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International Migration Outlook 2016

Please cite this publication as:
OECD (2016), International Migration Outlook 2016, OECD Publishing, Paris, http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/migr_outlook-2016-en.

Metadata, Legal and Rights

ISBN: 978-92-64-26066-5 (epub) - 978-92-64-25844-0 (print) - 978-92-64-25845-7 (pdf)

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/migr_outlook-2016-en

Série : International Migration Outlook

ISSN: 1995-3968 (print) - 1999-124X (online)

This work is published under the responsibility of the Secretary-General of the OECD. The opinions expressed and arguments employed herein do not necessarily reflect the official views of OECD member countries.

This document and any map included herein are without prejudice to the status of or sovereignty over any territory, to the delimitation of international frontiers and boundaries and to the name of any territory, city or area.

The statistical data for Israel are supplied by and under the responsibility of the relevant Israeli authorities. The use of such data by the OECD is without prejudice to the status of the Golan Heights, East Jerusalem and Israeli settlements in the West Bank under the terms of international law.

Note by Turkey

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Note by all the European Union Member States of the OECD and the European Union The Republic of Cyprus is recognised by all members of the United Nations with the exception of Turkey. The information in this document relates to the area under the effective control of the Government of the Republic of Cyprus.

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Foreword

This publication constitutes the 40th report of the OECD’s Continuous Reporting System on Migration. The report is divided into five chapters plus a statistical annex.

Chapter 1 provides a broad overview of recent trends in international migration flows and migration policies. Chapter 2 takes a close look at the employment situation of immigrants and highlights major changes in policies to support the integration of immigrants and their children.

Chapter 3 looks at the effect of migration on local labour and housing markets, as well as local finances with a view to explain the difference between the public opinion perception of the effect of migration and the results of most studies on the topic, which tend to identify small effects. Chapter 4 discusses how OECD countries can respond to external shocks causing sudden and substantial movements of populations. Focusing on environmental and geopolitical shocks, it presents the lessons learnt from recent shocks and examines alternative pathways and their potential with respect to the current refugee crisis.

Chapter 5 presents succinct country-specific notes and statistics on developments in international migration movements and policies in OECD countries in recent years. Finally, the Statistical Annex includes a broad selection of recent and historical statistics on immigrant flows, the foreign and foreign-born populations and naturalisations.

This year’s edition of the OECD International Migration Outlook is the joint work of staff of the International Migration Division in the Directorate for Employment, Labour and Social Affairs. Chapters 1 and 2 are a collective work of the staff of the International Migration Division with contributions from Philippe de Bruycker (Université libre de Bruxelles) (policy section in Chapter 1). Chapter 3 was prepared by Anne-Mareike Vanselow (Consultant to the OECD), Thomas Liebig (OECD) and Ioannis Kaplanis (OECD). Chapter 4 was prepared by Jean-Christophe Dumont (OECD), Richard Black (University of London), Giulia Maria Baldinelli (University of London) and Martin Ruhs (Oxford University). Chapter 5 was prepared with contributions from John Salt (University College London). Jean-Christophe Dumont edited the report. Research assistance and statistical work were carried out by Véronique Gindrey and Philippe Hervé. Editorial assistance was provided by Mireia Sirol Carrillo and Sylviane Yvron. Finally, thanks go to Randy Holden for the editing of Chapters 1 and 5, and to Ken Kincaid for the editing of Chapter 4.

Latvia was not an OECD member at the time of preparation of this publication. Accordingly, Latvia does not appear in the list of OECD members and is not included in the area totals.

Editorial: OECD countries need to address the migration backlash

The public is losing faith in the capacity of governments to manage migration. Opinion polls in a wide range of countries suggest that the share of the public holding extreme anti-immigration views has grown in recent years and that these extreme views are more frequently heard in public debates.

In part, this is due to the perception that no end is in sight for large migration inflows and that countries have lost control over them. In Europe, the massive increase of refugees during the past few years has contributed to this perception. However, in most countries, refugee flows are still a relatively small part of overall migration. The OECD has collected a wealth of evidence showing that the medium and longer term effects of migration on public finance, economic growth and the labour market are generally positive. But this message is not getting through. People are concerned about the short-term impact of large inflows of migrants, and refugees in particular, and many feel that migration is threatening their economic, social as well as personal security. Common concerns are:

Migration is unmanaged and borders are not secured.

Immigrants stretch local services, such as social housing, health and education, to the detriment of local populations.

Immigration benefits the rich, with the poor finding themselves competing with immigrants for jobs and with wages for low-skilled work depressed.

Many migrants do not want to integrate and may even oppose the values of host societies.

However much the demographic and macro-economic arguments for migration are true, they seem abstract and long-term to many people. As a result, they have only a limited impact on public opinion, and mainly preach to the converted. Governments need to develop better, more practical arguments if they are to counter anti-immigration voices.

The truth of the matter is that migration is clearly a fact of our life and is here to stay. About 120 million people living in OECD countries were born elsewhere and one person out of five is either a migrant or was born to a migrant parent. On average over the past decade, more than 4 million new permanent migrants settled in OECD countries each year.

If we want to reap the full benefits of migration and to heal the social schisms that seem to be appearing in too many countries, action is needed from policy makers on three main fronts:

Countries must acknowledge and address the fact that the impact of migration is not the same for everyone. Immigrants are nearly always concentrated in specific regions and urban areas – often the most disadvantaged ones. The local impact of large-scale immigration may be far stronger than what is observed at the national level, and may be working in a different direction. In particular, this edition of the OECD International Migration Outlook shows that large sudden inflows of migrants can aggravate longstanding structural problems and bottlenecks in local infrastructure, such as housing, transportation and education. Similarly, although this is not usually the case, in some circumstances, large numbers of low-skilled migrants arriving in a particular area may have a negative impact on the local labour market prospects of already present low-skilled residents. Scaling up those local public services stretched by increased numbers of migrants is a necessary part of an effective policy response, as is ensuring that minimum wages and other labour market regulations are applied rigorously.

Global challenges need global solutions. Leaving individual countries to deal with massive inflows, as recently witnessed with the refugee crisis, cannot address the problems adequately. International co-operation needs to be stepped up, with different countries making different contributions.

Needs must be identified and addressed more rapidly at both the global and local level. Adapting to higher migration flows can take time, during which political resistance builds up. If authorities fail to respond quickly to emerging migration challenges, as witnessed during the recent refugee surge in Europe, the impression that migration and (lack of) integration are out of control becomes entrenched. Preparing for future developments requires:

Better anticipation of future flows and the corresponding needs for infrastructure and capacity, at all levels.

Pre-commitment to take appropriate actions. When a migration crisis hits, it often takes too long to agree on even ad hoc actions at the international level, and countries should consider stronger pre-commitment before a crisis becomes unmanageable. Here, lessons from other global challenges are illuminating; for example, systems are in place to identify global health challenges and to ensure that they are addressed in a co-ordinated and systematic way.

Adapting policies to reflect crisis situations. This issue is considered at length in the OECD International Migration Outlook. For example, a range of policy responses to address large movements of refugees and migrants are available, but one which has not yet been exploited in any substantial way is the use of legal alternative pathways to reduce irregular flows.

We need a new generation of effective migration policies adequate to the challenges of the 21st century. These policies must be both global and local at the same time. They must be global, because no country can deal with large, unexpected migration flows alone and in isolation. A stronger co-ordination framework needs to be in place and to react quickly at the first signs of crisis. And local, because policies must promote quick and effective integration of those who are going to stay in the local community. At the same time, local responses must address the specific concerns of those who feel they do not experience direct benefits from migration and rather fear that it will challenge the basic values of the host society. Unless systematic and co-ordinated action is taken in a timely way to acknowledge and vigorously address these concerns, migration policy will continue to seem abstract and elitist, at best trailing behind the problems it is supposed to be addressing. And, as is already apparent, the result is likely to be a more strident political populism.

Stefano Scarpetta

OECD Director for Employment, Labour and Social Affairs

Executive summary

Main trends

Permanent migration flows increased sharply in the OECD area for the second year in a row, preliminary 2015 data suggests. Around 4.8 million people migrated permanently to OECD countries in 2015, slightly above the 2007 peak level and 10% more than in 2014.

Family reunification migration and free movement within the European Union each accounted for about 30% of all permanent migration to the OECD. Migration from Romania, Bulgaria, Italy and France increased sharply in 2014. One in three new migrants to OECD countries comes from another OECD country. About 1 in 10 migrants to the OECD is Chinese and 1 in 20 is Indian.

Temporary migration has also increased. In 2014, intra-firm mobility and secondment of workers within the European Union and the European Free Trade Area rose by 17% and 38%. International recruitment of seasonal workers increased in several countries.

In 2015, there were 1.65 million new registered asylum seekers in the OECD, a record high. Almost 1.3 million of them came to European OECD countries. Syrians made about 25% of applications, Afghans made 16%. Germany registered 440 000 formal asylum applications in 2015 and more than one million pre-registrations. Sweden received the most applications in proportion to its population (1.6%).

There were no major changes in OECD migration policies in 2015-16. In Canada, however, a new application management system for economic immigrants entered into force in 2015. In Europe, the “European Agenda for Migration” was adopted and implemented in 2015, as well as other measures aiming at addressing the root causes and aftermath of the recent migration flows surge and at reforming the common European asylum system. In 2016, the European Commission proposed amendments to the blue card directive for highly skilled workers and the conditions for the posting of workers within the EU.

In 2011-15, migrants’ employment rates stayed level or slightly decreased in most OECD countries, but migrant unemployment remained high in many. On average, about 60% of the immigrants in the OECD are employed (64.9% for the native-born) and their unemployment rate reaches 9.3% (7.3% for the native-born).

In countries most affected by the refugee crisis, integration measures for asylum seekers and refugees were stepped up. Expenditure on education and language courses increased in Austria, Finland, Germany, Norway and Sweden. Several countries reduced waiting times to enter the labour market or facilitated early access to language courses and skills assessment.

The local impact of migration

Much of the empirical evidence on the impact of migration in host countries focuses on the national level, although the impact is most felt locally. It is difficult to generalise across domains (labour market, education, health, housing, etc.); the local impact of migration usually depends on the specific socio-economic characteristics of migrants. For example, available evidence suggests that immigrants tend to consume less health services than the native-born, but use public transportation more often. In school, children of immigrants, especially recent arrivals, often require more support and are thus more costly per capita, notably because of language training.

Large sudden inflows may exacerbate longstanding structural problems in local infrastructure and adapting to higher demand can take time. Acknowledging that migration is not the primary cause of such challenges is an important first step in reconciling often negative public opinion with the facts of the situation.

Migration associated with environmental and geopolitical shocks

Environmental and geopolitical shocks are often associated with large-scale migration flows, which can put legal migration and protection systems under strain.

Past experiences show that OECD countries make use of temporary relief measures for people from countries in conflict or facing natural disasters. Some OECD countries operate sizeable resettlement programmes in the context of geopolitical shocks, but temporary and subsidiary protection remains, the most common response to upsurges in asylum seekers, including the current crisis. Alternative pathways, such as labour, international study and family channels, or humanitarian visas and private sponsorship programmes, are not part of the usual response to increased flows, including in the context of the current refugee crisis.

This year’s Outlook emphasizes that: effective international co-operation cannot be taken for granted; protracted crises generate growing tensions between the need for durable solutions and the general preference for short-term protection measures; and selection, a common feature of most migration systems, needs to be rethought in the context of an international protection framework.

Main findings

Migration is rising and has returned to its pre-crisis level

Permanent migration flows to OECD countries amounted to 4.3 million entries in 2014 (+4% compared with 2013). According to preliminary data, this increased by around 10% in 2015.

The foreign-born population in OECD countries was 120 million people in 2014.

In 2015, OECD countries registered 1.65 million asylum applications, double 2014 and 1992 levels.

In 2013, there were almost 3 million international students enrolled in OECD countries, 23% from China.

The impact of migration at the local level should not be underestimated

In all OECD countries, immigrants are overrepresented in urban areas.

The impact on public infrastructure and services depends on the relative characteristics of immigrants compared to the native born and on the public services and infrastructure considered. High inflows can put pressure on local infrastructure. However, while immigration can exacerbate structural problems, notably in housing and education, it is generally not the main source of these challenges.

Migration policies could better respond to geopolitical and environmental shocks

There is a limited range of international instruments for dealing with shock-related migration.

Despite the practical challenges of implementing alternative pathways for refugees, the potential in terms of number of beneficiaries may be important, shown by the Syrian crisis.

In the OECD area, 18 200 work permits were granted to Syrians (nearly 2 million Syrian 18-to-59-year-olds were displaced to neighbouring countries) during the past five years, while about 15 300 young Syrians received student visas to OECD countries (less than 10% of displaced Syrian university students) and more than 72 000 Syrians were reunited with family members.

Chapter 1.

Recent developments in international migration movements and policies¹

This chapter provides an overview of how international migration movements have evolved in OECD countries. After a quick glance at 2015 migration flow trends, it presents an analysis of the trends in permanent migration between 2007 and 2014, by country and by main category of migration – migration for work, family or humanitarian purposes, and migration within free movement areas. The next section covers temporary labour migration flows, paying particular attention to seasonal workers, posted workers and Working Holiday Makers. The chapter then takes up the dramatic rise in the number of asylum seekers in OECD countries and furnishes a brief overview of international student mobility, gender composition of flows by country of destination, size of foreign-born populations, and the acquisition of nationality in OECD countries. The chapter concludes with a policy section relating the main changes in countries’ migration management frameworks, in particular in the European Union.

Introduction

In 2015, the overall growth rate of the gross domestic product (GDP) in the OECD area stood at 2%, a slight increase from 2014. Of 34 OECD member countries, 32 showed positive growth in 2015. Since the last quarter of 2013, the overall unemployment rate in the OECD area fell by over 1 percentage point to reach 6.6% by end-2015 – 6 million fewer unemployed in two years. This change applies to most countries, although its magnitude varies from one country to another. Seven countries have an unemployment rate that remains above 10%; this is also the case for the Eurozone as a whole. The macroeconomic environment and the improving employment situation constitute a relatively favourable context for labour migration.

This chapter first takes a look at these most recent trends, and then offers a global view of international migration flows and policies. It covers total permanent movements into OECD countries, entries by category, temporary labour migration, asylum movements, international students and movements by gender and country of origin. Particular attention is paid to recent trends in asylum seekers, fuelled partly by the deteriorating security situation in Syria and Libya. The chapter then provides an overview of the size and composition of foreign-born populations, and acquisition of citizenship. The second part of this chapter is a policy section, which culls major recent policy developments that regulate the entry and stay of foreign nationals in OECD countries. Large-scale revisions in migration frameworks are reviewed, as well as specific policy changes affecting particular categories of migrants, and revisions of asylum procedures and enforcement measures.

Main findings

Permanent migration flows to OECD countries amounted to 4.3 million entries in 2014 (+4% compared with 2013). According to preliminary data, they increased by around 10% in 2015.

Humanitarian and free movement were the two migration categories on the rise in 2014 (+13% and +8%, respectively).

Family migration and free movement migration each accounted for a third of the total in 2014.

In 2014, international recruitment of seasonal workers increased in most countries outside the European Union, and in Poland.

Poland has quickly become the leading destination in the OECD area for seasonal workers with 387 000 permits issued in 2014, which was more than twice the number of seasonal workers admitted to the United States that year.

In 2014 intra-firm mobility and secondment of workers between countries of the European Union and EFTA rose by 17% and 38%, respectively.

In 2014 Australia, the United States, New Zealand and Canada received over 440 000 young holiday workers (+4% compared to 2013), employed mainly in seasonal agricultural activities and in hotels and restaurants.

In 2015 OECD countries recorded a number of asylum seekers unprecedented since World War II. Applications for asylum in the OECD area doubled that year, reaching 1.65 million.

Syria is by far the main country of origin of asylum seekers, with 370 000 applications in 2015.

Germany registered 440 000 asylum applications in 2015, accounting for one-quarter of all applications in the OECD area. Sweden received the highest number of applications in proportion to its population (1.6%).

In 2013 there were almost 3 million international students enrolled in OECD countries, 23% of whom came from China.

On average, international students make up 8% of total tertiary enrolment in OECD countries. This share rises to 13% at the master’s level and to 22% at the doctoral level. Among international students, 55% of the doctoral graduates earned a degree in either science or engineering.

In 2014, one in three new immigrants to the OECD was a citizen of another OECD country. Emigration of Romanian, Bulgarian, Italian and French citizens to OECD countries increased sharply in 2014.

Eight OECD countries received more migrant women than migrant men in 2014.

The total foreign-born population in OECD countries stood at 120 million persons in 2014.

The increase in the foreign-born population accounted for approximately three-quarters of the total population increase in EU/EFTA countries over the period.

In 2014, almost two million people acquired the nationality of an OECD country. This represents an average of 2.5% of foreign populations in OECD countries.

Recent trends in international migration

Migration trends in 2015 based on preliminary and partial data

The conflict in Syria and the subsequent refugee crisis, which worsened dramatically in 2015, had an unprecedented impact on migration flows to some OECD countries. This makes it difficult to discuss global trends for the area as a whole. However, given the importance of these events, it is necessary to analyse preliminary and/or partial data that are available for a number of countries (Annex Table 1.A1.1).

Germany is more than ever at the centre of the picture, with 50% more new migrants in 2015 than in 2014 – which was already a peak year – according to estimations by the German national statistical office. In particular, 430 000 Syrians, 150 000 Afghans and 120 000 Iraqis appeared in the German asylum pre-registration system “EASY” in 2015. With recognition rates in 2015 close to 100% for Syrians and Iraqis, and 70% for Afghans, up to 650 000 people from these three countries who have entered Germany in 2015 have been, or will eventually be, granted refugee status. German national statistics for 2015 show that migration from within the EU also rose in 2015, by 4%. These statistics include temporary and permanent movements, but applying this increase to the permanent inflows registered in 2014, one can imagine between 450 000 and 500 000 new permanent entries from other EU countries. With at least 1 million new permanent entries in 2015 (although not all will be registered as such in 2015), Germany stood at comparable immigration levels as the United States, if not higher.

Besides Germany, half of the countries for which data are available received a sharply higher number of migrants in 2015 than in 2014 and among them, many EU countries such as Austria (+12%), Denmark (+16%), Ireland (+17%), Luxembourg (+8%), the Netherlands (+13%) and Sweden (+7%). Preliminary migration figures also show rising flows in Israel (+7%), New Zealand (+14%), Japan (+10%) and Korea (+7%). After several years of increase, inflows to France (flows coming from third-countries only), Switzerland and to the United Kingdom were stable in 2015, at high levels. The only countries recording lower flow levels in 2015 than in 2014 are Finland and Norway.

Preliminary data indicate that, overall, migration flows to the OECD area are at their highest level in 2015, with 4.8 million new permanent entries, a +10% increase compared to 2014 (Figure 1.1).

Figure 1.1. Permanent migration flows to OECD countries, 2006-15

Notes: Data for 2006 to 2014 is the sum of standardised figures for countries where they are available (accounting for 95% of the total), and unstandardised figures for other countries.

Source: OECD calculations based on national statistics.

e Data relating to 2015 are estimated based on growth rates published in official national statistics.

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395282

Trends in migration flows by country of destination and by category in 2014

Permanent migration to OECD countries increased by approximately 4% in 2014² (Table 1.1). This is the second consecutive rise, to 4.3 million new migrants – the highest level since 2008. However, this increase largely had to do with Germany, which contributed to about two-thirds of the growth. The United States remains the main OECD destination country in 2014, with one million new migrants (+3%), and Germany kept its second place with more than half a million new permanent migrants in 2014 (+23%). The evolution observed in Germany is partly due to the increase in migration from other EU/EFTA countries (+80 000, +23%) and only marginally to the increase in the number of refugees (+11 000, +36%). Permanent migration to the United Kingdom also increased – by 7% – but remained below the average annual flow observed since 2007, at 310 000 persons. After six years of decline, permanent migration to Spain rebounded above 200 000 in 2014.

