to improve co-ordination and minimise the duplication of efforts in designing assistance programmes.

For example, Eurostat, the European Union’s statistical office, provides statistics that enable comparisons among countries and regions at the European level. In conducting its Joint Annual Review, Eurostat routinely extracts information on member countries’ activities from PRESS, supplementing it with PRESS details on activities from other partners. These data provide a solid context for evaluating specific country activities. Eurostat also draws on PRESS information to help providers of development co-operation ensure that their support does not duplicate – and instead complements – the efforts of other countries or organisations.

At the country level, the Country Report on Support to Statistics (CRESS) contributes to greater transparency as it delves deeper into the funding of national statistical activities, revealing and sharing information on the distribution of national and international statistical resources in different development sectors. To date, a CRESS has been carried out in six countries (Benin, Cameroon, Ethiopia, Ghana, Malawi and Senegal).

What are the main challenges PARIS21 faces?

PARIS21 faces two main challenges: balancing the interest of the partnership with the specific interests of its partners, as well as the roles of the partners with those of the secretariat; and adapting to a rapidly changing environment.

One of biggest challenges PARIS21 has faced since its inception in 1999 has been balancing the priorities and objectives of the partnership’s members. With 5 founding members, 46 board members and a vast network of other interested parties, maintaining the focus on shared objectives for statistical development requires constant attention. In addition, the specific role of the partners vis-à-vis the secretariat is under constant development. A new strategy for PARIS21 provides guidance on the comparative advantages of the partnership, the partners and the secretariat, and how these can be even further leveraged in the post-2015 development context.

New development issues and measurement requirements are constantly emerging.

New development issues and measurement requirements are constantly emerging. In this fast-changing environment, the challenge for PARIS21 is to adapt quickly whilst also ensuring that existing work is not side-lined. In this regard, flexibility is essential, enabling the partnership to adapt, take on board new activities as necessary and react quickly to new demands.

PARIS21 is helping to lead the data revolution

The data revolution called for by the United Nations Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel (UN, 2013 and see the “In my view” box above) is well underway. An Independent Expert Advisory Group – including PARIS21 – has issued a report to the UN Secretary-General proposing a programme of action in four areas: capacity and resources; principles and standards; governance and leadership; technology, innovation and analysis (IEAG, 2014). Following on from this work, PARIS21 has prepared a road map for a country-led data revolution that identifies three main elements for success:

a major and sustained increase in the generation and use of data to help countries and the world as a whole to deal with the major challenges of eliminating extreme poverty, leaving no one behind and managing natural resources

promotion of real institutional change and much more effective use of technology to improve the performance of everyone involved in the production and use of data

making data accessible to everyone in ways that they are able to understand and use the data to hold governments and decision makers to account.

The problem for statistical systems will not be a shortage of innovations, but rather how to keep up with them.

New technology and other innovations will clearly be crucial in driving the data revolution. The Innovations Inventory constructed as part of the PARIS21 Informing a Data Revolution project demonstrates what can be done in terms of data collection, dissemination and visualisation, open data initiatives and the use of big data.² The problem for statistical systems will not be a shortage of innovations, but rather how to keep up with them and decide which are the most appropriate for current circumstances.

Understanding the problems and constraints affecting national statistical systems and identifying what will be needed to make them work more effectively will be at the core of an effective data revolution. This will require an inventory of the main data gaps in individual countries’ statistical and data systems, and of their capacity, building on existing data and analysis. A good starting point is the Metabase developed by PARIS21 in conjunction with the World Bank, which provides a snapshot of countries’ statistical capacity profiles. Users can generate a country profile that displays a set of information across six dimensions:3

access: the public availability of data is the foundation of a better-informed society

innovations: innovations offer solutions for today’s problems and inform tomorrow’s standards

timeliness: timely data helps decision makers react quickly and stay informed

soundness: sound methodology builds trust in data and ensures transparency

institutions: a healthy institutional environment is a catalyst for statistical development

use: knowledge on the demand for data improves efficiency in data production.

PARIS21 has much to offer post-2015 partnerships

The Millennium Development Goals have driven the push for evidence-based policy making and accountability, and significant inroads have been made in laying the foundations for improved production and management of data and statistics. Today, data are generated at an incredible rate and demand for them has grown exponentially. While this explosion of data creates exceptional opportunities for analysis and dissemination, the associated challenges and risks are also unprecedented.

There is a clear need to help developing countries manage these challenges and risks so as to reap the potential benefits for their own development and poverty reduction. As a partnership with clear objectives focused on putting countries first while remaining inclusive and neutral, PARIS21 is well placed to support the data revolution that will be required for the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals, whilst offering an example to other partnerships in the post-2015 world.

Notes

 1. PARIS21 was founded in November 1999 by the United Nations, the European Commission, the OECD, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.

 2. See: http://datarevolution.paris21.org/innovation.

 3. See: http://datarevolution.paris21.org/metabase.

References

IEAG (2014), A World That Counts: Mobilising the Data Revolution for Sustainable Development, Independent Expert Advisory Group on a Data Revolution for Sustainable Development, United Nations, New York, www.undatarevolution.org/report.

PARIS21 (2015), “A road map for a country-led data revolution”, PARIS21, Paris, http://datarevolution.paris21.org/sites/default/files/Road%20Map%20draft%200.pdf.

PARIS21 (2011), “Statistics for transparency, accountability and results: A Busan action plan for statistics”, PARIS21, Paris, www.paris21.org/sites/default/files/Busanactionplan_nov2011.pdf.

UN (2013), “A new global partnership: Eradicate poverty and transform economies through sustainable development”, report of the High-Level Panel of Eminent Persons on the Post-2015 Development Agenda, United Nations, New York, www.un.org/sg/management/pdf/HLP_P2015_Report.pdf.

Chapter 16.

The Grow Africa partnership

by

Arne Cartridge

Chief Executive Officer, Grow Africa

Africa’s farming sector has great potential for generating economic growth and creating jobs, particularly for farmers, women and young people. Private sector investment is vital to drive rapid and sustainable growth in agriculture, but does so most efficiently when it is in partnership with government and development co-operation providers. This chapter describes the efforts of Grow Africa to enable countries to realise the potential of the agricultural sector. A key element of Grow Africa’s work involves incubating new public-private partnerships, as well as strengthening existing ones. This chapter highlights some successful models, as well as some lessons learned along the way.

While there is broad consensus that private sector investment is vital to drive rapid and sustainable growth in Africa’s agricultural sector, development co-operation is still an essential ingredient of that growth. The dynamics of the sector include many systemic issues that hold back growth, such as the lack of appetite in commercial channels for financing agriculture. Issues like this can only be overcome if governments, providers of development co-operation, the private sector and smallholder organisations work together.

The concept of public-private partnership is still relatively new in the agricultural sector.

The concept of public-private partnership is still relatively new in the agricultural sector, however, and there is much to be learned about how to implement public-private partnership business models effectively. Nonetheless, some elements of best practice are emerging, as this chapter illustrates.

Grow Africa aims to unleash the potential of agriculture

The Grow Africa partnership is in a privileged position to learn from these developments. Founded jointly by the African Union, the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) and the World Economic Forum in 2011, Grow Africa works to increase private sector investment in agriculture, and to accelerate the execution and impact of investment commitments. Its aim is to enable countries to realise the potential of the agricultural sector for economic growth and job creation, particularly among farmers, women and young people. Grow Africa facilitates collaboration among governments, international and domestic agriculture companies, and smallholder farmers in order to lower the risks and costs of investing in agriculture, and to improve the speed of return to all stakeholders. It does so by:

working with governments that have signed co-operation agreements (currently ten) in order to identify and address weaknesses in the enabling environment that must be overcome to attract private sector investment that leads to inclusive economic growth

working with international and domestic private sector investors – mostly agri-business companies – to implement investments, currently totalling USD 10 billion from over 200 companies

identifying pan-African systemic constraints to implementing private sector investments and convening working groups to develop solutions

facilitating the sharing of best practice through a variety of channels, including communities of practice and an annual investment forum.

In addition, a key element of Grow Africa’s work involves incubating new public-private partnerships, as well as strengthening existing ones by facilitating new contacts. All this has enabled Grow Africa to identify several success factors for public-private partnerships, as well as some challenges that need to be addressed.

Public-private partnerships can support co-ordination and accelerate investment

Successful public-private partnerships depend on good collaboration among the partners. Yet there is generally an equally pressing need for collaboration within each of the respective partner groups to facilitate investment and speed up project implementation.

For example, large-scale agricultural transformation generally requires co-ordination with multiple ministries, not just the Ministry of Agriculture. Yet private sector agricultural companies, even domestic companies, can find government structures opaque and difficult to navigate. The creation of a single point of contact with the public sector can help to overcome this hurdle. Ethiopia’s Agricultural Transformation Agency is a good example. The agency’s remit is to “address systemic bottlenecks in the agricultural sector by supporting and enhancing the capability of the Ministry of Agriculture and other public, private and non-governmental implementing partners” (ATA, 2015). Its governing council, chaired by the Prime Minister, includes members of the Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development, and the Ministry of Water and Energy. The Agricultural Transformation Agency brokers and facilitates investments that are in line with the Ethiopian government’s overall agricultural agenda. For example, it was instrumental in supporting the United Kingdom’s Diageo brewery in setting up a pilot barley farming project.¹

On the private sector side, co-ordinating diverse investments in geographically targeted value-chain clusters or corridors can significantly speed up implementation for the individual investments within the cluster. A promising model in this area is the Southern Agricultural Growth Corridor of Tanzania (SAGCOT) Centre. This inclusive, multi-stakeholder partnership aims to rapidly develop the region’s agricultural potential. It fosters inclusive, commercially successful agri-businesses to benefit the region’s small-scale farmers, and in so doing improve food security, reduce rural poverty and ensure environmental sustainability. The centre co-ordinates investment by private sector organisations within the growth corridor using an “investment blueprint” to showcase opportunities; it then lays out a framework to help reap the full development potential of these investments. SAGCOT’s risk-sharing model has been successful in achieving its goals and it is the first public-private partnership of such a scale in Tanzania’s agricultural history. The centre is primarily funded by providers of development co-operation; it has an independent legal status and so is not affiliated with or governed by any one company acting within the corridor.

Political commitment and an enabling environment are critical to success

Political commitment at the highest level is vital for any truly transformative initiative, as the highly successful Nigerian Growth Enhancement Support initiative demonstrates. This project, which overturned the political status quo by dismantling extensive frameworks of corruption in agricultural input supply, was the brainchild of Nigeria’s Minister of Agriculture and Rural Development, Akinwumi Adesina. It would not have been possible for him to push the project through, however, without the strong and consistent support of the country’s President, Goodluck Jonathan.

Political commitment at the highest level is vital for any truly transformative initiative.

Nigeria has implemented large-scale fertiliser subsidies since the 1970s, with fertiliser supply counting as the single largest expenditure item in the federal capital account. Until 2012, all fertiliser was bought by the government and sold at subsidised prices to distributors, who in turn sold it to farmers. This model was plagued by wide-scale corruption and inefficiencies, costing the government over NGN 26 billion (Nigerian naira; or USD 162.5 million) on average every year. The Growth Enhancement Support programme set out to reverse this situation by turning the procurement and distribution of inputs over to the private sector. Today, private sector suppliers register with the government and each is assigned a distribution centre (government or privately owned) where farmers can exchange electronic vouchers for fertiliser, backed by funds contributed by the federal and state governments (each contributes 25% of the cost of the fertiliser to a fund held in escrow at the Central Bank). When the agro-dealers submit their vouchers for redemption, they are reviewed by a third party for approval before authorising payment to the agro-dealer. In 2012, the first full year of implementation, the Growth Enhancement Support programme saved the federal government NGN 25 billion (USD 122 million). Opening up the input system to the private sector has already led to investment commitments in the fertiliser sector of USD 5 billion and the number of seed companies involved has risen from 3 to 80.

The reliability of the policy environment is also critical for the success of individual investments. Agricultural enterprises generally take years to begin to show a profit, but this can be undone overnight by an unexpected change in policy – for example, a reduction in import tariffs that undercuts the competitiveness of local producers. Some agricultural policy shifts are the result of changes in the overall political environment, but others result from policy makers’ lack of in-depth understanding of the complex dynamics of the sector or from lack of consultation with stakeholders, particularly those in the private sector. These risks can be addressed by facilitating contacts, supporting appropriate training, and disseminating information and best practice.

A systematic approach is needed to scale up partnership successes

The models described above are promising – and replicable. Nonetheless, challenges remain in scaling them up.

Grow Africa has observed that it is vital, from the outset of a project, to be clear about the motivations and expectations of each of the partners, and about who is accountable for what within the partnership. Beyond the immediate partners, it is also fundamental to ensure consultation with all stakeholders along the agricultural value chain, particularly the smallholder producers who supply agri-businesses and the local communities, especially in cases involving land acquisition. Most of the business models and metrics in use today, however, focus on pre-investment due diligence; there are relatively little consistent data available on the impact and value of regular multi-stakeholder consultation over the lifetime of an investment. Building up this knowledge base could help to establish replicable, and affordable, practices for setting up and running agricultural value chains involving public and private sector partners, from appropriate legal frameworks and governance structures to models for aligning public and private sector incentives, or for engaging with smallholder farmers.

It is vital to be clear about the motivations and expectations of each of the partners, and about who is accountable for what.

There are two other areas in which a more systematic approach to collaboration is needed. One is in addressing the thorny issue of trade in raw agricultural commodities. Smallholder aggregation is the most effective model for enabling trade between buyers and smallholder producers, who represent around 80% of farmers in Africa. Yet only around 10% of African smallholders are currently aggregated. There is also much work to be done to identify successful aggregation models, as well as to ensure that as legal entities, these groups have the business skills they need to serve their members and function as effective counterparts. On the buyer side, promising models exist for aggregating demand. This avoids farmers becoming dangerously dependent on one large buyer, which can have disastrous consequences if that buyer becomes insolvent or finds a new source of supply.

The other area requiring a systematic approach is the issue of scaling up multi-stakeholder collaboration in agricultural financing. This is particularly critical for domestic agri-businesses that are too small to secure commercial lending at affordable interest rates, yet too big to qualify for alternative financing models, such as micro-lending. There are numerous examples of innovative public-private funding initiatives that use development co-operation capital to guarantee commercial lending to agri-businesses at affordable rates. For example, a USD 5 million risk-sharing facility set up by the Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa, the International Fund for Agricultural Development and the government of Kenya guarantees commercial loans awarded by the Equity Bank of Kenya to small and larger-scale farmers, as well as agri-businesses. Rather than offsetting the cost of default risk for the Equity Bank by high interest rates to the borrower – the usual case in commercial financing – risk capital is provided by international organisations and the national government. The challenge is to effectively scale up these formulas so as to fill the substantial gaps in agricultural finance that are preventing the much-needed growth of the domestic private sector.

Collaboration will drive transformation

In summary, the value of private sector investment in agriculture is well understood both by development co-operation partners and African governments. The focus now needs to be on improving collaboration among stakeholders – in particular the triangle of government, the private sector and smallholder collectives – to accelerate the implementation of investments and drive real transformation in the agricultural sector.

Note

 1. For more details, see: www.diageo.com/en-row/newsmedia/pages/resource.aspx?resourceid=1269.

Reference

ATA (2015), “Our mandate”, Ethiopian Agricultural Transformation Agency webpage, www.ata.gov.et/about/our-mandate (accessed 3 March 2015).

Chapter 17.

Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation

by

Per Fredrik Ilsaas Pharo

Director, Norwegian International Climate and Forest Initiative, Norwegian Ministry of Climate and Environment

The urgent need to reduce carbon emissions from forest loss prompted the international community to negotiate the Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+) mechanism under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). This collaborative mechanism is designed to provide incentives for developing countries to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from their forest and peatland sectors. A broad range of stakeholders – governments, multilateral organisations, civil society, indigenous groups and other forest-dependent communities, academia and the private sector – are included in all REDD+ planning and implementation processes. This chapter describes how REDD+ works and draws out some common denominators among the partnerships it promotes.

This chapter also includes an opinion piece by Bharrat Jagdeo, former President of Guyana.

The world’s forests are disappearing at an alarming rate. With only a few exceptions – most notably, Brazil, which has slashed its deforestation rates over the past decade – the clear tendency in many countries is towards a continued and drastic decline in forest cover. While it is not known precisely how fast or how much forest is being lost, some estimates hold that 130 000 km2 disappear every year (FAO, 2010) – an area the size of Nicaragua or England. Most of this loss occurs in tropical areas, such as the great rainforests of the Amazon, the Congo basin, Indonesia and Papua New Guinea.

Every year 130 000 km2 of forest disappear – an area the size of Nicaragua or England.

The drivers of deforestation vary regionally. In the greater Amazon, forest conversion to cattle ranching and soy production are among the main causes. In Indonesia and Malaysia, deforestation is mainly driven by palm oil production and logging – much of it illegal.

REDD+ responds to the urgency of conserving forests

The global community has recognised the importance of forest conservation and sustainable forest management at the local, national and international levels. Forests are vital to the estimated 1.2-1.4 billion people who rely on them for their livelihoods (Chao, 2012); among these people, around 60 million are indigenous groups (RFN and GRID-Arendal, 2014). Forests are also critical to watershed protection and are home to a multitude of flora and fauna. From a financial perspective, sustainable use of forest resources can promote green economic growth, contributing to local and national economies. On a global scale, preserving forests means that carbon is stored in trees rather than emitted into the atmosphere, where it accelerates climate change.

Guided by the recognition of the urgency of conserving forests – and in particular of reducing carbon emissions – the Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation in developing countries, or REDD+ mechanism, began taking form as part of the negotiations under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) starting in the mid-2000s. This collaborative mechanism provides incentives for developing countries to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from their forest and peatland sectors.

Pilot REDD+ activities are supported by many providers of development co-operation and implemented in numerous developing and middle-income countries around the world. A key focus of many of these activities is to help countries establish the necessary institutional structures to reduce their national deforestation rates. Once countries can verify their emission reductions, they qualify to receive results-based payments and other financial support. To date, many countries have come a long way in getting systems and policy reforms in place to reduce deforestation, and in mapping and measuring their emission reductions. Brazil is one example: it receives results-based payments based on verified emissions reductions through reduced deforestation. Guyana – a country that has a high forest cover, but a very low deforestation rate – receives payments for emissions avoided, thanks to its continuing low deforestation (see the “In my view” box).

In my view: Guyana and Norway are showing how climate action can deliver results

Bharrat Jagdeo, former President of Guyana

Cruelly, the most vulnerable communities and poorest countries in the world are the ones that suffer the most from climate change, despite the fact that they have done almost nothing to cause the problem. Yet if our climate is to be stabilised, today’s developing countries need to lead the world to a solution – and as has been emphasised elsewhere in this chapter, there is no solution to climate change without halting deforestation.

In 2008, people in Guyana recognised this. Climate change had already caused suffering in the country. In 2005, floods inflicted damage equivalent to 60% of that year’s gross domestic product (GDP). Yet, as a country with 85% of its land mass under forest, an area larger than Great Britain, our people didn’t want to just complain about climate change – we were prepared to act.

So we set out to find partners who shared our vision.

Speaking on behalf of Guyana’s people, I addressed the Commonwealth Finance Ministers in 2008 outlining an offer to the world. We were prepared to deploy almost our entire forest in the global fight against climate change, providing: 1) we could access the right economic incentives to value our standing forests; and 2) our people’s sovereignty over their forests would not be diminished. Soon after, a nation-wide consultation enabled us to develop a strategy that aimed even higher: we would seek not just to protect our forests, but to shift our entire economy onto a low-carbon trajectory with economic growth coming from new sectors, and with our country’s economy powered almost entirely by renewable energy.

The result was Guyana’s Low Carbon Development Strategy.* This plan had a simple proposition at its core: those who benefit from our standing forests must contribute to their maintenance. We realised that most efforts to maintain our forests would continue to come from the people of Guyana, including our Amerindian (indigenous) communities. Yet we felt that international citizens must also pay their share, given the immense benefits our forests contribute to stabilising the global climate, securing carbon sequestration, and maintaining water and other ecosystem services.

In time, we hope that the international REDD+ mechanism will create the necessary incentives. In 2008, however – even before the REDD+ mechanism had been agreed – we wanted to show that progress was possible.

Guyana was fortunate to find a progressive partner who shared our views. Norway was one of the first developed countries to recognise that protecting tropical forests was both an essential and highly cost-effective way to combat climate change. In November 2009, the then Norwegian Minister of the Environment and Development, Erik Solheim, and I travelled to Fairview Village, deep in the forests of Guyana; there we signed the document that started the Guyana-Norway partnership on forests. Under this partnership, Norway – as a proxy for the broader world – pays Guyana for some of the global carbon value provided by our forests. In turn, Guyana invests this money in our Low Carbon Development Strategy. By April 2015, Norway had paid Guyana about USD 150 million in carbon payments.

The carbon payments are funding numerous investments. For example, they are enabling our Amerindian communities – about 10% of the people in our country – to own their own land through a titling programme and to put in place ambitious community development plans. In partnership with local banks, small and medium enterprises are advancing ambitious low-carbon business ideas. The government is building emergency and long-term flood defences and water management infrastructure. Climate action is being introduced in our school curricula. Guyana is about to build a world-class centre for biodiversity. We are improving practices in mining and other extractive industries. And while all of this is happening, Guyana is maintaining strong economic growth despite the global financial crisis.

The carbon payments are also catalysing other, much larger private investments, for example in renewable energy. As a result, Guyana is on track to not only maintain the world’s lowest level of deforestation, but also to reduce energy-related greenhouse gas emissions by over 92% – more than any developed country.

Together, Guyana and Norway have learned many lessons that are relevant to far bigger countries and to the global community – lessons in areas such as financing low-carbon development, sustaining national support, and making progress in the absence of an international agreement on climate.

While there is still much to be done in the years ahead, I believe that Guyana and Norway, working together as equal partners, are showing how climate action can deliver real results to combat poverty, increase prosperity, sustain vital ecosystem services and advance the fight against climate change for the good of the entire world.

* Available at www.lcds.gov.gy.

Environmental goals are an integral part of several of the Sustainable Development Goals, including Goal 13 on urgent action to combat climate change and its impacts, and Goal 15 on protection, restoration and sustainable use of terrestrial ecosystems (see Box 2.1 in Chapter 2). The conviction that forest conservation is the most effective and cost-efficient way of reducing greenhouse gas emissions and halting climate change is at the very core of REDD+ thinking. From a REDD+ perspective, Goal 15 – forest conservation – is a means of achieving Goal 13 – combating climate change.

Nonetheless, forest conservation is not only about reducing emissions. Healthy forests are vital for the people living in and depending on these important biological areas. For this reason, it is paramount to the success of REDD+ that a broad range of stakeholders – including civil society, indigenous groups and other forest-dependent communities, government, academia and the private sector – are included in all processes of REDD+ planning and implementation.¹

The REDD+ mechanism works through a variety of channels and partners

The REDD+ mechanism aims to become part of a binding international climate agreement as of 2020, currently being negotiated under the UNFCCC. In the meantime, several tropical forest countries have initiated serious REDD+ efforts and development co-operation providers – including Germany, Norway, the United Kingdom and the United States – are committed to supporting and piloting REDD+ around the world.

Norway is currently the biggest contributor to REDD+ globally. Norway’s government – through the Norwegian International Climate and Forest Initiative – has pledged approximately 10% of its annual development co-operation budget, or more than USD 500 million, to REDD+. According to Jonathan Lash, co-author of an independent strategic evaluation of the Norwegian REDD+ initiative: “If Norway had not made this commitment, progress on REDD+ would likely be moving at the same slow pace as other components of the international climate negotiations, and fewer of the technical and conceptual challenges would be resolved” (Lash and Dyer, 2014).

Norway has pledged approximately 10% of its annual development co-operation budget to REDD+.

More than half of this funding goes directly to partner countries, while about 35% is channelled through multilateral institutions that work with countries in the preparatory stages of REDD+. These are most notably the UN-REDD programme, co-hosted by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, the United Nations Environment Programme, the United Nations Development Programme and the World Bank’s Forest Carbon Partnership Facility. In addition, about one-tenth of the funds are given to civil society organisations that work with REDD+.

More than 50 developing countries taking part in REDD+ work through these multilateral channels. The UN and the World Bank provide a range of services: developing capacity for measuring and reporting on forest cover change and greenhouse gas emissions; ensuring that the voices of indigenous peoples and civil society are heard; reforming laws and policies; introducing anti-corruption measures; and strengthening knowledge of the drivers of deforestation, to name a  few.

These multilateral REDD+ programmes have also placed forest conservation on the political agenda in many countries and facilitated dialogue among a broad range of government sectors, such as agriculture, mining, environment and finance (Baastel and Nordeco, 2011).

Successful REDD+ partnerships share some key features

There is no “one-size-fits-all” approach to successful REDD+ partnerships, but some common denominators can be detected.

Political will and national ownership

The single most important prerequisite for REDD+ success is political ambition and national ownership. Countries that can point to reduced deforestation rates, such as Brazil; that have committed to green development plans to keep their deforestation rates low, such as Guyana; or that have launched policy reforms that will radically change the way forests are managed, such as Indonesia (Box 17.1), share these characteristics.

Box 17.1. The Norway-Indonesia REDD+ partnership brings about a development revolution

Indonesia produces the world’s third-largest greenhouse gas emissions after the United States and the People’s Republic of China. About 80% of these emissions come from deforestation, forest degradation and the conversion of peatlands. At the climate summit in Copenhagen in 2009, Indonesia committed to reducing its emissions either by 26% by 2020, if working on its own; or by 41%, with international help. Shortly afterwards, Norway and Indonesia engaged in a bilateral partnership, with Norway pledging support amounting to as much as USD 1 billion for Indonesia’s REDD+ efforts. About 80% of this support was to take the form of payments for verified emissions reductions.

Indonesia can already point to tangible improvements, the most notable among them being a national moratorium on new concessions of logging, mining and plantations on primary forest and peatland (first established in 2011, the moratorium was renewed in 2013 for an additional two years). Another revolutionary shift was the constitutional ruling in 2013 which – for the first time – recognised indigenous people’s right to forest land. According to a recent independent evaluation, this effort has “contributed substantially to a distinct, positive shift in the discourse on indigenous peoples’ rights in Indonesia” (Norad, 2014).

Indonesia has also established a system for monitoring and targeting forest fires, a major problem in many parts of the country; forest fires are a cause of deforestation as well as of the infamous haze that pollutes neighbouring cities like Singapore and Kuala Lumpur. In addition, the national REDD+ programme has made headway in establishing the institutional structures necessary for its implementation: a financial fund that will manage future REDD+ payments, as well as a monitoring, reporting and verification system for greenhouse gas emissions that meets international standards. Finally, Indonesia has made an effort to combat illegal logging and corruption in the forest sector, with many arrests and prosecutions already made.

In the words of Kuntoro Mangkusobroto, former Head of Indonesia’s REDD+ Task Force, “This has been a revolution. In the past, development meant that the forests were cut down or burned. Now development means that people take care of the forest. In this way we can fight poverty, and at the same time protect the rainforest” (Mangkusobroto, 2012).

Predictable funding in a partnership among equals

The promise of significant and predictable funding from Norway provided an important incentive to get REDD+ actions into motion. Norway has also been saluted for its “hands-off” approach to its forest partnerships (Lash and Dyer, 2014), with limited intervention in countries’ processes as long as basic social, environmental and fiduciary standards are met. Experience shows that this approach works well and helps to develop a true partnership among equals.

A “hands-off” approach to forest partnerships works well and helps to develop a true partnership among equals.

Good governance based on transparency and inclusiveness

A focus on good governance, transparency and inclusive decision-making processes characterises all REDD+ partnerships. Efforts to target corruption and other forms of illegality in the forest sector have been prioritised in countries like Brazil and Indonesia, with good results (Box 17.1). Safeguarding indigenous peoples’ and local communities’ rights are paramount, as is including them in decision-making processes. REDD+ initiatives have assisted in resolving land conflicts between indigenous forest-dependent groups and governments (Norad, 2014; Frechette et al., 2014).

Note

 1. In the Rio+20 outcome document, member states agreed that the development goals must “Include active involvement of all relevant stakeholders, as appropriate, in the process” (UN, 2012).

References

Baastel and Nordeco (2011), “First program evaluation for the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF)”, Baastel, Canada and Nordic Agency for Development and Ecology, Copenhagen, www.forestcarbonpartnership.org/sites/forestcarbonpartnership.org/files/Documents/PDF/Jun2011/5.%20Final%20FCPF_EVALUATION_REPORT_June%2013th.pdf.

Chao, S. (2012), Forest Peoples: Numbers Across the World, Forest Peoples Programme, Moreton-in-Marsh, United Kingdom, cited in FAO (2014), State of the World’s Forests: Enhancing the Economic Benefits from Forests, Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations, Rome.

FAO (2010), Global Forest Resources Assessment 2010: Main Report, Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations, Rome, www.fao.org/docrep/013/i1757e/i1757e.pdf.

Frechette, A. et al. (2014), “External evaluation of the United Nations Collaborative Programme on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation in Developing Countries (the UN-REDD Programme)”, Volume I – Final Report, www.un-redd.org/Portals/15/documents/UN-REDD%20Evaluation%20Final%20Report%20 Volume1%20June2014%20EN.pdf.

Lash, J. and G. Dyer (2014), “Norway’s International Climate and Forest Initiative: A strategic evaluation”, report commissioned by the Norwegian Ministry of Climate and Environment, Oslo, www.regjeringen.no/globalassets/upload/md/2011/vedlegg/klima/klima_skogprosjektet/lash_final_nicfi_evaluationreport.pdf.

Mangkusobroto, K. (2012), Quoted in CIFOR blog-post, “REDD+ beyond carbon, towards sustainable development” (translated from Indonesian), 28 November, Center for International Forestry Research, Bogor, http://blog.cifor.org/12374/indonesia-dan-redd-bergerak-melampaui-karbon-menuju-pembangunan-berkelanjutan.

Norad (2014), Real-time Evaluation of Norway’s International Climate and Forest Initiative: Synthesising Report 2007-13, Report 3/2014, Norwegian Agency for Development Co-operation, Oslo.

RFN and GRID-Arendal (2014), State of the Rainforest 2014, Rainforest Foundation Norway and GRID-Arendal, Arendal, Norway, www.grida.no/publications/soe-rain-forest.

UN (2012), “The future we want”, outcome document adopted at Rio+20, the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development, United Nations, New York, www.uncsd2012.org/content/documents/727The%20 Future%20We%20Want%2019%20June%201230pm.pdf.

Part III.

Profiles of development co-operation providers

Learning from experience with the Millennium Development Goals as policy and advocacy tools¹

As the international community moves towards implementation of the new Sustainable Development Goals, learning from the experience of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) can help to make the new goals function as influential policy tools. Evidence shows that the global narrative around the MDGs not only increased public and political support for international development, it also resulted in the reorientation of development co-operation programmes and policies, and promoted behaviour changes within development co-operation agencies. This section looks at these changes among the members of the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC), drawing on a representative sample of eight DAC member countries.

As the international community adopts new goals to guide development efforts until 2030, learning from the experience of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) can help development co-operation provider countries to use the Sustainable Development Goals as effective policy tools.

Members of the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) have already begun to integrate issues such as climate change, resilience and domestic resource mobilisation into their development co-operation policy frameworks. Even so, the Sustainable Development Goals call for a much broader, holistic approach to development, which will require enhancing coherence across all branches of government while reaching out to the private sector and civil society. This ambitious, transformative agenda for sustainable development implies mobilising resources and building synergies among many different actors. While the task – because of its complexity – may appear overwhelming, the MDGs have demonstrated that efforts to address complexity must be complemented by clear, focused messages that can enhance political momentum and strengthen public support for development. At the same time, having a limited set of indicators to measure progress against the MDGs has helped to enhance the focus on accountability and results.

DAC peer reviews (see Chapter 6) demonstrate that the MDGs, and their framework of indicators and targets, have served as influential policy and advocacy tools in three key areas:

they have provided strategic orientations for development co-operation, becoming a universal reference for development co-operation providers and in particular for DAC members

they have mobilised public and political support for development, providing new momentum by communicating the purpose and objectives of development co-operation to a wide audience

they have helped to shift the focus from inputs to results, providing a clear set of indicators and targets against which to monitor progress.

This section looks at these changes among the members of the DAC. It does so by drawing on a representative sample of eight DAC member countries, based on a comparative analysis of the DAC peer reviews of these countries conducted between 1997 and 2014.2

The Millennium Development Goals have provided strategic orientations for development co-operation

Many DAC members were very involved in preparing a set of policy guidelines, published in 1996, that reaffirmed the moral imperative of responding to extreme poverty. This policy document, “Shaping the 21st century: The contribution of development co-operation” (OECD, 1996), is considered to be the precursor of the MDGs, and as such informed DAC members’ policies in the lead up to the Millennium Declaration.

Prior to 2000, however, while some countries – such as Australia, Norway, Switzerland and the United Kingdom – had poverty reduction as a stated objective, others – such as France and Japan – focused on economic growth, assuming that growth would ultimately reduce poverty.

In the wake of the United Nations’ Millennium Summit, in 2001 DAC members confirmed their commitment to reducing poverty in all its dimensions (OECD, 2001). One year later, the MDGs – with the message of poverty alleviation as their central theme – became the universal reference for development co-operation, providing a common framework that was taken up in many national development co-operation plans. DAC peer reviews show that already in the early 2000s, all DAC members referred in one way or another to reducing poverty in their development co-operation strategies. As an illustration, the United Kingdom’s International Development Act 2002 stipulates that poverty reduction is the purpose of development assistance.³ The United States and Japan made combating poverty a foreign policy priority in 2002 and 2003 respectively.⁴

There are disparities, however, in the take-up of the MDGs within DAC members’ development co-operation programmes. Some DAC members were quicker than others to embed the MDGs into their strategic orientations: Ireland, Norway and the United Kingdom made explicit references to the MDGs from 2000. In 2004, Switzerland made the MDGs the ultimate reference guiding its development co-operation, using the MDG indicators as benchmarks for its own programme. While referring to the MDGs since 2005 in its medium-term policy, however, Japan continued to consider economic growth the primary vehicle for poverty reduction. It was not until 2008 that Australia referred to the MDGs explicitly as guiding its programme – emphasising continuing support to stable and secure environments as a precondition for meeting the MDGs. Only in 2009 did France define MDG-related sectors for aid concentration, while the United States did not set its strategy for meeting the MDGs until 2010.

Differences in timing and level of adhesion to the MDGs derive largely from diverse national contexts and agendas.

These differences in timing and level of adhesion to the MDGs from one country to another derive largely from diverse national contexts and agendas. For example, while an economic lens has long been applied to development co-operation by countries such as France and Japan, this focus is not prominent in the MDGs. Similarly, while security and good governance are not strongly featured in the MDGs, they are emphasised by Australia, the United States and other countries, which closely link diplomacy, defence and development. Overall, however, adhesion increased over time and all DAC member countries eventually adopted the MDGs as a reference for their programmes. With this, a new consensus progressively emerged, setting the scene for a broader, shared approach to development goals.

The Millennium Development Goals have mobilised support for development

The MDGs provided new momentum for public and political support for development, serving as a tool in provider countries to communicate the purpose and objectives of development co-operation. While the United Nations took the lead in communicating on the MDGs, as illustrated by the End Poverty campaign, in the mid-2000s many DAC member countries (e.g. Australia, Switzerland and the United States) reviewed their communication strategies in the light of the MDGs and even increased their related budgets. Some countries developed specific communication strategies around the MDGs. For example, the Netherlands adopted the MDGs as its framework for communication and set up a special budget for building public awareness around them. In 2002, Finland and Sweden launched publicity campaigns on the MDGs and set up coalitions of stakeholders to communicate them actively.

Civil society organisations also organised wide-ranging campaigns for raising public awareness around the MDGs. As an illustration, the United States organised the Better World campaign in 2003, a national campaign involving many non-governmental organisations, research centres and think tanks to reach out to the corporate world and societal leaders.

Many countries expected greater public awareness and concern about development issues. In most countries, however, communication and development education efforts did not translate into a significant increase in knowledge of the MDGs. Public opinion surveys in the European Union, for example, show that in 2013 only 22% of European citizens had heard of the MDGs, up from 12% in 2004. The Netherlands and Sweden stand out: more than half of their citizens have heard of the MDGs, although the reasons for the relatively positive impact of their government-led MDG campaigns are not clear (European Commission, 2005, 2013).

In the European Union, 83% of citizens believe in the importance of helping people in developing countries.

In contrast, the overall level of support to development co-operation in DAC member countries has increased since the end of the 1990s. In the European Union, the percentage of citizens who believe in the importance of helping people in developing countries rose from 76% in 1998 to 91% in 2004, although it has since fallen – to 88% in 2009 and to 83% in 2013. In Norway, public support for development co-operation has remained high and fairly stable over the past decade, with nine out of ten Norwegians expressing their backing for Norway’s support to developing countries in 2010. In Japan, the level of public support rose from 70% in 1998 to 75% in 2001 (European Commission, 2005, 2013; Fransman and Solignac Lecomte, 2004), a level maintained until 2011.

These trends suggest that communication and development education efforts around the MDGs have helped to broaden and then protect the support for development co-operation, despite the financial and economic crisis that hit most development co-operation provider countries in 2008/09.

The Millennium Development Goals helped to shift the focus from inputs to results

With a clear set of indicators attached to them, the MDGs provided a basis for monitoring progress against concrete targets. This, in turn, helped to hold governments accountable for the commitments they had made when they signed the Millennium Declaration, and for producing concrete results – rather than simply communicating about amounts invested. By as early as 2003, countries such as the Netherlands and Norway were emphasising the importance of managing for development results for accountability purposes. In 2005-06, the United States set clearly defined results and performance indicators for each of its development programmes. This focus on results was reinforced by the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (see Annex D).

The MDG framework was also explicitly used by a number of development co-operation agencies to link the MDGs to internal goals and objectives, and ultimately to results at the project level. The United Kingdom was at the forefront in doing so and Australia joined later. Many other countries, such as Ireland and Switzerland, also progressively put in place MDG-related results frameworks around a number of strategic outcomes.

In a similar manner, civil service and administrative reforms undertaken in the second half of the 2000s by many DAC member governments, in particular in Europe, had the objective of raising the efficiency and effectiveness of public spending and increasing value for money. Development co-operation departments were asked to report more explicitly on the results achieved against their budgets in response to the domestic pressure aroused by budgetary constraints.

Accountability mechanisms such as the OECD-DAC peer reviews were also instrumental in putting pressure on DAC members to meet their commitments (see Chapter 6). By encouraging the sharing of good practice among the development co-operation community, they also helped to improve the quality of co-operation. In the same vein, monitoring processes – such as the monitoring surveys associated with the implementation of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and more recently those of the Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation (see Chapters 3 and 7) – are helping to make development co-operation providers accountable to their partner countries.

The culture of results is gaining momentum in the development co-operation community.

While the culture of results is gaining momentum in the development co-operation community, setting appropriate quantitative and qualitative indicators and shifting from inputs and outputs to outcomes remains challenging for all development co-operation providers. A number of DAC members only have results frameworks in place at the project level; others still do not make the link between results frameworks and budget lines.

The lessons from applying the Millennium Development Goals will be valuable for the post-2015 era

The scope of the development agenda began to expand beyond the MDGs as development co-operation providers started to embed climate change and environmental protection into their development co-operation programmes. Over time, they also began to emphasise the importance of good political and economic governance, increasingly providing support to public financial management and domestic resource mobilisation; to dedicate more attention to disaster-related risk reduction and resilience; and to diversify their financial instruments, including using official development assistance as a catalyst for other flows and partnering with the private sector (OECD, 2014). This has translated, in institutional terms, into an emphasis on whole-of-government approaches. Nonetheless, the challenges of implementing the Sustainable Development Goals will require even broader, more inclusive and integrated approaches and partnerships. The lessons from applying the MDGs as a policy and advocacy tool will be essential in ensuring support and efficiency around the universal, Sustainable Development Goals post-2015.

Recommendations

Use clear, focused messages to enhance political momentum and strengthen public support for development.

Use a set of indicators against which to measure progress to enhance the focus on accountability and results.

Concentrate on the few indicators that are crucial to inform policies to develop a realistic and manageable accountability framework.

Organise communication and development education efforts around the goals to broaden support for their achievement and for the development co-operation allocations required to get there.

Notes

 1. This section was prepared by Chantal Verger of the OECD Development Co-operation Directorate.

 2. Australia, France, Ireland, Japan, Norway, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States. This sample – comprising DAC members from Europe, America and Asia – offers wide variety in terms of size of development co-operation programmes and related national efforts (in terms of progress towards the official development assistance/gross national income target ratio). It represents well the diversity of the DAC membership over the period covered. Other DAC member countries are also referred to in the text and, when relevant, sources other than peer reviews are specified.

 3. Available at: www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2002/1/contents.

 4. See the United States Presidential Address (Bush, 2002) and the 2003 revised version of Japan’s Official Development Assistance Charter (Government of Japan, 2003).

References

Bush, G.W. (2002), United States Presidential Address at the Inter-American Development Bank, Washington, DC, 14 March, http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/infocus/developingnations/text.

European Commission (2013), “EU development aid and the Millennium Development Goals”, Special Eurobarometer 405, European Union, Brussels, http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_405_en.pdf.

European Commission (2009), “Development aid in times of economic turmoil”, Special Eurobarometer 318, European Union, Brussels, http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_318_en.pdf.

European Commission (2005), “Attitudes towards development aid”, Special Eurobarometer 222, European Union, Brussels, http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_222_en.pdf.

Fransman, J. and H. Solignac Lecomte (2004), “Mobilising public opinion against global poverty”, OECD Development Centre Policy Insights, No. 2, OECD Publishing, Paris, http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/023738715074.

Government of Japan (2003), “Japan’s Official Development Assistance Charter”, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of Japan, Tokyo, www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/reform/revision0308.pdf.

OECD (2014), Development Co-operation Report 2014: Mobilising Resources for Sustainable Development, OECD Publishing, Paris, http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/dcr-2014-en.

OECD (2001), “Rising to the global challenge: Partnership for reducing world poverty”, Policy Statement by the DAC High-Level Meeting upon endorsement of the DAC Guidelines on Poverty Reduction, Paris, 25-26 April, www.oecd.org/dac/povertyreduction/1895254.pdf.

OECD (1996), “Shaping the 21st century: The contribution of development co-operation”, OECD, Paris, www.oecd.org/dac/2508761.pdf.

Further reading

Mc Donnell, I. (2004), “An international perspective on communication strategies for the Millennium Development Goals”, OECD, Paris, www.oecd.org/development/pgd/33904346.pdf.

OECD (various years), OECD Development Co-operation Peer Reviews: Australia (2000, 2004, 2008, 2013); France (1997, 2000, 2004, 2008, 2013); Ireland (1999, 2003, 2009, 2014); Japan (1999, 2003, 2010, 2014); Norway (1999, 2004, 2008, 2013); Switzerland (2000, 2005, 2009, 2013); United Kingdom (1997, 2001, 2006, 2010, 2014); United States (1998, 2002, 2006, 2011), OECD Publishing, Paris, www.oecd.org/dac/peer-reviews/peerreviewsofdacmembers.htm.

Development Assistance Committee members’ ODA performance in 2013 and 2014¹

According to preliminary data, in 2014 net official development assistance (ODA) flows from member countries of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) was USD 135.2 billion, representing 0.29% of gross national income (GNI). In the past 15 years, net ODA has been rising steadily and has increased by 66% since 2000. Despite the recession in several DAC member countries which has led to reductions in their aid budgets, it is encouraging that overall levels of ODA remain high and stable.

Overall aid trends

In 2014, net official development assistance (ODA) flows from member countries of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD totalled USD 135.2 billion, level with the all-time high in 2013 of USD 135.1 billion, though marking a slight decline of 0.5% in real terms.

Net ODA as a percentage of GNI was 0.29% in 2014, down from 0.30% in 2013. However, DAC members are progressively introducing the new System of National Accounts (SNA08), which is leading to slight upward revisions of GNI levels, and corresponding falls in reported ODA/GNI ratios. Calculated on this basis, ODA as a percentage of GNI in 2013 would be 0.29%.

In the past 15 years, after the Millennium Development Goals were agreed and especially after the Monterrey Conference on Financing for Development in 2002, net ODA has been rising steadily (see Figure 19.1). It has increased by 66% in real terms since 2000 and has long been a stable source of financing for development. Despite the recession in several DAC member countries which has led to reductions in their aid budgets, it is encouraging that overall levels of ODA remain high and stable.

Figure 19.1. Net official development assistance, 1960-2014

p: Preliminary data.

1. Total DAC excludes debt forgiveness of non-ODA claims in 1990, 1991 and 1992.

Source: OECD (2014c), “Detailed aid statistics: Official and private flows”, OECD International Development Statistics (database), http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/data-00072-en (accessed on 21 April 2015).

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933243458

DAC members’ performance

In 2014, the largest donor countries by volume were the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, France and Japan. Denmark, Luxembourg, Norway, Sweden and the United Kingdom continued to exceed the United Nations’ ODA target of 0.7% of GNI.

Net ODA rose in 13 countries – with the largest increases recorded in Finland, Germany, Sweden and Switzerland – but fell in 15 countries, with the largest decreases in Australia, Canada, France, Japan, Poland, Portugal and Spain.

Net ODA as a percentage of GNI was 0.29% in 2014, down from 0.30% in 2013. However, DAC members are progressively introducing the new System of National Accounts (SNA08), which is leading to slight upward revisions of GNI levels, and corresponding falls in reported ODA/GNI ratios. Calculated on this basis, ODA as a percentage of GNI in 2013 would be 0.29%.

Among DAC member countries, G7 countries provided 71% of total net DAC ODA in 2014, and the DAC-EU countries 55%.

Further outlook

The annual DAC Survey on Donors’ Forward Spending Plans provides estimates of future gross aid receipts of country programmable aid (CPA).² In 2014, CPA from all sources (DAC members, non-DAC providers and multilateral agencies) decreased by 7.0% in real terms to an estimated USD 105.3 billion. The overall decline of CPA in 2014 was driven by a significant drop in aid to top aid recipient countries (e.g. Afghanistan, Kenya, Myanmar and Tanzania), thus affecting overall ODA levels for both least developed countries and other low-income countries. By contrast, CPA to lower middle-income countries rose by 1.3% in real terms, mainly due to concessional loans to countries in Asia and Eastern Europe. CPA to upper middle-income countries dropped 1.5%, but with large fluctuations across countries.

Looking forward, the survey projects a 2.5% real increase in CPA in 2015, mainly due to recent replenishments that will increase disbursements by multilateral agencies. Least developed and other low-income countries will benefit most from this increase, with their aid levels expected to grow by 5.7% in real terms. Total CPA is expected to increase slightly through 2018. The DAC Survey suggests a continued increase for the least developed countries, whereas allocations to lower middle and upper middle-income countries are expected to be stable.

The post-2015 Open Working Group proposal for Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) envisages an end to absolute poverty and a new era in global development characterised by economic and social progress, environmental sustainability, and peaceful and inclusive societies. The historic agreement by OECD-DAC ministers in December 2014 to modernise the DAC statistical system is an important input to the nascent post-2015 financing agenda to be agreed at the Third International Conference on Financing for Development in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, in July 2015 as it provides for a more robust ODA definition; measures to incentivise more and better terms of concessional finance for countries most in need; more use of ODA in a catalytic way to help leverage additional resources, both external and domestic; and greater scope for ensuring that all financial instruments are recognised in order to maximise resources for sustainable development.

Aggregate aid trends by aid types and channels

Country programmable aid

DAC countries’ total CPA was USD 61 billion in 2013, a 9.6% increase in real terms from 2012. This volume represents 55% of DAC countries’ gross bilateral ODA (Figure 19.2). CPA as a share of total bilateral ODA has been fairly stable since 2004, apart from a temporary drop in 2005 and 2006 when the DAC gave exceptionally large amounts of debt relief to Iraq and several African countries.

Figure 19.2. Composition of DAC countries’ bilateral ODA, 2013, gross disbursements

Source: OECD DAC statistics: DAC2a available at http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=TABLE2A; CRS available at http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=CRS1; CPA available at http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=CPA.

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933243463

Aid by income group

The increase in ODA over the past decade has benefited countries in all income groups, including the least developed countries (Figure 19.3). However, close to two-thirds of the increase in ODA to least developed countries benefited only four countries (Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia and Sudan/South Sudan). ODA to least developed countries fell between 2011 and 2012 but rose again in 2013 due to debt relief for Myanmar.

Figure 19.3. Bilateral ODA by income group, 2003-13, gross disbursements

Source: OECD (2014d), “Detailed aid statistics: ODA official development assistance: Disbursements”, OECD International Development Statistics (database), http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/data-00069-en (accessed on 20 April 2015).

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933243473

The majority of DAC countries still fall short of the United Nations target of allocating 0.15% of their gross national income (GNI) as net ODA to least developed countries (Figure 19.4).³ In 2013, only nine member countries reached this target (Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and the United Kingdom). In total, DAC countries provided 0.10% of their GNI as ODA to least developed countries in 2013, up from 0.09% in 2012. This figure takes into account both DAC countries’ bilateral ODA and imputed multilateral ODA (see Endnote 2).

Figure 19.4. DAC countries’ net ODA to least developed countries as a % of gross national income, 1960-2013

Source: OECD (2014d), “Detailed aid statistics: ODA official development assistance: Disbursements”, OECD International Development Statistics (database), http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/data-00069-en (accessed on 20 April 2015).

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933243481

Untied aid

Untied aid is defined by the DAC as loans and grants whose proceeds are fully and freely available to finance procurement from all OECD countries and substantially all developing countries. All other loans and grants are classified either as tied aid (procurement open only to suppliers in the provider country) or as partially untied aid (procurement open to a restricted number of countries which must include substantially all developing countries and can include the provider country). These definitions apply whether aid is tied formally or through informal arrangements.

The DAC has focused on the issue of untying aid since its inception in 1961. The purpose of reporting the tying status of aid is to show how much of members’ aid is open for procurement through international competition. Internationally competitive procurement promotes cost-effective sourcing of aid inputs, promotes free and open trade, and facilitates the implementation of commitments under the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness in areas such as co-ordination and alignment (see Annex D). DAC reporting on tying status does not include multilateral ODA (core contributions to multilateral agencies), as multilateral ODA is treated as untied by convention. In this field, as in others, the DAC has for many years given special consideration to the needs of least developed countries. In 2001, the DAC agreed the Recommendation on Untying ODA to the Least Developed Countries (OECD, 2001). In 2008, it expanded this Recommendation to include those heavily indebted poor countries (HIPCs) that were not included as least developed countries (OECD, 2008).

The Paris Declaration committed OECD-DAC providers “to continue making progress to untie aid as encouraged by the 2001 DAC Recommendation on Untying ODA to the Least Developed Countries”, while the Accra Agenda for Action encouraged co-operation providers to “elaborate plans to further untie aid to the maximum extent”.⁴ The Busan Partnership agreement urges providers to “accelerate efforts to untie aid” and to “improve the quality, consistency and transparency of reporting on the tying status of aid” (Fourth High-Level Forum, 2011). Overall, reporting on the tying status of ODA has greatly improved. In 2013, only 2.3% of ODA did not have its tying status reported, and most of this concerned free-standing technical co-operation.⁵ While reporting the tying status of this type of aid is not mandatory (except for ODA to the least developed and highly indebted poor countries), most DAC members do so, filling a major reporting gap which was hindering accurate and comparative analysis of individual members’ untying performance (OECD/UNDP, 2014).

The country notes in the section “Profiles of Development Assistance Committee members” refer to the share of untied aid in DAC members’ total bilateral ODA (excluding providers’ administrative costs and their in-country refugee costs) to all partner countries. In 2013, 83% of DAC countries’ bilateral ODA was untied (Figure 19.5), up from 81% in 2012.

Figure 19.5. Untying status of DAC countries’ bilateral aid, 2013

Note: This measure of untied aid excludes providers’ administrative costs and refugee costs in provider countries.

Source: OECD (2014e), “Detailed aid statistics: Official bilateral commitments by sector”, OECD International Development Statistics (database), http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/data-00073-en (accessed March 2015).

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933243499

ODA to and through the multilateral aid system

On average for 2012 and 2013, DAC countries channelled 39% of their ODA to and through the multilateral aid system, up from the 2008-09 average of 37%. This increase was mainly due to larger ODA shares allocated to the multilateral system for specific themes, sectors or country/regions (multi-bi/non-core; see Glossary). While the share of multi-bi rose from 11% in 2008-09 to 12% in 2010-11 and 2012-13, the share of core contributions increased only marginally, from 26% in 2008-09 to 27% in both 2010-11 and 2012-13 (Figure 19.6).

Figure 19.6. DAC countries’ share of ODA channelled to and through the multilateral system, two year averages, gross disbursements

Source: OECD (2014e), “Detailed aid statistics: Official bilateral commitments by sector”, OECD International Development Statistics (database), http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/data-00073-en (accessed March 2015).

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933243500

ODA allocations to and through civil society organisations

In 2013, DAC countries channelled USD 18 billion in official development assistance to and through civil society organisations (CSOs) (Figure 19.7). This accounted for 16.1% of total bilateral aid. While the share of bilateral aid allocated to and through CSOs differs widely among DAC members, the average share of total bilateral aid for all DAC countries over the last three years has been 16.3%.

Figure 19.7. Bilateral ODA to and through CSOs, total DAC countries, two year averages, gross disbursements

Note: CSOs: civil society organisations; ODA: official development assistance.

Source: OECD (2014e), “Detailed aid statistics: Official bilateral commitments by sector”, OECD International Development Statistics (database), http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/data-00073-en (accessed March 2015).

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933243513

Development co-operation for gender equality and women’s empowerment

Gender equality is widely recognised as an important end in its own right and a prerequisite for sustainable development. The Busan Partnership agreement calls for a redoubling of efforts to implement commitments in this area (Fourth High-Level Forum, 2011). Adequate financing for gender equality and women’s rights will be critical for making the gender equality commitments of the Busan Global Partnership a reality and accelerating progress towards gender equality and women’s rights beyond 2015.

The DAC Gender Equality Marker is a statistical instrument to measure aid that is focused on achieving gender equality and women’s empowerment. Activities are classified as “principal” when gender equality is a primary objective, “significant” when gender equality is an important but secondary objective, or “not targeted”. All DAC members except the United States⁶ screen their activities against the DAC Gender Equality Marker. The marker is an important tool for strengthening accountability and transparency in DAC provider financing for gender equality and women’s rights.

