## EDITORIAL: REGAINING MOMENTUM DESPITE OIL TURBULENCE

Since the 2001 slowdown, the world economy has moved in fits and starts and economists as well as the general public are now longing for a smooth and sustained recovery, undisturbed by chronic geopolitical risks or abrupt gyrations in oil prices and financial markets.

Although economic fortunes have been contrasting over the past few quarters, with the United States forging ahead, East Asia slowing but from a rapid pace, and Continental Europe plodding along, households seem to have been lacking confidence OECD-wide. This pervasive sense of uncertainty has proved somewhat contagious since after a year of record growth in world trade, business confidence has fallen back to just above the historical average in the United States and Europe, dashing hopes that GDP would keep growing above trend over the next few months.

Compared to cautiously upbeat assessments that could be made even two months ago, this turnaround has been a source of disappointment. It has been prompted in large part by a surge in oil prices that has depressed real incomes as well as confidence in the OECD countries. There are nonetheless good reasons to believe that despite recent oil price turbulence, the world economy will regain momentum in a not-too-distant future. Supported by strong balance sheets and high profits, the recovery of business investment should continue in North America and start in earnest in Europe, while consumer spending will benefit from the recent retreat of oil prices to less onerous levels, in a context where job creation is progressively strengthening and monetary conditions remain very accommodative. All in all, there are still some good grounds to expect OECD economies to grow again above trend in the course of 2005 and 2006.

From a geographical perspective, the momentum of this recovery will benefit from continued Asian dynamism, in China, where activity accelerated in the third quarter, following a desirable slowdown during the first half of the year, and Japan, which staged a noticeable comeback based on a renewed export drive, broadening into a recovery of investment, employment and finally consumption, before marking a pause over the past few months. The strength of this recovery will also be enhanced by positive developments in North America. But it remains to be seen whether Continental Europe will play a strong supportive role through a marked upswing of final domestic demand.

On the latter issue, this *Outlook* takes a reasoned but positive bet on Europe. It tables on a significant pick-up of final domestic demand in the euro area in 2005-06, while world trade and OECD output would not accelerate over the period. Continental Europe, and more specifically, Germany, would thus have to find enough of an autonomous momentum to achieve a higher relative growth path. For this scenario to materialise, a modicum of stability in oil prices and exchange rates is required, which would allow a traditionally weakly resilient euro area to start catching up with the fast growing economies of the OECD.

A strong appreciation of the euro, in a context of worsening external imbalances, or further rises in oil prices, may thus bear disproportionately on Continental Europe, where growth is still over-reliant on exports and high oil prices do not find their counterpart in high output growth and energy demand.

However, Europe might not be at such a disadvantage, compared with the rest of the OECD, in coping with higher oil prices. Should an additional oil shock hit, the OECD countries, including euro area members, would be less vulnerable than in the past. First, dependence on oil, expressed as a share of GDP, has been halved since the 1970s, leading to a much lower income burden than in the past for households and businesses alike. Also, and more importantly, inflation expectations are now low and well anchored, so that rising oil prices have only impacted so far on headline inflation while nominal wages and core inflation barely budged. It would thus be very surprising if OECD

countries were to suffer again, as they did in the 1970s, from a nightmarish situation where wages and prices are spiralling out of control and central banks are forced to switch into severe "tightening mode".

Nonetheless, when it comes to the impact of oil price shifts, economic agents' perceptions and economists' received wisdom do not seem to coincide. While estimates derived from econometric models signal a rather modest impact on output and inflation, oil price fluctuations take centre stage in the public debate and strongly influence economic confidence.

In this context, it was natural to devote a special chapter of this *Outlook* to the economics of oil. To better understand why oil matters, it is necessary to go beyond the short run. In a world where people are more "forward-looking", uncertainty about future oil prospects may have more of an impact on the current economic situation than, say, month-to-month changes in market prices.

Here OECD expertise suggests that recent oil prices were certainly well above long-term equilibrium levels, even allowing for strong market power on the part of the OPEC cartel. There are still important resources available on the supply side, especially among OPEC producers to match increasing demand for oil, and the efficiency of existing facilities could be significantly improved. Furthermore, alternative sources of energy may already become profitable at current prices.

This does not mean, however, that oil prices will quickly fall back to the low levels which prevailed three or four years ago. First, the fall may not be rapid in a context where strong geopolitical uncertainty and high price volatility inhibit investment in new oil facilities. Second, looking past the current situation, oil prices will retreat somewhat but are likely to remain higher than during the 1990s.