Table 1.1. Inflows of permanent immigrants into selected OECD countries, 2007-14
| 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | Variation (%)
2014/13 | 2013/12 | 2014/07
Standardised statistics |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
United States | 1 052 400 | 1 107 100 | 1 130 200 | 1 041 900 | 1 061 400 | 1 031 000 | 989 900 | 1 016 500 | +3 | -4 | -3
Germany | 232 900 | 228 300 | 201 500 | 222 500 | 290 800 | 399 900 | 468 800 | 574 500 | +23 | +17 | +147
United Kingdom | 343 300 | 317 300 | 359 200 | 394 800 | 320 100 | 283 600 | 290 600 | 311 500 | +7 | +2 | -9
Canada | 236 800 | 247 200 | 252 200 | 280 700 | 248 700 | 257 900 | 258 600 | 259 300 | +0 | +0 | +10
France | 206 200 | 214 100 | 213 200 | 224 300 | 231 200 | 251 200 | 259 400 | 258 900 | -0 | +3 | +26
Australia | 191 900 | 205 900 | 221 000 | 208 500 | 219 500 | 245 100 | 253 500 | 231 000 | -9 | +3 | +20
Italy | 571 900 | 490 400 | 390 300 | 355 700 | 317 300 | 258 400 | 251 400 | 204 100 | -19 | -3 | -64
Spain | 645 600 | 386 700 | 315 300 | 280 400 | 273 200 | 196 300 | 180 400 | 183 700 | +2 | -8 | -72
Switzerland | 122 200 | 139 100 | 114 800 | 115 000 | 124 300 | 125 600 | 136 200 | 134 600 | -1 | +8 | +10
Netherlands | 76 800 | 87 000 | 87 400 | 93 800 | 104 200 | | 99 900 | 109 200 | 124 100 | +14 | +9 | +62
Belgium | 83 100 | 95 000 | 95 500 | 96 700 | 95 600 | 99 000 | 93 300 | 93 100 | -0 | -6 | +12
Sweden | 74 400 | 71 000 | 71 500 | 65 600 | 71 800 | 81 700 | 86 700 | 84 500 | -3 | +6 | +14
Korea | 44 200 | 39 000 | 36 700 | 51 100 | 56 900 | 55 600 | 66 700 | 75 700 | +13 | +20 | +71
Austria | 47 100 | 49 500 | 45 700 | 45 900 | 55 200 | | 70 800 | 68 300 | 74 600 | +9 | -4 | +58
Japan | 108 500 | 97 700 | 65 500 | 55 700 | 59 100 | 66 800 | 63 600 | 63 500 | -0 | -5 | -41
Denmark | 30 300 | 45 600 | 38 400 | 42 400 | 41 300 | 43 800 | 52 400 | 55 500 | +6 | +20 | +83
Norway | 43 900 | 49 300 | 48 900 | 56 800 | 61 600 | 59 900 | 60 300 | 55 000 | -9 | +1 | +25
New Zealand | 51 700 | 51 200 | 47 500 | 48 500 | 44 500 | 42 700 | 44 400 | 49 500 | +11 | +4 | -4
Mexico | 6 800 | 15 100 | 23 900 | 26 400 | 21 700 | 21 000 | | 54 40 | | 43 500 | -20 | .. | ..
Czech Republic | 100 600 | 76 200 | 38 200 | 28 000 | 20 700 | 28 600 | 27 800 | 38 500 | +38 | -3 | -62
Portugal | 42 800 | 71 000 | 57 300 | 43 800 | 36 900 | 30 700 | 27 000 | 35 900 | +33 | -12 | -16
Ireland | 120 400 | 56 700 | 30 000 | 26 800 | 25 600 | 26 800 | 28 300 | 32 800 | +16 | +6 | -73
Finland | 17 500 | 19 900 | 18 100 | 18 200 | 20 400 | 23 300 | 23 900 | 23 600 | -1 | +3 | +35
Luxembourg | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 18 000 | 18 800 | +4 |  |
Total number of persons |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
All countries | 4 451 300 | 4 160 300 | 3 902 300 | 3 823 500 | 3 802 000 | 3 799 600 | 3 913 100 | 4 042 700 | +3 | +3 | -10
Settlement countries | 1 532 800 | 1 611 400 | 1 650 900 | 1 579 600 | 1 574 100 | 1 576 700 | 1 546 400 | 1 556 300 | +1 | -2 | +2
EU included above | 2 592 900 | 2 208 700 | 1 961 600 | 1 938 900 | 1 904 300 | 1 894 000 | 1 985 500 | 2 114 100 | +6 | +5 | -18
Of which: free movements | 1 215 700 | 900 000 | 734 900 | 739 300 | 831 700 | 926 200 | 1 002 936 | 1 114 244 | +11 | +8 | -8
Annual percent change |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
All countries |  | -7 | -5 | -2 | -0 | -0 | +3 | +3 |  |  |
Settlement countries |  | +5 | +2 | -4 | -0 | +0 | -2 | +1 |  |  |
EU included above |  | -15 | -11 | -1 | -2 | -1 | +5 | +6 |  |  |
Of which: free movements |  | -26 | -18 | +1 | +12 | +11 | +8 | +11 |  |  |
National statistics (unstandardised) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
Chile | 79 400 | 68 400 | 57 100 | 63 900 | 76 300 | 105 100 | 132 100 | 138 000 | +4 | +26 | +74
Poland | 40 600 | 41 800 | 41 300 | 41 100 | 41 300 | 47 100 | 46 600 | 60 000 | +29 | -1 | +48
Hungary | 22 600 | 35 500 | 25 600 | 23 900 | 22 500 | 20 300 | 21 300 | 26 000 | +22 | +5 | +15
Israel | 18 100 | 13 700 | 14 600 | 16 600 | 16 900 | 16 600 | 16 900 | 24 100 | +43 | +2 | +33
Greece | 46 300 | 41 500 | 35 800 | 35 400 | 33 000 | 32 000 | 31 300 | 29 500 | -6 | -2 | -36
Slovenia | 30 500 | 43 800 | 24 100 | 11 200 | 18 000 | 17 300 | 15 700 | 18 400 | +17 | -9 | -40
Iceland | 9 300 | 7 500 | 3 400 | 3 000 | 2 800 | 2 800 | 3 900 | 4 300 | +10 | +39 | -54
Slovak Republic | 14 800 | 16 500 | 14 400 | 12 700 | 8 200 | 2 900 | 2 500 | 2 400 | -4 | -14 | -84
Estonia | 2 000 | 1 900 | 2 200 | 1 200 | 1 700 | 1 100 | 1 600 | 1 300 | -19 | +45 | -35
Turkey | .. | .. | .. | 29 900 | .. | .. | .. |  |  |  |
Total (except Turkey) | 263 600 | 270 600 | 218 500 | 209 000 | 220 700 | 245 200 | 271 900 | 304 000 | +12 | +11 | +15
Percent change | +23 | +3 | -19 | -4 | +6 | +11 | +11 | +12 |  |  |

Notes: Includes only foreign nationals. The inflows include status changes, namely persons in the country on a temporary status who obtained the right to stay on a longer-term basis. Breaks in series are indicated with a “|”. Series for some countries have been significantly revised, notably for Belgium and France.

.. Information not available.

Source: OECD International Migration Database.

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933396215

Among the other major destination countries, in absolute terms inflows were stable at 260 000 in both Canada and France, and fell in Australia (-9%) and Italy (-19%). In Italy, which experienced a third year in a row of weak economic growth, humanitarian migration is the only category rising. Other notable evolutions in 2014 include sharp rises in Korea (+13%), Japan (+11%) and Austria (+9%), and a small drop in Switzerland following four years of increase. Immigration flows to Chile – for which standardised data are not available – have been growing since 2009 to reach 140 000 in 2014. According to national data, migration flows to Poland rose sharply to reach a record level (60 000), and Israel received more immigrants than in any of the past ten years due to sharp increases of migration flows from France and Ukraine (+4 000 each).

Overall, permanent labour migration to OECD countries declined again in 2014, by 3% (Figure 1.2, Panels A and C). However, this overall figure can be seen as the end effect of a 9% drop in the EU/EFTA countries and a 5% increase in the non-EU/EFTA OECD countries altogether. In particular, Italy (-33%) and, to a lesser extent, Spain (-20%) pulled the overall figure on permanent labour migration down. In the case of Italy, the sharp fall is explained partly by administrative factors.³ Not taking Italy into account, labour migration flows to the remaining OECD countries would be up by +2% and those to the EU/EFTA would be stable. In 2014, two-thirds of OECD countries received more permanent migrant workers than in 2013, notably France (+25%) and Canada (+20%). Among other OECD countries, the United States and United Kingdom register a significant decline (-6%).

Family migration is another category that has been steadily declining since 2008. In 2014, the number of family migrants dropped by -1.7% from 2013. As a result, they now represent only 33% of total permanent migration to OECD countries (Figure 1.2, Panel B), whereas they had accounted for almost 40% in 2009. However, family migration increased in many countries in 2014, such as Germany (+13%) and Sweden (+7%). At the other end, Italy (-24%) and Canada (-16%) displayed sharp decreases. Despite a small decline in 2014, the United States remains by far the largest destination country for family migrants, with 650 000 (half the total), followed by France (100 000) and Canada (66 000).

Figure 1.2. Permanent migration flows to OECD countries by category of entry, 2007-14

Source: OECD International Migration Database.

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395295

In terms of migration, humanitarian issues drew most of the OECD countries’ attention in 2015. However, already in 2014 humanitarian migration was the fastest growing category in the OECD area, with almost 13% more new refugees recognised than in 2013. In total, OECD countries welcomed 350 000 refugees – the highest level since 2006 – of whom 135 000 in the United States and 160 000 in the OECD EU countries. However, their share among all migrants remained relatively small (9%). Most OECD countries received more humanitarian migrants in 2014, with the highest increases (in absolute terms) observed in the United States (+14 000), Germany (+12 000), Sweden (+7 000) and Italy (+6 000). Australia, Austria, Canada, Norway and the United Kingdom were the only countries where humanitarian migration declined in 2014.

In 2014, one in three migration movements occurred within areas of free circulation, mainly the EU. This type of migration was as frequent as family migration. Migration movements within the EU/EFTA increased by 9%. Germany, which received more than 400 000 EU/EFTA citizens in 2014, accounts for most of the observed increase, which is limited to 3% for this category in the rest of the OECD area. The second favourite destination country for intra-EU/EFTA migrants is France, followed by Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom. While the last two attracted more citizens of other EU/EFTA countries in 2014 than in 2013, France and Italy have experienced a sharp decrease in migration from other EU/EFTA countries.

Other OECD countries are part of free circulation areas. In South America, Chile for example is an associate country of the Southern Common Market (Mercosur). The Mercosur Residence Agreement, signed by the six full member countries and six associate countries, covers all of South America but French Guyana. This “free establishment area” displays a number of similarities with the free movement of persons in the European Union (see Box 1.1). Chile is also one of the founding members of the Pacific Alliance in 2011 – together with Colombia, Mexico and Peru – which establishes among its priorities the facilitation of mobility. In 2012, Chile received 15 600 migrants under one of these international agreement titles (OAS/OECD, 2015). Immigrants holding this kind of title represent 16% of the total annual inflows. The countries of origin of the vast majority of immigrants to Chile are Peru, Bolivia, Colombia and Argentina, which are part of the Mercosur Residence Agreement.

Box 1.1. Free establishment in the European Union and in Mercosur

The right of free movement within the European Union is not unique to that region. A similar right has been established for the countries of South America in the context of the Mercosur trade agreement (Acosta Acarazo and Geddes, 2014).

Mercosur (from the Spanish Mercado Común del Sur) was established by the Treaty of Asunción (Paraguay) in 1991 with the objective of encouraging the free movement of goods, services and factors of production throughout its member states. The current membership consists of Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay and Venezuela, with Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana, Peru and Suriname as associate members. With the exception of the French overseas department of Guyana, the entire South American continent now has links with Mercosur. It is now, at least in principle, a full customs union and trading bloc. Associate members are not part of the customs union and do not have voting rights, but have preferential trade access. The trade and commercial aspects of Mercosur will not be considered further here; the focus will be on the provisions for migration between member and associate member states.

The Mercosur Residence Agreement was adopted in 2002 to address intra-regional migration, but was only implemented in 2009, because of national delays related to putting in place the formalities necessary to make it operational. The agreement covers all states of Mercosur, whether they are full or associate members. Under this agreement, a national of any signatory state can establish residence in any other state covered by the agreement, subject only to the absence of a criminal record over the previous five years. A document for this purpose is generally available from the police of the origin country. Persons in an irregular situation may also apply for temporary residence. The residence permit granted is for two years. Holders of the temporary permit must apply for permanent residence 90 days before its expiration, and be able to show legitimate means of livelihood for themselves and accompanying family members. Those not applying become subject to the immigration laws of the country of residence. Note that border controls are not eliminated by the agreement and that persons moving under its provisions are still required to obtain a residence permit. The mobility provisions are thus perhaps more accurately described as the right of “free establishment” rather than “free movement”.

By contrast, nationals of a member state of the European Union, in order to establish residence in another member state, must either have a job or sufficient resources and health insurance to ensure that they and their families do not become a burden on member states. No residence permit is required, although member states may require that persons moving under the provision register with the authorities. Migrants can be expelled on grounds of public security or public health, but the migrant is not required to demonstrate the absence of such grounds upon entry, nor indeed do previous criminal convictions constitute automatic grounds for expulsion. After five years of uninterrupted residence, European Union nationals are granted the right of permanent residence, subject to no conditions whatsoever. In addition, there are no border controls in those member states covered by the Schengen Agreement. The migration regime can thus be described as “free movement” within Schengen countries and free establishment outside of Schengen.

In summary then, Mercosur imposes essentially no conditions on a temporary stay but a means-of-livelihood requirement for a permanent stay, whereas in the European Union the reverse holds.

A second significant difference between free establishment under Mercosur and the European Union concerns enforcement mechanisms. In the European Union, the right of free movement is a fundamental right guaranteed by European citizenship, which was established under the Maastricht Treaty of 1992. Enforcement proceedings can be launched by the European Commission and there is a court (the Court of Justice of the European Union) with jurisdiction in cases involving the right of free establishment.

By contrast, there are no formal means for enforcement of the free establishment right for nationals of Mercosur signatory countries, and no sanctions for violations. The rights are “guaranteed” by the requirement of reciprocity among signatory countries; disagreements are addressed by discussions at the Mercosur Specialised Migration Forum, which is made up of senior migration officials from signatory countries and meets at least annually. As a result of the lack of formal enforcement mechanisms, implementation of the residence agreement is not entirely uniform across Mercosur countries. Some impose higher permit fees, some offer better conditions than the residence agreement, and others apply it only to nationals of a reduced group of countries. Recently, Colombia suspended Mercosur visas and permits for nationals of Venezuela, in retaliation for the fact that no such permits were being issued to Colombians by Venezuela.

Although implementation of the Mercosur Residence Agreement seems rather variable at the current time, establishment of a continental citizenship is planned for 2021. This will likely result in both harmonisation of the conditions of movement across countries, and firmer legal guarantees of the right of free establishment to nationals of South American countries.

Finally, both the Mercosur Residence Agreement and the free movement of persons in the European Union grant equal treatment with nationals of the destination country with respect to social, cultural and economic rights. They also both ensure access to the labour market and to social and tax advantages, subject to the conditions of the residence permit.

On average, OECD countries received seven new migrants per thousand inhabitants in 2014 (Figure 1.3). The OECD country that stands out most when migration flows are expressed as a ratio to total population is Luxembourg, with the equivalent of almost 4% of its population entering every year. Switzerland follows with 1.7%; these two countries have a very large share of migrants coming from other EU/EFTA countries. Most other countries with ratios above average are settlement countries like New Zealand, Australia and Canada, and northern European countries.

Figure 1.3. Permanent migration flows into selected OECD countries, 2014

Percentage of the total population

Notes: Data for countries in grey are not standardised. EU average is the average of EU countries presented in the chart. ‘EU total’ represents the entries of third-country nationals into EU countries for which standardised data are available, as a percentage of their total population.

Source: OECD International Migration Database.

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395301

At the other end of the spectrum, ratios below one per thousand are found in large countries with little immigration such as Mexico and Japan, as well as some eastern European countries. This ratio is also very low for the United States (3.2 per thousand) and for the EU taken as whole – i.e. taking into account entries solely from outside the EU – with 2.5 per thousand.

Temporary labour migration

Temporary labour migration concerns workers of all skill levels and across a very wide range of categories. In non-European OECD countries, temporary labour migration has returned to its level before the 2007/08 economic crisis, and in some cases exceeded it. The intra-European mobility of workers continues to rise and concerns various types of movement: postings, cross-border work, temporary work, etc.

Seasonal workers

Seasonal labour migration, which is often linked to agricultural activities, can also cover non-farm activities with seasonal peaks, especially those linked to hospitality (e.g. hotels, catering, retail, and other tourist-related service businesses). Residence permits for seasonal work are issued only to workers in the agricultural sector in Canada (Seasonal Agricultural Worker Programme), Finland (berry picking), Sweden (also covering the forest sector) and New Zealand (Recognised Seasonal Employer Programme).

Changes in flows of foreign seasonal workers are closely linked to changes in economic activity. These workers are often from neighbouring countries, or countries which have signed a bilateral agreement with the host country. In non-European OECD countries, the decline in inflows after the global economic crisis in 2007 was followed by an upturn, with volumes in 2014 in some countries outstripping the pre-crisis level. In the United States, seasonal migration in the agricultural sector (H-2A visas) remained above its 2007 level and has even increased in recent years, to a record 89 000 workers in 2014. The number of visas issued to non-farm seasonal workers (H-2B visas) also rose to 68 000 in 2014, well below the historical peak of 2007 (130 000). Unlike H-2A permits, H-2B visas are issued on a quota basis. Most seasonal workers in the United States come from Mexico (85%), with the other main countries of origin being Jamaica (4%), Guatemala (3%) and South Africa (2%). The maximum authorised length of stay in the United States under such permits is three years.

Canada, which ranks second in terms of destination countries for seasonal workers, admitted 29 000 seasonal workers in 2014, a figure in constant progression and currently 28% higher than the pre-crisis level. In Australia, the Seasonal Worker Programme replaced, in 2012, the Pacific Seasonal Worker Pilot Scheme, originally launched in 2008 to meet objectives including the economic development of the Pacific island nations and Timor-Leste. It allows for the recruitment of low skilled workers in nine countries, mainly for the horticultural sector. Most seasonal labour requirements are in fact already satisfied by the large number of Working Holiday Makers (see Table 1.2) and inflows of seasonal workers into Australia are below the established ceiling, even if they are visibly increasing. Seasonal workers in New Zealand are also mainly from the Pacific Islands – including Fiji since 2014 – and work in horticulture and vineyards. A labour market test has not prevented inflows from nearing the ceiling, which itself was raised from 8 000 to 9 000 in 2014. In Mexico, seasonal workers, from Guatemala and Belize, are issued a border work permit to carry out agricultural work, mainly in Chiapas. This permit was relatively successful, with around 70 000 issued at its peak in 2000, but the region’s loss of competitiveness, the decline in coffee prices and a series of natural disasters caused the number of permits issued to fall to only 15 000 in 2014.