In the profiles of DAC members that follow, ODA supporting gender equality and women’s empowerment is presented for each country in terms of: 1) the volume of ODA in support of gender equality; 2) the share of sector-allocable ODA committed for significant or principal activities; and 3) the share of bilateral ODA in support of gender equality by sector. In some cases, fluctuations in a DAC country’s ODA for gender equality may be partly due to variations in the way the gender marker has been applied from one year to the next. As shown in Figure 19.8, in 2013 DAC countries committed a total of USD 23 billion for gender equality and women’s empowerment. The DAC country average for the share of development co-operation that had a gender equality and women’s empowerment objective was 31% in 2013.

Figure 19.8. Total DAC countries’ ODA for gender equality and women’s empowerment, 2002-13, commitments

Source: OECD (2014e), “Detailed aid statistics: Official bilateral commitments by sector”, OECD International Development Statistics (database), http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/data-00073-en (accessed March 2015).

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933243520

Development co-operation for the environment, including the Rio conventions

The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) and the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD), collectively known as the Rio conventions, were established following the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro. Signatory countries committed to incorporating the principles of sustainable development and global environmental concerns into their national development agendas, while providing developing countries with financial and technical resources for this purpose. The developed countries that signed the three Rio conventions in 1992 committed themselves to assist developing countries in implementing them.

Since 1998, the DAC has monitored ODA commitments targeting the objectives of the Rio conventions through its Creditor Reporting System using the “Rio markers”. Every bilateral development co-operation activity reported to the Creditor Reporting System should be screened and marked as either: 1) targeting the conventions as a “principal objective” or a “significant objective”; or 2) not targeting the objective. The Rio markers are descriptive and allow for an approximate quantification of financial flows targeting the objectives of the Rio conventions. Finance reported to the UNFCCC and the Convention on Biological Diversity may be based on alternative definitions and measurement methodologies, and may not be comparable with Rio marker data. In analysing finance flows we recommend looking at trends, over at least three years, in particular to smooth fluctuations from large multi-year projects programmed and committed in a given year, such as observed in 2010.

In 2013, total commitments of bilateral ODA by OECD-DAC countries targeting the global environmental objectives of the three Rio conventions were USD 25.7 billion, or 30% of total ODA. This represented a real increase of 7% over 2012 (USD 25.1 billion). Of the various global environmental objectives, climate change mitigation received the largest commitments of bilateral ODA in 2013, totalling USD 13.4 billion (16% of total ODA).⁷

External development finance beyond ODA

Most DAC members also provide developing countries with official finance that does not qualify as ODA, either because the operations are not primarily development-motivated (e.g. export-related operations) or because they are extended at non-concessional terms (e.g. non-concessional loans from bilateral development finance institutions). In recent years, the DAC has been paying more attention to these flows, partly to explore better ways of monitoring total official support for development in the post-2015 measurement framework. In 2013, DAC members’ gross disbursements of “other official flows” (see Glossary) decreased by 13% compared to 2012, after having recorded a general upward trend during the last decade. Japan, Korea, Canada and the United States were the largest providers of other official flows in 2013. Recent DAC surveys have shown that private sector instruments are also increasingly used by members to mobilise private investment in developing countries (Mirabile et al., 2013; OECD, 2014a). For example, guarantees for development – extended by development co-operation agencies and bilateral and multilateral development finance institutions – mobilised USD 15.3 billion from the private sector for development purposes from 2009 to 2011 (OECD, 2014b).

Beyond official finance, developing countries also receive external financial resources from the private sector in DAC member countries. Total net private flows to developing countries at market terms recorded a slight decrease in 2013 (-14%) totalling USD 263 billion, with the United States, Japan and Germany being the largest providers.

With regard to net private grants mobilised by non-governmental organisations and foundations, developing countries received USD 29.7 billion from DAC countries in 2013, compared with USD 30.3 billion in 2012. Funds raised privately by non-governmental organisations based in DAC member countries appear to have stabilised since 2010 and are the equivalent of 24% of total ODA. The United States alone accounted for 70% of these flows.

Notes

 1. This section was prepared by Yasmin Ahmad of the OECD Development Co-operation Directorate.

 2. Country programmable aid (CPA), also known as “core” aid, is the portion of an aid donor’s programme for individual countries, and over which partner countries could have a significant say. CPA is much closer than ODA to capturing the flows of aid that go to the partner country, and has been proven in several studies to be a good proxy of aid recorded at country level. Read more on CPA at: www.oecd.org/dac/aid-architecture/cpa.htm.

 3. Total net ODA to least developed countries is calculated as DAC countries’ bilateral net ODA and imputed multilateral ODA. Imputed multilateral ODA is a way of estimating the geographical distribution of providers’ core contributions to multilateral agencies, based on the geographical breakdown of multilateral agencies’ disbursements for the year of reference. For more information, see: www.oecd.org/dac/stats/oecdmethodologyforcalculatingimputedmultilateraloda.htm.

 4. These documents can be viewed at: www.oecd.org/development/effectiveness/34428351.pdf.

 5. Free-standing technical co-operation refers to the provision of resources for transferring technical and managerial skills or technology in order to build up general national capacity. It does not refer to the implementation of any specific investment projects.

 6. The United States, which did not report against the Gender Equality Policy Marker from 2010 to 2012, has implemented a new data collection methodology for the Gender Equality Marker and is included in the data for 2013. The screening for 2011 and 2012 had not yet been completed in time for this volume, but data for these years will be provided in the coming months.

 7. This calculation excludes the United States, which did not report on the climate mitigation marker in 2012 or 2013.

References

Fourth High-Level Forum (2011), Busan Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation, Fourth High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness, Busan, Korea, 29 November-1 December 2011, www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/49650173.pdf.

Mirabile, M. et al. (2013), “Guarantees for development”, OECD Development Co-operation Working Papers, No. 11, OECD Publishing, Paris, http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5k407lx5b8f8-en.

OECD (2014a), “Survey on the Mobilisation Effect of Official Development Finance: Preliminary results”, OECD, Paris, www.oecd.org/dac/stats/documentupload/surveymobilisation.pdf.

OECD (2014b), Development Co-operation Report 2014: Mobilising Resources for Sustainable Development, OECD Publishing, Paris, http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/dcr-2014-en.

OECD (2014c), “Detailed aid statistics: Official and private flows”, OECD International Development Statistics (database), http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/data-00072-en (accessed on 21 April 2015).

OECD (2014d), “Detailed aid statistics: ODA official development assistance: Disbursements”, OECD International Development Statistics (database), http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/data-00069-en (accessed on 20 April 2015).

OECD (2014e), “Detailed aid statistics: Official bilateral commitments by sector”, OECD International Development Statistics (database), http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/data-00073-en (accessed March 2015).

OECD (2008), DAC Recommendation on Untying ODA to Least Developed Countries and Heavily Indebted Poor Countries, OECD, Paris, www.oecd.org/countries/nicaragua/41707972.pdf.

OECD (2001), “Untying aid to the least developed countries”, OECD Policy Brief, July, OECD Publishing, Paris, www.oecd.org/finance/2002959.pdf.

OECD/UNDP (2014), Making Development Co-operation More Effective: 2014 Progress Report, OECD Publishing, Paris, http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264209305-en.

Profiles of Development Assistance Committee membersThis section was prepared by Ida Mc Donnell and Valentina Sanna, in collaboration with Yasmin Ahmad, Joëlline Benefice, Elena Bernaldo, Olivier Bouret, Juan Casado Asensio, Gregory De Paepe, Sylvie Dewitt, Anna Drutschinin, Fredrik Ericsson, Ann Gordon, Masato Hayashikawa, Karen Jorgensen, Hanna-Mari Kilpelainen, Thilo Klein, Hetty Kovach, Frans Lammersen, Rahul Malhotra, Stephanie Ockenden, Leslie Rae, Julie Seghers, Guillaume Simon, Andrzej Suchodolski, Valérie Thielemans and Chantal Verger of the Development Co-operation Directorate, OECD.

Profiles of Development Assistance Committee members¹

The profiles on DAC members, which are presented in alphabetical order in this section, give key data on resources mobilised by each member for development, with a focus on official development assistance (ODA) key flows, channels and areas of focus.

Australia

Austria

Belgium

Canada

Czech Republic

Denmark

European Union institutions

Finland

France

Germany

Greece

Iceland

Ireland

Italy

Japan

Korea

Luxembourg

Netherlands

New Zealand

Norway

Poland

Portugal

Slovak Republic

Slovenia

Spain

Sweden

Switzerland

United Kingdom

United States

Notes

 1. This section was prepared by Ida Mc Donnell and Valentina Sanna, in collaboration with Yasmin Ahmad, Joëlline Benefice, Elena Bernaldo, Olivier Bouret, Juan Casado Asensio, Gregory De Paepe, Sylvie Dewitt, Anna Drutschinin, Fredrik Ericsson, Ann Gordon, Masato Hayashikawa, Karen Jorgensen, Hanna-Mari Kilpelainen, Thilo Klein, Hetty Kovach, Frans Lammersen, Rahul Malhotra, Stephanie Ockenden, Leslie Rae, Julie Seghers, Guillaume Simon, Andrzej Suchodolski, Valérie Thielemans and Chantal Verger of the Development Co-operation Directorate, OECD.

Australia

Financial flows from Australia to developing countries

Figure 20.1. Net resource flows to developing countries, 2003-13, Australia

Note: Data on private flows at market terms are not available for 2009 and those for private grants are not available for 2009 and 2013.

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933243535

Australia uses ODA to mobilise other resources for sustainable development

Australia contributes to the mobilisation of domestic resources in developing countries by supporting their tax systems. In 2013, it is estimated that Australia committed USD 36.2 million of its official development assistance (ODA) to tax-related activities in partner countries.

It promotes aid for trade to improve developing countries’ trade performance and integration into the world economy. Australia intends to scale up aid-for-trade investments to 20% of the total aid budget. It committed USD 452 million (14% of its sector-allocable ODA) to trade-related activities in 2013, a decrease of 15% in real terms from 2012. The trend has been decreasing since 2010.

It invests in building up national statistical capacities and systems in partner countries so they can monitor their development goals. It committed USD 6.7 million to this effort in 2013.

It invests in reducing climate change-related risks and increasing resilience in the Indo-Pacific region. It has pledged USD 187 million (AUD 200 million) to the Green Climate Fund, which plays a key role in channelling resources to developing countries and catalysing climate finance at the international and national levels.

Australia promotes the effective use of resources for sustainable development by:

Enabling developing country ownership through the way it delivers its aid. There is scope to make further progress. In 2013, 55% of Australia’s aid scheduled for the government sector in partner countries was recorded on partners’ national budgets, while the agreed minimum target for 2015 is at least 85%. In 2013, 34% of Australia’s development assistance to the government sector was channelled through partners’ public financial management and procurement systems, still below the 2015 target of 57%.

Integrating a strong results focus into its development co-operation. The government’s new performance framework, “Making performance count: Enhancing the accountability and effectiveness of Australian aid” (Commonwealth of Australia, 2014a), will assess performance at three levels – overall programme, country programme and individual investments.

Making its aid predictable. In 2013, the annual predictability of Australian development assistance was 100%. Medium-term predictability was lower, at 51%.

Untying aid. Australia’s share of untied ODA (excluding administrative costs and in-donor refugee costs) was 99.2% in 2013 (down from 100% in 2012), while the DAC average was 83.2%.

Australia’s official development assistance

Australia provided USD 4.2 billion in net ODA in 2014 (preliminary data), which represented 0.27% of gross national income (GNI) and a fall of 7.2% in real terms from 2013. Australia’s ODA has fallen since 2012, both in volume and as a percentage of GNI. The present government has not retained the ODA target of 0.5% ODA/GNI. It announced a 20% reduction to the 2015/16 budget in mid-December 2014 – the largest cut ever in the Australian aid programme. It plans, however, to target investments better. Australia is the 14th largest Development Assistance Committee (DAC) donor in terms of ODA as a percentage of GNI, and the 9th largest by volume. The grant element of total ODA was 99.9% in 2013.

Figure 20.2. Net ODA: Trends in volume and as a share of GNI, 1998-2014, Australia

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933243547

In 2013, 86% of ODA was provided bilaterally. Australia allocated 14% of total ODA as core contributions to multilateral organisations, compared with the DAC country average of 27%. It channelled a further 21% of its bilateral ODA for projects implemented by multilateral organisations (multi-bi/non-core).

Figure 20.3. Share of ODA channelled to and through the multilateral system, two year averages, gross disbursements, Australia

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933243557

In 2013, 66% of bilateral ODA was programmed at partner country level. Australia’s share of country programmable aid (CPA) was well above the DAC country average (54.5%); 52% of CPA consisted of project-type interventions.

Figure 20.4. Composition of bilateral ODA, 2013, gross disbursements, Australia

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933243568

In 2013, USD 522.4 million of bilateral ODA was channelled to and through civil society organisations (CSOs). This was equivalent to 12% of bilateral ODA, compared with the DAC average of 16%. Aid to and through CSOs decreased between 2012 and 2013, both in volume (-10%) and as a share of bilateral ODA (from 13% to 12%).

Figure 20.5. Bilateral ODA to and through CSOs, two year averages, gross disbursements, Australia

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933243577

In 2013, bilateral ODA was primarily focused on Asia and Oceania. USD 1.1 billion was allocated to Far East Asia, USD 1 billion to Oceania and USD 437.4 million to South and Central Asia. USD 310.7 million was allocated to sub-Saharan Africa. Bilateral allocations to sub-Saharan Africa are decreasing in line with government policy.

Figure 20.6. Share of bilateral ODA by region, 2012-13 average, gross disbursements, Australia

Note: 24% of bilateral ODA allocated was unspecified by region in 2012-13. This share is not represented on the map.

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933243584

68% of bilateral country-allocable ODA went to Australia’s top 10 recipients. Its top 10 recipients are in the Indo-Pacific region, where Australia has programmes with 33 countries. Its support to fragile states reached USD 1.1 billion in 2013 (25% of gross bilateral ODA).

Figure 20.7. Bilateral country-allocable ODA to top recipients, 2012-13 average, gross disbursements, Australia

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933243599

In 2013, 24% of Australia’s bilateral ODA was allocated to least developed countries (LDCs), corresponding to USD 1 billion. This is down from 28% (USD 1.3 billion) in 2012. It is lower than the 2013 DAC average of 31%. Lower middle-income countries received the highest share of bilateral ODA in 2013 (39%).

At 0.09% of GNI in 2013, total ODA to LDCs was less than the UN target of 0.15% of GNI.

Figure 20.8. Bilateral ODA by income group, two year averages, gross disbursements, Australia

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933243607

44% of bilateral ODA in 2013 was allocated to social infrastructure and services, representing USD 1.8 billion. There was a strong focus on support to government and civil society (USD 802 million), education (USD 416 million) and health (USD 210 million).

Figure 20.9. Share of bilateral ODA by sector, 2012-13 average, commitments, Australia

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933243611

USD 1.7 billion of bilateral ODA supported gender equality. Empowering women and girls and promoting gender equality are central to Australia’s development co-operation and international diplomacy. To achieve these objectives the government has set a target requiring that at least 80% of investments, regardless of their objectives, will effectively address gender issues in their implementation. In 2013, 59% of Australia’s bilateral sector-allocable aid had gender equality and women’s empowerment as a principal or significant objective. This is an increase from 47% in 2008 and is higher than the 2013 DAC country average of 31%. A high share of Australia’s aid to population, reproductive health and education focuses on gender.

Figure 20.10. Share of bilateral ODA in support of gender equality by sector, 2013, commitments, Australia

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933243623

USD 568 million of bilateral ODA supported the environment in 2013. Australia’s new development policy commits Australia’s aid programme to “… actively manage risk by mitigating adverse environmental and social impacts in the aid programme through the application of mandatory safeguard policies…” (Commonwealth of Australia, 2014b). In 2013, 14% of its bilateral aid focused on the environment, compared with the DAC country average of 23%. In 2013, 12% of Australian bilateral aid (USD 487 million) focused particularly on climate change, compared with the DAC country average of 16%.

Figure 20.11. Bilateral ODA in support of global and local environment objectives, two year averages, commitments, Australia

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933243636

Note to reader: Annex B provides “Methodological notes on definitions and measurement for the Profiles of Development Assistance Committee members”.

References

Commonwealth of Australia (2014a), Making Performance Count: Enhancing the Accountability and Effectiveness of Australian Aid, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Canberra, www.dfat.gov.au/about-us/publications/Documents/framework-making-performance-count.pdf.

Commonwealth of Australia (2014b), Australian Aid: Promoting Prosperity, Reducing Poverty, Enhancing Stability, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Canberra, www.dfat.gov.au/about-us/publications/Documents/australian-aid-development-policy.pdf.

Austria

Financial flows from Austria to developing countries

Figure 21.1. Net resource flows to developing countries, 2003-13, Austria

Note: Data on private grants are not available for 2013.

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933243642

Austria uses ODA to mobilise other resources for sustainable development

Austria contributes to the mobilisation of domestic resources in developing countries by supporting their tax systems. In 2013, it is estimated that Austria committed USD 5.8 million of its official development assistance (ODA) to tax-related activities in partner countries.

It promotes aid for trade to improve developing countries’ trade performance and integration into the world economy. It committed USD 143 million to trade-related activities in 2013 (29% of its sector-allocable ODA), an 88% increase in real terms from 2012. The trend has been increasing over the past few years.

It invests in building up national statistical capacities and systems in partner countries so they can monitor their development goals. It committed USD 0.9 million to this effort in 2013.

It invests in climate change by focusing on mitigation, adaptation and REDD+, with a specific emphasis on capacity strengthening. Austria has pledged to provide at least USD 25 million to the Green Climate Fund, which plays a key role in channelling resources to developing countries and catalysing climate finance at the international and national levels.

Austria promotes the effective use of resources for sustainable development by:

Enabling developing country ownership through the way it delivers its aid. There is scope to make further progress. In 2013, just 21% of Austria’s aid scheduled for the government sector in partner countries was recorded on partners’ national budgets. The agreed minimum target for 2015 is at least 85%. In 2013, 28% of Austria’s development assistance to the government sector was channelled through partners’ public financial management and procurement systems, which is below the 2015 target of 57%.

Taking important steps to build results into programming. Austria has introduced results matrices for its bilateral country programmes and its funding for non-governmental organisations (NGOs). Efforts are also being made to build a results culture through training. The 2015 DAC Peer Review of Austria, however, found that Austria could have a more consistent and coherent approach to development results, and that more could be done to ensure results-informed programming decisions (OECD, 2015).

Making its aid predictable. In 2013, the annual predictability of Austrian development assistance was 94%. This is above the 2015 target of 90% of funding disbursed as scheduled. Medium-term predictability was slightly lower, at 73%.

Untying aid. There is scope to make progress. While Austria’s share of untied ODA (excluding administrative costs and in-donor refugee costs) has increased, from 37.3% in 2012 to 44.2% in 2013, it is still low compared to the 2013 DAC average of 83.2%.

Austria’s official development assistance

In 2014, Austria provided USD 1.1 billion in net ODA (preliminary data), which represented 0.26% of gross national income (GNI) and a 3.8% decrease in real terms from 2013. Austria is the 15th largest Development Assistance Committee (DAC) donor in terms of ODA as a percentage of GNI and the 18th donor in terms of volume. The Austrian government remains committed to achieving the target of 0.7% ODA/GNI. It intends to develop a legally binding roadmap to achieve this target. At the same time, the outlook for growth in the ODA budget is negative, with cuts planned for 2015. The grant element of total ODA was 100% in 2013.

Figure 21.2. Net ODA: Trends in volume and as a share of GNI, 1998-2014, Austria

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933243657

In 2013, 47% of Austria’s ODA was provided bilaterally. Austria allocated 53% of total ODA as core contributions to multilateral organisations. This is well above the DAC country average of 27% and reflects overall decreases in the aid budget. It channelled a further 16% of its bilateral ODA for specific projects implemented by multilateral organisations (multi-bi/non-core).

Figure 21.3. Share of ODA channelled to and through the multilateral system, two year averages, gross disbursements, Austria

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933243661

Only 17% of Austria’s bilateral ODA was programmed at partner country level in 2013. Austria’s share of country programmable aid (CPA) was low compared to the DAC country average (54.5%) in 2013. Project-type interventions accounted for 48% of CPA. ODA allocated to imputed student costs was particularly high in 2013 (19%).

Figure 21.4. Composition of bilateral ODA, 2013, gross disbursements, Austria

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933243679

In 2013, USD 53.7 million of bilateral ODA was channelled to and through civil society organisations (CSOs). Contributions to CSOs reflect the overall decline in Austrian ODA, with a significant decrease since 2008-09. Nevertheless, in 2013 ODA channelled to and through CSOs increased by 13% in volume compared to 2012. As a share of bilateral ODA it increased from 8% in 2012 to 10% in 2013. The DAC average was 16%.

Figure 21.5. Bilateral ODA to and through CSOs, two year averages, gross disbursements, Austria

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933243684

In 2013, bilateral ODA was primarily focused on Eastern Europe, South and Central Asia and sub-Saharan Africa, representing USD 120.8 million to Eastern Europe, USD 97.3 million to South and Central Asia (an increase of 316% in real terms from 2012) and USD 85 million to sub-Saharan Africa (a decrease of 49% in real terms from 2012).

Figure 21.6. Share of bilateral ODA by region, 2012-13 average, gross disbursements, Austria

Note: 27% of bilateral ODA allocated was unspecified by region in 2012-13. This share is not represented on the map.

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933243697

58% of bilateral country-allocable ODA went to Austria’s top 10 recipients. Four of Austria’s 11 priority partner countries are among its top 10 recipients. Côte d’Ivoire, its top recipient, received a high amount of debt relief in 2012. Austria’s support to fragile states reached USD 136.6 million in 2013 (24.9% of gross bilateral ODA).

Figure 21.7. Bilateral country-allocable ODA to top recipients, 2012-13 average, gross disbursements, Austria

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933243700

In 2013, 20% of Austria’s bilateral ODA was allocated to least developed countries (LDCs), amounting to USD 108.9 million. As a share of bilateral ODA, it has increased since 2012, when it was 11%. However, this is still well below the 2013 DAC average of 31%. Upper middle-income countries received the highest share of bilateral ODA in 2013 (23%).

At 0.08% of GNI in 2013, total ODA to LDCs was less than the UN target of 0.15% of GNI.

Figure 21.8. Bilateral ODA by income group, two year averages, gross disbursements, Austria

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933243717

In 2013, 46% of bilateral ODA was allocated to social infrastructure and services. A total of USD 306 million of bilateral ODA was allocated to social sectors, with a strong focus on support to education (USD 153 million), government and civil society (USD 55 million), and health (USD 50 million). Debt relief amounted to USD 42 million.

Figure 21.9. Share of bilateral ODA by sector, 2012-13 average, commitments, Austria

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933243721

USD 93 million of bilateral ODA supported gender equality in 2013. Support for gender equality is a priority cross-cutting issue for Austrian development co-operation. Mainstreaming gender equality into the programme is still work in progress. In 2013, 19% of bilateral sector-allocable aid had gender equality and women’s empowerment as a principal or significant objective. This is an increase over 2012, when it was 12%, but is lower than the share in 2008 (24%) and the DAC country average of 31% in 2013. A high share of Austria’s aid to population and reproductive health focuses on gender.

Figure 21.10. Share of bilateral ODA in support of gender equality by sector, 2013, commitments, Austria

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933243734

USD 121 million of bilateral ODA supported the environment. Tackling global environmental issues is a top priority for Austria, although mainstreaming the environment throughout the programme remains work in progress. In 2013, 18% of its bilateral aid focused on the environment and 13% focused particularly on climate change, compared with the respective DAC country averages of 23% and 16%.

Figure 21.11. Bilateral ODA in support of global and local environment objectives, two year averages, commitments, Austria

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933243746

Note to reader: Annex B provides “Methodological notes on definitions and measurement for the Profiles of Development Assistance Committee members”.

Reference

OECD (2015), OECD Development Co-operation Peer Reviews: Austria 2015, OECD Development Co-operation Peer Reviews, OECD Publishing, Paris, http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264227958-en.

Belgium

Financial flows from Belgium to developing countries

Figure 22.1. Net resource flows to developing countries, 2003-13, Belgium

Note: Data on private grants are not available for 2012.

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933243757

Belgium uses ODA to mobilise other resources for sustainable development

Belgium contributes to the mobilisation of domestic resources in developing countries by supporting their tax systems. In 2013, it is estimated that Belgium committed USD 181 000 of its official development assistance (ODA) to tax-related activities in partner countries.

It promotes aid for trade to improve developing countries’ trade performance and integration into the world economy. It committed USD 201 million to aid-related activities in 2013 (23% of its sector-allocable ODA), a 38% increase in real terms from 2012. The trend has been fluctuating over the past few years.

It invests in building up national statistical capacities and systems in partner countries so they can monitor their development goals. It committed USD 0.3 million to this effort in 2013.

It invests in climate change adaptation through climate-related financial, technological and capacity-building support. Belgium has pledged USD 69 million (EUR 51.6 million) to the Green Climate Fund, which plays a key role in channelling resources to developing countries and catalysing climate finance at the international and national levels.

Belgium promotes the effective use of resources for sustainable development by:

Enabling developing country ownership through the way it delivers its aid. There is scope to make further progress. In 2013, 42% of Belgium’s aid scheduled for the government sector in partner countries was recorded on partners’ national budgets. The agreed minimum target for 2015 is at least 85%. In 2013, 19% of Belgium’s development assistance to the government sector was channelled through partners’ public financial management and procurement systems, well below the 2015 target of 57%.

Taking important steps to build a system to manage for development results. The new results strategy sets out Belgium’s overarching vision for a coherent institutional approach to managing for and assessing results at the partner country level. Belgium’s development agency is also integrating results management into its project and programme cycle and building partners’ capacity.

Making its aid predictable. In 2013, the annual predictability of Belgian development assistance was 78% (the target for 2015 is to have 90% of funding disbursed as scheduled). Medium-term predictability was also 78%.

Untying aid. Belgium’s share of untied ODA (excluding administrative costs and in-donor refugee costs) was 98.1% in 2013 (up from 96.5% in 2012). The 2013 DAC average was 83.2%.

Belgium’s official development assistance

In 2014, Belgium delivered USD 2.4 billion in net ODA (preliminary data), which represented 0.45% of gross national income (GNI) and an increase of 3.3% in real terms from 2013. This represents a slight reversal of the downward trend in ODA, which decreased both in terms of volume and as a percentage of GNI from a peak of 0.64% in 2010. Belgium is the 9th largest Development Assistance Committee (DAC) donor in terms of ODA as a percentage of GNI and the 14th donor in terms of volume. The outlook for growth in Belgium’s ODA is negative. The government is committed to the target of 0.7% ODA/GNI, which is enshrined in law; however, the 2015 budget announced significant cuts until 2019. The grant element of total ODA was 99.8% in 2013.

Figure 22.2. Net ODA: Trends in volume and as a share of GNI, 1998-2014, Belgium

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933243765

In 2013, 58% of ODA was provided bilaterally. Belgium allocated 42% of total ODA as core contributions to multilateral organisations, compared with the DAC country average of 27%. It channelled a further 13% of its bilateral ODA for specific projects implemented by multilateral organisations (multi-bi/non-core).

Figure 22.3. Share of ODA channelled to and through the multilateral system, two year averages, gross disbursements, Belgium

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933243773

In 2013, 28% of bilateral ODA was programmed at partner country level. The share of country programmable aid (CPA) was low compared with the DAC country average (54.5%) in 2013. Project-type interventions accounted for 84% of CPA. A high share of bilateral ODA went to support non-governmental organisations (NGOs).

Figure 22.4. Composition of bilateral ODA, 2013, gross disbursements, Belgium

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933243789

In 2013, USD 322.2 million of bilateral ODA was channelled to and through civil society organisations (CSOs). This was equivalent to 24% of Belgium’s bilateral ODA, compared with the DAC average of 16%. Belgium’s aid channelled to and through CSOs increased between 2012 and 2013, both in terms of volume (+2.5%) and as a share of bilateral aid (from 20% to 24%).

Figure 22.5. Bilateral ODA to and through CSOs, two year averages, gross disbursements, Belgium

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933243797

Bilateral ODA in 2013 was primarily focused on sub-Saharan Africa, with USD 566.9 million allocated to this region. USD 295 million (or 39%) of Belgium’s aid to sub-Saharan Africa was allocated to the Great Lakes region, which is a priority for Belgian development co-operation.

Figure 22.6. Share of bilateral ODA by region, 2012-13 average, gross disbursements, Belgium

Note: 37% of bilateral ODA allocated was unspecified by region in 2012-13. This share is not represented on the map.

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933243807

63% of bilateral country-allocable ODA went to Belgium’s top 10 recipients. Nine of its 18 priority partner countries are among its top 10 recipients. The Democratic Republic of Congo, Burundi and Rwanda are among its top 5 recipients. Belgium’s support to fragile states reached USD 465.4 million in 2013, accounting for 34.1% of gross bilateral ODA.

Figure 22.7. Bilateral country-allocable ODA to top recipients, 2012-13 average, gross disbursements, Belgium

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933243811

In 2013, 37% of Belgium’s bilateral ODA was allocated to least developed countries (LDCs), amounting to USD 505.1 million. This is an increase from 30% in 2012, and higher than the 2013 DAC average of 31%. LDCs receive the highest share of bilateral ODA.

At 0.16% of GNI in 2013, Belgium’s total ODA to LDCs surpassed the UN target of 0.15% of GNI.

Figure 22.8. Bilateral ODA by income group, two year averages, gross disbursements, Belgium

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933243821

In 2013, 31% of bilateral ODA was allocated to social infrastructure and services, for a total of USD 443 million. There was a strong focus on health (USD 142 million), education (USD 114 million), and government and civil society (USD 102 million). Humanitarian aid amounted to USD 169 million.

Figure 22.9. Share of bilateral ODA by sector, 2012-13 average, commitments, Belgium

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933243839

USD 569 million of bilateral ODA supported gender equality. Gender equality is a cross-cutting theme in Belgian development co-operation, which in 2013 approved its second National Action Plan for Women, Peace and Security. This plan places strong emphasis on preventing and combating gender-based violence in conflict and post-conflict zones. In 2013, 71% of Belgium’s bilateral sector-allocable aid had gender equality and women’s empowerment as a principal or significant objective, compared with the DAC country average of 31%. This is an increase from 63% in 2012 and 57% in 2008. A high share of Belgium’s aid to population and reproductive health, productive sectors, and water and sanitation focuses on gender.

Figure 22.10. Share of bilateral ODA in support of gender equality by sector, 2013, commitments, Belgium

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933243845

USD 484 million of bilateral ODA supported the environment. The environment and climate change are cross-cutting themes for Belgium, which is also reinforcing its strategy and resources for making progress. The share of environment-focused bilateral ODA has been increasing since 2007. In 2013, 34% of its bilateral aid supported the environment, and 18% focused particularly on climate change, compared with the respective DAC country averages of 23% and 16%.

Figure 22.11. Bilateral ODA in support of global and local environment objectives, two year averages, commitments, Belgium

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933243851

Note to reader: Annex B provides “Methodological notes on definitions and measurement for the Profiles of Development Assistance Committee members”.

Canada

Financial flows from Canada to developing countries

Figure 23.1. Net resource flows to developing countries, 2003-13, Canada

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933243862

Canada uses ODA to mobilise other resources for sustainable development

Canada contributes to the mobilisation of domestic resources in developing countries by supporting their tax systems. In 2013, it is estimated that Canada committed USD 42 million of its official development assistance (ODA) to tax-related activities in partner countries.

It promotes aid for trade to improve developing countries’ trade performance and integration into the world economy. It committed USD 760 million to trade-related activities in 2013 (34% of its sector-allocable ODA), a 31% increase in real terms from 2012. The trend has been increasing over the past few years.

It invests in building up national statistical capacities and systems in partner countries so they can monitor their development goals. It committed USD 4.7 million to this effort in 2013.

Its support for environmental sustainability focuses on reducing greenhouse gas emissions, protecting carbon-absorbing vegetation and adapting to climate change. Canada has pledged USD 277 million (CAD 300 million) to the Green Climate Fund, which plays a key role in channelling resources to developing countries and catalysing climate finance at the international and national levels.

Canada promotes the effective use of resources for sustainable development by:

Enabling developing country ownership through the way it delivers its aid. There is scope to make further progress. In 2013, 63% of Canada’s aid scheduled for the government sector in partner countries was recorded on partners’ national budgets. The agreed minimum target for 2015 is at least 85%. In 2013, 63% of Canada’s development assistance to the government sector was channelled through partners’ public financial management and procurement systems, above the 2015 target of 57%.

Placing a strong emphasis on results through a comprehensive performance management system. Canada has developed a policy, frameworks and guidelines to mainstream the focus on results, and efforts are being made to develop a consistent approach to measuring and attributing results in country strategies as well as at the corporate level.

Making its aid predictable. In 2013, the annual predictability of Canadian development assistance was 76% (the target for 2015 is to have 90% of funding disbursed as scheduled). Medium-term predictability was lower, at 65%.

Untying aid. Canada’s share of untied ODA (excluding administrative costs and in-donor refugee costs) was 92.9% in 2013 (up from 91.6% in 2012), which is well above the DAC average of 83.2%.

Canada’s official development assistance

In 2014, Canada provided USD 4.2 billion in net ODA (preliminary data). This represented 0.24% of gross national income (GNI) and a fall of 10.7% in real terms from 2013, partially due to national budget saving measures. Canada’s ODA has fallen since 2012, both in volume and as a percentage of GNI. Canada is the 16th largest Development Assistance Committee (DAC) donor in terms of ODA as a percentage of GNI and the 10th largest donor in terms of volume. The grant element of total ODA was 100% in 2013.

Figure 23.2. Net ODA: Trends in volume and as a share of GNI, 1998-2014, Canada

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933243872

In 2013, 71% of ODA was provided bilaterally. In 2013, Canada allocated 29% of total ODA as core contributions to multilateral organisations, which was higher than the DAC country average of 27%. It channelled a further 38% of its bilateral ODA for specific projects implemented by multilateral organisations (multi-bi/non-core).

Figure 23.3. Share of ODA channelled to and through the multilateral system, two year averages, gross disbursements, Canada

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933243888

31% of bilateral ODA was programmed at partner country level in 2013. Canada’s share of country programmable aid (CPA) was lower than the DAC country average (54.5%) in 2013. Contributions to pooled programmes and funds accounted for 49% of CPA. A high share of Canada’s bilateral ODA was categorised as “other and unallocated”.

Figure 23.4. Composition of bilateral ODA, 2013, gross disbursements, Canada

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933243891

In 2013, USD 837.4 million of bilateral ODA was channelled to and through civil society organisations (CSOs). Aid channelled to and through CSOs increased between 2012 and 2013, both in terms of volume (+11%) and as a share of bilateral ODA (from 19% to 24%). This share was higher than the DAC country average of 16%.

Figure 23.5. Bilateral ODA to and through CSOs, two year averages, gross disbursements, Canada

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933243900

In 2013, bilateral ODA primarily focused on sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean. USD 1.4 billion of bilateral ODA was allocated to sub-Saharan Africa, USD 430.7 million to Latin America and the Caribbean and USD 316.7 million to South and Central Asia.

Figure 23.6. Share of bilateral ODA by region, 2012-13 average, gross disbursements, Canada

Note: 16% of bilateral ODA allocated was unspecified by region in 2012-13. This share is not represented on the map.

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933243918

48% of bilateral country-allocable ODA went to Canada’s top 10 recipients. Canada has 25 “countries of focus”, 9 of which are among the top 10 recipients. Its support to fragile states reached USD 1.1 billion (31% of gross bilateral ODA) in 2013.

Figure 23.7. Bilateral country-allocable ODA to top recipients, 2012-13 average, gross disbursements, Canada

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933243929

In 2013, 34% of bilateral ODA was allocated to least developed countries (LDCs), amounting to USD 1.2 billion. The share has increased from 31% in 2012, and is higher than the 2013 DAC average of 31%. LDCs receive the highest share of bilateral ODA, noting that 42% was unallocated by income.

At 0.10% of GNI in 2013, total ODA to LDCs was lower than the UN target of 0.15% of GNI.

Figure 23.8. Bilateral ODA by income group, two year averages, gross disbursements, Canada

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933243936

In 2013, 36% of bilateral ODA was allocated to social infrastructure and services, amounting to USD 1.2 billion. There was a strong focus on support to health (USD 484 million). Humanitarian aid amounted to USD 606 million.

Figure 23.9. Share of bilateral ODA by sector, 2012-13 average, commitments, Canada

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933243946

USD 1.4 billion of bilateral ODA supported gender equality. Canada has made a long-term effort to mainstream gender equality across its programmes and to bring gender equality into its policy dialogue with partners (OECD, 2013). In 2013, 64% of its bilateral sector-allocable aid had gender equality and women’s empowerment as a principal or significant objective, compared with the DAC country average of 31%. This was an important increase over the 39% share in 2008. A high share of Canada’s aid to population and reproductive health, other social infrastructures and education focuses on gender.

Figure 23.10. Share of bilateral ODA in support of gender equality by sector, 2013, commitments, Canada

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933243954

USD 1.2 billion of bilateral ODA supported the environment in 2013. Environmental sustainability is a cross-cutting priority for Canada. The share of environment-focused bilateral ODA has been increasing since 2007. In 2013, 37% of Canadian aid supported the environment and 7% focused particularly on climate change, compared with the respective DAC country averages of 23% and 16%.

Figure 23.11. Bilateral ODA in support of global and local environment objectives, two year averages, commitments, Canada

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933243964

Note to reader: Annex B provides “Methodological notes on definitions and measurement for the Profiles of Development Assistance Committee members”.

Reference

OECD (2013), OECD Development Assistance Peer Reviews: Canada 2012, OECD Publishing, Paris, http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264200784-en.

Czech Republic

Financial flows from the Czech Republic to developing countries

In 2014, the Czech Republic provided USD 209 million in net ODA (preliminary data). This represented 0.11% of gross national income (GNI) and an increase of 2.5% in real terms from 2013. The Czech Republic is committed to maintaining a gradual increase in its official development assistance (ODA) as a percentage of GNI. It is the 25th largest Development Assistance Committee (DAC) donor in terms of ODA as a percentage of GNI and in terms of volume. The grant element of total ODA was 100% in 2013. At present, data on other official flows, private grants (funds raised by non-governmental organisations and foundations) and private flows at market terms from the Czech Republic to developing countries are not available.

Figure 24.1. Net ODA: Trends in volume and as a share of GNI, 1998-2014, Czech Republic

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933243978

The Czech Republic uses ODA to mobilise other resources for sustainable development

The Czech Republic contributes to the mobilisation of domestic resources in developing countries by supporting their tax systems. In 2013, the Czech Republic continued its programme of technical assistance in the field of public financial management and tax and customs. The programme, implemented through study visits from the ministries of finance of its partner countries to the Czech Ministry of Finance, is focused on professional staff (including high-ranking officials).

It promotes aid for trade to improve developing countries’ trade performance and integration into the world economy. It committed USD 9 million (25% of its sector-allocable ODA) to trade-related activities in 2013, a 9% decrease in real terms from 2012. The trend has been decreasing over the past few years.

It invests in building up national statistical capacities and systems in partner countries so they can monitor their development goals. It committed USD 0.07 million to this effort in 2013.

It integrates the environment and climate change into all its development co-operation activities. The Czech Republic has pledged USD 5.3 million (CZK 110 million) to the Green Climate Fund, which plays a key role in channelling resources to developing countries and catalysing climate finance at the international and national levels.

The Czech Republic promotes the effective use of resources for sustainable development by:

Implementing actively the principles of the Busan Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation. It is, for example, supporting the European Union’s joint programming initiative in Ethiopia which aims to simplify the overall development architecture and decrease transaction costs.

Assessing development results by monitoring and evaluating its interventions.

Untying its aid. There is scope to make further progress in this area. Its share of untied ODA (excluding administrative costs and in-donor refugee costs) decreased from 45.1% in 2012 to 40.1% in 2013 and is far below the DAC average of 83.2%.

The Czech Republic’s official development assistance

In 2013, 27% of ODA was provided bilaterally, totalling USD 57 million. The Czech Republic allocated 73% of total ODA as core contributions to multilateral organisations (USD 152 million), compared with the DAC country average of 27%. It channelled a further 7% of its bilateral ODA (USD 4 million) to specific projects implemented by multilateral organisations (multilateral non-core contributions). While most of its multilateral ODA is channelled through the EU, some is provided through the UN and other multilateral organisations.

Figure 24.2. Share of ODA channelled to and through the multilateral system, two year averages, gross disbursements, Czech Republic

Note: Data on multi-bi/non-core ODA are not available prior to 2011.

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933243982

62% of bilateral ODA was programmed at partner country level in 2013. The Czech Republic’s share of country programmable aid (CPA) was well above the DAC country average of 54.5% in 2013. Project-type interventions made up 61% of CPA. In-donor refugee costs accounted for 16% of bilateral ODA.

Figure 24.3. Composition of bilateral ODA, 2013, gross disbursements, Czech Republic

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933243998

In 2013, USD 16 million of bilateral ODA was channelled to and through civil society organisations (CSOs). Between 2012 and 2013, the Czech Republic’s ODA channelled to and through CSOs increased both in terms of volume (+8.7%) and as a share of bilateral aid, from 22% to 29%. This share was higher than the 2013 DAC country average of 16%.

Figure 24.4. Bilateral ODA to and through CSOs, two year averages, gross disbursements, Czech Republic

Note: Data on ODA channelled through CSOs are not available prior to 2011, which explains the important change between 2008-09 and 2010-11.

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933244005

Bilateral ODA is primarily focused on Eastern Europe and South and Central Asia. In 2013, USD 18.2 million of bilateral ODA was allocated to Eastern Europe, and USD 9.9 million to South and Central Asia.

Figure 24.5. Share of bilateral ODA by region, 2012-13 average, gross disbursements, Czech Republic

Notes: 12% of bilateral ODA allocated was unspecified by region in 2012-13. This share is not represented on the map. Data are not available prior to 2011.

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933244016

66% of bilateral country-allocable ODA went to the Czech Republic’s top 10 recipients. Eight of its priority countries are among its top 10 recipients. Its support to fragile states reached USD 18.9 million in 2013 (33.1% of gross bilateral ODA).

Figure 24.6. Bilateral country-allocable ODA to top recipients, 2012-13 average, gross disbursements, Czech Republic

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933244022

In 2013, 21% of bilateral ODA was allocated to least developed countries (LDCs), amounting to USD 12.1 million. The share of ODA to LDCs decreased between 2012 and 2013 and is lower than the 2013 DAC average of 31%. Lower middle-income countries received the highest share of bilateral ODA in 2013 (40%).

At 0.03% of GNI in 2013, total ODA to LDCs was far below the UN target of 0.15% of GNI.

Figure 24.7. Bilateral ODA by income group, two year averages, gross disbursements, Czech Republic

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933244035

46% of bilateral ODA was allocated to social infrastructure and services in 2013, amounting to USD 26 million, with a strong focus on support to education (USD 9 million) and government and civil society (USD 8 million). In 2010, the Czech Republic identified five priority areas for its development co-operation: environment, agriculture, social development, economic development and the support of democracy, human rights and social transition (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2010).

Figure 24.8. Share of bilateral ODA by sector, 2012-13 average, commitments, Czech Republic

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933244040

USD 9 million of bilateral ODA supported gender equality. Gender equality is one of the cross-cutting issues in the Czech Republic’s development co-operation. In 2013, 30% of Czech bilateral sector-allocable aid had gender equality and women’s empowerment as a principal or significant objective, compared with the DAC country average of 31%. A high share of Czech aid to population and reproductive health, other social infrastructure and health focuses on gender.

Figure 24.9. Share of bilateral ODA in support of gender equality by sector, 2013, commitments, Czech Republic

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933244054

USD 9 million of bilateral ODA supported the environment. Protection of the environment and the fight against climate change are priority cross-cutting issues for the Czech Republic and are reflected in all of its development activities. In 2013, 15% of Czech bilateral aid supported the environment, and 10% focused particularly on climate change, compared with the respective DAC country averages of 23% and 16%.

Figure 24.10. Bilateral ODA in support of global and local environment objectives, 2012-13 average, commitments, Czech Republic

Note: Data are not available prior to 2011.

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933244069

Note to reader: Annex B provides “Methodological notes on definitions and measurement for the Profiles of Development Assistance Committee members”.

Reference

Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2010), The Development Cooperation Strategy of the Czech Republic 2010-2017, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Prague, www.mzv.cz/file/762314/FINAL__Development_Cooperation_Strategy_2010_2017.pdf.

Denmark

Financial flows from Denmark to developing countries

Figure 25.1. Net resource flows to developing countries, 2003-13, Denmark

Note: Data on private grants are not available for 2003.

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933244073

Denmark uses ODA to mobilise other resources for sustainable development

Denmark contributes to the mobilisation of domestic resources in developing countries by supporting their tax systems. In 2013, it is estimated that Denmark committed USD 1.7 million of its official development assistance (ODA) to tax-related activities in partner countries.

It promotes aid for trade to improve developing countries’ trade performance and integration into the world economy. It committed USD 423 million to trade-related activities in 2013 (31% of its sector-allocable ODA), a 5% increase in real terms from 2012. The trend has been increasing over the past few years.

It prioritises green growth, which encompasses climate change and energy. Denmark invests in integrating climate change concerns into national and local development strategies and civil society organisations to push the climate agenda. Denmark has pledged USD 72 million (DKK 400 million) to the Green Climate Fund, which plays a key role in channelling resources to developing countries and catalysing climate finance at the international and national levels.

Denmark promotes the effective use of resources for sustainable development by:

Enabling developing country ownership through the way it delivers its aid. At 84% in 2013, Denmark had almost achieved the agreed minimum target of recording 85% of aid scheduled for the government sector on partners’ national budgets. In 2013, 76% of Denmark’s development assistance to the government sector was channelled through partners’ public financial management and procurement systems, well above the 2015 target of 57%.

Strengthening its commitments to development results. New guidelines for country programmes set standards for a result-oriented focus, support alignment with partner country results frameworks and require a predefined results framework that includes key indicators. The results framework is the basis for assessing the results achieved by Danish development co-operation. Results are also rated at corporate level against a list of objectives for bilateral assistance.

Making its aid predictable. In 2013, the annual predictability of Danish development assistance was 77% (the target for 2015 is to have 90% of funding disbursed as scheduled). Medium-term predictability was 72%.

Untying aid. Denmark’s share of untied ODA (excluding administrative costs and in-donor refugee costs) was 96.7% in 2013 (up from 96.3% in 2012), compared to the DAC average of 83.2%.

Denmark’s official development assistance

In 2014, Denmark provided USD 3 billion in net ODA (preliminary data), which represented 0.85% of gross national income (GNI), and a 1.6% increase in real terms from 2013. After a slight decrease between 2010 and 2012, Denmark’s ODA/GNI share increased from 0.83% in 2012 to 0.85% in 2014. It is the 4th largest Development Assistance Committee (DAC) donor in terms of ODA as a percentage of GNI and the 13th donor in terms of volume. Denmark is one of five DAC members to exceed the UN target of 0.7% ODA/GNI and the government is committed to increasing ODA over the coming years so that it returns to 1% of GNI. The grant element of total ODA was 100% in 2013.

Figure 25.2. Net ODA: Trends in volume and as a share of GNI, 1998-2014, Denmark

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933244087

In 2013, 75% of ODA was provided bilaterally. Denmark allocated 25% of total ODA as core contributions to multilateral organisations, compared to the DAC country average of 27%. It also channelled 20% of its bilateral ODA for specific projects implemented by multilateral organisations (multi-bi/non-core).

Figure 25.3. Share of ODA channelled to and through the multilateral system, two year averages, gross disbursements, Denmark

Note: The shift in multilateral contributions from core to multi-bi/non-core from 2008-09 to 2010-11 is primarily due to increased precision in the data after implementing CRS++, and not an indication of decreased multilateral core contributions as such.

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933244096

In 2013, 45% of bilateral ODA was programmed at partner country level. Denmark’s share of country programmable aid (CPA) was lower than the DAC country average (54.5%). Project-type interventions made up 84% of CPA.

Figure 25.4. Composition of bilateral ODA, 2013, gross disbursements, Denmark

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933244104

In 2013, USD 492.3 million of bilateral ODA was channelled to and through civil society organisations (CSOs). Denmark channelled 21% of its bilateral ODA to and through CSOs in 2013, compared with the DAC country average of 16%. In recent years, aid to and through CSOs has decreased both in volume (-1.9% between 2012 and 2013) and as a share of bilateral ODA (it was 23% in 2012).

Figure 25.5. Bilateral ODA to and through CSOs, two year averages, gross disbursements, Denmark

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933244113

Bilateral ODA is primarily focused on sub-Saharan Africa and South and Central Asia. In 2013, Denmark allocated USD 681.5 million to sub-Saharan Africa and USD 228.6 million to South and Central Asia.

Figure 25.6. Share of bilateral ODA by region, 2012-13 average, gross disbursements, Denmark

Note: 42% of bilateral ODA allocated was unspecified by region in 2012-13. This share is not represented on the map.

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933244121

56% of bilateral country-allocable ODA went to Denmark’s top 10 recipients, which reflects good aid concentration. All of the top 10 recipients of Danish aid were priority countries – Denmark has a total of 21 priority countries. Its support to fragile states reached USD 615.4 million in 2013 (26.6% of gross bilateral ODA).

Figure 25.7. Bilateral country-allocable ODA to top recipients, 2012-13 average, gross disbursements, Denmark

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933244130

In 2013, 30% of bilateral ODA was allocated to least developed countries (LDCs), amounting to USD 704.4 million. This is a decrease from 2012 (37%) and is lower than the 2013 DAC average of 31%. However, LDCs still received the highest share of bilateral ODA in 2013, noting that 51% was unallocated by income group.

At 0.27% of GNI, total ODA to LDCs was well above the UN target of 0.15% of GNI.

Figure 25.8. Bilateral ODA by income group, two year averages, gross disbursements, Denmark

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933244143

36% of bilateral ODA was allocated to social infrastructure and services in 2013, reaching USD 732 million. There was a strong focus on support to government and civil society (USD 452 million) and education (USD 111 million). USD 261 million was allocated to economic infrastructure and services (mainly to business and other services) and USD 190 million to humanitarian aid.

Figure 25.9. Share of bilateral ODA by sector, 2012-13 average, commitments, Denmark

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933244155

USD 637 million of bilateral ODA supported gender equality. Advancing gender equality and women’s rights is a major strategic priority for Denmark. In 2013, 47% of Danish bilateral sector-allocable aid had gender equality and women’s empowerment as a principal or significant objective, compared with the DAC country average of 31%. This is down from previous years, however (55% in 2012 and 61% in 2008). A high share of Denmark’s aid to water, sanitation and health focuses on gender.

Figure 25.10. Share of bilateral ODA in support of gender equality by sector, 2013, commitments, Denmark

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933244167

USD 648 million of bilateral ODA supported the environment in 2013. Promoting green growth based on the sustainable management and use of natural resources is one of four overall goals for Danish development co-operation. In 2013, 32% of Danish bilateral aid supported the environment and 19% focused particularly on climate change, compared with the respective DAC country averages of 23% and 16%.

Figure 25.11. Bilateral ODA in support of global and local environment objectives, two year averages, commitments, Denmark

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933244171

Note to reader: Annex B provides “Methodological notes on definitions and measurement for the Profiles of Development Assistance Committee members”.

European Union institutions

Financial flows from the European Union institutions to developing countries

Figure 26.1. Net resource flows to developing countries, 2003-13, EU institutions

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933244187

The European Union institutions use ODA to mobilise other resources for sustainable development

The EU institutions contribute to the mobilisation of domestic resources in developing countries by supporting their tax systems. In 2013, it is estimated that they committed USD 6.6 million of their official development assistance (ODA) to tax-related activities in partner countries.

They promote aid for trade to improve developing countries’ trade performance and integration into the world economy. They committed USD 10.1 billion to trade-related activities in 2013 (49% of their sector-allocable ODA), a 14% decrease in real terms from 2012. The trend has been fluctuating over the past few years.

They invest in building up national statistical capacities and systems in partner countries so they can monitor their development goals. They committed USD 26.2 million to this effort in 2013.

They have set a target for 20% of their development co-operation activities to have a climate focus by 2020. Their climate mitigation and adaptation activities support least developed countries (LDCs) and small island developing states (SIDS) to move towards a low emissions development path. EU institutions have pledged USD 100 million to the Green Climate Fund, which plays a key role in channelling resources to developing countries and catalysing climate finance at the international and national levels.

The European Union institutions promote the effective use of resources for sustainable development by:

Enabling developing country ownership through the way they deliver their aid. There is scope to make further progress. In 2013, 63% of the European Union’s aid scheduled for government-to-government co-operation in partner countries was recorded on partners’ national budgets – while the agreed minimum target for 2015 is at least 85%; and 41% was channelled through partners’ public financial management and procurement systems, still below the 2015 target of 57%.

Taking important steps to strengthen their ability to monitor and report operational results through their new corporate results framework. This framework, which aims to be operational as of 2015, will attempt to measure the EU’s contribution towards global development progress and – more concretely – to a set of development outcomes and outputs supported by the EU institutions over the next years. The Commission is also promoting an internal performance-driven culture including the ex ante setting of objectives, regular monitoring, ex post measurement and reporting of achievements.

Making their aid predictable. In 2013, the annual predictability of the EU institutions’ development assistance was 82% (the target for 2015 is to have 90% of funding disbursed as scheduled). Medium-term predictability was lower, at 69%.

Untying their aid. EU institutions’ share of untied ODA (excluding administrative costs and in-donor refugee costs) was 67% in 2013 (up from 66% in 2012), compared to the DAC average of 83.2%.

The European Union institutions’ official development assistance

In 2014, the EU institutions provided USD 16 billion in net ODA (preliminary data), a stable amount compared to 2013. The level of ODA managed by the EU institutions is determined within the EU multi-year financial framework. ODA grew steadily between 2003 and 2012, when it peaked at USD 17.5 billion. This trend was, however, reversed in 2013.

Figure 26.2. Net ODA: Trends in volume, 1998-2014, EU institutions

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933244190

In 2013, 99% of ODA was provided bilaterally. In 2013, the EU institutions allocated 1% of total ODA as core contributions to multilateral organisations. They channelled a further 45% of their bilateral ODA for projects implemented by multilateral organisations (multi-bi/non-core).

