

## *Chapter 1*

### **Evidence-based policy making on security and justice in Mexico**

*This chapter is devoted to security and justice as a distinct dimension of governance and public policy. It argues in favour of a horizontal, “whole-of-government” approach to security and justice because such an approach has broad socio-economic implications for well-being and quality of life as well as confidence in the rule of law and economic competitiveness. Furthermore, the chapter discusses how evidence can contribute to improving the effectiveness of public policies and elaborates on how to introduce the evidence throughout the policy cycle in a more systematic manner. Specifically, it sets out a framework for using evidence more concretely in Mexico to improve results during times when citizens perceive security to be weak or when significant reforms to the criminal justice system are taking place. Best practices in the measurement and evaluation of security and justice policies are featured from such countries as Canada, Norway and the United Kingdom.*

## Introduction

Security and justice are among the oldest and most basic functions of the state. They not only concern victims of crime and abuse, but are also ultimate public goods whose benefits are shared by society as a whole. Security and justice are at the heart of the rule of law of modern democratic societies and are an essential ingredient of governance, social cohesion and the functioning of markets.

While no country can claim to have completely eradicated crime, some face significant challenges in this area, either at the national level or in specific territories. Crime can also transcend national borders, as drug trafficking, money laundering and cybercrime have become the dark side of globalisation.

Notwithstanding its sociological or economic causes, the prevalence of crime reveals government's failure to deliver on a core responsibility, proportional to the scale of illegal activities. This is well understood by citizens, whose perceptions of insecurity are reflected in their assessments of institutions and authorities. When crime becomes too widespread, it erodes personal well-being, trust, the legitimacy of institutions and economic competitiveness.

Security and justice should be seen as a critical domain of public policy and should be organised, managed and accountable as such. Given the complexity of crime, security and justice policies should be capable of integrating different disciplines and mobilising different government bodies.

Recognising security and justice as a subject of public policy is especially relevant given the dynamic nature of crime. Criminals sometimes have the means to adjust rapidly to a changing environment, react to control mechanisms and take advantage of opportunities and legal loopholes. Adaptation also takes place at the territorial level, with the possibility of crime concentrating, expanding and displacing geographically. Dynamic crime cannot therefore be fought with static policies. To respond to changes in crime patterns, public policies need to not only have the flexibility to adapt, but the information to do it in an effective way as well. Information is necessary to detect and anticipate changes in criminal activity, to redeploy public resources, to adapt strategies and means, and to assess the impact of policies. Generating and using information in this area is, however, particularly challenging because it is in the essence of criminal activity to operate in the dark.

This chapter is devoted to security and justice as a dimension of governance and as a public policy domain. In particular, it elaborates on how information and evidence can concretely contribute to the effectiveness of such policies in Mexico. To this end, the second section depicts security and justice as a distinct policy challenge, both in terms of its potential impact on well-being and competitiveness as well as in terms of its requirements on the design and implementation of public policies. The third section provides some additional background on how evidence can contribute to the effectiveness of public policies and elaborates on how to translate it into the information requirements of effective policy making on security and justice. This is reflected in some international efforts at promoting and standardising crime-related statistics. This methodological part of the chapter concludes by underscoring the territorial dimension of crime and how it translates into multi-level governance challenges.

The chapter continues with a preliminary assessment of the situation in Mexico concerning the incidence of crime, its territorial expression and the quantity and quality of evidence available to support public policies. As indicated in the executive summary,

the purpose here is to analyse the availability and use of information to develop effective policies on security and justice rather than policy performance itself. To this end, the next section proposes a methodological framework to organise and interpret the statistical information on crime, security and justice administration that provides a framework for analysing state-level data in the ensuing chapters. The chapter ends with a section illustrating how our conceptual and methodological framework could be used to analyse a particular dimension of crime, which is the relationship between (in)security and economic competitiveness.


## Security and justice as a policy challenge

### *The impact of security on well-being and competitiveness*

Security – or the lack of it – is a major determinant of the quality of people’s lives all around the globe. Crime is a direct threat to the physical and psychological integrity of victims, very directly touching their immediate entourage of relatives and friends. Security is determined not only by the direct experience of being the victim of a crime, but also by the perception of the risk of being so. Such perception may force people to change their behaviour – like walking down the street or trusting strangers – or to commit resources to provide extra security – like acquiring security locks, alarms or even private guards.

These factors have led the OECD to include safety as one of the components of its Better Life Index, which uses the homicide rate and assault rate as base indicators to rank citizens’ feeling of vulnerability in their country and then compares that to other countries (Figure 1.1). More indirectly, crime is also an important component of health indicators published by specialised agencies, like the WHO, due to its impact on mortality rates.

Figure 1.1. Safety as a component of the OECD Better Life Index




*Note:* Countries ranked on the basis of the safety component of the OECD’s Better Life Index, with 10 representing the lowest perception of risk of being assaulted or falling victim to other types of crime. The statistical data for Israel are supplied by and under the responsibility of the relevant Israeli authorities. The use of such data by the OECD is without prejudice to the status of the Golan Heights, East Jerusalem and Israeli settlements in the West Bank under the terms of international law.

*Source:* OECD Better Life Index, [www.oecdbetterlifeindex.org/topics/safety](http://www.oecdbetterlifeindex.org/topics/safety), accessed July 2012.

Opinion surveys can recognise the impact of insecurity on personal well-being. Figure 1.2 depicts the proportion of respondents to the Latinobarómetro and Eurobarometer surveys that report that security is of main concern. Compared to their European counterparts, citizens in Latin America perceive crime as a considerably greater concern. Indeed, they ranked this as the most important issue, even above unemployment and poverty. Conversely, in Europe, only 10% of those surveyed replied that this issue was worrisome. In fact, the European country that ranked this issue the highest (Cyprus<sup>1 2</sup>) is well below the Latin American average (28%).

Figure 1.2. Security as a public policy priority, according to Latinobarómetro and Eurobarometer



*Note by Turkey:* The information in this document with reference to “Cyprus” relates to the southern part of the Island. There is no single authority representing both Turkish and Greek Cypriot people on the Island. Turkey recognises the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). Until a lasting and equitable solution is found within the context of the United Nations, Turkey shall preserve its position concerning the “Cyprus issue”.  
*Note by all the European Union Member States of the OECD and the European Union:* The Republic of Cyprus is recognised by all members of the United Nations with the exception of Turkey. The information in this document relates to the area under the effective control of the Government of the Republic of Cyprus.

*Source:* Latinobarómetro (2011), *Informe 2011*, Corporación Latinobarómetro, Santiago, Chile; and Eurobarometer (2011), *Special Eurobarometer 371. Internal Security Report*, European Commission, Brussels.

Insecurity also has an impact on the productivity and competitiveness of businesses. Threats to the integrity of property and the security of executives and employees increase the risk of investing in certain countries or areas. Insecurity creates additional costs for businesses in the form of insurance premiums, security systems and employee compensation. This may either entirely drive investors and projects away from certain countries and areas, or reduce their competitiveness due to larger overhead costs.

While many studies attempt to measure the economic impact of crime and insecurity in some high-risk countries – including Mexico – security indicators are regularly included in competitiveness measures, like the *Global Competitiveness Report* of the World Economic Forum (Figure 1.3). The loss of human capital due to loss of life, injury, imprisonment and emigration to safer countries further adds to the economic and social cost of crime (see Box 1.1).


Despite the overwhelming evidence on crime's impact on well-being and competitiveness, many governments do not treat security and justice the same way that they do traditional policy domains like education, health or the environment. While strategic objectives are routinely established to mobilise resources and design programmes in the latter areas, not many governments dare to set measurable objectives to security and justice, and sometimes even concrete policies and programmes are difficult to discern. This may also be reflected in poor statistics, reactive policies, weak co-ordination and/or poor accountability.

Many factors may contribute to security being neglected as a public policy domain, including limited resources or corruption, but more often it is due to the belief that security is someone else's responsibility, either the police, the judiciary, the legislature or some other level of government. However, a highly professional police force and an efficient judiciary are not sufficient, in isolation, to provide an effective response to crime. The experience of many countries indicates that crime cannot be fought by the inertial operation of the police and courts of justice alone; they are only part of a more complex arrangement of institutions that are responsible for a limited part of law enforcement.

Security and justice institutions are strongly inter-related, not only by procedures also by the nature of crime itself. In terms of processes, law enforcement can benefit from effective prevention and delivers suspects and evidence for courts to administer justice. Court decisions need to be based on legislation and their rulings have to be applied by another set of institutions, like prisons and correctional services. In many countries, these functions are not only distributed across state powers and specialised bodies but across levels of government as well, adding to the complexity of the system.

In addition, crime can follow a changing pattern, both in terms of its nature, victims, means and territorial deployment and cannot be effectively controlled by static institutions. To be effective, security and justice institutions need to know where to concentrate their efforts, how to detect changes and redeploy their resources.

Thus, the effectiveness of security and justice systems could be seen as depending on three major factors: *i*) the coherence of the institutional environment and the legal framework; *ii*) the co-ordination of law enforcement and justice administration bodies; and *iii*) the use of evidence to plan, organise and adapt. In other words, for security and justice to be effective as a policy domain, they have to be organised as such.

Figure 1.3. Security in the *Global Competitiveness Report*: Business cost of crime and violence

*Note:* The statistical data for Israel are supplied by and under the responsibility of the relevant Israeli authorities. The use of such data by the OECD is without prejudice to the status of the Golan Heights, East Jerusalem and Israeli settlements in the West Bank under the terms of international law.

*Source:* World Economic Forum (2011), *The Global Competitiveness Report 2011-2012*, World Economic Forum, Geneva.