Table 1.2. Workers who obtained a seasonal work permit by main destination country, 2007-14
|  | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2014/2013 | 2014/2007
|  | Thousands | Change (%)
Seasonal workers to main non-EU OECD countries | United States (agricultural workers) | 51 | 64 | 60 | 56 | 55 | 65 | 74 | 89 | +20 | +76
United States (non agricultural workers) | 130 | 94 | 45 | 47 | 51 | 50 | 58 | 68 | +18 | -47
Canada | 23 | 28 | 23 | 24 | 25 | 25 | 28 | 29 | +5 | +28
Mexico | 28 | 23 | 31 | 29 | 28 | 23 | 15 | 15 | +2 | -45
New Zealand | 7 | 10 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 9 | +10 | +41
Australia | - | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 3 | +58 | -
Norway | 3 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 3 | +1 | -1
Total | 240 | 223 | 169 | 166 | 170 | 176 | 187 | 217 | +16 | -10
Seasonal workers to EU countries (excluding EU workers) | Poland | 22 | 157 | 188 | 180 | 260 | 144 | 236 | 387 | +64 | +1677
Finland | 14 | 12 | 13 | 12 | 12 | 14 | 14 | 14 | +0 | +0
Austria | 42 | 44 | 40 | 41 | 21 | 16 | 15 | 7 | -53 | -83
France | 19 | 12 | 7 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 7 | +8 | -66
Italy | 65 | 42 | 35 | 28 | 15 | 10 | 8 | 5 | -36 | -93
Spain | 16 | 42 | 6 | 9 | 5 | 4 | 3 | 3 | -2 | -80
Sweden | 2 | 4 | 7 | 5 | 4 | 6 | 6 | 3 | -51 | +22
Belgium | 17 | 20 | 10 | 6 | 6 | 10 | 11 | 0 | -100 | -100
United Kingdom | 17 | 16 | 20 | 20 | 20 | 21 | 20 | 0 | Programme discontinued
Germany | 300 | 285 | 295 | 297 | 168 | 4 | 0 | 0 | Programme discontinued
Total | 513 | 633 | 621 | 602 | 516 | 234 | 318 | 426 | +34 | -17
Total |  | 753 | 856 | 790 | 769 | 686 | 410 | 505 | 643 | +27 | -15

Notes: With the exception of France where multi-year permits are given, data do not relate to the actual number of entries, but to the number of workers who were granted a permit. The data for France consider seasonal workers who change employer to be a “new worker”. Free access to the labour market has been progressively given to new EU member countries and therefore these series do not cover the same set of origin countries since 2007. Figures may include foreigners already present in the country.

Source: OECD International Migration Database.

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933396226

Unlike these countries, most European Union members saw a decrease in the number of permits issued to seasonal workers between 2013 and 2014, due mainly to the fact that Bulgarian and Romanian nationals no longer needed work permits as of 1 January 2014. With the exception of Croatian nationals, who are still subject to transitional restrictions in some countries, seasonal work permits are now only required for non-EU citizens. Poland is a notable exception to the trend, as inflows of seasonal workers are increasing rapidly (+64% between 2013 and 2014) and the country alone hosted 387 000 seasonal workers in 2014; i.e. 91% of the total European Union inflow of seasonal workers that year. Following its accession to the European Union in 2004, Poland enjoyed a period of strong economic growth which led to labour shortages in agriculture, construction and the manufacturing industry. The Polish authorities responded to this by creating a fast-track procedure allowing employers to recruit non-EU citizens on a temporary basis. Since 2006, Ukrainian, Belarussian and Russian nationals can be employed as seasonal workers in Poland for a maximum of six months in any consecutive 12-month period. This procedure was extended to Moldovans and Georgians in 2009, and Armenians in 2014 but is still mainly used by Ukrainians (96%), 20% of whom are already in Poland under another type of visa at the time of their recruitment.

Most other European Union countries have seen a sharp decrease in the number of seasonal work permits issued. Between 2012 and 2014, Austria adjusted its ceilings on certain categories of seasonal workers three times as a result of the full opening of the labour market to the inhabitants of States which joined the European Union between 2004 and 2007. The fall in the number of permits issued is also due to the fact that Spain and Italy, whose agricultural and construction sectors employed a large number of workers from non-EU States, have not completely recovered from the 2007/08 crisis. Italy also capped seasonal inflows at the height of the crisis in 2012.

Inflows of seasonal workers into Belgium are virtually non-existent. Germany, which only accepted seasonal workers from other EU countries, stopped issuing permits after 2013, which was also the year in which the United Kingdom terminated its programme.

The main flows of seasonal workers originating from outside EU the are from the Russian Federation to Finland, from Ukraine and Kosovo to Austria, from Morocco and Tunisia to France, from India, Morocco and Albania to Italy, and from Morocco to Spain. In Sweden however, where incoming seasonal workers come almost entirely from Thailand for crop picking, the halving of the number of seasonal workers between 2013 and 2014 was for the most part due to tighter controls on employers, notably in terms of respecting salary payments. The number of seasonal workers in Norway has remained stable at around 2 500 a year, over one third of whom are from Viet Nam.

Intra-company transfers

Mobility of staff between business divisions is becoming increasingly important for employers. Corresponding residence permits allow a company’s workers and managers to spend a limited period of time in foreign subsidiaries or at the headquarters. The highest demand for these permits comes from the services sector. Under international trade rules, States have to admit these temporary workers but the rules differ on how to obtain a work permit. The United Kingdom, for example, imposes a minimum wage requirement, and in Australia the issuance of a visa is conditional upon prior labour market testing, the only exception being for heads of companies. The main destination of intra-company transfers is the United States, followed by the United Kingdom and Canada (Table 1.3). Increases, sometimes substantial, in this type of movement have been observed in most countries for which data are available.

Table 1.3. Intra-company transfers to the main OECD destinations, 2007-14
Number of permits issued
| 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2014/2013 | 2014/2007
| Thousands | Change (%)
United States | 84.5 | 84.1 | 64.7 | 74.7 | 70.7 | 62.4 | 66.7 | 71.5 | +7 | -15
United Kingdom | .. | .. | 13.2 | 17.5 | 21.0 | 22.8 | 25.8 | 28.0 | +9 | +112
Canada | 9.2 | 10.5 | 10.1 | 13.6 | 13.5 | 13.6 | 14.0 | 15.6 | +12 | +69
Germany | 5.4 | 5.7 | 4.4 | 5.9 | 7.1 | 7.2 | 7.8 | 9.4 | +20 | +73
Australia | 6.9 | 6.0 | 6.0 | 8.2 | 10.1 | 8.9 | .. | 7.8 |  | +13
Japan | 7.2 | 7.3 | 5.2 | 5.8 | 5.3 | 6.1 | 6.2 | 7.2 | +15 | +1
Ireland | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.6 | +42 | +50
Austria | 0.1 | 0.2 | 0.1 | 0.2 | 0.2 | .. | 0.2 | 0.2 | +0 | +47
Luxembourg | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 0.2 | .. | ..
France | 1.0 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.2 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | +41 | -85
Total |  |  | (104) | (126) | (128) | (122) | (121) | 141 | +17 | +36

Notes: Not including transfers within the European Economic Area (EEA) as they do not require a work permit. The 2014/07 evolution for the total and the United Kingdom corresponds to the 2014/2009 evolution. Some variations of the total for the period 2009-13 might be explained by gaps in the country series.

.. Information not available.

Source: OECD International Migration Database.

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933396234

Workers on postings in the European Union

In the European Union, under the Directive concerning the posting of workers (1996), companies are allowed to “post” workers to other countries. In this case, employees are subject to the labour law of the country of posting but social security contributions are paid to their resident country of origin. Between 2010 and 2014, there was a 38% increase in the number of posted workers (Figure 1.4) and a 44% increase in the number of postings.

Figure 1.4. Evolution of the number of posted workers by receiving European OECD country, 2005-14

Note: Numbers are based on issuance of E101 forms and, from 1 May 2010, of A1 Portable documents.

Source: European Commission Statistics compiled by Pacolet and De Wispelaere (2015).

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395313

Figure 1.5 presents the situation in the different European countries which received posted workers in 2014. Germany, which is the primary destination of posted workers, with significant inflows from Poland in particular, is also the second country of origin for this type of worker. France follows Germany in terms of receiving the most workers posted from EU countries, followed by Belgium and Austria. A proportion of these movements are between neighbouring countries but an increasing amount now involves flows between more distant countries, such as from Slovenia, Hungary and the Slovak Republic to Germany, and from Poland and Portugal to France. Relative to the size of its labour market, Luxembourg is the country which makes the most use of posted workers, and, also in relative terms, the main country of origin of posted workers.

Figure 1.5. Inflows, ouflows and net balance of posted workers in UE/EFTA countries in 2014

Notes: Numbers are based on the issuances of E101 forms and, from 1 May 2010, of A1 Portable documents. Non OECD countries that belong to the EU or the EFTA are not presented but included in the inflows and outflows.

Source: European Commission Statistics compiled by Pacolet and De Wispelaere (2015).

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395325

The companies sending the most workers on postings in 2014 were in construction (44%) and the services sector (33%). In 2014, the average posting lasted four months, and the 1.45 million posted workers represented 0.4% of the total EU workforce.

In March 2016, the European Commission proposed a revision of the rules on posting of workers (European Commission, 2016), including the granting to posted workers of the same rules on remuneration that are applied generally to local workers, and not just the payment of the minimum wage. And this for a period that shall not exceed two years. Lastly, temporary work agencies shall be obliged to provide equal treatment for all workers established in the same country.

Trainees and Working Holiday Makers

Table 1.4 illustrates how the number of permits issued to trainees and Working Holiday Makers fluctuates according to economic conditions. In 2014, Japan welcomed almost 100 000 paid trainees; i.e. over three quarters of the total number of trainees who migrated to an OECD country in the same year. Most of the trainees had a “Technical intern training” visa and therefore an employment contract for a position requiring a certain degree of technical expertise. This permit, with a duration of three months to a year, can be renewed once. Trainee inflows started to rise in 2014 after five years of stagnation. Only Korea, which is the second main destination for trainees, welcomed more trainees in 2014 than in 2008.

Table 1.4. Entries of trainees and Working Holiday Makers in selected OECD countries, 2007-14
| Destination | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2014/2013 | 2014/2007
Thousands | Change (%)
Trainees | Japan | 102.0 | 101.9 | 80.5 | 77.7 | 82.3 | 85.9 | 83.9 | 98.7 | +18 | -3
Korea | 14.2 | 13.6 | 11.4 | 11.8 | 13.3 | 12.2 | 12.5 | 15.1 | +21 | +6
Australia | 5.4 | 5.3 | 3.7 | 3.5 | 3.8 | 3.6 | 3.5 | 4.4 | +25 | -19
Germany | 4.8 | 5.4 | 4.8 | 4.9 | 4.9 | 4.1 | 3.9 | 3.8 | -3 | -21
United States | 3.1 | 3.4 | 2.1 | 1.8 | 2.1 | 2.9 | 2.7 | 2.2 | -17 | -28
Denmark | 3.2 | 3.1 | 2.2 | 1.6 | 1.5 | 1.4 | 1.4 | 1.5 | +8 | -52
Sweden | 0.6 | 0.7 | 0.7 | 0.5 | 0.4 | 0.5 | 0.4 | 0.5 | +13 | -16
Norway | 0.4 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.1 | 0.3 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.3 | +47 | -30
| Total | 133.7 | 133.7 | 105.6 | 102.0 | 108.7 | 110.8 | 108.6 | 126.5 | +17 | -5
Working Holiday Makers | Australia | 154.1 | 187.7 | 175.7 | 185.5 | 223.7 | 259.4 | 226.8 | 239.6 | +6 | +55
United States | 147.6 | 152.7 | 116.4 | 118.2 | 97.6 | 79.8 | 86.4 | 90.3 | +5 | -39
New Zealand | 35.6 | 40.3 | 41.2 | 44.8 | 45.1 | 50.8 | 57.6 | 61.4 | +7 | +72
Canada | 32.5 | 41.1 | 45.3 | 50.0 | 54.9 | 59.1 | 54.0 | 51.9 | -4 | +60
United Kingdom | 39.4 | 34.5 | 5.1 | 21.3 | 20.7 | 19.6 | 20.9 | 23.5 | +13 | -40
Japan | 6.2 | 6.5 | 6.5 | 7.5 | 8.5 | 9.5 | 10.5 | 11.5 | +10 | +84
Ireland | .. | .. | .. | 1.6 | 1.3 | 1.4 | 2.0 | 2.3 | +13 | +42
Korea | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.5 | 0.8 | 1.0 | 1.2 | 1.3 | +12 | +367
Denmark | .. | 0.4 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.6 | +37 | +62
Italy | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.5 | 0.5 | -5 | +23
| Total | 416.2 | 463.9 | 391.3 | 430.1 | 453.3 | 481.4 | 460.3 | 482.8 | +5 | +16
Note: Only countries with more than 100 trainees or Working Holiday Makers are included.
Source: OECD International Migration Database.
StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933396247

Programmes for Working Holiday Makers allow young people to acquire experience abroad through bilateral reciprocal agreements. They are particularly developed in the traditional countries of settlement and, to a lesser extent, in the United Kingdom and Japan.

Australia, which has signed agreements with 36 countries, welcomes over 200 000 Working Holiday Makers, which allows it to partially meet demand for seasonal labour in the agricultural sector, mining and construction. Two thirds of young people entering Australia under one of these programmes are from the United Kingdom, China, Germany, Korea and France. 17 of the 36 bilateral agreements are “Work and holiday visas”, seven of which were signed by Australia in 2014 and 2015. They stipulate the maximum number of people allowed to enter from each country of origin and are non-renewable. 19 earlier “Working holiday visa” agreements have no limit on numbers and the permits can be renewed once.

In the United States, the “Summer Work Travel Program” is managed by the State Department and is aimed at students wishing to spend no longer than four months in the country. Participants in the programme may only enter temporary or seasonal employment. Since 2011, the programme has banned domestic employment and annual numbers are limited to 109 000. In 2012, employers were asked to allow participants to take part in cultural activities outside the workplace. The countries with the most participants in the programme are Bulgaria, Ireland, Turkey and the Russian Federation.

New Zealand is the third most popular destination for Working Holiday Makers, ahead of Canada. The programme is run by the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment. 42 countries have signed bilateral agreements with New Zealand, 28 of which contain provisions to cap the number of people entering. In 2014, half of total inflow came from Germany, the United Kingdom and France. The growth of the programme can be put down to the increase in numbers from Germany and France, and the signing of new agreements.

The International Experience Canada (IEC) programme facilitates movement to and from 32 countries. In 2013, responsibility for the programme was transferred from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development Canada to the Ministry of Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada, which provided the opportunity to align it with other immigration programmes in order to better cater to labour force requirements. The Ministry also wants to improve the levels of reciprocity in exchanges, as there are far more young people coming to Canada than young Canadians going abroad.

Asylum seekers

In 2015, OECD countries – especially in Europe – recorded asylum seeker numbers unprecedented since World War II. Applications for asylum in the OECD area have increased steadily since 2010, reaching a peak in 2015 of up to 1.65 million (Figure 1.6). More than three-quarters of asylum seekers in the OECD area lodged an application in an EU member state.

Figure 1.6. New asylum applications since 1980 in the OECD and the EU

Note: Preliminary data for the first quarter of 2016.

Source: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395334

The discussion in this section uses data from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). It should be noted, however, that those asylum application statistics suffer from a number of limitations. First, there is a delay between the asylum seeker’s arrival and the actual registration of the asylum application by the administration responsible. This time lag may become longer when the increase in the number of applications is unexpected. Such is currently the case (notably) in countries that have received the majority of the inflow in 2015. In Germany for example, upon arrival asylum seekers are pre-registered in the EASY system, which enables the distribution of applicants throughout the country. The time spent between this pre-registration and the final registration of the asylum claim generates a sizeable gap between pre-registration and UNHCR data. It is likely that a significant portion of asylum applicants registered in 2016 in Germany arrived the year before.

Second, the UNHCR is aware that “the statistical picture of the number of people seeking international protection in Europe is partially distorted because of the reported instances of the same individual being registered as asylum seeker multiple times across the continent” (UNHCR, 2015). More than ever before, the data published during this refugee crisis include multiple counting.

Lastly, asylum applications do not include all types of temporary protection, such as that given by Turkey. From early 2011 to end-2015, more than 2.3 million Syrians arrived in Turkey, while only up to 9 000 asylum applications from Syrians in the country were registered from 2011 onwards. Turkey is by far the top OECD receiving country of asylum seekers over the past five years.

Knowing these limitations, and to avoid misuse of several datasets on asylum applications developed since the beginning of the crisis, only UNHCR data are used in this chapter. UNHCR is in fact the only source that takes into account all OECD countries.

The number of asylum seekers in the OECD area doubled in 2015 compared with 2014. This unprecedented increase was fuelled partly by the deterioration of the security situation in Syria, Iraq and Libya. But fuelling it as well was the development of new smuggling routes, such as the eastern Mediterranean and western Balkan routes. The latter was mainly used by asylum seekers from Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan, but also (and more frequently) used by citizens of Pakistan, by selected African migrant groups, and by people from Kosovo and Albania. Therefore, more than during previous crises, asylum seekers are very diverse in terms of country of origin and profile.

Syrian asylum seekers accounted for almost half of the increase. In fact, Syria is by far the main country of origin (Figure 1.7). Some 370 000 applications were submitted to OECD countries by Syrian citizens in 2015 (24% of the total), three times as many as in 2014 and six times as many as in 2013. The situation has deteriorated to such an extent that the OECD countries received even more Syrian asylum seekers in the third quarter of 2015 alone than in the whole of 2014 (Figure 1.8). Afghanistan, with 250 000 applications for asylum, is the second largest country of origin (16% of the total), with five times as many asylum seekers in 2015 as in 2014. Iraq, with nearly 180 000 applications, accounted for 12% of the total number of asylum seekers in OECD countries. Besides those three countries, accounting for half of all asylum applications in 2015, the number of people seeking international protection increased sharply throughout the world. In 2015, the number of asylum seekers from Albania was four times higher than in 2014 and the numbers of those from Pakistan and Iran were two times higher. Asylum seekers from Serbia (and Kosovo), Albania and Pakistan exceeded 50 000 each. No decrease between 2014 and 2015 has been observed among the top 20 countries of origin of asylum seekers.

Figure 1.7. New asylum applications in the OECD by Syrians, Q1 2012 to Q1 2016

Note: Preliminary data for the first quarter 2016.

Source: UNHCR.

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395342

Figure 1.8. Distribution of new asylum seekers by origin, 2013-15

Source: UNHCR.

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395358

As in 2013 and 2014, Germany registered the highest numbers of asylum applications in 2015, as well as the greatest increase (up 270 000, +155%). It alone accounts for one-quarter of all applications in the OECD area (Table 1.5). A third of all asylum applicants came from Syria (four times higher than in 2014), 12% from Albania (seven times higher), 11% from Serbia (and Kosovo), (two times higher), 7% from Afghanistan (three times higher) and 7% from Iraq (six times higher). By contrast, the number of Eritreans dropped by 18% in Germany compared to 2014.

The number of monthly applications in Germany rose progressively throughout the year 2015. Beginning at around 25 000 monthly applications in the first half of the year, the number peaked in October-November at almost 60 000 to eventually drop back down to 45 000 in December. In total, over 440 000 asylum applications have been filed in Germany in 2015, the highest number ever recorded. The number of people who have entered Germany in 2015 to seek protection is, however, underestimated. According to the EASY registration system (see above), almost 1.1 million asylum seekers have been allocated to a German reception facility in 2015. Even if they do not all eventually complete an asylum claim (for instance because they decide to move on to another country in the meantime), the number of asylum seekers in Germany is much larger than the UNHCR figure. Almost two-thirds of all EASY registrations were from Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq.

Behind Germany came Hungary, Sweden, the United States and Turkey, each of which received over 100 000 asylum requests in 2015. It should be noted however that most people filing an asylum request in Hungary were only transiting through the country (and have not transited anymore since October), thus leaving for elsewhere afterwards. The number of asylum applications in Hungary has indeed already dropped from 30 500 in September to less than 1 000 over the fourth quarter of 2015.

Compared to 2014, almost all OECD countries registered an increase in those seeking asylum (Tables 1.5). The growth was very large in several countries, such as in Finland (nine times higher than in 2014), Austria and Belgium (three times), and Norway and Sweden (more than twice as high). Compared to these countries, some other OECD countries such as the United Kingdom, France and Italy had lower growth rates and the origins of asylum applications in those countries are different from those of most European countries. In the United Kingdom, where the number of applications grew by 23%, Eritrea is the top origin country; in France (+26%), it is Sudan; and Italy (+31%) receives mainly requests from sub-Saharan African countries, such as Nigeria and Gambia. By contrast, the number of asylum seekers in the United States in 2015 increased by 38%, most of them coming from China and Latin America. China is also the top country of origin of asylum applicants in Canada (which saw a 19% increase in total) and, along with citizens from Malaysia, in Australia (+37%).