The EU institutions are unique among DAC members because of the dual role they play in development assistance. In contrast to multilateral organisations that exclusively receive transfers from members, the EU institutions are donors in their own right with their own resources and budgetary authority.

Figure 26.3. Share of ODA channelled to and through the multilateral system, two year averages, gross disbursements, EU institutions

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933244202

In 2013, 51% of the EU institutions’ bilateral ODA was programmed at partner country level. Project-type interventions accounted for 57% of CPA. A high share (33%) of bilateral ODA was categorised as “other and unallocated”.

Figure 26.4. Composition of bilateral ODA, 2013, gross disbursements, EU institutions

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933244210

In 2013, USD 2 billion of bilateral ODA was channelled to and through civil society organisations (CSOs), corresponding to 12% of bilateral ODA. Aid to and through CSOs increased both in terms of volume (a 5.1% increase between 2012 and 2013) and as a share of bilateral aid (it was 10% in 2012).

Figure 26.5. Bilateral ODA to and through CSOs, two year averages, gross disbursements, EU institutions

Note: Data on ODA to CSOs are not available for 2008 to 2011.

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933244224

Bilateral ODA primarily focused on Eastern Europe and sub-Saharan Africa. In 2013, USD 5.5 billion was allocated to Eastern Europe and USD 4.7 billion to sub-Saharan Africa.

Figure 26.6. Share of bilateral ODA by region, 2012-13 average, gross disbursements, EU institutions

Note: 8% of bilateral ODA allocated was unspecified by region in 2012-13. This share is not represented on the map.

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933244235

47% of bilateral country-allocable ODA went to the top 10 recipients. The European Union has specific agreements and instruments with 79 African, Caribbean and Pacific countries and 9 European accession countries. In 2013, its support to fragile states reached USD 5.3 billion (30.9% of gross bilateral ODA).

Figure 26.7. Bilateral country-allocable ODA to top recipients, 2012-13 average, gross disbursements, EU institutions

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933244241

23% of bilateral ODA was allocated to least developed countries (LDCs), which amounted to USD 3.9 billion in 2013. The share has fallen since 2010 (35%). ODA allocated to upper middle-income countries has strongly increased in recent years, in terms of volume (USD 6.3 billion in 2013) and as a share of bilateral ODA (36% in 2013). This is partly due to the instrument for pre-accession with nine European countries.

Figure 26.8. Bilateral ODA by income group, two year averages, gross disbursements, EU institutions

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933244258

In 2013, two-thirds of bilateral ODA was allocated to social and economic infrastructure and services. USD 3.8 billion of bilateral ODA was allocated to government and civil society, USD 3.2 billion to transport and storage, and USD 2.4 billion to energy generation and supply. USD 2.1 billion was allocated to humanitarian aid.

Figure 26.9. Share of bilateral ODA by sector, 2012-13 average, commitments, EU institutions

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933244261

USD 5.3 billion of bilateral ODA supported gender equality. The EU is strongly committed to promoting gender equality. It has adopted a three-pronged approach with political dialogue as a key dimension, along with mainstreaming and focused programmes (OECD, 2013). In 2013, 39% of its bilateral sector-allocable aid had gender equality and women’s empowerment as a principal or significant objective, compared to 28% in 2012 and 22% in 2008. A high share of the EU’s aid to health and population and reproductive health focuses on gender.

Figure 26.10. Share of bilateral ODA in support of gender equality by sector, 2013, commitments, EU institutions

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933244272

USD 4.3 billion of bilateral ODA supported the environment in 2013. The European Commission has made an important effort to promote international consensus for reducing emissions and for helping developing countries adapt to climate change. It is also committed to mainstreaming environmental issues into its development co-operation, and has developed guidelines and tools (in particular strategic environmental assessments) to do so. Developing a strategy for mainstreaming environment and climate change issues into development co-operation would help to maintain progress in mainstreaming the environment into the programme. In 2013, 17% of the EU’s bilateral aid supported the environment and 11% focused particularly on climate change.

Figure 26.11. Bilateral ODA in support of global and local environment objectives, two year averages, commitments, EU institutions

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933244280

Note to reader: Annex B provides “Methodological notes on definitions and measurement for the Profiles of Development Assistance Committee members”.

Reference

OECD (2013), OECD Development Assistance Peer Reviews: European Union 2012, OECD Publishing, Paris, http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264196124-en.

Finland

Financial flows from Finland to developing countries

Figure 27.1. Net resource flows to developing countries, 2003-13, Finland

Note: Data on other official flows are not available for 2005 and 2006.

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933244291

Finland uses ODA to mobilise other resources for sustainable development

It promotes aid for trade to improve developing countries’ trade performance and integration into the world economy. It committed USD 144 million to trade-related activities in 2013 (30% of its sector-allocable official development assistance [ODA]), an increase of 8% in real terms from 2012. The trend has been fluctuating over the past few years.

It invests in low-carbon development, improving the capacity of partner countries to adapt to climate change, and integrating mitigation and adaptation goals into partner countries’ development planning. Finland has pledged USD 107 million (EUR 80 million) to the Green Climate Fund, which plays a key role in channelling resources to developing countries and catalysing climate finance at the international and national levels.

Finland promotes the effective use of resources for sustainable development by:

Enabling developing country ownership through the way it delivers its aid. In 2013, 82% of Finland’s aid scheduled for the government sector in partner countries was recorded on partners’ national budgets. This is close to the agreed minimum target of at least 85% for 2015. In 2013, 70% of Finland’s development assistance to the government sector was channelled through partners’ public financial management and procurement systems, well above the 2015 target of 57%.

Taking pragmatic steps to strengthen its results-based management approach. Finland has clarified the objectives and intended results of its development programme in key areas; all country strategies prepared from 2013 contain results frameworks and targets for monitoring performance.

Making its aid predictable. In 2013, the annual predictability of Finnish development assistance was 88%, close to the target for 2015 of 90% of funding disbursed as scheduled. Medium-term predictability was lower, at 65%.

Untying aid. Its share of untied ODA (excluding administrative costs and in-donor refugee costs) has decreased, from 95.9% in 2012 to 90.5% in 2013, but still remains above the DAC average of 83.2%.

Finland’s official development assistance

In 2014, Finland provided USD 1.6 billion in net ODA (preliminary data), which represented 0.60% of gross national income (GNI) and a 12.5% increase in real terms from 2013, reflecting an increase in bilateral aid and contributions to multilateral organisations. Finland is the 7th largest Development Assistance Committee (DAC) donor in terms of ODA as a percentage of GNI, and the 17th donor in terms of volume. Finland’s ODA has increased considerably since 2007, both in terms of volume and as a share of ODA/GNI. Despite this success, Finland is aware that it will be a challenge to meet its commitment of 0.7% ODA/GNI by 2015. The grant element of total ODA was 100% in 2013.

Figure 27.2. Net ODA: Trends in volume and as a share of GNI, 1998-2014, Finland

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933244305

In 2013, 57% of ODA was provided bilaterally. Finland allocated 43% of total ODA as core contributions to multilateral organisations, above the DAC country average of 27%. It channelled a further 29% of its bilateral ODA for specific projects implemented by multilateral organisations (multi-bi/non-core).

Figure 27.3. Share of ODA channelled to and through the multilateral system, two year averages, gross disbursements, Finland

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933244311

52% of bilateral ODA provided by Finland was programmed at partner country level. Finland’s share of country programmable aid (CPA) was close to the DAC country average (54.5%) in 2013. Project-type interventions accounted for 69% of CPA.

Figure 27.4. Composition of bilateral ODA, 2013, gross disbursements, Finland

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933244323

In 2013, USD 203.3 million of bilateral ODA was channelled to and through civil society organisations (CSOs). ODA channelled to and through CSOs increased between 2012 and 2013, both in terms of volume (+11.7%) and as a share of bilateral aid (from 22% in 2012 to 25% in 2013). The share provided in 2013 is higher than the DAC average of 16%.

Figure 27.5. Bilateral ODA to and through CSOs, two year averages, gross disbursements, Finland

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933244335

Bilateral ODA is primarily focused on sub-Saharan Africa and South and Central Asia. In 2013, USD 288 million was allocated to sub-Saharan Africa and USD 90.1 million to South and Central Asia.

Figure 27.6. Share of bilateral ODA by region, 2012-13 average, gross disbursements, Finland

Note: 34% of bilateral ODA allocated was unspecified by region in 2012-13. This share is not represented on the map.

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933244343

59% of bilateral country-allocable ODA went to Finland’s top 10 recipients. All of its top 10 recipients are long-term priority partner countries. In 2013, its support to fragile states reached USD 239.4 million (29.1% of gross bilateral ODA).

Figure 27.7. Bilateral country-allocable ODA to top recipients, 2012-13 average, gross disbursements, Finland

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933244355

35% of bilateral ODA was allocated to least developed countries (LDCs), amounting to USD 291.3 million in 2013. The share has been increasing slightly in recent years, and is higher than the 2013 DAC average of 31%. LDCs received the highest share of bilateral ODA compared with other income groups in 2013, noting that 44% was unallocated by income group.

At 0.19% of GNI in 2013, total ODA to LDCs was above the UN target of 0.15% of GNI.

Figure 27.8. Bilateral ODA by income group, two year averages, gross disbursements, Finland

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933244363

In 2013, over one-third of bilateral ODA was allocated to social infrastructure and services, amounting to USD 296 million, with a strong focus on support to government and civil society (USD 134 million) and education (USD 68 million). USD 149 million was allocated to humanitarian aid.

Figure 27.9. Share of bilateral ODA by sector, 2012-13 average, commitments, Finland

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933244373

USD 249 million of bilateral ODA supported gender equality. Finland is committed to integrating gender equality into its projects and programmes. In 2013, 52% of its bilateral sector-allocable aid had gender equality and women’s empowerment as a principal or significant objective, compared with the DAC country average of 31%. This was an increase from 47% in 2012 and 43% in 2008. A high share of Finland’s aid to population, reproductive health and education focuses on gender.

Figure 27.10. Share of bilateral ODA in support of gender equality by sector, 2013, commitments, Finland

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933244380

USD 162 million of bilateral ODA supported the environment in 2013. Finland is committed to mainstreaming the environment into its programming, but challenges remain in ensuring it is done systematically. In recent years, there has been a decrease in the share of bilateral aid supporting the environment. In 2013, 19% of its bilateral aid focused on the environment, and 13% focused on climate change, compared with respective DAC country averages of 23% and 16%.

Figure 27.11. Bilateral ODA in support of global and local environment objectives, two year averages, commitments, Finland

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933244399

Note to reader: Annex B provides “Methodological notes on definitions and measurement for the Profiles of Development Assistance Committee members”.

France

Financial flows from France to developing countries

Figure 28.1. Net resource flows to developing countries, 2003-13, France

Note: Data on private grants are not available.

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933244403

France uses ODA to mobilise other resources for sustainable development

France promotes aid for trade to improve developing countries’ trade performance and integration into the world economy. France committed USD 2.4 billion to trade-related activities in 2013 (37% of its sector-allocable official development assistance [ODA]), a 35% decrease in real terms from 2012. This follows a very important increase between 2011 and 2012.

It has set targets for 50% of the Agence Française de Développement (AFD)’s budget and 30% of Proparco’s allocations to tackle climate change by 2016. The carbon footprint of each project is measured, and projects are selected according to their climate impacts. France has pledged USD 1 billion (EUR 774 million) to the Green Climate Fund, which plays a key role in channelling resources to developing countries and catalysing climate finance at the international and national levels.

France promotes the effective use of resources for sustainable development by:

Enabling developing country ownership through the way it delivers its aid. There is scope to make further progress. In 2013, 67% of France’s aid scheduled for government-to-government co-operation was recorded on partners’ national budgets – while the agreed minimum target for 2015 is at least 85%; and 78% was channelled through partners’ public financial management and procurement systems, well above the 2015 target of 57%.

Pursuing its efforts to manage the co-operation programme in accordance with a results-based management approach. A law on development co-operation adopted by parliament in June 2014 introduced a set of 30 results indicators to be monitored and reported on in the biannual report to parliament. France is still working on improving the links between objectives, budget programming and results.

Making its aid predictable. In 2013, the annual predictability of French development assistance was 78% (the target for 2015 is to have 90% of funding disbursed as scheduled). Medium-term predictability was higher, at 82%.

Untying aid. France’s share of untied ODA (excluding administrative costs and in-donor refugee costs) was 90.5% in 2013 (decreasing from 95.9% in 2012), compared to the DAC average of 83.2%.

France’s official development assistance

In 2014, France provided USD 10.4 billion in net ODA (preliminary data), which represented 0.36% of gross national income (GNI) and a 9.2% decrease in real terms from 2013, due to lower levels of debt relief and of loans to multilateral institutions. France is the 12th largest Development Assistance Committee (DAC) donor in terms of ODA as a percentage of GNI, and the 4th largest donor in terms of volume. France plans to achieve a 0.42% ODA/GNI ratio in 2015. However, its ODA has decreased every year since 2010, both in terms of volume and as a share of GNI. The grant element of total ODA was 84.4% in 2013, below the DAC compliance grant element norm of 86%.

Figure 28.2. Net ODA: Trends in volume and as a share of GNI, 1998-2014, France

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933244415

In 2013, 64% of ODA was provided bilaterally. France allocated 36% of total ODA as core contributions to multilateral organisations, compared with the DAC country average of 27%. It channelled a further 2% of its bilateral ODA for specific projects implemented by multilateral organisations (multi-bi/non-core).

Figure 28.3. Share of ODA channelled to and through the multilateral system, two year averages, gross disbursements, France

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933244421

In 2013, 58% of French bilateral ODA was programmed at partner country level. France’s share of country programmable aid (CPA) was higher than the DAC country average (54.5%) in 2013. Project-type interventions made up 76% of CPA. A high share of French bilateral ODA went to imputed student costs and debt relief.

Figure 28.4. Composition of bilateral ODA, 2013, gross disbursements, France

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933244430

In 2013, USD 109.4 million of bilateral ODA was channelled to and through civil society organisations (CSOs). France’s ODA to and through CSOs decreased between 2012 and 2013 in terms of volume (a 14.4% decrease), but remained stable as a share of bilateral aid. This share (1% in 2013) was low compared with the DAC country average of 16%.

Figure 28.5. Bilateral ODA to and through CSOs, two year averages, gross disbursements, France

Note: Data on ODA to CSOs are not available for 2012.

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933244441

In 2013, bilateral ODA primarily focused on sub-Saharan Africa, North Africa, and South and Central Asia. In 2013, France allocated USD 2.6 billion to sub-Saharan Africa, USD 1.3 billion to North Africa and USD 1 billion to South and Central Asia.

Figure 28.6. Share of bilateral ODA by region, 2012-13 average, gross disbursements, France

Note: 14% of bilateral ODA allocated was unspecified by region in 2012-13. This share is not represented on the map.

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933244455

53% of bilateral country-allocable ODA went to France’s top 10 recipients. France has 16 priority partner countries in sub-Saharan Africa, which should receive at least 50% of French grant ODA. Its support to fragile states reached USD 2.7 billion in 2013 (32.6% of gross bilateral ODA).

Figure 28.7. Bilateral country-allocable ODA to top recipients, 2012-13 average, gross disbursements, France

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933244465

In 2013, 25% of bilateral ODA was allocated to least developed countries (LDCs), amounting to USD 2.1 billion. This is an increase from 2012 (15%), but is lower than the 2013 DAC average of 31%. Lower middle-income countries received the highest share of bilateral ODA in 2013 (29%).

At 0.12% of GNI in 2013, ODA to LDCs was lower than the UN target of 0.15% of GNI.

Figure 28.8. Bilateral ODA by income group, two year averages, gross disbursements, France

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933244472

Almost half of France’s bilateral ODA was allocated to social and economic infrastructure and services. In 2013, USD 2.8 billion of bilateral ODA was allocated to social sectors, with a strong focus on support to education (USD 1.4 billion). USD 2 billion was allocated to economic infrastructure and services, mainly to transport and storage (USD 1.1 billion) and energy generation and supply (USD 698 million). USD 1 billion was allocated to debt relief.

Figure 28.9. Share of bilateral ODA by sector, 2012-13 average, commitments, France

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933244481

USD 431 million of bilateral ODA supported gender equality. Gender equality is not yet well integrated into France’s projects and programmes (OECD, 2014). In 2013, 11% of French bilateral sector-allocable aid had gender equality and women’s empowerment as a principal or significant objective, compared with the DAC country average of 31%. This was a decrease from 23% in 2012 and 43% in 2008. Population and reproductive health is the only sector in which the focus on gender is strong.

Figure 28.10. Share of bilateral ODA in support of gender equality by sector, 2013, commitments, France

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933244497

USD 2.8 billion of bilateral ODA supported the environment in 2013. France has made positive steps to integrate the environment and climate change into its development co-operation (OECD, 2014). In 2013, 32% of French bilateral aid supported the environment and 22% focused on climate change, compared with the respective DAC country averages of 23% and 16%.

Figure 28.11. Bilateral ODA in support of global and local environment objectives, two year averages, commitments, France

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933244505

Note to reader: Annex B provides “Methodological notes on definitions and measurement for the Profiles of Development Assistance Committee members”.

Reference

OECD (2014), OECD Development Co-operation Peer Reviews: France 2013, OECD Development Co-operation Peer Reviews, OECD  Publishing, Paris, http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264196193-en.

Germany

Financial flows from Germany to developing countries

Figure 29.1. Net resource flows to developing countries, 2003-13, Germany

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933244516

Germany uses ODA to mobilise other resources for sustainable development

Germany contributes to the mobilisation of domestic resources in developing countries by supporting their tax systems. In 2013, it is estimated that Germany committed USD 2.1 million of its official development assistance (ODA) to tax-related activities in partner countries.

It promotes aid for trade to improve developing countries’ trade performance and integration into the world economy. It committed USD 5 billion to trade-related activities in 2013 (40% of its sector-allocable ODA), a 43% increase in real terms from 2012. This was the first increase since 2010.

It invests in building up national statistical capacities and systems in partner countries so they can monitor their development goals. It committed USD 13.4 million to this effort in 2013.

It invests in climate adaptation in least developed countries (LDCs) and small island developing states (SIDS). Its support to climate mitigation focuses on water, agriculture, biodiversity, environmental protection and urban development, in addition to the energy and waste management sectors. Germany has pledged USD 1 billion (EUR 750 million) to the Green Climate Fund, which plays a key role in channelling resources to developing countries and catalysing climate finance at the international and national levels.

Germany promotes the effective use of resources for sustainable development by:

Enabling developing country ownership through the way it delivers its aid. There is scope to make further progress. In 2013, 48% of Germany’s aid scheduled for government-to-government co-operation in partner countries was recorded on partners’ national budgets – yet the agreed minimum target for 2015 is at least 85%; 45% was channelled through partners’ public financial management and procurement systems, also below the 2015 target of 57%.

Taking steps to build results into programming, introducing a new binding and general system for monitoring the objectives and results of bilateral programmes. In partner countries, each programme’s objectives should reflect the country strategy, be agreed with the partner, and results should be measured using the partner’s national statistics. Germany is also piloting approaches for results-based aid.

Making its aid predictable. In 2013, the annual predictability of German development assistance was 87% (the target for 2015 is to have 90% of funding disbursed as scheduled). Medium-term predictability was lower, at 47%.

Untying aid. Germany’s share of untied ODA (excluding administrative costs and in-donor refugee costs) was 80.1% in 2013 (up from 79.2% in 2012), below the DAC average of 83.2%.

Germany’s official development assistance

In 2014, Germany provided USD 16.2 billion in net ODA (preliminary data). This represented 0.41% of gross national income (GNI) and a 12% increase in real terms from 2013, due especially to an increase in bilateral lending to middle-income countries. Germany is the 10th largest Development Assistance Committee (DAC) donor in terms of ODA as a percentage of GNI, and the 3rd largest donor in terms of volume. The grant element of total ODA was 86.9% in 2013 (a fall from 88.4% in 2012).

Figure 29.2. Net ODA: Trends in volume and as a share of GNI, 1998-2014, Germany

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933244524

In 2013, 71% of ODA was provided bilaterally. Germany allocated 29% of total ODA as core contributions to multilateral organisations, compared with the DAC country average of 27%. It channelled a further 7% of its bilateral ODA for specific projects implemented by multilateral organisations (multi-bi/non-core contributions).

Figure 29.3. Share of ODA channelled to and through the multilateral system, two year averages, gross disbursements, Germany

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933244537

In 2013, 52% of bilateral ODA was programmed at partner country level. Germany’s share of country programmable aid (CPA) was close to the DAC country average (54.5%) in 2013. Project-type interventions accounted for 81% of CPA. A high share of German bilateral ODA was categorised as “other and unallocated”.

Figure 29.4. Composition of bilateral ODA, 2013, gross disbursements, Germany

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933244543

In 2013, USD 1.1 billion of bilateral ODA was channelled through civil society organisations (CSOs), corresponding to 10% of bilateral aid, compared with the DAC country average of 16%. Between 2012 and 2013, ODA through CSOs increased in terms of volume (+4.5%), but remained stable as a share of bilateral ODA.

Figure 29.5. Bilateral ODA to and through CSOs, two year averages, gross disbursements, Germany

Note: Data on ODA to civil society organisations are not available after 2007.

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933244554

Bilateral ODA primarily focused on sub-Saharan Africa and South and Central Asia. In 2013, USD 2.1 billion was allocated to sub-Saharan Africa and USD 1.9 billion to South and Central Asia.

Figure 29.6. Share of bilateral ODA by region, 2012-13 average, gross disbursements, Germany

Note: 20% of bilateral ODA allocated was unspecified by region in 2012-13. This share is not represented on the map.

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933244562

47% of bilateral country-allocable ODA went to Germany’s top 10 recipients. Germany has bilateral programmes with 50 partner countries. It has regional/thematic programmes with an additional 29 countries. In 2013, its support to fragile states reached USD 3.2 billion (28.1% of gross bilateral ODA).

Figure 29.7. Bilateral country-allocable ODA to top recipients, 2012-13 average, gross disbursements, Germany

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933244574

In 2013, 16% of bilateral ODA was allocated to least developed countries (LDCs), amounting to USD 1.8 billion. This is lower than in 2012 (23%), and is also lower than the 2013 DAC average (31%). In 2013, lower middle-income countries received the highest share of bilateral ODA (28%) compared with other income groups, noting that 33% was unallocated by income group.

At 0.09% of GNI in 2013, total ODA to LDCs was lower than the UN target of 0.15% of GNI.

Figure 29.8. Bilateral ODA by income group, two year averages, gross disbursements, Germany

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933244587

40% of bilateral ODA was allocated to social infrastructure and services, amounting to USD 5.7 billion, with a strong focus on education (USD 1.9 billion) and support to government and civil society (USD 1.6 billion). In 2013, 31% of bilateral ODA was allocated to economic infrastructure and services, amounting to USD 4.3 billion, with a particular focus on energy generation and supply (USD 2.1 billion) and banking and financial services (USD 1.6 billion).

Figure 29.9. Share of bilateral ODA by sector, 2012-13 average, commitments, Germany

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933244591

USD 4.7 billion of bilateral ODA supported gender equality. Germany considers gender to be a key poverty factor, and therefore targets support to women and girls as an integral element of its programme. Germany’s 2014 strategy on gender equality has further strengthened its commitment to advancing gender equality (BMZ, 2014). In 2013, 42% of German bilateral sector-allocable aid had gender equality and women’s empowerment as a principal or significant objective, compared with 45% in 2012 and 56% in 2008. The DAC country average was 31% in 2013. A high share of Germany’s aid to population and reproductive health and government and civil society focuses on gender.

Figure 29.10. Share of bilateral ODA in support of gender equality by sector, 2013, commitments, Germany

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933244602

USD 5.7 billion of bilateral ODA supported the environment in 2013. Germany focuses on climate change mitigation and adaptation, biodiversity conservation and the sustainable management of natural resources. In 2013, the share of German bilateral aid focusing on the environment reached 40%, compared to the DAC country average of 23%. Germany’s financial commitment to climate change mitigation and adaptation has nearly doubled over recent years (from USD 2 billion in 2008 to USD 4 billion in 2013). It represented 28% of its ODA in 2013, compared to the DAC country average of 16%.

Figure 29.11. Bilateral ODA in support of global and local environment objectives, two year averages, commitments, Germany

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933244618

Note to reader: Annex B provides “Methodological notes on definitions and measurement for the Profiles of Development Assistance Committee members”.

Reference

BMZ (2014), “Gender equality in German development policy”, BMZ Strategy Paper, No. 2, May, Berlin.

Greece

Financial flows from Greece to developing countries

Figure 30.1. Net resource flows to developing countries, 2003-13, Greece

Note: Data on other official flows are not available for 2003, 2005 and 2009-12; data on private grants are not available for 2013.

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933244623

Greece uses ODA to mobilise other resources for sustainable development

It promotes aid for trade to improve developing countries’ trade performance and integration into the world economy. It committed USD 72 000 to trade-related activities in 2013 (0.5% of its sector-allocable official development assistance [ODA]), a further decrease of 34% in real terms from 2012. The trend has been negative since 2011.

Greece promotes the effective use of resources for sustainable development by:

Focusing on enhancing the quality of its development co-operation in a domestic context of severe fiscal constraints and inability to make new bilateral aid commitments. Greece is committed to incorporating the four Busan principles into its development co-operation: ownership of development priorities by developing countries; focus on results; inclusive development partnerships; and transparency and accountability.

Untying its aid. Greece’s share of untied ODA (excluding administrative costs and in-donor refugee costs) was 2.7% in 2013 (down from 6.4% in 2012), compared with the DAC average of 83.2%. This high share of tied aid reflects the composition of Greece’s aid portfolio, which has a high share of tied technical co-operation in its aid portfolio (i.e. scholarships and imputed student costs – considered by the DAC as tied aid by definition).

Greece’s official development assistance

In 2014, Greece provided USD 248 million in net ODA (preliminary data), which represented 0.11% of gross national income (GNI) and an increase of 6.3% in real terms from 2013. This is the first increase in ODA volume since 2009, when its aid budget started to decline as a direct consequence of the severe economic crisis. Greece is the 26th largest Development Assistance Committee (DAC) donor in terms of its share of ODA as a percentage of GNI, and the 24th donor in terms of volume. The grant element of total ODA was 100% in 2013.

Figure 30.2. Net ODA: Trends in volume and as a share of GNI, 1998-2014, Greece

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933244633

In 2013, 18% of Greece’s ODA was provided bilaterally. Greece allocated 82% of total ODA as core contributions to multilateral organisations, compared with the DAC country average of 27%. This high share reflects the overall decline in its ODA. It channelled a further 3% of its bilateral ODA for specific projects implemented by multilateral organisations (multi-bi/non-core contributions).

Figure 30.3. Share of ODA channelled to and through the multilateral system, two year averages, gross disbursements, Greece

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933244642

In 2013, only 10% of Greece’s bilateral ODA was programmed at partner country level. Greece’s share of country programmable aid (CPA) was low compared to the DAC country average (54.5%) in 2013. This is due to its high spending on refugees in Greece, and imputed student costs. Technical assistance accounted for 32% of CPA.

Figure 30.4. Composition of bilateral ODA, 2013, gross disbursements, Greece

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933244650

In 2013, USD 0.1 million of bilateral ODA was channelled to and through civil society organisations (CSOs). Greece’s ODA channelled to and through CSOs fell sharply in terms of volume (a 46.2% decrease) between 2012 and 2013, but slightly increased as a share of bilateral aid (from 0.1% to 0.2%).

Figure 30.5. Bilateral ODA to and through CSOs, two year averages, gross disbursements, Greece

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933244660

Bilateral ODA primarily focused on Eastern Europe. In 2013, USD 6.9 million was allocated to Eastern Europe and USD 2.6 million to the Middle East.

Figure 30.6. Share of bilateral ODA by region, 2012-13 average, gross disbursements, Greece

Note: 40% of bilateral ODA allocated was unspecified by region in 2012-13. This share is not represented on the map.

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933244678

77% of bilateral country-allocable ODA went to Greece’s top 10 recipients. It has 18 priority partner countries. All of Greece’s priority countries feature on the list of top 10 recipients below. In 2013, its support to fragile states reached USD 4.7 million (10.9% of gross bilateral ODA).

Figure 30.7. Bilateral country-allocable ODA to top recipients, 2012-13 average, gross disbursements, Greece

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933244681

3% of bilateral ODA was allocated to least developed countries (LDCs) in 2013, amounting to USD 1.5 million. The share fell from 10% in 2009 to 3% in 2010, remaining relatively steady since then (the 2013 DAC average was 31%). Lower middle-income countries received the highest share of bilateral ODA in 2013 (15%), noting that 68% was unallocated by income group.

At 0.02% of GNI, total ODA to LDCs was far below the UN target of 0.15% of GNI.

Figure 30.8. Bilateral ODA by income group, two year averages, gross disbursements, Greece

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933244697

In 2013, 27% of bilateral ODA was allocated to social infrastructure and services, equal to USD 12 million, with a strong focus on education (USD 11 million).

Figure 30.9. Share of bilateral ODA by sector, 2012-13 average, commitments, Greece

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933244708

USD 13 million of bilateral ODA supported gender equality. Gender equality is a priority sector for Greece. In 2013, 95% of its bilateral sector-allocable aid had gender equality and women’s empowerment as a principal or significant objective, compared to the DAC country average of 31%. This is up from 2012 (93%) and 2008 (58%). A high share of Greece’s aid to education and health focuses on gender.

Figure 30.10. Share of bilateral ODA in support of gender equality by sector, 2013, commitments, Greece

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933244716

USD 0.6 million of bilateral ODA supported the environment. In 2013, 1.3% of Greek bilateral aid focused on the environment, compared to a 7% average in 2008-09 and a 23% DAC country average in 2013. The proportion of its aid focusing on climate change was 1%, compared to the DAC country average of 16%.

Figure 30.11. Bilateral ODA in support of global and local environment objectives, two year averages, commitments, Greece

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933244727

Note to reader: Annex B provides “Methodological notes on definitions and measurement for the Profiles of Development Assistance Committee members”.

Iceland

Financial flows from Iceland to developing countries

In 2014, Iceland delivered USD 35 million in net ODA (preliminary data), which represented 0.21% of its gross national income (GNI) and a 3.8% decrease in real terms from 2013. Iceland is committed to achieving 0.7% ODA/GNI, and this commitment has been accompanied by an increase in ODA both in terms of volume and as a share of GNI between 2011 and 2013. Iceland is the 17th largest Development Assistance Committee (DAC) donor in terms of ODA as a percentage of GNI, and the 28th (last) donor in terms of volume. The grant element of total ODA was 100% in 2013. At present, data on other official flows, private grants (funds raised by non-governmental organisations and foundations) and private flows at market terms from Iceland to developing countries are not available.

Figure 31.1. Net ODA: Trends in volume and as a share of GNI, 1998-2014, Iceland

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933244732

Iceland uses ODA to mobilise other resources for sustainable development

It promotes aid for trade to improve developing countries’ trade performance and integration into the world economy. It committed USD 10.5 million (42% of its sector-allocable ODA) to trade-related activities in 2013, a 19% increase in real terms from 2011. The trend has been increasing over the past few years.

It prioritises renewable energy in its development co-operation, which is essential for climate change mitigation.

Iceland promotes the effective use of resources for sustainable development by:

Monitoring the progress of projects and conducting project evaluations. Iceland is committed to strengthening its monitoring and evaluation system so that it can capture the long-term results of its programmes at the country level.

Untying aid. Iceland untied 100% of its ODA (excluding administrative costs and in-donor refugee costs) in 2013, compared to the DAC average of 83.2%. Its ODA was also fully untied in 2012.

Iceland’s official development assistance

In 2013, 84% of ODA was provided bilaterally, totalling USD 28 million. Iceland allocated 16% of total ODA as core contributions to multilateral organisations (USD 5 million), compared with the DAC country average of 27%. It channelled a further 35% of its bilateral ODA (USD 10 million) for specific projects implemented by multilateral organisations (multi-bi/non-core contributions). Iceland provides contributions to multilateral organisations such as the United Nations agencies and the World Bank.

Figure 31.2. Share of ODA channelled to and through the multilateral system, two year averages, gross disbursements, Iceland

Note: Data on multi-bi/non-core ODA are not available prior to 2011.

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933244744

In 2013, 66% of bilateral ODA was programmed at partner country level. Iceland’s share of country programmable aid (CPA) was higher than the DAC country average (54.5%) in 2013. Project-type interventions made up 72% of CPA. The proportion of bilateral ODA categorised as other and unallocated equalled 24%.

Figure 31.3. Composition of bilateral ODA, 2013, gross disbursements, Iceland

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933244753

In 2013, USD 3 million of bilateral ODA was channelled to and through civil society organisations (CSOs). Iceland’s aid channelled to and through CSOs rose by 33.5% in volume terms between 2012 and 2013. However, as a share of bilateral ODA, it remained stable over this period (at 10% in 2012 and 2013). This share was lower than the DAC average of 16%.

Figure 31.4. Bilateral ODA to and through CSOs, 2012-13 average, gross disbursements, Iceland

Note: Data on ODA to CSOs are not available prior to 2011.

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933244763

Half of bilateral ODA is focused on sub-Saharan Africa. In 2013, USD 15.22 million was allocated to sub-Saharan Africa.

Figure 31.5. Share of bilateral ODA by region, 2012-13 average, gross disbursements, Iceland

Note: 35% of ODA allocated was unspecified by region in 2012-13. This share is not represented on the map.

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933244774

95% of bilateral country-allocable ODA went to Iceland’s top 10 recipients. Its three priority partner countries – Malawi, Uganda and Mozambique – are the top three recipients of its ODA. In 2013, its support to fragile states reached USD 13.9 million (47.3% of gross bilateral ODA).

Figure 31.6. Bilateral country-allocable ODA to top recipients, 2012-13 average, gross disbursements, Iceland

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933244783

In 2013, 49% of bilateral ODA was allocated to least developed countries (LDCs), amounting to USD 14.3 million. This share is above the DAC average of 31% in 2013. Although the share fell from 54% in 2010 to 49% in 2011, since then it has remained relatively steady. LDCs received the highest share of bilateral ODA in 2013, noting that 40% was unallocated by income group.

At 0.12% of GNI in 2013, total ODA to LDCs was below the UN target of 0.15% of GNI.

Figure 31.7. Bilateral ODA by income group, two year averages, gross disbursements, Iceland

Note: Data concerning other low-income countries are only available for 2008 and 2009.

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933244798

In 2013, 46% of bilateral ODA was allocated to social infrastructure and services, amounting to USD 14 million, with a strong focus on government and civil society (USD 3.5 million) and education (USD 3.2 million). USD 6.5 million was allocated to the production sectors, in particular to fishing (USD 5.8 million) and USD 4 million to economic infrastructure and services.

Figure 31.8. Share of bilateral ODA by sector, 2012-13 average, commitments, Iceland

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933244802

USD 21 million of bilateral ODA supported gender equality. Iceland has solidly integrated gender equality into its projects and programmes. In 2013, 84% of Iceland’s bilateral sector-allocable aid had gender equality and women’s empowerment as a principal or significant objective, compared with the DAC country average of 31%. This is up from 78% in 2012. Iceland has also been striving to promote gender equality in its multilateral support, mainly through the United Nations and the World Bank.

Figure 31.9. Share of bilateral ODA in support of gender equality by sector, 2013, commitments, Iceland

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933244810

USD 20 million of bilateral ODA supported the environment in 2013. Iceland has also solidly integrated the environment into its projects and programmes. In 2013, 70% of Iceland’s bilateral aid supported the environment, and 34% focused particularly on climate change, compared with the respective DAC country averages of 23% and 16%.

Figure 31.10. Bilateral ODA in support of global and local environment objectives, 2012-13 average, commitments, Iceland

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933244821

Note to reader: Annex B provides “Methodological notes on definitions and measurement for the Profiles of Development Assistance Committee members”.

Ireland

Financial flows from Ireland to developing countries

Figure 32.1. Net resource flows to developing countries, 2003-13, Ireland

Note: Data on other official flows are not available; data on private flows are not available for 2012.

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933244838

Ireland uses ODA to mobilise other resources for sustainable development

Ireland contributes to the mobilisation of domestic resources in developing countries by supporting their tax systems. In 2013, it is estimated that Ireland committed USD 266 000 of its official development assistance (ODA) to tax-related activities in partner countries.

It promotes aid for trade to improve developing countries’ trade performance and integration into the world economy. It committed USD 54 million (16% of sector-allocable ODA) to trade-related activities in 2013. The trend has been stable over the past two years.

It invests in building up national statistical capacities and systems in partner countries so they can monitor their development goals. It committed USD 0.2 million to this effort in 2013.

It invests in climate change adaptation, particularly in Africa, as well as in research on how climate change affects other development concerns and what solutions work best for local communities.

Ireland promotes the effective use of resources for sustainable development by:

Enabling developing country ownership through the way it delivers its aid. In 2013, 86% of Ireland’s aid scheduled for the government sector was recorded on partners’ national budgets. This means Ireland had fully met the agreed minimum target of 85%. In 2013, 82% of Ireland’s development assistance to the government sector was channelled through partners’ public financial management and procurement systems, well above the 2015 target of 57%.

Institutionalising results-based management so that it informs programming decisions and serves accountability needs. Ireland has prioritised a bottom-up approach to results planning and reporting in order to have sound evidence for programming decisions. In line with a cross-government drive for greater domestic accountability for performance against policy priorities, Ireland is starting to identify corporate-level results.

Making its aid predictable. In 2013, the annual predictability of Irish development assistance was 96% (the target for 2015 is to have 90% of funding disbursed as scheduled). Medium-term predictability was 85%.

Untying aid. All of Ireland’s ODA (excluding administrative costs and in-donor refugee costs) was untied in 2013 (as in 2012), compared with the DAC average of 83.2%.

Ireland’s official development assistance

In 2014, Ireland provided USD 809 million in net ODA (preliminary data), which represented 0.38% of gross national income (GNI) and a 4.5% decrease in real terms from 2013. Ireland is the 11th largest Development Assistance Committee (DAC) in terms of ODA as a percentage of GNI, and the 19th donor in terms of volume. Ireland’s ODA has fallen since 2008, both in volume and as a percentage of GNI. Ireland remains committed to meeting the 0.7% ODA/GNI target as soon as economic circumstances permit. The grant element of total ODA was 100% in 2013.

Figure 32.2. Net ODA: Trends in volume and as a share of GNI, 1998-2014, Ireland

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933244845

In 2013, 65% of ODA was provided bilaterally. In 2013, Ireland allocated 35% of total ODA as core contributions to multilateral organisations, compared with the DAC country average of 27%. It channelled a further 21% of its bilateral ODA for specific projects implemented by multilateral organisations (multi-bi/non-core contributions).

Figure 32.3. Share of ODA channelled to and through the multilateral system, two year averages, gross disbursements, Ireland

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933244852

In 2013, 38% of bilateral ODA was programmed at partner country level. Ireland’s share of country programmable aid (CPA) was lower than the DAC country average (54.5%); 45% of its CPA consisted of contributions to pooled programmes and funds. Core aid to non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and humanitarian assistance accounted for almost half of bilateral ODA.

Figure 32.4. Composition of bilateral ODA, 2013, gross disbursements, Ireland

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933244861

In 2013, USD 252.2 million of bilateral ODA was channelled to and through civil society organisations (CSOs). This equalled 46% of bilateral ODA, compared with the DAC average of 16%. Between 2012 and 2013 Irish aid channelled through and to CSOs increased, both in volume (+4.8%) and as a share of bilateral aid (from 43% to 46%).

Figure 32.5. Bilateral ODA to and through CSOs, two year averages, gross disbursements, Ireland

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933244873

Bilateral ODA is primarily focused on sub-Saharan Africa. In 2013, Ireland allocated USD 347.8 million to sub-Saharan Africa, USD 24.9 million to the Middle East and USD 23.9 million to Far East Asia.

Figure 32.6. Share of bilateral ODA by region, 2012-13 average, gross disbursements, Ireland

Note: 22% of bilateral ODA allocated was unspecified by region in 2012-13. This share is not represented on the map.

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933244882

68% of bilateral country-allocable ODA went to Ireland’s top 10 recipients. Its nine key partner countries are among its top 10 recipients, showing a high concentration of aid allocations. Sierra Leone became a new key partner country in 2014. Irish support to fragile states is increasing and reached USD 234.3 million in 2013 (43% of gross bilateral ODA).

Figure 32.7. Bilateral country-allocable ODA to top recipients, 2012-13 average, gross disbursements, Ireland

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933244899

In 2013, 60% of bilateral ODA was allocated to least developed countries (LDCs), amounting to USD 325.4 million. The share has fallen slightly since 2010, when it stood at 65%. Ireland ranked highest among DAC members for the share of bilateral ODA allocated to LDCs in 2013 (the DAC average was at 31%).

At 0.23% of GNI in 2013, total ODA to LDCs exceeds the UN target of 0.15% of GNI.

Figure 32.8. Bilateral ODA by income group, two year averages, gross disbursements, Ireland

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933244904

48% of bilateral ODA, or USD 261 million, was allocated to social infrastructure and services in 2013, with a strong focus on support to government and civil society (USD 83 million) and health (USD 77 million). Humanitarian aid amounted to USD 101 million.

Figure 32.9. Share of bilateral ODA by sector, 2012-13 average, commitments, Ireland

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933244910

USD 186 million of bilateral ODA supported gender equality. Ireland plays an agenda-setting role on gender equality and women’s empowerment and continues to strengthen its mainstreaming approaches. In 2013, 55% of its bilateral sector-allocable aid had gender equality and women’s empowerment as a principal or significant objective, compared with the DAC country average of 31%. This is only a slight decrease from 2012, when it was 56%, but an important increase over 2008 (36%). A high share of its aid to population and reproductive health, other social infrastructure and health targets gender equality.

Figure 32.10. Share of bilateral ODA in support of gender equality by sector, 2013, commitments, Ireland

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933244929

USD 88 million of bilateral ODA supported the environment in 2013. Environmental sustainability, climate change and development are growing priority issues for Ireland. In 2013, 16% of its aid supported the environment, compared with the DAC country average of 23%. Also, 13% of Irish aid focused on climate change, compared with the DAC country average of 16%.

Figure 32.11. Bilateral ODA in support of global and local environment objectives, two year averages, commitments, Ireland

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933244933

Note to reader: Annex B provides “Methodological notes on definitions and measurement for the Profiles of Development Assistance Committee members”.

Italy

Financial flows from Italy to developing countries

Figure 33.1. Net resource flows to developing countries, 2003-13, Italy

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933244944

Italy uses ODA to mobilise other resources for sustainable development

Italy contributes to the mobilisation of domestic resources in developing countries by supporting their tax systems. In 2013, it is estimated that Italy committed USD 119 000 of its official development assistance (ODA) to tax-related activities in partner countries.

It promotes aid for trade to improve developing countries’ trade performance and integration into the world economy. It committed USD 92 million (24% of sector-allocable ODA) to trade-related activities in 2013, a 54% decrease in real terms from 2012. The trend has been fluctuating over the past few years.

It invests in building up national statistical capacities and systems in partner countries so they can monitor their development goals. It committed USD 0.9 million to this effort in 2013.

It has developed and adopted innovative methods integrating environmental and climate-related considerations into its development co-operation activities, with a specific focus on maximising synergies between environmental conservation and poverty reduction. Italy has pledged USD 334 million (EUR 250 million) to the Green Climate Fund, which plays a key role in channelling resources to developing countries and catalysing climate finance at the international and national levels.

Italy promotes the effective use of resources for sustainable development by:

Enabling developing country ownership through the way it delivers its aid. There is scope to make further progress. In 2013, 76% of Italy’s aid scheduled for the government sector in partner countries was recorded on partners’ national budgets. The agreed minimum target for 2015 is at least 85%. In 2013, 56% of Italy’s development assistance to the government sector was channelled through partners’ public financial management and procurement systems, very close to the 2015 target of 57%.

Taking steps to build results into programming. The systems in place mainly target projects and, in the case of participation in multi-donor funding schemes, programmes. The 2014 DAC Peer Review of Italy found that additional efforts are still necessary to build a results-oriented culture (OECD, 2014).

Making its aid predictable. In 2013, the annual predictability of Italian development assistance was 56% (the target for 2015 is to have 90% of funding disbursed as scheduled). Medium-term predictability was higher, at 77%.

Untying aid. Italy’s share of untied ODA (excluding administrative costs and in-donor refugee costs) was 87.5% in 2013 (up from 82% in 2012), while the DAC average was 83.2%.

Italy’s official development assistance

In 2014, Italy provided USD 3.3 billion in net ODA (preliminary data), which represented 0.16% of gross national income (GNI) and a 2.9% decrease in real terms from 2013. Italy is the 21st largest Development Assistance Committee (DAC) donor in terms of ODA as a percentage of GNI, and the 12th largest donor in terms of volume. It has committed to raising the ODA/GNI ratio to 0.28-0.31% in 2017. The grant element of total ODA was 99.8% in 2013.

Figure 33.2. Net ODA: Trends in volume and as a share of GNI, 1998-2014, Italy

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933244957

In 2013, 27% of ODA was provided bilaterally. Italy allocated 73% of total ODA as core contributions to multilateral organisations, compared with the DAC country average of 27%. It channelled a further 12% of its bilateral ODA for specific projects implemented by multilateral organisations (multi-bi/non-core contributions).

Figure 33.3. Share of ODA channelled to and through the multilateral system, two year averages, gross disbursements, Italy

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933244967

In 2013, 31% of bilateral ODA was programmed at partner country level. Italy’s share of country programmable aid (CPA) was lower than the DAC country average (54.5%). Project-type interventions accounted for 81% of CPA. The share of bilateral ODA allocated to refugees in donor country was 43%.

Figure 33.4. Composition of bilateral ODA, 2013, gross disbursements, Italy

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933244971

In 2013, USD 158.6 million of bilateral ODA was channelled to and through civil society organisations (CSOs). Between 2012 and 2013, aid channelled to and through CSOs increased both in terms of volume (+131%), and as a share of bilateral ODA (from 9% in 2012 to 17% in 2013); the DAC country average was 16% in 2013.

Figure 33.5. Bilateral ODA to and through CSOs, two year averages, gross disbursements, Italy

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933244987

Bilateral ODA is focused on sub-Saharan Africa and South and Central Asia. In 2013, USD 144.3 million was allocated to sub-Saharan Africa and USD 96.9 million to South and Central Asia.

Figure 33.6. Share of bilateral ODA by region, 2012-13 average, gross disbursements, Italy

Note: 50% of bilateral ODA allocated was unspecified by region in 2012-13. This share is not represented on the map.

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933244992

51% of bilateral country-allocable ODA went to Italy’s top 10 recipients. It has reduced its number of priority countries from 35 in 2010 to 20 in 2014. Its support to fragile states reached USD 201.1 million in 2013 (21.6% of gross bilateral ODA).

Figure 33.7. Bilateral country-allocable ODA to top recipients, 2012-13 average, gross disbursements, Italy

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933245004

In 2013, 20% of bilateral ODA was allocated to least developed countries (LDCs), amounting to USD 187.4 million. The share has been falling since 2011, when it stood at 48%. LDCs received the highest share of bilateral ODA in 2013, noting that 56% was unallocated by income group, and compared to the 2013 DAC average of 31%.

At 0.05% of GNI in 2013, total ODA to LDCs was far from the UN target of 0.15% of GNI.

Figure 33.8. Bilateral ODA by income group, two year averages, gross disbursements, Italy

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933245016

In 2013, 25.8%, or USD 237 million, of bilateral ODA was allocated to social infrastructure and services, with a strong focus on health (USD 62.4 million), education (USD 63.9 million) and government and civil society (USD 51.6 million). Humanitarian aid amounted to USD 43.9 million.

Figure 33.9. Share of bilateral ODA by sector, 2012-13 average, commitments, Italy

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933245023

USD 165 million of Italy’s bilateral ODA supported gender equality. In 2013, 62% of Italian bilateral sector-allocable aid had gender equality and women’s empowerment as a principal or significant objective, compared with 42% in 2012 and 22% in 2008. The DAC country average was 31% in 2013. A high share of Italy’s aid to health and the production sector focuses on gender. Italy approved new guidelines for gender equality in 2010. Nevertheless, mainstreaming gender remains challenging (OECD, 2014).

Figure 33.10. Share of bilateral ODA in support of gender equality by sector, 2013, commitments, Italy

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933245033

USD 167 million of bilateral ODA supported the environment in 2013. Italy issued environmental guidelines in 2011 and the share of environment-focused ODA has been increasing in recent years. In 2013, 19% of Italian bilateral aid supported the environment (down, however, from 39% in 2012), and 10% focused particularly on climate change, compared with respective DAC country averages of 23% and 16%.

Figure 33.11. Bilateral ODA in support of global and local environment objectives, two year averages, commitments, Italy

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933245042

Note to reader: Annex B provides “Methodological notes on definitions and measurement for the Profiles of Development Assistance Committee members”.

Reference

OECD (2014), OECD Development Co-operation Peer Reviews: Italy 2014, OECD Development Co-operation Peer Reviews, OECD Publishing, Paris, http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264213241-en.

Japan

Financial flows from Japan to developing countries

Figure 34.1. Net resource flows to developing countries, 2003-13, Japan

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933245058

Japan uses ODA to mobilise other resources for sustainable development

Japan contributes to the mobilisation of domestic resources in developing countries by supporting their tax systems. In 2013, it is estimated that Japan committed USD 3.8 million of its official development assistance (ODA) to tax-related activities in partner countries.

It promotes aid for trade to improve developing countries’ trade performance and integration into the world economy. It committed USD 10.3 billion (69% of its sector-allocable ODA) to trade-related activities in 2013, a 47% increase in real terms from 2012. The trend has been increasing in recent years.

It invests in building up national statistical capacities and systems in partner countries so they can monitor their development goals. It committed USD 5 million to this effort in 2013.

It invests in climate change mitigation by focusing on renewable energy sources and energy-saving measures; while climate change adaptation includes assisting with policy and planning, technology transfer and implementing disaster risk reduction measures. Japan pledged USD 1.5 billion (JPY 154.03 billion) to the Green Climate Fund, which plays a key role in channelling resources to developing countries and catalysing climate finance at the international and national levels.

Japan promotes the effective use of resources for sustainable development by:

Enabling developing country ownership through the way it delivers its aid. There is scope to make further progress. In 2013, 63% of Japan’s aid scheduled for the government sector in partner countries was recorded on partners’ national budgets. The agreed minimum target for 2015 is at least 85%. In 2013, 70% of Japan’s development assistance to the government sector was channelled through partners’ public financial management and procurement systems, well above the 2015 target of 57%.

Managing for development results at the activity level through a P (Plan), D (Do), C (Check), A (Act) programming cycle, project design matrices and a comprehensive approach to evaluating results. The 2014 DAC Peer Review of Japan found that its results approach could be more systematic, including by addressing country and thematic policy levels (OECD, 2014).

Making its aid predictable. In 2013, the annual predictability of Japanese development assistance was 98% (the target for 2015 is to have 90% of funding disbursed as scheduled). Medium-term predictability was lower, at 79%.

Untying its aid. In 2013, the untied share of Japanese total bilateral ODA excluding technical co-operation was 89%, an increase of 3 percentage points from its 2012 level. Japan’s ODA includes a large technical co-operation programme, but Japan does not report its tying status. The share of total Japanese bilateral aid reported as untied was 80% in 2013. With respect to the implementation of the DAC Recommendation on Untying ODA to the Least Developed Countries and Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (OECD, 2008), Japan notified the DAC during the 2014 peer review that, in accordance with paragraph 21, it now reserves the right to use tied aid as part of its ODA to all non-LDC heavily-indebted poor countries (HIPCs).

Japan’s official development assistance

In 2014, Japan provided USD 9.2 billion in net ODA (preliminary data). This represented 0.19% of gross national income (GNI) and a 15.3% decrease in real terms from 2013, due to lower levels of debt relief in 2014. Japan is the 18th largest Development Assistance Committee (DAC) donor in terms of ODA as a percentage of GNI, and the 5th largest donor in terms of volume. The grant element of total ODA was 89.1% in 2013.

Figure 34.2. Net ODA: Trends in volume and as a share of GNI, 1998-2014, Japan

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933245064

In 2013, 87% of ODA was provided bilaterally. Japan allocated 13% of total ODA as core contributions to multilateral organisations, compared with the DAC country average of 27%. It channelled a further 9% of its bilateral ODA for specific projects implemented by multilateral organisations (multi-bi/non-core contributions).

Figure 34.3. Share of ODA channelled to and through the multilateral system, two year averages, gross disbursements, Japan

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933245079

In 2013, Japan programmed 67% of bilateral ODA at partner country level. Japan’s share of country programmable aid (CPA) was well above the DAC country average (54.5%) in 2013. Project-type interventions totalled 72% of CPA. Debt relief accounted for 21% of bilateral aid.

Figure 34.4. Composition of bilateral ODA, 2013, gross disbursements, Japan

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933245081

In 2013, USD 318.7 million of bilateral ODA was channelled to and through civil society organisations (CSOs). Between 2012 and 2013 Japan’s aid channelled to and through CSOs fell both in terms of volume (-22.2%) and as a share of bilateral ODA (from 3% in 2012 to 2% in 2013). The DAC country average for aid to and through CSOs was 16% in 2013.

Figure 34.5. Bilateral ODA to and through CSOs, two year averages, gross disbursements, Japan

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933245099

Bilateral ODA is heavily focused on Asia. In 2013, USD 8.8 billion was allocated to South and Central Asia and USD 4.4 billion to Far East Asia. USD 2.7 billion was allocated to sub-Saharan Africa.

Figure 34.6. Share of bilateral ODA by region, 2012-13 average, gross disbursements, Japan

Note: 9% of bilateral ODA allocated was unspecified by region in 2012-13. This share is not represented on the map.

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933245101

66% of bilateral country-allocable ODA went to Japan’s top 10 recipients. Japan works in over 140 countries; however, its concentration on the top 10 recipients is strong. Japan’s support to fragile states reached USD 10.2 billion in 2013 (51.9% of gross bilateral ODA).

Figure 34.7. Bilateral country-allocable ODA to top recipients, 2012-13 average, gross disbursements, Japan

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933245114

In 2013, 46% of bilateral ODA was provided to least developed countries (LDCs), amounting to USD 9 billion. This is an important increase over 2012 (22%), and is due to exceptional debt forgiveness to Myanmar. The 2013 DAC country average was 31%. LDCs received the highest share of bilateral ODA in 2013.

