

## Intergovernmental organisation activity

### European Atomic Energy Community

#### **Published reports**

##### *Euratom Supply Agency Annual Report 2018*

The *Euratom Supply Agency Annual Report 2018*<sup>1</sup> takes note of the conclusion of negotiations on eight major legislative acts aimed at ensuring clean energy for all Europeans. The report states that the Euratom Supply Agency (ESA) has continued to assume responsibility for the common supply policy in the interest of regular and equitable access to nuclear material for Euratom Community users. To ensure security of supply for European users in the medium and long term, ESA has been consistently encouraging the diversification of sources. ESA welcomes steps towards licensing an alternative fuel supplier in the member states using VVER technology and encourages continued efforts in this area.

ESA pursued its co-operation with the United States (US) Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Agency to implement the high-enriched uranium (HEU) exchange programme, as provided for in a 2014 memorandum of understanding.<sup>2</sup> The aim is to provide European research reactors and producers of radioisotopes with the necessary amounts of HEU in conformity with the policy of minimising its use. A dedicated working group of the ESA's Advisory Committee resumed its work on the supply of high-assay low-enriched uranium (HALEU), which is currently not produced in Europe and is intended to replace HEU in nuclear medicine applications as well as in other areas. The ESA Advisory Committee produced its report in May 2019 (see below).

2018 was also a year of unique challenges. In preparation for the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from Euratom, ESA analysed all the supply contracts that it had concluded involving United Kingdom entities and took appropriate measures to ensure that those contracts continue to remain valid after the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European Union (EU). ESA liaised with the EU-27 (the 27 remaining EU member states engaged in the negotiations with the United Kingdom) stakeholders to help raise awareness of the need to be prepared and to address, in the appropriate fora, issues related to the future supply of medical radioisotopes.

##### *Euratom Supply Agency (ESA) Advisory Committee Report*

In May 2019, the ESA Advisory Committee produced its revised report,<sup>3</sup> which it endorsed and approved in its session of 21 March 2019.

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1. Euratom Supply Agency (2019), *Euratom Supply Agency Annual Report 2018*, Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg.
  2. "Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the Department of Energy National Nuclear Security Administration of the United States of America and the Euratom Supply Agency concerning the exchange of highly enriched uranium needed for supply of European research reactors and isotope production facilities" (Dec. 2014).
  3. Euratom Supply Agency (2019), *Securing the European Supply of 19.75% enriched Uranium Fuel: A Revised Assessment*.

The report provides an updated view of HALEU needs, including potential global demand. It also takes account of developments in recent years, specifically realistic scenarios for the conversion of HEU fuelled high-performance research reactors, new concepts for power reactors and fuel design, the current geopolitical situation, and issues relating to the shipping and transport of HALEU. It also addresses the pressing issue of US stocks of HEU available for downblending to HALEU, since these are only sufficient to cover needs until 2030-2040.

HALEU is not currently produced in any western country. The material used in research reactors is obtained either by downblending US HEU stocks, or from Russia. If no action is taken, there is a risk that the supply of this critically important material cannot be guaranteed after 2030-2040. This could jeopardise European research technological applications and the production of the most vital medical radioisotopes. It is now recognised that HALEU production could be of major importance for the future of nuclear technology, science using nuclear technology and nuclear medicine.

The report contains an overview of the demand for HALEU in the coming decades, a discussion on the potential future needs of small and medium-sized reactors using advanced HALEU fuel, and a description of issues related to the metallisation, deconversion and transport of HALEU. The core part of the report presents a business model to build European capacity for the production of metallic HALEU, based on three different market demand scenarios. The report concludes that building such a facility in the EU is feasible but that its economic viability would depend on certain conditions, in particular production volumes, price and financing.

By providing an overview of the current situation while looking ahead to the future, this report contributes to the European and international discussion on the future secure supply of HALEU and provides policymakers with a basis for making informed decisions on related initiatives.

### **Published studies**

#### *Study on the impact of the ITER activities in the EU, final report*

On 4 April 2018, Trinomics B.V. completed a study on the impact of the ITER project activities on behalf of the Commission's Director-General for Energy.<sup>4</sup> The report presents an analysis of the impacts of the spending on ITER by the joint undertaking Fusion for Energy. The study provides a detailed analysis of the in-kind contributions funded by Fusion for Energy and an analysis of future payments. It shows that spending on ITER is already delivering significant benefits, almost equivalent to the spending by Fusion for Energy. It has also generated around 34 000 job years between 2008-2017. These impacts are expected to increase, along with spending, in the next five years. So far, the geographical distribution of impacts largely corresponds to the size of an economy, with a weighting towards France as the host country.