Table 1.5. New asylum applications by country where application is filed, 2011-15
| 2011-13 annual average | 2014 | 2015 | 2014-15 absolute change | % change 2014-15 | Asylum seekers per million population (most recent year) | Top three origins of the asylum seekers (most recent year)
Germany | 73 290 | 173 070 | 441 900 | +268 830 | +155 | 5 471 | Syria, Albania, Serbia (and Kosovo)
Hungary | 7 730 | 41 370 | 174 360 | +132 990 | +321 | 17 703 | Syria, Afghanistan, Serbia (and Kosovo)
United States | 77 610 | 121 160 | 172 740 | +51 580 | +43 | 552 | China, Mexico, El Salvador
Sweden | 42 590 | 75 090 | 156 460 | +81 370 | +108 | 16 052 | Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq
Turkey | 29 100 | 87 820 | 133 590 | +45 770 | +52 | 1 728 | Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran
Austria | 16 440 | 28 060 | 85 620 | +57 560 | +205 | 9 973 | Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq
Italy | 25 730 | 63 660 | 83 240 | +19 580 | +31 | 1 369 | Nigeria, Pakistan, Gambia
France | 55 820 | 59 030 | 74 300 | +15 270 | +26 | 1 157 | Sudan, Serbia (and Kosovo), Syria
Netherlands | 11 880 | 23 850 | 43 100 | +19 250 | +81 | 2 588 | Syria, Eritrea, Iraq
Belgium | 19 010 | 13 870 | 38 700 | +24 830 | +179 | 3 454 | Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan
United Kingdom | 27 760 | 31 260 | 38 570 | +7 310 | +23 | 606 | Eritrea, Iran, Pakistan
Switzerland | 21 610 | 22 110 | 38 120 | +16 010 | +72 | 4 683 | Eritrea, Afghanistan, Syria
Finland | 3 010 | 3 520 | 32 270 | +28 750 | +817 | 5 897 | Iraq, Afghanistan, Somalia
Norway | 10 100 | 12 640 | 30 520 | +17 880 | +141 | 5 908 | Syria, Afghanistan, Eritrea
Denmark | 5 850 | 14 820 | 21 160 | +6 340 | +43 | 3 792 | Syria, Iran, Eritrea
Canada | 18 520 | 13 450 | 16 070 | +2 620 | +19 | 460 | China, Hungary, Pakistan
Spain | 3 500 | 5 900 | 13 370 | +7 470 | +127 | 287 | Syria, Ukraine, West Bank and Gaza Strip
Australia | 13 010 | 8 960 | 12 350 | +3 390 | +38 | 530 | Malaysia, China, Iraq
Greece | 9 040 | 9 450 | 11 370 | +1 920 | +20 | 1 010 | Syria, Afghanistan, Pakistan
Poland | 9 340 | 6 810 | 10 250 | +3 440 | +51 | 266 | Russian Federation, Ukraine, Tajikistan
Japan | 2 560 | 5 000 | 7 580 | +2 580 | +52 | 59 | Nepal, Turkey, Myanmar
Korea | 1 240 | 2 900 | 5 710 | +2 810 | +97 | 113 | Pakistan, Egypt, China
Mexico | 950 | 2 140 | 3 420 | +1 280 | +60 | 28 | Honduras, El Salvador, Guatemala
Ireland | 1 160 | 1 440 | 3 280 | +1 840 | +128 | 712 | Pakistan, Bangladesh, Albania
Luxembourg | 1 690 | 970 | 2 300 | +1 330 | +137 | 4 187 | Syria, Iraq, Serbia (and Kosovo)
Czech Republic | 670 | 920 | 1 250 | +330 | +36 | 119 | Ukraine, Syria, Cuba
Israel | 2 420 | 490 | .. | .. | .. | 61 | Côte d’Ivoire, South Sudan, Eritrea
Portugal | 360 | 440 | 900 | +460 | +105 | 86 | Ukraine, Mali, China
Iceland | 120 | 160 | 360 | +200 | +125 | 1 094 | Albania, Iraq, Afghanistan
New Zealand | 310 | 290 | 350 | +60 | +21 | 77 | Fidji, Pakistan, South Africa
Slovak Republic | 500 | 230 | 270 | +40 | +17 | 50 | Iraq, Afghanistan
Slovenia | 310 | 360 | 260 | -100 | -28 | 126 | Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan
Chile | 240 | 280 | .. | .. | .. | 16 | Colombia, Syria, West Bank and Gaza Strip
Estonia | 80 | 150 | 230 | +80 | +53 | 175 | Ukraine, Afghanistan, Iraq
OECD total | 493 550 | 831 670 | 1 653 970 | +822 300 | +99 | 1 314 | Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq
Selected non-OECD countries
Bulgaria | 3 034 | 10 790 | 20 160 | +9 370 | +87 | 2 799 | Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria
Malta | 2 043 | 1 280 | 1 700 | +420 | +33 | 3 960 | Libya, Syria, Ukraine
Romania | 2 024 | 1 550 | 1 270 | -280 | -18 | 64 | Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan
Latvia | 348 | 360 | 330 | -30 | -8 | 178 | Iraq, Viet Nam, Ukraine
Lithuania | 402 | 390 | 290 | -100 | -26 | 99 | Ukraine, Georgia, Afghanistan
Notes: Figures for the United States refer to “affirmative” claims submitted with the Department of Homeland Security (number of cases) and “defensive” claims submitted to the Executive Office for Immigration Review (number of people). The symbol “..” stands for “not available”.
Source: UNHCR.
StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933396258

A particularly striking feature of the current refugee crisis is the large number of unaccompanied minors (UAMs) among asylum seekers. Eighty-five thousand UAMs applied for asylum in the EU and other OECD European countries in 2015, the highest number recorded in the past ten years. The number was more than three times higher than in 2014, and even five times higher in Sweden and Norway. Among all asylum applicants, the share of those who claimed to be UAMs increased from 4% in 2014 to 6% in 2015. The country of origin of most UAMs (54%) was Afghanistan.

Comparisons of ratios of asylum seeker entries to host country populations reveal that the OECD area received 1 300 applications per million inhabitants in 2015. Sweden received the highest number of applications as a proportion of its population, with 16 000 requests per million inhabitants. Austria follows with almost 10 000 asylum seekers for one million inhabitants, and the ratio is almost 6 per thousand in Norway and Finland. Although small countries generally have the highest rates of asylum seekers per capita, Germany was among the top asylum receiving country, with a ratio of 5 500 per million. This ratio is however underestimated and closer to 13 500 per million if one refers to EASY registrations (see above). In contrast, the United States and United Kingdom received only 400 and 600 asylum applications per million inhabitants, respectively.

This humanitarian migration crisis continued during the first months of 2016, but at a slower pace. After three consecutive months of decrease, the number of asylum applications in January 2016 (almost 110 000) in the OECD area was twice as low as in October 2015. In February new asylum applications increased again. However, most of this change has been triggered by Germany; EASY registrations have decreased drastically during the past months, from 200 000 registrations in November 2015 to 20 000 in March 2016. This suggests that the increase in asylum applications observed in February 2016 corresponds to the number of EASY registrations previously made in 2015, and not to a current increase in the number of asylum seeker flows. Given the fall in the number of EASY registrations in Germany during the first quarter of 2016, the number of asylum applications is likely to continue to decrease in the near future.

Since the main origin countries (Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan) face persistent security issues, recognition rates⁴ are high (Figure 1.9). In 2015, the average recognition rate in the European Union was 52%, twice the rate of 2011. At just over 70%, the rate is highest in Sweden and Austria, where most asylum seekers came from those war-torn areas.

Figure 1.9. Average recognition rates of applications for international protection in selected European countries, 2010-15

Source: Eurostat.

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395366

As a consequence of both higher flows and a higher recognition rate, the number of permanent migrants for humanitarian reasons in 2014 reached its highest point since 2007 (Table 1.6). In the OECD countries for which standardised data are available, up to 340 000 migrants (160 000 in Europe) received a permanent right of residency for humanitarian reasons in 2014. The growth was especially strong in European countries, such as Denmark (+57%), Italy (+43%) and Germany (+38%). The number of humanitarian permanent migrants also increased by 12% in the United States, while the number dropped in Canada (-11%) and in Australia (-31%). Given the rise in the number of decisions granting international protection status in the European Union in 2015 (according to Eurostat), it is plausible that the number of permanent migrants for humanitarian reasons in European OECD countries increased by two-thirds and reached more than 250 000 people in 2015.

Table 1.6. Number of new beneficiaries of international protection in OECD countries, 2007-15
| 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2014-15 Change (%)
Australia | 14 158 | 11 729 | 14 854 | 14 553 | 13 976 | 13 759 | 20 019 | 13 768 | ..
Austria | 7 002 | 5 539 | 4 982 | 4 749 | 5 757 | 4 099 | 2 512 | 1 341 | +41
Belgium | 2 122 | 2 537 | 2 305 | 2 818 | 3 951 | 4 419 | 4 937 | 6 146 | +28
Canada | 39 160 | 32 484 | 33 374 | 33 432 | 36 091 | 31 990 | 30 952 | 27 637 | ..
Denmark | 1 278 | 1 453 | 1 376 | 2 124 | 2 249 | 2 583 | 3 889 | 6 110 | +77
Finland | 2 083 | 2 153 | 3 011 | 3 168 | 2 241 | 2 854 | 3 055 | 2 899 | +17
France | 9 901 | 11 655 | 12 732 | 12 083 | 11 606 | 12 231 | 12 101 | 13 194 | +26
Germany | 50 944 | 37 491 | 11 107 | 11 828 | 11 036 | 18 092 | 30 667 | 42 393 | +196
Ireland | 579 | 588 | 366 | 153 | 132 | 112 | 182 | 224 | +43
Italy | 7 726 | 10 019 | 9 573 | 4 303 | 7 155 | 5 989 | 14 395 | 20 580 | +44
Japan | 129 | 417 | 531 | 402 | 269 | 130 | 130 | 157 | ..
Korea | 13 | 32 | 74 | 47 | 38 | 60 | 36 | 633 | ..
Mexico | .. | .. | .. | 222 | 262 | 389 | 198 | 348 | ..
Netherlands | 12 340 | 7 330 | 9 590 | 10 010 | 10 690 | 5 268 | 9 970 | .. | +29
New Zealand | 3 769 | 3 678 | 3 109 | 2 807 | 2 741 | 3 032 | 3 385 | 3 551 | ..
Norway | 5 930 | 4 757 | 6 189 | 5 328 | 5 389 | 5 721 | 6 725 | 5 690 | +22
Portugal | 122 | 82 | 52 | 57 | 65 | 100 | 135 | 110 | +77
Spain | 544 | 277 | 341 | 595 | 967 | 520 | 463 | 1 583 | -36
Sweden | 18 290 | 11 173 | 11 119 | 12 073 | 12 651 | 17 355 | 28 904 | 35 642 | +4
Switzerland | 5 425 | 6 348 | 5 370 | 6 655 | 5 755 | 4 212 | 5 061 | 6 355 | -9
United Kingdom | 14 190 | 2 825 | 3 110 | 4 931 | 13 003 | 11 434 | 21 266 | 17 191 | +7
United States | 136 125 | 166 392 | 177 368 | 136 291 | 168 460 | 150 614 | 119 630 | 134 242 | ..
All countries | 331 830 | 318 959 | 310 533 | 268 629 | 314 484 | 294 963 | 318 612 | 339 794 | ..
All European countries | 138 476 | 104 227 | 81 223 | 80 875 | 92 647 | 94 989 | 144 262 | 159 458 | +67
.. Information not available.
Source: 2007-14: OECD International Migration Database; 2014-15 change: Eurostat Database on International Migration and Asylum.
StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933396264

International student mobility

International student mobility is part of the broader phenomenon of the internationalisation of education, and an aspect that requires migration movement. As such, both education and migration policy makers pay close attention to these movements. Even though the latest figures for 2013 are not fully comparable with those of previous years, there is little doubt that the OECD area witnessed another increase in international student enrolments.

In 2013, there were almost 3 million international students enrolled in OECD countries, 48% of whom were women (Table 1.7). The main destination countries are the United States with almost 800 000 students, the United Kingdom (420 000) and Australia (260 000), followed by France and Germany. Slightly fewer than 1.4 million international students – two-thirds of which were coming from third countries – are enrolled in EU OECD countries. International students on average make up 8% of total tertiary enrolment across OECD countries, but this share is much higher in Australia, Austria, New Zealand, Switzerland and the United Kingdom – where it is between 16% and 18% – and it even reaches 44% in Luxembourg. The share of international students also rises with the level of education. Indeed, at the master’s level, international students represent on average 13% of the total, and this figure jumps to 22% at the doctoral level. The share of international students at the doctoral level is especially high in France, Luxembourg, New Zealand, Switzerland and the United Kingdom.

Table 1.7. International students enrolled in OECD countries, 2013
| International tertiary students | Share of international students by level of education (%) | Distribution of foreign students by field of study (%)
| Total (thousands) | Of which: From OECD countries (%) | Of which: From EU28 countries (%) | Of which: Women (%) | Total tertiary education | Master’s or equivalent level | Doctoral or equivalent level | Social sciences, business and law | Sciences, engineering, manufacturing and construction | Humanities and arts | Health and welfare | Other
Australia | 250 | 12 | 3 | 48 | 18 | 38 | 33 | 52 | 26 | 6 | 10 | 6
Austria | 71 | 73 | 71 | 53 | 17 | 19 | 28 | 38 | 27 | 17 | 8 | 9
Belgium | 45 | 56 | 56 | 57 | 10 | 16 | 38 | 23 | 18 | 14 | 34 | 12
Canada | 135 | 21 | 10 | 44 | 9 | 13 | 26 | 41 | 33 | 6 | 5 | 14
Chile | 3 | 5 | 2 | 49 | 0 | 2 | 3 | 32 | 18 | 6 | 7 | 37
Czech Republic | 40 | 70 | 69 | 53 | 9 | 11 | 13 | 38 | 28 | 10 | 17 | 8
Denmark | 29 | 65 | 63 | 54 | 10 | 18 | 30 | 41 | 31 | 10 | 11 | 7
Estonia | 2 | 66 | 66 | 48 | 3 | 4 | 7 | 55 | 15 | 16 | 5 | 9
Finland | 22 | 21 | 18 | 42 | 7 | 11 | 17 | 27 | 42 | 11 | 10 | 10
France | 229 | 20 | 16 | 52 | 10 | 13 | 40 | 38 | 32 | 17 | 7 | 5
Germany | 197 | 34 | 29 | 50 | 7 | 12 | 7 | 26 | 40 | 19 | 6 | 9
Hungary | 21 | 54 | 51 | 50 | 6 | 14 | 7 | 21 | 13 | 11 | 40 | 15
Iceland | 1 | 78 | 67 | 63 | 7 | 6 | 20 | 25 | 20 | 40 | 5 | 10
Ireland | 13 | 52 | 34 |  | 6 | 10 | 25 | .. | .. | .. | .. | ..
Israel | 10 | 42 | 17 | 57 | .. | 4 | 5 | .. | .. | .. | .. | ..
Italy | 82 | 19 | 23 | 59 | 4 | 4 | 12 | 31 | 27 | 21 | 15 | 6
Japan | 136 | 17 | 2 | 49 | 4 | 8 | 19 | 38 | 18 | 21 | 2 | 20
Korea | 56 | 7 | 1 | 52 | 2 | 6 | 8 | 45 | 22 | 22 | 4 | 7
Luxembourg | 3 | 78 | 79 | 50 | 44 | 67 | 84 | 62 | 17 | 9 | 3 | 9
Mexico | 8 | 0 | 0 |  | 0 | 1 | 3 | .. | .. | .. | .. | ..
Netherlands | 69 | 60 | 61 | 55 | 10 | 17 | 38 | 43 | 18 | 12 | 13 | 14
New Zealand | 41 | 24 | 5 | 45 | 16 | 20 | 43 | 39 | 27 | 9 | 7 | 18
Norway | 9 | 36 | 33 | 51 | 4 | 7 | 21 | 26 | 26 | 17 | 10 | 21
Poland | 28 | 30 | 22 | 52 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 42 | 14 | 11 | 22 | 12
Portugal | 15 | 24 | 21 | 51 | 4 | 5 | 15 | 35 | 29 | 13 | 10 | 13
Slovak Republic | 10 | 85 | 81 | 56 | 5 | 6 | 9 | 18 | 8 | 5 | 53 | 15
Slovenia | 3 | 16 | 48 | 58 | 3 | 4 | 8 | 39 | 29 | 13 | 7 | 13
Spain | 56 | 34 | 30 | 53 | 3 | 5 | 16 | 30 | 23 | 9 | 26 | 12
Sweden | 25 | 36 | 31 | 46 | 6 | 9 | 32 | 25 | 47 | 11 | 11 | 5
Switzerland | 47 | 71 | 67 |  | 17 | 27 | 52 | 33 | 35 | 16 | 7 | 9
Turkey | 54 | 9 | 11 | 35 | 1 | 4 | 4 | 38 | 25 | 13 | 12 | 13
United Kingdom | 417 | 33 | 30 | 50 | 17 | 36 | 41 | 45 | 29 | 13 | 8 | 6
United States | 784 | 26 | 7 | 46 | 4 | 8 | 32 | 33 | 35 | 13 | 9 | 11
EU OECD countries | 1 376 | 46 | 45 | 52 | 9 | 14 | 23 | 36 | 26 | 13 | 16 | 10
OECD total | 2 911 | 851 | 594 | 48 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | ..
OECD average | .. | 39 | 34 | 51 | 8 | 13 | 22 | 36 | 26 | 14 | 13 | 12
Notes: Data for the Czech Republic, Israel, Italy, Korea and Turkey refer to foreign students instead of international students. Data for Canada refer to 2012 instead of 2013.
.. Information not available.
Source: Education at a Glance 2015: OECD Indicators.
StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933396278

In OECD countries, the fields of social sciences, business and law gather the most tertiary students in general and international students in particular (36% on average). This percentage is particularly high in Luxembourg (62%), Estonia (55%) and Australia (52%). However, the fields of sciences and engineering, manufacturing and construction altogether (26% on average) attract more international students in a few countries, such as Finland, Germany, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and the United States. Health and welfare is the main field for international students in Belgium, Hungary and the Slovak Republic, and in Iceland the 500 international students in humanities and arts make up 40% of the total.

Moreover, this distribution too varies with the level of education (OECD, 2015b). At the highest levels the fields of science and engineering dominate, so that among the international students, 55% of the doctoral graduates earned a degree in either science or engineering (against 44% of all students) (Figure 1.10).

Figure 1.10. International students enrolled in OECD countries by origin, 2013

Note: Asia includes Western Asia.

Source: Education at a Glance 2015: OECD Indicators.

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395379

In 2013 Asian students had a stronger presence in OECD educational institutions, as they accounted for 55% of all enrolments. In particular, almost one in four international students in OECD countries comes from China. India follows far behind, while Germany and Korea are the only other countries sending more than 100 000 of their students to another OECD country. Saudi Arabia appears just after France in the ranking, and the top ten is completed by two OECD countries, the United States and Italy, and two Asian countries, Viet Nam and Malaysia.

International migrants’ countries of origin

The discussion of permanent and temporary migration in previous sections has been based on standardised definitions designed to make the scale and composition of migration comparable across countries. With the exception of a handful of countries, however, no such standardised data are yet available by country or region of origin. And although information on migrants is generally available from national population registers, what constitutes a “migrant” varies widely from country to country. Adding up and deriving trends from register-based data (as in Table 1.8) is therefore not without caveats. Although the figures in the table should be treated with caution, they do offer an indication of the magnitude and make-up of flows by country of origin.