### Box 1.1. Estimate of total domestic cost of crime and violence

There is a widespread recognition that a high rate of crime can have many negative consequences at several levels, including:

- **Undermining the investment climate** and deterring investment and growth (*e.g.* through higher cost of doing business as a result of high security costs or business losses and lost outputs and working time as a result of crime). A high level of crime also diverts investment away from business expansion and improving productivity and may lead to a less than optimal operating strategy.
- **Eroding the development of human and social capital**, thus undermining the potential for growth (*e.g.* through exodus of qualified labour from the crime-affected areas as a result of reduced quality of life; exodus of productive individuals from the workforce; periodic school closures).
- **Excessively diverting public resources away from productive uses** that could have a stronger impact on development and growth (*e.g.* more productive investments could be made in the medical system, for example, at a society-wide level, or into personal education and health at the level of the individual) (World Bank, 2004).

These impacts impose a significant cost to society. For example, several studies in the United Kingdom provide estimates of the cost of crime ranging from GBP 35 to GBP 60 billion per year. These estimates aim to enable policy makers to make better-informed decisions about which policy measures are the most effective, by allowing meaningful comparisons to be made of the costs and benefits offered by alternative crime reduction measures. They include a wide range of costs, including the economic and social costs of crime, and can be grouped in several categories, including:

- **Health costs**, including medical expenses, lost production due to death and injury, and the costs of victims' emotional suffering. Emotional impact (that reduces quality of life) and legacy of increased fear and interpersonal problems for victims of crime can be substantial, particularly for personal crimes (World Bank, 2004).
- **Institutional costs**, covering government spending on security and the justice system (*e.g.* security hardware and patrols, awareness programmes and community safety programmes, police, prosecutors, courts, legal aid, prison and probation services, criminal injuries compensation boards, witness and jury service, costs of victim assistance, victim support units, a proportion of child protection and out-of-home care for children in need, etc.) (Mayhew, 2003).
- **Private security costs** in households and businesses (*e.g.* security alarms and guards; costs of precautionary behaviour, such as taking taxis instead of public transport, avoiding particular people or places, or staying at home after dark), as well as insurance resources and premiums.
- **Material and economic costs**, encompassing property losses suffered by individuals and businesses, but also lost productivity as a result of the loss of human capital from the crime-affected areas or poor business and investment climate.

These estimates incorporate costs associated with the full cycle of crime management, including those associated with the anticipation and prevention of crime, responding to crime (costs of the criminal justice system, as well as other services to victims, including health and housing; costs related to miscarriage of justice when one is wrongfully accused or acquitted) and dealing with the consequences of crime (medical costs, economic impact) (Brand and Price, 2000).

### Box 1.1. Estimate of total domestic cost of crime and violence (*cont.*)

An example of crime cost estimates for South Africa is depicted in the table below (Alda and Cuesta, 2010). Such estimates amounted to a total cost of USD 22.1 billion or 7.8% of GDP in 2007. The most burdensome category is the institutional cost of violence (*i.e.* direct public expenditures through the criminal justice and security systems) followed closely by health-related costs. They represent about two-thirds of the total. Interestingly, the remaining third is explained by material transfers from legitimate private owners to thieves, private security costs and economic costs in the form of averted foreign direct investment (FDI).

#### Estimates of cost of crime by category (2007)

	Millions USD	% GDP
<b>Health costs</b>	7 369.75	2.6
1. Medical attention	24.69	0.0087
a. Unintentional homicide	10.28	0.0036
b. Intentional homicide	14.41	0.0051
2. Disease burden/productivity loss	4 948.60	1.75
3. Emotional costs	2 396.46	0.85
<b>Institutional costs</b>	7 169.00	2.55
1. Correction services	1 523.73	0.54
2. Police, public security	4 612.96	1.65
3. Justice	1 032.31	0.36
<b>Private security costs</b>	2 827.24	1.00
1. Households	98.59	0.03
2. Firms	2 728.65	0.89
<b>Economic costs</b>	1 287.04	0.45
1. Investment (FDI)	1 287.04	0.45
<b>Transfers</b>	3 426.42	1.21
1. Residential property	404.14	0.14
2. Vehicle theft	464.11	0.16
3. Robbery	5.57	0.002
4. Weapons	39.72	0.01
5. Personal theft	54.82	0.02
6. Firms' property, merchandise	2 295.98	0.75
7. Theft of cattle	162.08	0.06
<b>Grand total</b>	22 079.45	7.81

*Source:* Alda, E. and J. Cuesta (2010), "Comprehensive estimation of costs of crime in South Africa and its implications for effective policy making", *Journal of International Development*, Vol. 23, N° 7.

While good practice in some OECD countries testifies to the importance of coherence, co-ordination and the use of evidence (Box 1.2), in many cases, government policies on security and justice are fragmented, organised through silos, with overlapping responsibilities across levels of government. At the same time, not all information gets collected, as public sector information processes tend to follow financial flows or



bureaucratic processes, making it difficult to extract meaningful data. Many countries could benefit substantially from improving policy design and implementation in security and justice.

### Box 1.2. The SaLTo model: Crime prevention in Oslo, Norway

It has been universally acknowledged that co-ordination and co-operation among various stakeholders is key to preventing and reducing crime. One of the examples of effective co-ordination in crime prevention comes from Norway through the so-called SaLTo model. The SaLTo model was introduced in 2006 as a collaborative crime-prevention strategy between the municipality of Oslo, the Oslo Police District, local co-ordinators and work groups. It is designed as a central, wide-ranging crime-prevention action programme, together with budget and local activity plans, and is intended to form the basis for devising central and local action programmes covering all relevant bodies – under the guidance of the Police Council. The model includes a central steering group, supported by local steering groups with representatives of the police, central city authorities and other departments, supported by SaLTo co-ordinators at the central and district levels, child welfare consultants and follow-up teams. It operates on a three-year cycle, with the latest central action programme for 2012-2015 approved in 2011.

The model focuses on children and young people aged 12 to 23 who grew up in challenging or vulnerable environments and who may have engaged in alcohol, drugs or crimes at an early age. The main objectives of this early crime-prevention strategy are threefold:

- to reduce child and youth crime;
- to reduce alcohol and drug abuse; and
- to co-ordinate the work on crime-prevention.

From 2012-2015 the focus will be on the following action areas:

- safe schools;
- close follow up of children and young persons who have committed crimes;
- contingencies in respect of acute problems (assault and menace);
- early intervention – integration of the preventive work;
- SaLTo+ (measures aimed at the 18-23 age group);
- information and knowledge development.

This approach builds on crime-prevention expertise, information and local partnerships. It aims to engage civil society as a whole by developing a broad spectrum of innovative and constructive measures between the various stakeholders, from early identification and intervention in childhood and adolescence to effective follow up of children and young persons who have committed crimes.

Some of the SaLTo model's reported results include better co-ordination, earlier intervention, faster reactions, better information flow, more knowledge on crime and crime prevention, less youth crime which, in turn, contributed to a safer city. In the period 2007-2010, the city of Oslo experienced a 27.1% decrease in the number of reported victims under the age of 18 and a 63.6% reduction in the number of reported criminal offences in 2010 from the previous year among young repeat offenders.

*Source:* Official website for the city of Oslo, [www.salto.oslo.kommune.no/english](http://www.salto.oslo.kommune.no/english), accessed June 2012.

### *Evidence-based public policies*

While institutional consistency and co-ordination have received a lot of attention in the development of security and justice systems, the generation of evidence to support policy design and implementation in this area is considerably less developed, especially in emerging countries.


To better understand evidence-based policy making in the governance area, the OECD proposes it as comprising four elements (OECD, 2012):

- **Generating and gathering reliable basic data.** Basic data is essential to build solid evidence for policy making. There are multiple ways of generating data. OECD statistics and “at a glance” publications draw information from administrative records, broad surveys or the codification of opinions of informed observers. Process-based sectors, like health and justice, are especially prolific at generating data, but oftentimes information is not collected in a systematic and/or standard way. Budgets are a very common source of data in the public sector, but accounting rules and classifications define the quality of such information. Surveys of individuals, households or businesses are usually carried out by statistical offices or specialised agencies, and are a privileged means to capture perceptions, attitudes and expectations. Surveys of policy makers, specialists or practitioners of public policies are especially useful for transforming qualitative information into data that can be compared across different subjects.
- **Transforming data into actionable evidence.** While basic data is useful, it may not always offer the right responses. Was the policy effective in reaching its goal? What were the real effects? What is the relationship between costs and benefits? When can we expect results? Who bears the cost? What is the impact on citizens’ satisfaction and perception? These are the practical questions that leaders or institutions may face. To be able to respond to these questions, basic data needs to be standardised and integrated into algorithms with more analytical content, like ratios, indices and composites. Qualitative information can be codified to be transformed into quantifiable data. But even more sophisticated indicators may be insufficient to answer the more fundamental questions on effectiveness and efficiency. To this end, some form of evaluation may be necessary. Many methodologies have been developed to support evaluation under different perspectives and circumstances – like impact evaluations, benchmarking exercises, comparative studies. OECD work in this area suggests that a good evaluation of a programme or policy has to be cost-effective, to which end not only the information has to be readily available and the cost affordable, but the purpose of the programme or policy under analysis should be clearly identifiable as well.
- **Using evidence to support policy decisions.** Opportunities should exist for integrating the data into the policy decision-making process. On the one hand, this means that policy makers and decision-making processes should be open to incorporating such evidence. This may require a cultural shift for some actors as well as a substantial redesign of processes so that evidence is systematically generated and analysed. Using evidence for policy decisions, however, is not a matter of pure will; evidence should be reliable, timely and easy to understand by the actors involved in order to contribute effectively to better policy decisions.