Potential impacts of spin-offs further increase the economic impact. A survey of contracted firms and a series of case studies confirm these impacts and demonstrate the multiple, other economic benefits to firms.

The study also provides a cross-cutting analysis of the aggregate impact of ITER spending, in the context of the future EU energy system and EU energy research spending. An analysis of ITER compared to other big science projects, especially the Large Hadron Collider at the European Organization for Nuclear Research (CERN) and the European Space Agency is provided. The analysis finds that the economic impacts of ITER follow a similar pathway and may deliver a positive net return on investment in the future, that there are synergies for firms working across big science projects

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4. Trinomics B.V. (2018), *Study on the impact of the ITER activities in the EU: Final report*, Rotterdam.

and that there are lessons to be learnt by Fusion for Energy on technology transfer and public dissemination and opinion.

The study concludes that it remains highly valuable to keep open the ITER fusion power option, as a large-scale, low-carbon, clean, low environmental impact energy technology in which Europe can be self-sufficient. Although fusion power will only play a major role in the energy system post-2050, it is thought by most experts, and in the opinion of the authors of the report, that it is highly valuable to keep open the ITER fusion power option. While the risks associated with the project are high, the benefits are also potentially very high for ITER to act as a catalyst for the sustainable energy transition that will be necessary in the coming decades.

According to the study, ITER should be seen as a big science project investment rather than energy research. The study recommends already beginning to systematically invest in technology transfer because a technology transfer system takes time but is crucial to enhancing the impact of the public investment. It makes clear that it is also important to reduce the chances that EU investments in technology development result in sustainable economic gains instead of (as in the case of solar photovoltaic) EU money kick-starting the development of the technology although the industrial production and benefits largely occur elsewhere. Further work to examine the best option for such a mechanism for Fusion for Energy and ITER would be beneficial as the approaches taken by the European Space Agency and CERN differ considerably and each have particular strengths. The study states that steps should be undertaken as soon as possible to build up a technology transfer system, so that it can support innovation and guarantee the continued generation of societal benefits at ITER through its operational phase.

The study further recommends developing a strategy to create a positive public image of ITER and fusion energy. It states that it is very important to create a positive public image of fusion energy for the future success of the project. This is something that other big science projects such as CERN and the European Space Agency have managed to achieve, and which helps in budget discussions. ITER and Fusion for Energy should plan more clearly what they will do to engage the public in this way. According to the study, important routes for doing so are:

- being clear about the time horizon for ITER. Positioning fusion as much as possible as a major science project that contributes to fundamental human knowledge next to already delivering concrete spin-offs and benefits to society;
- positioning fusion as a fossil-free (baseload) energy source complementary to, and not a competitor with, already existing intermittent renewable energy sources;
- being as open as possible about benefits and the real and perceived risks of the technology; and
- dedicating substantial budget to informing the public about fusion energy, not only developing dissemination fact sheets, but also engaging and organising public debate that discusses potential risks and drawbacks, organising site visits, etc.

## **International Atomic Energy Agency**

### ***Nuclear safety***

#### *Convention on Nuclear Safety: Officers' Meeting*

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) facilitated an additional Officers' Meeting in Vienna in September at which officers for the Eighth Review Meeting of

the Convention on Nuclear Safety<sup>5</sup> agreed on and approved a number of templates to further enhance the peer review process to be used at the Eighth Review Meeting scheduled from 23 March to 3 April 2020. At the meeting, the officers also discussed the organisation of topical sessions on safety culture and ageing management and considered the possibility of utilising an electronic tool to ask questions and streamline them during the topical sessions. In this context, they requested the Secretariat to inquire into the technical possibility for this tool.

*Open-ended Meeting of Technical and Legal Experts for Sharing Information on States' Implementation of the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources and its Supplementary Guidance*

The IAEA held an Open-ended Meeting of Technical and Legal Experts to Share Information on States' Implementation of the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources<sup>6</sup> and its Supplementary Guidance<sup>7</sup> in Vienna, from 27 to 31 May 2019. The meeting provided an opportunity for a wide exchange of information among member states and identified current needs to ensure the safe and secure management of radioactive sources during import and export worldwide. At the meeting, a revised version of the "formalised process" was also agreed upon for sharing information related to states' implementation of the Code of Conduct and its Supplementary Guidance. The meeting concluded that the national papers submitted prior to the meeting and the presentations made during the meeting showed progress in implementing the provisions of the Code and its Supplementary Guidance.