At 0.14% of GNI in 2013, total ODA to LDCs was close to the UN target of 0.15% of GNI.

Figure 34.8. Bilateral ODA by income group, two year averages, gross disbursements, Japan

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933245123

Over 40% of bilateral ODA was allocated to economic infrastructure and services in 2013, or a total of USD 9 billion, with a strong focus on transport and storage (USD 6.7 billion) and energy generation and supply (USD 2.1 billion). USD 1.6 billion was allocated to water and sanitation, as a part of social sector allocation, and USD 2.2 billion to debt relief.

Figure 34.9. Share of bilateral ODA by sector, 2012-13 average, commitments, Japan

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933245138

USD 1.9 billion of bilateral ODA supported gender equality. In 2013, 15% of Japan’s bilateral sector-allocable aid had gender equality and women’s empowerment as a principal or significant objective, compared to the DAC country average of 31%. This was down from 2012 (21%), but up from 7% in 2008. A high share of Japan’s aid to population and reproductive health focuses on gender. In 2013, the government of Japan announced a new and significant emphasis on women’s empowerment in its development co-operation.

Figure 34.10. Share of bilateral ODA in support of gender equality by sector, 2013, commitments, Japan

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933245143

USD 8 billion of bilateral ODA supported the environment in 2013. Japan has maintained strong financial commitments to the environment and climate change. Environmental safeguards were introduced in 2010. In 2013, 37% of its bilateral aid supported the environment, and 33% focused particularly on climate change, compared with the respective DAC country averages of 23% and 16%.

Figure 34.11. Bilateral ODA in support of global and local environment objectives, two year averages, commitments, Japan

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933245155

Note to reader: Annex B provides “Methodological notes on definitions and measurement for the Profiles of Development Assistance Committee members”.

References

OECD (2014), OECD Development Co-operation Peer Reviews: Japan 2014, OECD Development Co-operation Peer Reviews, OECD Publishing, Paris, http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264218161-en.

OECD (2008), DAC Recommendation on Untying ODA to the Least Developed Countries and Heavily Indebted Poor Countries, OECD, Paris, www.oecd.org/dac/41707972.pdf.

Korea

Financial flows from Korea to developing countries

Figure 35.1. Net resource flows to developing countries, 2003-13, Korea

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933245161

Korea uses ODA to mobilise other resources for sustainable development

Korea contributes to the mobilisation of domestic resources in developing countries by supporting their tax systems. In 2013, it is estimated that Korea committed USD 9.6 million of its official development assistance (ODA) to tax-related activities in partner countries.

It promotes aid for trade to improve developing countries’ trade performance and integration into the world economy. It committed USD 704 million (34% of its sector-allocable ODA) to trade-related activities in 2013, a 13% decrease in real terms from 2012. The trend has been fluctuating over the past few years.

It invests in building up national statistical capacities and systems in partner countries so they can monitor their development goals. It committed USD 3.1 million to this effort in 2013.

It invests in the “East Asia Climate Partnership”, which supports low-carbon growth and climate change adaptation in East Asian developing countries. Korea is the host of the Green Climate Fund, to which it has pledged USD 100 million. The fund plays a key role in channelling resources to developing countries and catalysing climate finance at the international and national levels.

Korea promotes the effective use of resources for sustainable development by:

Enabling developing country ownership through the way it delivers its aid. There is scope to make further progress. In 2013, 54% of Korea’s aid scheduled for the government sector in partner countries was recorded on partners’ national budgets, while the agreed minimum target for 2015 is at least 85%. In 2013, 45% of Korea’s development assistance to the government sector was channelled through partners’ public financial management and procurement systems, below the 2015 target of 57%.

Committing to manage for development results at the activity level.

Making its aid predictable. In 2013, the annual predictability of Korean development assistance was 83% (the target for 2015 is to have 90% of funding disbursed as scheduled). Medium-term predictability was lower, at 46%.

Untying aid. Korea’s share of untied ODA (excluding administrative costs and in-donor refugee costs) was 54.3% in 2013 (increasing from 49.4% in 2012), compared to the DAC average of 83.2%.

Korea’s official development assistance

In 2014, Korea provided USD 1.9 billion in net ODA (preliminary data), which represented 0.13% of gross national income (GNI) and a 0.8% increase in real terms from 2013.1 Korea is the 23rd largest Development Assistance Committee (DAC) donor in terms of its ODA as a percentage of GNI, and the 16th largest donor by volume. The Korean government is firmly committed to achieving its national ODA/GNI target of 0.25% in 2015. The grant element of total ODA was 95.1% in 2013.

Figure 35.2. Net ODA: Trends in volume and as a share of GNI, 1998-2014, Korea

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933245178

In 2013, 76% of ODA was provided bilaterally. Korea allocated 24% of total ODA as core contributions to multilateral organisations (the DAC country average is 27%). It channelled a further 11% of its bilateral ODA for specific projects implemented by multilateral organisations (multi-bi/non-core contributions).

Figure 35.3. Share of ODA channelled to and through the multilateral system, two year averages, gross disbursements, Korea

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933245186

In 2013, 86% of bilateral ODA was programmed at partner country level. Korea’s bilateral programme is characterised by a high proportion of country programmable aid (CPA), which was well above the DAC country average of 54.5% in 2013. Korea’s high CPA figure is explained mainly by its low levels of other bilateral costs, such as in-donor refugee costs, humanitarian assistance and debt relief. Project-type interventions amounted to 73% of CPA.

Figure 35.4. Composition of bilateral ODA, 2013, gross disbursements, Korea

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933245195

In 2013, USD 27.7 million of bilateral ODA was channelled to and through civil society organisations (CSOs). Korea’s ODA channelled to and through CSOs has increased in volume in recent years (+2.9% between 2012 and 2013). It has, however, been relatively steady as a share of bilateral ODA since 2010. This share amounted to 2% in 2013, compared with the DAC country average of 16%.

Figure 35.5. Bilateral ODA to and through CSOs, two year averages, gross disbursements, Korea

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933245205

Bilateral ODA is primarily focused on Asia. In 2013, USD 457.4 million was allocated to Far East Asia and USD 317.6 million to South and Central Asia. USD 252.3 million was allocated to sub-Saharan Africa.

Figure 35.6. Share of bilateral ODA by region, 2012-13 average, gross disbursements, Korea

Note: 12% of bilateral ODA allocated was unspecified by region in 2012-13. This share is not represented on the map.

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933245212

62% of bilateral country-allocable ODA went to Korea’s top 10 recipients in 2012-13. Eight of its 26 priority partner countries are among its top 10 recipients. Korea’s support to fragile states reached USD 427.5 million in 2013 (31.1% of gross bilateral ODA).

Figure 35.7. Bilateral country-allocable ODA to top recipients, 2012-13 average, gross disbursements, Korea

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933245227

In 2013, 38% of bilateral ODA was allocated to least developed countries (LDCs), reaching USD 526.6 million. The share has progressively increased over the past decade and is higher than the 2013 DAC average of 31%. Lower middle-income countries received the highest share of bilateral ODA in 2013 (40%).

At 0.05% of GNI in 2013, total ODA to LDCs was lower than the UN target of 0.15% of GNI.

Figure 35.8. Bilateral ODA by income group, two year averages, gross disbursements, Korea

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933245231

In 2013, 59% of bilateral ODA was allocated to social infrastructure and services, amounting to USD 1.3 billion, with a strong focus on water and sanitation (USD 365 million), education (USD 337 million) and health (USD 307 million). USD 563 million was allocated to economic infrastructure and services, mainly to transport and storage (USD 312 million).

Figure 35.9. Share of bilateral ODA by sector, 2012-13 average, commitments, Korea

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933245246

USD 215 million of bilateral ODA supported gender equality. In 2013, 10% of Korea’s bilateral sector-allocable aid had gender equality and women’s empowerment as a principal or significant objective, compared with the DAC country average of 31%. This is up from 3% in 2008 and 7% in 2012. A high share of Korea’s aid to population and reproductive health focuses on gender. Gender equality is placed centrally in Korea’s Mid-term ODA Policy for 2011-15 as a critical element of its development co-operation programme.

Figure 35.10. Share of bilateral ODA in support of gender equality by sector, 2013, commitments, Korea

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933245254

USD 390 million of bilateral ODA supported the environment in 2013. Korea committed to increase its green ODA to 30% by 2020 and is making an effort to improve the integration of the environment and climate change into its development co-operation. In 2013, 17% of its bilateral aid supported the environment, and 11% focused on climate change, compared with the respective DAC country averages of 23% and 16%.

Figure 35.11. Bilateral ODA in support of global and local environment objectives, two year averages, commitments, Korea

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933245267

Note to reader: Annex B provides “Methodological notes on definitions and measurement for the Profiles of Development Assistance Committee members”.

Note

 1. Korea does not report to the DAC on ODA-eligible assistance to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). The ODA eligible portion of its assistance to DPRK was estimated at approximately USD 12.3 million in 2013.

Luxembourg

Financial flows from Luxembourg to developing countries

Figure 36.1. Net resource flows to developing countries, 2003-13, Luxembourg

Note: Data on other official flows and private flows at market terms are not available; data on private grants are not available from 2012.

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933245276

Luxembourg uses ODA to mobilise other resources for sustainable development

Luxembourg promotes aid for trade to improve developing countries’ trade performance and integration into the world economy. It committed USD 44 million (22% of sector-allocable official development assistance [ODA]) to trade-related activities in 2013, a 1% decrease in real terms from 2012. The trend has remained stable in recent years.

Its supports its partner countries to prioritise, refine and implement climate-related policies, tools and approaches in their national-level activities. It also invests in renewable energy and energy efficiency and supports adaptation planning, prevention and risk management measures and data collection. Luxembourg has pledged USD 6.7 million (EUR 5 million) to the Green Climate Fund, which plays a key role in channelling resources to developing countries and catalysing climate finance at the international and national levels.

Luxembourg promotes the effective use of resources for sustainable development by:

Enabling developing country ownership through the way it delivers its aid. There is scope to make further progress. In 2013, 47% of Luxembourg’s aid scheduled for government-to-government co-operation was recorded on partners’ national budgets – while the agreed minimum target for 2015 is at least 85% – and only 13% was channelled through partners’ public financial management and procurement systems, well below the 2015 target of 57%.

Taking important steps to build results into programming by introducing sector-level results matrices into its new country strategies. Luxembourg aims to ensure the indicators for measuring these results are drawn, where possible, from partner countries’ monitoring systems. Its agency is working on programming processes to reinforce the link between results at project, country and strategic levels.

Making its aid predictable. In 2013, the annual predictability of Luxembourg’s development assistance was 85%. This is close to the 2015 target of 90% of funding disbursed as scheduled. Medium-term predictability was lower, at 70%.

Untying aid. Luxembourg’s share of untied ODA (excluding administrative costs and in-donor refugee costs) increased from 94.1% in 2012 to 97% in 2013, and is above the DAC average of 83.2%.

Luxembourg’s official development assistance

In 2014, Luxembourg provided USD 427 million in net ODA (preliminary data), which represented 1.07% of gross national income (GNI) and a decrease of 1.1% in real terms from 2013. Luxembourg is the 2nd largest Development Assistance Committee (DAC) donor in terms of ODA as a percentage of GNI – and one of only five DAC members to have met the UN target of 0.7% – and the 22nd donor in terms of volume. The grant element of total ODA was 100% in 2013.

Figure 36.2. Net ODA: Trends in volume and as a share of GNI, 1998-2014, Luxembourg

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933245281

In 2013, 70% of ODA was provided bilaterally. Luxembourg allocated 30% of total ODA as core contributions to multilateral organisations, just above the DAC country average of 27%. It channelled a further 21% of its bilateral ODA for specific projects implemented by multilateral organisations (multi-bi/non-core contributions).

Figure 36.3. Share of ODA channelled to and through the multilateral system, two year averages, gross disbursements, Luxembourg

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933245292

In 2013, 61% of bilateral ODA was programmed at partner country level. Luxembourg’s share of country programmable aid (CPA) was above the 2013 DAC country average of 54.5%. Project-type interventions made up 91% of CPA. Humanitarian and food aid amounted to 18% of bilateral aid.

Figure 36.4. Composition of bilateral ODA, 2013, gross disbursements, Luxembourg

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933245304

In 2013, USD 91.2 million of bilateral ODA was channelled to and through civil society organisations (CSOs). ODA channelled to and through CSOs increased between 2012 and 2013 by volume (+3.1%), but the share of ODA allocated has remained steady at 30% in 2013, well above the DAC country average of 16% for that year.

Figure 36.5. Bilateral ODA to and through CSOs, two year averages, gross disbursements, Luxembourg

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933245316

Bilateral ODA is primarily focused on sub-Saharan Africa. In 2013, USD 116.6 million was allocated to sub-Saharan Africa and USD 37.5 million to Far East Asia.

Figure 36.6. Share of bilateral ODA by region, 2012-13 average, gross disbursements, Luxembourg

Note: 23% of bilateral ODA allocated was unspecified by region in 2012-13. This share is not represented on the map.

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933245323

69% of bilateral country-allocable ODA went to Luxembourg’s top 10 recipients. Luxembourg has nine  priority partner countries, all of which are among its top 10 recipients. In 2013, its support to fragile states reached USD 90.4 million (29.9% of gross bilateral ODA).

Figure 36.7. Bilateral country-allocable ODA to top recipients, 2012-13 average, gross disbursements, Luxembourg

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933245330

In 2013, 40% of bilateral ODA was allocated to least developed countries (LDCs), amounting to USD 120.2 million. The share has been relatively steady in recent years, and is above the 2013 DAC average of 31%. LDCs received the highest share of bilateral ODA in 2013, compared with other income groups.

At 0.38% of Luxembourg’s GNI in 2013, total ODA to LDCs far exceeds the UN target of 0.15% of GNI.

Figure 36.8. Bilateral ODA by income group, two year averages, gross disbursements, Luxembourg

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933245341

In 2013, 45% of bilateral ODA was allocated to social infrastructure and services, or USD 135 million, with a strong focus on education (USD 47.3 million) and health (USD 47 million). Humanitarian aid amounted to USD 49.3 million.

Figure 36.9. Share of bilateral ODA by sector, 2012-13 average, commitments, Luxembourg

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933245350

USD 56 million of bilateral ODA supported gender equality. Luxembourg mainstreams gender in its programmes while also promoting standard-setting in international bodies (OECD, 2012). In 2013, 28% of its bilateral sector-allocable aid had gender equality and women’s empowerment as a principal or significant objective, compared with the DAC country average of 31%. This is down from 57% in 2008 and 38% in 2012. A high share of Luxembourg’s aid to productive sectors focuses on gender.

Figure 36.10. Share of bilateral ODA in support of gender equality by sector, 2013, commitments, Luxembourg

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933245362

USD 57 million of bilateral ODA supported the environment in 2013. Luxembourg has developed a holistic approach to the environment and climate change in its development co-operation. It is using impact analysis and environmental evaluation more systematically. In 2013, 19% of its bilateral aid supported the environment, and 9% focused particularly on climate change, compared with the respective DAC country averages of 23% and 16%.

Figure 36.11. Bilateral ODA in support of global and local environment objectives, two year averages, commitments, Luxembourg

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933245373

Note to reader: Annex B provides “Methodological notes on definitions and measurement for the Profiles of Development Assistance Committee members”.

Reference

OECD (2012), DAC Peer Review of Luxembourg 2012, OECD, Paris, www.oecd.org/dac/peer-reviews/LUXEMBOURG%20in%20CRC%20 template%20April%202013.pdf.

Netherlands

Financial flows from the Netherlands to developing countries

Figure 37.1. Net resource flows to developing countries, 2003-13, Netherlands

Note: Data on other official flows are not available from 2007.

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933245389

The Netherlands uses ODA to mobilise other resources for sustainable development

The Netherlands contributes to the mobilisation of domestic resources in developing countries by supporting their tax systems. In 2013, it is estimated that the Netherlands committed USD 2 million of its official development assistance (ODA) to tax-related activities in partner countries.

It promotes aid for trade to improve developing countries’ trade performance and integration into the world economy. It committed USD 764 million (31% of its sector-allocable ODA) to trade-related activities in 2013, a 34% decrease in real terms from 2012. The trend has been decreasing over the past few years.

It invests in building up national statistical capacities and systems in partner countries so they can monitor their development goals. It committed USD 7.6 million to this effort in 2013.

It invests in climate change mitigation activities focusing on renewable energy and reduced deforestation related to sustainable trade chains; while climate change adaptation (including disaster risk reduction) focuses on water (water productivity and integrated water resources management [IWRM]) and agriculture (food and nutrition security). The Netherlands has pledged USD 134 million (EUR 100 million) to the Green Climate Fund, which plays a key role in channelling resources to developing countries and catalysing climate finance at the international and national levels.

The Netherlands promotes the effective use of resources for sustainable development by:

Enabling developing country ownership through the way it delivers its aid. There is scope to make further progress. In 2013, 59% of the Netherlands’ aid scheduled for the government sector in partner countries was recorded on partners’ national budgets, while the agreed minimum target for 2015 is at least 85%. In 2013, 52% of the Netherlands’ development assistance to the government sector was channelled through partners’ public financial management and procurement systems, not far from the 2015 target of 57%.

Placing emphasis on results-based management through its results framework. The results of the Dutch thematic priorities are reported by headquarters and embassies on an annual basis to parliament and made public on the government’s website. At present, the Netherlands’ results framework includes its seven thematic priorities (water, sexual and reproductive health and rights, security and the rule of law, food security, private sector development, women’s rights and gender equality, climate and sustainability), which covered approximately 40% of the Dutch co-operation in 2013.

Making its aid predictable. In 2013, the annual predictability of Dutch ODA was 79% (the target for 2015 is to have 90% of funding disbursed as scheduled). Medium-term predictability was lower, at 42%.

Untying aid. The Netherlands’ share of untied ODA (excluding administrative costs and in-donor refugee costs) was 96.7% in 2013 (decreasing from 98.4% in 2012), above the DAC average of 83.2%.

The Netherlands’ official development assistance

In 2014, the Netherlands provided USD 5.6 billion in net ODA (preliminary data), which represented 0.64% of gross national income (GNI) and an increase of 1.6% in real terms from 2013. This represents a slight reversal of the downward trend in ODA volume started in 2011. ODA dropped below the 0.7% ODA/GNI target in 2013 for the first time since 1975 due to budgetary cutbacks in order to improve public finances. However, the Netherlands remains committed to the 0.7% target. The Netherlands is the sixth largest Development Assistance Committee (DAC) donor in terms of ODA as a percentage of GNI, and the seventh largest donor by volume. The grant element of total ODA was 100% in 2013.

Figure 37.2. Net ODA: Trends in volume and as a share of GNI, 1998-2014, Netherlands

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933245396

In 2013, 68% of ODA was provided bilaterally. The Netherlands allocated 32% of total ODA as core contributions to multilateral organisations, compared with the DAC country average of 27%. It channelled a further 20% of its bilateral ODA for specific projects implemented by multilateral organisations (multi-bi/non-core contributions).

Figure 37.3. Share of ODA channelled to and through the multilateral system, two year averages, gross disbursements, Netherlands

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933245404

In 2013, 31% of bilateral ODA was programmed at partner country level. The Netherlands’ share of country programmable aid (CPA) was lower than the DAC country average of 54.5% in 2013. This low level of CPA is due to a high amount of unallocated bilateral ODA provided through central funds, especially through civil society. Project-type interventions accounted for 63% of CPA.

Figure 37.4. Composition of bilateral ODA, 2013, gross disbursements, Netherlands

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933245411

In 2013, USD 1.3 billion of bilateral ODA was channelled to and through civil society organisations (CSOs). Between 2012 and 2013, aid channelled to and through CSOs decreased in volume (-0.5%), but increased as a share of bilateral aid (from 31% to 34%). This share was higher than the 2013 DAC country average (16%).

Figure 37.5. Bilateral ODA to and through CSOs, two year averages, gross disbursements, Netherlands

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933245425

The largest share of bilateral ODA was directed towards sub-Saharan Africa. In 2013, USD 837.4 million was allocated to sub-Saharan Africa and USD 194.7 million to South and Central Asia.

Figure 37.6. Share of bilateral ODA by region, 2012-13 average, gross disbursements, Netherlands

Note: 68% of bilateral ODA allocated was unspecified by region in 2012-13. This share is not represented on the map.

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933245439

54% of bilateral country-allocable ODA went to the Netherlands’ top 10 recipients. Eight of its 15 priority partner countries are on the list of its top 10 recipients. It has taken steps to concentrate its bilateral ODA on fewer countries. In 2013, its support to fragile states reached USD 677.8 million (17.7% of gross bilateral ODA).

Figure 37.7. Bilateral country-allocable ODA to top recipients, 2012-13 average, gross disbursements, Netherlands

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933245442

In 2013, 18% of bilateral ODA was allocated to least developed countries (LDCs), amounting to USD 697 million, compared to the DAC average of 31%. The share decreased from 27% in 2010 to 18% in 2013. LDCs received the highest share of bilateral ODA in 2013, noting that 74% of bilateral ODA was unallocated by income group.

At 0.17% of the Netherlands’ GNI in 2013, total ODA to LDCs surpassed the UN target of 0.15% of GNI.

Figure 37.8. Bilateral ODA by income group, two year averages, gross disbursements, Netherlands

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933245451

In 2013, 36% of bilateral ODA (USD 1.2 billion) was allocated to social infrastructure and services, with a strong focus on support to government and civil society (USD 529 million) and water and sanitation (USD 323 million). USD 352 million was allocated to agriculture (described as ODA to production sectors).

Figure 37.9. Share of bilateral ODA by sector, 2012-13 average, commitments, Netherlands

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933245463

USD 771 million of bilateral ODA supported gender equality. In 2013, 31% of the Netherlands’ bilateral sector-allocable aid had gender equality and women’s empowerment as a principal or significant objective, compared with the DAC country average of 31%. This is down from 43% in 2012. A high share of the Netherlands’ aid to population and reproductive health focuses on gender.

Figure 37.10. Share of bilateral ODA in support of gender equality by sector, 2013, commitments, Netherlands

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933245474

USD 862 million of Dutch bilateral ODA commitments supported environmental outcomes in 2013. Actual total ODA expenditures on environment (based on the policy marker environment) amounted to EUR 202 million in 2013. The Netherlands focuses on promoting a sustainable and safe living environment and poverty reduction through sustainable environment and water management and investments in climate change – mitigation and adaptation (see the first page of this profile). The share of bilateral aid supporting the environment has been increasing in recent years, reaching 26% in 2013 (compared with the DAC country average of 23%). In 2013, 22% of bilateral aid focused specifically on climate change, compared with the DAC country average of 16%.

Figure 37.11. Bilateral ODA in support of global and local environment objectives, two year averages, commitments, Netherlands

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933245487

Note to reader: Annex B provides “Methodological notes on definitions and measurement for the Profiles of Development Assistance Committee members”.

New Zealand

Financial flows from New Zealand to developing countries

Figure 38.1. Net resource flows to developing countries, 2003-13, New Zealand

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933245492

New Zealand uses ODA to mobilise other resources for sustainable development

New Zealand contributes to the mobilisation of domestic resources in developing countries by supporting their tax systems. In 2013, it is estimated that New Zealand committed USD 56 000 of its official development assistance (ODA) to tax-related activities in partner countries.

It promotes aid for trade to improve developing countries’ trade performance and integration into the world economy. It committed USD 109 million (42% of its sector-allocable ODA) to trade-related activities in 2013, a 27% increase in real terms from 2012. The trend has been fluctuating over the past few years.

It invests in climate change programmes that support adaptation in small island developing states (SIDS) in the Pacific, to improve their resilience to natural disasters and sea level rise. In addition, New Zealand has pledged USD 2.6 million (NZD 3 million) to the Green Climate Fund, which plays a key role in channelling resources to developing countries and catalysing climate finance at the international and national levels.

New Zealand promotes the effective use of resources for sustainable development by:

Enabling developing country ownership through the way it delivers its aid. In 2013, 81% of New Zealand’s aid scheduled for the government sector in partner countries was recorded on partners’ national budgets, not far from the agreed minimum target of at least 85% for 2015. In 2013, just 31% of New Zealand’s development assistance to the government sector was channelled through partners’ public financial management and procurement systems, still below the 2015 target of 57%.

Placing strong emphasis on results. New Zealand has adopted a practical approach to results-based management. The system delivers simple, timely and useful information for both strategic oversight and activity management. There is a concerted effort for building a results culture across the organisation.

Making its aid predictable. In 2013, the annual predictability of New Zealand’s development assistance was 100% (the target for 2015 is to have 90% of funding disbursed as scheduled). Medium-term predictability was lower, at 60%.

Untying aid. New Zealand’s share of untied ODA (excluding administrative costs and in-donor refugee costs) was 88% in 2013 (up from 84.3% in 2012), compared with the DAC average of 83.2%.

New Zealand’s official development assistance

In 2014, New Zealand provided USD 502 million in net ODA (preliminary data), which represented 0.27% of gross national income (GNI) and an increase of 6.8% in real terms from 2013, driven mainly by an increase in bilateral grants, primarily to least developed countries (LDCs). New Zealand is the 13th largest Development Assistance Committee (DAC) donor in terms of ODA as a percentage of GNI, and the 20th largest donor by volume. The outlook for growth in the ODA budget is positive since in 2014 New Zealand announced an overall increase in ODA of nearly NZD 220 million for the three-year period starting 2015/16. The grant element of total ODA was 100% in 2013.

Figure 38.2. Net ODA: Trends in volume and as a share of GNI, 1998-2014, New Zealand

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933245508

In 2013, 77% of ODA was provided bilaterally. New Zealand allocated 23% of total ODA as core contributions to multilateral organisations, compared with the DAC country average of 27%. It channelled a further 6% of its bilateral ODA for specific projects implemented by multilateral organisations (multi-bi/non-core contributions).

Figure 38.3. Share of ODA channelled to and through the multilateral system, two year averages, gross disbursements, New Zealand

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933245511

In 2013, New Zealand programmed 69% of bilateral ODA at partner country level. New Zealand’s share of country programmable aid (CPA) was well above the DAC country average (54.5%). Project-type interventions accounted for 33% of CPA.

Figure 38.4. Composition of bilateral ODA, 2013, gross disbursements, New Zealand

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933245528

In 2013, USD 60.8 million of bilateral ODA was channelled to and through civil society organisations (CSOs). ODA channelled to and through CSOs increased between 2012 and 2013, both in terms of volume (+20.9%) and as a share of bilateral ODA (from 13% in 2012 to 17% in 2013). This share was higher than the 2013 DAC country average of 16%.

Figure 38.5. Bilateral ODA to and through CSOs, two year averages, gross disbursements, New Zealand

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933245532

Bilateral ODA is strongly focused on Oceania and Asia. In 2013, USD 222.3 million was allocated to Oceania, USD 52.6 million to Far East Asia and USD 11.8 million to South and Central Asia.

Figure 38.6. Share of bilateral ODA by region, 2012-13 average, gross disbursements, New Zealand

Note: 14% of bilateral ODA allocated was unspecified by region in 2012-13. This share is not represented on the map.

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933245542

71% of bilateral country-allocable ODA went to New Zealand’s top 10 recipients. New Zealand has 15 priority partner countries, all of which are among its top 20 ODA recipients. Its support to fragile states reached USD 70 million in 2013 (20% of gross bilateral ODA).

Figure 38.7. Bilateral country-allocable ODA to top recipients, 2012-13 average, gross disbursements, New Zealand

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933245550

In 2013, 31% of bilateral ODA was allocated to least developed countries (LDCs), reaching USD 109.3 million. The LDCs’ share of New Zealand’s bilateral ODA has been fluctuating around 30% in recent years. Compared with other income groups, LDCs received the highest share of bilateral ODA in 2013.

At 0.09% of New Zealand’s GNI in 2013, total ODA to LDCs was lower than the UN target of 0.15% of GNI. This reflects the geographical focus of New Zealand’s ODA on small island developing states (SIDS) in Oceania and Asia, many of which are not LDCs.

Figure 38.8. Bilateral ODA by income group, two year averages, gross disbursements, New Zealand

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933245560

In 2013, 38% of bilateral ODA was allocated to social infrastructure and services, representing USD 141 million, with a strong focus on education (USD 84 million) and support to government and civil society (USD 24 million). USD 29 million was allocated to energy generation and supply (included under ODA to economic infrastructure and services) and USD 27 million to agriculture (included under ODA to production sectors). USD 29 million was allocated to humanitarian aid.

Figure 38.9. Share of bilateral ODA by sector, 2012-13 average, commitments, New Zealand

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933245571

USD 130 million of bilateral ODA supported gender equality. In 2013, 50% of New Zealand’s bilateral sector-allocable aid had gender equality and women’s empowerment as a principal or significant objective, compared with the DAC country average of 31%. A high share of aid to population, reproductive health, other social infrastructure and education focuses on gender.

Figure 38.10. Share of bilateral ODA in support of gender equality by sector, 2013, commitments, New Zealand

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933245587

USD 144 million of bilateral ODA contributed to environmental outcomes in 2013. Thirty-nine per cent of New Zealand’s bilateral aid focuses on the environment, and 8% focuses particularly on climate change (mostly on adaptation), compared with the respective DAC country averages of 23% and 16%.

Figure 38.11. Bilateral ODA in support of global and local environment objectives, two year averages, commitments, New Zealand

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933245599

Note to reader: Annex B provides “Methodological notes on definitions and measurement for the Profiles of Development Assistance Committee members”.

Norway

Financial flows from Norway to developing countries

Figure 39.1. Net resource flows to developing countries, 2003-13, Norway

Note: Data on private grants are not available; data on other official flows are not available for 2011.

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933245606

Norway uses ODA to mobilise other resources for sustainable development

Norway contributes to the mobilisation of domestic resources in developing countries by supporting their tax systems. In 2013, it is estimated that Norway committed USD 2.1 million of its official development assistance (ODA) to tax-related activities in partner countries.

It promotes aid for trade to improve developing countries’ trade performance and integration into the world economy. It committed USD 1.2 billion (36% of its sector-allocable ODA) to trade-related activities in 2013, a 25% increase in real terms from 2012. The trend has been fluctuating over the past few years.

It invests in building up national statistical capacities and systems in partner countries so they can monitor their development goals. It committed USD 16.6 million to this effort in 2013.

It “climate-proofs” its projects, and supports climate adaptation and mitigation projects in partner countries, predominantly through the UN programme on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (UN-REDD), the Clean Energy Initiative and the Clean Development Mechanism. Norway has pledged USD 258 million (NOK 1.6 billion) to the Green Climate Fund, which plays a key role in channelling resources to developing countries and catalysing climate finance at the international and national levels.

Norway promotes the effective use of resources for sustainable development by:

Enabling developing country ownership through the way it delivers its aid. In 2013, 62% of Norway’s development assistance to the government sector was channelled through partners’ public financial management and procurement systems, above the 2015 target of 57%. There is still scope to make further progress, though, on the degree to which Norway’s aid is on budget. In 2013, 62% of Norway’s aid scheduled for the government sector in partner countries was recorded on partners’ national budgets. The agreed minimum target for 2015 is at least 85%.

Placing strong emphasis on results through continued efforts to build a stronger results management culture. Norway is also striving to manage for results by implementing output-based aid in a number of prioritised sectors. This means the disbursement of aid is conditional on delivering a measurable action or achieving a performance target.

Making its aid predictable. In 2013, the annual predictability of Norwegian development assistance was 94%, exceeding the 2015 target of disbursing 90% of funding as scheduled. Medium-term predictability was lower, at 52%.

Untying aid. All of Norway’s ODA was untied in 2013 (excluding administrative costs and in-donor refugee costs), whilst the DAC average was 83.2%. Its ODA was also fully untied in 2012.

Norway’s official development assistance

In 2014, Norway provided USD 5 billion in net ODA (preliminary data), which represented 0.99% of gross national income (GNI) and a 4.3% decrease in real terms from 2013. Norway is the third largest Development Assistance Committee (DAC) donor in terms of ODA as a percentage of GNI, and the eighth largest donor by volume. Norway is one of only five DAC members to have met the UN target of 0.7% and it has consistently maintained its level of development assistance, having spent about 1% of GNI on ODA every year since 2009. The grant element of total ODA was 100% in 2013.

Figure 39.2. Net ODA: Trends in volume and as a share of GNI, 1998-2014, Norway

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933245617

In 2013, 78% of ODA was provided bilaterally. Norway allocated 22% of total ODA as core contributions to multilateral organisations, compared with the DAC country average of 27%. It channelled a further 27% of its bilateral ODA for specific projects implemented by multilateral organisations (multi-bi/non-core contributions).

Figure 39.3. Share of ODA channelled to and through the multilateral system, two year averages, gross disbursements, Norway

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933245627

In 2013, 45% of bilateral ODA was programmed at partner country level. Norway’s share of country programmable aid (CPA) was lower than the DAC country average (54.5%). Contributions to pooled programmes and funds accounted for 50% of CPA. A large share (23%) of bilateral aid was classified as “other and unallocated”.

Figure 39.4. Composition of bilateral ODA, 2013, gross disbursements, Norway

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933245637

In 2013, USD 1 billion of Norway’s bilateral ODA was channelled to and through civil society organisations (CSOs). Norway’s ODA channelled to and through CSOs increased in volume between 2012 and 2013 (+11.3%), but decreased as a share of bilateral ODA (from 26% to 24%). This share was higher than the DAC country average of 16%.

Figure 39.5. Bilateral ODA to and through CSOs, two year averages, gross disbursements, Norway

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933245644

Bilateral ODA primarily focused on sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America. In 2013, USD 986.3 million was allocated to sub-Saharan Africa and USD 729 million to South America.

Figure 39.6. Share of bilateral ODA by region, 2012-13 average, gross disbursements, Norway

Note: 41% of bilateral ODA allocated was unspecified by region in 2012-13. This share is not represented on the map.

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933245658

56% of bilateral country-allocable ODA went to Norway’s top 10 recipients. Norway does not identify priority countries, but it does have 15 countries that it views as long-term and substantial partners: 9 of which are among its top 10 recipients. In 2013, its support to fragile states reached USD 1.2 billion (26.3% of gross bilateral ODA).

Figure 39.7. Bilateral country-allocable ODA to top recipients, 2012-13 average, gross disbursements, Norway

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933245663

In 2013, 25% of bilateral ODA was allocated to least developed countries (LDCs), amounting to USD 1.1 billion. The share has fallen, from 30% in 2010 to 25% in 2013, and is below the DAC average of 31%. LDCs received the highest share of bilateral ODA in 2013, noting that 44% was unallocated by income group.

At 0.30% of GNI in 2013, total ODA to LDCs far exceeded the UN target of 0.15% of GNI.

Figure 39.8. Bilateral ODA by income group, two year averages, gross disbursements, Norway

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933245670

Almost 40% of bilateral ODA was allocated to social infrastructure and services in 2013, reaching USD 1.8 billion, with a strong focus on support to government and civil society (USD 908 million) and education (USD 373 million). USD 381 million went to forestry (included under ODA to production sectors) and USD 383 million was allocated to humanitarian aid.

Figure 39.9. Share of bilateral ODA by sector, 2012-13 average, commitments, Norway

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933245680

USD 1.3 billion of bilateral ODA supported gender equality. Gender is a long-standing focus of Norway’s development programme, both as a thematic priority and a cross-cutting issue (OECD, 2014). In 2013, 37% of its bilateral sector-allocable aid had gender equality and women’s empowerment as a principal or significant objective, compared with the DAC country average of 31%. This is an increase over 2012 (31%). In particular, a high share of Norway’s aid to population, reproductive health and education focuses on gender.

Figure 39.10. Share of bilateral ODA in support of gender equality by sector, 2013, commitments, Norway

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933245698

USD 1.2 billion of bilateral ODA supported the environment in 2013. Norway is strongly committed to supporting environmental and climate change activities. It is making progress with mainstreaming these issues in its development co-operation (OECD, 2014). In 2013, 26% of its bilateral aid focused on environment, and 21% focused specifically on climate change, compared with the respective DAC country averages of 23% and 16%.

Figure 39.11. Bilateral ODA in support of global and local environment objectives, two year averages, commitments, Norway

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933245709

Note to reader: Annex B provides “Methodological notes on definitions and measurement for the Profiles of Development Assistance Committee members”.

Reference

OECD (2014), OECD Development Co-operation Peer Reviews: Norway 2013, OECD Development Co-operation Peer Reviews, OECD Publishing, Paris, http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264196315-en.

Poland

Financial flows from Poland to developing countries

In 2014, Poland provided USD 437 million in net ODA (preliminary data), which represented 0.08% of gross national income (GNI) and an 8.3% decrease in real terms from 2013 due to a decrease in loans. This is the first decrease in ODA volume and as a percentage of GNI since 2010. Poland is committed to attain the 0.33% ODA/GNI ratio when political and financial conditions permit. Poland is the 28th (last) largest Development Assistance Committee (DAC) donor in terms of official development assistance (ODA) as a percentage of GNI, and the 21st largest donor by volume. At present, data on other official flows, private grants (funds raised by non-governmental organisations and foundations) and private flows at market terms from Poland to developing countries are not available.

Figure 40.1. Net ODA: Trends in volume and as a share of GNI, 2003-14, Poland

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933245717

Poland uses ODA to mobilise other resources for sustainable development

Poland promotes aid for trade to improve developing countries’ trade performance and integration into the world economy. It committed USD 3.5 million to trade-related activities in 2013 (5% of its sector-allocable ODA).

It invests in building up national statistical capacities and systems in partner countries so they can monitor their development goals. It committed USD 79 059 to this effort in 2013.

It includes environmental considerations in its support to the agricultural sector in partner countries.

Poland promotes the effective use of resources for sustainable development by:

Integrating aid effectiveness principles in the elaboration of its new multi-annual development co-operation strategy for 2016-20. Poland is striving to promote country ownership, and to align its interventions with partner countries’ development strategies and goals. It is also taking action to strengthen country systems by providing technical assistance to support capacity building of central banks outside the European Union (through its central bank) and in the area of illicit financial flows (through its Ministry of Finance). The country is also co-operating with the Intra-European Organisation of Tax Administrations (IOTA), a non-profit intergovernmental organisation, which provides assistance to its members for the improvement of tax administrations.

Assessing development results by monitoring and evaluating its interventions.

Untying aid. Poland’s share of untied ODA (excluding administrative costs and in-donor refugee costs) was 99% in 2013, compared to the DAC average of 83.2%.

Poland’s official development assistance

Poland delivered 29% of ODA bilaterally. It channelled 71% of its ODA to multilateral organisations in 2013, compared with the DAC country average of 27%. Its multilateral aid consisted mainly of mandatory assessed contributions to the European Union and other international organisations. It channelled a further 8% of its bilateral ODA to specific projects implemented by multilateral organisations (multi-bi/non-core contributions).

Figure 40.2. Share of ODA channelled to and through the multilateral system, two year averages, gross disbursements, Poland

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933245724

In 2013, 39% of bilateral ODA was programmed at partner country level. Poland’s share of country programmable aid (CPA) was lower than the DAC country average (54.5%) for 2013. Project-type interventions made up 76% of CPA. Debt relief amounted to 50% of bilateral ODA.

Figure 40.3. Composition of bilateral ODA, 2013, gross disbursements, Poland

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933245738

In 2013, bilateral ODA primarily focused on Europe, Far East Asia and sub-Saharan Africa. USD 44.1 million was allocated to sub-Saharan Africa, USD 38.7 million was allocated to Eastern Europe and USD 31.2 million to Far East Asia.

Figure 40.4. Share of bilateral ODA by region, 2012-13 average, gross disbursements, Poland

Note: 8% of bilateral ODA allocated was unspecified by region in 2012-13. This share is not represented on the map.

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933245743

91% of bilateral country-allocable ODA went to Poland’s top 10 recipients. Poland divides its geographical priorities into two groups: Eastern Partnership countries and selected countries of Africa, Central Asia and the Middle East. Its support to fragile states reached USD 8.6 million in 2013 (6.1% of gross bilateral ODA).

Figure 40.5. Bilateral country-allocable ODA to top recipients, 2012-13 average, gross disbursements, Poland

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933245751

In 2013, 34% of bilateral ODA was allocated to least developed countries (LDCs), amounting to USD 47.2 million. This is an important increase compared to 9% in 2012, and is higher than the 2013 DAC average of 31%. Upper middle-income countries still received the highest share of bilateral ODA in 2013 (36%, compared to 61% in 2012).

At 0.03% of GNI in 2013, total ODA to LDCs was far below the UN target of 0.15% of GNI.

Figure 40.6. Bilateral ODA by income group, two year averages, gross disbursements, Poland

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933245769

In 2013, 42% of bilateral ODA was allocated to social infrastructure and services, reaching USD 60 million, with a strong focus on education (USD 30 million) and government and civil society (USD 24 million). Priority sectors vary among Eastern European countries and its other partner countries. Poland has two priority sectors in its Eastern European partner countries: 1) democratisation and human rights; and 2) support to political and economic transformation. Partner countries in Asia and Africa are supported in the areas of education, environment, development of small and medium-size enterprises (SMEs), and professionalisation of the public administration.

Figure 40.7. Share of bilateral ODA by sector, 2013, commitments, Poland

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933245770

Gender equality is a cross-cutting priority. Gender equality and women’s empowerment are among the focus areas of Poland’s development co-operation and an integral part of its thematic priority of democracy and human rights. Poland supports projects targeted at enhancing the social and economic status of women and girls in partner countries such as Afghanistan, as well as in other partner countries. All projects supported by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs must integrate gender equality and women’s empowerment as a cross-cutting theme.

Caring for the natural environment, the sustainable use of natural resources and combating climate change remain among the key principles of Polish development co-operation. Counteracting environmental degradation, climate change mitigation and adaptation are integrated into Poland’s sector support. Environmental impact assessments are required for all development projects submitted to “Polish Development Aid”. Measures to redress possible negative impacts must be identified. Poland has recently hosted international meetings devoted to climate change (Poznan UN Climate Change Conference in 2008 and Warsaw UN Climate Change Conference in 2013). USD 2.4 million (or 1.7%) of bilateral aid supported the environment in 2013, focusing mostly on climate change.

Figure 40.8. Bilateral ODA in support of global and local environment objectives, 2013, commitments, Poland

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933245786

Note to reader: Annex B provides “Methodological notes on definitions and measurement for the Profiles of Development Assistance Committee members”.

Portugal

Financial flows from Portugal to developing countries

Figure 41.1. Net resource flows to developing countries, 2003-13, Portugal

Note: Data on other official flows are not available for 2008-10.

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933245796

Portugal uses ODA to mobilise other resources for sustainable development

Portugal contributes to the mobilisation of domestic resources in developing countries by supporting their tax systems. In 2013, it is estimated that Portugal committed USD 111 000 of its official development assistance (ODA) to tax-related activities in partner countries.

It promotes aid for trade to improve developing countries’ trade performance and integration into the world economy. It committed USD 23 million (13% of sector-allocable ODA) to trade-related activities in 2013, up 1% in real terms from 2012.

It invests in building up national statistical capacities and systems in partner countries so they can monitor their development goals. It committed USD 0.6 million to this effort in 2013.

The new Portuguese Co-operation Strategy prioritises the environment, green growth, energy (including renewable energy), rural development and the sea along with its traditional areas of focus such as education, health, peace and security.

Portugal promotes the effective use of resources for sustainable development by:

Enabling developing country ownership through the way it delivers its aid. In 2013, 96% of Portugal’s aid scheduled for the government sector in partner countries was recorded on partners’ national budgets, well above the agreed minimum target of 85% for 2015. In 2013, 23% of Portugal’s development assistance to the government sector was channelled through partners’ public financial management and procurement systems, still below the 2015 target of 57%.

Taking steps to build results into programming by strengthening the project cycle and performance assessment, as well as developing sector and country-level impact evaluation tools.

Making its aid predictable. In 2013, the annual predictability of Portuguese development assistance was 89% (the 2015 target is to disburse 90% of funding as scheduled). Medium-term predictability was lower, at 80%.

Untying aid. Portugal’s share of untied ODA (excluding administrative costs and in-donor refugee costs) was 30% in 2013 (up from 24.6% in 2012), compared to the DAC average of 83.2%.

Portugal’s official development assistance

In 2014, Portugal provided USD 419 million in net ODA (preliminary data), which represented 0.19% of gross national income (GNI) and a fall of 14.9% in real terms from 2013 due to a decrease in its lending. Portugal’s ODA has fallen since 2011, both in volume and as a percentage of GNI. Portugal is the 20th largest Development Assistance Committee (DAC) donor in terms of ODA as a percentage of GNI, and the 23rd donor by volume. The grant element of total ODA was 87.7% in 2013.

Figure 41.2. Net ODA: Trends in volume and as a share of GNI, 1998-2014, Portugal

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933245802

In 2013, 65% of ODA was provided bilaterally. Portugal allocated 35% of total ODA as core contributions to multilateral organisations, compared with the DAC country average of 27%. It channelled a further 2% of its bilateral ODA to specific projects implemented by multilateral organisations (multi-bi/non-core contributions).

Figure 41.3. Share of ODA channelled to and through the multilateral system, two year averages, gross disbursements, Portugal

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933245815

In 2013, 88% of bilateral ODA was programmed at partner country level. This share of country programmable aid (CPA) was very high compared with the DAC 2013 country average of 54.5%. Project-type interventions made up 95% of CPA.

Figure 41.4. Composition of bilateral ODA, 2013, gross disbursements, Portugal

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933245824

In 2013, USD 15.2 million of bilateral ODA was channelled to and through civil society organisations (CSOs). Portugal’s ODA to and through CSOs fell between 2012 and 2013 in volume (-11%), but increased slightly as a share of bilateral aid (from 3.8% to 4.4%). This share was low compared to the 2013 DAC country average of 16%, however.

Figure 41.5. Bilateral ODA to and through CSOs, two year averages, gross disbursements, Portugal

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933245837

Bilateral ODA is primarily focused on sub-Saharan Africa. In 2013, USD 285.7 million was allocated to this region.

Figure 41.6. Share of bilateral ODA by region, 2012-13 average, gross disbursements, Portugal

Note: 4% of bilateral ODA allocated was unspecified by region in 2012-13. This share is not represented on the map.

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933245842

99% of bilateral country-allocable ODA went to Portugal’s top 10 recipients. Portugal’s programme is highly focused on six Portuguese-speaking priority partner countries, all of which are among its top 10 recipients. Its support to fragile states reached USD 27.6 million in 2013 (8.1% of gross bilateral ODA).

Figure 41.7. Bilateral country-allocable ODA to top recipients, 2012-13 average, gross disbursements, Portugal

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933245850

In 2013, 40% of bilateral ODA was allocated to least developed countries (LDCs), amounting to USD 138.6 million. As a share of bilateral ODA, it has decreased in recent years (it was 62% in 2011 and 52% in 2010), but it is still higher than the 2013 DAC average of 31%. Lower middle-income countries received the highest share of bilateral ODA in 2013 (48%).

At 0.07% of GNI in 2013, total ODA to LDCs was below the UN target of 0.15% of GNI.

Figure 41.8. Bilateral ODA by income group, two year averages, gross disbursements, Portugal

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933245869

In 2013, 41% of bilateral ODA was allocated to programme assistance, amounting to USD 130 million. USD 145 million was allocated to social infrastructure and services, with a strong focus on education (USD 53 million). USD 20 million was allocated to energy generation and supply (included under ODA to economic infrastructure and services).

Figure 41.9. Share of bilateral ODA by sector, 2012-13 average, commitments, Portugal

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933245878

USD 53 million of bilateral ODA supported gender equality. Gender equality is prioritised in Portugal’s policy for development co-operation and has been progressively integrated into bilateral programming with its main partner countries. In 2013, 30% of Portuguese bilateral sector-allocable aid had gender equality and women’s empowerment as a principal or significant objective, compared with the DAC country average of 31%. This is a decrease from 38% in 2012, but an increase from the 6% in 2008. A high share of Portugal’s aid to population, reproductive health and education focuses on gender.

Figure 41.10. Share of bilateral ODA in support of gender equality by sector, 2013, commitments, Portugal

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933245889

USD 24 million of bilateral ODA supported the environment in 2013. Portugal’s share of environment-focused ODA has increased in recent years. Nevertheless, integrating the environment and climate change across its development co-operation remains a challenge. In 2013, 8% of its bilateral aid supported the environment, and 7% focused specifically on climate change, compared with the respective DAC country averages of 23% and 16%.

Figure 41.11. Bilateral ODA in support of global and local environment objectives, two year averages, commitments, Portugal

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933245895

Note to reader: Annex B provides “Methodological notes on definitions and measurement for the Profiles of Development Assistance Committee members”.

Slovak Republic

Financial flows from the Slovak Republic to developing countries

In 2014, the Slovak Republic provided USD 81 million in net ODA (preliminary data), which represented 0.08% of gross national income (GNI) and a 5.1% decrease in real terms from 2013. The Slovak Republic is committed to gradually meeting ODA targets adopted at the EU level when the economy recovers. The Slovak Republic is the 27th largest Development Assistance Committee (DAC) donor in terms of ODA as a percentage of GNI, and 26th by volume. The grant element of total ODA was 100% in 2013. At present, data on other official flows, private grants (funds raised by non-governmental organisations and foundations) and private flows at market terms from the Slovak Republic to developing countries are not available.

Figure 42.1. Net ODA: Trends in volume and as a share of GNI, 2006-14, Slovak Republic

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933245902

The Slovak Republic uses ODA to mobilise other resources for sustainable development

The Slovak Republic contributes to the mobilisation of domestic resources in developing countries by supporting initiatives to strengthen the tax systems of its partner countries (e.g. via knowledge transfer) as well as by supporting co-ordinated EU efforts in this area.

It promotes aid for trade to improve developing countries’ trade performance and integration into the world economy. It committed USD 1 million to trade-related activities in 2013 (11% of its sector-allocable ODA).

It invests in building up national statistical capacities and systems in partner countries so they can monitor their development goals. In particular, the Slovak Republic supports initiatives aimed at standardising statistical reporting on key public finance and economic indicators in selected partner countries, mostly in the Western Balkans. The Slovak Republic is also engaged in an EU project aimed at improving methodological and dissemination aspects of regional statistics in Moldova.

It invests in agriculture and forestry, water and sanitation, and the energy sectors through its development co-operation, all directly relevant to climate change.

The Slovak Republic promotes the effective use of resources for sustainable development by:

Making the principles of effective development co-operation key principles in its Medium-Term Strategy for Development Cooperation (2014-18). Its goal is to achieve maximum impact using available financial resources, emphasising the responsibility of partner countries for their own development, aligning to their national development priorities, and paying attention to the co-ordination and division of labour with other development partners and supporting EU joint programming.

Taking steps to strengthen results monitoring by developing a new monitoring and evaluation strategy and subsequent methodological guidelines, and allocating financial resources to evaluating development co-operation activities.

Untying aid. The Slovak Republic’s share of untied ODA (excluding administrative costs and in-donor refugee costs) was 15.2% in 2013, compared to the DAC average of 83.2%.

The Slovak Republic’s official development assistance

In 2013, 19% of the Slovak Republic’s ODA was provided bilaterally, while 81% of total ODA was allocated as core contributions to multilateral organisations (well above the DAC country average of 27%). The major share of its multilateral aid (i.e. 89%) went to fulfil its assessed contribution to the EU (including the European Development Fund). It also contributed to several other international organisations, notably the European Investment Bank, the United Nations system and the World Bank Group. It channelled a further 2% of its bilateral ODA to specific projects implemented by multilateral organisations (multi-bi/non-core contributions).

Figure 42.2. Share of ODA channelled to and through the multilateral system, two year averages, gross disbursements, Slovak Republic

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933245915

In 2013, 69% of bilateral ODA was programmed at partner country level. Its share of country programmable aid (CPA) was well above the DAC country average (54.5%). Project-type interventions made up 47% of CPA.

Figure 42.3. Composition of bilateral ODA, 2013, gross disbursements, Slovak Republic

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933245926

In 2013, USD 4.9 million of bilateral ODA was channelled to and through civil society organisations (CSOs). This was equivalent to 31% of bilateral ODA, compared with the DAC average of 16%.

Bilateral ODA is primarily focused on Eastern Europe. In 2013, USD 4.5 million was allocated to Eastern Europe, USD 3.3 million to South and Central Asia and USD 2.5 million to sub-Saharan Africa.

Figure 42.4. Share of bilateral ODA by region, 2012-13 average, gross disbursements, Slovak Republic

Note: 39% of bilateral ODA allocated was unspecified by region in 2012-13. This share is not represented on the map.

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933245932

80% of bilateral country-allocable ODA went to the Slovak Republic’s top 10 recipients. It focuses on ten priority partners of which there are three programme countries (Afghanistan, Kenya, Moldova), six project countries (Albania, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, Kosovo, Ukraine) and South Sudan. Seven priority countries are among its top 10 recipients. In 2013, its support to fragile states reached USD 5.9 million (36.7% of gross bilateral ODA).

Figure 42.5. Bilateral country-allocable ODA to top recipients, 2012-13 average, gross disbursements, Slovak Republic

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933245945

In 2013, 21% of bilateral ODA was allocated to least developed countries (LDCs), amounting to USD 3.3 million. The share fell sharply between 2008 (63%) and 2009 (3%), and has since then slightly increased. LDCs received the highest share of bilateral ODA, noting the high share unallocated by income group (30%) in 2013, and compared to the 31% total DAC average.

At 0.02% of GNI in 2013, total ODA to LDCs was far below the UN target of 0.15% of GNI.

Figure 42.6. Bilateral ODA by income group, two year averages, gross disbursements, Slovak Republic

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933245956

Almost 60% of bilateral ODA (USD 8 million) was allocated to social infrastructure and services in 2013, with a strong focus on education (USD 4 million) and support to government and civil society (USD 3 million). The Slovak Republic’s bilateral co-operation focuses on seven areas: education, healthcare, good governance and building of civil society, agriculture and forestry, water and sanitation, energy, and building a market environment. Priority sectors of engagement are identified in the country strategy papers for programme countries. The Slovak Republic will support sectors in its “project” countries on the basis of the diverse needs of the countries undergoing transformation and on the Slovak Republic’s own experience.