- **Disseminating evidence and involving stakeholders to sustain reform implementation.** Evidence should be necessary not only to technicians but to all stakeholders, in order to address key political economy challenges. When the evidence is available, it may help to mobilise stakeholders and confront entrenched interests. This is especially important in the area of security and justice, where crime can be fought more effectively with the support of communities and public opinion. Evidence on the incidence of crime and the performance of public institutions in fighting it needs to be shared with the public, involving stakeholders in participatory processes to sustain reform implementation. Such evidence may also help to manage public expectations and help people understand how the justice system works. This requires authoritative reports, supported by active communication strategies and tools to disseminate the results.

Figure 1.4 illustrates the above proposal by reflecting the volume of information required at each step. In particular, it suggests that each of the four proposed steps require further synthesising information in a way that can respond to the interests and capabilities of different stakeholders.

Figure 1.4. **Pyramid of evidence-based policies**



*Source:* OECD (2012), “Strengthening the evidence base on public governance and supporting policy makers with comparative evidence: The way forward. Issues for discussion”, OECD, Paris, GOV/PGC(2012)1.

In the case of security and justice, the generation of evidence acquires an even more fundamental role, as the evidence requirements in the implementation of policies may well exceed those for policy implementation. Sound evidence is indeed a fundamental requirement of due process in justice administration, making law enforcement agencies and forensic services systematic providers of inputs into courts’ decisions. But evidence is also necessary to guide the execution of policies to concentrate resources where they

are needed the most as well as to assess the performance of the multiple actors of the process. Sound evidence is also especially needed in policy formulation and in assessing progress, as citizens' and politicians' attitudes towards crime may be easily dominated by emotions and the influence of notorious events in the public domain.

### ***Methodological challenges and responses to them***<sup>3</sup>

#### *Incidence of crime, administrative records and perceptions*

Insecurity is a phenomenon caused not only by actual criminal events but also by people's perceptions and fear of crime as well as by a lack of rule of law.<sup>4</sup> For this reason, security and justice policies cannot be confined to reducing crime rates.

The relevance of these subjective factors was acknowledged some time ago. The first concerns emerged at the end of the 1960s and beginning of the 1970s, when a few developed countries, led by the United States and the United Kingdom, started to implement victimisation surveys (VS). This type of survey is designed to capture unreported criminal events, fear of crime and perceptions of insecurity. The use of VS progressively spread across the world, with the support of UNICRI, a UN-based programme of the late 1980s that also introduced the first surveys in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC).<sup>5</sup>

The VS collects not only "subjective" information (perception of insecurity, fear of crime) but also "objective" information: the number of crimes that victims anonymously indicate having experienced directly or by one of the members of their household, although not necessarily officially reported or claimed to corresponding authorities: victimisation surveys, therefore, not only test interpretations of a perceived reality, but report on actual facts from direct life experiences. Matching actual crime incidents with the formally reported ones allows estimating the "dark figure" of crime (the number of events that victims do not report).<sup>6</sup>

The measurement of the "dark figure" of crime and the fear of crime have arguably been two of the most relevant steps in supporting evidence-based studies and policies on citizens' security over the last decades. With the traditional approach based only on police and/or judicial records, it was impossible for policy makers to know the real evolution of citizens' demands for public safety, or the "subjective" reasons for it.

More recently, VS have evolved to target not only individuals but businesses as well. This new type of VS aims to detect the direct impact of crime on economic activities and private investments, including the actual costs of crime supported by business units, ranging from small shops to big corporations.<sup>7</sup>

As VS have proved the lack of reliability of most police records, closing the gap between reported and unreported crime is beginning to be recognised as key in strengthening the state's capacity for fighting delinquency. Therefore, the need for better administrative records on crime has become a central demand.

### Box 1.3. Unreported crimes: Examples from Canada and the United Kingdom

While crime statistics aim to provide a comprehensive picture of crime, it is difficult to capture the full extent of it, as many criminal activities remain unreported. The volume of crime that is not officially recorded is often referred to as the "dark figure" of crime (this may include crime that is never reported to the police as well as crimes that were reported but never recorded by police officers). Unreported crime may raise doubts about the effectiveness and efficiency of the official crime data and is the primary reason why official crime statistics are often supplemented by "crime and victimisation" surveys (e.g. British Crime Survey,<sup>1</sup> the US National Crime Survey<sup>2</sup> and Canada's General Social Survey on Victimization). These surveys and police-recorded crimes are complementary to each other and aim to provide a fuller picture of crime. The survey data provide insight into citizens' experience with crime, their perceptions of living in a safe environment, the functioning of and attitudes towards the criminal justice system, and perceptions of anti-social behaviour.

The level of unreported crime revealed through these surveys is indeed significant. For example, according to the 2009 General Social Survey, 69% of Canadians who had been the victim of a crime in the preceding 12 months, did not report it to the police. These figures beg the question of why is not all crime reported. Some of the most common reasons in Canada, according to the survey results, included believing that the incident was not important enough (68%), thinking there was nothing the police could do to help (59%), having dealt with the situation in another way (42%) and feeling that the incident was a personal matter (36%). Other reasons revealed through the UK survey included having reported the incident to other authorities, the common incidence of that particular crime, fear of reprisal, dislike or fear of the police/previous bad experience with the police or courts (Chaplin et al., 2011).

Unrecorded crime is problematic as it limits the capability of the criminal justice system to deter crime, may reduce the effectiveness of allocating police resources or shield offenders from police action. Besides, it directly affects citizens and the society as a whole, as victims of unreported crime are not eligible for victim compensation benefits and insurance costs are misevaluated. It also has a negative impact on the perception of safety and security, which in turn may contribute to the deterioration of the business climate, national competitiveness and prosperity, as well as confidence in public institutions, including the criminal justice system. This calls for accurate crime data, reflecting reported and unreported crime, as well as targeted actions to raise awareness of the reporting mechanisms and creating a safe climate for reporting crimes. It is also essential to ensure that various data sources on crime are used by government institutions in defining and evaluating policy, programme and budget priorities. These actions tend to bring results. For example, the UK Statistics Authority reports that in the United Kingdom, the number of unreported crimes peaked in 1995 and has decreased ever since, although at a slower rate since 2004, and is currently at its lowest level: according to the 2010/11 BCS report, there are half as many unreported crimes now compared to 1995 (*Ibid*).

#### Notes:

1. "The British Crime Survey (BCS) is a nationally representative survey with an achieved sample of approximately 47 000 adults living in private households in England and Wales each year. The BCS started in 1981 and has been running as a continuous survey since 2001/02. It is a face-to-face survey in which respondents are asked about their experiences of crime in the 12 months prior to their interview and their perceptions of crime and crime-related topics, such as anti-social behaviour and the police." (UK Office for National Statistics website).

2. "Each year, data are obtained from a nationally representative sample of about 40 000 households comprising nearly 75 000 persons on the frequency, characteristics and consequences of criminal victimization in the United States. Each household is interviewed twice during the year. The survey enables BJS to estimate the likelihood of victimization by rape, sexual assault, robbery, assault, theft, household burglary, and motor vehicle theft for the population as a whole as well as for segments of the population such as women, the elderly, members of various racial groups, city dwellers, or other groups". (Truman, 2011)

The most relevant progress on police reports occurred once the dominant approach to policing moved from the rapid response focus to the prevention of crime. Consistent information about trends, places, delinquents and victims started to be required as essential input for more focused and tailor-made preventive plans. Then the improvement of the quality of police reports, 911 data systems and mapping crime tools moved up to the top of the reform agenda's priorities.<sup>8</sup>

Besides police records, other information systems that collect data on crime were also identified as a target for these strengthening efforts. On one side, prosecutors' records are strongly linked to those of the police, since both institutions are key pieces of states' criminal system. On the other side, hospital records register cases of injured people and deaths for external causes (homicide and other violent incidents). Both the criminal system and the health system therefore constitute the main sources of crime data today.

The quality of criminal and health records varies from country to country, and crime by crime. Each system (and each institution inside them) collects data for its own particular ends. Similar events are tracked or valued in different ways and there are no standards to allow data to be compared: frequently, incidents registered by one are unknown by the other.<sup>9</sup>

Hence, the main challenges to organise a co-ordinated response of the state against crime are improving the quality of the records in both the criminal and health systems and closing the information gaps between them and between the institutions of the same criminal system (police and prosecutors). To the extent that all data sources have advantages and weaknesses, capacity-building projects must improve their respective registries and additional efforts aimed to harmonise those indicators need to be carried out.<sup>10</sup>

### *Crime indicators*

The United Nations Office on Drug and Crime (UNODC), due to the mandate given to it by the UN members in the late 1970s, is responsible for systematic and publishing international information on crime. UNODC runs a periodical Crime Trend Survey (CTS) that is sent to each country to be completed with official information. The agency, through its Office of Statistics, has also made a relevant contribution to harmonising VS around the world through a *Manual on Victimization Surveys*, which, although not mandatory for UN members, has become a forced reference for every organisation running this kind of project around the world.

The CTS is a common framework for collecting and estimating crime data worldwide. It has also been useful in reducing the long list of crimes that national statistics reflected according to each country's (or state's) legal definition, provoking confusion and misinterpretation in comparing rates and trends.

Nevertheless, those concepts were incorporated and used unevenly by the different countries and their institutions. Besides the above-mentioned technical difficulties in managing public records on crime, some institutional restraints often disrupt the transparency of country's official reports. So figures collected by UNODC tables still lack reliability and comparability, and are better for understanding collective, regional trends than for representing the real situation of crime in a particular country or city.

