1887

OECD Journal: Competition Law and Policy

  • Discontinué

This journal draws on the best of the recent work done for and by the OECD Committee on Competition Law and Policy. Its articles provide insight into the thinking a competition law enforcers, and focus on the practical application of competition law and policy. Here’s what Robert Pitofsky, Chairman of the US Federal Trade Commission said about this new journal when it was launched: “Global competition is the wave of the future, and comparative analysis of the laws and practices of various members of the worldwide community of nations is a necessary corollary. This new OECD Journal of Competition Law and Policy, compiled from OECD Round Table discussions, summaries of recent developments, and articles on topics of special interest, will introduce regulators, practitioners, and scholars to different regulatory approaches around the world and will allow us to consider in a more informed way the strengths and weaknesses of our own systems.”

Anglais Egalement disponible en : Français

Prosecuting Cartels without Direct Evidence of Agreement

Circumstantial evidence is employed in cartel cases in all countries. The better practice is to use circumstantial evidence holistically, giving it cumulative effect, rather than on an item-by-item basis. Complicating the use of circumstantial evidence are provisions in national competition laws that variously define the nature of agreements that are subject to the law. There are two general types of circumstantial evidence: communication evidence and economic evidence. Of the two, communication evidence is considered to be the more important. Economic evidence is almost always ambiguous. It could be consistent with either agreement or independent action. Therefore it requires careful analysis. National treatment of cartels, such as whether they are prosecuted as crimes or as administrative violations, can affect the burden of proof that applies to the cases, and hence the use of circumstantial evidence. It can be difficult to convince courts to accept circumstantial evidence in cartel cases, especially where the potential liability for having violated the anti-cartel provisions of the competition law is high. There are circumstances in countries that are relatively new to anti-cartel enforcement that could affect the extent to which they rely on circumstantial evidence in their cases.

Anglais Egalement disponible en : Français

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