Figure 42.7. Share of bilateral ODA by sector, 2013, commitments, Slovak Republic

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933245969

USD 1 million of bilateral ODA supported gender equality. The Slovak Republic considers that gender equality and women’s empowerment are crucial for eradicating poverty and promoting economic growth and social development. It plans to mainstream gender equality into its development co-operation programme. In 2013, 8% of Slovak bilateral sector-allocable aid had gender equality and women’s empowerment as a principal or significant objective, compared with the DAC country average of 31%. A high share of Slovak aid to other social infrastructure and productive sectors focuses on gender.

Figure 42.8. Share of bilateral ODA in support of gender equality by sector, 2013, commitments, Slovak Republic

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933245972

Integrating the environment into development co-operation. The Slovak Republic strives to integrate the environment and climate change into its development co-operation, in accordance with its commitments to mitigation, adaptation and protection of biodiversity. USD 1.4 million (10.2%) of bilateral ODA supported the environment in 2013; 5.4% of bilateral ODA focused specifically on climate change.

Figure 42.9. Bilateral ODA in support of global and local environment objectives, 2013, commitments, Slovak Republic

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933245983

Note to reader: Annex B provides “Methodological notes on definitions and measurement for the Profiles of Development Assistance Committee members”.

Slovenia

Financial flows from Slovenia to developing countries

In 2014, Slovenia provided USD 62 million in net ODA (preliminary data), which represented 0.13% of gross national income (GNI) and a 0.3% decrease in real terms from 2013. Slovenia is the 24th largest donor of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) in terms of official development assistance (ODA) as a percentage of GNI and the 27th donor in terms of volume. The grant element of total ODA was 100% in 2013. At present, data on other official flows, private grants (funds raised by non-governmental organisations and foundations) and private flows at market terms from Slovenia to developing countries are not available.

Figure 43.1. Net ODA: Trends in volume and as a share of GNI, 2005-14, Slovenia

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933245992

Slovenia uses ODA to mobilise other resources for sustainable development

Slovenia contributes to the mobilisation of domestic resources in developing countries by supporting their tax systems. In 2013, it is estimated that Slovenia committed USD 41 000 of its ODA to tax-related activities in partner countries.

It promotes aid for trade to improve developing countries’ trade performance and integration into the world economy. It committed USD 1 million to trade-related activities in 2013 (8% of its sector-allocable ODA), an 18% decrease in real terms from 2012. The trend has been decreasing over the past few years.

It prioritises environmental protection in its development co-operation with an emphasis placed on sustainable water management.

Slovenia promotes the effective use of resources for sustainable development by:

Improving the quality and impact of its aid by implementing and monitoring commitments on aid effectiveness. National ownership, donor co-ordination and harmonisation, alignment to recipient country systems and a result-oriented approach are core principles for Slovenian development co-operation. Slovenia is also co-ordinating its development co-operation activities with other countries, especially through its embassies in the Western Balkans.

Slovenia’s official development assistance

In 2013, 34% of ODA was provided bilaterally. In 2013, 66% of Slovenia’s ODA was channelled to multilateral organisations, compared with the DAC country average of 27%. Slovenia principally allocated its multilateral contributions to the European Union (EU general budget and European Development Fund) to meet its mandatory contributions. The remainder of Slovenia’s multilateral ODA consisted of contributions to the World Bank Group, as well as small contributions to the Global Environment Facility and the United Nations agencies. It channelled a further 10% of its bilateral ODA for specific projects implemented by multilateral organisations (multi-bi/non-core contributions).

Figure 43.2. Share of ODA channelled to and through the multilateral system, two year averages, gross disbursements, Slovenia

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933246002

In 2013, 45% of bilateral ODA was programmed at partner country level. Slovenia’s share of country programmable aid (CPA) was lower than the DAC country average (54.5%). Project-type interventions made up 54% of CPA. Administrative costs amounted to 30% of bilateral aid.

Figure 43.3. Composition of bilateral ODA, 2013, gross disbursements, Slovenia

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933246017

In 2013, USD 4.2 million of bilateral ODA was channelled to and through civil society organisations (CSOs). This was equivalent to 20% of bilateral ODA, compared with the DAC average of 16%. Aid to and through CSOs decreased between 2012 and 2013, both in volume (-7%) and as a share of bilateral ODA (from 23% to 20%).

Figure 43.4. Bilateral ODA to and through CSOs, 2012-13 average, gross disbursements, Slovenia

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933246023

Bilateral ODA primarily focused on Eastern Europe (with a strong emphasis on South East Europe). In 2013, USD 10.5 million was allocated to Eastern Europe and USD 1 million to sub-Saharan Africa.

Figure 43.5. Share of bilateral ODA by region, 2012-13 average, gross disbursements, Slovenia

Note: 38% of bilateral ODA allocated was unspecified by region in 2012-13. This share is not represented on the map.

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933246033

92% of bilateral country-allocable ODA went to Slovenia’s top 10 recipients. Slovenia has eight priority partner countries and its ODA to the top 10 recipients is strongly concentrated. In 2013, its support to fragile states reached USD 3.4 million (16.5% of gross bilateral ODA).

Figure 43.6. Bilateral country-allocable ODA to top recipients, 2012-13 average, gross disbursements, Slovenia

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933246044

In 2013, 3% of bilateral ODA was allocated to least developed countries (LDCs), amounting to USD 0.6 million. The share has decreased from 6% in 2010 and 8% in 2011. Upper middle-income countries received the highest share of bilateral ODA in 2013 (40%).

At 0.02% of gross national income (GNI) in 2013, total ODA to LDCs was far below the UN target of 0.15% of GNI.

Figure 43.7. Bilateral ODA by income group, two year averages, gross disbursements, Slovenia

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933246056

Half of Slovenia’s bilateral ODA was allocated to social infrastructure and services in 2013 (USD 10 million), with a strong focus on support to government and civil society (USD 4.3 million), and education (USD 3.9 million). Until the end of 2015, Slovenia’s bilateral co-operation will focus on social services; economic services and infrastructure; and multi-sectoral priorities (including climate change adaptation and good governance).

Figure 43.8. Share of bilateral ODA by sector, 2012-13 average, commitments, Slovenia

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933246064

USD 1 million of bilateral ODA supported gender equality. Women’s empowerment is one of the cross-cutting themes of Slovenia’s development co-operation. The Ministry for Foreign Affairs has developed a Draft Gender Strategy. In 2013, 10% of Slovenian bilateral sector-allocable aid had gender equality and women’s empowerment as a principal or significant objective, compared with the DAC country average of 31%.

The environment is a priority theme. Environmental protection, with a focus on sustainable water management, is one of the priority themes for Slovenia’s development co-operation. In 2011, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs developed a Sustainable Water Management Strategy. USD 2 million (or 12%) of bilateral aid supported the environment in 2013; 8% of bilateral aid focused specifically on climate change.

Figure 43.9. Bilateral ODA in support of global and local environment objectives, two year averages, commitments, Slovenia

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933246071

Note to reader: Annex B provides “Methodological notes on definitions and measurement for the Profiles of Development Assistance Committee members”.

Spain

Financial flows from Spain to developing countries

Figure 44.1. Net resource flows to developing countries, 2003-13, Spain

Note: Data on private grants available from 2012; data on other official flows are not available for 2006, 2008 and 2010.

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933246083

Spain uses ODA to mobilise other resources for sustainable development

It promotes aid for trade to improve developing countries’ trade performance and integration into the world economy. It committed USD 96 million to trade-related activities in 2013 (21% of its sector-allocable official development assistance [ODA]), a 7% increase in real terms from 2012. This is the first increase in real terms since 2010.

It invests in building up national statistical capacities and systems in partner countries so they can monitor their development goals. It committed USD 0.2 million to this effort in 2013.

It invests in climate mitigation where it emphasises energy access, efficiency, renewables, sustainable forest management and eco-tourism. Its support to adaptation focuses on agricultural diversity and building and reinforcing resilience. Spain has pledged USD 160 million (EUR 120 million) to the Green Climate Fund, which plays a key role in channelling resources to developing countries and catalysing climate finance at the international and national levels.

Spain promotes the effective use of resources for sustainable development by:

Enabling developing country ownership through the way it delivers its aid. There is scope to make further progress. In 2013, 57% of Spain’s aid scheduled for the government sector in partner countries was recorded on partners’ national budgets. This is far below the agreed minimum 2015 target of at least 85%. In 2013, 48% of Spain’s development assistance to the government sector was channelled through partners’ public financial management and procurement systems, not far off the 2015 target of 57%.

Taking important steps to build results into programming. Spain is committed to improving its results-based management system and is developing a monitoring system to capture the country-level results of its programmes. Efforts are also being made to build a results culture through training and guidelines.

Making its aid predictable. In 2013, the annual predictability of Spanish development assistance was 69%. This is below the 2015 target of disbursing 90% of funding as scheduled. Medium-term predictability was lower, at 39%.

Untying aid. Spain’s share of untied ODA (excluding administrative costs and in-donor refugee costs) increased from 83.4% in 2012 to 85.1% in 2013. It is just above the DAC average of 83.2%.

Spain’s official development assistance

In 2014, Spain provided USD 1.9 billion in net ODA (preliminary data), which represented 0.14% of gross national income (GNI) and a 20.3% decrease in real terms from 2013 due mainly to lower levels of debt relief. Spain is the 22nd Development Assistance Committee (DAC) donor in terms of ODA as a percentage of GNI, and 15th largest by volume. Spain is currently not on track to meet its commitment to reach the 0.7% ODA/GNI target by 2015, since its ODA experienced an important decrease both in terms of volume and as a percentage of GNI between 2009 and 2012 and continued to fall in 2014. The grant element of total ODA was 100% in 2013.

Figure 44.2. Net ODA: Trends in volume and as a share of GNI, 1998-2014, Spain

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933246094

In 2013, 45% of Spain’s ODA was provided bilaterally. It allocated 55% of total ODA as core contributions to multilateral organisations, compared to the DAC country average of 27%. It channelled a further 5% of its bilateral ODA to specific projects implemented by multilateral organisations (multi-bi/non-core contributions).

Figure 44.3. Share of ODA channelled to and through the multilateral system, two year averages, gross disbursements, Spain

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933246107

In 2013, 36% of bilateral ODA was programmed at partner country level. Spain’s share of country programmable aid (CPA) was lower than the DAC country average (54.5%). This results from the high percentage of unallocated aid and a high amount of debt relief. Project-type interventions accounted for 81% of CPA.

Figure 44.4. Composition of bilateral ODA, 2013, gross disbursements, Spain

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933246112

In 2013, USD 384.6 million of bilateral ODA was channelled to and through civil society organisations (CSOs). ODA channelled to and through CSOs fell between 2012 and 2013 both in volume (-12%) and as a share of bilateral aid (from 39% in 2012 to 33% in 2013). The share provided in 2013 is above the DAC country average of 16%.

Figure 44.5. Bilateral ODA to and through CSOs, two year averages, gross disbursements, Spain

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933246125

Bilateral ODA is primarily focused on sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean. In 2013, USD 396.9 million was allocated to sub-Saharan Africa (a big increase of 49% in real terms since 2012), and USD 336 million to the American continent (a large fall from 2011 volumes).

Figure 44.6. Share of bilateral ODA by region, 2012-13 average, gross disbursements, Spain

Note: 25% of ODA allocated was unspecified by region in 2012-13. This share is not represented on the map.

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933246131

52% of bilateral country-allocable ODA went to Spain’s top 10 recipients. Spain reduced the number of its priority partner countries from 50 in 2012 to 23 in 2013. Seven of its top 10 recipients are priority partner countries. In 2013, its support to fragile states reached USD 385.23 million (32.8% of gross bilateral ODA).

Figure 44.7. Bilateral country-allocable ODA to top recipients, 2012-13 average, gross disbursements, Spain

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933246147

In 2013, 15% of bilateral ODA was allocated to least developed countries (LDCs), amounting to USD 170.7 million. This is down from 25% in 2012, and is far below the 2013 DAC average of 31%. Lower middle-income countries received the highest share of bilateral ODA in 2013 (39%).

At 0.03% of GNI in 2013, total ODA to LDCs was far below the UN target of 0.15% of GNI.

Figure 44.8. Bilateral ODA by income group, two year averages, gross disbursements, Spain

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933246151

In 2013, 33% of bilateral ODA (USD 313 million) was allocated to social infrastructure and services, with a strong focus on support to government and civil society (USD 90 million), water and sanitation (USD 71 million) and education (USD 56 million). USD 244 million was allocated to debt relief and USD 58 million to agriculture (accounted as ODA to production sectors).

Figure 44.9. Share of bilateral ODA by sector, 2012-13 average, commitments, Spain

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933246163

USD 186 million of bilateral ODA supported gender equality. Gender equality has been integrated into Spain’s projects and programmes. In 2013, 42% of Spanish bilateral sector-allocable aid had gender equality and women’s empowerment as a principal or significant objective, above the DAC country average of 31%. This is down from 2012 (when it was 54%). A high share of Spain’s aid to population, reproductive health and education focuses on gender.

Figure 44.10. Share of bilateral ODA in support of gender equality by sector, 2013, commitments, Spain

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933246175

USD 215 million of Spain’s bilateral ODA supported the environment in 2013. Spain is committed to ensuring the environment is mainstreamed into its projects and programmes, but implementation challenges remain. While there was a significant decrease in the volume of bilateral ODA focusing on the environment between 2010-11 and 2012-13 (as a consequence of an important decrease in total ODA), the share of bilateral ODA to the environment did not decline so steeply over this period. In 2013, 23% of Spanish bilateral aid supported the environment, and 18% focused particularly on climate change, compared with the respective DAC country averages of 23% and 16%.

Figure 44.11. Bilateral ODA in support of global and local environment objectives, two year averages, commitments, Spain

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933246180

Note to reader: Annex B provides “Methodological notes on definitions and measurement for the Profiles of Development Assistance Committee members”.

Sweden

Financial flows from Sweden to developing countries

Figure 45.1. Net resource flows to developing countries, 2003-13, Sweden

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933246199

Sweden uses ODA to mobilise other resources for sustainable development

Sweden contributes to the mobilisation of domestic resources in developing countries by supporting their tax systems. In 2013, it is estimated that Sweden committed USD 7.3 million of its official development assistance (ODA) to tax-related activities in partner countries.

It promotes aid for trade to improve developing countries’ trade performance and integration into the world economy. It committed USD 508 million (21% of its sector-allocable ODA) to trade-related activities in 2013, a 29% increase in real terms from 2012. The trend has been increasing in recent years.

It invests in building up national statistical capacities and systems in partner countries so they can monitor their development goals. It committed USD 17.3 million to this effort in 2013.

It prioritises the environment and climate in its development co-operation and emphasises sustainable energy alternatives, cities, increased resilience and the management of ecosystems and ecosystem services. Sweden has pledged USD 581 million (SEK 4 billion) to the Green Climate Fund, which plays a key role in channelling resources to developing countries and catalysing climate finance at the international and national levels.

Sweden promotes the effective use of resources for sustainable development by:

Enabling developing country ownership through the way it delivers its aid. In 2013, 92% of Sweden’s aid scheduled for the government sector in partner countries was recorded on partners’ national budgets, well above the agreed minimum 2015 target of at least 85%. In 2013, 49% of Sweden’s development assistance to the government sector was channelled through partners’ public financial management and procurement systems, not far from the 2015 target of 57%.

Placing a strong emphasis on planning for, and monitoring of, programme results, especially at the country level. Where possible, Sweden identifies its programme results from indicators in its partners’ monitoring frameworks and assesses progress jointly against these shared indicators. Sweden is striving to move its measurement from outputs to outcomes.

Making its aid predictable. In 2013, the annual predictability of Swedish development assistance was 84%. This is just below the 2015 target of 90% of funding disbursed as scheduled. Medium-term predictability was lower, at 78%.

Untying aid. Sweden’s share of untied ODA (excluding administrative costs and in-donor refugee costs) increased from 93% in 2012 to 94% in 2013 and is above the DAC average of 83.2%.

Sweden’s official development assistance

In 2014, Sweden provided USD 6.2 billion in net ODA (preliminary data), which represented 1.1% of gross national income (GNI) and an 11% increase in real terms from 2013 driven by an increase in bilateral grants. Sweden is the largest Development Assistance Committee (DAC) donor in terms of ODA as a percentage of GNI, and the sixth largest by volume. Sweden is one of only five DAC members to have met the UN target of 0.7% and it is committed to continue delivering 1% of its GNI to ODA. The grant element of total ODA was 100% in 2013.

Figure 45.2. Net ODA: Trends in volume and as a share of GNI, 1998-2014, Sweden

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933246202

In 2013, 68% of ODA was provided bilaterally. Sweden allocated 32% of total ODA as core contributions to multilateral organisations, compared with the DAC country average of 27%. It channelled a further 25% of its bilateral ODA to specific projects implemented by multilateral organisations (multi-bi/non-core contributions).

Figure 45.3. Share of ODA channelled to and through the multilateral system, two year averages, gross disbursements, Sweden

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933246216

In 2013, 37% of bilateral ODA was programmed at partner country level. Sweden’s share of country programmable aid (CPA) was lower than the DAC country average (54.5%). This is mainly due to high levels of spending on refugees in Sweden, humanitarian and food aid and a large percentage of bilateral aid that is unallocated. Project-type interventions accounted for 53% of CPA.

Figure 45.4. Composition of bilateral ODA, 2013, gross disbursements, Sweden

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933246229

In 2013, USD 1.1 billion of bilateral ODA was channelled to and through civil society organisations (CSOs). ODA channelled to and through CSOs has increased in recent years in volume (+7% between 2012 and 2013), but has remained stable as a share of bilateral aid. This share (28% in 2013) was higher than the DAC country average of 16%.

Figure 45.5. Bilateral ODA to and through CSOs, two year averages, gross disbursements, Sweden

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933246234

Bilateral ODA is primarily focused on sub-Saharan Africa. In 2013, USD 1.1 billion was allocated to sub-Saharan Africa, USD 269.5 million to South and Central Asia and USD 222.2 million to the Middle East.

Figure 45.6. Share of bilateral ODA by region, 2012-13 average, gross disbursements, Sweden

Note: 49% of bilateral ODA allocated was unspecified by region in 2012-13. This share is not represented on the map.

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933246245

46% of bilateral country-allocable ODA went to Sweden’s top 10 recipients. All of its top 10 recipients are priority partners for Sweden. In 2013, its support to fragile states reached USD 1.1 billion (26.9% of gross bilateral ODA).

Figure 45.7. Bilateral country-allocable ODA to top recipients, 2012-13, gross disbursements, Sweden

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933246257

In 2013, 27% of bilateral ODA (USD 1.1 billion) was allocated to least developed countries (LDCs). The share has slightly increased from 26% in 2012, but is still below the DAC average of 31% in 2013. LDCs receive the highest share of bilateral ODA, noting that 55% was unallocated by income group in 2013.

At 0.31% of GNI in 2013, total ODA to LDCs far exceeds the UN target of 0.15% GNI.

Figure 45.8. Bilateral ODA by income group, two year averages, gross disbursements, Sweden

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933246263

In 2013, 40% of bilateral ODA was allocated to social infrastructure and services, for a total of USD 1.6 billion, with a strong focus on support to government and civil society (USD 943 million). Humanitarian aid amounted to USD 368 million.

Figure 45.9. Share of bilateral ODA by sector, 2012-13 average, commitments, Sweden

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933246276

USD 1.9 billion of bilateral ODA supported gender equality. Gender equality has been solidly integrated into Sweden’s projects and programmes (OECD, 2014). In 2013, 81% of Swedish bilateral sector-allocable aid had gender equality and women’s empowerment as a principal or significant objective, compared with the DAC country average of 31%. Sweden has also been striving to promote gender mainstreaming in its multilateral partners’ activities, in particular the World Bank.

Figure 45.10. Share of bilateral ODA in support of gender equality by sector, 2013, commitments, Sweden

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933246285

USD 1.3 billion of bilateral ODA supported the environment in 2013. Sweden has integrated the environment into its programmes and projects. In 2013, 33% of its bilateral aid supported the environment, and 15% focused on climate change, compared with the respective DAC country averages of 23% and 16%. The share of bilateral ODA supporting the environment has declined steadily, from 46% in 2008-09 to 32% in 2012-13. The volume fell significantly between 2008 and 2011, and has remained at 2011 levels.

Figure 45.11. Bilateral ODA in support of global and local environment objectives, two year averages, commitments, Sweden

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933246292

Note to reader: Annex B provides “Methodological notes on definitions and measurement for the Profiles of Development Assistance Committee members”.

Reference

OECD (2014), OECD Development Co-operation Peer Reviews: Sweden 2013, OECD Development Co-operation Peer Reviews, OECD Publishing, Paris, http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264196254-en.

Switzerland

Financial flows from Switzerland to developing countries

Figure 46.1. Net resource flows to developing countries, 2003-13, Switzerland

Note: Data on other official flows are not available for 2004, 2005 and from 2007.

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933246304

Switzerland uses ODA to mobilise other resources for sustainable development

Switzerland contributes to the mobilisation of domestic resources in developing countries by supporting their tax systems. In 2013, it is estimated that Switzerland committed USD 7.7 million of its official development assistance (ODA) to tax-related activities in partner countries. It is likely that this amount understates the efforts undertaken by Switzerland.

It promotes aid for trade to improve developing countries’ trade performance and integration into the world economy. It committed USD 506 million (23% of its sector-allocable ODA) to trade-related activities in 2013, a 75% increase in real terms from 2012. This strong recovery follows a decrease of 18% in real terms between 2011 and 2012.

It invests in building up national statistical capacities and systems in partner countries so they can monitor their development goals. It committed USD 12.6 million to this effort in 2013.

It prioritises climate change through a global programme and supports this through multilateral processes and financing, mitigation, adaptation and knowledge management. Switzerland has pledged USD 100 million to the Green Climate Fund, which plays a key role in channelling resources to developing countries and catalysing climate finance at the international and national levels.

Switzerland promotes the effective use of resources for sustainable development by:

Enabling developing country ownership through the way it delivers its aid. There is scope to make further progress. In 2013, 32% of Switzerland’s aid scheduled for the government sector in partner countries was recorded on partners’ national budgets. This is far below the agreed minimum 2015 target of at least 85%. In 2013, 35% of Switzerland’s development assistance to the government sector was channelled through partners’ public financial management and procurement systems, below the 2015 target of 57%.

Working to institutionalise its results-based management approach by standardising results planning and monitoring tools at the country and corporate level, and ensuring that results feed into management’s strategic decision making in a consistent manner.

Making its aid predictable. In 2013, the annual predictability of Swiss development assistance was 84%, just below the 2015 target of 90% of funding disbursed as scheduled. Medium-term predictability was lower, at 77%.

Untying aid. Switzerland’s share of untied ODA (excluding administrative costs and in-donor refugee costs) has increased from 93.1% in 2012 to 94.6% in 2013 and is above the DAC average of 83.2%.

Switzerland’s official development assistance

In 2014, Switzerland provided USD 3.5 billion in net ODA (preliminary data), which represented 0.49% of gross national income (GNI) and a 9.2% increase in real terms from 2013. Switzerland is the 8th largest Development Assistance Committee (DAC) donor in terms of ODA as a percentage of GNI, and the 11th donor by volume. Switzerland is committed to deliver 0.5% of its GNI as ODA by 2015 and is on track to meet this target. The grant element of total ODA was 100% in 2013.

Figure 46.2. Net ODA: Trends in volume and as a share of GNI, 1998-2014, Switzerland

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933246314

In 2013, 79% of ODA was provided bilaterally. Switzerland allocated 21% of total ODA as core contributions to multilateral organisations, compared with the DAC country average of 27%. It channelled a further 21% of its bilateral ODA to specific projects implemented by multilateral organisations (multi-bi/non-core contributions).

Figure 46.3. Share of ODA channelled to and through the multilateral system, two year averages, gross disbursements, Switzerland

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933246321

In 2013, 40% of bilateral ODA was programmed at partner country level. The share of country programmable aid (CPA) was lower than the DAC country average (54.5%) and is a result of relatively high spending on refugees in Switzerland, humanitarian and food aid and a large percentage of bilateral aid that is unallocated. Project-type interventions made up 83% of CPA.

Figure 46.4. Composition of bilateral ODA, 2013, gross disbursements, Switzerland

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933246335

In 2013, USD 716.4 million of bilateral ODA was channelled to and through civil society organisations (CSOs). ODA channelled to and through CSOs increased between 2012 and 2013 both in terms of volume (+10%) and as a share of bilateral aid (from 26% in 2012 to 28% in 2013). The share in 2013 was higher than the DAC country average of 16%.

Figure 46.5. Bilateral ODA to and through CSOs, two year averages, gross disbursements, Switzerland

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933246342

Bilateral ODA primarily focused on sub-Saharan Africa. In 2013, USD 469.1 million was allocated to sub-Saharan Africa, USD 272.8 million to South and Central Asia and USD 206.9 million to Eastern Europe.

Figure 46.6. Share of bilateral ODA by region, 2012-13 average, gross disbursements, Switzerland

Notes: 45% of bilateral ODA allocated was unspecified by region in 2012-13. This share is not represented on the map. In 2013, approximately USD 216 million (CHF 200 million) was allocated in regional contributions which are not captured in the bilateral allocations by region.

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933246355

31% of bilateral country-allocable ODA went to Switzerland’s top 10 recipients. Switzerland has 37 priority partner countries, and all countries on the list of top 10 recipients are priority partners for Switzerland. Swiss support to fragile states reached USD 602.7 million in 2013 (23.8% of gross bilateral ODA).

Figure 46.7. Bilateral country-allocable ODA to top recipients, 2012-13, gross disbursements, Switzerland

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933246361

In 2013, 21% of bilateral ODA was allocated to least developed countries (LDCs), amounting to USD 531 million. This share has remained relatively stable in recent years, but is lower than the 2013 DAC average of 31%. LDCs received the highest share of bilateral ODA, noting that 49% was unallocated by income group in 2013.

At 0.12% of its GNI in 2013, total ODA to LDCs was lower than the UN target of 0.15% of GNI.

Figure 46.8. Bilateral ODA by income group, two year averages, gross disbursements, Switzerland

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933246378

In 2013, 32% of bilateral ODA (USD 1.2 billion) was allocated to social infrastructure and services, with a strong focus on support to government and civil society (USD 480 million) and water and sanitation (USD 298 million). Humanitarian aid amounted to USD 394 million.

Figure 46.9. Share of bilateral ODA by sector, 2012-13 average, commitments, Switzerland

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933246384

USD 441 million of bilateral ODA supported gender equality. Switzerland is committed to integrating gender equality into its projects and programmes (OECD, 2014), but challenges remain. In 2013, 20% of Swiss aid had gender equality and women’s empowerment as a principal or significant objective, compared with the DAC country average of 31%. This is down from 2008 (42%) and 2012 (22%). A high share of Switzerland’s aid to population and reproductive health focuses on gender.

Figure 46.10. Share of bilateral ODA in support of gender equality by sector, 2013, commitments, Switzerland

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933246394

USD 680 million of bilateral ODA supported the environment in 2013. Switzerland is committed to integrating the environment into its programming and projects. In 2013, 18% of its bilateral aid supported the environment, compared with the DAC country average of 23%. This share has strongly increased in recent years. In 2013, 15% of Swiss aid focused specifically on climate change, compared with the DAC country average of 16%.

Figure 46.11. Bilateral ODA in support of global and local environment objectives, two year averages, commitments, Switzerland

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933246407

Note to reader: Annex B provides “Methodological notes on definitions and measurement for the Profiles of Development Assistance Committee members”.

Reference

OECD (2014), OECD Development Co-operation Peer Reviews: Switzerland 2013, OECD Development Co-operation Peer Reviews, OECD Publishing, Paris, http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264196322-en.

United Kingdom

Financial flows from the United Kingdom to developing countries

Figure 47.1. Net resource flows to developing countries, 2003-13, United Kingdom

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933246415

The United Kingdom uses ODA to mobilise other resources for sustainable development

The United Kingdom contributes to the mobilisation of domestic resources in developing countries by supporting their tax systems. In 2013, it is estimated that the United Kingdom committed USD 5.5 million of its official development assistance (ODA) to tax-related activities in partner countries.

It promotes aid for trade to improve developing countries’ trade performance and integration into the world economy. It committed USD 968 million (20% of sector-allocable ODA) to trade-related activities in 2013, a 3% increase in real terms from 2012. The trend has been increasing in recent years after an important fall between 2009 and 2011.

It invests in building up national statistical capacities and systems in partner countries so they can monitor their development goals. It committed USD 28 million to this effort in 2013.

It prioritises climate change in its development co-operation and invests in the International Climate Fund (2011-16), which aims to reduce carbon emissions through promoting low carbon growth, helping the poor to adapt to the effects of climate change and to reduce deforestation. The United Kingdom has also pledged USD 1.2 billion (GBP 720 million) to the Green Climate Fund, which plays a key role in channelling resources to developing countries and catalysing climate finance at the international and national levels.

The United Kingdom promotes the effective use of resources for sustainable development by:

Enabling developing country ownership through the way it delivers its aid. There is scope to make further progress. In 2013, 64% of the United Kingdom’s aid scheduled for government-to-government co-operation in partner countries was recorded on partners’ national budgets – while the agreed minimum target for 2015 is at least 85%; and 59% was channelled through partners’ public financial management and procurement systems, above the 2015 target of 57%.

Placing strong emphasis on results through a clear results-oriented strategy and a strong results system, using general indicators for corporate reporting and more specific indicators for project management. The 2014 DAC Peer Review encourages the United Kingdom to make further use of its results system to improve performance while looking at ways to limit the administrative burden on staff and partners (OECD, 2014).

Making its aid predictable. In 2013, the annual predictability of UK development assistance was 89% (the 2015 target is to disburse 90% of funding as scheduled). Medium-term predictability was lower, at 85%.

Untying aid. All of the United Kingdom’s ODA (excluding administrative costs and in-donor refugee costs) was untied in 2013 (as well as in 2012), while the DAC average was 83.2%.

The United Kingdom’s official development assistance

In 2014, the United Kingdom provided USD 19.4 billion in net ODA (preliminary data), which represented 0.71% of gross national income (GNI) and a 1.2% increase in real terms from 2013. It is the fifth largest Development Assistance Committee (DAC) donor in terms of ODA as a percentage of GNI, and the second largest by volume. The United Kingdom is one of only five DAC members to have met the UN target of 0.7% of ODA/GNI and it is strongly committed to keep this ratio stable. The grant element of total ODA was 100% in 2013.

Figure 47.2. Net ODA: Trends in volume and as a share of GNI, 1998-2014, United Kingdom

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933246426

In 2013, 60% of ODA was provided bilaterally. The United Kingdom allocated 40% of total ODA as core contributions to multilateral organisations, compared with the DAC country average of 27%. It channelled a further 37% of its bilateral ODA for specific projects implemented by multilateral organisations (multi-bi/non-core contributions).

Figure 47.3. Share of ODA channelled to and through the multilateral system, two year averages, gross disbursements, United Kingdom

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933246436

In 2013, 51% of bilateral ODA was programmed at partner country level. The United Kingdom’s share of country programmable aid (CPA) was close to the DAC country average (54.5%). Project-type interventions accounted for 53% of CPA. A high share of bilateral ODA was categorised as “other and unallocated” aid.

Figure 47.4. Composition of bilateral ODA, 2013, gross disbursements, United Kingdom

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933246441

In 2013, USD 2.1 billion of bilateral ODA was channelled to and through civil society organisations (CSOs). ODA channelled to and through CSOs has increased in recent years in volume (+8.7% between 2012 and 2013), but has slightly decreased as a share of bilateral ODA (from 21% in 2012 to 19% in 2013). The DAC country average share was 16% in 2013.

Figure 47.5. Bilateral ODA to and through CSOs, two year averages, gross disbursements, United Kingdom

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933246456

Bilateral ODA is primarily focused on sub-Saharan Africa. In 2013, USD 3.8 billion was allocated to sub-Saharan Africa and USD 2.1 billion to South and Central Asia.

Figure 47.6. Share of bilateral ODA by region, 2012-13 average, gross disbursements, United Kingdom

Note: 33% of bilateral ODA allocated was unspecified by region in 2012-13. This share is not represented on the map.

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933246460

53% of bilateral country-allocable ODA went to the United Kingdom’s top 10 recipients. The United Kingdom has focused its programme on fewer countries. It now has 28 priority partner countries (down from 43 in 2010). In 2013, its support to fragile states reached USD 4.9 billion (45.1% of gross bilateral ODA).

Figure 47.7. Bilateral country-allocable ODA to top recipients, 2012-13, gross disbursements, United Kingdom

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933246472

In 2013, 34% of bilateral ODA was allocated to least developed countries (LDCs), amounting to USD 3.7 billion. LDCs received the highest share of bilateral ODA in 2013, compared with other income groups and with the 2013 DAC average of 31%.

At 0.24% of GNI in 2013, total ODA to LDCs was well above the UN target of 0.15% of GNI.

Figure 47.8. Bilateral ODA by income group, two year averages, gross disbursements, United Kingdom

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933246483

Almost half of bilateral ODA was allocated to social infrastructure and services in 2013, at a total of USD 3 billion, with a strong focus on health (USD 839 million) and education (USD 753 million). Humanitarian aid amounted to USD 1 billion.

Figure 47.9. Share of bilateral ODA by sector, 2012-13 average, commitments, United Kingdom

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933246491

USD 2 billion of bilateral ODA supported gender equality. The United Kingdom’s focus on women and girls was reinforced by the 2014 Development Act on Gender Equality. Gender equality is embedded in the bilateral programme, and issues affecting women and girls are also raised on the global stage. In 2013, 61% of the United Kingdom’s bilateral sector-allocable aid had gender equality and women’s empowerment as a principal or significant objective, compared with the DAC country average of 31%. This represents an important increase over 34% in 2008 and 48% in 2012.

Figure 47.10. Share of bilateral ODA in support of gender equality by sector, 2013, commitments, United Kingdom

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933246506

USD 821 million of bilateral ODA supported the environment in 2013. The UK Department for International Development’s (DFID) new “climate and environment assessments” review the impact of its programmes on the vulnerability of poor communities to environmental disasters. In 2013, 13% of its bilateral aid supported the environment, and 12% focused particularly on climate change, compared with the respective DAC country averages of 23% and 16%.

Figure 47.11. Bilateral ODA in support of global and local environment objectives, two year averages, commitments, United Kingdom

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933246517

Note to reader: Annex B provides “Methodological notes on definitions and measurement for the Profiles of Development Assistance Committee members”.

Reference

OECD (2014), OECD Development Co-operation Peer Reviews: United Kingdom 2014, OECD Development Co-operation Peer Reviews, OECD Publishing, Paris, http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264226579-en.

United States

Financial flows from the United States to developing countries

Figure 48.1. Net resource flows to developing countries, 2003-13, United States

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933246524

The United States uses ODA to mobilise other resources for sustainable development

It promotes aid for trade to improve developing countries’ trade performance and integration into the world economy. It committed USD 3.8 billion (20% of sector-allocable ODA) to trade-related activities in 2013, a 5% decrease in real terms from 2012. The trend has been fluctuating in recent years.

It invests in building up national statistical capacities and systems in partner countries so they can monitor their development goals. It committed USD 44.5 million to this effort in 2013.

It prioritises a faster transition to climate-resilient, low-emission, sustainable economic growth in developing countries. Mitigation interventions promote low-emission development; while adaptation activities aim at building the resilience of people, places and livelihoods to climate change. The United States has pledged USD 3 billion to the Green Climate Fund, which plays a key role in channelling resources to developing countries and catalysing climate finance at the international and national levels.

The United States contributes to the mobilisation of domestic resources in developing countries by supporting their tax systems. In 2013, it is estimated that the United States committed about USD 30 million of its official development assistance (ODA) to tax-related activities in partner countries.

The United States promotes the effective use of resources for sustainable development by:

Enabling developing country ownership through the way it delivers its aid. There is scope to make further progress. In 2013, 54% of the United States’ aid scheduled for the government sector in partner countries was recorded on partners’ national budgets, while the agreed minimum 2015 target is at least 85%. In 2013, 19% of the United States’ development assistance to the government sector was channelled through partners’ public financial management and procurement systems, far below the 2015 target of 57%.

Placing strong emphasis on results through the “USAID Forward” reform, promoting ownership, transparency and results. USAID has updated its performance monitoring and programme evaluation guidelines and introduced more frequent feedback loops into programming to better link results to decision making.

Making its aid predictable. In 2013, the annual predictability of the United States’ development assistance was 72% (while the 2015 target is to disburse 90% of funding as scheduled). Medium-term predictability was lower, at 63%.

Untying aid. The United States’ share of untied ODA (excluding administrative costs and in-donor refugee costs) was 72.9% in 2013 (up from 69% in 2012), while the DAC average was 83.2%.

The United States’ official development assistance

In 2014, the United States provided USD 32.7 billion in net ODA (preliminary data), which represented 0.19% of gross national income (GNI) and a 2.3% increase in real terms from 2013. It is the 19th largest Development Assistance Committee (DAC) donor in terms of ODA as a percentage of GNI, and the largest donor by volume. The grant element of total ODA was 100% in 2013.

Figure 48.2. Net ODA: Trends in volume and as a share of GNI, 1998-2014, United States

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933246536

In 2013, 86% of ODA was provided bilaterally. The United States allocated 14% of total ODA as core contributions to multilateral organisations, compared with the DAC country average of 27%. It channelled a further 16% of its bilateral ODA to specific projects implemented by multilateral organisations (multi-bi/non-core contributions).

Figure 48.3. Share of ODA channelled to and through the multilateral system, two year averages, gross disbursements, United States

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933246545

In 2013, 57% of bilateral ODA was programmed at partner country level. The share of country programmable aid (CPA) was higher than the DAC country average (54.5%). A high share of bilateral ODA was allocated to humanitarian and food aid. Project-type interventions amounted to 86% of CPA.

Figure 48.4. Composition of bilateral ODA, 2013, gross disbursements, United States

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933246555

In 2013, USD 6.4 billion of bilateral ODA was channelled to and through civil society organisations (CSOs). After a decrease in volume between 2010 and 2011, ODA channelled to and through CSOs has remained relatively stable in recent years, both in volume (with a 0.5% increase between 2012 and 2013), and as a share of bilateral aid (24% in 2013). This share was higher than the 2013 DAC average of 16%.

Figure 48.5. Bilateral ODA to and through CSOs, two year averages, gross disbursements, United States

Note: Data on ODA to CSOs are only available for 2012.

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933246569

The largest share of bilateral ODA was directed to sub-Saharan Africa. In 2013, USD 8.8 billion was allocated to sub-Saharan Africa, USD 3.2 billion to South and Central Asia and USD 3.1 billion to the Middle East.

Figure 48.6. Share of bilateral ODA by region, 2012-13 average, gross disbursements, United States

Note: 27% of bilateral ODA allocated was unspecified by region in 2012-13. This share is not represented on the map.

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933246576

43% of bilateral country-allocable ODA went to the United States’ top 10 recipients. It has 136 partner countries and slightly sharpened its geographic focus from 140 countries in 2010. Its support to fragile states reached USD 11.3 billion in 2013 (41.8% of gross bilateral ODA).

Figure 48.7. Bilateral country-allocable ODA to top recipients, 2012-13, gross disbursements, United States

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933246584

In 2013, 31% of bilateral ODA was allocated to least developed countries (LDCs), amounting to USD 8.3 billion. This is a decrease from 36% in 2012 and 38% in 2011. LDCs received the highest share of bilateral ODA in 2013, compared with other income groups.

At 0.06% of GNI in 2013, total ODA to LDCs was lower than the UN target of 0.15% of GNI.

Figure 48.8. Bilateral ODA by income group, two year averages, gross disbursements, United States

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933246592

Over half of bilateral ODA was allocated to social infrastructure and services in 2013, totalling USD 14 billion, with a strong focus on population policies and programmes (USD 5.8 billion) and support to government and civil society (USD 4.6 billion). Humanitarian aid amounted to USD 5 billion.

Figure 48.9. Share of bilateral ODA by sector, 2012-13 average, commitments, United States

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933246604

USD 4.1 billon of bilateral ODA supported gender equality. In 2013, 21% of the United States’ bilateral sector-allocable aid had gender equality and women’s empowerment as a principal or significant objective, compared with the DAC country average of 31%. This is up from 18% in 2008. Backed by strong political support, the United States has renewed its efforts to integrate gender equality and women’s empowerment. USAID’s new Policy on Gender Equality and Female Empowerment focuses on integrating gender into all USAID programming. Gender has also been mainstreamed in recent presidential initiatives on food security and health.

Figure 48.10. Share of bilateral ODA in support of gender equality by sector, 2013, commitments, United States

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933246615

USD 2.1 billion of bilateral ODA supported the environment in 2013. The United States’ environment and climate change assistance aims to help countries grow without harming the environment. It does so by promoting low-emission, climate-resilient development strategies, including clean energy development and community-based natural resource management that protect biodiversity and fight deforestation. In 2013, 8% of its bilateral aid supported the environment, compared with the DAC country average of 23%. The United States has developed a new data-screening process to significantly improve environment and Rio markers. It aims to provide 2010-13 data with improved markers for the environment and Rio Conventions based on this new screening process as soon as this information becomes available.

Figure 48.11. Bilateral ODA in support of global and local environment objectives, two year averages, commitments, United States

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933246622

Note to reader: Annex B provides “Methodological notes on definitions and measurement for the Profiles of Development Assistance Committee members”.

Providers of development co-operation beyond the DAC: Trends and profiles¹, 2

This chapter presents information on the volume and key features of the development co-operation provided by countries that are not members of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC). It includes 18 providers who report to the OECD on their development co-operation programmes, as well as 9 other providers that are priority partners for the DAC. For these providers, the OECD has estimated their programme volume based on official government reports, complemented by web-based research (mainly on contributions to multilateral organisations). The Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, the only private funding entity reporting to the OECD, is also included in this chapter.

One of the main changes in the international development co-operation landscape in recent years has been the substantial attention given to providers of development co-operation that are not members of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC).³ These providers are quite a heterogeneous group and include the “BRICS” (Brazil, the Russian Federation, India, China and South Africa), Latin American and Southeast Asian countries. They are mostly middle-income countries that are both recipients and providers of development co-operation. Their development co-operation is often rooted in the tradition of South-South co-operation. Arab countries – which have a long tradition of providing development co-operation – also belong to this group, along with several middle- and high-income countries in Central and South East Europe.

As their development co-operation programmes grow, there is an increasing demand for information on these countries’ programmes. For partner countries it is important to know more about the financial flows that are reaching them. Policy makers from these partner countries need this information to make informed decisions and to co-ordinate their activities with other countries and institutions. Transparent data also allow researchers to study these countries’ programmes, and the general public to see how public funds are being used.

Eighteen bilateral providers beyond the DAC currently report to the OECD on their development co-operation programmes, although in varying degrees of comprehensiveness and detail. The OECD DAC engages with several other countries to exchange ideas and share experiences on how to measure development co-operation. Some countries do not report to the OECD, but do publish data on their programmes. However, this information is often incomplete and not comparable with DAC statistics. For these reasons, the OECD is increasingly making estimates of how much of these countries’ programmes meet the criteria for official development assistance (ODA), as defined by the DAC (see the Glossary).

One important instrument for engagement in the DAC Global Relations Strategy is “monitoring the concessional and non-concessional development finance flows from public and private actors, particularly the official development co-operation flows of major non-member economies, and supporting [their] efforts […] to establish and improve their statistical collection and reporting systems” (OECD, 2011). Therefore, the OECD DAC welcomes additional or improved (i.e. more detailed and more comprehensive) reporting by countries providing development co-operation. Submitted data and OECD estimates are continuously updated and made available on the “Development finance reporting of countries beyond the DAC” webpage.⁴

In terms of partnerships and accountability – the focus of this year’s Development Co-operation Report – most countries, including non-DAC providers of development co-operation, participate in the Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation (see Chapters 3 and 7) as well as in other international partnerships. Several countries were also included in the review entitled Making Development Co-operation More Effective, which monitored their progress against the ten Global Partnership indicators agreed at the Fourth High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Busan, Korea in 2011 (OECD/UNDP, 2014). On some indicators, including medium-term predictability (Indicator 5b) and use of country public financial management and procurement systems (Indicator 9b), countries that are not DAC members generally scored lower than the average monitored country/institution. However, on annual predictability (Indicator 5a) and aid on budget (Indicator 6; OECD/UNDP, 2014), the People’s Republic of China (hereafter “China”) scored higher than the average.

Estimated global concessional development finance (“ODA-like” flows)

Figure 49.1 provides an overview, in both US dollars (USD) and as a percentage of gross national income (GNI), of gross concessional financing for development provided by countries with a development co-operation programme of more than USD 350 million in 2013. In total, the OECD estimates that global gross concessional development finance reached USD 175 billion in 2013, of which 13.4% by bilateral providers that are not DAC members (see also Table 49.1). It should be stressed that, for countries that do not report to the OECD, this number is an approximation of their development co-operation.

Figure 49.1. Gross concessional financing for development, 2013

Notes: Countries with gross development co-operation of more than USD 350 million. Gross national income (GNI) figures are based on World Bank data. ODA/GNI ratios may differ from the ones that the OECD usually publishes, which are on a net basis. Gross figures are used in this graph because net figures are not available for all countries. Non-DAC countries are presented with grey bars.

1. Estimates.

2. Based on 2012 GNI figures because 2013 data were not yet available.

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933246638

Table 49.1. Estimated global development co-operation flows, 2010-13
Gross figures, USD billion, current prices
| 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2013 (% of total)
ODA from current 28 DAC member countries | 141.8 | 149.6 | 140.0 | 151.4 | 86.6
ODA from 18 reporting countries beyond the DAC | 7.1 | 9.5 | 7.1 | 16.9 | 9.7
Estimated development co-operation flows from nine non-reporting countries beyond the DAC | 4.3 | 5.2 | 5.7 | 6.6 | 3.8
Subtotal flows from non-DAC providers | 11.4 | 14.7 | 12.8 | 23.5 | 13.4
Estimated global total | 153.2 | 164.3 | 152.9 | 174.9 | 100.0

Notes: Brazil and Mexico have not published data on their development co-operation for all the years included in this table. To complete the table, Brazil’s development co-operation in 2011, 2012 and 2013 is estimated to be at the same level as in 2010 and Mexico’s development co-operation in 2013 is estimated to be at the same level as in 2012.

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933246686

The subsequent sections provide further information on the development co-operation programmes of the following countries:

The first section covers the 18 bilateral providers that report to the OECD, with a particular focus on: 1) OECD member countries that are not members of the DAC (Estonia, Hungary, Israel and Turkey); 2) OECD accession countries (Latvia and the Russian Federation);⁵ and 3) other major providers of development co-operation that report detailed and comprehensive data to the OECD (the United Arab Emirates or UAE, which became a Participant in the DAC in 2014).⁶

The second section covers several providers of development co-operation that do not report to the OECD, focusing on OECD member countries that are not members of the DAC (Chile and Mexico), OECD accession countries (Colombia), the OECD Key Partners (Brazil, China, India, Indonesia and South Africa) and Qatar.

The final section provides information on the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, the only private foundation that reported on its activities to the OECD in 2014 (on 2013 flows).

Providers of development co-operation that report to the OECD

Net concessional development co-operation by the 18 providers that report to the OECD increased from USD 6.4 billion in 2012 to USD 16.3 billion in 2013. This is mainly due to a significant increase in development co-operation from Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Saudi Arabia’s net figures grew from USD 1.3 billion in 2012 to USD 5.7 billion in 2013, the same order of magnitude as in 2011 (when it reached USD 5 billion). The UAE’s net development co-operation rose from USD 1 billion in 2012 to USD 5.4 billion in 2013, which was 1.34% of the UAE’s GNI. Most countries’ programmes increased in 2013. Turkey’s programme continues to grow at a rapid pace and reached USD 3.3 billion in 2013. More figures and information on trends can be found in the following sections.

Estonia

In 2013, Estonia’s net ODA amounted to USD 31 million, representing an increase of 22% in real terms over 2012. The ratio of ODA as a share of GNI also rose, from 0.11% to 0.13%. Preliminary data show that ODA reached USD 37 million in 2014 (0.15% of GNI).

Estonia’s development co-operation is provided in line with its second Development Co-operation Strategy, which was set for the period of 2011-15. This strategy contains detailed provisions concerning the goals and objectives of Estonia’s development co-operation, its sectoral and geographical priorities, as well as its financial allocations of ODA. Estonia’s priorities for its co-operation with Georgia and Moldova are set out in country strategy papers. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is the key institution responsible for managing and co-ordinating Estonia’s development co-operation.

In 2013, Estonia provided its bilateral development co-operation mostly to Afghanistan, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine, often in the form of small-scale technical co-operation projects. Its bilateral development co-operation covers civil society, good governance, health, education and sustainable economic growth. Cross-cutting themes in Estonia’s development co-operation are the rights of women and children and information technology (including e-governance).

Multilateral ODA accounted for 63% of Estonia’s total ODA in 2013, provided primarily through the European Union (accounting for 81% of its multilateral ODA in 2013), as well as through the United Nations and the World Bank Group.

Estonia, which joined the OECD in 2010, is an observer to the DAC. In 2014, it participated in the DAC High-Level Meeting and both DAC Senior-Level Meetings, as well as a seminar hosted by Latvia for the Baltic states on engaging with the DAC and on evaluating development co-operation.

Figure 49.2. ODA key statistics: Estonia

Source: OECD (2014b), “Estonia’s official development assistance (ODA)”, OECD, Paris, www.oecd.org/dac/dac-global-relations/estonias-official-development-assistance.htm.

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933246641

Hungary

In 2013, Hungary’s net ODA amounted to USD 128 million, representing an increase of 5% in real terms over 2012. The ratio of ODA as a share of GNI remained stable at 0.10%. Preliminary data show that ODA reached USD 156 million in 2014 (0.12% of GNI).

The International Development Cooperation Strategy and Strategic Concept for International Humanitarian Aid of Hungary for the period 2014-20 were approved by the Hungarian government in March 2014. The Hungarian parliament adopted an act on International Development Cooperation and International Humanitarian Assistance on 15 December 2014, which will enter into force on 1 July 2015. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade is the key institution responsible for planning, implementing and co-ordinating Hungary’s development co-operation.

In 2013, Hungary provided its bilateral development co-operation mostly to Ukraine, Serbia, Sri Lanka, Viet Nam and Montenegro. The main sectors of Hungary’s bilateral development co-operation are political and economic transformation, good governance, education, migration, health, agriculture and water management. Hungary provides its bilateral development co-operation in the form of small-scale technical co-operation projects, scholarships and aid to refugees.

Multilateral ODA accounted for 73% of Hungary’s total ODA in 2013, provided primarily through the European Union (accounting for 78% of multilateral ODA in 2013) as well as through the United Nations and the World Bank Group.

Hungary, which joined the OECD in 1996, is an observer to the DAC. In 2014, Hungary participated in the DAC High-Level Meeting and both DAC Senior-Level Meetings, as well as meetings of DAC (joint) subsidiary bodies: the Advisory Group on Investment and Development (AGID) and the Working Party on Development Finance Statistics (WP-STAT).

Israel

In 2013, Israel’s net ODA amounted to USD 202 million, representing an increase of 2% in real terms over 2012. The ratio of ODA as a share of GNI remained stable at 0.07%. Preliminary data show that ODA reached USD 205 million in 2014 (0.07% of GNI).

Israel’s Agency for International Development Co-operation, a division of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, is in charge of planning, implementing and co-ordinating Israel’s development co-operation.

In 2013, Israel provided its bilateral development co-operation mostly to Jordan and the West Bank and Gaza Strip. It supported Syrian refugees, especially through the provision of medical services. The main sectors of Israel’s bilateral development co-operation are water resources management, desert agriculture and combating desertification, early childhood education, rural and community development, emergency and disaster medicine, public health and women’s empowerment. Israel provides its bilateral development co-operation mostly in the form of technical co-operation projects and capacity building, provided both in Israel and in developing countries.

Israel is also engaged in triangular co-operation, sharing its experience with other countries. It partners with several international organisations (e.g. the United Nations Development Programme, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations and the World Food Programme) and DAC members (e.g. Canada, France, Germany, Italy and the United States) to support developing countries in areas in which it has a comparative advantage.

Multilateral ODA accounted for USD 16 million in 2013, representing 8% of Israel’s total ODA. It was provided primarily through the United Nations (accounting for 62% of its multilateral ODA in 2013), as well as through the World Bank Group and some regional development banks.

Israel, which joined the OECD in 2010, is an observer to the DAC. In 2014, it participated in the DAC High-Level Meeting and both DAC Senior-Level Meetings, as well as meetings of several DAC (joint) subsidiary bodies: the Advisory Group on Investment and Development, the Network on Gender Equality (GENDERNET), the Network on Governance (GOVNET) and the Working Party on Development Finance Statistics.

Latvia

In 2013, Latvia’s net ODA amounted to USD 24 million, representing an increase of 12% in real terms over 2012. The ratio of ODA as a share of GNI also rose, from 0.07% to 0.08%. Preliminary data show that ODA reached USD 25 million in 2014 (0.08% of GNI).

Latvia’s development co-operation is provided in line with the Latvian Development Co-operation Policy Strategy 2011-15, which defines the goals, principles and directions of Latvia’s development co-operation. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is responsible for formulating development co-operation policy and for co-ordinating aid activities.

In 2013, Latvia provided its bilateral development co-operation mostly to Afghanistan and Georgia. The main sectors of Latvia’s bilateral development co-operation are fostering a market economy, good governance, rule of law, education and environment. Latvia provides its bilateral development co-operation mostly in the form of small-scale technical co-operation projects.

Multilateral ODA accounted for 94% of Latvia’s total ODA in 2013, provided primarily through the European Union (accounting for 84% of its multilateral ODA in 2013), as well as through the United Nations and the World Bank Group.

In 2014, Latvia, an OECD accession country, participated in the DAC High-Level Meeting and both DAC Senior-Level Meetings, as well as in meetings of DAC (joint) subsidiary bodies: the Advisory Group on Investment and Development and the DAC Working Party on Development Finance Statistics. Latvia also hosted a seminar for the Baltic states on engaging with the DAC and on evaluating development co-operation.

Russian Federation

In 2013, the Russian Federation’s net ODA amounted to USD 714 million, representing an increase of 49% in real terms over 2012. The ratio of ODA as a share of GNI rose from 0.02% to 0.03%.

The Russian Federation’s development co-operation is provided in line with the Concept of Russia’s Participation in International Development Assistance, approved by the President of the Russian Federation in 2014. The concept sets out the objectives, principles and priorities of the Russian Federation’s development co-operation, as well as the criteria for providing assistance to partner countries. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Finance are jointly responsible for formulating the Russian Federation’s development co-operation policy and for supervising its implementation.