Some types of crime are also captured by the World Health Organization (WHO), from its own perspective and goals. As part of its effort to measure mortality, injuries and other illnesses caused by external causes, WHO records include some crime-related information, particularly on intentional attacks against the life or physical integrity of individuals. Differing numbers for some relevant criminal events, like homicides, are often very significant compared to those collected by criminal systems, which is the preferred source used by countries to report data to UNODC.<sup>11</sup>

Other specialised agencies worldwide also capture partial crime-related information, for their own ends, such as domestic violence, traffic accidents, child abuse or femicide.<sup>12</sup> Numbers and rates vary as well for the same country and years between agencies members of a bigger organisation, like the UN.<sup>13</sup>

At present, a few countries from different continents, led by Mexico, are promoting a discussion in the UN's specialised organisms about a new international codification of criminal events. This debate has just started, but it could produce one of the most relevant upgrades in terms of international comparability of crime data records. The path to that common goal does not look easy, but the effort is just beginning.<sup>14</sup>

#### **Box 1.4. Harmonising crime statistics in Latin America and the Caribbean**

As efforts towards worldwide harmonisation of crime statistics has made mixed progress over the last decade, during the same period a number of LAC countries have made substantial progress through a promissory south-south co-operation project aimed at improving and standardising indicators concerning their citizens' security.

Funded by the Inter-American Development Bank and co-ordinated by the Cisalva Institute of the *Universidad del Valle* (Cali, Colombia), a number of countries (presently 15 LAC, 6 initially in 2007, plus 2 capital cities) partnered to build a Regional System of Standardized Indicators on Coexistence and Citizen Security (SES). This programme has fostered agreements on common definitions and methodology of capture and standardisation for 22 basic indicators on violence and crime.<sup>1</sup>

##### **Obtained by administrative record**

1. Homicide rate per 100 000 inhabitants
2. Traffic lesion death rate per 1 000 000 inhabitants
3. Suicide rate per 100 000 inhabitants
4. Firearm death rate per 100 000 inhabitants
5. Rate of sex crime reports per 100 000 inhabitants
6. Rate of reports of intra-family/family/domestic violence per 100 000 inhabitants
7. Rate of reports for child and adolescent maltreatment per 1 000 individuals younger than 18 years of age
8. Theft rate per 100 000 inhabitants
9. Robbery rate per 100 000 inhabitants
10. Rate of automotive theft and robbery per 10 000 vehicles registered
11. Kidnapping rate per 100 000 inhabitants
12. Rate of traffic violations under alcohol intoxication per 100 000 people over 15 years of age

**Box 1.4. Harmonising crime statistics in Latin America and the Caribbean (cont.)****Obtained by surveys**

13. Prevalence of sexual violence
14. Prevalence of domestic violence/family/household
15. Crime victimisation rate in people over 18 years of age
16. Percentage of robbery victimisation in people over 18 years of age
17. Percentage of theft victimisation in people over 18 years of age
18. Percentage of people over 18 who perceived insecurity, risk or fear of violence
19. Percentage of people over 18 who justify the use of violence
20. Percentage of people over 18 who have confidence in institutions

In addition to fostering the generation of new standardised data, the project has also supported the creation of multi-sectoral technical units constituted by the different institutions that produce crime data in each country. Ranging from the police and prosecutor's offices to institutes of statistics, Ministries of Health and councils of women, those public offices exchange and match their information, finding the best data available for each indicator.

Mexico has been a member country since 2011, led by the national Institute of Statistics and Geography (INEGI). Mexico has been actively engaged in supporting other SES countries to run VS through their national statistical offices, as INEGI has been doing for the last several years. At the same time, INEGI has promoted a stronger commitment from all of these specialised offices across the region, and its efforts are paying off through the newly created group on Citizen Security Statistics created by the CEA (Conference of the Statistics of the Americas); an organisation that unites all public statistical offices throughout the region.

Since most of the member countries do not yet carry out VS systematically, the main achievements of the project rest on the strengthening of administrative records. Nevertheless, many differences can still be found even in this field in the reporting to international agencies (UNODC, OAS, WHO). This gap has been flagged by member countries and the project's strategic partners (UNODC, OAS, SICA) as a priority.<sup>2</sup> Meanwhile, data reported to the SES is the best available data on those indicators for those countries.<sup>3</sup>

*Notes:*

1. Information based on harmonised methods and definitions provided by those partner countries, as well as institutional diagnostics on the data collection and analysis in each member country, can be found on SES' official website ([www.seguridadyregion.com](http://www.seguridadyregion.com)).
2. Information based on harmonised methods and definitions provided by those partner countries, as well as institutional diagnostics on the data collection and analysis in each member country, can be found on SES' official website ([www.seguridadyregion.com](http://www.seguridadyregion.com)).
3. The short list of indicators does not include a number of relevant figures needed to describe the citizen security situation of the countries, for instance, police and penitentiary resources or rates of recidivism. The Organization of the American States (OAS) collects a wider list of indicators for all OAS member countries, which can be found at [www.alertamerica.org](http://www.alertamerica.org). The data quality of each indicator is uneven, as the data submitted by countries is restrained by the limitations mentioned above for UNODC and other international organisations.



### *Justice indicators*

There are several types of international indicators on justice administration. Some aim to measure performance and outcomes, such as the quality of justice, governance and the rule of law. Others focus more on the institutional and policy process and procedures, and aim to measure the quality of governance in terms of how outcomes are achieved, as well as the inputs and outputs necessary to achieve them.

These types of indicators tend to be based on different approaches to data collection (and can combine different types of measurement). Assessments of justice performance and outcomes are most often based on opinions of the general public and qualified experts. Indicators based on expert polls have the advantage of providing cross-country comparability but suffer from being based on the opinions of a relatively limited number of experts per country. Data from population opinion polls are, in turn, based on perceptions which tend to be inherently subjective, yet they may often be more meaningful than objective data, especially when it comes measuring public trust in justice institutions.

Process, input and output indicators are, in turn, often measured using institutions' administrative and qualitative data. While these types of indicators aim to provide concrete guidance to policy makers on what works and what does not, and to help them make concrete improvements in specific policy areas, they may not necessarily provide the end users' perspective or an assessment of the justness or effectiveness of the justice system.

Some of the main examples of justice indicators representing these different approaches are presented here. The European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice (CEPEJ) focuses on evaluating the efficiency of judicial systems by focusing on the institutional means, such as the legal, regulatory and institutional frameworks necessary to achieve justice performance, based on the administrative and qualitative data provided by the 49 member countries of the Council of Europe (via Ministries of Justice).

Indicators have been selected on the basis of what is considered relevant for states who wish to assess the judicial systems' situation and better understand the functioning of their own systems. Biennial assessment exercises gather and compile administrative (quantitative) and qualitative data from member countries and are peer-reviewed by experts from CEPEJ. The latest evaluation scheme (2010, based on figures from 2008) comprises more than 100 performance indicators related to budgetary data, procedures related to access to justice, organisation of the court system, safeguards to ensure fair trial, career and status of judges and prosecutors, lawyers, alternative dispute resolution mechanisms, enforcement of court decisions, notaries, court interpreters (for more detailed information see Table 1.1). The national answers also contain descriptions of the judicial systems and explanations. The results of the data collection analysis are validated through peer review by an expert group as well as by non-governmental stakeholders (e.g. professional associations of judges and lawyers).

This set of indicators aims to provide policy makers with concrete benchmarks and indications of the possible deficiencies in their justice system that may allow them to take targeted and timely action. Yet, as noted, these types of indicators only provide a limited understanding of the effectiveness of justice systems and the actual impact of reforms in this area.

Table 1.1. **Scope of coverage of CEPEJ Evaluation of European Judicial Systems (2010)**

Public expenditures: courts, prosecution system and legal aid	Focuses on the public budget allocated to the courts, public prosecution services and the legal aid system.
Access to justice	This variable includes a description of the various types of legal aid, budget, conditions for granting legal aid, court fees, taxes and reimbursement as well as the revenues of the judicial system.
Users of the courts: rights and public confidence	Focuses on the institutional and policy provisions regarding the supply of information to court users, the protection of vulnerable persons and the role of the public prosecutor in protecting the rights of or assisting victims of crimes, compensation procedures as well as the mechanisms for assessing users' satisfaction.
Courts	This variable includes the organisation of the court, budgetary powers and ICT in the courts, and an evaluation of the quality and performance of the courts.
Alternative dispute resolution (ADR)	Includes a description of different forms of ADR, including mediation, arbitration and conciliation.
Judges	This variable compares the types and number of professional judges, including those sitting occasionally and non-professional judges, trial by jury and participation of citizens.
Non-judge staff	This variable includes information regarding the number and distribution of non-judge staff.
Fair trial and court activity	This variable is composed of data regarding provisions for legal representation in court, the possibility to challenge a judge, as well as the number of cases related to Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights, civil (and commercial) litigious and non-litigious cases in first instance courts, land register cases, business register cases, enforcement cases (non-criminal litigious cases), administrative law cases, criminal law cases (severe criminal offences) and misdemeanour cases (minor offences) at first instance courts. It also includes the clearance rate for the total number of non-criminal cases and discusses issues related to comparing case categories, such as procedure and length and measures to increase the efficiency of judicial proceedings.
Prosecutors	The number of public prosecutors, persons with similar duties and staff, their role and powers, and case proceedings managed by public prosecutors.
Status and career of judges and prosecutors	This variable focuses on the institutional and policy procedures in place regarding recruitment, nomination, training, career, bonuses and other benefits of judges and prosecutors, as well as disciplinary proceedings and sanctions.
Lawyers	Includes data regarding the number of lawyers, organisation of the profession and training as well as practices related to the legal profession.
Execution of court decisions	Focuses on the execution of court decisions in civil, commercial and administrative law as well as in criminal matters.
Notaries	This variable describes the provisions regarding the status, number and functions of notaries, as well as supervision of the profession.
Court interpreters	Includes the number of court interpreters, their title, function and quality, as well as the selection process by the courts.
Judicial reforms	Provides a description of some of the current trends in judicial reforms.