In this world of durably more expensive oil, demand emanating from dynamic emerging economies will play a strong role in shaping future prices. The importance of emerging economies stems not only from their increasing contribution to world growth but also and more importantly from the fact that for a given increase in activity their demand for oil is far larger than the OECD average. Indeed, future oil prices will crucially depend on further progress in energy conservation in emerging economies as well as the United States.

Prudent management of non-renewable natural resources is not the only issue that matters for the long-run sustainability of OECD societies. Putting public finances in order is also of vital importance for the well-being of future generations. In line with previous editorials, it bears repeating that, given existing budgetary plans, most of the largest OECD countries will see no substantial progress in bringing down structural deficits. This is regrettable in a context where pension and health care reforms are generating painful debate, and thus progressing with difficulty.

It might be hoped, of course, that prudent private agents would react to public profligacy by stepping up their own saving efforts and there certainly is evidence pointing in this direction. This is indeed the message delivered by the special chapter devoted in this *Economic Outlook* to the long-term impact of fiscal policies. But, as a general rule, private saving does not fully offset public dissaving and this precautionary reaction may be contingent on national and historical circumstances. It is, for instance, hardly discernible in the case of the United States.

At the end of the day, the role of fiscal policy is not to add to the financial pressures arising from ageing populations. It is rather to relieve them, and thus take advantage of the ongoing recovery to finally implement gradual but far-reaching retrenchment.

25 November 2004

Jean-Philippe Cotis Chief Economist

## Special chapters in recent issues of OECD Economic Outlook

#### No. 75, June 2004

Housing markets, wealth and the business cycle The challenges of narrowing the US current account deficit Asset price cycles, "one-off" factors and structural budget balances Enhancing income convergence in central Europe after EU accession

#### No. 74, December 2003

Fiscal stance over the cycle: the role of debt, institutions, and budget constraints Fiscal relations across levels of government Enhancing the cost effectiveness of public spending

#### No. 73, June 2003

After the telecommunication bubble Structural policies and growth Trends in foreign direct investment in OECD countries Foreign direct investment restrictions in OECD countries Policy influences on foreign direct investment

#### No. 72, December 2002

Fiscal sustainability: the contribution of fiscal rules Increasing employment: the role of later retirement Product market competition and economic performance Inflation persistence in the euro area

#### No. 71, June 2002

Economic consequences of terrorism Ongoing changes in the business cycle Intra-industry and intra-firm trade and the internationalisation of production Productivity and innovation: the impact of product and labour market policies

#### No. 70, December 2001

Saving and investment: determinants and policy implications Investment in human capital through post-compulsory education and training The cross-market effects of product and labour market policies Agricultural policy reform: the need for further progress

#### No. 69, June 2001

Fiscal implications of ageing: projections of age-related spending Challenges for tax policy in OECD countries Encouraging environmentally sustainable growth: experience in OECD countries Productivity and firm dynamics: evidence from microdata

#### No. 68, December 2000

Links between policy and growth: cross-country evidence Revised OECD measures of structural unemployment House prices and economic activity Trends in immigration and economic consequences