Table 1.8. Top 50 countries of origin of new immigrants to the OECD, 2004-14
| Average 2004-13 (thousands) | 2013 (thousands) | 2014 (thousands) | % of total OECD inflows 2014 | % change 2013-14 | Difference in ranking vs 2013 | Difference in ranking vs period 2004-13
China | 489 | 547 | 555 | 9.3 | +1.4 | 0 | 0
Romania | 298 | 292 | 374 | 6.3 | +28.0 | 1 | 0
Poland | 267 | 295 | 302 | 5.1 | +2.4 | -1 | 0
India | 227 | 241 | 263 | 4.4 | +9.2 | 0 | 0
Philippines | 171 | 152 | 158 | 2.6 | +3.9 | 1 | 1
Italy | 76 | 126 | 155 | 2.6 | +23.2 | 2 | 11
Mexico | 174 | 153 | 155 | 2.6 | +1.3 | -2 | -2
United States | 127 | 145 | 146 | 2.5 | +1.3 | -1 | 0
Viet Nam | 87 | 102 | 125 | 2.1 | +22.4 | 3 | 4
France | 86 | 105 | 123 | 2.1 | +17.4 | 0 | 3
Bulgaria | 72 | 100 | 122 | 2.1 | +22.9 | 1 | 7
United Kingdom | 134 | 113 | 115 | 1.9 | +1.4 | -4 | -6
Germany | 118 | 108 | 106 | 1.8 | -1.5 | -4 | -4
Spain | 41 | 95 | 98 | 1.7 | +3.9 | 0 | 16
Hungary | 51 | 97 | 96 | 1.6 | -.8 | -2 | 9
Thailand | 50 | 61 | 87 | 1.5 | +41.4 | 7 | 10
Morocco | 126 | 83 | 80 | 1.3 | -3.8 | -1 | -9
Pakistan | 81 | 73 | 78 | 1.3 | +7.3 | 0 | -4
Russian Federation | 77 | 90 | 78 | 1.3 | -13.3 | -4 | -4
Korea | 72 | 75 | 70 | 1.2 | -6.6 | -3 | -1
Brazil | 87 | 60 | 68 | 1.1 | +13.6 | 3 | -10
Ukraine | 89 | 63 | 68 | 1.1 | +7.4 | 0 | -12
Colombia | 71 | 72 | 68 | 1.1 | -6.8 | -4 | -3
Peru | 76 | 67 | 63 | 1.0 | -6.7 | -3 | -7
Portugal | 50 | 67 | 61 | 1.0 | -9.4 | -5 | 0
Dominican Republic | 56 | 59 | 60 | 1.0 | +2.2 | 0 | -4
Cuba | 49 | 46 | 59 | 1.0 | +27.7 | 3 | 0
Croatia | 19 | 35 | 59 | 1.0 | +69.8 | 16 | 36
Serbia | 26 | 45 | 58 | 1.0 | +29.4 | 3 | 19
Turkey | 65 | 59 | 55 | 0.9 | -6.5 | -5 | -9
Iran | 38 | 49 | 51 | 0.9 | +5.2 | -3 | 4
Greece | 25 | 50 | 47 | 0.8 | -5.8 | -5 | 19
Bangladesh | 42 | 43 | 47 | 0.8 | +7.8 | 1 | -5
Canada | 40 | 44 | 46 | 0.8 | +5.7 | -1 | -1
Afghanistan | 21 | 34 | 45 | 0.8 | +32.2 | 11 | 24
Iraq | 36 | 34 | 43 | 0.7 | +26.3 | 9 | 2
Nigeria | 40 | 43 | 42 | 0.7 | -2.7 | -2 | -5
Nepal | 22 | 39 | 42 | 0.7 | +7.4 | 1 | 20
Algeria | 41 | 40 | 41 | 0.7 | +.9 | -2 | -8
Netherlands | 36 | 37 | 40 | 0.7 | +7.6 | 1 | -1
Slovak Republic | 32 | 42 | 38 | 0.6 | -8.5 | -5 | 0
Egypt | 30 | 40 | 38 | 0.6 | -5.6 | -4 | 1
New Zealand | 42 | 49 | 38 | 0.6 | -22.8 | -14 | -14
Australia | 35 | 31 | 37 | 0.6 | +19.1 | 5 | -4
Bosnia and Herzegovina | 25 | 28 | 35 | 0.6 | +24.9 | 7 | 4
Indonesia | 29 | 36 | 35 | 0.6 | -3.3 | -4 | -1
Lithuania | 23 | 34 | 35 | 0.6 | +2.2 | 0 | 7
Bolivia | 37 | 35 | 34 | 0.6 | -1.7 | -5 | -12
Japan | 36 | 37 | 34 | 0.6 | -8.6 | -9 | -12
OECD | 1 746 | 1 940 | 2 075 | 34.0 | +6.9 |  |
Non-OECD | 3 647 | 3 681 | 4 035 | 66.0 | +9.6 |  |
EU28 | 1 525 | 1 786 | 2 058 | 33.7 | +15.2 |  |
Total | 5 393 | 5 621 | 6 109 | 100.0 | +8.7 |  |
Source: OECD International Migration Database.
StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933396284

Over the period 2004-14, there has been little change in the main countries of origin of new migrants to the OECD area, at least for the top four countries. In 2014, China remained number one although it represented a slightly lower share of all inflows (9%) than in 2013. Romania and Poland take the other places on the podium; Romania is second this year as a result of increased flows to Germany⁵ and to the United Kingdom. India appears fourth again, displaying a 9% increase compared to 2013, as more Indians emigrated to the United States and to New Zealand.

The Philippines was the fifth main country of origin, in place of Mexico whose share had not been so low in decades. Increasing numbers of Italians moved to Germany in recent years, so that in 2014 the level of migration flows from Italy to OECD countries is almost twice as high as in the previous ten years and Italy ranks between the Philippines and Mexico. Other EU countries have witnessed significantly more departures to OECD countries in 2014 than in previous years. Bulgaria for example (+23% compared to 2013) recorded, like Romania, a greater number of departures to Germany and to the United Kingdom. The United Kingdom also received many more French nationals in 2014 than in 2013, as did Israel. France, which has a fairly small diaspora in relative terms, seems to be catching up, as French migration to OECD countries was 40% higher in 2014 than in the previous ten years, and is for the first time larger than that of Germany and the United Kingdom. On the other hand, emigration from Greece and Portugal declined in 2014, and that from Spain was stable. Following its accession to the EU, Croatia showed the second largest increase in outflows to OECD countries in 2014.

The largest increase may have been the dramatic rise in the number of Syrians fleeing their country. However, Syria does not appear in the table due to the great uncertainty as to flow levels to a number of countries, including Turkey. Viet Nam and Thailand also displayed remarkable increases (+22% and +41%, respectively), with Japan as the preferred destination of Vietnamese citizens and Korea for Thailand citizens.

In 2014, Europe consolidated its position as the main region of origin of migrants to OECD countries, before Asia. Africa was the continent of origin of only one in twelve migrants to the OECD area. Just over one in three migrants came from within the OECD in 2014. This share has been stable since 2012, after having risen between 2010 and 2012.

Flows of migrant women

The share of women in migration flows to OECD countries peaked in 2009, when exactly one in two migrants was a woman. Since then this share has gradually declined so that overall, there were 47% of women among migrants to OECD countries in 2014 (Figure 1.11). This can be explained at least in part by the fact that migration for work reasons (within or outside free circulation areas) was at a low in 2009, and that humanitarian migration increased in the recent years – two categories where there are in general fewer women than men. This downward trend is very much a general one, as it is observed in three-quarters of the countries. In particular, the share of women among new migrants decreased sharply in 2014 compared to the preceding five-year period, in Estonia (-5 percentage points), Iceland and Denmark (-4 points each) and Italy (-3 points). Mexico (+2 points), Finland (+1.5), Canada and France (+1 each), are among the few countries that received relatively more women in 2014 than between 2009 and 2013.

Figure 1.11. Share of women in migration flows to OECD countries, 2009-14

Notes: OECD total refers to the total number of female migrants as a proportion of all migrants to OECD countries. OECD average is the simple average of countries in the chart.

Source: OECD International Migration Database.

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395388

In 2014, only eight OECD countries received more migrant women than migrant men. The United States and Ireland are at the top of the list, with 54%. They are followed by Canada, France, Israel and Australia, all at 52%. This can be at least partially explained by the composition of inflows by category. For example, family migration accounts for a large share of flows to the United States, Israel and France. Eastern European countries, as well as Germany, Korea and Austria, are at the lower end of the spectrum, with less than 45%. Looking at gender balance from the perspective of countries of origin, the most feminised outflows come from Asian and Latin American countries, as well as former Soviet republics. This also contributes to Australia, Canada and the United States having high inflows of women.

Foreign-born population

The total foreign-born population living in OECD countries rose to 120 million people in 2014 (Figure 1.12). On average, this represents approximately an additional three million per year since 2000. However, the growth pace decreased over the period 2010-14. Between 2000 and 2010, the foreign-born population gained a little over 3 million people every year, but since then it grew only by 2 million per year. Of these 120 million foreign-born, 46% live in an EU/EFTA country and 35% in the United States. This corresponds to an increase of the foreign-born population in the United States and in the EU/EFTA of 40% and 50%, respectively. The increase in the foreign-born population accounted for 80% of the total population increase in EU/EFTA countries over the period 2000-14.

Figure 1.12. Number of foreign-born in the OECD area, 2000-14

Source: OECD International Migration Database.

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395399

The average proportion of foreign-born persons in OECD countries rose from 9.5% in 2000 to 13% in 2014 (Figure 1.13). With the exception of Estonia, Israel and Poland, all countries contributed to this growth, and half of them saw the share of their foreign-born population rise by more than five percentage points over the period. Among them Luxembourg stands out, with 44% of its population born abroad – an 11-point leap from 2000. Switzerland, Australia and New Zealand follow at 29%. The foreign-born population of Spain is three times larger in 2014 than in 2000, and still represents 13% of the total population despite a declining trend since 2011. Overall, 11.5% of the population living in EU/EFTA countries was foreign-born. On the other hand, Finland, Chile and Korea are still quite below average but have experienced a very strong growth of their foreign-born population, in particular over the recent years.

Figure 1.13. The foreign-born as a percentage of the total population in OECD countries, 2000 and 2014

Notes: Data refer to 2000 or to the closest year with available data and to 2014 or most recent available year. OECD average refers to the average of countries presented. The value for EU/EFTA is the percentage of foreign-born population living in all EU/EFTA countries presented among the total population of these countries. Data refers to foreign instead of foreign-born population for Japan and Korea.

Source: OECD International Migration Database.

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395403

Acquisition of nationality

In 2014, almost two million people acquired the nationality of an OECD country. This is 6% under the figure for 2013 – which had been boosted by the “Intensive File Processing Plan” in Spain – and 3% higher than the 2009-13 average. Aside from Spain, the number of acquisitions of nationality in other EU/EFTA countries was stable at 740 000. US nationality was granted to fewer people in 2014 than any year since 2005 (650 000), and British nationality to fewer than any year since 2002 (125 000). Approximately 130 000 Indian citizens acquired the nationality of an OECD country. The other main countries of former nationality are Mexico, China, the Philippines and Morocco.

Over 6% of foreign citizens living in Sweden obtained Swedish nationality in 2014 (Figure 1.14). Although this is one percentage point less than in 2013, Sweden remains ahead of OECD countries in terms of acquisitions of citizenship as a percentage of foreign population. Hungary and Portugal follow, but with much lower absolute numbers and foreign populations. The Netherlands, Finland, Canada and Ireland all saw 4% of their foreign population become nationals. In New Zealand, Luxembourg and Switzerland, where foreign citizens make up a large proportion of the total population, only 2% of them acquired the nationality of their host country in 2014, slightly below the OECD average (2.5%).

Figure 1.14. Acquisitions of citizenship as a percentage of foreign population, 2013 and 2014

Notes: Data refer to foreign-born instead of foreign population for Australia, Canada, Chile and New Zealand. OECD average refers to the average of countries presented on the figure.

Source: OECD International Migration Database.

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395418

General policy developments

Major revisions in the managed migration framework have not taken place

2015-16 has not seen major framework migration policies introduced in OECD countries. Several countries have established policy guidance documents for upcoming years, but have not announced an overhaul of their entire framework. Japan approved its Fifth Basic Plan for Immigration Control in 2015. The Plan lays out policy priorities in attracting foreign talent, reforming the Technical Intern Training system, and measures against irregular migration and illegal employment of foreigners. Portugal’s “Strategic Plan for Migration 2015-20”, approved in March 2015, makes a number of proposals in the area of immigration and emigration, including a talent scheme and more orientation for seasonal workers, as well as initiatives to attract international students. Romania’s 2014 National Strategy on Immigration also targets highly qualified professionals and students, as well as covering irregular migration and asylum.

Economic migration

The lack of an overall change in systems does not mean that policy has stood still, and labour migration schemes have been revised in a number of OECD countries, generally to favour skilled workers. Denmark and France revised their labour migration systems. In Denmark, a reform of the rules regarding residence permits for the purpose of work and studies entered into force on 1 January 2015. Certain existing schemes and rules were abolished and new schemes and rules were introduced. For instance, the applications under the so-called corporate scheme were no longer accepted from 1 April 2015 as a fast-track scheme was introduced as a replacement. The Danish Green Card scheme was revised to make it more restrictive and to match employer demand more closely. In France, changes to the Aliens Law, first proposed in 2014, were approved and published in 2016. These include changes to the Integration Contract, longer renewal periods, and the creation of a four-year “Talents Passport” for highly-qualified foreigners and their family members.

Procedures have also been changed. Canada introduced Express Entry in January 2015, as the application management system for certain economic immigration programs including the Federal Skilled Worker Program, Federal Skilled Trades Program, Canadian Experience Class and a portion of the Provincial Nominee program. Express Entry is based on a pool of candidates from which applications are drawn and invited to apply. It was meant to make selection and application management more flexible, to respond to labour market and regional needs, and accelerate processing. Points are attributed for age, education, official language proficiency and work experience, and those with a job offer have scored high enough to be picked quickly. There have been adjustments to the system during the first year of operation.

Procedural simplification for labour migration has also occurred in a number of OECD countries. The United States introduced a pilot programme in 2016, “Known Employer”, which allows employers to pre-request eligibility to sponsor individuals under certain employment-based immigrant and non-immigrant visa classifications. Up to nine employers will be invited to file applications requesting that US Citizenship and Immigration Services predetermine that they meet certain requirements that relate to the employer itself (e.g. corporate structure, operations and financial health). Spain adjusted its 2013 Entrepreneurs Act in 2015 to facilitate family reunification for investors, entrepreneurs, highly qualified professionals, researchers and intra-corporate transferees. It also transposed the EU ICT Directive, introducing an “ultrafast track” for handling intra-corporate transferees in companies in strategic sectors, or those satisfying certain volume and performance requirements. These companies register with the “Large Companies – Strategic Sectors Unit” and are exempted from providing evidence of certain requirements for transferring their executives, specialists and trainees. In New Zealand, the list of English language tests accepted for immigration purposes will be expanded in late 2016 from one (IELTS) to include four additional tests, to provide flexibility for immigrants and accelerate procedures.

Measures to smooth permit transitions have been introduced, to give more flexibility to migrants who face difficulty in changing status under current regulations. Estonia introduced a 90 day extension for temporary residents whose permit is expiring to stay on and look for work (double this length for students, researchers and teachers). Foreign workers are now allowed to work for multiple employers as well as temporary work agencies. On 31 December 2015, the United States proposed a number of regulations which would allow job changes for foreign workers whose employment-based Green Card application has been accepted but who have not yet received their Green Card. These measures would smooth the transition from temporary (non-immigrant) to permanent status for those who change jobs after filing applications or who do not manage to receive a Green Card under annual caps. In some countries, flexibility is added to make a category more attractive. Denmark created facilitations for researchers allowing them to work and stay outside Denmark without forfeiting their permit. 

Efforts to better target programmes to the skills sought by OECD countries led to modification in criteria. Ireland made changes to its labour migration system in 2014-15, renaming its permits and modifying criteria and associated benefits. The Irish “Green Card” became the “Critical Skills Employment Permit” and the work permit became the “General Employment Permit”. Lower salary thresholds were created for a number of categories, including graduates on a highly skilled occupation list. Japan made adjustments to its point-based programme for highly qualified foreigners, reducing some of the eligibility criteria and granting indefinite stay to certain highly skilled professionals. Similarly, Korea significantly lowered the salary threshold required for foreign high-tech professionals to obtain a permanent visa. It is now equal to the average national salary, rather than three times as high. Other professional workers now have more opportunities to obtain a temporary visa in Korea through the points system for foreign professionals (F-2-7 visa), which allows faster access to permanent residency.

Labour market tests and safeguards for local workers have increased in some countries. Sweden modified its procedures for work permit applicants, who must now submit their employment offer letter to a local Swedish labour union for comment, instead of waiting for the Swedish Migration Agency to submit it to the labour union. Following an Integrity Review in 2014, Australia has adopted a range of measures to reinforce the integrity of its Temporary Work (Skilled) subclass 457 programme. This includes more stringent requirements in terms of English language knowledge and changes to the labour market test coverage. Australia also made it unlawful for a person to give or receive a benefit in return for a migration outcome in relation to certain skilled work visa programmes.

The United States, Canada and the United Kingdom also took steps to reinforce employer incentives to rely less on foreign workers by raising the cost and complexity of recruitment. In the United States, the H-1B fee increased by USD 4 000 for applicants that employ 50 or more employees in the United States if more than 50% of the applicant’s employees are H-1B or L-1. In Canada, labour market test procedures have been made more strict and a compliance fee added. In the United Kingdom, salary thresholds under the Tier 2 general scheme for skilled migrants will be increased to GBP 30 000 by 2017 from a minimum of 21 000 currently, with some exceptions. Intra-corporate transfers will be subject to a higher salary threshold. Fees will also be increased.

Less skilled workers

While no new large-scale labour migration programmes have been opened for less skilled workers, changes have been made in existing provisions.

In a number of countries, these have aimed at improving access. Chile introduced a simplified employment permit in March 2015, allowing workers to receive a work permit by presenting a valid employment contract. Renewal requires proof of payment of social contributions. Employers are no longer responsible for paying travel or return costs.

Canada reformed its Live-In Caregivers Programme, to lift the requirement to live with care recipients, and divided it into two pathways to permanent residence, depending on the person cared for in the home (a child or those with high medical needs).

Other changes have gone in the direction of making less skilled migration within temporary worker programmes more restrictive. In New Zealand, the labour market test, mandatory for low-skilled workers, has been changed from April 2016. Employers must engage with the authority, Work and Income, before submitting a work visa application. Work and Income provides guidance, reduces uncertainty for employers and streamlines the process of deciding the visa application. Canada introduced a cap on the share of employees who can be Temporary Foreign Workers, to reduce employer reliance on the programme. Slovenia, in transposing the EU Single Permit Directive in 2015, also restricted labour migration to those working on a full time basis. Several exceptions are made, including for those with a higher education degree.

Opportunities for migration for less skilled occupations have opened up, with specific targets, in Japan and Germany. Japan is making a gradual introduction of its programme authorising foreign domestic workers in certain areas. In two regions of Japan, families may now hire foreign domestic workers through agency schemes and subject to prevailing wage requirements. While Japan’s trainee programme is under review, past trainees in the construction and ship-building sector are authorized to return for employment until the 2020 Olympics. Germany activated a channel for labour migration – not subject to skill or education requirements – for citizens of Western Balkan countries. From January 2016, those with a valid contract respecting wage conditions can obtain a work permit, subject to a labour market test. The channel will run until the end of 2018. Those who received benefits as asylum seekers in Germany in the preceding two years, however, are ineligible.

Increased demand for temporary workers in non-professional occupations has led to higher caps. Caps have been raised in New Zealand’s RSE seasonal work programme, from 9 000 to 9 500 in 2015. In the United States, the 2016 Budget contained a provision to exempt H-2B temporary workers identified as “returning workers” from the FY2016 cap of 66 000. This allows H-2B workers who were counted against the cap in FY2013-15 to obtain or renew their visa without counting against the cap.

Korea adjusted its management system for non-professional foreign workers to allow for changes in the quota distribution among firms and sectors. The labour market test requirement was also shortened from two weeks to one week for certain sectors.