### *Expert views and composite indicators: The Rule of Law Index*

The World Justice Project (WJP) designed the Rule of Law Index as a quantitative tool to assess a set of outcome-oriented indicators on the rule of law from the perspective of the ordinary person. It examines practical situations in which deficiencies in the rule of law may affect the daily lives of ordinary people by collecting their views across 66 countries. More specifically, the index aims to provide a picture of where countries stand with regard to a number of outcomes that rule of law societies seek to achieve, including access to justice (Box 1.6).

### Box 1.5. How is the CEPEJ survey administered?

The CEPEJ survey has been conducted biannually since 2002, with the fifth edition published in 2012. Each Council of Europe member country nominates a national correspondent who is ultimately responsible for data provision and quality. National correspondents do not fill out the survey on their own, but distribute it to officials in different parts of the country's justice system, who provide responses to different parts of the survey. At the end of the process the national correspondent consolidates the country's responses.

The survey includes more than 200 items and takes 6-8 months to complete. It is more strenuous in federal countries where state-level data have to be collected and summarised.

Data cleaning is carried out through various statistical tests by the CEPEJ Secretariat; results are reviewed in detail by the Evaluation Working Group of CEPEJ and unresolved issues are referred back to the national correspondent.

Data is entered into a database that is available for free to all participants and the general public. A separate printed edition of biannual survey results is also produced.

CEPEJ also carries out special reviews of the data collection methods and data quality in member countries upon request.

There are several observer countries to the CEPEJ, including Mexico. Joining the data collection exercise by non-European Council member countries is welcomed; however, the terms and conditions of such an association have not yet been established.

### Box 1.6. Dimensions of the World Justice Project's Rule of Law Index

1. **Limited government powers** measures the extent to which those who govern are subject to law.
2. **Absence of corruption** measures three forms of corruption: bribery, improper influence by public or private interests, and misappropriation of public funds or other resources.
3. **Order and security** measures how well the society assures the security of persons and property and encompasses three dimensions: absence of crime, absence of civil conflict and absence of violence to redress personal grievances.
4. **Fundamental rights** covers effective enforcement of laws that ensure equal protection; freedom of thought, religion and expression; freedom of assembly and association; fundamental labour rights (including the right to collective bargaining, the prohibition of forced and child labour, and the elimination of discrimination); the rights to privacy and religion; the right to life and security of the person; and due process of law and the rights of the accused.
5. **Open government** measures the extent to which laws are comprehensible, sufficiently clear and publicised to the general public.
6. **Effective regulatory enforcement** concerns the fair and effective enforcement of administrative regulations.
7. **Access to civil justice** measures whether the system is affordable, effective, impartial and culturally competent and whether it provides for fair and effective enforcement.
8. **Effective criminal justice** measures whether the system is capable of investigating and adjudicating criminal offences impartially and effectively, while ensuring that the rights of suspects and victims are protected.
9. **Informal justice** is concerned with systems of traditional, tribal and religious courts, as well as community-based systems – in resolving disputes.

The index is based on the new data specifically collected by the World Justice Project. It includes 9 factors and 52 sub-factors, which were identified in consultation with academics, practitioners and community leaders from across the different countries. The data is collected through a set of five questionnaires, which were adapted to reflect commonly used terms and expressions. The dataset is mainly drawn from two sources:

- A general population poll (GPP) carried out every three years. This is conducted by leading local polling companies using a probability sample of 1 000 respondents in the 3 largest cities of each country. The GPP is administered in the local language, either via phone, online or face-to-face.
- Qualified respondents' questionnaires (QRQ) administered on a yearly basis in each surveyed country and completed by in-country practitioners and academics (2 000 as of 2011) in civil and commercial law, criminal justice, labour law and public health. It is made up of closed-ended questions.

In addition, some third-party sources provided information in 2011 to capture specific structural rule of law situations (*e.g.* terrorist bombings and other battle-related deaths). Finally, the findings are cross-checked with existing domestic and international data sources and legal resources.

As mentioned, this type of approach generates valuable comparable data which can be used to obtain insight on the overall functioning of justice and broader rule of law institutions in practice, from the perspective of users of the justice system and other citizens and stakeholders. Yet, there are some limitations to using this index for cross-country comparison, including different perceptions of the rule of law and performance of justice across cultures, different legal architectures, values and views, as well as limitations of sampling and stakeholder selection mechanisms.

### *The territorial dimension of crime and security*

Crime has distinct geographical patterns and national averages often mask strong differences within countries. Murder rates in the state of Chihuahua (77 murders per 100 000 inhabitants) were 25 times higher than in Yucatán and Hidalgo. Similarly, large differences can be observed across regions in different OECD countries.

The geography of crime can be highly dynamic over time and in space. In the case of Mexico, for example, crime activities were clustered in neighbouring states until 2002 with an increasing dispersion in the most recent years. However, over the past 20 years, murder crime rates have been high and tended to occur in north-western states such as Chihuahua, Baja California Norte, Sinaloa and Sonora, next to the Pacific Ocean and the Gulf of California. Murder rates in other states such as Tlaxcala, in the centre, and Yucatán, in the peninsula, remained well below the national average for the entire period (around the Canadian national average). Similarly, the United States presents a spatial clustering of murder crimes and property crime rates; with the latter concentrated in the southern states.

Property crimes tend to be concentrated in cities, and reported property crimes tend to increase with regional *per capita* GDP. A similar relationship can be found among regions of other OECD countries such as Canada, France, Italy, Poland and Turkey. However, in the case of Mexico, unemployment and youth unemployment are significantly associated with crime activities in states.

Even though regional differences are important in crime activities, it is often difficult to measure them satisfactorily and to identify what socio-economic, institutional and cultural conditions are associated or responsible for crime. First, there are important differences in the definition of crimes that limit international comparison. Second, there is a difficulty to gather robust data. Research demonstrates that a large number of crimes are never reported. Third, reporting by citizens and business is linked to issues of public trust, integrity in the public sector and perceived cost associated with criminal process, making the causality links fuzzy. Finally, the interpretation of crime factors can be difficult if the offences and other socio-economic variables are not available at the geographical level required to produce evidence on the causes, and not only on the effects, of crime activity. A recent analysis by INEGI, for example, shows that only by geo-referencing crime activity and socio-economic conditions is it possible to provide indications to public authorities on how to intervene to reduce property crimes in the city of Aguascalientes (INEGI, 2012).

The territorial dimension of crime activity, thus, requires coherent policies across levels of government and government bodies. The multi-level governance issue is particularly important not only because states have wide powers in the organisation of police and courts of law, but because given the strong local dimension of crime, the alignment of policy objectives across levels of government is essential to increase the effectiveness of prevention and security policies.

Practices in OECD countries show that national policies to reduce illegal activities can be more effective if co-ordinated with empowered local authorities and involving the local community. Conditions, instruments and actors to correctly co-ordinate wide policies with bottom-up practices can vary depending on the capacity of local governments, the transparency and accountability of practices, etc. National and local governments should put in place a process to identify the major co-ordination gaps and adapt instruments to overcome them.

In this sense, it is essential for evidence-based policy making in security and justice to have a strong territorial footing. In the case of Mexico, this should start by generating data and evidence at the state level by increasing the information available in the government Census. Mexico's statistical and analytical capacity should be mobilised at the national and state levels to improve security indicators, including better ways to integrate objective and perception measures of the effectiveness of the judicial system and law enforcement by states. In addition, capabilities to use this information for policy making should be also developed at the state and local level.

## **The state of the game in Mexico**

### ***Security and justice in Mexico***

There is no doubt that crime is a pressing reality and a great concern of the Mexican people. In opinion surveys, nearly 40% of the population identifies crime as the country's most important problem, above the Latin American average (28%) and well ahead of the European average (10%). Official data partly justifies this concern, as the homicide rate in Mexico reached 20 per 100 000 inhabitants in 2011, very close to the LAC average that in turn exceeds all other regions of the world. This figure is the result of a sharp increase in violent crime in the last five years, when the homicide rate nearly doubled, mostly pushed by executions related to organised crime. While other crimes, like robbery and theft, have grown at a more moderate rate, the exposure of the population to crime is very

high, as nearly a quarter declared having been the victim of a crime in 2010, and 36% of households as having at least one victim of crime in the same period. Worse still, nearly 40% of people think that the problem of crime, when evaluated at the national level, will worsen in the near future against less than 20% that expect it to improve.

### Box 1.7. Monitoring police performance in the United Kingdom

Since April 2009, Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) has been responsible for monitoring police performance in England and Wales and for tackling instances of underperformance. HMIC monitors and reports on forces and policing activity with the aim of encouraging improvement. To this end, the HMIC has developed a Police Report Card framework (formerly known as a rounded assessment and also referred to as banding analysis) for monitoring and assessing police performance – in line with the 2008 Policing Green Paper *From the Neighbourhood to the National: Policing Our Communities Together* and the Home Office’s subsequent response *The New Performance Landscape for Crime and Policing* (Audit Commission and HMIC, 2010). In 2009, this Police Report Card framework also contributed to the inspections of police authorities in England and Wales undertaken by the Audit Commission, the Wales Audit Office and HMIC.