### **Nuclear security**

*Meeting of Legal and Technical Experts in Preparation for the 2021 Conference of the Parties to the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM)*

From 22 to 26 July 2019, the IAEA convened a Meeting of Legal and Technical Experts in Preparation for the 2021 Conference of Parties to the Amendment<sup>8</sup> to the CPPNM.<sup>9</sup> The purpose of this event was to facilitate the preparations for the 2021 Conference with a view to the implementation and adequacy of the amended convention, as foreseen in Article 16(1) thereof.

### **Nuclear liability**

During the reporting period, the Secretariat continued to assist member states, upon request, in their efforts to adhere to the relevant nuclear liability instruments in the context of its overall legislative assistance programme. Also, a follow-up IAEA International Expert Group on Nuclear Liability (INLEX) mission to Saudi Arabia was conducted in August 2019.

### **63<sup>rd</sup> session of the IAEA General Conference**

The 63<sup>rd</sup> regular session of the IAEA General Conference was held in Vienna, Austria, from 16 to 22 September. A total of 3 034 participants attended the conference,

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5. Convention on Nuclear Safety (1994), IAEA Doc. INFCIRC/449, 1963 UNTS 293, entered into force 24 October 1996 (CNS).
  6. IAEA (2004), *Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources*, IAEA Doc. IAEA/CODEOC/2004.
  7. IAEA (2012), *Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources*, IAEA Doc. IAEA/CODEOC/IMO-EXP/2012.
  8. Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (2005), IAEA Doc. INFCIRC/274/Rev.1/Mod.1, entered into force 8 May 2016 (ACPPNM).
  9. Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (1980), IAEA Doc. INFCIRC/274 Rev. 1, 1456 UNTS 125, entered into force 8 February 1987 (CPPNM).

including delegates from 152 of the IAEA's 171 member states. Throughout the week, delegates were able to attend 43 exhibitions, 96 side-events showcasing activities and special programmes by the IAEA Secretariat, as well as by several member states.

#### *Resolutions of the conference*

A number of resolutions were adopted by the conference. As in previous years, resolution GC(63)/RES/7 on Nuclear and Radiation Safety, as well as resolution GC(63)/RES/8 on Nuclear Security, include sections that are of legal relevance. All resolutions adopted during the 63<sup>rd</sup> regular session of the General Conference are available on the IAEA website at: [www.iaea.org/about/policy/gc/gc63/agenda](http://www.iaea.org/about/policy/gc/gc63/agenda).

#### *Nuclear and Radiation Safety (GC(63)/RES/7)*

Regarding the CNS, the General Conference urged “all Member States that have not yet done so, especially those planning, constructing, commissioning or operating nuclear power plants, or considering a nuclear power programme, to become Contracting Parties to the CNS”. Concerning the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management,<sup>10</sup> the conference likewise urged “all Member States that have not yet done so, particularly those managing radioactive waste or spent fuel, to become Contracting Parties to the Joint Convention”.

The conference stressed “the importance of CNS and Joint Convention Contracting Parties fulfilling their respective obligations stemming from these Conventions and reflecting these in their actions to strengthen nuclear safety and in particular when preparing National Reports, and actively participating in peer reviews for CNS and Joint Convention Review Meetings”. In addition, the conference requested “the Secretariat to provide full support for the CNS and Joint Convention Review Meetings, and to consider addressing their outcomes in the Agency's activities, as appropriate and in consultation with Member State”.

The conference further urged “all Member States that have not yet done so to become Contracting Parties to the Early Notification Convention and the Assistance Convention”, and stressed “the importance of Contracting Parties fulfilling the obligations stemming from these Conventions, and actively participating in regular meetings of the Representatives of Competent Authorities”. In this context, the conference requested “the Secretariat, in collaboration with regional and international organisations and Member States, to continue its activities to promote the importance of conventions concluded under the auspices of the IAEA and to assist Member States upon request with adherence, participation and implementation as well as strengthening of their related technical and administrative procedures”.

With respect to the Code of Conduct, its Supplementary Guidance and its Guidance on the Management of Disused Radioactive Sources,<sup>11</sup> the General Conference encouraged *inter alia* all member states to make “political commitments”, and to implement them, as appropriate, “in order to maintain effective safety and security of radioactive sources throughout their life cycle”. The conference also requested the Secretariat to continue supporting member states in this regard.