Switzerland is examining how to adapt its migration regulations for EU citizens following a referendum in 2014 which imposes numerical limits to be implemented by February 2017. On 4 March 2016, the Federal Council submitted to Parliament several pieces of draft legislation to implement the constitutional provisions on immigration. Since the Federal Council has not yet been able to reach an agreement with the EU – whose nationals would also be subject to ceilings – it is proposing a unilateral safeguard clause to control immigration that will allow it to fix annual limits if immigration exceeds a certain level. In the meanwhile, Switzerland kept its annual quotas for non-EEA labour migrants for 2016 on the same level as in 2015 (2 500 residence permits and 4 000 short residence permits).

In Israel, issues in implementation of bilateral agreements have led to a decline in the inflow of foreign workers in the construction sector, and concerns over the negative effect of foreign workers on local employment persist. A different model is being introduced from 2016. The government will accept expressions of interest from foreign construction companies, which once approved will be able to bring up to 1 000 foreign workers to work on contracted projects.

Labour law is another area where countries have tried to prevent exploitation of foreign workers. New Zealand changed Employment Standards legislation with effect in April 2016. The minimum employment code (which includes minimum wage and paid holidays requirements) covers all workers in New Zealand, whether domestic or foreign, and regardless of visa status (i.e. including people working unlawfully).

Investors/entrepreneurs

Investor schemes have been an area of constant policy activity in OECD countries as models are evaluated and adjusted to provide the maximum return and remain attractive for entrepreneurs. The Netherlands simplified its investor scheme to attract more applicants, with changes to enter into force in July 2016. While the minimum threshold remains the same (EUR 1.25 million), there will be less emphasis on the “innovative” character of the investment. Verification of the origin of capital will be eased and the permit will be extended from one to three years. However, real estate investment will now be excluded.

Australia implemented changes in July 2015 to its investor streams. The Significant Investor (SIV) stream was changed to direct investments away from real estate and government bonds and into venture capital funds and emerging companies, as well as other securities. A Premium Investors programme (PIV) was also created, under which Australia invites a small number of entrepreneurs and talents, nominated by Austrade, to apply. Initially, it will target those in the United States.

Pilot schemes, including “Start Up” visas for entrepreneurs with less capital but with compelling business ideas or talent, have become more common. Denmark introduced a pilot programme for entrepreneurs, capped at 50 annually, to run for three years. In order to qualify for a residence permit under the scheme, the applicant must submit a business plan to a board in the Ministry of Business and Growth, which will assess the potential of the idea. New Zealand launched a “Global Impact Visa” category to enable government to partner with the private sector to attract and support high-impact entrepreneurs, investors and start-ups who do not meet existing requirements. Visas will be capped at 400 over a four-year pilot period. Ireland reduced the investment threshold for its “Start-up Entrepreneur Programme”, from EUR 75 000 to 50 000. The Netherlands introduced a “start up visa” in 2015, for applicants with a sponsor. Recipients receive a one year permit to develop their product or service. Lithuania approved a “start up visa” in 2016, but has not yet implemented it.

Bulgaria in 2014 introduced a simplified procedure for obtaining permanent residence and naturalisation for foreign high net-worth individuals investing in Bulgarian companies, stocks or funds. Investments of over EUR 500 000 grant permanent residence and simplified procedures for naturalisation, while for higher level investments (over EUR 1 million), investors are fast-tracked for naturalisation. Latvia revised its investor visa programme in 2014 to raise minimum investment levels and increase the fees on visa applications.

International students

OECD countries continue to rework their framework for attracting and retaining international students, trying to balance the important role of students in contributing to the higher education system and labour migration channels with the need to ensure compliance with conditions of admission. The Australian Government announced the intended implementation of a simplified student visa framework (SSVF) from 1 July 2016. Key changes include a reduction in the number of Student visa subclasses from eight to two, the introduction of a new single immigration risk framework and the expansion of online visa lodgement facilities. Canada increased compliance measures by limiting international students to designated learning facilities, but also lifted the work-permit requirement for employment during studies. Korea increased the number of hours of employment allowed during study, from 20 to 25.

Other countries have taken measures to ensure that international study is not a burden on local taxpayers. Portugal, from 2014, created an “International Student Status” for third-country nationals who apply from outside Portugal or who have been resident for less than two years, except for those in mobility programmes supported by the Portuguese government or the EU. The highest prevailing tuition is applicable to these students, although tuition fees in Portugal are low in international comparison. In October 2015 the Finnish government introduced tuition fees for higher education students from outside of the EU/EFTA, set by universities with a minimum of EUR 1 500 and binding from August 2017. However, scholarships will be provided, and fees apply only to those studying in a language other than Swedish or Finnish.

Regarding their possibility to remain after graduation, the clear trend in OECD countries has been to make this simpler. In Australia, postgraduates of Australian institutions with a Masters (Research) or PhD in a science, technology, engineering and mathematics (STEM) and information and communications technology (ICT) field will be awarded extra points under the points-tested skilled migration programme, which provides permanent residency. In Norway, from May 2016, facilitations for graduates and researchers have been improved. Work permits for job search will last for 12 months rather than six months, and researchers may receive one at expiration of a prior work permit. Finland extended its post-graduation job-search extension from six to 12 months in 2014.

The Netherlands created a single permit valid for job-search by qualified foreigners (“Orientation Year”). Since 1 March 2016, the one-year permit is available for foreign graduates of a Dutch university or one of a large number of approved foreign universities, and foreign scientific researchers who have carried out their research in the Netherlands.

In the United States, Optional Practical Training is offered as a possibility for post-graduate work. A Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics (STEM) OPT rule was published on 11 March 2016, extending the duration of OPT for STEM graduates by an additional seven months, to 36 months total. For the first time, however, employers of STEM OPT holders are subject to a series of measures (for example, wage and contract conditions must be commensurate with those of similarly situated US workers) and must establish a training programme for the participant.

Lithuania, from 2015, allows international graduates to take up employment in their field of study without having to demonstrate experience. They – as well as some categories of temporary worker – are also allowed to apply for work permits for highly qualified occupations without returning to their home country.

Family and residence

Canada has taken the clear policy position of facilitating family migration. Following the election of a new government on October 19, 2015, the Government of Canada established family reunification as a top priority for the immigration program. It raised the admission target by 17.6%, going from 68 000 in 2015 to 80 000 in 2016, an all-time high. This includes 20 000 parents and grandparents and 60 000 spouses, partners and children. Additional funds were allocated to deal with backlogs. Backlogs for parents and grandparents will be reduced by doubling future parents and grandparents application intake to a maximum of 10 000 applications annually.

Elsewhere, conditions for family reunification have not been eased. In countries with language requirements for family migrants, there has been no tendency to reduce them. The United Kingdom is increasing the English language requirements for non-EEA partners and parents, both for initial admission, permit issuance and after 30 months residence. The requirement will be implemented after October 2016. Fees have also been increased in Denmark. On 1 March 2016 a fee for applying for a family reunification residence permit was re-introduced. At present, the fee is approximately EUR 800.

Free Trade and Bilateral Agreements

Countries have expanded the network of bilateral agreements in which migration plays a role. Some are Free Trade Agreements (FTAs). For example, New Zealand signed an FTA with Korea in 2015, which included three new or amended temporary work policies that offered better access to New Zealand for citizens of Korea. The agreement increases the number of places in the working holiday scheme, allows up to 50 Koreans to receive training and experience in the primary sector in New Zealand, and exempts up to 200 Koreans from labour market tests in applying for work permits in specified occupations. On 20 December 2015, the China Australia Free Trade Agreement (ChAFTA) entered into force, eliminating Australian labour market testing requirements on employers sponsoring certain categories of workers from China.

Working holiday maker agreements are also signed bilaterally. Among the recent agreements are one between Chile and Hungary in 2016, and those between Israel and Australia, Korea and Germany in 2014. Israel also signed a bilateral pilot agreement with Nepal in 2015 for the recruitment of care workers.

Recent development in European migration and asylum policies

While the political guidelines of the President of the European Commission elected in 2014 envisaged to focus the legislative programme of the Commission on the European legal labour migration framework (notably, the reform of the 2009 EU Blue Card Directive on the entry and residence of highly qualified workers), policy changes have been driven so far by the EU response to the unfolding refugee crisis and by the revision of the European asylum system. The year 2015 was marked by the adoption and the implementation of the “European Agenda for Migration” presented by the Commission on 13 May 2015.6 To complement a set of immediate actions aiming at saving lives at sea, targeting smuggler networks, relocating asylum seekers within the EU and resettling Syrian refugees from countries of first asylum, the Commission proposed a set of initiatives based on four pillars: reducing the incentives for irregular migration, strengthening border management, building a strong common asylum policy and establishing a new policy on legal migration.

Building up a European response to the refugee crisis

The so-called Dublin Regulation determines responsibility for the examination of asylum applications, based on the principle that countries of first entry in the European Union would legally be responsible. The considerable inflow that was recorded in 2015, notably in Greece, put this principle under great strain. The Commission proposed to derogate temporarily to the Dublin System and to relocate asylum seekers from Greece as well as Italy to other member states. Moreover, EU member states decided to create “hot spots” in Greece and Italy to support the relocation scheme and facilitate an early identification of people who might not be entitled to protection in the EU.

The EU adopted on 14 and 22 September 2015 two decisions aiming at relocating respectively 20 000 and 140 000 asylum seekers towards the other EU member states, with the financial support of the EU to member states up to EUR 6 000 per relocated person. Those decisions have been extremely difficult to implement. On 18 May 2016, only 1 500 persons had been relocated from Greece and Italy since September 2015.7 After having been outvoted by the qualified majority of member states in favour of the relocation decisions, two member states (the Slovak Republic and Hungary) decided to introduce an appeal to the Court of Justice.

Regarding resettlement of refugees from third countries, the EU Council of Ministers adopted on 20 July 2015⁸ conclusions aimed at resettling 20 000 persons from North Africa, the Middle East and the Horn of Africa in clear need of international protection. By 18 May 2016, the member states had pledged to resettle 22 504 persons and 6 321 had already been effectively resettled.⁹

The flow of asylum seekers and migrants entering the EU through Greece and finding their way through the Balkans to other member states generated strong tensions in the European Union. While Germany continued to welcome asylum seekers without sending them back to the country of entry, several other member states reinforced their border controls and some even re-established checks at their internal borders within the Schengen Area. The Council activated on 12 May 2016 an exceptional circumstances clause in the Schengen treaty to allow member states to maintain internal borders controls for a period of six months (renewable three times up to a maximum of two years). This was motivated by the fact that the overall functioning of the Schengen area was put at risk as a result of persistent serious deficiencies in control of the Greek part of the external borders.¹⁰

The European Union concluded on 18 March 2016 an agreement with Turkey on the management of the refugee crisis that led to a very significant reduction in April and May of the number of people arriving in Greece.¹¹

The Commission, recognising that the crisis had revealed weaknesses in the Common Asylum Policy, proposed reforms on 6 April 2016. Key elements to the proposal are major legislative changes to increase convergence of the rules defining who is eligible for protection and on how asylum procedures are organised. The proposal would enhance the role of the European Agency in charge of asylum (EASO) and revise the Dublin Regulation. While the Commission proposal¹² preserves the system of allocation of responsibility, it includes a corrective allocation mechanism in order to ensure a fair sharing of responsibility between member states in line with the Treaty of Lisbon.

Once a member state has been considered responsible for 150% of its fair share, the corrective allocation mechanism is automatically triggered and the asylum seekers relocated among the member states below that threshold. The fair share of each member state is calculated based on the size of each member state’s population (50% weighting) and the GDP (50% weighting) relative to that of the entire EU. The proposal also allows member states not to take part in that mechanism by compensating the member state that has taken responsibility, at a cost of EUR 250 000 per asylum seeker. This proposal will be examined by the EU institutions under the co-decision procedure and is likely to be subject to intense political debate over the balance between solidarity and responsibility among member states in the Common Asylum Policy.

In addition, the Commission proposed on 7 June 2015 to frame the EU policy on resettlement on the basis of the basis of the 2014 Union Resettlement Programme,¹³ which created the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF). The Fund provides member states with financial support of EUR 6 000 to 10 000 per resettled person.

Reform of European Agencies in the areas of borders and asylum

The European Commission has tabled on 15 December 2016 a proposal aiming at reinforcing Frontex by transforming it into a “European Border and Coast Guard Agency”.¹⁴ Frontex, the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the EU member states, was built to support national agencies. The proposal would transform Frontex into an agency responsible for integrated border management of the EU’s external borders. The goal is to remedy the insufficient power of Frontex that needs the co-operation of member states to act efficiently, in particular by creating a permanent reserve pool of a minimum of 1 500 border guards from the member states that the Agency would be able to mobilise immediately. The most far reaching envisaged provision would give the Agency the power to intervene directly in a member state which does not take action to control its borders or in case of a “disproportionate migratory pressure at the external border risking to jeopardise the Schengen Area”.

However, even if the proposal from the Commission envisages transforming the implementation of EU legislation in the field of external borders into a shared responsibility, member states would retain the primary responsibility for the management of their section of the external borders in their interest and in the interest of all member states. The idea to reinforce the power of the European Agency for Asylum came up in parallel to the proposal related to the Border Agency. The Commission tabled on 4 May 2016 a proposal aiming at transforming the existing “European Asylum Support Office” (EASO) into an EU Agency for Asylum.¹⁵

EU Funding of migration and asylum policies

While the funding of migration and asylum policies is the responsibility of member states in charge of the implementation of European policies, the increasing regulation of these policies at the EU level has corresponded to an increase in the level of EU financial support to the member states. Two funds have been created for the financial period 2014-20: the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF) of up to EUR 3.1 billion, and the Internal Security Fund (ISF) under which border and visa policies are funded up to EUR 3.8 billion. These EUR 6.9 billion are part of the long-term funding foreseen in the projected budget for the 2014-20 six-year period.

EU funding has increased to address the combined effects of the asylum and financial crises at national level. The EU increased the budget in 2015 for the asylum crisis with EUR 801 million by reallocating money budgeted initially for other purposes. Moreover, emergency funding foreseen under the AMIF and ISF has more than doubled for 2016 (from EUR 189 to EUR 464 million). Such a reallocation is testimony to the solidarity from the EU towards member states particularly affected by the crisis, Greece foremost of all. The funds are on top of the budget allocated to each member state under the criteria established by the funding regulations and do not require co-financing from the recipient member states.

Finally, the EU has also adopted a Regulation (2016/369) on 15 March 2016 in order to be able to provide humanitarian assistance to member states in need due to the asylum crisis. The rules on humanitarian aid allow the EU to spend money for humanitarian aid only outside its territory (i.e. in third countries). EUR 700 million has been budgeted for 2016-18.

Relations with third countries

Relations of the EU with neighbouring third countries, in particular with Turkey, have been understandably dominated by attempts to address the asylum crisis.¹⁶

A high level-conference on the Eastern Mediterranean-Western Balkans Route was convened on 25 October 2015, with representatives of 11 States (Albania, Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Romania, Serbia and Slovenia). The final declaration of this conference emphasises that facing the asylum crisis is a “collective responsibility”. A 17-point Action Plan was agreed, covering the following items: permanent exchange of information, limiting secondary movements, supporting refugees and providing shelter and rest, co-operation in management of migration flows, border management, tackling smuggling and trafficking, information on rights and obligations of refugees and migrants, and monitoring of these commitments. The declaration called for the creation of 50 000 additional reception places for asylum seekers in Greece as well as an additional 50 000 other places along the Western Balkans route.

A summit was organised on 11-12 November 2015 in Valletta in the framework of the co-operation between the EU and Africa about migration. An action plan was agreed around five priority domains: improving the development benefits of migration and addressing root causes of irregular migration and forced displacement; legal migration and mobility; protection and asylum; prevention of and fight against irregular migration, migrant smuggling and trafficking in human beings; and return, readmission and reintegration. The action plan identifies initiatives, including some to be implemented by the end of 2016 at the latest. Initiatives include the operationalization of the African Institute on Remittances; the enhancement of civil status registration as a tool necessary for the identification of persons for the purpose of readmission of irregular migrants in their country of origin; pilot projects to pool offers for legal migration by EU member states to selected African countries; the implementation of Regional Development and Protection Programmes in the Horn of Africa and North Africa; the creation of a multi-purpose centre in Agadez (Niger) to assist, inform, register migrants; as well as providing opportunities for voluntary return and reintegration in cooperation with countries of origin.

A Trust Fund for Africa was also created with the aim to address root causes of forced displacement and irregular migration by promoting economic opportunities, security and development, including migration management. The targets are the Sahel Region and Lake Chad Area, the Horn of Africa and the Northern Africa. The budget amounts at the end of 2015 to EUR 1.9 billion.

The European Union and Turkey managed to conclude an “agreement” on 18 March 2016 in the form of a common statement. The complex package deal includes the following elements:

Turkey will take the necessary measures to prevent irregular crossings to Greece and all new persons arriving in Greece as from 20 March will be returned to Turkey. Regarding asylum seekers, this is based on the assumption that Turkey can be considered as a “safe third country” on the basis of article 38 of EU Directive 2013/32 on asylum procedures.

For every Syrian refugee returned from Greece to Turkey, another Syrian will be resettled from Turkey to the EU (the 1 to 1 principle) within the limits of 72 000 persons (this figure is the sum of 18 000 foreseen resettlement unfilled by mid-March 2016, and the 54 000 places for reallocation from Hungary proposed in September 2015 but declined by Hungary).

Turkey will benefit from EUR 3 billion funding projects for the integration of refugees, with a provision for as much as EUR 3 billion more available before the end of 2018 once the initial budget has been spent.

The visa liberalisation for Turkish nationals will be accelerated.

The enlargement process will be re-energised with the opening of new chapters.

Legal migration

Considering in its communication of 6 April 2016¹⁷ that it has “failed to reach its potential as the EU-wide scheme for attracting talented and highly skilled third-country nationals it was meant to be”, the Commission proposed on 7 June 2016 a new EU Blue Card Directive. The Commission also announced a REFIT (regulatory fitness) evaluation that could lead to the codification of the existing instruments in the area of legal migration, and potentially proposals in the area of investors and entrepreneurs.

In the meantime, the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament approved in May 2016 a compromise about the Commission proposal on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals for the purposes of research, studies, pupil exchange, remunerated and unremunerated training voluntary service and au pairing. This new legislation will replace the Students directive 2004/114 and the Researchers directive 2005/71. This legislative reform is part of the efforts of the European Union to attract highly skilled migrants in the global race for talents.

The most important change concerns a right for researchers and students to stay in the member state where they completed their research or studies for a period of at least nine months in order to seek employment or to set up a business. The aim is to retain highly skilled migrants, in particular in the case of those who are supposed to have been well trained in a European university and well integrated due to their studies in one member state. The right for students to work during their studies will be increased to a minimum of 15 hours a week instead of 10 hours under the current Directive 2004/114. The new Directive also contains provisions on the mobility of students who are covered by a EU or multilateral programme or by an agreement between two or more higher education institutions as well as on the mobility of researchers.

The Commission adopted on 24 June 2015 a regulation on the procedure for the issuance of the European Professional Card. The EPC is actually not a card but a proof generated by an on-line tool that the professional qualifications have been recognised. It is for the moment only applicable to five professions (general nurses, pharmacists, physiotherapists, mountain guides and real estate agents) characterised by a high degree of mobility between member states, but it could extended in the future to other professions like doctors and engineers. The Card is meant to support mobility, and both EU nationals and third-country nationals legally resident in the EU may apply for it.

The Commission presented on 8 March 2016 a proposal¹⁸ amending Directive 96/71 of 16 December 1996 concerning the posting of workers in the framework of the provision of services. The proposal is based on the principle that “the same work at the same place should be remunerated in the same manner”. While Directive 96/71 only obliges undertakings to apply the law of the working place to “the minimum rates of pay”, the proposal extends this rule to remuneration (including overtime rates) defined as “all the elements of remuneration rendered mandatory by national law, regulation or administrative provision, collective agreements or arbitration awards which have been declared universally applicable”. Moreover, when posting exceeds 24 months, all the provisions of the law of the working place would apply, except for those which can be derogated from by contract.