The Police Report Card requires periodic updates throughout the year (Suffolk Police Authority, 2009) and adopts a “balanced scorecard” approach, which analyses individual police force performance against itself over time and compared with peer police authorities. The assessment covers the following domains:

- **Confidence and satisfaction** – includes satisfaction and perception indicators, based on the results of British Crime and User Satisfaction Surveys carried out by police forces.
- **Local crime and policing** – includes data on crime, sanction detection and offences brought to justice for acquisitive crime as well as data for low-level violence against the person and road traffic casualties. These indicators are based on recorded crime.
- **Protection from serious harm** – based on recorded crime and includes indicators for violent crime (e.g. gun and knife crime) and data on sanction detection and offences brought to justice for serious violence and serious sexual assault.
- **Value for money** – based on a range of benchmarking profiles, showing whether each force is spending more or less than the average (and other benchmarks) on particular activities such as HR, crime investigation or response to calls for service. These profiles are used to highlight opportunities for efficiency gains and support local decision making in this area (HMIC, 2010).

The assessments are done at the central level for 43 police authorities across the country and are shown with reference to the most similar police group. They can range from “poor”, where the force is not meeting the required national standards or is not delivering an acceptable level or quality of service, to “excellent”, for exemplary service provision which consistently exceeds national threshold standards or normal expectations (HMIC, 2011).

The assessments provide information regarding the state of police performance to enable focused improvement efforts. For example, a 2010 report drawing on the Police Report Card highlighted that most of the police authorities inspected are effective in scrutinising everyday performance and holding their police forces to account in delivering policing priorities (Audit Commission and HMIC, 2010). Yet, it was highlighted that more needs to be done to ensure a clear and sustained focus on value for money and collaboration.

The reports also highlight persisting challenges in the assessment process, including the need to improve the clarity of data as well as the complexity and high level of detail of the current approach, which may compromise the ability to undertake a meaningful assessment and improve performance. In light of these challenges, the HMIC assessment framework is currently undergoing a review.

Victimisation studies indicate that an overwhelming majority of crimes in Mexico are not reported. More specifically, INEGI estimates that 93% of crimes are not declared at all or are not investigated (INEGI, 2011). Those that do not report crimes allege that it is because it would be a waste of time or because they do not trust authorities. This is in turn reflected in people's appreciation of the key institutions in charge of security and justice. According to the same survey, trust in the police has been decreasing. The most recent data from 2011 show that, on average, only 41% of citizens trust the state and local police. Trust in public prosecutors and judges follow the same trend.

Responsibilities to fight crime and administer justice in Mexico are distributed among a rather large number of institutions, many of them at the sub-national level. The police are organised at the federal, state and municipal level, with different responsibilities concerning prevention and investigation of crime. Police institutions add up to some 450 000 police officers and agents. Sometimes judiciary police and financial investigators are included in these calculations. The largest numbers of police officers are found at the state level (45%), followed by the municipal level (40%). The organisation of the judiciary also mirrors the federal structure of the country, including prosecutor offices in every state, in addition to the federal level.

Some describe this system as highly fragmented, motivating efforts in recent years to improve strategic direction and co-ordination, like the creation of the Federal Secretariat of Public Security, the National System of Public Security and the National Council of Public Security, among others.

One important initiative in this direction is judicial reform. In 2004, Nuevo León became the first state to implement oral trials for some kinds of criminal offenses. Following suit, in June 2006 the northern state of Chihuahua became the first in Mexico to enact a comprehensive reform to its code of criminal procedure and its secondary legislation, and in January 2007 became the first state to implement such reforms. Nonetheless, reforms to actually transform Nuevo León's criminal justice system have stalled, and today, only Chihuahua, the State of Mexico and Morelos have implemented these reforms across their entire territory. While progress has been piecemeal, these experiences have proven wrong those who thought that an oral adversarial criminal justice system was inappropriate for Mexico.

Responding to these state efforts and the increasing attention that NGOs, law fora, academic institutions and the public opinion have given to the important need for a profound transformation in the country's penal justice system, a major judicial reform was passed in 2008. This was set to replace a mixed prosecutorial-inquisitorial system with a modern adversarial system with oral trials. The reform sought to equilibrate the conflicting parts, the accused and the victim. This involved ensuring that the rights of the accused are respected, guaranteeing transparency and due process, while at the same time protecting victims. The reform also created new alternatives for resolution, including conciliation and mediation. The reform also concentrates the responsibility of judges as guarantors of due process and on issuing sentences.

The reform of 2008 was designed to be implemented gradually, developing the human capital, the administrative systems and the infrastructure to sustain change, with full implementation in all states planned for 2016. This resembles, to a great extent, the Chilean reform of 1998-2005 (Box 1.8). Halfway through the transition, however, only seven states (Chihuahua, Oaxaca, Durango, Zacatecas, State of Mexico, Morelos and Baja California) were at the stage of implementing it in at least one of their judiciary

districts, while another 18 were at some intermediate stage and the remaining 7 were at an initial stage.

#### Box 1.8. **Judicial reform in Chile**

At the end of the 1990s the Chilean Congress passed a crucial reform of the penal system, aimed at replacing an inquisitorial, document-based system whereby the same judge investigated and ruled a case, with an oral system with separate representation of prosecution and the defence. To this end, a prosecution system (*Ministerio Público*) was created, as well as a state defence agency. As court rulings would be issued by a tribunal of three judges, the judiciary service also had to be substantially enlarged.

The reform was introduced gradually, by region, over a six-year period, allowing time for the new institutions to be created; new staff to be recruited; judges, prosecutors and defenders to be trained; court facilities to be built; the administration of the judiciary to be improved; and procedures to be adapted. Despite all the plans for implementation, the transition had to be extended twice and the whole cost of the reform exceeded initial estimates substantially. Overall, judiciary personnel increased by 400% as a result of the reform and public spending in justice administration grew even more.

The preparation of the reform included building a series of indicators to monitor judicial performance. A pre-reform baseline was built to assess progress and performance against expectations. Despite the costs, the Chilean reform is considered to be largely successful, as the speed and quality of penal processes have improved substantially. This provided the basis for subsequent, successful reforms to family and labour tribunals that extended judicial reform.

Partly to support the judicial reform, but also as a response to the escalation of crime, the federal government of Mexico has substantially increased the resources for security and justice. According to the Executive Secretariat of the National System of Public Security, funding for this purpose grew by 350% between 2008 and 2011. But with a large share of the police force organised at the state or municipal levels, and courts and prosecutor offices responding to the country's federal structure, it is evident that a substantial part of the success – or absence of it – in improving the security levels in Mexico and the perception that the population has in this regard depends of the effectiveness of security and justice policies at the state level. In addition to reforming criminal justice administration, key complementary tasks include professionalising and providing tools and knowledge to actors in the states, strengthening forensic capabilities and creating investigation protocols.

#### ***Knowledge generation, research, policy analysis***

The importance of crime and violence as a phenomenon is so high in Mexico that many professionals and institutions have begun to investigate this issue. A recent account indicated that more than 50 non-governmental institutions – think tanks, academic institutions, NGOs – in Mexico and abroad have established programmes to study it and contribute to finding a solution to it in one way or another.

Similarly, diverse Mexican institutions have devoted a great effort at generating and analysing crime-related data. These efforts range from INEGI's new victimisation survey to the programme of research on CIDE on crime and its causes.



Facing a dramatic scenario of violence and organised crime, Mexico has stepped up means to measure crime and disseminate knowledge about it. These efforts have been developed against the backdrop of serious data gaps on crime in the past. However, more progress has been made in capturing data through surveys than in compiling it from administrative records. Municipal and state police, prosecutors and, in general, local and state offices, still encounter a number of difficulties in collecting and processing accurate information.<sup>15</sup> In general, the health system has better quality data at sub-national level. Nevertheless, five achievements in the treatment of crime data by Mexico must be highlighted:

1. A new institutional arrangement has recognised INEGI as the top instance of a national system of crime data collection. This means that all levels and jurisdictions of government recognise INEGI as the authority to define, collect, organise, supervise and publish crime data, no matter which office is primarily responsible for producing it.<sup>16</sup> This has allowed Mexico to overcome some jurisdictional disputes that compromised the quality and timeliness of crime data. Although the process is far from complete, progress in establishing a national, integrated system is evident.<sup>17</sup>
2. A progressive improvement in administrative registries in terms of quality and comparability. In seeking the cause of the difficulties of comparing records between states and between institutions inside each state, INEGI detected that approximately 1 400 types of offences are defined by the federal and sub-national penal codes. The conversion of this legal-based data into a unified, brief statistical-shaped typology is well on course, following a multi-level consultation with the producers and users of the data. As a part of this process, INEGI has developed a 41-crime incident statistical codification (organised according to 7 types of goods affected), which has begun to spread all over the country. On this basis, federal and state institutions will make a dual recording of incidents: on one side, according to each institutional definition and ends; on the other, adapting data to fit INEGI's statistical matrix.<sup>18</sup> As the implementation of this new model goes forward, improving the quality of each institution's records is the most urgent challenge for the Mexican agenda on criminal data.<sup>19</sup>
3. A high-quality Public Security Census, collecting the most complete information about the sectoral resources in all the levels of government, ranging from federal to state and local governments, and from police to prosecutors and all related public offices. The Census contains information (available or in progress) provided by 120 000 crime-related public offices, captured by federal (2012), state (2010, 2011) and municipal (2009, 2011) levels of government censuses. A 2012 National Survey on Quality of Government, with accurate data on the quality of justice and public security services, also offers very useful information about the system.
4. One of the most advanced and complete victimisation surveys in the world, in terms of the accuracy of the questionnaire, the sample size and timeliness. Actually there are not one but three tools to capture victimisation and citizens' perceptions on security, being carried out periodically in Mexico: the ENVIPE (an annual National Survey on Victimization and Perception of Public Security),<sup>20</sup> the ECOSEP (a monthly fast survey on the perception of public security that includes a fear of crime follow-up question); and the ENVE (a new victimisation survey

applied to corporations and businesses). Although Mexico has implemented victimisation surveys for the last decade, the 2012 ENVIPE has leveraged the quality, sampling and reach of the surveys, making it a model of best practice at the international level.