Similarly, the conference encouraged member states “to apply the guidance of the Code of Conduct on the Safety of Research Reactors at all stages in their life, including planning” and “to freely exchange their regulatory and operating information and

10. Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management (1997), IAEA Doc. INFCIRC/546, 2153 UNTS 357, entered into force 18 June 2001 (Joint Convention).

11. IAEA (2018), *Guidance on the Management of Disused Radioactive Sources*, IAEA Doc. IAEA/CODEOC/MGT-DRS/2018.

experience with regard to research reactors”. In this context, the conference requested the Secretariat “to continue to support member states, upon request, in [the] application of the guidance of the Code of Conduct on the Safety of Research Reactors”.

With regard to civil liability for nuclear damage, the General Conference encouraged “Member States to give due consideration to the possibility of joining the international nuclear liability instruments, as appropriate, and to work towards establishing a global nuclear liability regime”. In this context, the conference requested the Secretariat, in co-ordination with the OECD Nuclear Energy Agency when appropriate “to assist Member States, upon request, in their efforts to adhere to any international nuclear liability instruments concluded under the auspices of the IAEA or the OECD/NEA, taking into account the recommendations of the INLEX in response to the IAEA Action Plan on Nuclear Safety”.

In addition, the conference recognised “the valuable work of INLEX”; took note “of its recommendations and best practices on establishing a global nuclear liability regime, including through the identification of actions to address gaps in and enhance the existing nuclear liability regimes”; encouraged “the continuation of INLEX, especially for its support for the IAEA’s outreach activities to facilitate the achievement of a global nuclear liability regime”; and requested “that INLEX, via the Secretariat informs Member States on a regular and transparent basis about the work of INLEX and its recommendations to the Director General”.

#### *Nuclear Security (GC(63)/RES/8)*

In the context of nuclear security, the conference affirmed “the central role of the Agency in strengthening the nuclear security framework globally and in coordinating international activities in the field of nuclear security, while avoiding duplication and overlap”.

The conference called upon the Secretariat “to continue to organize [International Conference on Nuclear Security: Sustaining and Strengthening Efforts] ICONS every three to four years” and welcomed “the ongoing preparations for the 2020 ICONS”. It encouraged all member states “to participate at ministerial level” and called upon them “to strive towards a substantive outcome of ICONS in the form of a consensual Ministerial Declaration, and a successful technical and scientific programme which could contribute to further strengthening nuclear security”.

In addition, the conference welcomed “the ongoing preparatory process for the 2021 Conference, which is being convened in accordance with article 16.1 of the CPPNM, as modified by its 2005 Amendment”, and encouraged “all States Parties and EURATOM to engage actively”. The conference also encouraged “all Parties to the CPPNM and its 2005 Amendment to fully implement their obligations thereunder” and encouraged “States that have not yet done so to become party to this Convention and its Amendment”. It encouraged “the Agency to continue efforts to promote further adherence to the Amendment with the aim of its universalization”.

The conference welcomed “the organization by the Secretariat of CPPNM meetings” and encouraged “all States Parties to the Convention to participate in relevant meetings”.

#### *IAEA Treaty Event*

The yearly Treaty Event took place during the 63<sup>rd</sup> session of the IAEA General Conference in September 2019. During the event, Bolivia deposited instruments of accession to the CNS and to the Joint Convention; Chad deposited an instrument of accession to the CPPNM and of ratification of its 2005 Amendment; Ecuador deposited instruments of accession to the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear

Accident<sup>12</sup> and to the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency;<sup>13</sup> and Lesotho deposited an instrument of acceptance of the Agreement on the Privileges and Immunities of the IAEA.

### **Legislative assistance**

The IAEA continued to provide legislative assistance to its member states to support the development of adequate national legal frameworks and to promote adherence to the relevant international legal instruments. Specific bilateral legislative assistance was provided to several member states through written comments and advice on drafting national nuclear legislation. Assistance in gaining a better understanding of the relevant international legal instruments was also provided to member states through awareness missions and workshops conducted in member states.