# **TABLE OF CONTENTS**

I. General assessm	ent of the ma	acroeconomic situati	on		
Overview: an expansion	n facing headwind	ls			
Higher oil prices exert a	a drag on the glob	al expansion			
Prospects to 2006: over	coming the oil sh	ock.			
In the near term, risks a	ire dominated by o	oil price uncertainty			
Appendix: Corporate se	ector exposure to a	a rise in interest rates			
<b></b>					
-					
United States		Czech Republic		New Zealand	
Japan		Denmark		Norway	
Euro area		Finland		Poland	
Germany		Greece		Portugal	
France		Hungary		Slovak Republic	
Italy		Iceland		Spain	
United Kingdom		Ireland		Sweden	
Canada		Korea		Switzerland	
Australia		Luxembourg		Turkey	
Austria Belgium		Mexico Netherlands		тапксу	•••••
Deigium		Inculci lands			
China Brazil The Russian Federation	oments: drive	ers, economic conseq	uences an	d policy responses	
China Brazil The Russian Federation V. Oil price develop Introduction Longer-term prospects Oil price scenarios to 2 Short-term influences of The economic effects of	for the oil market 030 on oil price movem	ers, economic consec	juences an	d policy responses	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
China Brazil The Russian Federation V. Oil price develop Introduction Longer-term prospects Oil price scenarios to 2 Short-term influences of The economic effects of Appendix IV.1: The oil	for the oil market 030 on oil price moven f oil price moven spreadsheet mode	ers, economic consec nents ents	juences an	d policy responses	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
China Brazil The Russian Federation V. Oil price develop Introduction Longer-term prospects Oil price scenarios to 2 Short-term influences of The economic effects of Appendix IV.1: The oil Appendix IV.2: Price ve	for the oil market 030 on oil price moven of oil price moven spreadsheet mode olatility, inventori	ers, economic consec nents ents el es and the oil price	juences an	d policy responses	
China Brazil The Russian Federation V. Oil price develop Introduction Longer-term prospects Oil price scenarios to 2 Short-term influences of The economic effects of Appendix IV.1: The oil Appendix IV.2: Price vol V. Saving behaviou	for the oil market 030 on oil price moven of oil price moven spreadsheet mode olatility, inventorio <b>r and the effe</b>	ers, economic conseq nents nents el es and the oil price ectiveness of fiscal p	iuences and	d policy responses	
China Brazil The Russian Federation V. Oil price develop Introduction Longer-term prospects Oil price scenarios to 2 Short-term influences of The economic effects of Appendix IV.1: The oil Appendix IV.2: Price vo V. Saving behaviou Introduction	for the oil market 030 of oil price moven of oil price moven spreadsheet mode olatility, inventori <b>r and the effe</b>	ers, economic consecution nents nents el es and the oil price	juences an olicy	d policy responses	
China	for the oil market 030 on oil price moven of oil price moven spreadsheet mode olatility, inventori <b>r and the effo</b>	ers, economic consecution nents nents el es and the oil price ectiveness of fiscal p	juences an olicy	d policy responses	
ChinaBrazil The Russian Federation <b>7. Oil price develop</b> Introduction Longer-term prospects Oil price scenarios to 2 Short-term influences of The economic effects of Appendix IV.1: The oil Appendix IV.2: Price vol <b>8. Saving behaviou</b> Introduction Co-movements in priva Episodes of sharp swin	for the oil market 030 on oil price moven of oil price moven spreadsheet mode olatility, inventori <b>r and the effo</b> ate and public savi gs in fiscal stance.	ers, economic consecution nents nents el es and the oil price ectiveness of fiscal p	juences an olicy	d policy responses	
China	for the oil market 030 on oil price moven of oil price moven spreadsheet mode olatility, inventorie <b>r and the effe</b> ate and public savi gs in fiscal stance. he empirical evide	ers, economic consecution nents	juences an olicy	d policy responses	
China Brazil The Russian Federation <b>7. Oil price develop</b> Introduction Longer-term prospects Oil price scenarios to 2 Short-term influences of The economic effects of Appendix IV.1: The oil Appendix IV.2: Price vol <b>7. Saving behaviou</b> Introduction Co-movements in private Episodes of sharp swing Private saving offsets: t Composition effects	for the oil market 030 on oil price moven of oil price moven spreadsheet mode olatility, inventorion <b>r and the effo</b> the and public savings in fiscal stance he empirical evide	ers, economic consecution nents	juences an olicy	d policy responses	
China	for the oil market 030 on oil price moven of oil price moven spreadsheet mode olatility, inventorion <b>r and the effo</b> the and public savings in fiscal stance he empirical evide	ers, economic consecution nents	juences an olicy	d policy responses	
China	for the oil market 030 on oil price moven of oil price moven spreadsheet mode olatility, inventorion <b>r and the effo</b> the and public saving sin fiscal stance the empirical evide the private saving	ers, economic consecution nents	juences an olicy	d policy responses	
China Brazil The Russian Federation V. Oil price develop Introduction Longer-term prospects Oil price scenarios to 2 Short-term influences of The economic effects of Appendix IV.1: The oil Appendix IV.2: Price vo V. Saving behaviou Introduction Co-movements in priva Episodes of sharp swin Private saving offsets: t Composition effects Appendix: Estimating t	for the oil market 030	ers, economic consecutive nents	juences an olicy ic Outlook	d policy responses	
China Brazil The Russian Federation V. Oil price develop Introduction Longer-term prospects Oil price scenarios to 2 Short-term influences of The economic effects of Appendix IV.1: The oil Appendix IV.2: Price vo V. Saving behaviou Introduction Co-movements in private Episodes of sharp swim Private saving offsets: the Composition effects Appendix: Estimating the ecial chapters in reconstruction	for the oil market 030 on oil price moven of oil price moven spreadsheet mode olatility, inventorie <b>r and the effe</b> tte and public savi gs in fiscal stance he empirical evide the private saving <b>cent issues of</b>	ers, economic consequences, economic consequences, economic consequences, economic consequence, economic conse	juences an olicy ic Outlook	d policy responses	
China	for the oil market 030 on oil price moven spreadsheet mode olatility, inventorie <b>r and the effe</b> tte and public savi gs in fiscal stance he empirical evide the private saving <b>cent issues of</b>	ers, economic consequences, economic consequences, economic consequences, economic consequence, economic conse	ic Outlook	d policy responses	
China	for the oil market 030 on oil price moven of oil price moven spreadsheet mode olatility, inventorie <b>r and the effe</b> ate and public savi gs in fiscal stance he empirical evide the private saving <b>cent issues of</b>	ers, economic consequences, economic consequences, economic consequences, economic consequence, economic conse	ic Outlook	d policy responses	