5. Engagement with the main regional and international projects and institutions aimed at improving the quality and comparability of data. Particularly, the incorporation to the Regional System on Standardized Indicators of Coexistence and Citizen Security (2010), the release – in partnership between INEGI and UNODC – of the Centre of Excellence on Victimization for Crime Statistics on Governance, Victims of Crime, Public Security and Justice (2011)<sup>21</sup> and the proposals taken to the UN Committee of Statistics about the involvement of national offices of statistics on crime data collection, and the development of an international codification on statistical crime data.

Still, some weaknesses may lie at the base of the security and justice system that compromise not only the effectiveness of policies, but also the reliability of the data. The imbalance between the capabilities of the different parts of the justice chain (police, prosecutor, public defense and judiciary) raises both a governance issue and a key question: where should the process of data management through the criminal chain be improved? The police are a major concern in this respect. Limited capacities and motivation of police officers at the local level to enter data into information systems have led prosecutors to undertake such a task, becoming *de facto* responsible for classifying and quantifying criminal incidents. However, this has fed back into a vicious circle as the incentives to collect and use data by the police corps has further eroded, making statistics and mapping dependent upon the technical skills and honesty of politically committed officials. Judicial reform may act as a catalyst to improve the co-ordination between the different actors of the security and justice system. In the shadow of this reform, special efforts should be made at building capacity in the police for data management through the criminal chain. This support could include technical assistance to clarify concepts and ensure that a sound system of crude data collection is available; then to subsequently organise data correctly and produce basic statistics for analysis. Eventually, balanced parameters on security could be obtained and combined in an indicator basket for several purposes: to increase transparency, improve management, allow performance evaluation, etc.

### **Towards a conceptual framework for building a set of indicators on the performance of security and justice in Mexican states**

The second section described the OECD approach to evidence-based policy making as being comprised of four elements: *i*) generating meaningful data; *ii*) transforming data into actionable evidence; *iii*) using evidence to support policy decisions; and *iv*) disseminating evidence for mobilising stakeholders and improving accountability. This section is devoted to the first of these elements. In particular, we will discuss how indicators can be organised to provide a good basis for assessing the performance of states on security and justice.

Improving the reliability and comparability of crime data has become a key issue in the public agenda in Mexico. This includes the need of spreading high-quality, periodic victimisation surveys and more accurate and timely public records on crime. In August 2011 a congress of Mexican security and justice specialists concluded that:

The first component of a policy of state in this field should be to draw on a broad, transparent and participative diagnosis. No tool is as powerful in this process as the generation of timely and accurate information over the functioning of the diverse subsystems of security and penal justice. (UNAM, 2011)

Both countries and international institutions face common challenges in this field: more accurate reports, better inter-institutional co-ordination and data matching, developing minimum standards to compare data (and/or better disclosure of sources and features of their figures), tougher requirements for accountability and data quality control, progressive elimination of overlapping and, last but not least, better investment in human resources and technology, particularly oriented to integrate and geo-reference databases.

The most advanced countries moved to improve information on security and justice three decades ago. But their efforts have not been sufficiently accompanied by worldwide initiatives to strengthen data for internal and cross-country comparisons. Since crime has begun to show more transnational components and links, it is vital to step up efforts to upgrade the systematisation and comparability of crime statistics.

LAC countries are making substantial efforts in this direction through projects like the IDB-sponsored SES (see Box 1.4). Mexico is one of the most committed countries to this effort, whose efforts at institutionalisation, investment and development of new high-quality tools for measuring crime put the country in a leading position in the matter.

The main problems in Mexico relate to the quality of the administrative registries at the local and state levels. Fortunately, they have been targeted as priority areas in domestic technical discussions between INEGI and the network of producers and users of the data, particularly police and prosecution units. Undoubtedly, collecting data on multiple homicides or from hidden graves resulting from organised crime, are not easy problems to solve as they exceed the technical capacities of the public sector.

As this work continues to develop, high-quality VS and Public Security Census are already being implemented successfully. In addition to these domestic improvements, Mexico is also making relevant contributions to the international debate.

Evaluating the effectiveness of governments' security policies – and the capacity of criminal justice systems in implementing and enforcing them – is a complex undertaking, requiring a number of co-existing and inter-related factors to be considered. Merely identifying the unit of analysis (*e.g.* the performance of whom?) and attributing results to particular government institutions and their actions can be a challenge in the face of the multitude of layers/tiers of actors involved. The fiscal and managerial evolution of security policies from national government organisations to regional and local governments, while necessary to improve their responsiveness and efficiency, creates in turn a complex “eco system” of overlapping competencies for researchers and policy makers to dissect. Increasingly, even non-governmental actors such as community groups and volunteer organisations play important roles in preventing and combating crime. Measuring their varied, and often unaccounted for, contributions to security outcomes can pose an additional challenge for researchers. A useful performance framework therefore should set out to address the important reality of multi-level governance. Indeed, certain kinds of criminal activities, such as organised crime, often exploit porous borders and co-ordination gaps between government entities in order to flourish.

A second challenge in developing a useful model for performance measurement is establishing linear or causal links between criminal justice institutions' capacities, their practices and policies, and their impact on crime and security (*e.g.* the performance of what?). The model adopted in this preliminary study is one utilised by the OECD in measuring the performance of public administrations, beginning with the inputs invested, to an examination of the outputs and outcomes achieved. Government outlays or transfers destined for criminal justice institutions (police, prosecutors, judges, forensic experts, and penitentiary and correction officers) can provide one indication of their capacity to achieve the desired results. In turn, these capacities and resources are invested into the implementation of policies and management practices designed to effectively target specific policy objectives. These "processes" can be internal to the organisations themselves (such as HRM policies to attract and retain the most competent professionals, integrity policies to prevent the corruption of judges and police, ICT systems or ADR procedures which improve case management and processing, practices for promoting inter-agency co-operation, etc.) or outwards-facing policies intended to have a more direct impact on security (*e.g.* legislative reforms, crime prevention strategies and communications campaigns targeting youth or other segments of the population, intelligence gathering, rehabilitation strategies for inmates, etc.). Ultimately, these processes are designed to reduce the incidence of crime, as well as increase citizens' and firms' perceptions of security and (to the extent possible) trust in criminal justice institutions. Perceptions of positive performance on the part of criminal justice institutions may raise voters' and businesses' proclivity to continue investing in this common public good, creating a positive feedback loop for continued inputs.


In addition to permitting researchers to map out the different actors and elements that contribute to overall performance, a second benefit of the OECD's "production chain" model is that it allows policy makers and researchers to examine two key dimensions of performance: effectiveness and efficiency. The first (effectiveness) can be examined through an analysis of agencies' outputs in their own right, and the second (efficiency) through an analysis of the outcomes achieved with the given resources.

From a comparative perspective, this allows benchmarking national/sub-national governments, or, with sufficient data, the evolution of these two dimensions over time. Better-performing countries or states can offer good practices which can be transferred and adapted elsewhere. Such an approach also facilitates the policy design and evaluation process, by permitting decision makers to adjust resources and policy levers according to changing results.

The proposed framework is not immune to a number of methodological issues, however. While the progressive nature of the model may imply causality between these variables/categories, it is certainly not always the case. In instances of correlation, for example, the direction of the causality is not always so clear, requiring time-series data and regression analysis to gain further insight. Second, and particularly in the evaluation of crime and security policies, externalities and contextual variables have a heavy influence across each element of the chain. For instance, there are several factors which may influence citizens' perceptions of safety other than the prevalence of crime, and some crimes have more of an impact than others. To provide a second example, the types and nature of legal codes directly affect case-processing times and the punitive measures imposed (which can influence over-crowding in prisons, for instance). Finally, the model rests on the availability, quality and comparability of the underlying data itself. For instance, of the 55 variables initially selected for this study, only about half were deemed

reliable enough to be included for analysis either because of a high number of missing values, outdated data, comparability or low confidence in the data sources.

Figure 1.5. **Working conceptual framework for performance**



Source: OECD (2009), *Measuring Government Activity*, OECD Publishing, doi: 10.1787/9789264060784-en.

These and other issues will be discussed in greater depth in the following chapters, allowing further research issues and recommendations for improving measurement to be identified.

## Evidence-based policy framework applied to the relationship between security and competitiveness in Mexico

The OECD approach to evidence-based policy making depicted above may be applied not only to the broader analysis of security and justice policies but also to some specific aspects of it. One aspect that is particularly important for Mexico as an emerging country that needs to grow and reduce economic inequity is the relationship between security and competitiveness.

In Mexico, four out of five individuals who have been victims of crime change their behaviour and activities permanently (IMCO, 2006). This fact has a transcendental impact on the economy, affecting labour productivity and the number of work days lost because of crime. Even more importantly, exposure to crime changes consumption patterns and business tolerance to risk with a direct impact on a region's economic growth and competitiveness. For this reason, improving public safety conditions within a region is not only in the interest of governments but also, very importantly, of non-government stakeholders, most importantly the business community.

The World Economic Forum defines competitiveness as the “set of institutions, policies, and factors that determine the level of productivity of a country” (WEF, 2010). An alternative definition is: the ability of a country or region to attract and maintain investment and talent (IMCO, 2011). Based on these definitions, it should be clear why lower levels of public safety for both individuals and property would lead to lower overall competitiveness, either at the national or regional/state level. In an increasingly globalised world, firms should encourage and foster competitiveness with the intention of increasing their overall productivity to be able to better compete in world markets.