Nine member states from Eastern and Central Europe reacted by arguing that the proposal is incompatible with the single market, as pay rate differences constitute a legitimate element of competitive advantage for service providers. Several Western European member states support the position of the Commission. On 10 May 2016, 11 national parliaments of Central and Eastern Europe plus Denmark opposed the Commission proposal on the basis of protocol No. 2 to the Treaties by considering that it does not respect the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality. This so-called “Yellow Card” procedure obliges the Commission to review its proposal. It may decide to maintain, amend or withdraw the proposal but it must give reasons for its decision. The position of the Commission is expected, but no deadline is foreseen for this. It is only the third time since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty that this “Yellow Card” procedure has been used.

Bibliography

Acosta Arcarazo, D. et A. Geddes (2014), “Transnational Diffusion or Different Models? Regional approaches to Migration governance in the European Union and MERCOSUR”, European Journal of Migration and Law, pp. 19-44.

European Commission (2016), “Commissioner Thyssen presents Commission’s Social Package: First outline of the European Pillar of Social Rights and reform of the Posting of Workers Directive”, Brussels, European Commission, 8 March 2016, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-16-682_en.htm?locale=FR.

Lhernould, J.-P., M. Coucheir, S. Fisker, P.G. Madsen and E. Voss, E. (2016), “Study on wage setting systems and minimum rates of pay applicable to posted workers in accordance with Directive 96/71/EC in a selected number of member states and sectors”, Final report, Brussels, European Commission.

OAS/OECD, 2015, International Migration in the Americas: SICREMI 2015, Washington, DC, OAS.

OECD (2015a), International Migration Outlook 2015, OECD Publishing, Paris, http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/migr_outlook-2015-en.

OECD (2015b), Education at a Glance 2015: OECD Indicators, OECD Publishing, Paris, http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/eag-2015-en.

Pacolet, J. et F. De Wispelaere (2015), “Posting of workers: Report on A1 portable documents issued in 2014”, Network statistics FMSSFE, Brussels, European Union.

UNHCR (2015), “Mid-Year Trend 2015”, www.unhcr.org/uk/statistics/unhcrstats/56701b969/mid-year-trends-june-2015.html.

Annex 1.A1.

Supplementary tables and figures

Figure 1.A1.1. Changes in inflows of migrants by country of origin, selected OECD countries, 2004-13 and 2014

Source: International Migration Database.

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395425

Table 1.A1.1. Preliminary trends in migration flows, 2015
| 2014 | 2015 | % change | Period covered | Number of months
Australia | 236 559 | 226 570 | -4 | July-June | 12
Austria | 127 451 | 142 159 | 12 | January-October | 9
Belgium |  |  |  |  |
Canada | 260 265 | 271 662 | 4 | January-December | 12
Chile |  |  |  |  |
Czech Republic | 38 490 | 31 589 | -18 | January-December | 12
Denmark | 64 874 | 75 558 | 16 | January-December | 12
Estonia |  |  |  |  |
Finland | 23 647 | 21 414 | -9 | January-December | 12
France | 145 944 | 145 845 | 0 | January-December | 12
Germany | 1 342 529 | 2 016 000 | 50 | January-December | 12
Greece |  |  |  |  |
Hungary |  |  |  |  |
Iceland | 4 348 | 4 963 | 14 | January-December | 12
Ireland | 49 000 | 57 200 | 17 | May-April | 12
Israel | 24 120 | 27 208 | 13 | January-December | 12
Italy | 248 360 | 250 026 | 1 | January-December | 12
Japan | 65 352 | 71 894 | 10 | January-December | 12
Korea | 75 103 | 80 722 | 7 | January-December | 11
Luxembourg | 21 024 | 22 608 | 8 | January-December | 12
Mexico |  |  |  |  |
Netherlands | 154 193 | 174 303 | 13 | January-December | 12
New Zealand | 80 289 | 91 767 | 14 | January-December | 12
Norway | 61 429 | 59 068 | -4 | January-December | 12
Poland |  |  |  |  |
Portugal |  |  |  |  |
Slovak Republic |  |  |  |  |
Slovenia | 11 311 | 12 665 | 12 | January-December | 12
Spain | 264 485 | 291 387 | 10 | January-December | 12
Sweden | 106 100 | 113 868 | 7 | January-December | 12
Switzerland | 152 106 | 150 459 | -1 | January-December | 12
Turkey |  |  |  |  |
United Kingdom | 551 000 | 547 000 | -1 | January-December | 12
United States | 1 016 518 | 1 050 000 | 3 | October-September | 12
Note: Data for France refer to non-EU countries only.
Source: International Migration Database and national data sources.
StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933396296

Table 1.A1.2. Permanent flows to OECD countries by category, 2014
| Work | Accompanying family of workers | Family | Humanitarian | Other | Free movements
|  | % change 2013-14 |  | % change 2013-14 |  | % change 2013-14 |  | % change 2013-14 |  | % change 2013-14 |  | % change 2013-14
Australia | 61 580 | -2 | 66 970 | 2 | 61 110 | 2 | 13 770 | -31 | 340 | -92 | 27 270 | -34
Austria | 4 900 | 5 | 930 | 20 | 9 670 | 1 | 1 340 | -47 | 300 | 2 | 57 520 | 14
Belgium | 4 770 | 10 |  |  | 23 110 | 4 | 6 150 | 24 |  |  | 59 060 | -4
Canada | 78 040 | 21 | 86 900 | 4 | 66 660 | -16 | 27 640 | -11 | 30 | -39 |  |
Denmark | 7 930 | 0 | 4 190 | 19 | 5 790 | 12 | 6 110 | 57 | 4 820 | 14 | 26 710 | 13
Finland | 1 300 | 5 |  |  | 9 500 | 8 | 2 900 | -5 | 280 | -34 | 9 490 | -7
France | 31 270 | 25 |  |  | 103 880 | -1 | 13 190 | 9 | 22 990 | 7 | 87 610 | -9
Germany | 27 850 | 15 |  |  | 63 680 | 14 | 42 390 | 36 | 5 650 | 133 | 434 890 | 23
Ireland | 3 730 | 55 | 170 | -47 | 2 530 | 24 | 220 | 23 |  |  | 26 180 | 12
Italy | 48 490 | -34 | 1 660 | -34 | 59 740 | -24 | 20 580 | 43 | 5 240 | 6 | 68 390 | -12
Japan | 29 260 | 17 |  |  | 21 380 | 4 | 160 | 0 | 12 750 | 11 |  |
Korea | 1 180 | -26 | 5 170 | 2 | 27 950 | -11 | 630 | 1658 | 40 800 | 43 |  |
Mexico | 10 300 |  |  |  | 21 040 |  | 350 |  | 11 780 |  |  |
Luxembourg | 690 | -39 |  |  | 1 310 | 22 | 240 | 43 | 140 | -16 | 16 460 | 6
Netherlands | 11 950 | -8 |  |  | 20 420 | -3 | 19 430 | 95 |  |  | 72 310 | 11
New Zealand | 11 700 | 15 | 12 200 | 19 | 17 650 | 5 | 3 550 | 5 |  |  | 4 420 | 19
Norway | 3 740 | -3 |  |  | 11 040 | -8 | 5 690 | -15 |  |  | 34 570 | -9
Portugal | 6 410 | 0 |  |  | 10 880 | 13 | 110 | -19 | 6 100 | 88 | 12 380 | 19
Spain | 31 620 | -15 |  |  | 39 100 | -5 | 1 580 | 200 | 9 330 | 7 | 102 100 | 10
Sweden | 3 710 | -4 | 1 490 | -37 | 31 400 | 7 | 35 640 | 23 |  |  | 12 200 | -45
Switzerland | 1 870 | -18 |  |  | 19 510 | -6 | 6 360 | 26 | 3 070 | 53 | 103 780 | -2
United Kingdom | 79 250 | -8 | 37 050 | -1 | 27 370 | 4 | 17 190 | -19 | 22 390 | 1 | 128 210 | 30
United States | 71 400 | -6 | 80 200 | -6 | 645 560 | -1 | 134 240 | 12 | 85 120 | 41 |  |
Source: OECD International migration Database.
StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933396309

Notes

 1. The statistical data for Israel are supplied by and under the responsibility of the relevant Israeli authorities. The use of such data by the OECD is without prejudice to the status of the Golan Heights, East Jerusalem and Israeli settlements in the West Bank under the terms of international law.

 2. Asylum seekers are not included in permanent migration until they have been granted protection status. Therefore, 2014 data include only 2013 and early 2014 asylum requests – that is, before the start of the rise.

 3. In 2013, work permits in Italy granted as part of the 2012 migrant regularisation programme were eventually issued after a long delay. Therefore, the 2013 figure for labour migration was artificially inflated, and in turn the decline in 2014 appears to be much sharper than it actually is (OECD, 2015a).

 4. Recognition rate is defined as the share of positive decisions in the total number of asylum decisions.

 5. The magnitude of the variations of inflows to Germany is one of the abovementioned caveats, as German national data have a broader definition of migrant than most other countries. However, this does not impact the trend.

 6. COM(2015)240.

 7. COM(2016)360.

 8. Document 11130/15.

 9. COM(2016)360, Annex 3.

 10. This decision authorises Austria, Germany, Denmark, Sweden and Norway to continue controls at certain internal borders for a period of six months.

 11. COM(2016)360.

 12. COM(2016)270.

 13. Regulation 516/2014.

 14. COM(2015)671.

 15. COM(2016)271.

 16. See the Joint Communication of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 9 September 2015 entitled “Addressing the Refugee crisis in Europe: the role of EU external actions” (JOIN[2015]40).

 17. COM(2016)197.

 18. COM(2016)128.

Chapter 2.

Labour market outcomes of recent migrants and integration policies in OECD countries¹

The first part of this chapter examines the evolution of migrants’ labour market outcomes over the last years (mainly 2011-15). Particular attention is given to recent migrants, exploring how their labour market outcomes differ from settled migrants and from native-born persons. The discussion highlights cross-country patterns and sometimes diverging trends observed for recent and settled migrants. Results indicate that recent migrants face more difficult labour market conditions than settled migrants.

The second part of this chapter discusses recent changes in integration policies in OECD countries, with a focus on those meant to enhance the efficiency of the integration process and make optimal use of the skills of recent flows of persons in need of protection. Some of these changes have been directly targeted at the growing numbers of asylum seekers and refugees, while others will be to the benefit of all migrants.

Introduction: a focus on recent migrants

Integration is a process over time. At the time of their arrival in a destination country, migrants can encounter considerable difficulties, which might in particular undermine their success on the labour market. With time, however, migrants adjust to their destination country in many ways: by improving their mastery of the local language, by gaining local qualifications or local work experience, by learning how to navigate the local labour market and by establishing contacts. As a result, many migrants eventually find jobs or move to jobs that better match their qualifications and skills. Integration in the labour market can strongly contribute to successful integration more generally.

The first part of this chapter therefore assesses the labour market outcomes of recent and non-recent migrants separately, while comparing them with the labour market outcomes of native-born persons in the respective country. The chapter’s second part reviews latest developments in integration policies in OECD countries, highlighting novel approaches and identifying broader policy trends. Special attention is given to policies towards newly arrived refugees.

Main findings

Migrants’ employment rates stagnated or slightly decreased in most OECD countries between 2011 and 2015, while their unemployment rates often increased significantly. This trend was especially clear in a number of European OECD countries. In the United States and Canada, however, migrants’ employment rates rebounded from decreases between 2007 and 2011.

Recent migrants (who have arrived within the five preceding years) exhibit lower employment rates than settled migrants (who arrived earlier) in almost all OECD countries. Both employment rates typically remain below that of native-born persons.

In all OECD countries with sufficiently detailed data, unemployment rates are found to be higher for recent migrants than for settled migrants. Both unemployment rates exceed the unemployment rate of native-born persons in almost all countries.

Recent migrants aged 15-24 are especially likely not to be in employment, education or training (NEET): their NEET rate typically exceeds the NEET rates of settled migrants and native-born persons in this age group. The NEET rates of settled migrants and native-born persons are generally close to each other.

Employment rates of recent migrants have tended to fall between 2011 and 2015. Large decreases occurred in some countries that were severely affected by the financial crisis. Also, relative to employment rates of settled migrants or native-born persons, employment rates of recent migrants had a tendency to be lower during 2012-15 than during 2008-11.

The employment of migrants has grown more strongly during the recovery from the 2007/08 economic crisis than the employment of native-born persons. Changes in the employment of recent migrants appear to be more volatile than for settled migrants.

Citizenship policy has been at the forefront of integration policy developments. Countries are making continuing efforts to streamline the naturalisation process, to promote take-up of host-country citizenship, and to facilitate naturalisation among certain groups. Alongside this, however, language and other requirements to earn citizenship have been strengthened and new grounds for revocation of citizenship are being discussed in many OECD countries.

Early integration interventions are increasingly tailored to the needs of the individual migrant as well as to the needs of the local community. These targeted integration efforts involve building up more efficient and transparent qualification recognition processes, including for those without proof of their qualifications.

Countries are continuing to increase access and incentives to undertake language training and to improve the efficiency of language tuition through pedagogical development and an enhanced vocational focus.

In the countries most affected by the refugee crisis, existing integration measures targeted at asylum seekers and refugees were stepped up and new measures introduced. In particular, expenditure on education and language courses has been increased in countries with large inflows of asylum seekers and refugees, including in Austria, Finland, Germany, Norway and Sweden.

Several countries have introduced integration policies that target asylum seekers and refugees early on, for instance by reducing waiting times for asylum seekers to enter the labour market or by facilitating early access to language courses and skill assessment already during the asylum process, especially for those with a high prospect to remain.

The majority of OECD countries affected by the refugee crisis have put a strong focus on early labour market integration and Public Employment Services play an important role in delivering integration programmes. Vocational training schemes are increasingly adapted to the needs of asylum seekers and refugees, and have become an important instrument to facilitate labour market integration.

Recent changes in labour market outcomes of migrants in the OECD

Reflecting the high migration inflows in the last few years, Figure 2.1 shows that the share of recent migrants in the working-age population (15-64 years) has grown in a number of OECD countries between 2009 and 2015. In the Nordic countries (Norway, Denmark, Sweden and Finland), rising shares of recent migrants coincided with growth rates above 20% for the foreign-born population of working age. The share of recent migrants in the working-age population also grew in Canada, while it remained stable in the United States. By contrast, the corresponding shares have fallen strongly in some OECD countries that were heavily affected by the financial crisis. In Ireland, Spain, Portugal and Greece, shares fell by more than half. In absolute terms, the decrease was particularly large in Ireland and Spain, where recent migrants had accounted for 10% and 5%, respectively, of the working-age population in 2009.

Figure 2.1. Share of recent migrants in the working age population, 2009 and 2015

Shares of recent migrants in the 15-64 population in 2009 and 2015 and in the 15-64 foreign-born population in 2015

Note: Recent migrants are those who arrived within the five years preceding the survey. Migrants whose duration of stay is unknown are excluded from the totals.

Source: European countries and Turkey: Labour Force Surveys (Eurostat); Australia: Survey of Education and Work; Canada: Labour Force Survey; United States: Current Population Surveys.

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395433

In a number of countries, recent migrants made up substantial shares of the total foreign-born population in 2015. This share was around 20% in Sweden and Austria, following substantial increases in this share between 2009 and 2015. In Denmark, the share of recent migrants rose from 17% in 2009 to 27% in 2015, from 24% to 26% in Switzerland and from 22% to 30% in Luxembourg. At a lower level, the share of recent migrants also increased substantially in Germany over this period, from 12% to 17%. Shares remained roughly stable in the United States and Canada, at 14% and 12%, respectively. While recent migrants are a minority in almost all OECD countries, they accounted for close to all migrants in Poland (92%) and Turkey (87%). In Poland, this is explained by a very low number of settled migrants, while large numbers of recent refugees can explain the figure for Turkey.

In order to examine how recent migrants fare in terms of labour market outcomes, this chapter mainly considers employment rates as well as unemployment rates. In a number of OECD countries, these rates could in principle be affected by the presence of refugees who arrived in 2014 or 2015. However, since many if not most refugees do not yet participate in the labour market, the unemployment rate of recent migrants should not be affected, while the employment rate may have fallen slightly as the number of recent migrants of working-age increased (see also the discussion in OECD, 2015c). The next section begins with a general discussion of migrants’ employment and unemployment rates – defined respectively as the share of working-age persons who are employed and among those who participate in the labour market, the share of working-age persons who are unemployed,  – before the chapter focuses on the outcomes of recent and settled (i.e. non-recent) migrants.

Overall trends in migrants’ labour market outcomes

At 64.5% in 2015, the employment rate of migrants in the OECD area as a whole was roughly the same as in 2014 (64.3%). In most OECD countries, migrants’ employment rates stagnated or slightly decreased between 2011 and 2015, as shown in Panel A of Figure 2.2. This development typically continued the trend implied by changes in the employment rate between 2007 and 2011. It was reflected by often significant rises in migrants’ unemployment rate, shown in Panel B of Figure 2.2. This twin pattern was especially clear for a number of European OECD countries, including France, Italy, Finland, Norway, Luxembourg and Slovenia. In the case of Spain, both the employment rate and the unemployment rate returned in 2015 to 2011 levels, breaking the trend of rapidly worsening labour market outcomes for migrants in this country – in contrast to Greece, where migrants’ labour market outcomes continued to deteriorate. Migrants’ unemployment rate across the whole OECD area remains unchanged at 11.8% from 12.0% in 2014.

Figure 2.2. Employment and unemployment rates by place of birth, 2007, 2011 and 2015

Notes: The population refers to the working-age population (15-64) for the employment rate and to the active population aged 15-64 for the unemployment rate. The data for Canada and Turkey refer to 2008 instead of 2007. Countries are ranked by increasing order of the 2015 values of the foreign-born employment and unemployment rates.

Source: European countries and Turkey: Labour Force Surveys (Eurostat); Australia, Canada, Israel and New Zealand: Labour force Surveys; Chile: Encuesta de Caracterización Socioeconómica Nacional (CASEN); United States: Current Population Surveys; Mexico: Encuesta Nacional de Ocupación y Empleo (ENOE).

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395442

In a number of countries, however, migrants’ employment rates have risen significantly between 2011 and 2015. This includes some countries – the United States, Canada, Ireland, Estonia and Iceland – where migrants’ employment rates had been relatively high in 2007 but had fallen strongly by 2011. While the subsequent rise creates the impression that migrants’ employment rates in these countries have rebounded, they remained below pre-crisis levels (except in Canada). Unemployment rates for migrants in these countries exhibit a similar development: after an initial rise between 2007 and 2011, unemployment rates receded between 2011 and 2015 but stayed above pre-crises levels.

A second group of countries where migrants’ employment rates rose significantly between 2011 and 2015 is made up by the United Kingdom, Hungary and Israel: in these countries, employment rates for migrants were higher in 2015 than in 2007. Migrants’ unemployment rates correspondingly fell between 2011 and 2015 and, with the exception of Hungary, reached lower levels than in 2007. In the special case of Germany, migrants’ labour market outcomes had improved strongly between 2007 and 2011 but stagnated between 2011 and 2015.

The evolution of labour market outcomes for migrants followed similar trends as that for native-born persons in the vast majority of OECD countries, but tended to be more extreme (see Figure 2.2). In some countries severely affected by the financial crisis, such as Spain, Ireland, Estonia and Iceland, migrants’ employment rates had been above the employment rates of native-born persons in 2007, but then fell more strongly and in 2015 ended up below the level for native-born persons. The same switch, albeit through a different development, occurred in Turkey. Unemployment rates were already higher for migrants than for native-born persons in almost all OECD countries in 2007, but migrants’ unemployment rates often increased more over the period 2007-15 than the rates for native-born persons (for example in France, Italy, Denmark and the Netherlands).

In many OECD countries, the risk of long-term unemployment had grown quickly in the period 2007-11, but this development stagnated or reversed in the period 2011-15 (Figure 2.3). This also applies to a number of OECD countries that were severely affected by the financial crisis. Compared to the increase between 2007 and 2011, growth of the risk of long-term unemployment stagnated in Spain, Portugal and Slovenia, and it reversed in Ireland, the United Kingdom and the Slovak Republic. In the United States, Poland and Estonia, the reversal was sufficiently strong to reduce the risk of long-term unemployment to pre-crisis levels. In some OECD countries, however, growth of the long-term risk of unemployment has instead accelerated in the period 2011-15, notably in Greece, France and the Netherlands.