In addition, the IAEA continued to organise a number of regional and training events in nuclear law, such as the Subregional Workshop on Nuclear Law held in August in Jakarta, Indonesia, for member states of Asia and the Pacific, and the Meeting on the Role of the Legal Advisor in a Nuclear Regulatory Body held in August at IAEA headquarters in Vienna, as well as the ninth Session of the Nuclear Law Institute (NLI) held in October in Vienna, which was attended by 65 participants from 58 member states.

## **OECD Nuclear Energy Agency**

### ***Fourth International Workshop on the Indemnification of Damage in the Event of a Nuclear Accident***

The Fourth International Workshop on the Indemnification of Damage in the Event of a Nuclear Accident was organised by the OECD Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) in co-operation with the Instituto Superior Técnico and the Faculty of Law of the University of Lisbon (Portugal) on 8-10 October 2019 in Lisbon, Portugal. The event was a unique opportunity to continue exploring the practical application of the international nuclear liability conventions and national legislations in case a nuclear incident occurs at a nuclear installation that causes transboundary nuclear damage. More specifically, the workshop assessed the determination of the nuclear damage to be compensated and transboundary claims handling, in order for the participants to understand the challenges involved and discuss views and options to ensure an adequate compensation of victims in case such a nuclear incident were to occur.

With regard to the determination of nuclear damage, the aim was to discuss in different sessions the meaning of each of the following heads of damage that have been included in the post-Chernobyl versions of the nuclear liability conventions:

1. loss of life or personal injury;
2. loss of or damage to property;
3. economic loss (arising from damage 1 and 2, loss of income deriving from an economic interest in any use or enjoyment of the environment, loss caused by preventive measures, and any other economic loss);
4. costs of measures of reinstatement of impaired environment; and

12. Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident (1986), IAEA Doc. INFCIRC/335, 1439 UNTS 276, entered into force 27 October 1986 (Early Notification Convention).

13. Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency (1986), IAEA Doc. INFCIRC/336, 1457 UNTS 134, entered into force 26 February 1987 (Assistance Convention).

#### 5. costs of preventive measures.

The meaning to be given to each head of damage may in practice depend on the circumstances of the accident, the international convention(s) applicable (if any), the national legislation and case law, and the interpretation that the competent court may have. The purpose of the workshop was to identify:

- what could be considered in practice as “nuclear damage”,
- the challenges that could be raised by some heads of damage that are difficult to determine or may potentially be compensated under different heads of damage (to avoid double payment), and
- whether a system to determine what nuclear damage is should be set up in case of a nuclear accident to help avoiding disputes and litigations (which would be time consuming and costly for all parties involved and would delay the payment of compensation to the concerned victims).

The workshop also addressed the administrative challenges of handling nuclear damage compensation claims to set forth the complexity of such process, which would require, among many others, national and international co-ordination between several governmental authorities and private actors, an adequate claims handling procedure put in place in case the countries concerned (i.e. the country of the installation and the affected states) would not have treaty relations, and a common understanding of the applicable legal framework between the countries concerned. It clearly demonstrated the need to be prepared beforehand as much as feasible by, for example, setting up in advance whatever is possible (e.g. IT system, website, co-ordination between fund providers), clarifying the responsibilities between all the actors involved (which would certainly change from one country to another and from one operator to another) and carrying out international nuclear claims handling exercises.

A group of experts from different fields and backgrounds (e.g. legal, economics, radiological protection, insurance) was constituted for each head of damage and for the claims handling. Such variety of experts ensured a holistic analysis of each topic. There were in total 42 experts from 16 member and non-member countries involved in such groups. They prepared notes and relevant supporting documents for each topic, which were made available to the participants before the workshop. This approach ensured an active and collaborative discussion between the panel of experts and the participants who came prepared.

A total of 140 participants attended the workshop from 24 NEA member countries, 5 non-member countries, the European Commission and the IAEA. They represented governments, regulatory authorities, technical support organisations, academia, judiciary, operators, suppliers and law firms, as well as nuclear insurance pools. The Secretariat is now preparing a report with practical outputs that should facilitate countries to be prepared with regard to the determination of nuclear damage and claims handling in case a nuclear accident with transboundary damage occurred.

#### ***Nuclear Law Committee meeting***

The NEA Nuclear Law Committee (NLC) met on 27-28 June 2019 to review the ongoing activities of the NEA Office of Legal Counsel and of the NLC working parties on nuclear liability and transport, deep geological repositories and nuclear liability, and the legal aspects of nuclear safety. The meeting was attended by nearly 70 participants representing 25 NEA member countries, 4 non-NEA member countries, the IAEA, the European Commission (EC) and the insurance industry. Participants discussed the organisation of the Fourth International Workshop on the Indemnification of Damage in the Event of a Nuclear Accident, a forthcoming report on legal frameworks for the long-term operation (LTO) of nuclear power reactors and the implementation of



international conventions with regard to public participation in nuclear-related activities. Reports on the latest national developments in nuclear law were provided by Japan, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States.