The Russian Federation provides its bilateral development co-operation mostly to the members of the Commonwealth of Independent States. The priority sectors of the Russian Federation’s bilateral development co-operation are energy, health and education. The Russian Federation provides its bilateral development co-operation in the form of debt relief, concessional loans, technical co-operation projects and scholarships, as well as budget support.

The Russian Federation’s multilateral ODA accounted for 49% its total ODA, provided through the World Bank Group (accounting for 40% of its multilateral ODA in 2013), as well as through the United Nations and regional development banks.

In 2014, the Russian Federation, an OECD accession country, participated in both DAC Senior-Level Meetings and in the meeting of the DAC Working Party on Development Finance Statistics.

Turkey

In 2013, Turkey’s net ODA amounted to USD 3.3 billion, representing an increase of 31% in real terms over 2012. After the UAE, Turkey’s programme increased the most substantially between 2010 and 2013. Its gross development co-operation more than tripled from USD 967 million in 2010. This was mostly related to its response to the refugee crisis in its neighbouring country, the Syrian Arab Republic, to which it allocated USD 1.6 billion in 2013. Another part of the explanation is a USD 1 billion loan to Egypt, disbursed in equal parts in 2012 and 2013. The ratio of ODA as a share of GNI rose from 0.32% in 2012 to 0.40% in 2013 (Figure 49.3). Preliminary data show that ODA reached USD 3.4 billion in 2014 (0.41% of GNI).

Figure 49.3. ODA key statistics: Turkey

Source: OECD (2014c), “Turkey’s official development assistance (ODA)”, OECD, Paris, www.oecd.org/dac/dac-global-relations/turkeys-official-development-assistanceoda.htm.

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933246657

Turkey’s development co-operation is provided in line with the Decree-Law on the Organisation and Duties of the Turkish Co-operation and Co-ordination Agency (TIKA), adopted in 2011. The agency designs and co-ordinates Turkey’s bilateral development co-operation activities and implements projects in collaboration with other ministries, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and the private sector.

Turkey provides its bilateral development co-operation mostly to South and Central Asia and the Middle East, as well as to Africa. In 2013, Syria was the main recipient of Turkey’s bilateral development co-operation. The priority sectors of Turkey’s bilateral development co-operation are social infrastructure and services, notably education and health, as well as governance and civil society.

Multilateral ODA accounted for 5% of Turkey’s total ODA in 2013, provided through the United Nations (accounting for 21% of its multilateral ODA), as well as through the World Bank Group and regional development banks.

Turkey, which is a founding member of the OECD, is an observer to the DAC. In 2014, Turkey participated in the DAC High-Level Meeting and both DAC Senior-Level Meetings, as well as a meeting of the Advisory Group on Investment and Development.

United Arab Emirates

In 2013, the United Arab Emirates’ (UAE) total net ODA reached USD 5.4 billion, representing an increase in real terms of 608% over 2012. This increase mainly consisted of exceptional support to Egypt of over USD 4.5 billion. However, part of it is also a continuation of an upward trend which began in 2010. This seems consistent with the increased importance the UAE is giving to its role as a provider of development co-operation, also reflected in the creation of the Ministry of International Cooperation and Development (MICAD) in 2013. The Abu Dhabi Fund for Development is the main extending agency among the many UAE actors involved. The ratio of ODA as a share of GNI also rose in 2013 to 1.34%, up from 0.20% in 2012. Preliminary data show that ODA reached USD 4.9 billion in 2014 (1.17% of GNI).

In 2013, the UAE provided its bilateral co-operation mostly to Egypt, followed by Pakistan, Jordan, Morocco, the West Bank and Gaza Strip, Afghanistan and Yemen. The main sectors of the UAE’s bilateral development co-operation are general programme assistance, economic infrastructure and education, health and population. The UAE provides its bilateral programme mostly in the form of grants (Figure 49.4).

Figure 49.4. ODA key statistics: United Arab Emirates

Source: OECD (2014d), “United Arab Emirates’ development co-operation”, OECD, Paris, www.oecd.org/dac/dac-global-relations/uae-official-development-assistance.htm.

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933246663

Multilateral ODA accounted for 0.4% of the country’s total ODA in 2013, provided primarily through Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance (49%) and the United Nations (46%).

In 2014, the UAE became a participant in the DAC. It participated in the DAC High-Level Meeting and the March DAC Senior-Level Meeting, as well as the meetings of the DAC Network on Development Evaluation and the DAC Working Party on Development Finance Statistics.

The UAE acknowledges that while increasing total net ODA is important, achieving predictable, consistent ODA is the ultimate goal. As such, in 2014 the UAE began formulating a foreign aid policy and strategy to help it position its resources to promote sustainable development most effectively.

Overview of other providers that report to the OECD

In 2013, Saudi Arabia’s development co-operation rose to USD 5.7 billion, representing an increase in real terms of 335% since 2012. The ODA provided by the Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development increased to USD 186 million in 2013, up from USD 149 million in 2012. However, this amount does not represent the totality of the development co-operation provided by the Kuwaiti administration.

Among the nine European Union member countries that are not members of the DAC, Estonia and Hungary (OECD members) and Latvia (an OECD accession country) were discussed above. The other six European Union member countries also report to the OECD. Croatia reported for the first time in 2014 on both 2012 and 2013 flows, which amounted to USD 21 million and USD 45 million respectively. In 2013, Bulgarian aid increased by 24% in real terms over 2012, to reach USD 50 million, while ODA from Cyprus,⁷, 8 saw a drop of 19% in real terms, to reach USD 20 million. Development co-operation from Malta fell slightly to USD 18 million, a decrease of 2% in real terms, and Romanian development co-operation fell by 7% in real terms, reaching USD 134 million. Lithuania was the largest provider of development co-operation among the Baltic states, at USD 50 million. This was a decrease by 3% in real terms over 2012.

Thailand reported that its development co-operation increased from USD 17 million in 2012 to USD 46 million in 2013, although this may not cover the totality of the Thai programme. In 2013, Chinese Taipei’s development co-operation decreased by 11% compared to 2012. Liechtenstein’s development co-operation decreased slightly, from USD 29 million in 2012 to USD 28 million in 2013. In 2012 – the latest year for which a GNI figure for Liechtenstein is available – its ODA/GNI ratio reached 0.75%. This means it met the United Nations’ ODA/GNI target for economically advanced countries of 0.7% for the first time.⁹

Non-reporting countries

A number of providers of development co-operation do not report to the OECD on their development finance flows. A cautious estimate by the OECD indicates total gross concessional development finance by these nine non-reporting countries amounted to USD 6.6 billion in 2013. Their development co-operation programmes are discussed in this section, and include two OECD member countries (Chile and Mexico), one OECD accession country (Colombia) and the OECD Key Partners (Brazil, China, India, Indonesia and South Africa). These countries have a dual role since they both receive and provide development co-operation. Estimates for Qatar are also included, as it recently published data on its development co-operation programme in its foreign aid reports for 2010-11, 2012 and 2013.

Brazil

Brazil is a South-South co-operation provider. Brazil’s 2010 development co-operation programme figures remain its most recent (published in IPEA and ABC, 2013); no new figures were published in 2014. These figures – at USD 923 million – include activities that are not or not entirely included as development co-operation in DAC statistics.¹⁰ The OECD estimates that Brazil’s development co-operation amounted to USD 500 million in 2010 (Table 49.2), up from USD 362 million in 2009. Of these USD 500 million, 60% was channelled through multilateral organisations in 2010. More recent estimates by the OECD suggest that Brazil channelled USD 338 million through multilateral organisations in 2013 (Table 49.3).

Table 49.2. Estimates of gross concessional flows for development co-operation, 2010-13
USD million
| 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | Source
Brazil¹ | 500 | .. | .. | .. | Institute of Applied Economic Research (IPEA) and Brazilian Cooperation Agency (ABC)
Chile | 16 | 24 | 38 | 44 | Ministry of Finance
China (People’s Republic of) | 2 561 | 2 776 | 3 114 | 3 009 | Fiscal Yearbook, Ministry of Finance
Colombia | 15 | 22 | 27 | 36 | Strategic Institutional Plan 2013, Presidential Agency of International Cooperation
India² | 709 | 788 | 1 076 | 1 257 | Annual reports, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Indonesia | 10 | 17 | 27 | 12 | Ministry of National Development Planning
Mexico | .. | 99 | 203 | .. | Mexican Agency for International Development Cooperation (AMEXCID)
Qatar | 334 | 733 | 543 | 1 344 | Foreign aid reports, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
South Africa², 3 | 151 | 227 | 188 | 183 | Estimates of Public Expenditures 2013, National Treasury
Notes: These data are OECD-DAC Secretariat estimates of concessional flows for development from countries that do not report to DAC statistical systems. Unlike the figures of reporting countries, these estimates are on a gross basis because information on repayments is not available.

Estimates are based on publically available information and are therefore not necessarily complete or comparable. For some countries, estimates on funds channelled through multilateral organisations are based on data from the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, www.aidflows.org and websites of other multilateral organisations.

Data include only development-related contributions. This means local resources – financing from a country through multilateral organisations earmarked to programmes within that same country – are excluded. Moreover, as for reporting countries, coefficients are applied to core contributions to multilateral organisations that do not exclusively work in countries eligible for receiving ODA. These coefficients reflect the developmental part of the multilateral organisations’ activities.

.. Not available.

1. See Note 8 at the end of this chapter.

2. Figures for India and South Africa are based on their fiscal years. For example, 2012 data correspond to fiscal year 2012/13.

3. The decrease in South African development co-operation from 2012 to 2013 is strongly related to exchange rate fluctuations.

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933246690

Table 49.3. Estimated development-oriented contributions to and through multilateral organisations, 2011-13 (three year average)
Current USD million
| Brazil | Chile | China | Colombia | India | Indonesia | Mexico | Qatar | South Africa
Total United Nations | 119.4 | 6.1 | 130.4 | 10.0 | 35.8 | 10.0 | 55.1 | 8.5 | 22.9
World Food Program (100%) | 36.6 | 0.0 | 10.4 | 0.0 | 1.0 |  | 0.4 | 0.3 | 6.9
United Nations Organization (18%) | 10.0 | 1.3 | 18.7 | 0.9 | 5.2 | 1.3 | 10.5 | 0.8 | 1.8
Food and Agriculture Organization (51%) | 11.9 | 0.6 | 11.0 | 2.4 | 1.5 | 0.6 | 9.9 | 0.3 | 2.6
UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (60%) | 13.4 | 0.8 | 10.8 | 0.4 | 1.4 | 2.6 | 4.7 | 0.7 | 0.9
World Health Organization (76%) | 6.4 | 0.8 | 12.3 | 0.6 | 2.4 | 1.3 | 7.3 | 0.3 | 1.3
International Labour Organization (60%) | 5.0 | 0.7 | 7.9 | 1.7 | 1.5 | 0.5 | 5.9 | 0.3 | 3.1
International Fund for Agricultural Development (100%) | 5.6 |  | 8.0 |  | 9.8 | 1.2 | 1.1 |  | 0.2
UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (7%) | 0.4 | 0.1 | 23.9 | 0.0 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.4 | 0.7 | 0.0
UN Development Program (100%) | 2.5 | 0.4 | 7.2 | 0.1 | 4.7 | 0.6 | 0.5 | 0.0 | 2.6
UN Industrial Development Organization (100%) | 1.7 | 0.3 | 5.3 | 0.6 | 4.3 | 0.3 | 3.4 | 0.2 | 0.8
International Atomic Energy Agency (33%) | 2.3 | 0.4 | 6.3 | 0.2 | 1.1 | 0.4 | 4.8 | 0.2 | 0.7
UN Office on Drugs and Crime (100%) | 11.7 | 0.0 | 0.6 | 0.0 |  |  | 1.8 | 0.2 | 0.1
UNICEF (100%) | 4.2 | 0.3 | 1.4 | 0.2 | 0.7 | 0.3 | 0.2 | 0.9 | 0.2
Other UN | 7.7 | 0.5 | 6.7 | 3.0 | 2.0 | 0.8 | 4.2 | 3.6 | 1.4
Total regional development banks | 38.9 | 9.5 | 144.5 | 10.7 | 1.1 | 5.4 | 21.5 | 38.5 | 33.3
Inter-American Development Bank (100%) | 34.0 | 9.5 | 85.4 | 9.2 |  |  | 21.5 |  |
African Development Bank (100%) | 4.9 |  | 42.9 |  |  |  |  |  | 33.3
Islamic Development Bank (100%) |  |  |  |  |  | 5.4 |  | 38.5 |
Asian Development Bank (100%) |  |  | 10.2 |  | 1.1 |  |  |  |
Caribbean Development Bank (100%) |  | 0.0 | 6.1 | 1.5 |  |  |  |  |
Total World Bank Group | 85.6 | 7.7 | 57.1 | 1.5 |  |  | 2.1 |  | 17.0
Total other multilateral organisations | 3.0 | 0.0 | 8.3 | 0.4 | 20.2 |  | 3.3 |  | 31.1
African Union (100%) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 18.9
Global Environment Facility (100%) | 1.1 |  | 3.4 |  | 2.3 |  | 2.2 |  |
Other organisations | 2.0 | 0.0 | 4.9 | 0.4 | 17.9 |  | 1.1 |  | 12.2
Overall total | 246.9 | 23.3 | 340.3 | 22.6 | 57.1 | 15.4 | 82.0 | 46.9 | 104.3

Notes: Data include only development-related contributions. DAC coefficients – the percentage of an organisation’s core budget allocated to developmental purposes in developing countries (see first column in parenthesis) – are applied to core contributions. Lastly, local resources, financing from a country through multilateral organisations destined to programmes within that same country, are excluded.

The information in this table is mainly based on data from the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA), www.aidflows.org and websites of other multilateral organisations and national publications of the countries involved. Not all data on contributions to multilateral organisations are made publically available, so the presented information may not be complete.

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933246700

The Ministry of External Relations oversees Brazil’s development co-operation and co-ordinates its humanitarian assistance, technical co-operation (through the Brazilian Cooperation Agency), financial co-operation (debt relief and some concessional loans) and multilateral allocations.

Most of Brazil’s development co-operation is allocated to Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean; co-operation to the latter region was higher in 2010 due to exceptional support to Haiti. The modalities of Brazil’s bilateral co-operation are humanitarian assistance, technical co-operation, scientific and technological co-operation, scholarships and imputed student costs, and refugee costs.

Brazil is also engaged in triangular co-operation, partnering with several international organisations (e.g. the United Nations Development Programme, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, the World Food Programme, the International Labour Organization, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization [UNESCO]) and DAC members (e.g. Germany, Japan and the United States) to support developing countries (e.g. South American countries, Lusophone African countries, Haiti and Timor-Leste) in areas such as agriculture, food security, health and public administration.

In 2013, Brazil’s development co-operation through multilateral organisations was primarily channelled through the World Bank Group (53%) and the United Nations (35%). The International Development Association (IDA) and the Inter-American Development Bank were the main single recipients (Table 49.3).

Brazil is a Key Partner of the OECD. In 2014, it participated in the DAC High-Level Meeting and both DAC Senior-Level Meetings.

Chile

According to OECD estimates, Chile’s concessional finance for development reached USD 44 million in 2013 compared to USD 38 million in 2012 (based on Government of Chile, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013). Chile’s contributions through multilateral organisations that qualify as development co-operation amounted to USD 29 million.

In October 2013, Chile drafted its first Policy on International Co-operation. This describes Chile’s goals, mission, values and approach, based on a South-South co-operation model. The Chilean International Co-operation Agency is the main entity responsible for managing Chile’s international development co-operation.

Chile’s priority partner countries are primarily in Latin America and the Caribbean. Its co-operation programme is spread across a range of sectors, including governance and institutional strengthening; poverty reduction and social development; and support to industry, innovation and competitiveness. Chile’s bilateral co-operation is mostly provided in the form of technical assistance and scholarships.

Chile is also engaged in triangular co-operation, partnering with several international organisations (e.g. the Inter-American Development Bank and the World Food Programme) and DAC members (e.g. Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Korea, Japan, New Zealand, Spain, Switzerland and the United States) to support development in other developing countries (e.g. Bolivia, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala and Paraguay).

Chile’s development co-operation through multilateral organisations was primarily channelled through the International Development Association (40%), the Inter-American Development Bank (35%) and the United Nations (25%) in 2013 (Table 49.3).

Chile, which joined the OECD in 2010, is an observer to the DAC. A special review of Chile’s development co-operation policies and programme was released in 2014 (OECD, 2014a). In 2014, Chile participated in the DAC High-Level Meeting, both Senior-Level Meetings and the meeting of the Network of Governance.

China (People’s Republic of)

In 2013, China’s bilateral co-operation reached USD 2.8 billion, compared to USD 2.6 billion in 2012 (OECD estimates based on Government of China, 2013). Including developmental funds channelled through multilateral organisations, the OECD estimates that China’s total concessional finance for development reached USD 3 billion in 2013. The second White Paper on China’s Foreign Aid was published in 2014 and includes information on the overall geographical and sectoral distribution of the Chinese programme between 2010 and 2012 (Government of China, 2014).

The Eight Principles for Economic Aid and Technical Assistance to Other Countries, announced by Premier Zhou Enlai in 1964, set out the core principles of China’s foreign aid (Government of China, 1964). The Ministry of Commerce’s Department of Foreign Assistance is at the centre of the Chinese system and manages over 90% of its bilateral funding. It is responsible for drafting the aid budget and aid regulations, managing foreign aid joint ventures, programming zero-interest loans and grants, and co-ordinating concessional loans with the China Eximbank (the latter are not included in OECD estimates because no information is available on these loans).

China does not have specific priority countries (aside from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea). Its grant aid is distributed more or less equally to some 120 partner countries. The main sectors are public facilities, industry and economic infrastructure. China offers eight different forms of co-operation with complete projects (turn-key projects) being the major modality. China also provides humanitarian assistance.

China is starting to become engaged in triangular co-operation, partnering with several international organisations (e.g. the United Nations Development Programme, the United Nations Industrial Development Organization and the World Bank) and DAC members (e.g. New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States).

China’s development co-operation through multilateral organisations was primarily channelled through regional development banks and the United Nations (Table 49.3).

China is a Key Partner of the OECD. In 2014, China participated in the DAC High-Level Meeting and both DAC Senior-Level Meetings. The DAC Chair visited China in November 2014 to open a symposium organised by the China-DAC Study Group on “Promoting Ethical Business and Public-Private Partnerships for Development”. The Study Group also organised a roundtable discussion in Beijing in June 2014 on “Evaluating Development Co-operation: Providing Evidence for Learning and Decision Making”.

Colombia

According to OECD estimates (based on Government of Colombia, 2012/13), Colombia’s development co-operation reached USD 36 million in 2013, compared to USD 27 million in 2012. In 2013, USD 28 million was channelled through multilateral organisations.

The Colombian Presidential Agency of International Co-operation (APC-Colombia) sets priorities and ensures alignment of Colombia’s development co-operation with its National Development Plan and foreign policy. The agency manages and co-ordinates out-going development co-operation and, through the National Strategy of International Co-operation, sets out Colombia’s strengths and good practices that can be shared with other countries. It has also introduced a national co-ordination scheme as well as monitoring systems.

Through South-South co-operation, Colombia shares its knowledge and experience in areas such as entrepreneurship, security, food security, culture, agricultural innovation, social development, climate change and disaster risk management, tourism, statistics and technical vocational training. About 70 countries in Latin America and the Caribbean, Africa, Asia and Eurasia are adapting Colombian programmes and policies to their own context. In addition, Colombia is an active partner developing projects in regional mechanisms such as the Pacific Alliance and the Forum for East Asia-Latin America Cooperation (FEALAC).

Colombia is also engaged in triangular co-operation, partnering with several international organisations (e.g. the United Nations Population Fund and the Organization of American States) and DAC members (e.g. Australia, Canada, Germany, Japan, Korea and the United States) to support other developing countries (mainly in Central America and the Caribbean) in a wide range of areas.

In 2014, Colombia, an OECD accession country, participated in the DAC High-Level Meeting, both Senior-Level Meetings as well as meetings of several DAC (joint) subsidiary bodies: the Advisory Group on Investment and Development and the Network on Gender Equality (GENDERNET).

India

According to OECD estimates, India’s total concessional development finance amounted to USD 1.3 billion in 2013, compared to USD 1.1 billion in 2012 (based on Government of India, 2012, 2013). India channelled 5% (USD 65 million) of its development finance through multilateral organisations in 2013.

The Development Partnership Administration within the Ministry of External Affairs manages grants and the Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation Program as well as co-ordinating all of India’s bilateral development co-operation. The Ministry of Finance manages multilateral assistance and exercises administrative oversight over the concessional loans and lines of credit provided by the EXIM Bank.

India’s priority partner countries are its neighbours in South Asia. Between 2000 and 2010, Bhutan received 49% of India’s overall development co-operation. The main sectors of India’s development co-operation are health, education, energy (hydropower) and information technology.

In both 2012 and 2013, India’s development co-operation with multilateral organisations was primarily channelled through the United Nations, especially the International Fund for Agricultural Development (Table 49.3).

India is a Key Partner of the OECD. In 2014, India participated in the DAC High-Level Meeting and both Senior-Level Meetings.

Indonesia

In 2013, Indonesia’s development co-operation amounted to an estimated USD 12 million, of which USD 9 million was channelled through multilateral organisations (OECD estimate based on Government of Indonesia, 2011).

Several government regulations, national plans and presidential instructions guide Indonesia’s development co-operation. The National Development Planning Agency (BAPPENAS) is responsible for developing and co-ordinating Indonesia’s national strategy for development co-operation. Together with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Finance and the State Secretariat, BAPPENAS constitutes the National Coordination Team on South-South and Triangular Cooperation.

Indonesia co-operates bilaterally with around 40 partner countries, most of them in Asia, in a variety of sectors. Bilateral co-operation consists mainly of scholarships and technical co-operation projects. Indonesia is also engaged in triangular co-operation, partnering with several international organisations and DAC members in Timor-Leste.

In 2013, all of Indonesia’s development co-operation through multilateral organisations was channelled through the United Nations (Table 49.3).

Indonesia is a Key Partner of the OECD. In 2014, it participated in the DAC High-Level Meeting and both DAC Senior-Level Meetings.

Mexico

Mexico published figures on its development co-operation programme for the first time in 2014 (Government of Mexico, 2014). According to these figures, which cover 2012, Mexico’s international development co-operation reached USD 277 million in 2012, up from USD 269 million in 2011. Out of the total disbursed in 2012, the OECD estimates that at least USD 203 million meets the criteria of development co-operation as defined in DAC Statistics. Of this amount, 52% was channelled through multilateral organisations.

The Law on International Co-operation for Development (April 2011) gave the government a mandate to set up the International Development Co-operation Programme and create the Mexican Agency of International Development Co-operation (AMEXCID), as well as the tools necessary to programme, co-ordinate, implement and evaluate development co-operation. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has overall responsibility for Mexico’s development co-operation, which is managed by the agency.

Mexico’s priority partner countries are those in Latin America and the Caribbean. The main sectors of its bilateral development co-operation are public administration, education, science and technology, agriculture, environmental protection and health. Mexico’s bilateral development co-operation is provided mainly through technical and scientific co-operation.

Mexico is also engaged in triangular co-operation, partnering with several international organisations (e.g. the Inter-American Institute for Co-operation on Agriculture, UNICEF, the United Nations Development Programme and the World Trade Organization) and DAC members (e.g. Germany, Japan and Spain) to support other developing countries, mainly in Latin America and the Caribbean.

Mexico’s development co-operation through multilateral organisations is primarily channelled through the United Nations, although the main single recipient of Mexican funds in 2011-13 was the Inter-American Development Bank (Table 49.3).

Mexico, which joined the OECD in 1994, is an observer to the DAC. In 2014, Mexico participated in the DAC High-Level Meeting and both DAC Senior-Level Meetings as well as meetings of some DAC subsidiary bodies: the Advisory Group on Investment and Development, the Network on Gender Equality and the Working Party on Development Finance Statistics. In November 2014, the OECD organised a seminar in Mexico hosted by the Mexican Agency of International Development Co-operation on managing development co-operation.

Qatar

The OECD estimates that Qatar’s development co-operation amounted to USD 1.3 billion in 2013, up from USD 544 million in 2012 and USD 734 million in 2011 (based on Government of Qatar, 2014). Qatar channelled 1% of its development co-operation through multilateral institutions, mainly through the United Nations and the Islamic Development Bank (Table 49.3).

Qatar views development co-operation as an integral part of its foreign policy. The Office of the Minister’s Assistant for International Co-operation Affairs in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is responsible for development co-operation and humanitarian assistance. Within the ministry, the Department of International Development is the central unit, in charge of policy design and implementation.

In 2013, the main recipients of Qatari development co-operation were Syria, Morocco, the West Bank and Gaza Strip, Egypt and Yemen. The main sectors were humanitarian aid, construction, and multi-sectoral and budget support.

In 2014, an OECD statistical seminar was held in Qatar, hosted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

South Africa

South African concessional finance for development reached USD 183 million in 2013, compared to USD 188 million in 2012 (OECD estimates based on Government of South Africa, 2014). In 2013, 61% of South Africa’s total development co-operation was channelled through multilateral organisations.

The Strategic Plan (2010-13) of South Africa’s Department of International Relations and Co-operation (DIRCO) includes “the African continent” and “strengthening South-South relations” as priorities. The department is the main institution responsible for planning, implementing and co-ordinating South Africa’s development co-operation. It also manages the African Renaissance and International Cooperation Fund, which South Africa plans to replace with the South African Development Agency, to be created under the Department of International Relations and Co-operation.

South Africa prioritises co-operation with the African continent, with a strong focus on member countries of the Southern African Development Community. The priority sectors of its bilateral development co-operation are peacekeeping, security and governance. South Africa provides its bilateral development co-operation mostly in the form of technical co-operation.

South Africa is also engaged in triangular co-operation, partnering with several DAC members (e.g. Canada, Germany, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United States) to support other developing countries (mainly in Africa) in areas such as governance, public security and post-conflict resolution.

In 2013, South Africa’s development co-operation through multilateral organisations was primarily channelled through the United Nations (34%) and the African Development Bank (26%) as well as through other, primarily regional organisations, and the World Bank Group (Table 49.3).

South Africa is a Key Partner of the OECD, and in 2014 it participated in the DAC High-Level Meeting and both Senior-Level Meetings.

Private development flows

Some private organisations also deliver significant amounts of financing for development. At present, the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation is the only private entity reporting to the OECD on its activities with developing countries (grants, loans and equity). Disbursements by the Gates Foundation in 2013 were higher than in 2012, at USD 2.8 billion. Two-thirds of its geographically allocated grants target African countries, directly or indirectly.

In 2013, 75% of the Gates Foundation’s sector-allocable disbursements were extended to the health sector (including reproductive health). These exclude core contributions of USD 273 million to multilateral organisations working in the health sector. The Gates Foundation is the third-largest international donor for health after the United States and the Global Fund for Fighting AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (GFATM). A significant part of the Gates Foundation’s expenditures is channelled through NGOs from both partner and provider countries, international NGOs, universities and other teaching or research institutes, and multilateral agencies. The World Health Organization (WHO), Gavi and the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) are the main institutions with which the foundation collaborates.

Notes

 1. The statistical data for Israel are supplied by and under the responsibility of the relevant Israeli authorities. The use of such data by the OECD is without prejudice to the status of the Golan Heights, East Jerusalem and Israeli settlements in the West Bank under the terms of international law.

 2. This section was prepared by Willem Luijkx in collaboration with Michael Laird, Talita Yamashiro Fordelone and Ann Zimmerman of the Development Co-operation Directorate, OECD.

 3. The DAC encourages bilateral providers of development co-operation that fulfil the DAC accession criteria to apply to join the Committee as a member (in the case of OECD countries) or as an associate (in the case of other countries), independent of whether they receive official development assistance. The DAC is open to countries that: 1) have appropriate strategies, policies and institutional frameworks for development co-operation; 2) have an accepted measure of effort (e.g. a ratio of official development assistance [ODA] to gross national income over 0.20% or ODA volume above USD 100 million); and 3) have established a system of performance monitoring and evaluation.

 4. See: www.oecd.org/dac/dac-global-relations/non-dac-reporting.htm.

 5. At the time this report was prepared, Costa Rica and Lithuania were not yet OECD accession countries.

 6. As a participant, the UAE can take part in all of the DAC’s non-confidential meetings, including its high-level and senior-level meetings, and the meetings of the DAC subsidiary bodies. However, the UAE does not take part in formal decision-making processes and cannot serve as Chair or Vice-Chair of the DAC or its sub-committees.

 7. Note by Turkey: The information in this document with reference to “Cyprus” relates to the southern part of the Island. There is no single authority representing both Turkish and Greek Cypriot people on the Island. Turkey recognises the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). Until a lasting and equitable solution is found within the context of United Nations, Turkey shall preserve its position concerning the “Cyprus issue”.

 8. Note by all the European Union member states of the OECD and the European Union: The Republic of Cyprus is recognised by all members of the United Nations with the exception of Turkey. The information in this document relates to the area under the effective control of the Government of the Republic of Cyprus.

 9. For more information on this target, see: www.oecd.org/dac/stats/45539274.pdf.

 10. Brazil’s development co-operation is significantly higher according to the official figures published by the Brazilian government. The OECD uses these data but, for the purposes of this analysis, only includes in its estimates: 1) activities in low and middle-income countries; and 2) contributions to multilateral agencies whose main aim is promoting economic development and welfare of developing countries (or a percentage of these contributions when a multilateral agency does not work exclusively on developmental activities in developing countries). The OECD also excludes bilateral peacekeeping activities. Brazil’s official data may exclude some activities that would be included as development co-operation in DAC statistics, and so are also excluded from the OECD estimates that are based on Brazil’s own data.

References

Government of Chile (2010, 2011, 2012 and 2013), Informes de ejecución (in Spanish), Budget Directorate, Santiago, www.dipres.gob.cl/595/w3-multipropertyvalues-14357-15967.html.

Government of China (2014), China’s Foreign Aid, White Paper, Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, Beijing, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-07/10/c_133474011.htm.

Government of China (2013), “The central level expenditure budget table 2013” (in Chinese), Ministry of Finance of the People’s Republic of China website, Beijing, http://yss.mof.gov.cn/2013zyczys/201303/t20130322_785066.html (accessed 6 March 2015).

Government of China (1964), China’s Eight Principles for Economic Aid and Technical Assistance to Other Countries, Government of China, Beijing, http://english1.english.gov.cn/official/2011-04/21/content_1849913_10.htm.

Government of Colombia (2012/13), Plan Estratégico Institucional (in Spanish), Presidential Agency of International Cooperation, Bogotá, www.apccolombia.gov.co/recursos_user/Documentos/PLAN%20ESTRATEGICO%20 INSTITUCIONAL%20APC-COLOMBIA%202013.pdf.

Government of India (2013), Annual Report 2012-13, Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi.

Government of India (2012), Annual Report 2011-12, Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi.

Government of Indonesia (2011), Prospective of Indonesia South-South Cooperation 2011-14, National Coordination Team on South-South and Triangular Cooperation, South Jakarta.

Government of Mexico (2014), Mexican Agency for International Development Co-operation website, http://amexcid.gob.mx/images/ccid (accessed 6 March 2015).

Government of Qatar (2014), Foreign Aid Report 2013, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Doha.

Government of South Africa (2014), Estimates of National Expenditure 2014, National Treasury, Pretoria.

IPEA and ABC (2013), Cooperação Brasileira para o Desenvolvimento Internacional 2010 (in Portuguese), Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada and Agência Brasileira de Cooperação, Brasilia.

OECD (2014a), “Special review of Chile’s development co-operation”, OECD, Paris, www.oecd.org/dac/dac-global-relations/Chile%20Special%20Review.pdf.

OECD (2014b), “Estonia’s official development assistance (ODA)”, OECD, Paris, www.oecd.org/dac/dac-global-relations/estonias-official-development-assistance.htm.

OECD (2014c), “Turkey’s official development assistance (ODA)”, OECD, Paris, www.oecd.org/dac/dac-global-relations/turkeys-official-development-assistanceoda.htm.

OECD (2014d), “United Arab Emirates’ development co-operation”, OECD, Paris, www.oecd.org/dac/dac-global-relations/uae-official-development-assistance.htm.

OECD (2011), “The DAC Global Relations Strategy”, OECD, Paris, www.oecd.org/dac/49102914.pdf.

OECD/UNDP (2014), Making Development Co-operation More Effective: 2014 Progress Report, OECD Publishing, Paris, http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264209305-en.

Further reading

OECD (2015), “Development co-operation by countries beyond the DAC”, OECD, Paris, www.oecd.org/dac/dac-global-relations/Dev%20Coop%20by%20Countries%20beyond%20the%20DAC.pdf.

OECD (2014), “Non-DAC countries and the debate on measuring post-2015 development finance”, OECD, Paris, www.oecd.org/dac/externalfinancingfordevelopment/documentupload/DCD-DAC(2014)6-ENG.pdf.

Annex A.

Statistical annex

This statistical annex incorporates data submitted up to 7 November 2014. All data in this annex refer to calendar years, unless otherwise stated. The data presented reflect the DAC List as it was in 2013 (for a complete list of countries, please refer to Annex C of this report).

Symbols used

p Preliminary

0 or 0.00 Nil or negligible

.. Not available

n.a. Not applicable

Slight discrepancies in totals may be due to rounding.

More detailed data on the source and destination of aid and resource flows are available in the International Development Statistics online databases (IDS/o) at: www.oecd.org/dac/stats/idsonline.htm.

For more information on DAC statistics, please see “Aid statistics” at: www.oecd.org/dac.

Table A.1. DAC members’ net official development assistance, 2013
| 2013 | 2012 | % change 2012 to 2013 in real terms¹
| ODA (USD million current) | ODA/GNI (%) | ODA (USD million current) | ODA/GNI (%)
Australia | 4 846 | 0.33 | 5 403 | 0.36 | -4.6
Austria | 1 171 | 0.27 | 1 106 | 0.28 | 0.7
Belgium | 2 300 | 0.45 | 2 315 | 0.47 | -5.3
Canada | 4 947 | 0.27 | 5 650 | 0.32 | -10.7
Czech Republic | 211 | 0.11 | 220 | 0.12 | -5.4
Denmark | 2 927 | 0.85 | 2 693 | 0.83 | 3.8
Finland | 1 435 | 0.54 | 1 320 | 0.53 | 3.5
France | 11 342 | 0.41 | 12 028 | 0.45 | -10.0
Germany | 14 228 | 0.38 | 12 939 | 0.37 | 4.2
Greece | 239 | 0.10 | 327 | 0.13 | -27.7
Iceland | 35 | 0.25 | 26 | 0.22 | 26.3
Ireland | 846 | 0.46 | 808 | 0.47 | 1.0
Italy | 3 407 | 0.17 | 2 737 | 0.14 | 18.8
Japan | 11 582 | 0.23 | 10 605 | 0.17 | 34.2
Korea | 1 755 | 0.13 | 1 597 | 0.14 | 5.5
Luxembourg | 429 | 1.00 | 399 | 1.00 | 0.9
Netherlands | 5 435 | 0.67 | 5 523 | 0.71 | -6.2
New Zealand | 457 | 0.26 | 449 | 0.28 | -1.9
Norway | 5 581 | 1.07 | 4 753 | 0.93 | 16.4
Poland | 472 | 0.10 | 421 | 0.09 | 8.0
Portugal | 488 | 0.23 | 581 | 0.28 | -19.7
Slovak Republic | 86 | 0.09 | 80 | 0.09 | 3.2
Slovenia | 62 | 0.13 | 58 | 0.13 | 1.7
Spain | 2 375 | 0.17 | 2 037 | 0.16 | 12.0
Sweden | 5 827 | 1.01 | 5 240 | 0.97 | 6.2
Switzerland | 3 197 | 0.47 | 3 056 | 0.47 | 3.4
United Kingdom | 17 920 | 0.71 | 13 891 | 0.56 | 28.1
United States | 30 879 | 0.18 | 30 687 | 0.19 | -0.9
Total DAC | 134 481 | 0.30 | 126 949 | 0.29 | 5.8
Average country effort |  | 0.39 |  | 0.39 |
Memorandum items: |  |  |  |  |
EU institutions | 15 959 | .. | 17 479 | .. | -12.9
DAC-EU countries | 71 201 | 0.42 | 64 724 | 0.40 | 5.9
G7 countries | 94 305 | 0.27 | 88 538 | 0.25 | 7.4
Non-G7 countries | 40 176 | 0.40 | 38 411 | 0.40 | 2.1
1. Taking account of both inflation and exchange rate movements.
StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933246713

Table A.2. Total net flows from DAC countries by type of flow
Net disbursements at current prices and exchange rates
| USD million | % of total
| 1997-98 average | 2002-03 average | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 1997-98 average | 2002-03 average | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013
I. Official development assistance | 50 502 | 64 119 | 120 558 | 129 066 | 134 670 | 126 949 | 134 481 | 27 | 63 | 36 | 25 | 27 | 27 | 31
1. Bilateral ODA | 33 942 | 45 558 | 83 938 | 90 988 | 94 446 | 88 553 | 93 562 | 18 | 45 | 25 | 18 | 19 | 19 | 21
of which: |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
General budget support | .. | 1 778 | 2 723 | 1 396 | 1 391 | 721 | 3 128 | 0 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1
Core support to national NGOs | 1 018 | 1 395 | 2 131 | 1 569 | 1 474 | 1 485 | 1 816 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0
Investment projects | 6 549 | 3 650 | 10 582 | 10 984 | 13 763 | 7 363 | 9 092 | 4 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 2
Debt relief grants | 2 315 | 5 768 | 1 712 | 3 666 | 4 138 | 2 867 | 3 638 | 1 | 6 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1
Administrative costs | 2 777 | 3 307 | 5 302 | 5 981 | 6 002 | 6 684 | 6 445 | 1 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1
Other in-donor expenditures¹ | 891 | 1 631 | 3 513 | 3 940 | 4 865 | 4 660 | 5 232 | 0 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1
2. Contributions to multilateral institutions | 16 560 | 18 561 | 36 620 | 38 078 | 40 224 | 38 396 | 40 918 | 9 | 18 | 11 | 7 | 8 | 8 | 9
of which: |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
United Nations | 4 182 | 4 818 | 6 233 | 6 519 | 6 571 | 6 637 | 6 659 | 2 | 5 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2
European institutions | 4 914 | 6 318 | 14 242 | 13 611 | 13 672 | 11 963 | 12 763 | 3 | 6 | 4 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3
International Development Association | 4 124 | 3 210 | 7 188 | 8 072 | 9 441 | 7 696 | 8 528 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2
Regional development banks | 1 723 | 1 790 | 3 107 | 3 156 | 4 059 | 3 929 | 3 935 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1
II. Other official flows | 9 616 | -150 | 10 148 | 5 878 | 8 603 | 9 800 | 7 027 | 5 | -0 | 3 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 2
1. Bilateral | 8 633 | 914 | 8 050 | 5 393 | 8 931 | 10 737 | 7 012 | 5 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 2
2. Multilateral | 983 | -1 064 | 2 097 | 485 | -327 | -937 | 15 | 1 | -1 | 1 | 0 | -0 | -0 | 0
III. Private flows at market terms | 119 740 | 27 492 | 181 608 | 344 386 | 326 593 | 307 613 | 263 460 | 65 | 27 | 54 | 68 | 65 | 65 | 60
1. Direct investment | 81 404 | 43 893 | 116 189 | 179 317 | 219 571 | 206 118 | 153 914 | 44 | 43 | 35 | 35 | 44 | 43 | 35
2. Bilateral portfolio investment | 39 501 | -16 533 | 44 199 | 144 158 | 105 735 | 93 307 | 85 456 | 21 | -16 | 13 | 28 | 21 | 20 | 20
3. Multilateral portfolio investment | -4 093 | -1 032 | 18 767 | -6 157 | -9 291 | -895 | 8 201 | -2 | -1 | 6 | -1 | -2 | -0 | 2
4. Export credits | 2 928 | 1 163 | 2 452 | 27 069 | 10 579 | 9 082 | 15 889 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 5 | 2 | 2 | 4
IV. Net grants by NGOs | 5 408 | 9 551 | 22 048 | 30 775 | 31 970 | 30 268 | 30 744 | 3 | 9 | 7 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 7
Total net flows | 185 266 | 101 012 | 334 361 | 510 106 | 501 837 | 474 630 | 435 711 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100
Total net flows at 2012 prices and exchange rates² | 273 471 | 141 427 | 350 643 | 529 787 | 489 854 | 474 630 | 435 303 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
1. Includes development awareness and refugees in donor countries.
2. Deflated by the total DAC deflator.
Source of private flows: DAC members’ reporting to the annual DAC Questionnaire on total official and private flows.
StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933246727

Table A.3. Total net flows by DAC country
Net disbursements at current prices and exchange rates
| USD million | % of GNI
| 1997-98 average | 2002-03 average | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 1997-98 average | 2002-03 average | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013
Australia | -872 | 1 845 | 3 133 | 14 531 | 18 522 | 21 906 | 23 170 | -0.23 | 0.42 | 0.33 | 1.23 | 1.28 | 1.46 | 1.58
Austria | 1 329 | 1 677 | 3 273 | 6 372 | 8 075 | 4 797 | 867 | 0.64 | 0.74 | 0.87 | 1.70 | 1.94 | 1.22 | 0.20
Belgium | -1 456 | 1 279 | 3 224 | 7 896 | 1 185 | 2 703 | 10 218 | -0.59 | 0.46 | 0.68 | 1.68 | 0.23 | 0.55 | 2.01
Canada | 9 881 | 3 497 | 7 340 | 22 642 | 13 548 | 18 515 | 11 109 | 1.68 | 0.44 | 0.56 | 1.46 | 0.79 | 1.04 | 0.62
Czech Republic | 16 | 68 | 215 | 228 | 250 | 220 | 211 | 0.03 | 0.09 | 0.12 | 0.13 | 0.12 | 0.12 | 0.11
Denmark | 1 867 | 1 736 | 3 757 | 4 794 | 2 818 | 2 400 | 4 371 | 1.10 | 0.92 | 1.18 | 1.52 | 0.82 | 0.74 | 1.27
Finland | 1 041 | -112 | 3 185 | 4 312 | 1 016 | 1 527 | 996 | 0.85 | -0.08 | 1.34 | 1.78 | 0.38 | 0.62 | 0.37
France | 11 191 | 5 832 | 38 420 | 35 198 | 34 216 | 29 578 | 10 526 | 0.76 | 0.36 | 1.43 | 1.35 | 1.21 | 1.11 | 0.38
Germany | 185 266 | 6 216 | 29 130 | 41 637 | 56 202 | 34 717 | 51 219 | 0.99 | 0.28 | 0.86 | 1.24 | 1.54 | 1.00 | 1.37
Greece | 187 | 362 | 850 | 761 | 485 | 907 | 869 | 0.16 | 0.24 | 0.26 | 0.26 | 0.17 | 0.36 | 0.36
Iceland | 7 | 15 | 34 | 29 | 26 | 26 | 35 | 0.00 | 0.16 | 0.35 | 0.29 | 0.21 | 0.22 | 0.25
Ireland | 328 | 1 902 | 4 188 | 2 695 | 2 444 | 956 | 1 933 | 0.52 | 1.68 | 2.27 | 1.57 | 1.37 | 0.56 | 1.06
Italy | 10 643 | 2 809 | 5 569 | 9 608 | 11 912 | 11 186 | 16 680 | 0.92 | 0.21 | 0.27 | 0.47 | 0.55 | 0.56 | 0.81
Japan | 23 705 | 5 497 | 45 482 | 48 249 | 61 828 | 48 977 | 58 459 | 0.57 | 0.13 | 0.88 | 0.86 | 1.02 | 0.80 | 1.15
Korea | 1 471 | 1 888 | 6 442 | 11 834 | 11 509 | 12 415 | 15 038 | 0.34 | 0.33 | 0.77 | 1.17 | 1.03 | 1.09 | 1.14
Luxembourg | 109 | 174 | 428 | 411 | 417 | 399 | 429 | 0.63 | 0.84 | 1.08 | 1.07 | 0.99 | 1.00 | 1.00
Netherlands | 10 718 | 6 855 | 6 045 | 13 013 | 22 046 | 19 943 | 19 428 | 2.87 | 1.50 | 0.77 | 1.67 | 2.62 | 2.56 | 2.39
New Zealand | 168 | 186 | 387 | 426 | 536 | 629 | 581 | 0.31 | 0.29 | 0.35 | 0.32 | 0.35 | 0.39 | 0.33
Norway | 1 815 | 2 793 | 4 977 | 5 876 | 4 755 | 4 752 | 5 580 | 1.19 | 1.35 | 1.29 | 1.41 | 0.96 | 0.93 | 1.07
Poland | 19 | 21 | 375 | 378 | 417 | 421 | 472 | 0.01 | 0.02 | 0.09 | 0.08 | 0.08 | 0.09 | 0.10
Portugal | 1 676 | 660 | -1 060 | 162 | -1 299 | 475 | 2 275 | 1.61 | 0.50 | -0.48 | 0.07 | -0.57 | 0.23 | 1.06
Slovak Republic | .. | 11 | 75 | 74 | 86 | 80 | 86 | .. | 0.04 | 0.09 | 0.09 | 0.09 | 0.09 | 0.09
Slovenia | .. | .. | 71 | 59 | 63 | 58 | 62 | .. | .. | 0.15 | 0.13 | 0.13 | 0.13 | 0.13
Spain | 9 626 | 7 419 | 12 812 | 10 340 | 20 145 | 1 977 | 8 013 | 1.77 | 1.00 | 0.89 | 0.74 | 1.38 | 0.15 | 0.59
Sweden | 2 469 | 1 744 | 7 164 | 5 127 | 6 598 | 14 156 | 10 447 | 1.13 | 0.64 | 1.77 | 1.10 | 1.20 | 2.63 | 1.82
Switzerland | 613 | 2 414 | 8 853 | 23 444 | 11 965 | 15 007 | 3 666 | 0.21 | 0.74 | 1.69 | 4.01 | 1.80 | 2.30 | 0.53
United Kingdom | 15 897 | 13 089 | 24 713 | 25 632 | 46 851 | 63 461 | 30 787 | 1.17 | 0.76 | 1.11 | 1.12 | 1.91 | 2.57 | 1.21
United States | 61 706 | 31 135 | 115 276 | 214 378 | 165 222 | 162 440 | 148 184 | 0.73 | 0.29 | 0.82 | 1.46 | 1.09 | 0.98 | 0.86
Total DAC | 185 266 | 101 012 | 334 360 | 510 106 | 501 837 | 474 630 | 435 711 | 0.79 | 0.37 | 0.85 | 1.25 | 1.14 | 1.07 | 0.96
of which: DAC-EU countries | 86 770 | 51 742 | 142 435 | 168 696 | 213 927 | 189 962 | 169 889 | 1.02 | 0.53 | 0.89 | 1.07 | 1.25 | 1.18 | 1.00
StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933246733

Table A.4. Net official development assistance by DAC country
Net disbursements at current prices and exchange rates
| USD million | % of GNI
| 1997-98 average | 2002-03 average | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 1997-98 average | 2002-03 average | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013
Australia | 1 011 | 1 104 | 2 762 | 3 826 | 4 983 | 5 403 | 4 846 | 0.27 | 0.25 | 0.29 | 0.32 | 0.34 | 0.36 | 0.33
Austria | 477 | 512 | 1 142 | 1 208 | 1 111 | 1 106 | 1 171 | 0.23 | 0.23 | 0.30 | 0.32 | 0.27 | 0.28 | 0.27
Belgium | 823 | 1 462 | 2 610 | 3 004 | 2 807 | 2 315 | 2 300 | 0.33 | 0.53 | 0.55 | 0.64 | 0.54 | 0.47 | 0.45
Canada | 1 876 | 2 017 | 4 000 | 5 214 | 5 459 | 5 650 | 4 947 | 0.32 | 0.26 | 0.30 | 0.34 | 0.32 | 0.32 | 0.27
Czech Republic | 16 | 68 | 215 | 228 | 250 | 220 | 211 | 0.03 | 0.09 | 0.12 | 0.13 | 0.12 | 0.12 | 0.11
Denmark | 1 670 | 1 696 | 2 810 | 2 871 | 2 931 | 2 693 | 2 927 | 0.98 | 0.89 | 0.88 | 0.91 | 0.85 | 0.83 | 0.85
Finland | 388 | 510 | 1 290 | 1 333 | 1 406 | 1 320 | 1 435 | 0.32 | 0.35 | 0.54 | 0.55 | 0.53 | 0.53 | 0.54
France | 6 024 | 6 370 | 12 602 | 12 915 | 12 997 | 12 028 | 11 342 | 0.41 | 0.39 | 0.47 | 0.50 | 0.46 | 0.45 | 0.41
Germany | 5 719 | 6 054 | 12 079 | 12 985 | 14 093 | 12 939 | 14 228 | 0.27 | 0.28 | 0.35 | 0.39 | 0.39 | 0.37 | 0.38
Greece | 176 | 319 | 607 | 508 | 425 | 327 | 239 | 0.15 | 0.21 | 0.19 | 0.17 | 0.15 | 0.13 | 0.10
Iceland | 7 | 15 | 34 | 29 | 26 | 26 | 35 | 0.00 | 0.16 | 0.35 | 0.29 | 0.21 | 0.22 | 0.25
Ireland | 193 | 451 | 1 006 | 895 | 914 | 808 | 846 | 0.30 | 0.40 | 0.54 | 0.52 | 0.51 | 0.47 | 0.46
Italy | 1 772 | 2 382 | 3 297 | 2 996 | 4 326 | 2 737 | 3 407 | 0.15 | 0.18 | 0.16 | 0.15 | 0.20 | 0.14 | 0.17
Japan | 9 999 | 9 081 | 9 467 | 11 058 | 10 831 | 10 605 | 11 582 | 0.24 | 0.22 | 0.18 | 0.20 | 0.18 | 0.17 | 0.23
Korea | 184 | 322 | 816 | 1 174 | 1 325 | 1 597 | 1 755 | 0.04 | 0.06 | 0.10 | 0.12 | 0.12 | 0.14 | 0.13
Luxembourg | 103 | 170 | 415 | 403 | 409 | 399 | 429 | 0.60 | 0.82 | 1.04 | 1.05 | 0.97 | 1.00 | 1.00
Netherlands | 2 994 | 3 655 | 6 426 | 6 357 | 6 344 | 5 523 | 5 435 | 0.80 | 0.80 | 0.82 | 0.81 | 0.75 | 0.71 | 0.67
New Zealand | 142 | 144 | 309 | 342 | 424 | 449 | 457 | 0.26 | 0.22 | 0.28 | 0.26 | 0.28 | 0.28 | 0.26
Norway | 1 314 | 1 870 | 4 081 | 4 372 | 4 756 | 4 753 | 5 581 | 0.86 | 0.91 | 1.06 | 1.05 | 0.96 | 0.93 | 1.07
Poland | 19 | 21 | 375 | 378 | 417 | 421 | 472 | 0.01 | 0.02 | 0.09 | 0.08 | 0.08 | 0.09 | 0.10
Portugal | 255 | 321 | 513 | 649 | 708 | 581 | 488 | 0.25 | 0.24 | 0.23 | 0.29 | 0.31 | 0.28 | 0.23
Slovak Republic | .. | 11 | 75 | 74 | 86 | 80 | 86 | .. | 0.04 | 0.09 | 0.09 | 0.09 | 0.09 | 0.09
Slovenia | .. | .. | 71 | 59 | 63 | 58 | 62 | .. | .. | 0.15 | 0.13 | 0.13 | 0.13 | 0.13
Spain | 1 305 | 1 837 | 6 584 | 5 949 | 4 173 | 2 037 | 2 375 | 0.24 | 0.25 | 0.46 | 0.43 | 0.29 | 0.16 | 0.17
Sweden | 1 652 | 2 206 | 4 548 | 4 533 | 5 603 | 5 240 | 5 827 | 0.75 | 0.81 | 1.12 | 0.97 | 1.02 | 0.97 | 1.01
Switzerland | 904 | 1 119 | 2 310 | 2 300 | 3 051 | 3 056 | 3 197 | 0.31 | 0.34 | 0.44 | 0.39 | 0.46 | 0.47 | 0.47
United Kingdom | 3 648 | 5 595 | 11 283 | 13 053 | 13 832 | 13 891 | 17 920 | 0.27 | 0.33 | 0.51 | 0.57 | 0.56 | 0.56 | 0.71
United States | 7 832 | 14 805 | 28 831 | 30 353 | 30 920 | 30 687 | 30 879 | 0.09 | 0.14 | 0.21 | 0.21 | 0.20 | 0.19 | 0.18
Total DAC | 50 502 | 64 119 | 120 558 | 129 066 | 134 670 | 126 949 | 134 481 | 0.21 | 0.24 | 0.31 | 0.32 | 0.31 | 0.29 | 0.30
of which: DAC-EU countries | 27 234 | 33 641 | 67 947 | 70 399 | 72 897 | 64 724 | 71 201 | 0.32 | 0.34 | 0.43 | 0.45 | 0.43 | 0.40 | 0.42
Memorandum item: |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
Average country effort |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 0.33 | 0.35 | 0.42 | 0.42 | 0.40 | 0.39 | 0.39
StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933246745