## Boxes

I.1.	Policy and other assumptions underlying the central projections	10
I.2.	Has there been a lasting shift in Japanese consumer behaviour?	12
I.3.	Have oil prices overshot?	16
I.4.	Where does the "neutral" interest rate lie?	24
I.5.	Where do public pension reforms stand?	28
IV.1.	The impact of an oil supply crisis	131
IV.2.	The impact of speculation	132
IV.3.	Channels of oil price effects on the economy	133
V.1.	Conceptual issues	144
V.2.	Private saving responses to budget deficits	149
V.3.	Private saving equations: conventional control variables	155

### **Tables**

I.1.	The expansion continues	1
	Near-term estimates point to continued growth	9
I.3.	World trade growth should be sustained	15
I.4.	Fiscal deficits are large and persistent	27
I.5.	Fiscal deficits are large and persistent Debt-to-equity ratios Share of firms in the vulnerable zone	32
I.6.	Share of firms in the vulnerable zone	33
III.1.	Projections for China Projections for Brazil Projections for the Russian Federation	115
III.2.	Projections for Brazil	116
III.3.	Projections for the Russian Federation	118
IV.1.	OPEC's market share under different assumptions	125
IV.2.	Oil price extrapolations under selected demand and supply scenarios	126
IV.3.	Crude oil prices have become more volatile than the price of other commodities	128
IV.4.	The United States and China have been major of incremental oil demand since 1995	129
IV.5.	The mechanical impact of a 10 per cent oil price change on consumer price inflation	134
IV.6.	Impacts of a sustained \$15 increase in the price of oil	135
	Response of private saving to fiscal stance	150
V.2.	Response of private saving to fiscal stance: selected countries	152
V.3.	Response of private saving to fiscal stance: composition effects	153

## Figures

I.1.	Oil prices have soared	3
	The expension has lost some momentum	3
	Labour markets perform unevenly	4
I.4.	Recovery in Germany and Italy has relied more on exports	5
I.5.	Core inflation generally remains subdued	7
I.6.	Confidence is fragile	8
	High-tech sector activity is decelerating	9
	Export performance is diverging among the larger euro area economies	14
	Investment has been picking up slowly in some countries	18
	Real house prices may be peaking in some countries	20
I.11.	The US current account has entered uncharted territory	21
	Monetary stimulus is being withdraw at an uneven pace and fiscal adjustment is wanting	23
I.13.	Real interest rates remain relatively low	26
I.14.	Public investment shrinks but social benefit outlays rise	31
IV.1.	Oil prices: a historical perspective	119
IV.2.	Oil prices: a historical perspective Oil intensity of production has fallen in the OECD area	121
	Oil demand is projected to increase in most North America and China	122
IV.4.	Proved oil reserves appear adequate for the next few decades relative to current production	123
IV.5.	Short-term influences on the oil price	130

V.1.	Private and public saving: deviations from averages	142
	Private and public saving: raw correlations	145
V.3.	Change in private and public saving	145
V.4.	Public saving: inflation adjustment	146
V.5.	Public debt and net financing wealth in selected OECD countries	151

## **Conventional signs**

\$	US dollar		Decimal point
¥	Japanese yen	I, II	Calendar half-years
£	Pound sterling	Q1, Q4	Calendar quarters
€	Euro	Billion	Thousand million
mbd	Million barrels per day	Trillion	Thousand billion
	Data not available	s.a.a.r.	Seasonally adjusted at annual rates
0	Nil or negligible	n.s.a.	Not seasonally adjusted
_	Irrelevant		