Two working group meetings took place on the margins of the NLC meeting. The NEA Working Party on the Legal Aspects of Nuclear Safety held a meeting on 25 June 2019 with 34 participants from 18 NEA member countries, 2 non-NEA member countries and the EC. Reports on national licensing processes were provided by Finland and the United States, while Spain and Sweden gave presentations on latest national developments related to the legal aspects of nuclear safety. Participants finalised a forthcoming report on the legal framework for the LTO of nuclear power reactors. They also discussed the legal aspects of licensing small modular reactors, legal challenges to licensing decisions, and the enforcement of nuclear safety related laws and regulations.

The NEA Working Party on Nuclear Liability and Transport (WPNLT) met on 26 June 2019 with 38 representatives from 19 member countries, two non-NEA member countries, the EC, the IAEA, the nuclear insurance industry and the International Nuclear Law Association (INLA). At this meeting, participants discussed the preliminary results of an enquiry regarding national legislation and rules applicable to nuclear transport and transit, and agreed to make the potential final deliverables publicly available. A topical session examined, through legal, technical and insurance perspectives, the challenges relating to the qualification of nuclear substances to be transported. Participants also worked on theoretical case studies.

### **Contracting Parties to the Paris Convention**

The Contracting Parties to the Paris Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy met on 24 June 2019 to discuss the interpretation and implementation of this Convention and the Brussels Convention Supplementary to the Paris Convention. During this meeting, the Contracting Parties continued preparing for the entry into force of the 2004 Protocols to amend both conventions. The Contracting Parties have not been able to ratify the 2004 Protocol to amend the Paris Convention due to a decision of the Council of the European Union (EU) that requires EU member states that are Contracting Parties to the Paris Convention (except Denmark and Slovenia) to deposit their instruments of ratification of the Protocol simultaneously.<sup>14</sup> The last EU member state that needs to finalise its national legislative process to be able to ratify the 2004 Protocols is Italy, which has made some progress lately. After its approval by the Council of Ministers on 28 November 2018, a draft bill authorising the ratification of both Protocols has been submitted to the Chamber of Deputies in December 2018 and has been posted on the website of the Chamber of Deputies. The consideration of the bill has been jointly assigned to the Standing Committee of Foreign and European Community Affairs and the Standing Committee of Environment, Territory and Public Works. Since 13 May 2019, both Committees have examined the draft bill in three sessions, the last one taking place on 3 July 2019.

### **2019 International School of Nuclear Law (ISNL)**

The 19<sup>th</sup> session of the NEA International School of Nuclear Law (ISNL) was held from 26 August to 6 September 2019 in Montpellier, France, bringing together a diverse group of graduate students and professionals from across the world to learn more

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14. Council Decision 2004/294/EC of 8 March 2004 authorising the member states which are Contracting Parties to the Paris Convention of 29 July 1960 on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy to ratify, in the interest of the European Community, the Protocol amending that Convention, or to accede to it, *Official Journal of the European Union (OJ) L 97* (1 Apr. 2004).

about the legal framework and major issues affecting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Organised by the NEA and the University of Montpellier, the ISNL is a unique educational programme that offers participants from the academic, private and governmental sectors an in-depth look at international nuclear law, focusing on areas such as nuclear safety, environmental law, security, safeguards and nuclear liability. A total of 60 participants from 33 countries, including numerous non-NEA member countries, attended this year's session. Many of these participants received support to attend the ISNL from the IAEA, which also provided several lecturers. The ISNL has attracted since 2001 more than 1 000 participants from an increasingly diverse range of countries, many of whom are now experts in the nuclear law field.

### **Second NEA International Radiological Protection School (IRPS)**

The second session of the NEA International Radiological Protection School (IRPS) was held on 19-23 August 2019 at the Centre for Radiation Protection Research (CRPR), Stockholm University, with the support of the Swedish Radiation Safety Authority (SSM). This year's session brought together 31 participants from 14 countries. The five-day training featured lectures and dialogues by renowned radiological protection experts on the history of the development and implementation of the international system of radiological protection.