Table A.5. Total net private flows¹ by DAC country
Net disbursements at current prices and exchange rates
| USD million | % of GNI
| 1997-98 average | 2002-03 average | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 1997-98 average | 2002-03 average | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013
Australia | -2 088 | 470 | .. | 9 511 | 11 904 | 14 740 | 17 858 | -0.53 | 0.08 | .. | 0.80 | 0.82 | 0.98 | 1.22
Austria | 629 | 1 096 | 2 035 | 5 150 | 6 751 | 3 380 | -758 | 0.31 | 0.50 | 0.54 | 1.37 | 1.62 | 0.86 | -0.18
Belgium | -2 356 | -833 | 147 | 4 530 | -2 126 | 333 | 7 178 | -0.98 | -0.27 | 0.03 | 0.96 | -0.41 | 0.07 | 1.41
Canada | 6 365 | 1 449 | 3 140 | 14 124 | 5 714 | 9 194 | 3 103 | 1.08 | 0.17 | 0.24 | 0.91 | 0.33 | 0.51 | 0.17
Czech Republic | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | ..
Denmark | 29 | 22 | 599 | 1 779 | -356 | -242 | 1 246 | 0.02 | 0.01 | 0.19 | 0.56 | -0.10 | -0.07 | 0.36
Finland | 588 | -639 | 1 741 | 2 922 | -1 498 | 180 | -425 | 0.47 | -0.44 | 0.73 | 1.21 | -0.57 | 0.07 | -0.16
France | 5 215 | -2 258 | 25 524 | 22 856 | 21 289 | 18 078 | -1 486 | 0.36 | -0.13 | 0.95 | 0.88 | 0.75 | 0.68 | -0.05
Germany | 14 861 | -828 | 15 495 | 27 595 | 40 921 | 21 224 | 35 942 | 0.70 | -0.05 | 0.46 | 0.82 | 1.12 | 0.61 | 0.96
Greece | .. | 37 | 241 | 243 | 60 | 579 | 630 | .. | 0.02 | 0.08 | 0.08 | 0.02 | 0.23 | 0.26
Iceland | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | ..
Ireland | 85 | 1 266 | 3 000 | 1 500 | 1 000 | .. | 1 000 | 0.13 | 1.10 | 1.62 | 0.88 | 0.56 | .. | 0.55
Italy | 8 454 | 740 | 2 181 | 6 612 | 7 689 | 8 161 | 13 055 | 0.73 | 0.05 | 0.10 | 0.33 | 0.35 | 0.41 | 0.63
Japan | 6 104 | -652 | 27 217 | 32 837 | 47 594 | 32 494 | 45 133 | 0.14 | -0.02 | 0.53 | 0.58 | 0.78 | 0.53 | 0.89
Korea | 1 493 | 1 395 | 5 018 | 8 716 | 7 772 | 9 616 | 11 637 | 0.36 | 0.24 | 0.60 | 0.86 | 0.70 | 0.85 | 0.88
Luxembourg | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | ..
Netherlands | 7 438 | 2 318 | -923 | 5 999 | 15 472 | 13 891 | 12 479 | 1.99 | 0.35 | -0.12 | 0.77 | 1.84 | 1.79 | 1.54
New Zealand | 12 | 19 | 24 | 26 | 28 | 35 | 37 | 0.02 | 0.03 | 0.02 | 0.02 | 0.02 | 0.02 | 0.02
Norway | 378 | 698 | 895 | 1 504 | -0 | -1 | -2 | 0.25 | 0.32 | 0.23 | 0.36 | -0.00 | -0.00 | -0.00
Poland | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | ..
Portugal | 1 318 | 337 | -1 577 | -492 | -2 013 | -114 | 1 776 | 1.26 | 0.22 | -0.72 | -0.22 | -0.88 | -0.06 | 0.82
Slovak Republic | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | ..
Slovenia | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | ..
Spain | 8 176 | 5 518 | 6 225 | 4 391 | 15 968 | -63 | 5 498 | 1.49 | 0.77 | 0.43 | 0.32 | 1.10 | -0.00 | 0.40
Sweden | 777 | -477 | 2 473 | 372 | 1 097 | 8 946 | 4 633 | 0.35 | -0.15 | 0.61 | 0.08 | 0.20 | 1.66 | 0.81
Switzerland | -422 | 1 052 | 6 186 | 20 731 | 8 448 | 11 479 | -34 | -0.16 | 0.31 | 1.18 | 3.54 | 1.27 | 1.76 | -0.00
United Kingdom | 11 972 | 7 100 | 12 798 | 12 246 | 32 428 | 48 508 | 11 664 | 0.89 | 0.40 | 0.58 | 0.54 | 1.32 | 1.96 | 0.46
United States | 50 710 | 9 660 | 69 168 | 161 234 | 108 451 | 107 194 | 93 299 | 0.61 | 0.09 | 0.49 | 1.10 | 0.71 | 0.65 | 0.54
Total DAC | 119 740 | 27 492 | 181 608 | 344 386 | 326 593 | 307 613 | 263 460 | 0.51 | 0.10 | 0.46 | 0.84 | 0.74 | 0.69 | 0.58
of which: DAC-EU countries | 57 187 | 13 400 | 69 959 | 95 704 | 136 682 | 122 862 | 92 429 | 0.68 | 0.14 | 0.44 | 0.61 | 0.80 | 0.76 | 0.55
1. Excluding grants by NGOs.
StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933246757

Table A.6. Official development finance to developing countries
Constant 2012 USD billion
| 1983 | 1988 | 1993 | 1998 | 2003 | 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013
Official development finance (ODF) | 97.1 | 102.0 | 102.2 | 110.9 | 92.6 | 94.3 | 141.1 | 126.1 | 131.7 | 152.4 | 181.8 | 181.4 | 161.2 | 162.4 | 170.1
1. Official development assistance (ODA) | 75.5 | 78.3 | 83.6 | 77.0 | 95.2 | 97.5 | 128.5 | 123.8 | 116.0 | 129.8 | 132.9 | 136.4 | 137.5 | 133.0 | 149.5
of which: |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
Bilateral donors¹ | 56.5 | 59.3 | 60.2 | 54.9 | 71.2 | 70.8 | 101.9 | 94.7 | 85.4 | 97.6 | 94.5 | 100.2 | 100.2 | 93.8 | 108.8
Multilateral organisations | 19.0 | 18.9 | 23.4 | 22.1 | 24.0 | 26.7 | 26.6 | 29.1 | 30.7 | 32.2 | 38.5 | 36.2 | 37.2 | 39.2 | 40.7
2. Other ODF | 21.7 | 23.7 | 18.7 | 33.8 | -2.6 | -3.2 | 12.6 | 2.2 | 15.7 | 22.6 | 48.9 | 45.0 | 23.7 | 29.4 | 20.6
of which: |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
Bilateral donors¹ | 3.1 | 12.2 | 8.4 | 9.8 | 5.5 | 1.4 | 12.1 | 3.7 | 1.4 | 1.8 | 11.1 | 5.7 | 9.4 | 9.2 | 5.2
Multilateral organisations | 18.6 | 11.6 | 10.2 | 24.1 | -8.1 | -4.6 | 0.5 | -1.5 | 14.2 | 20.8 | 37.8 | 39.2 | 14.3 | 20.2 | 15.4
For cross reference |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
Total DAC net ODA² | 69.1 | 82.5 | 83.9 | 77.9 | 92.6 | 97.5 | 128.4 | 122.1 | 112.2 | 124.9 | 126.4 | 134.0 | 131.5 | 126.9 | 134.3
of which: Bilateral grants | 36.1 | 44.2 | 51.0 | 48.9 | 67.8 | 70.3 | 99.3 | 92.5 | 81.9 | 90.8 | 86.1 | 91.2 | 90.9 | 85.9 | 92.8
1. Bilateral flows from DAC countries and non-DAC countries (see Table A.12 for the list of non-DAC countries for which data are available).
2. Comprises bilateral ODA, as above, plus contributions to multilateral organisations in place of ODA disbursements from multilateral organisations as shown above.
StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933246761

Table A.7. ODA by individual DAC country at 2012 prices and exchange rates
Net disbursements, USD million
| 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013
Australia | 2 728 | 2 903 | 3 533 | 3 843 | 4 049 | 3 993 | 4 459 | 4 967 | 5 403 | 5 152
Austria | 809 | 1 841 | 1 704 | 1 849 | 1 633 | 1 113 | 1 218 | 1 046 | 1 106 | 1 113
Belgium | 1 782 | 2 334 | 2 274 | 2 009 | 2 283 | 2 557 | 3 033 | 2 646 | 2 315 | 2 192
Canada | 4 057 | 5 291 | 4 728 | 4 805 | 5 440 | 4 921 | 5 643 | 5 494 | 5 650 | 5 044
Czech Republic | 152 | 178 | 198 | 192 | 224 | 207 | 224 | 230 | 220 | 208
Denmark | 2 551 | 2 571 | 2 645 | 2 714 | 2 705 | 2 787 | 2 871 | 2 775 | 2 693 | 2 794
Finland | 814 | 1 074 | 976 | 1 022 | 1 119 | 1 264 | 1 368 | 1 337 | 1 320 | 1 367
France | 10 037 | 11 651 | 11 942 | 9 952 | 10 165 | 12 077 | 12 889 | 12 199 | 12 028 | 10 821
Germany | 8 461 | 11 248 | 11 491 | 12 212 | 13 082 | 11 571 | 12 944 | 13 219 | 12 939 | 13 488
Greece | 389 | 457 | 487 | 511 | 650 | 568 | 494 | 390 | 327 | 237
Iceland | 19 | 22 | 34 | 34 | 43 | 39 | 30 | 24 | 26 | 33
Ireland | 631 | 729 | 992 | 1 044 | 1 136 | 926 | 880 | 850 | 808 | 816
Italy | 2 925 | 5 940 | 4 136 | 4 039 | 4 577 | 3 150 | 2 998 | 4 068 | 2 737 | 3 250
Japan | 10 929 | 16 583 | 15 042 | 10 621 | 11 789 | 10 543 | 11 827 | 10 723 | 10 605 | 14 235
Korea | 499 | 789 | 444 | 650 | 869 | 981 | 1 235 | 1 315 | 1 597 | 1 685
Luxembourg | 329 | 342 | 360 | 411 | 429 | 440 | 419 | 390 | 399 | 403
Netherlands | 4 876 | 5 789 | 6 004 | 6 171 | 6 444 | 6 128 | 6 322 | 5 942 | 5 523 | 5 181
New Zealand | 314 | 372 | 372 | 389 | 433 | 424 | 391 | 431 | 449 | 441
Norway | 3 800 | 4 237 | 4 088 | 4 595 | 4 329 | 5 128 | 4 975 | 4 700 | 4 753 | 5 534
Poland | 164 | 246 | 341 | 354 | 311 | 385 | 370 | 390 | 421 | 455
Portugal | 1 192 | 425 | 430 | 456 | 561 | 476 | 629 | 652 | 581 | 466
Slovak Republic | 43 | 82 | 74 | 74 | 87 | 72 | 74 | 81 | 80 | 82
Slovenia | .. | 41 | 51 | 55 | 62 | 66 | 58 | 58 | 58 | 59
Spain | 2 901 | 3 442 | 4 135 | 4 948 | 6 129 | 6 082 | 5 774 | 3 857 | 2 037 | 2 281
Sweden | 3 386 | 4 217 | 4 807 | 4 706 | 4 916 | 5 289 | 4 930 | 5 419 | 5 240 | 5 565
Switzerland | 2 220 | 2 545 | 2 327 | 2 224 | 2 392 | 2 693 | 2 570 | 2 890 | 3 056 | 3 160
United Kingdom | 8 297 | 11 179 | 12 417 | 8 823 | 11 043 | 12 276 | 13 931 | 13 901 | 13 891 | 17 793
United States | 23 213 | 31 886 | 26 060 | 23 503 | 27 973 | 30 273 | 31 490 | 31 460 | 30 687 | 30 424
Total DAC | 97 519 | 128 411 | 122 092 | 112 205 | 124 873 | 126 429 | 134 046 | 131 454 | 126 949 | 134 281
of which: DAC-EU countries | 49 739 | 63 786 | 65 464 | 61 541 | 67 557 | 67 434 | 71 425 | 69 450 | 64 724 | 68 572
Memorandum item: |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
Total DAC at current prices and exchange rates | 80 130 | 108 296 | 105 415 | 104 917 | 122 784 | 120 558 | 129 066 | 134 670 | 126 949 | 134 481
StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933246779

Table A.8. ODA from DAC countries to multilateral organisations,¹ 2013
Net disbursements, USD million
| Total | World Bank Group | of which: | Regional development banks | of which: | United Nations agencies | of which: | EU | of which: | Other multilateral | of which:
| IDA | African Dev. Bank | Asian Dev. Bank | IFAD | UNDP | UNHCR | UNICEF | WFP | EDF | IMF² | Gavi | Global Fund
Australia | 680 | 205 | 110 | 112 | .. | 112 | 176 | .. | 8 | .. | .. | 44 | .. | .. | 186 | .. | 46 | 96
Austria | 628 | 187 | 181 | 69 | 53 | 13 | 50 | 21 | 3 | 1 | 2 | .. | 299 | 103 | 23 | .. | .. | ..
Belgium | 992 | 197 | 184 | 59 | 47 | 11 | 147 | 11 | 15 | 10 | 14 | 0 | 496 | 138 | 94 | .. | .. | 15
Canada | 1 436 | 535 | 478 | 244 | 134 | 79 | 319 | 24 | 92 | 13 | 17 | 24 | .. | .. | 338 | .. | 19 | 155
Czech Republic | 154 | 8 | 6 | 4 | .. | .. | 10 | .. | 0 | 0 | .. | .. | 118 | 20 | 14 | 11 | .. | ..
Denmark | 784 | 94 | 87 | 73 | 67 | 6 | 274 | .. | 60 | 28 | 31 | 33 | 260 | 75 | 82 | 8 | 4 | 26
Finland | 613 | 103 | 99 | 57 | 48 | 9 | 210 | 5 | 29 | 17 | 28 | 8 | 198 | 62 | 44 | .. | .. | 3
France | 4 540 | 563 | 531 | 325 | 264 | 47 | 252 | .. | 18 | 21 | 4 | 0 | 2 272 | 847 | 1 127 | 283 | 27 | 452
Germany | 4 777 | 880 | 842 | 332 | 244 | 76 | 407 | 45 | 30 | 11 | 9 | 31 | 2 620 | 880 | 538 | .. | 13 | 266
Greece | 195 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 13 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 180 | 62 | 2 | .. | .. | ..
Iceland | 6 | 2 | 2 | .. | .. | .. | 3 | .. | 0 | .. | 1 | .. | .. | .. | 1 | .. | .. | 0
Ireland | 300 | 43 | 39 | 9 | .. | 9 | 90 | 3 | 12 | 8 | 11 | 13 | 131 | 31 | 28 | .. | 3 | 19
Italy | 2 556 | 420 | 341 | 217 | 139 | 66 | 196 | 36 | 5 | 3 | 8 | 20 | 1 620 | 545 | 103 | .. | .. | ..
Japan | 2 970 | 1 231 | 1 139 | 768 | 157 | 580 | 593 | 30 | 80 | 23 | 23 | 7 | .. | .. | 377 | 76 | 9 | 122
Korea | 446 | 170 | 128 | 127 | 39 | 76 | 114 | 2 | 6 | 3 | 3 | 0 | .. | .. | 35 | 6 | 1 | 4
Luxembourg | 131 | 27 | 20 | 1 | .. | .. | 59 | 1 | 11 | 2 | 7 | 1 | 38 | 11 | 5 | .. | 1 | ..
Netherlands | 1 789 | 262 | 243 | 160 | 159 | .. | 568 | 27 | 79 | 50 | 93 | 53 | 645 | 207 | 154 | .. | 33 | 89
New Zealand | 107 | 31 | 31 | 9 | .. | 9 | 47 | 1 | 7 | 5 | 5 | 5 | .. | .. | 20 | .. | .. | ..
Norway | 1 266 | 187 | 174 | 107 | 91 | 13 | 629 | 15 | 124 | 51 | 77 | 25 | .. | .. | 342 | .. | 127 | 77
Poland | 351 | 3 | 3 | .. | .. | .. | 19 | .. | .. | 1 | 1 | 0 | 322 | 51 | 7 | .. | .. | ..
Portugal | 186 | 2 | 2 | 8 | 3 | .. | 17 | .. | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 157 | 45 | 2 | .. | .. | ..
Slovak Republic | 70 | 1 | 1 | .. | .. | .. | 4 | .. | .. | 0 | 0 | 0 | 59 | 8 | 5 | 4 | .. | ..
Slovenia | 41 | 4 | 2 | 0 | .. | .. | 2 | .. | 0 | .. | 0 | .. | 33 | 7 | 1 | .. | .. | ..
Spain | 1 430 | 53 | .. | 143 | .. | .. | 128 | .. | 3 | .. | .. | .. | 1 033 | 320 | 72 | .. | .. | ..
Sweden | 1 909 | 412 | 405 | 109 | 20 | 85 | 754 | 71 | 86 | 89 | 71 | 79 | 372 | 108 | 263 | 2 | 72 | 115
Switzerland | 691 | 288 | 273 | 80 | 63 | 15 | 210 | 10 | 65 | 15 | 23 | 6 | .. | .. | 113 | 4 | .. | 11
United Kingdom | 7 375 | 1 892 | 1 853 | 414 | 304 | 93 | 734 | .. | 129 | 55 | 72 | 31 | 1 907 | 636 | 2 429 | 50 | 437 | 849
United States | 4 496 | 1 577 | 1 351 | 506 | 194 | 174 | 633 | 40 | .. | .. | 125 | .. | .. | .. | 1 780 | .. | 138 | 1 246
Total DAC | 40 918 | 9 377 | 8 528 | 3 935 | 2 024 | 1 474 | 6 658 | 343 | 863 | 406 | 623 | 380 | 12 762 | 4 157 | 8 187 | 444 | 930 | 3 544
of which: DAC-EU countries | 28 821 | 5 149 | 4 840 | 1 982 | 1 347 | 415 | 3 933 | 219 | 480 | 297 | 350 | 269 | 12 762 | 4 157 | 4 995 | 358 | 590 | 1 833
1. Unearmarked contributions. Includes recoveries on multilateral grants and capital subscriptions.
2. IMF PRGT and PRG-HIPC Trust.
StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933246782

Table A.9. Aid by major purpose, 2013
Commitments
| % of total bilateral ODA | % of total
| Australia | Austria | Belgium | Canada | Czech Republic | Denmark | Finland | France | Germany | Greece | Iceland | Ireland | Italy | Japan | Korea | Luxembourg | Netherlands | New Zealand | Norway | Poland | Portugal | Slovak Republic | Slovenia | Spain | Sweden | Switzerland | United Kingdom | United States | Total DAC | EU institutions | Multilateral finance (ODF)⁴
| World Bank⁵ | Regional dev. banks⁶
Social and administrative infrastructure | 44.4 | 46.1 | 31.3 | 35.8 | 45.9 | 35.9 | 34.1 | 31.3 | 40.3 | 27.0 | 46.2 | 47.7 | 26.4 | 15.3 | 58.7 | 44.7 | 35.7 | 41.4 | 39.1 | 42.1 | 45.7 | 58.7 | 50.2 | 33.5 | 40.3 | 31.8 | 47.3 | 49.5 | 37.0 | 30.3 | 36.6 | 35.7
Education¹ | 10.0 | 23.0 | 8.0 | 8.3 | 15.4 | 5.4 | 7.9 | 15.9 | 13.4 | 24.8 | 11.0 | 8.7 | 7.0 | 2.6 | 15.1 | 15.7 | 2.8 | 21.9 | 8.1 | 20.9 | 16.6 | 30.5 | 19.3 | 6.3 | 2.5 | 5.2 | 12.0 | 3.3 | 7.3 | 3.6 | 7.6 | 4.6
of which: Basic education | 3.0 | 0.0 | 0.2 | 2.9 | 1.3 | 2.1 | 1.7 | 1.3 | 1.1 | .. | 9.2 | 1.5 | 1.2 | 0.4 | 2.3 | 3.1 | 0.0 | 6.7 | 3.9 | .. | 0.0 | 0.6 | 0.1 | 0.7 | 0.1 | 1.8 | 2.1 | 2.6 | 1.6 | 0.4 | 1.0 | 0.9
Health | 5.1 | 7.5 | 10.0 | 14.8 | 3.8 | 0.8 | 1.4 | 5.8 | 4.7 | 1.0 | 9.7 | 14.6 | 7.1 | 2.0 | 13.7 | 15.6 | 4.0 | 5.8 | 4.1 | 1.0 | 5.1 | 2.5 | 4.9 | 4.7 | 2.5 | 3.3 | 13.3 | 5.4 | 5.3 | 2.8 | 4.4 | 2.7
of which: Basic health | 2.6 | 0.3 | 4.9 | 12.8 | 1.6 | 0.7 | 0.7 | 0.8 | 3.3 | .. | 9.7 | 7.6 | 2.3 | 1.3 | 2.5 | 8.5 | 2.3 | 4.0 | 1.8 | .. | 0.6 | 0.3 | .. | 1.4 | 2.1 | 1.6 | 11.6 | 5.1 | 3.6 | 1.6 | 2.1 | 0.4
Population² | 3.9 | 0.1 | 0.8 | 1.7 | 0.5 | 1.5 | 1.3 | 1.2 | 1.5 | .. | 0.8 | 2.7 | 0.9 | 0.2 | 1.1 | 1.1 | 2.4 | 1.4 | 4.3 | .. | 0.3 | 0.1 | .. | 1.4 | 4.9 | 0.8 | 6.6 | 20.8 | 6.6 | 0.7 | 0.8 | 0.1
Water supply and sanitation | 4.2 | 5.1 | 2.3 | 1.1 | 8.9 | 4.2 | 3.8 | 3.9 | 7.6 | 0.1 | 3.3 | 1.1 | 1.1 | 7.4 | 16.3 | 3.5 | 9.7 | 2.1 | 0.8 | 0.7 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 3.8 | 7.9 | 4.9 | 8.0 | 2.5 | 1.9 | 4.8 | 3.6 | 6.1 | 9.0
Government and civil society | 19.3 | 8.3 | 7.2 | 8.9 | 13.2 | 22.2 | 15.5 | 2.1 | 11.6 | 1.1 | 12.0 | 15.2 | 5.8 | 2.2 | 10.8 | 6.4 | 16.0 | 9.1 | 19.7 | 17.0 | 2.8 | 23.5 | 21.2 | 9.5 | 24.1 | 12.8 | 10.3 | 15.2 | 11.0 | 15.3 | 11.0 | 11.4
Other social infrastructure/service | 2.0 | 2.1 | 3.0 | 1.0 | 4.0 | 1.8 | 4.1 | 2.4 | 1.6 | .. | 9.4 | 5.4 | 4.5 | 0.7 | 1.7 | 2.5 | 0.9 | 1.1 | 2.1 | 2.4 | 20.8 | 2.0 | 1.0 | 3.6 | 1.4 | 1.6 | 2.7 | 2.9 | 2.0 | 4.3 | 6.6 | 8.0
Economic infrastructure | 5.1 | 8.2 | 3.0 | 7.5 | 6.3 | 12.8 | 7.4 | 21.6 | 30.6 | 0.2 | 13.5 | 0.7 | 2.0 | 41.4 | 25.2 | 8.6 | 6.3 | 16.0 | 10.6 | 1.7 | 7.0 | 1.7 | 4.2 | 1.8 | 4.3 | 7.0 | 10.4 | 7.6 | 18.4 | 31.8 | 38.6 | 47.8
Transport and communications | 3.9 | 2.2 | 1.0 | 0.9 | .. | 0.7 | 0.5 | 13.5 | 2.4 | 0.2 | .. | 0.0 | 1.2 | 31.0 | 17.8 | 0.5 | 0.2 | 8.9 | 0.0 | .. | 0.2 | 0.1 | 0.6 | 0.1 | 0.9 | 1.8 | 3.9 | 1.0 | 8.5 | 14.8 | 16.4 | 28.9
Energy | 0.3 | 4.3 | 1.5 | 3.2 | 5.4 | 2.6 | 4.6 | 7.7 | 14.9 | .. | 12.9 | 0.0 | 0.7 | 9.9 | 7.1 | 1.3 | 2.4 | 3.9 | 7.1 | 0.8 | 6.4 | 1.1 | 2.5 | 1.5 | 0.9 | 0.8 | 3.8 | 4.4 | 6.5 | 9.6 | 9.8 | 11.2
Other | 0.8 | 1.7 | 0.6 | 3.3 | 0.9 | 9.5 | 2.4 | 0.4 | 13.3 | .. | 0.6 | 0.6 | 0.1 | 0.4 | 0.2 | 6.8 | 3.7 | 3.2 | 3.5 | 0.9 | 0.4 | 0.6 | 1.1 | 0.2 | 2.5 | 4.4 | 2.7 | 2.1 | 3.3 | 7.4 | 12.3 | 7.7
Production | 5.8 | 13.3 | 11.1 | 15.7 | 9.2 | 7.9 | 9.3 | 4.3 | 5.0 | .. | 22.1 | 9.3 | 8.4 | 6.3 | 6.4 | 5.8 | 16.7 | 10.0 | 16.6 | 0.9 | 0.2 | 5.9 | 0.8 | 8.3 | 8.7 | 7.4 | 5.5 | 5.6 | 7.0 | 8.8 | 17.8 | 9.7
Agriculture | 4.3 | 6.7 | 10.1 | 10.4 | 6.8 | 6.6 | 5.4 | 4.1 | 3.7 | .. | 22.1 | 8.9 | 5.5 | 3.0 | 5.2 | 5.3 | 11.0 | 6.5 | 14.7 | 0.9 | 0.2 | 5.9 | 0.8 | 6.2 | 5.4 | 4.8 | 2.5 | 4.0 | 4.9 | 5.3 | 10.0 | 3.9
Industry, mining and construction | 0.9 | 6.5 | 0.4 | 4.2 | 2.3 | 1.2 | 1.7 | 0.2 | 0.9 | .. | .. | 0.1 | 2.8 | 2.6 | 0.7 | 0.1 | 0.4 | 0.3 | 1.4 | .. | 0.0 | .. | 0.0 | 1.9 | 2.0 | 1.2 | 1.7 | 0.3 | 1.3 | 1.7 | 6.8 | 1.4
Trade and tourism | 0.6 | 0.1 | 0.7 | 1.1 | 0.1 | 0.2 | 2.2 | 0.0 | 0.4 | .. | .. | 0.3 | 0.1 | 0.7 | 0.4 | 0.5 | 5.3 | 3.2 | 0.5 | .. | 0.0 | 0.1 | .. | 0.2 | 1.2 | 1.4 | 1.4 | 1.2 | 0.9 | 1.8 | 1.1 | 4.3
Multisector | 22.0 | 6.5 | 17.0 | 8.4 | 1.9 | 10.7 | 4.0 | 13.5 | 12.6 | 4.7 | 2.6 | 4.6 | 5.9 | 5.9 | 3.3 | 6.7 | 15.5 | 3.0 | 8.2 | 0.7 | 1.9 | 3.0 | 7.0 | 4.1 | 7.1 | 11.6 | 12.0 | 5.4 | 9.0 | 11.9 | 4.8 | 2.7
Programme assistance | 1.2 | 0.8 | .. | 1.6 | .. | 0.1 | 0.9 | 4.6 | 0.6 | .. | .. | 8.2 | 1.0 | 13.5 | 0.0 | 1.3 | 0.9 | 4.4 | 2.6 | .. | 40.7 | .. | 0.1 | 1.7 | 3.3 | 3.7 | 1.8 | 2.4 | 4.4 | 5.3 | 0.4 | 1.1
Action relating to debt³ | .. | 6.3 | 1.3 | .. | .. | .. | .. | 12.7 | 0.9 | .. | .. | .. | 0.4 | 10.1 | .. | .. | 0.3 | .. | 0.0 | 50.4 | .. | .. | .. | 25.7 | .. | .. | 0.8 | 0.6 | 3.6 | .. | 0.0 | 0.4
Humanitarian aid | 6.4 | 2.6 | 12.0 | 18.5 | 8.4 | 9.3 | 17.3 | 0.5 | 4.2 | 0.5 | 5.7 | 18.5 | 4.9 | 3.7 | 1.6 | 16.3 | 5.6 | 6.9 | 8.3 | 3.6 | 0.1 | 3.3 | 2.4 | 3.7 | 9.4 | 10.5 | 16.8 | 17.1 | 9.1 | 8.3 | 1.9 | 0.0
Administrative expenses | 7.7 | 5.2 | 6.5 | 7.9 | 8.0 | 6.1 | 10.0 | 5.7 | 4.0 | 16.2 | 7.6 | 6.3 | 3.0 | 3.0 | 3.1 | 7.3 | 7.7 | 12.6 | 6.3 | .. | 3.7 | 16.5 | 31.4 | 13.1 | 6.5 | 8.1 | 2.8 | 7.3 | 5.6 | 2.9 | .. | 2.5
Other and unspecified | 7.5 | 11.1 | 17.7 | 4.6 | 20.3 | 17.1 | 17.0 | 5.9 | 1.7 | 51.4 | 2.3 | 4.7 | 48.0 | 0.9 | 1.7 | 9.3 | 11.3 | 5.7 | 8.4 | 0.8 | 0.7 | 10.9 | 3.9 | 8.1 | 20.4 | 19.9 | 2.6 | 4.5 | 5.9 | 0.8 | .. | 0.0
Total | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0
Memorandum item: |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
Food aid, total | 1.6 | 0.8 | 5.4 | 7.5 | 0.6 | 0.1 | 2.5 | 0.6 | 0.9 | .. | 0.5 | 5.1 | 0.5 | 1.4 | .. | 3.5 | 1.0 | 0.8 | 1.0 | 0.4 | 0.1 | .. | 0.3 | 1.2 | 0.2 | 1.6 | 5.5 | 3.3 | 2.1 | 2.1 | .. | ..
1. Including students and trainees.
2. Population and reproductive health.
3. Including forgiveness of non-ODA debt.
4. Official development financing by multilateral institutions.
5. Including IDA, IBRD and IFC.
6. Including the African Development Bank, Asian Development Bank, Caribbean Development Bank and Inter-American Development Bank.
StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933246799

Table A.10. Distribution of ODA by income group¹
Net disbursements as a % of total ODA
| ODA to least developed countries | ODA to other low-income countries | ODA to lower middle-income countries | ODA to upper middle-income countries
| 2002-03 | 2012-13 | 2002-03 | 2012-13 | 2002-03 | 2012-13 | 2002-03 | 2012-13
Australia | 31.5 | 39.9 | 1.3 | 3.1 | 57.5 | 52.7 | 9.6 | 4.3
Austria | 41.1 | 33.9 | 1.6 | 2.7 | 24.2 | 34.9 | 33.1 | 28.5
Belgium | 68.4 | 47.8 | 1.7 | 2.6 | 17.0 | 31.9 | 12.9 | 17.6
Canada | 51.6 | 56.6 | 2.8 | 4.2 | 28.7 | 31.7 | 16.8 | 7.5
Czech Republic | 18.1 | 31.8 | 1.1 | 3.2 | 62.8 | 32.9 | 18.0 | 32.1
Denmark | 56.5 | 58.4 | 2.6 | 6.5 | 29.6 | 27.4 | 11.3 | 7.6
Finland | 48.8 | 53.5 | 3.7 | 5.7 | 25.8 | 25.5 | 21.7 | 15.3
France | 48.6 | 31.8 | 1.4 | 3.5 | 29.9 | 32.8 | 20.1 | 31.9
Germany | 42.0 | 36.9 | 2.8 | 4.1 | 28.6 | 31.4 | 26.6 | 27.5
Greece | 22.4 | 22.6 | 1.4 | 2.4 | 17.8 | 27.3 | 58.4 | 47.7
Iceland | 62.2 | 76.3 | 0.9 | 1.3 | 19.1 | 20.3 | 17.8 | 2.2
Ireland | 69.8 | 66.2 | 3.5 | 4.5 | 14.1 | 17.9 | 12.6 | 11.4
Italy | 64.4 | 37.5 | 1.5 | 3.2 | 19.6 | 29.2 | 14.5 | 30.2
Japan | 27.8 | 66.9 | 1.6 | 4.9 | 52.3 | 40.1 | 18.3 | -11.9
Korea | 32.3 | 46.0 | 0.9 | 2.1 | 51.5 | 44.4 | 15.3 | 7.5
Luxembourg | 41.5 | 49.5 | 1.3 | 1.6 | 35.9 | 37.5 | 21.2 | 11.5
Netherlands | 51.3 | 55.1 | 2.1 | 4.1 | 31.3 | 25.2 | 15.3 | 15.5
New Zealand | 38.7 | 48.6 | 1.9 | 1.7 | 43.0 | 37.7 | 16.4 | 12.0
Norway | 55.5 | 49.8 | 2.6 | 3.7 | 26.2 | 23.3 | 15.7 | 23.2
Poland | 18.7 | 27.4 | 1.5 | 2.7 | 20.7 | 26.0 | 59.1 | 44.0
Portugal | 64.8 | 33.7 | 1.2 | 0.9 | 24.6 | 49.1 | 9.4 | 16.3
Slovak Republic | 36.1 | 28.5 | 6.7 | 6.0 | 31.6 | 26.4 | 25.6 | 39.1
Slovenia | .. | 23.7 | .. | 2.2 | .. | 27.6 | .. | 46.5
Spain | 28.2 | 30.5 | 1.3 | 1.7 | 35.6 | 35.8 | 34.9 | 32.0
Sweden | 52.8 | 54.3 | 3.5 | 6.3 | 27.8 | 26.0 | 15.9 | 13.4
Switzerland | 44.7 | 45.3 | 4.2 | 6.7 | 28.7 | 33.7 | 22.4 | 14.2
United Kingdom | 43.8 | 50.2 | 3.9 | 5.8 | 32.0 | 31.9 | 20.2 | 12.1
United States | 36.1 | 50.2 | 3.6 | 6.1 | 36.2 | 29.9 | 24.1 | 13.9
Total DAC | 42.1 | 47.5 | 2.6 | 4.8 | 34.6 | 32.5 | 20.7 | 15.2
of which: DAC-EU countries | 48.2 | 42.5 | 2.4 | 4.4 | 28.6 | 31.0 | 20.8 | 22.1
1. Including imputed multilateral ODA. Excluding more advanced developing countries and territories and amounts unspecified by country.
StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933246807

Table A.11. Regional distribution of ODA by individual DAC donors¹
% of total net disbursements
| Sub-Saharan Africa | South and Central Asia | Other Asia and Oceania | Middle East and North Africa | Europe | Latin America and Caribbean
| 2002-03 | 2007-08 | 2012-13 | 2002-03 | 2007-08 | 2012-13 | 2002-03 | 2007-08 | 2012-13 | 2002-03 | 2007-08 | 2012-13 | 2002-03 | 2007-08 | 2012-13 | 2002-03 | 2007-08 | 2012-13
Australia | 9.8 | 7.9 | 16.0 | 13.7 | 14.2 | 18.1 | 68.3 | 62.2 | 60.0 | 4.7 | 14.7 | 3.9 | 2.5 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 1.0 | 0.6 | 1.7
Austria | 40.2 | 29.0 | 39.7 | 8.8 | 7.9 | 14.9 | 5.6 | 4.3 | 7.7 | 12.3 | 43.1 | 8.4 | 26.3 | 12.2 | 23.6 | 6.8 | 3.7 | 5.6
Belgium | 72.7 | 59.0 | 59.6 | 4.3 | 9.2 | 7.8 | 4.3 | 5.8 | 5.6 | 5.4 | 12.2 | 9.2 | 5.7 | 4.4 | 9.4 | 7.5 | 9.5 | 8.5
Canada | 49.6 | 44.4 | 56.9 | 7.5 | 22.1 | 13.3 | 12.9 | 9.9 | 6.3 | 6.6 | 7.3 | 6.2 | 7.9 | 2.4 | 2.2 | 15.5 | 14.0 | 15.0
Czech Republic | 10.6 | 27.6 | 28.6 | 16.2 | 23.9 | 15.5 | 9.9 | 9.1 | 6.9 | 40.0 | 12.2 | 13.4 | 19.4 | 20.1 | 30.2 | 3.9 | 7.1 | 5.3
Denmark | 53.3 | 56.6 | 56.8 | 13.1 | 15.1 | 16.5 | 11.5 | 8.5 | 6.0 | 6.8 | 8.4 | 11.3 | 5.5 | 3.9 | 5.5 | 9.7 | 7.4 | 3.8
Finland | 46.0 | 50.0 | 50.1 | 16.0 | 15.1 | 15.6 | 10.2 | 10.3 | 8.8 | 9.4 | 8.3 | 8.6 | 8.9 | 7.0 | 8.7 | 9.5 | 9.3 | 8.3
France | 58.2 | 49.3 | 43.2 | 5.5 | 7.4 | 11.1 | 8.3 | 8.9 | 7.5 | 14.2 | 20.6 | 16.3 | 8.3 | 7.6 | 8.6 | 5.5 | 6.1 | 13.2
Germany | 44.6 | 36.3 | 34.9 | 12.1 | 13.5 | 18.3 | 9.5 | 8.8 | 9.9 | 10.5 | 27.3 | 13.9 | 12.6 | 6.8 | 12.8 | 10.7 | 7.3 | 10.2
Greece | 19.1 | 28.6 | 26.2 | 10.5 | 13.8 | 7.7 | 2.8 | 5.4 | 3.1 | 11.4 | 15.0 | 17.3 | 52.6 | 31.4 | 39.4 | 3.7 | 5.7 | 6.3
Iceland | 75.0 | 53.3 | 72.1 | 8.3 | 25.4 | 8.2 | 3.3 | 3.3 | 2.7 | 9.9 | 6.8 | 10.4 | 1.9 | 4.1 | 2.2 | 1.5 | 7.1 | 4.4
Ireland | 72.3 | 69.4 | 67.5 | 8.0 | 9.4 | 7.5 | 4.0 | 7.8 | 6.4 | 6.2 | 4.9 | 7.4 | 4.5 | 3.4 | 7.0 | 5.0 | 5.1 | 4.1
Italy | 62.2 | 37.8 | 37.3 | 7.9 | 12.3 | 14.6 | 2.2 | 5.1 | 4.8 | 11.6 | 29.1 | 13.8 | 9.7 | 8.0 | 22.6 | 6.4 | 7.7 | 6.9
Japan | 19.3 | 34.3 | 36.0 | 28.6 | 22.2 | 52.8 | 37.2 | 13.2 | 1.6 | 4.3 | 20.6 | 8.3 | 2.1 | 4.4 | 1.1 | 8.5 | 5.3 | 0.2
Korea | 14.4 | 21.6 | 28.2 | 27.1 | 18.6 | 26.1 | 39.0 | 30.2 | 32.4 | 10.2 | 10.7 | 4.7 | 4.6 | 3.0 | 1.3 | 4.7 | 15.8 | 7.4
Luxembourg | 43.8 | 49.3 | 47.7 | 8.5 | 9.2 | 8.8 | 13.3 | 13.7 | 13.9 | 10.5 | 6.7 | 7.1 | 8.9 | 7.1 | 10.4 | 15.1 | 14.1 | 12.1
Netherlands | 49.1 | 56.7 | 55.4 | 15.6 | 13.8 | 14.4 | 10.5 | 7.1 | 4.0 | 7.5 | 7.8 | 9.7 | 7.6 | 5.5 | 9.7 | 9.7 | 9.1 | 6.7
New Zealand | 13.7 | 11.2 | 8.6 | 10.7 | 10.3 | 9.2 | 65.3 | 72.1 | 78.2 | 6.6 | 2.8 | 1.9 | 0.8 | 0.7 | 0.6 | 3.0 | 2.9 | 1.5
Norway | 47.4 | 50.4 | 45.0 | 18.4 | 18.4 | 15.2 | 6.8 | 8.1 | 6.3 | 10.2 | 8.4 | 9.5 | 10.8 | 5.3 | 4.3 | 6.4 | 9.3 | 19.8
Poland | 16.8 | 30.3 | 28.4 | 19.8 | 10.0 | 9.1 | 19.9 | 16.6 | 11.8 | 7.1 | 10.8 | 13.0 | 33.7 | 21.3 | 32.2 | 2.6 | 11.0 | 5.5
Portugal | 51.0 | 47.2 | 64.3 | 9.3 | 8.2 | 3.2 | 25.5 | 11.8 | 7.4 | 5.9 | 17.3 | 11.1 | 5.4 | 11.6 | 10.3 | 2.9 | 3.8 | 3.6
Slovak Republic | 35.1 | 56.9 | 31.4 | 19.3 | 8.7 | 11.7 | 8.1 | 4.1 | 3.5 | 9.5 | 9.5 | 14.3 | 21.7 | 15.0 | 33.0 | 6.2 | 5.7 | 6.1
Slovenia | .. | 27.9 | 27.2 | .. | 9.1 | 8.4 | .. | 4.4 | 3.9 | .. | 11.0 | 11.6 | .. | 40.9 | 43.3 | .. | 6.6 | 5.6
Spain | 28.4 | 32.3 | 37.4 | 6.9 | 8.5 | 6.8 | 6.9 | 6.7 | 2.6 | 12.4 | 15.2 | 15.1 | 12.6 | 7.3 | 18.7 | 32.7 | 29.9 | 19.4
Sweden | 50.5 | 52.3 | 52.2 | 14.7 | 13.8 | 15.0 | 8.9 | 8.9 | 6.7 | 6.9 | 8.1 | 10.9 | 8.8 | 8.1 | 9.1 | 10.3 | 8.8 | 6.2
Switzerland | 40.0 | 40.4 | 40.0 | 21.5 | 20.6 | 19.2 | 8.8 | 8.2 | 9.8 | 5.5 | 9.6 | 9.2 | 12.0 | 10.9 | 11.0 | 12.2 | 10.3 | 10.8
United Kingdom | 44.4 | 50.3 | 51.3 | 24.3 | 26.0 | 24.1 | 6.1 | 8.6 | 4.8 | 7.9 | 10.3 | 9.1 | 10.1 | 4.7 | 6.2 | 7.2 | 0.1 | 4.5
United States | 36.3 | 36.5 | 48.6 | 14.3 | 20.6 | 20.2 | 7.9 | 5.9 | 6.6 | 20.9 | 25.7 | 13.1 | 7.6 | 2.5 | 2.6 | 12.9 | 8.9 | 8.9
Total DAC | 41.2 | 41.3 | 44.1 | 15.4 | 16.3 | 20.6 | 13.8 | 9.8 | 9.2 | 11.5 | 18.9 | 11.2 | 8.2 | 5.5 | 6.7 | 9.9 | 8.2 | 8.2
of which: DAC-EU countries | 50.2 | 45.1 | 45.5 | 12.2 | 13.6 | 16.2 | 8.0 | 8.0 | 6.8 | 10.1 | 18.1 | 12.3 | 10.2 | 7.1 | 10.7 | 9.3 | 8.1 | 8.6
1. Including imputed multilateral flows, i.e. making allowance for contributions through multilateral organisations, calculated using the geographical distribution of multilateral disbursements for the year of reference. Excluding amounts unspecified by region.
StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933246818

Table A.12. Concessional flows for development from non-DAC providers of development co-operation
Net disbursements
| 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | Memorandum: 2013
| Share of bilateral co-operation | ODA/GNI
| USD million | %
OECD non-DAC |  |  |  |  |  |  |
Estonia | 18 | 19 | 24 | 23 | 31 | 37 | 0.13
Hungary | 117 | 114 | 140 | 118 | 128 | 27 | 0.10
Israel¹, 2 | 124 | 145 | 206 | 181 | 202 | 92 | 0.07
Turkey | 707 | 967 | 1 273 | 2 533 | 3 308 | 95 | 0.42
Other providers |  |  |  |  |  |  |
Bulgaria | .. | 40 | 48 | 40 | 50 | 1 | 0.10
Croatia | .. | .. | .. | 21 | 45 | 54 | 0.08
Cyprus³, 4 | 46 | 51 | 38 | 25 | 20 | 16 | 0.10
Kuwait (KFAED) | 221 | 211 | 145 | 149 | 186 | 100 | n.a.
Latvia | 21 | 16 | 19 | 21 | 24 | 6 | 0.08
Liechtenstein | 26 | 27 | 31 | 29 | 28 | 84 | n.a.
Lithuania | 36 | 37 | 52 | 52 | 50 | 35 | 0.11
Malta | 14 | 14 | 20 | 19 | 18 | 66 | 0.20
Romania | 153 | 114 | 164 | 142 | 134 | 15 | 0.07
Russian Federation | .. | 472 | 479 | 465 | 714 | 51 | 0.03
Saudi Arabia | 3 134 | 3 480 | 5 095 | 1 299 | 5 683 | 95 | n.a.
Chinese Taipei | 411 | 381 | 381 | 305 | 272 | 85 | 0.05
Thailand | 40 | 10 | 31 | 17 | 46 | 60 | 0.01
United Arab Emirates | 947 | 414 | 713 | 1 009 | 5 402 | 100 | 1.34
Total | 6 015 | 6 511 | 8 859 | 6 449 | 16 341 | .. | ..

1. These figures include USD 35.4 million in 2009, USD 40.2 million in 2010, USD 49.2 million in 2011, USD 56 million in 2012 and USD 55.9 million in 2013 for first year sustenance expenses for persons arriving from developing countries (many of which are experiencing civil war or severe unrest), or individuals who have left due to humanitarian or political reasons.

2. The statistical data for Israel are supplied by and under the responsibility of the relevant Israeli authorities. The use of such data by the OECD is without prejudice to the status of the Golan Heights, East Jerusalem and Israeli settlements in the West Bank under the terms of international law.

3. Footnote by Turkey: The information in this document with reference to “Cyprus” relates to the southern part of the Island. There is no single authority representing both Turkish and Greek Cypriot people on the Island. Turkey recognizes the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). Until a lasting and equitable solution is found within the context of the United Nations, Turkey shall preserve its position concerning the “Cyprus issue”.

4. Footnote by all the European Union Member States of the OECD and the European Commission: The Republic of Cyprus is recognised by all members of the United Nations with the exception of Turkey. The information in this document relates to the area under the effective control of the Government of the Republic of Cyprus.

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933246829

Table A.13. Concessional and non-concessional flows by multilateral organisations¹
USD million, at current prices and exchange rates
| Gross disbursements | Net disbursements
| 1997-98 average | 2002-03 average | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 1997-98 average | 2002-03 average | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013
Concessional flows |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
International financial institutions (IFI) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
AfDB | 632 | 840 | 3 175 | 2 414 | 2 355 | 2 548 | 2 420 | 583 | 641 | 2 750 | 1 830 | 2 272 | 1 902 | 2 324
AsDB | 1 153 | 1 153 | 2 790 | 1 930 | 1 940 | 1 835 | 2 696 | 1 006 | 866 | 1 943 | 1 023 | 863 | 716 | 1 004
CarDB | 24 | 78 | 85 | 75 | 72 | 64 | 92 | 2 | 44 | 68 | 55 | 39 | 42 | 65
EBRD | 20 | 48 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 20 | 48 | .. | .. | .. | .. | ..
IDA | 5 822 | 7 443 | 12 793 | 12 123 | 11 703 | 12 523 | 12 307 | 5 037 | 5 836 | 9 006 | 7 779 | 6 995 | 6 840 | 8 172
IDB Sp.Fund | 592 | 509 | 1 025 | 1 994 | 1 703 | 1 619 | 2 169 | 310 | 229 | 380 | 1 287 | 1 497 | 1 413 | 1 930
IMF² | 1 117 | 1 810 | 2 605 | 2 973 | 1 455 | 1 506 | 1 212 | 284 | 642 | 1 825 | 1 230 | 772 | 769 | 620
Nordic Dev. Fund | 46 | 45 | 76 | 65 | 70 | 56 | 49 | 46 | 43 | 64 | 50 | 52 | 38 | 28
Total IFIs | 9 408 | 11 927 | 22 549 | 21 575 | 19 297 | 20 151 | 20 945 | 7 288 | 8 348 | 16 035 | 13 253 | 12 490 | 11 721 | 14 144
United Nations³ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
IFAD | 215 | 257 | 399 | 520 | 621 | 631 | 612 | 122 | 152 | 230 | 284 | 382 | 449 | 433
UNAIDS | .. | .. | 243 | 246 | 265 | 242 | 246 | .. | .. | 243 | 246 | 265 | 242 | 246
UNDP | 637 | 285 | 631 | 613 | 494 | 487 | 468 | 637 | 285 | 631 | 602 | 490 | 483 | 465
UNFPA | 215 | 290 | 348 | 316 | 315 | 349 | 355 | 215 | 290 | 346 | 314 | 314 | 332 | 354
UNHCR | 248 | 584 | 301 | 393 | 441 | 424 | 417 | 248 | 584 | 301 | 393 | 441 | 424 | 417
UNICEF | 499 | 598 | 1 104 | 1 050 | 1 104 | 1 152 | 1 252 | 499 | 598 | 1 086 | 1 046 | 1 089 | 1 140 | 1 230
UNRWA | 281 | 411 | 473 | 545 | 608 | 667 | 539 | 281 | 411 | 473 | 545 | 608 | 667 | 539
UNTA | 358 | 485 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 358 | 485 | .. | .. | .. | .. | ..
WFP | 274 | 335 | 293 | 244 | 345 | 355 | 365 | 274 | 335 | 290 | 243 | 337 | 354 | 364
WHO | .. | .. | 437 | 366 | 452 | 397 | 475 | .. | .. | 437 | 366 | 452 | 397 | 474
Other UN⁴ | .. | .. | 121 | 151 | 145 | 148 | 143 | .. | .. | 120 | 151 | 145 | 141 | 136
Total UN | 2 727 | 3 246 | 4 348 | 4 443 | 4 792 | 4 851 | 4 873 | 2 634 | 3 141 | 4 157 | 4 189 | 4 523 | 4 630 | 4 658
EU institutions | 5 395 | 6 080 | 13 161 | 12 638 | 17 947 | 18 082 | 17 243 | 5 140 | 5 798 | 13 159 | 12 496 | 17 045 | 17 173 | 15 723
Gavi | .. | .. | 469 | 772 | 819 | 1 068 | 1 569 | .. | .. | 469 | 772 | 819 | 1 068 | 1 544
GEF⁵ | .. | 447 | 711 | 530 | 474 | 539 | 574 | .. | 447 | 711 | 530 | 471 | 537 | 573
GGGI | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 16 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 16
Global Fund | .. | 108 | 2 337 | 3 031 | 2 647 | 3 359 | 4 009 | .. | 108 | 2 333 | 3 003 | 2 612 | 3 307 | 3 946
Montreal Protocol | 97 | 63 | 29 | 21 | 10 | 5 | 37 | 97 | 63 | 29 | 21 | 8 | 5 | 37
OSCE | .. | .. | .. | 150 | 151 | 135 | 134 | .. | .. | .. | 150 | 151 | 135 | 134
Arab Funds⁶ | 115 | 250 | 1 827 | 1 864 | 1 599 | 1 569 | 1 435 | -23 | 92 | 965 | 993 | 730 | 616 | 681
Arab Funds | 17 742 | 22 120 | 45 432 | 45 022 | 47 735 | 49 759 | 50 834 | 15 136 | 17 996 | 37 859 | 35 406 | 38 850 | 39 193 | 41 456
Non-concessional flows |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
AfDB | 781 | 824 | 3 626 | 2 042 | 3 051 | 3 510 | 2 304 | -115 | -695 | 2 475 | 1 152 | 2 050 | 2 660 | 1 065
AsDB | 5 463 | 2 877 | 7 898 | 5 272 | 5 626 | 6 900 | 6 163 | 4 313 | -1 329 | 6 035 | 3 230 | 3 155 | 3 982 | 1 581
CarDB | 49 | 91 | 114 | 247 | 83 | 36 | 54 | 34 | 52 | 54 | 132 | 36 | -10 | -10
EBRD | 383 | 741 | 3 606 | 3 629 | 4 034 | 3 336 | 3 827 | 282 | 155 | 2 300 | 2 033 | 2 357 | 1 813 | 1 620
EU institutions | 1 020 | 1 491 | 6 674 | 8 259 | 982 | 762 | 1 433 | 841 | 1 015 | 4 693 | 5 583 | -794 | -999 | -612
IBRD | 14 262 | 10 030 | 21 408 | 26 511 | 15 971 | 15 136 | 16 234 | 4 445 | -5 255 | 11 519 | 18 215 | 1 810 | 7 725 | 8 026
IDB | 5 492 | 6 959 | 11 415 | 10 175 | 7 187 | 6 447 | 9 828 | 3 405 | 1 340 | 6 852 | 4 518 | 2 655 | 1 914 | 1 419
IFAD | 17 | 22 | 38 | 44 | 49 | 63 | 57 | -7 | -6 | 6 | 11 | 11 | 28 | 27
IFC | 1 567 | 1 768 | 4 471 | 4 184 | 4 733 | 6 414 | 6 743 | 462 | 642 | 2 245 | 1 693 | 1 426 | 2 181 | 2 013
Arab Funds⁶ | .. | .. | 362 | 1 983 | 2 297 | 1 752 | 679 | .. | .. | 259 | 1 448 | 1 899 | 916 | 229
Total non-concessional | 29 032 | 24 803 | 59 613 | 62 347 | 44 013 | 44 357 | 47 321 | 13 659 | -4 081 | 36 439 | 38 015 | 14 605 | 20 210 | 15 357
1. To countries and territories on the DAC List of ODA Recipients.
2. IMF concessional Trust Funds.

3. The data for UN agencies have been reviewed to include only regular budget expenditures. This has led to revisions of UNDP data since 1990. For the WFP and the UNHCR, revisions have only been possible from 1996 onwards, while for UNICEF the data are revised from 1997. Since 2000, the UNHCR operates an Annual Programme Budget which includes country operations, global operations and administrative costs under a unified budget. However, data shown for the UNHCR as of 2004 cover expenditures from unrestricted or broadly earmarked funds only. For the UNFPA, data prior to 2004 include regular budget and other expenditures.