Summary of projections —													
	2004	2005		2004		2005		2006			Fourth quarter		
	2004	2005	2006	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	2004	2005	2006
						F	Per cent						
Real GDP growth													
United States	4.4	3.3	3.6	3.5	3.1	3.2	3.4	3.5	3.6	3.7	3.8	3.3	3.6
Japan	4.0	2.1	2.3	2.8	2.3	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.2	2.1	2.6	2.4	2.1
Euro area	1.8	1.9	2.5	1.7	1.9	2.1	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	1.9	2.3	2.5
Total OECD	3.6	2.9	3.1	2.9	2.9	3.0	3.2	3.2	3.1	3.1	3.1	3.1	3.1
Inflation													
United States	2.0	1.8	1.7	1.5	2.1	1.7	1.7	1.7	1.9	1.6	2.2	1.8	1.7
Japan	-2.3	-1.3	-0.3	-1.6	-1.5	-1.2	-1.0	-0.6	0.0	0.1	-1.6	-1.1	0.2
Euro area	1.9	1.7	1.8	1.4	1.9	1.9	1.7	1.7	1.8	1.8	1.7	1.8	1.8
Total OECD	1.8	1.7	1.7	1.4	1.8	1.5	1.7	1.8	1.8	1.6	1.9	1.7	1.7
Unemployment rate													
United States	5.5	5.3	5.1	5.4	5.4	5.4	5.3	5.3	5.2	5.2	5.4	5.3	5.0
Japan	4.8	4.5	4.2	4.8	4.7	4.6	4.5	4.4	4.3	4.2	4.8	4.4	4.0
Euro area	8.8	8.6	8.3	8.8	8.7	8.7	8.6	8.6	8.4	8.4	8.8	8.6	8.2
Total OECD	6.6	6.5	6.3	6.5	6.5	6.5	6.5	6.4	6.4	6.3	6.5	6.4	6.2
World trade growth	9.5	9.0	9.5	8.4	8.7	8.9	9.3	9.4	9.7	9.7	9.4	9.1	9.6
Current account balance													
United States	-5.7	-6.2	-6.4										
Japan	3.5	3.5	3.7										
Euro area	0.7	0.6	0.9										
Total OECD	-1.2	-1.4	-1.3										
Cyclically-adjusted fiscal balance													
United States	-4.2	-4.0	-4.2										
Japan	-6.3	-6.4	-6.6										
Euro area	-2.1	-1.8	-1.8										
Total OECD	-3.4	-3.3	-3.3										
Short-term interest rate													
United States	1.5	2.8	3.8	2.1	2.5	2.7	3.0	3.2	3.5	3.7	2.1	3.2	4.2
Japan	0.0	0.0	0.4	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.2	0.0	0.0	0.5
Euro area	2.1	2.1	2.7	2.1	2.1	2.1	2.1	2.1	2.3	2.5	2.1	2.1	3.0

Note: Real GDP growth, inflation (measured by the increase in the GDP deflator) and world trade growth (the arithmetic average of world merchandise import and export volumes) are seasonally and working-day-adjusted annual rates. The "fourth quarter" columns are expressed in year-on-year growth rates where appropriate and in levels otherwise. The unemployment rate is in per cent of the labour force while the current account balance is in per cent of GDP. The cyclically-adjusted fiscal balance is in per cent of potential GDP. Interest rates are for the United States: 3-month eurodollar deposit; Japan: 3-month certificate of deposits; euro area: 3-month interbank rate.

Assumptions underlying the projections include:

- no change in actual and announced fiscal policies;

- unchanged exchange rates as from 5 November 2004; in particular 1\$ = 105.70 yen and 0.771 euros;

The cut-off date for other information used in the compilation of the projections is 18 November 2004.

Source: OECD Economic Outlook 76 database.

## From: OECD Economic Outlook, Volume 2004 Issue 2



Access the complete publication at: https://doi.org/10.1787/eco\_outlook-v2004-2-en

#### Please cite this chapter as:

Cotis, Jean-Philippe (2004), "Regaining Momentum Despite Oil Turbulence", in OECD, OECD Economic Outlook, Volume 2004 Issue 2, OECD Publishing, Paris.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1787/eco\_outlook-v2004-2-2-en

This work is published under the responsibility of the Secretary-General of the OECD. The opinions expressed and arguments employed herein do not necessarily reflect the official views of OECD member countries.

This document and any map included herein are without prejudice to the status of or sovereignty over any territory, to the delimitation of international frontiers and boundaries and to the name of any territory, city or area.

You can copy, download or print OECD content for your own use, and you can include excerpts from OECD publications, databases and multimedia products in your own documents, presentations, blogs, websites and teaching materials, provided that suitable acknowledgment of OECD as source and copyright owner is given. All requests for public or commercial use and translation rights should be submitted to rights@oecd.org. Requests for permission to photocopy portions of this material for public or commercial use shall be addressed directly to the Copyright Clearance Center (CCC) at info@copyright.com or the Centre français d'exploitation du droit de copie (CFC) at contact@cfcopies.com.