So far, most of the research regarding the relationship between competitiveness and security has dealt with the existence and fulfilment of clear laws and norms, most importantly the legal certainty of firms and contracts guaranteed by trustworthy and objective court systems. This incorporates judicial certainty in the interaction between individuals, firms and the government within an economy as a fundamental determinant to incentivise investment, growth and competitiveness. The main idea is that regions that lack such legal systems impose higher transaction costs to market participants. While these factors are very well understood in competitiveness research, there is still a need for more detailed examination of the effects of insecurity and criminality to a region’s competitiveness.

Insecurity and criminality impact individuals and firms by imposing higher costs of market participation. These can be items such as resources spent on private security or the cost of stolen or damaged goods and property, which lower the ability of firms to compete by raising costs relative to firms in safer regions. For this reason, firms should encourage changes that lead to better overall security conditions for their regions of business.

Despite the fact that the causes of insecurity and criminal incidence in regions are dependent of structural variables such as employment opportunities, income distribution, education, demographic composition and poverty, these causes are at the same time dependent on institutional factors. For example, there is powerful evidence that countries with worse structural conditions than Mexico have, in fact, lower criminal incidence rates because of changes to their justice procurement institutions (IMCO, 2006). This stresses the idea that the evaluation of law enforcement and justice institutions within a region is of vital importance. Both government and the business community have huge incentives to promote the reform of institutions that may lead to better security of individuals and property.

Using the OECD’s evidence-based policy-making framework, we can illustrate how the relationship between security and competitiveness can be further explored with the intention of creating information that could mobilise governmental and non-governmental stakeholders.

- **Generating basic data:** As mentioned throughout this report, basic data is of fundamental importance to the policy-making process. Available data on security and justice, such as resources spent, human and physical infrastructure outputs, criminal incidence outcomes and public perception on public safety, are still far away from the desired levels. Lack of data is a lesser concern for measuring competitiveness as there is an increasing number of both governmental and non-governmental organisations that collect and compile variables that are necessary to evaluate competitiveness within a region. Still, alongside the need to generate better data on criminal and legal processes, further efforts are needed at

collecting additional information on dimensions of crime that may affect business decisions, like working days lost by victims of crime or additional costs incurred by firms to enforce security.

- **Transforming data into actionable evidence:** While the availability of basic data is necessary, it is not sufficient to understand the complex relationships between security and competitiveness. As mentioned previously, an increasing number of non-governmental institutions such as think tanks and academic centres have proposed and implemented complex and interesting methods to evaluate a region's competitiveness outcomes. Increases in available data should be accompanied by the incorporation of criminal incidence and justice system indicators into such studies, potentially increasing knowledge of the security-competitiveness relationship. Additionally, more detailed exercises that analyse the effects of potential interventions and reform on law enforcement and criminal justice also must be undertaken.
- **Using evidence on security-competitiveness relationships in policy decisions:** Once that data is transformed into evidence it should be disseminated among the relevant decision makers. In the case of the relationship between security and competitiveness, the range of policies involved should reach beyond security and justice. The relevant questions for economic authorities and regulators should not only be based on the grounds of what further security could do for competitiveness, but to what extent economic policies and regulations are consistent with the need to generate the right structure of incentives for economic agents to contribute to enhancing the rule of law.
- **Creating indicators and reports that could mobilise non-governmental stakeholders:** Secondary diffusion of evidence, such as the creation of reports and indicators, as well as the involvement of media, can play a fundamental role in transforming evidence into policy. The detrimental effect of a lack of security in competitiveness levels not only affects those institutions responsible for making policy happen, but also the business community, as one of the agents that can benefit the most from increases in competitiveness, can play a vital role in pressuring and co-operating with the relevant authorities to implement reform and ultimately improve criminality outcomes. For this reason, the creation and diffusion of evidence is a fundamental part of the policy-making process, ideally informing and mobilising stakeholders that can directly and indirectly benefit from informed policy decisions.

## Notes

1. Note by Turkey: The information in this document with reference to “Cyprus” relates to the southern part of the Island. There is no single authority representing both Turkish and Greek Cypriot people on the Island. Turkey recognises the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). Until a lasting and equitable solution is found within the context of the United Nations, Turkey shall preserve its position concerning the “Cyprus issue”.
2. Note by all the European Union Member States of the OECD and the European Union: The Republic of Cyprus is recognised by all members of the United Nations with the exception of Turkey. The information in this document relates to the area under the effective control of the Government of the Republic of Cyprus.
3. This subsection includes several contributions by Jorge Srur of the Inter-American Development Bank.
4. For example, citizens’ low confidence in the police reduces their propensity to report crime, downgrading the reliability of official criminal records. Violence-related costs are also strongly linked to perceptions: if people feel crime is increasing, even if actual rates are dropping, they will spend more on crime prevention and demand more public investment. Therefore, in order to have a complete picture of insecurity, better police and judicial records on crime have to be complemented by information on unreported facts and perceptions.
5. The UNICRI project initially only included four LAC capital cities. Afterwards, more countries and cities were developing their own VS. However, periodical, systematic and state-run VS are still exceptional in developing countries, whose statistical priorities are usually allocated on issues other than crime.
6. Sometimes estimating the “dark figure” of crime, as in Mexico, matches criminal events not only against those that are unreported but against those that never reached a state of “investigation proceeding judicial order” as well.
7. The addition of information collected by home-based VS and business-focused VS plus Census and surveys on crime-related public sector expenditure helps to obtain a fairly complete picture of the actual state of citizens’ security and approximate costs of the violence in a territory.
8. The COMPSTAT and other similar systems used by police departments to analyse and prevent crime, stimulated upgrades in reports, technology, analytical tools and police accountability in general.
9. An injured person report following an intentional gunshot wound in a police report can be the same case that a health record reports as a homicide if the victim dies in the hospital.
10. One best practice, particularly at local levels, is the creation of observatories of violence whereby all institutions periodically exchange data, case by case, to validate it and analyse common facts and trends. Colombia has made the most progress on this issue (successful experiences can be found in Bogotá, Cali and Medellín).
11. In the case of Brazil, for instance, over the last few years homicide rates collected by WHO have remained around 25-30% over the homicide rate reported to UNODC,



both reported by official, but different, national sources. The homicide rate in Haiti collected by UNODC until 2004 was estimated according to health system criteria. Since the source of this data has been alternated to the police system, numbers have dropped dramatically: in 2010, Haiti's homicide rate, for example, was one of the lowest among LAC countries, similar to that of Uruguay or Argentina, and four times less than the rate it had six years before.

12. When the UNODC does not receive an official response to the CTS from a member country, it sometimes takes information from some of these sources to develop particular studies. For instance, the UNODC's 2011 Global Study on Homicide primarily takes data from criminal systems, but when such data is not available, it uses data reported to WHO or other sources. In some cases, like for some African countries, estimations are only statistical projections based on the most frequent causes of mortality detected in the small number of reported cases.
13. The causes of those problems have to be sought not only in international organisations' structure and processes, but more importantly in countries' domestic capacity building and political economy, as they are the original providers of official data to those international organisations.
14. The two basic conditions for achieving that goal are: *i*) the technical readiness of national statistics offices to lead not only the publication, but also the quality control, of the crime data collection in a majority of the countries (today more the exception than the rule, at least in most developing countries); *ii*) the political will of states, particularly in terms of the autonomy of statistical offices, and their capacity building to collect and publish transparent crime data.
15. These problems can be more pronounced in areas challenged by drug cartels, where organised crime is taking up a significant amount of state capacity, including in terms of the scientific collection of evidence and statistical follow up of their criminal actions.
16. INEGI is the highest level public agency responsible for the production and dissemination of data on government, public security, provision of justice and prosecution. The main federal counterparts are, respectively, the national Ministry of Finance, the federal police, the Council of the Judiciary and the General Prosecutor's Office. They co-ordinate committees where the sub-national actors of each sector are represented.
17. The last update of homicide data (2010), for instance, shows a large increase, which originates from insufficient quality control (and delay in the confirmation of events) of the original published data. Once INEGI can carefully double-check the information, state by state and municipality by municipality, a large number of previously unregistered cases could be captured by the statistical systems. The 2010 homicide rate increased from 18.1 per 100 000 inhabitants (UNODC, 2011) to 22.76 per 100 000 inhabitants (INEGI, 2012; SES, 2012). The number of homicides recognised by the Mexican statistics for that year increased from 20 585 to 25 757.
18. Mexico is proposing this code to UNODC as a model for international debate with a view to homogenising statistical definitions. Unlike that of SES, of which Mexico is also a member, which focuses on a short list of common indicators about a few main criminal events, INEGI's proposal seeks a short list that is able to include all criminal events. The feasibility of reaching such a wide consensus on an internationally agreed


upon table is unlikely in a short period of time, but the fact that discussions have been initiated is a positive development.

19. That improvement is not only dependent on technical assistance for better capture and validation of data, but also on greater public confidence in the police and institutions in order to increase the rate of reported crime.
20. Although Mexico has been implementing VS over the last decade, the new ENVIPE, now carried out by INEGI, has meant a relevant upgrade from the size of the sampling (78 000 homes in 2011 to 94 000 in 2012, a very significant sample compared to other international experience) and quality (for example, a new detailed checklist of crime events was added to remind respondents of all of the possible incidents of crime, which resulted in a significantly higher number of crime events being collected with regard to previous surveys).
21. The Centre of Excellence's efforts to improve the measurement of organised crime is one of the most relevant projects in progress. A recent international conference organised by this centre in Aguascalientes showed important progress in this respect. This knowledge is key to understanding the actual evolution of crime in Mexico.

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