4. IAEA, UNECE and UNPBF.

5. Until 2010, the data for the GEF are on a commitment basis.

6. AFESD, BADEA, Isl. Dev. Bank and OFID.

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933246831

Table A.14. Deflators for resource flows from DAC donors¹ (2012 = 100)
| 1997 | 1998 | 1999 | 2000 | 2001 | 2002 | 2003 | 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013
Australia | 44.92 | 38.07 | 39.61 | 37.19 | 34.30 | 37.16 | 45.50 | 53.52 | 57.88 | 60.10 | 69.44 | 72.96 | 69.16 | 85.80 | 100.31 | 100.00 | 94.05
Austria | 70.64 | 69.81 | 67.07 | 58.63 | 57.98 | 61.92 | 74.94 | 83.78 | 85.48 | 87.95 | 97.80 | 104.93 | 102.61 | 99.24 | 106.27 | 100.00 | 105.23
Belgium | 66.00 | 66.24 | 63.70 | 56.19 | 55.72 | 59.82 | 73.13 | 82.14 | 84.12 | 86.95 | 97.08 | 104.47 | 102.07 | 99.06 | 106.10 | 100.00 | 104.93
Canada | 51.72 | 48.19 | 49.02 | 51.12 | 49.83 | 49.75 | 57.65 | 64.07 | 71.00 | 77.90 | 84.91 | 88.14 | 81.28 | 92.41 | 99.36 | 100.00 | 98.08
Czech Republic | 44.87 | 48.32 | 46.23 | 41.95 | 44.61 | 53.19 | 62.45 | 71.13 | 76.03 | 81.07 | 93.24 | 111.14 | 103.85 | 101.73 | 108.79 | 100.00 | 101.45
Denmark | 62.64 | 62.52 | 60.98 | 54.21 | 54.01 | 58.31 | 71.05 | 79.86 | 82.04 | 84.53 | 94.41 | 103.64 | 100.83 | 100.00 | 105.63 | 100.00 | 104.77
Finland | 69.15 | 69.39 | 67.09 | 59.54 | 59.60 | 63.52 | 75.63 | 83.57 | 83.98 | 85.52 | 96.06 | 104.18 | 102.09 | 97.43 | 105.13 | 100.00 | 105.04
France | 68.67 | 68.66 | 65.91 | 57.91 | 57.41 | 61.75 | 75.51 | 84.41 | 86.05 | 88.77 | 99.32 | 107.30 | 104.34 | 100.21 | 106.55 | 100.00 | 104.81
Germany | 77.05 | 76.39 | 73.35 | 63.02 | 61.93 | 66.11 | 80.12 | 89.04 | 89.64 | 90.81 | 100.64 | 106.87 | 104.39 | 100.32 | 106.61 | 100.00 | 105.49
Greece | 64.88 | 63.09 | 62.79 | 54.30 | 53.79 | 58.52 | 72.91 | 82.54 | 84.14 | 87.03 | 98.07 | 108.21 | 106.87 | 102.80 | 109.05 | 100.00 | 100.98
Iceland | 81.45 | 85.40 | 86.65 | 82.50 | 72.34 | 81.49 | 97.92 | 109.66 | 125.90 | 123.22 | 142.02 | 111.87 | 89.32 | 96.37 | 104.82 | 100.00 | 105.86
Ireland | 67.11 | 66.88 | 66.08 | 60.19 | 62.00 | 68.83 | 85.58 | 96.34 | 98.63 | 102.94 | 114.22 | 116.92 | 108.56 | 101.69 | 107.46 | 100.00 | 103.63
Italy | 64.48 | 64.92 | 63.15 | 55.68 | 55.66 | 60.46 | 74.74 | 84.15 | 85.71 | 88.04 | 98.30 | 106.20 | 104.67 | 99.94 | 106.34 | 100.00 | 104.80
Japan | 79.37 | 73.32 | 83.19 | 86.81 | 76.10 | 72.70 | 77.19 | 81.64 | 79.15 | 74.03 | 72.47 | 81.44 | 89.79 | 93.49 | 101.01 | 100.00 | 81.36
Korea | 85.11 | 60.62 | 70.80 | 75.05 | 68.29 | 72.72 | 79.12 | 84.76 | 95.40 | 102.51 | 107.16 | 92.33 | 83.21 | 95.06 | 100.72 | 100.00 | 104.17
Luxembourg | 55.12 | 54.10 | 54.61 | 48.19 | 46.84 | 50.32 | 63.87 | 71.52 | 74.96 | 80.82 | 91.47 | 96.79 | 94.21 | 96.00 | 105.02 | 100.00 | 106.64
Netherlands | 64.63 | 64.76 | 63.24 | 56.95 | 58.15 | 63.54 | 77.83 | 86.21 | 88.35 | 90.80 | 100.86 | 108.51 | 104.86 | 100.55 | 106.77 | 100.00 | 104.90
New Zealand | 58.95 | 48.02 | 47.63 | 41.77 | 40.34 | 44.89 | 57.19 | 67.65 | 73.49 | 69.62 | 82.22 | 80.44 | 72.92 | 87.57 | 98.34 | 100.00 | 103.78
Norway | 41.38 | 38.48 | 39.71 | 40.70 | 40.50 | 44.80 | 52.00 | 57.85 | 65.93 | 72.05 | 81.28 | 92.54 | 79.58 | 87.86 | 101.19 | 100.00 | 100.85
Poland | 57.12 | 59.57 | 55.63 | 54.45 | 59.84 | 61.36 | 64.58 | 71.79 | 83.11 | 87.88 | 102.56 | 119.79 | 97.49 | 102.10 | 107.15 | 100.00 | 103.73
Portugal | 63.48 | 64.07 | 63.36 | 56.59 | 56.95 | 62.17 | 76.78 | 86.52 | 88.73 | 92.10 | 103.29 | 110.56 | 107.73 | 103.10 | 108.50 | 100.00 | 104.70
Slovak Republic | 41.47 | 41.57 | 38.02 | 37.22 | 37.40 | 41.43 | 53.78 | 64.91 | 69.01 | 74.36 | 90.34 | 105.82 | 104.76 | 100.13 | 106.84 | 100.00 | 104.68
Slovenia | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 84.23 | 86.82 | 98.67 | 108.26 | 107.98 | 101.61 | 107.91 | 100.00 | 103.70
Spain | 59.94 | 60.20 | 59.10 | 52.88 | 53.54 | 58.80 | 73.42 | 84.00 | 87.69 | 92.22 | 103.87 | 112.04 | 108.25 | 103.04 | 108.19 | 100.00 | 104.10
Sweden | 70.74 | 68.34 | 66.38 | 60.70 | 55.02 | 59.42 | 72.74 | 80.38 | 79.71 | 82.28 | 92.20 | 96.25 | 85.99 | 91.97 | 103.40 | 100.00 | 104.72
Switzerland | 56.86 | 56.65 | 54.77 | 49.50 | 50.14 | 54.67 | 63.80 | 69.63 | 69.62 | 70.75 | 75.75 | 85.18 | 85.79 | 89.48 | 105.56 | 100.00 | 101.17
United Kingdom | 74.03 | 76.30 | 76.13 | 71.80 | 69.87 | 74.59 | 82.93 | 95.27 | 96.36 | 100.34 | 111.63 | 104.14 | 91.91 | 93.70 | 99.50 | 100.00 | 100.71
United States | 74.38 | 75.18 | 76.26 | 77.99 | 79.78 | 81.00 | 82.62 | 84.89 | 87.61 | 90.30 | 92.70 | 94.51 | 95.24 | 96.39 | 98.28 | 100.00 | 101.50
Total DAC | 68.36 | 67.13 | 68.26 | 65.92 | 63.33 | 65.79 | 75.16 | 82.17 | 84.34 | 86.34 | 93.51 | 98.33 | 95.36 | 96.29 | 102.45 | 100.00 | 100.09
EU institutions | 68.58 | 68.79 | 66.20 | 58.09 | 57.83 | 62.41 | 76.46 | 85.67 | 87.30 | 89.76 | 100.17 | 107.56 | 104.85 | 100.51 | 106.77 | 100.00 | 104.86
1. Including the effect of exchange rate changes, i.e. applicable to US dollar figures only.
StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933246840

Table A.15. Annual average US dollar exchange rates for DAC member countries
1 USD = |  | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013
Australia | Dollars | 1.2800 | 1.0902 | 0.9692 | 0.9660 | 1.0367
Austria | Euro | 0.7181 | 0.7550 | 0.7192 | 0.7780 | 0.7532
Belgium | Euro | 0.7181 | 0.7550 | 0.7192 | 0.7780 | 0.7532
Canada | Dollars | 1.1410 | 1.0302 | 0.9891 | 0.9992 | 1.0302
Czech Republic | Koruna | 18.9895 | 19.0795 | 17.6722 | 19.5383 | 19.5585
Denmark | Kroner | 5.3465 | 5.6218 | 5.3604 | 5.7899 | 5.6169
Finland | Euro | 0.7181 | 0.7550 | 0.7192 | 0.7780 | 0.7532
France | Euro | 0.7181 | 0.7550 | 0.7192 | 0.7780 | 0.7532
Germany | Euro | 0.7181 | 0.7550 | 0.7192 | 0.7780 | 0.7532
Greece | Euro | 0.7181 | 0.7550 | 0.7192 | 0.7780 | 0.7532
Iceland | Krona | 123.4 | 122.2 | 116.1 | 125.1 | 122.2
Ireland | Euro | 0.7181 | 0.7550 | 0.7192 | 0.7780 | 0.7532
Italy | Euro | 0.7181 | 0.7550 | 0.7192 | 0.7780 | 0.7532
Japan | Yen | 93.4 | 87.8 | 79.7 | 79.8 | 97.6
Korea | Won | 1 273.9 | 1 155.4 | 1 107.3 | 1 125.9 | 1 094.6
Luxembourg | Euro | 0.7181 | 0.7550 | 0.7192 | 0.7780 | 0.7532
Netherlands | Euro | 0.7181 | 0.7550 | 0.7192 | 0.7780 | 0.7532
New Zealand | Dollars | 1.5988 | 1.3876 | 1.2664 | 1.2349 | 1.2203
Norway | Kroner | 6.2784 | 6.0445 | 5.6046 | 5.8149 | 5.8780
Poland | Zloty | 3.1092 | 3.0145 | 2.9621 | 3.2518 | 3.1596
Portugal | Euro | 0.7181 | 0.7550 | 0.7192 | 0.7780 | 0.7532
Slovak Republic | Euro | 0.7181 | 0.7550 | 0.7192 | 0.7780 | 0.7532
Slovenia | Euro | 0.7181 | 0.7550 | 0.7192 | 0.7780 | 0.7532
Spain | Euro | 0.7181 | 0.7550 | 0.7192 | 0.7780 | 0.7532
Sweden | Kroner | 7.6322 | 7.2022 | 6.4892 | 6.7689 | 6.5132
Switzerland | Francs | 1.0839 | 1.0427 | 0.8872 | 0.9375 | 0.9268
United Kingdom | Pound Sterling | 0.6402 | 0.6475 | 0.6238 | 0.6311 | 0.6396
EU14 | Euro | 0.7181 | 0.7550 | 0.7192 | 0.7780 | 0.7532
StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933246857

Table A.16. Gross national income and population of DAC member countries
| Gross national income (USD billion) | Population (thousands)
| 2002-03 average | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2002-03 average | 2011 | 2012 | 2013
Australia | 440 | 1 450 | 1 497 | 1 464 | 19 730 | 23 200 | 22 910 | 23 320
Austria | 227 | 416 | 395 | 428 | 8 040 | 8 440 | 8 430 | 8 480
Belgium | 278 | 523 | 488 | 508 | 10 345 | 10 950 | 10 950 | 11 150
Canada | 786 | 1 707 | 1 789 | 1 799 | 31 600 | 34 610 | 35 000 | 35 160
Czech Republic | 75 | 201 | 182 | 185 | 10 205 | 10 510 | 10 510 | 10 510
Denmark | 190 | 344 | 324 | 344 | 5 390 | 5 580 | 5 600 | 5 630
Finland | 146 | 265 | 247 | 268 | 5 210 | 5 400 | 5 430 | 5 450
France | 1 631 | 2 828 | 2 657 | 2 794 | 59 605 | 65 350 | 65 590 | 65 590
Germany | 2 188 | 3 644 | 3 481 | 3 736 | 82 500 | 81 840 | 80 490 | 80 720
Greece | 153 | 290 | 250 | 241 | 10 985 | 11 320 | 11 300 | 11 060
Iceland | 9 | 12 | 12 | 14 | 290 | 320 | 330 | 330
Ireland | 113 | 178 | 172 | 183 | 3 940 | 4 590 | 4 590 | 4 590
Italy | 1 314 | 2 183 | 1 998 | 2 059 | 57 700 | 60 850 | 59 690 | 59 680
Japan | 4 220 | 6 089 | 6 125 | 5 084 | 127 530 | 127 770 | 127 490 | 127 260
Korea | 577 | 1 118 | 1 135 | 1 316 | 48 015 | 49 780 | 50 000 | 50 000
Luxembourg | 21 | 42 | 40 | 43 | 445 | 510 | 520 | 520
Netherlands | 456 | 842 | 778 | 813 | 16 195 | 16 670 | 16 730 | 16 780
New Zealand | 64 | 154 | 162 | 174 | 3 975 | 4 420 | 4 450 | 4 500
Norway | 207 | 493 | 511 | 519 | 4 560 | 4 990 | 5 050 | 5 110
Poland | 103 | 496 | 468 | 496 | 38 215 | 38 210 | 38 540 | 38 500
Portugal | 132 | 229 | 207 | 215 | 10 340 | 10 560 | 10 560 | 10 490
Slovak Republic | 30 | 94 | 90 | 92 | 5 380 | 5 400 | 5 400 | 5 410
Slovenia | .. | 49 | 45 | 47 | .. | 2 060 | 2 060 | 2 060
Spain | 746 | 1 457 | 1 307 | 1 362 | 41 945 | 47 190 | 47 270 | 47 130
Sweden | 271 | 550 | 538 | 575 | 8 960 | 9 520 | 9 560 | 9 540
Switzerland | 328 | 666 | 653 | 686 | 7 320 | 7 950 | 8 010 | 8 110
United Kingdom | 1 712 | 2 459 | 2 472 | 2 536 | 59 090 | 62 260 | 63 710 | 63 710
United States | 10 736 | 15 211 | 16 515 | 17 204 | 289 630 | 311 590 | 313 910 | 316 130
Total DAC | 27 153 | 43 990 | 44 539 | 45 186 | 967 140 | 1021 840 | 1024 080 | 1026 920
of which: DAC-EU countries | 9 787 | 17 090 | 16 140 | 16 925 | 434 490 | 457 210 | 456 930 | 457 000
StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933246865

Annex B.

Methodological notes on the Profiles of Development Assistance Committee members

General point: unless otherwise stated, and with the exception of data on official development assistance (ODA) allocation by sector, and ODA supporting gender equality and environment objectives (whose figures refer to commitments), all figures in the profiles refer to gross bilateral disbursements. All of the data presented in the profiles are publicly available at: www.oecd.org/dac/stats.

Data specificities on the Development Assistance Committee’s most recent members

In 2013, five new countries joined the DAC: Iceland (March 2013), the Czech Republic (May 2013), the Slovak Republic (September 2013), Poland (October 2013) and Slovenia (December 2013).

Data for these members are not as complete as the data collected on other DAC members:

data on flows other than ODA (other official flows, private flows at market terms and private grants) are not available for these five members

data on ODA to and through civil society organisations (CSOs) and ODA in support of gender equality and women’s empowerment are not available for Poland.

The remainder of this annex describes the methodology and sources for: tax and development, aid for trade, support for statistical capacity building, climate change and pledges to the Green Climate Fund, promotion of effective use of resources for sustainable development, country programmable aid (CPA), support to fragile states, the Gender Equality Policy Marker and the Environment markers.

Tax and development

To estimate the amount of ODA that supports tax-related activities, the OECD uses the DAC’s Creditor Reporting System (CRS) database. This database registers information on the purpose of aid using a sector classification specifically developed to track aid flows and to permit measuring the share of each sector or other purpose category in total aid. There are 26 main sector/purpose categories. Each has a prescribed list of attributes to ensure that the proper activities are correctly classified. Most of the main sectors then have a number of sub-codes which allows for a breakdown of activities. The methodology is currently under review by the OECD Working Party on Development Finance and Statistics.

Source: OECD (2013), “Creditor Reporting System: Aid activities”, OECD International Development Statistics (database), http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/data-00061-en. The data cited in the profiles does not include the International Monetary Fund.

Aid for trade

According to the World Trade Organization (WTO) Task Force on Aid for Trade, projects and programmes are part of aid for trade if these activities have been identified as trade-related development priorities in the partner country’s national development strategies. Furthermore, the WTO Task Force concluded that to measure aid-for-trade flows, the following categories should be included: technical assistance for trade policy and regulations, trade-related infrastructure, productive capacity building (including trade development), trade-related adjustment, other trade-related needs.

The DAC’s CRS database was recognised as the best available data source for tracking global aid-for-trade flows. It should be kept in mind that the CRS does not provide data that match exactly all of the above aid-for-trade categories. In fact, the CRS provides proxies under four headings: trade policy and regulations, economic infrastructure, building productive capacity (BPC), trade-related adjustment. The CRS covers all ODA, but only those activities reported under the above four categories can be identified as aid for trade. It is not possible to distinguish activities in the context of “other trade-related needs”. To estimate the volume of such “other” activities, donors would need to examine aid projects in sectors other than those considered so far – for example in health and education – and indicate what share, if any, of these activities has an important trade component. A health programme, for instance, might permit increased trade from localities where the disease burden was previously a constraint on trade. Consequently, accurately monitoring aid for trade would require comparison of the CRS data with donor and partner countries’ self-assessments of their aid for trade.

Source: OECD (2013), “Creditor Reporting System: Aid activities”, OECD International Development Statistics (database), http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/data-00061-en.

Support for statistical capacity building

The data for this entry is extracted from the OECD’s Creditor Reporting System (CRS), line 16062: Statistical Capacity Building. In some instances, when the CRS data is incomplete, we complement with information received from members.

Source: OECD (2013), “Creditor Reporting System: Aid activities”, OECD International Development Statistics (database), http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/data-00061-en.

Climate change and pledges to the Green Climate Fund

This information comes from surveys submitted by OECD-DAC members to the DAC ENVIRONET Secretariat, and from public websites and policy documents of the development co-operation agencies. Pledges to the Green Climate Fund (GCF) have been sourced from the Green Climate Fund homepage (http://news.gcfund.org), which reflects pledges as of 31 December 2014, and from the Carbon Brief (www.carbonbrief.org/blog/2014/11/2014/12/briefing-country-pledges-to-the-green-climate-fund), which reflects pledges as of 10 December 2014.

Promotion of effective use of resources for sustainable development

The source and methodology for data on aid on budget; use of country public financial management and procurement systems; annual predictability and medium-term predictability is OECD/UNDP (2014), “Annex: Data related to the Global Partnership monitoring exercise”, in Making Development Co-operation More Effective: 2014 Progress Report, OECD Publishing, Paris. There are some fiscal year differences within the report, these data are referred to as 2013 data overall. See the full report for more detail on this topic (ibid.).

For a more detailed explanation of the Busan Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation monitoring indicators see: Proposed Indicators, Targets and Process for Global Monitoring (document discussed and approved at the meeting of the Working Party on Aid Effectiveness hosted at UNESCO Headquarters on 28-29 July 2012) available at http://effectivecooperation.org/.

Source of information for focus on results: OECD (2013), “Managing and measuring for results: Survey highlights”, OECD, Paris; OECD (2014), Measuring and Managing Results in Development Co-operation: A Review of Challenges and Practices among DAC Members and Observers, OECD, Paris, www.oecd.org/dac/peer-reviews/Measuring-and-managing-results.pdf; OECD Peer Reviews of DAC members.

Source for data on untied aid: OECD (2013), “Creditor Reporting System: Aid activities”, OECD International Development Statistics (database), http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/data-00061-en.

Country programmable aid

Country programmable aid (CPA) is a subset of gross bilateral ODA critical for the support of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). CPA tracks the proportion of ODA over which recipient countries have, or could have, a significant say. CPA reflects the amount of aid that involves a cross-border flow and is subject to multi-year planning at country/regional level.

CPA is defined through exclusions, by subtracting from total gross bilateral ODA activities that: 1) are inherently unpredictable (humanitarian aid and debt relief); 2) entail no cross-border flows (administrative costs, imputed student costs, promotion of development awareness, and costs related to research and refugees in donor countries); 3) do not form part of co-operation agreements between governments (food aid, aid from local governments, core funding to non-governmental organisations, ODA equity investments, aid through secondary agencies, and aid which is not allocable by country or region).

CPA is measured in disbursement terms and does not net out loan repayments since these are not usually factored into country aid decisions. CPA is derived from the standard DAC and CRS database.

Source: OECD (2013), “Country Programmable Aid (CPA)”, OECD International Development Statistics (database), http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=CPA.

For further information, see: www.oecd.org/development/effectiveness/countryprogrammableaidcpa frequentlyaskedquestions.htm.

Support to fragile states

Support to fragile states corresponds to gross bilateral ODA to the latest List of Fragile States (which appears in the OECD’s 2015 States of Fragility report). The 2015 List of Fragile States can be found at: www.oecd.org/dac/governance-peace/conflictandfragility/docs/List%20of%20fragile%20states.pdf.

For information on the States of Fragility report, see: www.oecd.org/dac/governance-peace/conflictandfragility/rf.htm.

Gender Equality Policy Marker

The DAC Gender Equality Policy Marker is a statistical instrument to measure aid that is focused on achieving gender equality and women’s empowerment. Activities are classified as “principal” when gender equality is a primary objective, “significant” when gender equality is an important but secondary objective, or “not targeted”. Poland, the Slovak Republic and Slovenia do not report on the Gender Equality Policy Marker, while the United States uses a different methodology (see individual footnote). In the profiles of DAC members, the basis of calculation is bilateral sector allocable, screened aid.

Source: OECD (2013), “Aid projects targeting gender equality and women’s empowerment (CRS)”, OECD International Development Statistics (database), http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=GENDER.

Environment markers

The figure “Bilateral ODA in support of global and local environment objectives, two year averages, commitments” presented in each DAC member profile nets out the overlaps between Rio and environment markers: it shows climate-related aid as a sub-category of total environmental aid; biodiversity and desertification are also included (either overlapping with climate-related aid or as additional – other – environmental aid) but not separately identified for the sake of readability of the figure. One activity can address several policy objectives at the same time. This reflects the fact that the three Rio conventions (targeting global environmental objectives) and local environmental objectives are mutually reinforcing. The same activity can, for example, be marked for climate change mitigation and biodiversity, or for biodiversity and desertification.

“Climate-related aid” covers both aid to climate mitigation and to adaptation from 2010 onwards, but only mitigation aid pre-2010. Reported figures for 2006-09 May appear lower than in practice, and may reflect a break in the series, given that pre-2010 adaptation spend is not marked. In the profiles of DAC members, the basis of calculation is total bilateral ODA. More details are available at: www.oecd.org/dac/stats/rioconventions.htm.

Source: OECD (2013), “Aid activities targeting Global Environmental Objectives”, OECD International Development Statistics (database), http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=RIOMARKERS.

Annex C.

Technical notes on definitions and measurement

The coverage of the data presented in the Development Co-operation Report has changed in recent years. The main points are as follows.

Changes in the concept of official development assistance and the coverage of gross national income

While the definition of official development assistance (ODA) has not changed since 1972, some changes in interpretation have tended to broaden the scope of the concept. The main changes are: the recording of administrative costs as ODA (from 1979), the imputation as ODA of the share of subsidies to educational systems representing the cost of educating students from aid recipient countries (first specifically identified in 1984), and the inclusion of assistance provided by donor countries in the first year after the arrival of a refugee from an aid recipient country (eligible to be reported as of the early 1980s but only widely used since 1991).

Precise quantification of the effects of these changes is difficult because changes in data collection methodology and coverage are often not directly apparent from members’ statistical returns. The amounts involved can, however, be substantial. For example, reporting by Canada in 1993 included for the first time a figure for in-Canada refugee support. The amount involved (USD 184 million) represented almost 8% of total Canadian ODA. Aid flows reported by Australia in the late 1980s have been estimated to be approximately 12% higher than had they been calculated according to the rules and procedures that applied 15 years earlier (Scott, 1989).

The coverage of national income has also been expanding through the inclusion of new areas of economic activity and the improvement of collection methods. The 1993 System of National Accounts (SNA) broadened the coverage of gross national product (GNP), renaming it gross national income (GNI). The new SNA 2008,1 which is gradually being implemented by members, tends to increase GNI, which, in turn will lower ODA/GNI ratios for some countries.

Recipient country coverage

Since 1990, the following entities were added to the DAC List of ODA Recipients at the dates shown: the Black Communities of South Africa (1991; now listed as South Africa); Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan (1992); Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia (1993); Palestinian Administered Areas (1994; now listed as West Bank and Gaza Strip); Moldova (1997); Belarus, Libya and Ukraine (2005); Kosovo (2009); South Sudan (2011).

Table C.1. DAC List of ODA Recipients, 2012-13
Effective for reporting on 2012 and 2013 flows
Least developed countries | Other low-income countries (per capita GNI ≤ USD 1 005 in 2010) | Lower middle-income countries and territories (per capita GNI USD 1 006-USD 3 975 in 2010) | Upper middle-income countries and territories (per capita GNI USD 3 976-USD 12 275 in 2010)
Afghanistan | Democratic People's Republic of Korea | Armenia | Albania
Angola | Kenya | Belize | Algeria
Bangladesh | Kyrgyzstan | Bolivia | Anguilla
Benin | Tajikistan | Cameroon | Antigua and Barbuda
Bhutan | Zimbabwe | Cabo Verde | Argentina
Burkina Faso |  | Congo | Azerbaijan
Burundi |  | Côte d'Ivoire | Belarus
Cambodia |  | Egypt | Bosnia and Herzegovina
Central African Republic |  | El Salvador | Botswana
Chad |  | Fiji | Brazil
Comoros |  | Georgia | Chile
Democratic Republic of the Congo |  | Ghana | China (People's Republic of)
Djibouti |  | Guatemala | Colombia
Equatorial Guinea |  | Guyana | Cook Islands
Eritrea |  | Honduras | Costa Rica
Ethiopia |  | India | Cuba
Gambia |  | Indonesia | Dominica
Guinea |  | Iraq | Dominican Republic
Guinea-Bissau |  | Kosovo | Ecuador
Haiti |  | Marshall Islands | Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
Kiribati |  | Micronesia | Gabon
Lao People's Democratic Republic |  | Moldova | Grenada
Lesotho |  | Mongolia | Iran
Liberia |  | Morocco | Jamaica
Madagascar |  | Nicaragua | Jordan
Malawi |  | Nigeria | Kazakhstan
Mali |  | Pakistan | Lebanon
Mauritania |  | Papua New Guinea | Libya
Mozambique |  | Paraguay | Malaysia
Myanmar |  | Philippines | Maldives
Nepal |  | Sri Lanka | Mauritius
Niger |  | Swaziland | Mexico
Rwanda |  | Syrian Arab Republic | Montenegro
Samoa |  | Tokelau | Montserrat
Sao Tome and Principe |  | Tonga | Namibia
Senegal |  | Turkmenistan | Nauru
Sierra Leone |  | Ukraine | Niue
Solomon Islands |  | Uzbekistan | Palau
Somalia |  | Viet Nam | Panama
South Sudan |  | West Bank and Gaza Strip | Peru
Sudan |  |  | Saint Helena
Tanzania |  |  | Saint Kitts and Nevis
Timor-Leste |  |  | Saint Lucia
Togo |  |  | Saint Vincent and the Grenadines
Tuvalu |  |  | Serbia
Uganda |  |  | Seychelles
Vanuatu |  |  | South Africa
Yemen |  |  | Suriname
Zambia |  |  | Thailand
|  |  | Tunisia
|  |  | Turkey
|  |  | Uruguay
|  |  | Venezuela
|  |  | Wallis and Futuna

Table C.2. DAC List of ODA Recipients, 2014-16
Effective for reporting on 2014, 2015 and 2016 flows
Least developed countries | Other low-income countries (per capita GNI ≤ USD 1 045 in 2013) | Lower middle-income countries and territories (per capita GNI USD 1 046-USD 4 125 in 2013) | Upper middle-income countries and territories (per capita GNI USD 4 126-USD 12 745 in 2013)
Afghanistan | Democratic People’s Republic of Korea | Armenia | Albania
Angola | Kenya | Bolivia | Algeria
Bangladesh | Tajikistan | Cabo Verde | Antigua and Barbuda²
Benin | Zimbabwe | Cameroon | Argentina
Bhutan |  | Congo | Azerbaijan
Burkina Faso |  | Côte d'Ivoire | Belarus
Burundi |  | Egypt | Belize
Cambodia |  | El Salvador | Bosnia and Herzegovina
Central African Republic |  | Georgia | Botswana
Chad |  | Ghana | Brazil
Comoros |  | Guatemala | Chile²
Democratic Republic of the Congo |  | Guyana | China (People’s Republic of)
Djibouti |  | Honduras | Colombia
Equatorial Guinea¹ |  | India | Cook Islands
Eritrea |  | Indonesia | Costa Rica
Ethiopia |  | Kosovo | Cuba
Gambia |  | Kyrgyzstan | Dominica
Guinea |  | Micronesia | Dominican Republic
Guinea-Bissau |  | Moldova | Ecuador
Haiti |  | Mongolia | Fiji
Kiribati |  | Morocco | Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
Lao People’s Democratic Republic |  | Nicaragua | Gabon
Lesotho |  | Nigeria | Grenada
Liberia |  | Pakistan | Iran
Madagascar |  | Papua New Guinea | Iraq
Malawi |  | Paraguay | Jamaica
Mali |  | Philippines | Jordan
Mauritania |  | Samoa | Kazakhstan
Mozambique |  | Sri Lanka | Lebanon
Myanmar |  | Swaziland | Libya
Nepal |  | Syrian Arab Republic | Malaysia
Niger |  | Tokelau | Maldives
Rwanda |  | Ukraine | Marshall Islands
Sao Tome and Principe |  | Uzbekistan | Mauritius
Senegal |  | Viet Nam | Mexico
Sierra Leone |  | West Bank and Gaza Strip | Montenegro
Solomon Islands |  |  | Montserrat
Somalia |  |  | Namibia
South Sudan |  |  | Nauru
Sudan |  |  | Niue
Tanzania |  |  | Palau
Timor-Leste |  |  | Panama
Togo |  |  | Peru
Tuvalu |  |  | Saint Helena
Uganda |  |  | Saint Lucia
Vanuatu¹ |  |  | Saint Vincent and the Grenadines
Yemen |  |  | Serbia
Zambia |  |  | Seychelles
|  |  | South Africa
|  |  | Suriname
|  |  | Thailand
|  |  | Tonga
|  |  | Tunisia
|  |  | Turkey
|  |  | Turkmenistan
|  |  | Uruguay²
|  |  | Venezuela
|  |  | Wallis and Futuna
1. The United Nations General Assembly resolution 68/L.20 adopted on 4 December 2013 decided that Equatorial Guinea will graduate from the least developed country category 3.5 years after the adoption of the resolution and that Vanuatu will graduate 4 years after the adoption of the resolution.
2. Antigua and Barbuda, Chile and Uruguay exceeded the high-income country threshold in 2012 and 2013. In accordance with the DAC rules for revision of this list, all three countries will graduate from the list in 2017 if they remain high-income countries until 2016.

Over the same period, the following countries and territories were removed from the DAC List of ODA Recipients at the dates shown: Portugal (1991); French Guyana, Guadeloupe, Martinique, Réunion, and Saint Pierre and Miquelon (1992); Greece (1994); Bahamas, Brunei, Kuwait, Qatar, Singapore and the United Arab Emirates (1996); Bermuda, Cayman Islands, Chinese Taipei, Cyprus, Falkland Islands, Hong Kong (China) and Israel (1997); Aruba, the British Virgin Islands, French Polynesia, Gibraltar, Korea, Libya, Macao, the Netherlands Antilles, New Caledonia and the Northern Marianas Islands (2000); Malta and Slovenia (2003); Bahrain (2005); Saudi Arabia, and Turks and Caicos Islands (2008); Barbados, Croatia, Mayotte, Oman, and Trinidad and Tobago (2011); Anguilla and Saint Kitts and Nevis (2014).

From 1993 to 2004, several Central and Eastern European Countries (CEEC)/New Independent States (NIS) countries in transition and more advanced developing countries were included on a separate list of recipients of official aid. This list has now been abolished.

Donor country coverage

Portugal, one of the founding members of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) in 1961, withdrew from the DAC in 1974 and rejoined in 1991. Spain joined the DAC in 1991; Luxembourg joined in 1992; Greece joined in 1999; Korea joined in 2010; and the Czech Republic, Iceland, Poland, the Slovak Republic and Slovenia joined in 2013. Their assistance is now counted within the DAC total. ODA flows from these countries before they joined the DAC have been added to earlier years’ data where available. The accession of new members has added to total DAC ODA, but has usually reduced the overall ODA/GNI ratio, since their programmes are often smaller in relation to GNI than those of the longer established donors.

Treatment of debt forgiveness

The treatment of the forgiveness of loans not originally reported as ODA varied in earlier years. Up to and including 1992, where forgiveness of non-ODA debt met the tests of ODA, it was reportable as ODA. From 1990 to 1992 inclusive, it remained reportable as part of a country’s ODA but was excluded from the DAC total. The amounts treated as such are shown in Table C.3. From 1993, forgiveness of debt originally intended for military purposes has been reportable as other official flows, whereas forgiveness of other non-ODA loans (mainly export credits) recorded as ODA is included both in country data and in total DAC ODA in the same way as it was until 1989.

Table C.3. Debt forgiveness of non-ODA claims¹
USD million
| 1990 | 1991 | 1992
Australia | .. | .. | 4.2
Austria | .. | 4.2 | 25.3
Belgium | .. | .. | 30.2
France | 294.0 | .. | 108.5
Germany | .. | .. | 620.4
Japan | 15.0 | 6.8 | 32.0
Netherlands | 12.0 | .. | 11.4
Norway | .. | .. | 46.8
Sweden | 5.0 | .. | 7.1
United Kingdom | 8.0 | 17.0 | 90.4
United States | 1 200.0 | 1 855.0 | 894.0
Total DAC | 1 534.0 | 1 882.9 | 1 870.2
1. These data are included in the ODA figures of individual countries but are excluded from DAC total ODA in all tables showing performance by donor.
StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933133989

The forgiveness of outstanding loan principal originally reported as ODA does not give rise to a new net disbursement of ODA. Statistically, the benefit is reflected in the fact that because the cancelled repayments will not take place, net ODA disbursements will not be reduced.

Reporting year

All data in this publication refer to calendar years, unless otherwise stated.

Note

 1. www.oecd.org/std/na/sna-2008-main-changes.htm.

Reference

Scott, S. (1989), “Some aspects of the 1988-89 aid budget”, in Quarterly Aid Round-Up, No. 6, AIDAB, Canberra, pp. 11-18.

Annex D.

The concept of partnership and the evolution of the principles for effective development co-operation

The concept of “partnerships for development” featured prominently in such seminal development co-operation treatises as the 1969 Pearson Commission Report and the 1980 Brandt Report. Yet it did not rise to prominence in political discourse and policy approaches within the development community until the 1990s, when the Nordic countries began to actively explore partnership models for agreeing and delivering their development co-operation.

In 1996, the publication Shaping the 21st Century by the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC) set out a partnership-based vision for effective development co-operation centred on strategies led by developing country governments and civil society. Over the next five years, many DAC members tested and piloted partnership approaches in their interaction with developing countries and by the turn of the century a repository of good practice had accumulated. This was distilled in the 2001 DAC Guidelines on Poverty Reduction, which set out the rights, responsibilities and obligations implicit in partnership approaches. The guidelines proposed fundamental changes in the way DAC members planned and implemented development co-operation, organised themselves in the field and at headquarters, and structured their own institutional training and incentive systems. By the time of the 2002 Monterrey Consensus, the notion of development partnerships – and their role in promoting aid effectiveness – were well established.

The growing inclusiveness of the aid effectiveness agenda

Meanwhile, the DAC embarked on an aid effectiveness agenda that was to guide its work over the next decade. During this period, the DAC involved an ever-widening number of non-DAC countries and development partners in its deliberations, organising a series of four consultative forums (in Rome in 2003, Paris in 2005, Accra in 2008 and Busan in 2011) that were crucial in shaping the principles for effective and accountable development partnerships (Figure D.1).

Figure D.1. Growing inclusiveness of the DAC High-Level Forums

Note: This does not include philanthropies, emerging providers of development assistance or private sector participants. BetterAid is an open platform that unites over 700 development organisations from civil society.

Developing country priorities came to the forefront in Rome, 2003

At the beginning of the 21st century, the DAC established a Task Force on Donor Practices to address the growing concerns about the heavy transaction costs developing countries faced in dealing with multiple provider-imposed administrative and operational requirements. Sixteen developing countries participated in the research and discussions, marking the first time developing countries were systematically engaged in DAC work. The reform agenda that emerged from this exercise fed into the First High-Level DAC Aid Effectiveness Forum – held in Rome in 2003 – laying the foundation for much of the aid effectiveness work that would be carried out over the next decade.

Principles to guide practice were agreed in Paris, 2005

Immediately following the Rome event, the DAC established the Working Party on Aid Effectiveness as the successor to the Task Force on Donor Practices. This forum was to evolve into a cohesive, reciprocal partnership among development assistance providers, developing countries, multilateral agencies and – over time – civil society, grassroots organisations, parliamentarians, the philanthropic sector, vertical funds and the private sector. The Working Party shaped the agenda for the Second High-Level Forum on Joint Progress toward Enhanced Aid Effectiveness, in Paris in 2005. Participants in this forum agreed on a set of principles to anchor and guide the aid effectiveness agenda, culled from years of experience and learning on all sides. These principles, the keystone of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, provided a common conceptual framework for ensuring the effectiveness of development co-operation that continue to be highly relevant today:

ownership by developing countries of development strategies, together with a recognition of the importance of improving national institutions for their implementation

alignment by development assistance providers behind those strategies and institutions

harmonisation among providers, implying a commitment to co-ordinate, simplify procedures and share information

a focus on development results

the pledge to be held mutually accountable for delivering on commitments.

The Paris Declaration (2005), adhered to by 137 countries and 30 international institutions, comprised a set of targets to be achieved by 2010. Another of its critical components – and one that set it aside from many other development pronouncements – was a monitoring framework for tracking compliance by all adherents in implementing the commitments.

In effect, the monitoring framework amounted to a practical, action-oriented roadmap to improve the quality of development co-operation and its impact on development. It called for progress to be assessed in two monitoring rounds – in 2008 and 2010 – against a baseline established in 2006. The in-country discussions during data collection and the reviews of the results of the survey have constituted one of the strongest and most widespread processes of mutual accountability in development history.

Trust, negotiation and inclusiveness were pledged in Accra, 2008

The Third High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Accra marked the first time an aid effectiveness forum included lively negotiations among development co-operation providers, partner countries and civil society. By this time, the Working Party included developing and provider countries, emerging economies, United Nations and multilateral institutions, global funds and civil society organisations. The culminating declaration – the Accra Agenda for Action – gave renewed impetus to the Paris Declaration principles and set a standard for an inclusive approach to development, focusing on key areas where rapid progress could be achieved by the agreed date for meeting the Paris Declaration targets in 2010.

The discourse shifted from aid to development effectiveness in Busan, 2011

To promote further inclusiveness and ensure a country-driven agenda for global development, members of the Working Party on Aid Effectiveness agreed that they would bring their work to a close in favour of promoting a global partnership with a much larger – and less technical – agenda. They also agreed to shift the debate from aid effectiveness to a broader discourse on effective development co-operation.

This took shape at the Fourth High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness (HLF4) in Busan, Korea. Attended by over 3 000 delegates from the private sector, civil society, philanthropies, emerging development assistance providers, developing countries, development agencies and multilateral organisations, the HLF4 culminated in the signing of the Busan Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation. Adopted by ministers of developed and developing nations, emerging economies, providers of South-South and triangular co-operation and civil society, this declaration marked a critical turning point in development co-operation. For the first time, it established an agreed framework for development co-operation embracing traditional donors, South-South co-operators, the BRICS, civil society organisations and private funders.

The Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation (Chapters 3 and 7) was established as a direct outcome of the Busan Partnership agreement.

The following pages present summaries of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, the Accra Agenda for Action and the Busan Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation, as well as links to the full documents.

The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness

The Paris Declaration takes its name from a meeting that took place in Paris in 2005, where over 100 developed and developing countries agreed to change the way they do business.

More than a statement of general principles, the Paris Declaration lays out a practical, action-orientated roadmap to improve the quality of aid and its impact on development. It puts in place a series of specific measures for implementation and establishes performance indicators that assess progress. It also calls for an international monitoring system to ensure that donors and recipients hold each other accountable – a feature that is unique among international agreements.

The Paris Declaration contains 56 partnership commitments organised around 5 principles that make aid more effective:

Ownership: Developing countries set their own development strategies, improve their institutions and tackle corruption.

Alignment: Donor countries and organisations bring their support in line with these strategies and use local systems.

Harmonisation: Donor countries and organisations co-ordinate their actions, simplify procedures and share information to avoid duplication.

Managing for results: Developing countries and donors focus on producing – and measuring – results.

Mutual accountability: Donors and developing countries are accountable for development results.

By implementing these principles, the countries and organisations that endorsed the Paris Declaration are making major breakthroughs in improving aid effectiveness, tackling issues that have hampered development for decades. Developing country governments and civil society are reaping the rewards in the form of better, more aligned and more predictable donor support.

As part of the Paris Declaration agenda, donors are working to minimise proliferation, harmonise procedures and align aid by using developing country systems. Donors are also co-ordinating their aid programmes and ensuring coherence by reducing the number of countries and sectors in which they operate and avoiding overlapping actions.

Meanwhile, the development landscape is rapidly changing. Significant new sources of funding are emerging (such as the People’s Republic of China’s and India’s rapidly growing aid programmes) and new types of donors (such as private foundations and local authorities from industrialised countries) are becoming increasingly important. The lessons of the Paris Declaration and its principles can help encourage better ways of working together – to the benefit of all.

The full Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness can be accessed at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264098084-en.

The Accra Agenda for Action

In Accra, Ghana, on 4 September 2008, developed and developing countries came together and endorsed the Accra Agenda for Action (AAA). In doing so, developing countries committed to taking control of their own future, donors pledged to co-ordinate better amongst themselves, and all agreed to be more accountable to each other – and to their citizens.

The Accra Agenda for Action is the product of an unprecedented alliance: more than 80 developing countries, all OECD donors and some 3 000 civil society organisations from around the world joined representatives of emerging economies, United Nations and multilateral institutions and global funds in the negotiations leading up to and taking place during the Accra meeting.

The AAA seeks to strengthen and deepen implementation of the Paris Declaration. Prepared through a broad-based process of dialogue at both country and international levels, it takes stock of progress on the commitments of the Paris Declaration and set the agenda for accelerating progress to reach the agreed targets by 2010.

The AAA draws from strong evidence – gathered primarily from a 2008 monitoring survey and an evaluation exercise on the implementation of the Paris Declaration. To complete the survey, all donor countries of the OECD DAC and 54 developing countries contributed information on work towards meeting the targets outlined in the Paris Declaration. The evaluation exercise was conducted as an independent, cross-country assessment of how increased aid effectiveness contributes to meeting development objectives.

The AAA hinges on three main themes:

Countries determine their own development strategies by playing a more active role in designing development policies and take a stronger leadership role in co-ordinating aid. Donors use existing fiduciary and procurement systems to deliver aid.

Inclusive partnerships in which all partners – not only DAC donors and developing countries but also new donors, foundations and civil society – participate fully.

Delivering results that will have real and measurable impact on development.

The AAA calls on donors to respect local priorities while encouraging developing countries to consult fully with their parliaments and civil society. Capacity development – to build the ability of countries to manage their own futures – is at the heart of the AAA, with an emphasis on ensuring that countries set their own priorities for where they need to build their capacity.

The AAA recognises the value of co-operation that reaches beyond traditional aid arrangements, such as among developing and middle-income countries. It stresses the fundamental, independent role of civil society in engaging citizens. It emphasises the need to follow accepted principles of good international engagement in fragile states. It acknowledges the need for reliable data at the national level that can be used to develop and implement development strategies. And it stresses the value of sound, country-based action plans that are appropriately and regularly monitored.

In doing all this, the AAA redefines the relationship between donors, developing countries and their citizens.

The full Accra Agenda for Action can be accessed at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264098107-en.

The Busan Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation

The Fourth High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness (HLF4) in Busan, Korea aimed to evaluate progress already made towards achieving more effective aid, and also to define an agenda for the future. Participants recognised the significant changes in the international socio-economic climate since the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness was endorsed in 2005 and the need to reorient international development, taking into consideration the role of the private sector, and the need to combat corruption and tax evasion.

After a lengthy and highly participatory negotiation process, the HLF4 concluded with the endorsement of the Busan Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation by over 160 countries and some 50 organisations. The agreement highlights a set of common principles that are key to making development co-operation effective:

Ownership of development priorities by developing counties: Countries should define the development model that they want to implement.

A focus on results: Having a sustainable impact should be the driving force behind investments and efforts in development policy making.

Partnerships for development: Development depends on the participation of all actors, and recognises the diversity and complementarity of their functions.

Transparency and shared responsibility: Development co-operation must be transparent and accountable to all citizens.

The Busan Partnership gives new impetus to the aid efficiency agenda, framing it within the larger context of development efficiency. Participants in Busan agreed to:

use results frameworks designed with the needs of the partner country in mind

untie aid to the maximum extent possible

use country public financial management systems and give support for strengthening them

increase transparency and use a common standard for the publication of data on development co-operation

avoid the proliferation of multilateral organisations and global programmes and funds

tackle the issue of countries that receive insufficient assistance (aid orphans)

ensure regular, timely, indicative three- to five-year forward expenditure plans

increase support to parliaments and local governments

foster a favourable environment for civil society organisations to function as independent development actors

step up efforts towards gender equality, including the disaggregation of data by gender

improve support for sustainable development in situations of conflict and fragility, and strengthen resilience to disasters.

The Busan Partnership recognises the fundamental contribution of South-South and triangular co-operation to sustainable development, which goes beyond financial co-operation. It emphasises the role of development co-operation as a catalyst to mobilise resources, in particular from the private sector, and the need to align development and climate finance. Finally, the Busan Partnership recognises the importance of monitoring as a tool for holding partners accountable for their commitments.

The full Busan Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation can be accessed at: www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/busanpartnership.htm.

Glossary

Aid for trade: Trade-related projects and programmes defined as priorities in national development strategies.

Bilateral flows: Bilateral transactions are those undertaken by a development assistance provider country directly with a developing country. They also encompass transactions channelled through multilateral organisations (“multi-bi” or “earmarked” contributions), transactions with non-governmental organisations active in development and other, internal development-related transactions such as interest subsidies, spending on promotion of development awareness, debt reorganisation and administrative costs.

Budget support: A transfer of resources from a provider to the partner government’s national treasury. The transferred funds are managed in accordance with the recipient’s budgetary procedures.

Commitment: A commitment is a firm written obligation by a government or official agency, backed by the appropriation or availability of the necessary funds, to provide resources of a specified amount under specified financial terms and conditions and for specified purposes for the benefit of a recipient country or a multilateral agency.

Concessional loans: While non-concessional loans are provided at, or near to, market terms, concessional loans are provided at softer terms. To help distinguish official development assistance from other official flows, a minimum grant element of 25% has been specified. See the note on the treatment of loan concessionality in DAC statistics at: www.oecd.org/dac/stats/concessionality-note.htm.

Core allocations: Un-earmarked contributions; the development assistance provider relinquishes the exclusive control of funds allocated to non-governmental organisations or multilateral organisations.

Country programmable aid (CPA): A subset of gross bilateral official development assistance (ODA). Country programmable aid tracks the proportion of official development assistance over which host countries have, or could have, significant say. It measures gross bilateral official development assistance but excludes activities that: 1) are inherently unpredictable (humanitarian aid and debt relief); 2) entail no cross-border flows (administrative costs, imputed student costs, promotion of development awareness, and costs related to research and refugees in provider countries); 3) do not form part of co-operation agreements between governments (food aid, assistance from local governments, core funding to non-governmental organisations, ODA equity investments, assistance through secondary agencies and assistance which is not allocable by country or region).

Creditor Reporting System (CRS): The central statistical reporting system of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) whereby bilateral and multilateral providers of development co-operation report at item level on all flows of resources to developing countries. It is governed by reporting rules and agreed classifications, and used to produce various aggregates, making DAC statistics the internationally recognised source of comparable and transparent data on official development assistance and other resource flows to developing countries.

DAC: See Development Assistance Committee.

DAC List of ODA Recipients: The list of developing countries eligible for official development assistance. This list is maintained by the Development Assistance Committee and revised every three years. Data in this report are based on the following income group categories. For further details see Annex C: “Technical notes on definitions and measurement” (the word “countries” includes territories):

Least developed countries (LDCs): a group established by the United Nations (UN). To be classified as an LDC, a country’s income, economic diversification and social development must fall below established thresholds. The DAC List of ODA Recipients is updated immediately to reflect any change in the LDCs group.

Other low-income countries (LICs): includes all non-LDCs with per capita gross national income (GNI) of USD 1 005 or less in 2010 (World Bank Atlas basis).

Lower middle-income countries (LMICs): countries with GNI per capita (World Bank Atlas basis) between USD 1 006 and USD 3 975 in 2010. LDCs which are also LMICs are only shown as LDCs, not as LMICs.

Upper middle-income countries (UMICs): countries with GNI per capita (World Bank Atlas basis) between USD 3 976 and USD 12 275 in 2010.

When a country is added to or removed from the LDCs group, totals for the income groups affected are adjusted retroactively to maximise comparability over time with reference to the current list. For the current income classifications as defined by the World Bank, please see: http://data.worldbank.org/news/2015-country-classifications.

Development Assistance Committee (DAC): The committee of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) that deals with development co-operation matters. A description of its aims and a list of its members are available at: www.oecd.org/dac.

Disbursement: The release of funds to or the purchase of goods or services for a recipient; by extension, the amount thus spent. Disbursements record the actual international transfer of financial resources, or of goods or services valued at the cost to the provider.

Grant element: A measure of the concessionality of a loan, expressed as the percentage by which the present value of the expected stream of repayments falls short of the repayments that would have been generated at a given reference rate of interest. The reference rate is 10% in DAC statistics. This rate was selected as a proxy for the marginal efficiency of domestic investment, i.e. as an indication of the opportunity cost to the development assistance provider of making the funds available. Thus, the grant element is nil for a loan carrying an interest rate of 10%; it is 100% for a grant; it lies between these two limits for a loan at less than 10% interest. If the face value of a loan is multiplied by its grant element, the result is referred to as the grant equivalent of that loan. The grant element reflects all of the key financial terms of a loan commitment, namely interest rate, maturity and grace period (interval to first repayment of capital). See also official development assistance.

Imputed multilateral ODA: Total net official development assistance (ODA) to least developed countries is calculated as DAC countries’ bilateral net ODA and imputed multilateral ODA. Imputed multilateral ODA is a way of estimating the geographical distribution of development co-operation providers’ core contributions to multilateral agencies, based on the geographical breakdown of multilateral agencies’ disbursements for the year of reference. For more information, see: www.oecd.org/dac/stats/oecdmethodologyforcalculatingimputedmultilateraloda.htm.

Least developed country: See DAC List of ODA Recipients.

Loans: Transfers for which repayment is required. Only loans with maturities of over one year are included in DAC statistics. The data record actual flows throughout the lifetime of the loans, not the grant equivalent of the loans (see grant element). Data on net loan flows include deductions for repayments of principal (but not payment of interest) on earlier loans. This means that when a loan has been fully repaid, its effect on total net flows over the life of the loan is zero. See also official development assistance.

Low-income country: See DAC List of ODA Recipients.

Middle-income country: See DAC List of ODA Recipients.

Modality: The way development co-operation provider support is channelled to the activities to be funded. This includes: 1) budget support (which is integrated into the national budget of the host country); 2) parallel support (which is kept separate from the general resources in the national budget); and 3) in-kind support (in the form of goods or services).

Multi-bi allocations: Contributions to multilateral organisations earmarked for a specific purpose, sector, region or country, which includes contributions to trust funds and joint programming; also referred to as non-core funding.

Multilateral agencies: In DAC statistics, those international institutions with governmental membership that conduct all or a significant part of their activities in favour of development and aid recipient countries. They include multilateral development banks (e.g. the World Bank, regional development banks), United Nations agencies and regional bodies (e.g. certain European Union and Arab agencies). A contribution by a DAC member to such an agency is deemed to be multilateral if it is pooled with other contributions and disbursed at the discretion of the agency.

Multilateral development bank: An institution created by a group of countries, which provides financing and professional advice for the purpose of development. The main multilateral development banks are the World Bank, the European Investment Bank (EIB), the Asian Development Bank (ADB), the New Development Bank (NDB), the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), the Inter-American Development Bank Group (IDB or IADB), the African Development Bank (AfDB) and the Islamic Development Bank (IsDB).

Multilateral flows: Financial flows to or from multilateral agencies. Tables showing the total official development assistance (ODA) from providers includes contributions by those providers to multilateral agencies. Tables showing the total receipts of recipient countries includes the outflows of multilateral agencies to those countries, but not the contributions which the agencies received from providers of development co-operation.

Official development assistance (ODA): Grants or loans to countries and territories on the DAC list of ODA recipients available at: www.oecd.org/dac/stats/daclist.htm and to multilateral agencies that are undertaken by the official sector at concessional terms (i.e. with a grant element of at least 25%) and that have the promotion of the economic development and welfare of developing countries as their main objective. In addition to financial flows, technical co-operation is included in ODA. Grants, loans and credits for military purposes are excluded. See: www.oecd.org/dac/OECD%20DAC%20HLM%20Communique.pdf for agreements in 2014 on the assessment of concessionality based on discount rates differentiated by income group and the new “grant equivalent” method for calculating loan ODA that will apply from and including 2018 flows (with data also being available on the same basis with effect from 2015 flows).

Other official flows: Transactions by the official sector which do not meet the conditions for eligibility as official development assistance, either because they are not primarily aimed at development or because they have a grant element of less than 25%. See official development assistance.

Sector-wide approach (SWAp): A method of providing official development assistance (ODA) under which project funds are tied to a defined sector policy and channelled through a government authority in the developing country. In essence, a SWAp calls for a partnership between government and development agencies.

South-South co-operation (SSC): There are numerous descriptions of South-South co-operation, but the UN General Assembly describes it as “… a manifestation of solidarity among peoples and countries of the South that contributes to their national well-being, their national and collective self-reliance and the attainment of internationally agreed development goals, including the Millennium Development Goals” (UN General Assembly Resolution 64/222).

Tied aid: Official grants and loans where procurement of goods and services is limited to suppliers from the provider country. In contrast, untied aid is procured through open international competition (e.g. international competitive bidding).

Triangular co-operation: There is no internationally agreed definition of triangular co-operation. The expression is nevertheless frequently used to refer to development co-operation where a third party supports co-operation among developing countries (that is, South-South co-operation [SSC]). It usually involves one or more bilateral providers of development co-operation or international organisations which support SSC, joining forces with developing countries to facilitate a sharing of knowledge and experience among all partners involved. Activities that only involve several bilateral providers or international organisations without a SSC element (e.g. joint programming, pooled funding or delegated co-operation) are usually not considered triangular co-operation.

Upper middle-income country: See DAC List of ODA Recipients.

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