Figure 2.3. The risk of long-term unemployment faced by workers by place of birth, 2007, 2011 and 2015

Note: The risk of long-term unemployment is defined as the share of persons unemployed for more than one year in the labour force aged 15-64.

Source: European countries and Turkey: Labour Force Surveys (Eurostat); Australia, Canada (2008 instead of 2007), Israel, New Zealand: Labour Force Surveys; United States: Current Population Surveys.

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395455

Labour market outcomes by duration of stay

Across OECD countries, a clear pattern emerges in terms of employment rates of recent migrants, settled migrants, and native-born persons, as shown in Figure 2.4. In almost all OECD countries, the employment rates of recent migrants were below the employment rates of settled migrants in 2015. In most countries, the employment rate of settled migrants was in turn below the employment rate of native-born persons. In terms of employment rates, recent migrants therefore fare worst, but their labour market outcomes can be expected to improve with the duration of their stay: while the gap between employment rates of settled and recent migrants might to some extent derive from differences between migrant cohorts, results in OECD (2012) indicate that the employment rate of a given cohort also rises with duration of stay.

In Luxembourg and the Slovak Republic, employment rates of recent migrants significantly exceed the employment rates of settled migrants and also of native-born persons. These cases appear particular because Luxembourg and the Slovak Republic also exhibit some of the highest employment rates of recent migrants. In a number of countries, however, a higher employment rate for settled migrants is observed than for native-born persons. This might reflect that many migrants came to these countries with the goal of finding employment. It is also possible that migrants in these countries are especially strongly selected, which can result from differential staying behaviour: those who are successful on the labour market are likely to stay, while others are more likely to leave. Bijwaard et al. (2014), among others, report evidence of such staying behaviour.

Figure 2.4. Employment rates by place of birth and duration of stay, 2015

Note: Recent migrants are those who arrived within the five years preceding the survey and settled migrants are those who arrived at least five years before the survey. The population refers to the working-age population (15-64). The OECD average excludes Poland.

Source: European countries and Turkey: Labour Force Surveys (Eurostat); Australia: Survey of Education and Work; Canada: Labour Force Survey; United States: Current Population Surveys.

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395467

To take a look specifically at employment rates of recent migrants from Southern Europe, Panel A of Figure 2.5 presents employment rates of recent migrants from EU15 countries as an approximation (these data are not available by individual origin country). While Germany cannot be included here due to missing information on migrants’ origin, recent EU15 migrants exhibited comparatively high employment rates in 2015. With few exceptions, the employment rates of recent EU15 migrants were at least as high as the corresponding rates of recent migrants from new EU member states (that joined the EU after 2003) – and often substantially exceeded them, for example in the Czech Republic, France and Switzerland. The employment rates of both groups were above the employment rates of recent non-EU migrants in all countries shown except Greece and Hungary. Panel A of Figure 2.5 thus indicates that recent migrants from EU15 countries have fared comparatively well on the labour markets of other European countries, which might reflect that many of them were looking for employment, notably those leaving Southern Europe. Recent Asian migrants in non-European countries have not fared as well, relative to other groups of migrants: in the United States, their employment rate was below 50% in 2015, lower than for migrants from Europe or other origins (Panel B of Figure 2.5). The employment rate of recent Asian migrants in Canada was substantially higher but did not reach that of migrants from Europe. A broader overview of labour market outcomes by region of origin is provided in Table 2.A1.1 in the Annex.

Figure 2.5. Employment rates of recent migrants by region of origin in selected OECD countries, 2015

Note: Recent migrants are those who arrived within the five years preceding the survey. The population refers to the working-age population (15-64).

Source: European countries: Labour Force Surveys (Eurostat); Canada: Labour Force Survey; United States: Current Population Surveys.

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395475

An even more pronounced pattern than for employment rates emerges for unemployment rates by duration of stay (Figure 2.6). In virtually all countries, the unemployment rate of recent migrants exceeds the unemployment rate of settled migrants. The latter in turn exceeds the unemployment rate of native-born persons (or matches it, notably in the United States and Canada). This pattern constitutes a mirror image to the pattern found for employment rates: recent migrants again fare worst on the labour market, and while settled migrants fare better, they still fare worse than native-born persons. In addition, the gap between the unemployment rate of native-born persons and that of recent migrants tends to be larger in countries where the unemployment rate of recent migrants is high. For example, this gap reached 18 percentage points in Portugal and exceeded 20 percentage points in France and in Sweden. In all three countries, unemployment rates of recent migrants were especially high (close to 30%).

Figure 2.6. Unemployment rates by place of birth and duration of stay, 2015

Note: Recent migrants are those who arrived within the five years preceding the survey and settled migrants are those who arrived at least five years before the survey. The population refers to the active population aged 15-64. The OECD average excludes Poland.

Source: European countries and Turkey: Labour Force Surveys (Eurostat); Australia: Survey of Education and Work; Canada: Labour Force Survey; United States: Current Population Surveys.

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395481

Many reasons contribute to recent migrants having lower employment rates and higher unemployment rates than settled migrants. The obstacles to migrants’ labour market integration discussed in OECD (2014) appear particularly relevant for recent migrants: low proficiency in the local language, unrecognised formal qualifications, low applicability of skills acquired abroad, lack of access to jobs in the public sector, little knowledge of local standards and customs, as well as lack of networks and employer contacts. As many of these problems can only be addressed over time, recent migrants are more likely to be affected than settled migrants. This does not only make it harder for recent migrants to find employment, but also to keep it: recent migrants might often have to accept temporary jobs or jobs of low productivity that can quickly become unsustainable.

Systematic differences between recent and settled migrants are also observed in the share of persons aged 15-24 who are not in employment, education or training (NEET). As shown in Figure 2.7, NEET rates for recent migrants are typically substantially higher than NEET rates for settled migrants or for native-born persons – especially in some countries heavily affected by the financial crisis, but also in Germany, the Netherlands and Switzerland. While the NEET rates of settled migrants are also at least as high as those for native-born persons (except in Turkey), they are comparatively close. This implies that higher NEET rates for migrants than for native-born persons are driven by especially high NEET rates among recent migrants. The case of Germany shows that the NEET rate of recent migrants can be high while NEET rates for settled migrants and native-born persons are very low. But across most countries, there is a tendency for all NEET rates to rise together. For example, Italy exhibits the highest NEET rate for recent migrants after Turkey, and also the second highest NEET rates for settled migrants and native-born persons.

Figure 2.7. NEET rates by place of birth in selected OECD countries, 2015

Share of the 15-24 population who is not in employment or in education or training

Note: Recent migrants are those who arrived within the five years preceding the survey and settled migrants are those who arrived at least five years before the survey. The OECD average excludes Estonia and Poland.

Source: European countries and Turkey: Labour Force Surveys (Eurostat); Canada: Labour Force Survey; United States: Current Population Surveys.

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395490

The wedge between the NEET rates of recent migrants and those of settled migrants and native-born persons likely reflects the difficulties that many migrants initially face. Migrants who arrived recently have had less time to find a job, a training opportunity or an educational programme. While they are not yet accustomed to the formal and informal institutions of their host country, their search is also likely to be more difficult than for settled migrants and native-born persons. In addition, it is possible that recent migrants who do not eventually find employment or training leave the country, so that they are not counted towards NEET rates of settled migrants.

Have disparities between recent and settled migrants grown or declined?

Over the years 2011-15, employment rates of recent migrants have tended to fall (Figure 2.8). Especially large decreases were observed in some countries severely affected by the financial crisis: in Greece, Italy and Portugal, the employment rate of recent migrants declined by 10-20 percentage points over this period. It declined by around five percentage points in Spain, but also in France, Finland, Norway and the Netherlands. A large increase (by 11 percentage points) occurred in Hungary alongside a moderate increase in Denmark (by 4 percentage points), while increases elsewhere remained small. By this measure, recent migrants thus appeared to fare worse in 2015 than four years earlier, although many OECD countries were in 2011 still affected by the financial crisis.

Figure 2.8. Employment rates of recent migrants, 2011 and 2015

Notes: Recent migrants are those who arrived within the five years preceding the survey. The population refers to the working-age population (15-64).

Source: European countries and Turkey: Labour Force Surveys (Eurostat); Australia: Survey of Education and Work; Canada: Labour Force Survey; United States: Current Population Surveys.

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395507

In order to explore whether the situation of recent migrants has also deteriorated relative to settled migrants, Figure 2.9 depicts the employment rates of recent migrants as percentages of the employment rates of settled migrants. This representation avoids a problem with absolute gaps between employment rates: they can be positive or negative, so that falling employment rates of recent migrants could be associated with both closing and widening gaps to the employment rates of settled migrants. In Figure 2.9, a lower value always represents a lower employment rate of recent migrants, relative to settled migrants. Values above one arise when the employment rate of recent migrants exceeds that of settled migrants, and values below one indicate the opposite case.

Figure 2.9. Ratio of recent migrants’ employment rate to settled migrants’ employment rate, 2008-11 and 2012-15

Notes: Recent migrants are those who arrived within the five years preceding the survey and settled migrants are those who arrived at least five years before the survey. Figures for the United States are based on 2009 and 2011 instead of 2008-11 and on 2013 and 2015 instead of 2012-15. Figures for the Slovak Republic are based on the years 2009-10 and 2013-15.

Source: European countries and Turkey: Labour Force Surveys (Eurostat); Australia: Survey of Education and Work; Canada: Labour Force Survey; United States: Current Population Surveys.

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395516

Figure 2.9 suggests that, relative to the employment rates of settled migrants, employment rates of recent migrants have tended to fall or stay roughly the same in the last few years: the average level for 2012-15 was typically below the average level for 2008-11, or only little above. The ratio fell considerably in Portugal, Greece, Ireland, the United Kingdom and the Czech Republic, while more moderate decreases occurred in Italy, Spain, and the Netherlands. Significant increases were only observed in Austria and in the Slovak Republic. In the latter, the employment rate of recent migrants rose from 1.1 times the employment rate of settled migrants to 1.2 times, due to substantial rises in the employment rates of recent migrants while employment rates of settled migrants remained roughly stable.

The tendency of recent migrants’ employment rates to decrease relative to those of settled migrants has widened the absolute gaps between the two groups. This was observed notably in Portugal, Greece and Spain: in these countries, employment rates of recent migrants were initially already below those of settled migrants and fell more strongly in subsequent years. The widening gap in the United Kingdom was primarily driven by an increasing employment rate of settled migrants. Only in the Czech Republic, the gap shrank as the employment rate of recent migrants decreased towards the level for settled migrants. In both periods, one of the largest gaps arose in France, where the employment rate of recent migrants corresponded to only two-thirds of settled migrants’ employment rate.

An analogous examination of recent migrants’ employment rates relative to the employment rates of native-born persons produces similar results: relative to native-born persons, the employment rates of recent migrants have mostly fallen or stayed the same. Rises were only observed in Germany, Austria and the Slovak Republic. Also in this case, the decreases in recent migrants’ relative employment rates tended to widen the absolute gap between the employment rates of native-born persons and recent migrants. One can conclude that recent migrants in most OECD countries have seen their employment rates fall or stay the same, both relative to settled migrants and to native-born persons. As a consequence, the gaps to settled migrants and to native-born persons have widened in some countries, especially in countries that were heavily affected by the financial crisis.

Different developments in the labour market outcomes of recent and settled migrants might be linked to differences in the demographic composition of these two groups, so that they are differentially affected by overall labour market trends. To examine this possibility, Figure 2.10 characterises recent migrants and settled migrants along a number of important demographic variables. It indicates that, in European OECD countries as well as in the United States, recent migrants are much more frequently aged 15-24 than settled migrants, and much less frequently aged 55-64. Reasons for the high share of young persons among recent migrants include that one is more mobile before starting a family or establishing a career in one particular country. Recent migrants are also substantially more likely than settled migrants to have a high level of education, but less likely to have a medium or low level of education. This might partly reflect the tendency in OECD countries towards tertiary education, which applies especially to young age cohorts and therefore to recent migrants. But also the gains from migration might have been greater for highly-educated persons than for others in the last few years, resulting in an over-representation of highly-educated persons among recent migrants.

Figure 2.10. Demographic characteristics of recent and settled migrants in selected OECD countries, 2015

Note: Recent migrants are those who arrived within the five years preceding the survey. The population refers to the working-age population (15-64).

Source: European countries: Labour Force Surveys (Eurostat); United States: Current Population Surveys.

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395522

In European OECD countries (Figure 2.11 Panel A), employment rates have increased between 2011 and 2015 for migrants aged 55-64 while they have fallen for migrants aged 15-24. The fact that younger immigrants are over-represented among recent immigrants may partly explain the evolution of the outcome in some countries in comparison to settled migrants. By contrast, the decreases in employment rates of migrants with a low education level alongside increases in employment rates of highly-educated migrants are likely to favour more recent migrants relative to settled migrants.

Figure 2.11. Changes in labour market outcomes by demographic group and country of birth, in selected OECD countries, 2011-15

Percentage points

Notes: The reference population is the working-age population (15-64), including for unemployment rates. Thus the sum of the employment rate and the unemployment rate gives the participation rate. “Low-educated” here refers to less than upper secondary attainment, “Medium-educated” to upper secondary and post-secondary non-tertiary, “Highly-educated” to tertiary.

Source: Panel A: Labour Force Surveys (Eurostat). Panel B: Current Population Surveys. Panel C: Labour Force Survey. Panel D: Labour Force Survey.

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395530

For the United States, Figure 2.11 suggests substantial improvements in labour market outcomes across all demographic groups (Panel B), and for native-born persons as well as migrants. This “universal” improvement in labour market outcomes aligns with the earlier finding for the United States (see Figure 2.9) that the difference between the employment rates of recent and settled migrants was roughly the same in 2012-15 as in 2008-11. Figure 2.11 shows that employment rates rose and the shares of unemployment in the working-age population fell strongly between 2011 and 2015, while participation rates mostly decreased by up to two percentage points. Since unemployment in many cases fell more strongly than employment rose, the fall in unemployment partly resulted from some persons changing from unemployment to non-participation (the discouraged worker effect).

Trends in the employment of migrants

This section discusses changes in the level of migrant employment, with special attention given to employment levels of recent migrants. As opposed to migrants’ employment rate, their employment level is not scaled by the migrant population of working-age (15-64). Variation in total foreign-born employment therefore reflects both the effects of in and out migration and the effects of the business cycle.

Figure 2.12 shows the development of native-born and migrant employment levels, indexed to the beginning of the financial crisis in 2007/08. With the exception of employment levels in Australia, all levels decreased initially but eventually moved to a rising trend. By 2012, however, employment levels for all four migrant groups exhibited more strongly rising trends than employment levels of the native-born persons in the respective countries.

Figure 2.12. Quarterly employment by place of birth in selected OECD countries, 2007-15

Index 100 = Q3 2007 (the United States) or Q3 2008 (Australia, Canada and Europe)

Notes: The population refers to the working-age population (15-64). Switzerland was excluded because quarterly data are available since 2010 only.

Source: European countries: Labour Force Surveys (Eurostat); Australia, Canada: Labour Force Surveys; United States: Current Population Surveys.

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395544

However, due to structural and compositional differences, migrant employment might also be more volatile in response to business-cycle changes than native-born employment. For example, in the case of the United States, migrant employment fell more than native-born employment from the third quarter of 2007 to the first quarter of 2010 (see Figure 2.12); two years later, migrant employment in the United States was recovering faster than native-born employment. OECD (2009) analysed the sensitivity of immigrant employment in the context of the 2007/08 economic crisis and the relative importance of various explanatory factors (e.g. concentration in certain industries, low seniority and less protective types of contract, selective lays-off). Dustmann et al. (2010) also find for Germany and the United Kingdom that unemployment levels of migrants, especially of migrants from non-OECD countries, reacted more strongly to the business cycle. With a focus on the financial crisis, Hoynes et al. (2012) report stronger crisis effects on the employment of men, ethnic minorities, young persons and those with a low level of education. This pattern is found to be robust over crises in the last few decades.

Recent migrants likely play an important role for the cyclical behaviour of migrant employment, since they are arguably more exposed to changes in labour market conditions than settled migrants. In a cyclical downturn, recent migrants might be more likely to become unemployed because they are on average less established in their current job than settled migrants. Lack of language proficiency and firm- or market-specific know-how might limit the productivity of many recent migrants, so that their jobs are among the first to become unsustainable in a difficult business climate. Recent migrants might also be less protected by any kind of formal status only obtained after several years of tenure or residence. In all these respects, settled migrants could be in a much more advantageous position, comparable to that of native-born persons.

Table 2.1. Ten industries with the largest changes in foreign-born employment by duration of stay, in selected OECD countries, 2011-201

Notes: Recent migrants are those who arrived within the five years preceding the survey and settled migrants are those who arrived at least five years before the survey. The population refers to working-age population (15-64). Panel A: Industries are derived from the Statistical Classification of Economic Activities in the European Community (NACE) Rev. 2. Panel B: Industries are derived from the 2002 Census Classification.

Source: Panel A: Labour Force Surveys (Eurostat); Panel B: Current Population Surveys.

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933396310

In turn, the employment of recent migrants might receive a greater boost from a cyclical upturn than the employment of settled migrants or native-born persons. As documented by Hall (2005), the rate at which job seekers find employment is highly pro-cyclical. For several reasons, recent migrants might be very frequent among job seekers, so that recent migrants benefit strongly from improving conditions for job seekers. Many recent migrants will be job seekers because they have not yet found employment, have only found temporary employment or because they look for better opportunities. They may be less invested in any particular industry, region or occupation, so that they are more willing to adjust to the labour market. For example, results in Poeschel (2016) indicate that recent migrants from outside the EU are considerably more likely than settled non-EU migrants to move from one EU country to another. In addition, job growth likely attracts migrants to the country in the first place. Therefore, the number of recent migrants who are present in the country can rise in response to a cyclical upturn.

It is highlighted in OECD (2015b) that migrants’ sectors of work can partly explain their exposure to the business cycle and to effects of the financial crisis: employment contracts in sectors such as hotels and catering might be more flexible, and sectors such as construction might see larger swings in demand. In both the United States and in European OECD countries, the construction sectors saw the largest employment declines in the aftermath of the financial crisis (see OECD, 2015b). Given the important role of sectors, Table 2.1 lists the detailed sectors that drove employment gains and losses of recent and settled migrants. Table 2.A1.2 in the Annex provides migrants’ distribution over broad sectors.

The ten detailed sectors with the largest changes of employment overlap only to a limited extent between recent and settled migrants in European OECD countries (Panel A of Table 2.1). While both recent migrants and settled migrants have found employment in education or in services to buildings and landscape activities, for example, employment of recent migrants in specialised construction activities and in manufacture of motor vehicles grew while it fell for settled migrants. The overlap appears larger for employment gains of recent and settled migrants in the United States (Panel B), but smaller for employment losses. Also in this case, employment changes are sometimes diverging: while employment of recent migrants rose in publishing industries, it declined for settled migrants. Similarly, there were employment gains for settled migrants in hospitals, but employment losses for recent migrants.

Importantly for the discussion of business-cycle effects in this section, the percentage increases and decreases for recent migrants seem to be systematically larger than for settled migrants. This notably also applies to detailed sectors that appear on both sides of Table 2.1. In European OECD countries, employment gains for recent migrants were 32% in education and 27% in services to buildings and landscape activities compared with employment gains for settled migrants of respectively 18% and 20% in the same detailed sectors. Employment losses among recent migrants include decreases by 11% in financial services, 32% in activities of extraterritorial organisations, and 21% in construction, compared with respectively 6%, 3% and 7% for settled migrants in the same detailed sectors.

A corresponding pattern arises in the United States. Recent migrants saw employment gains of 49% in professional and technical services, 32% in construction, 51% in health care services, 15% in education, 8% in retail trade and 17% in transportation and warehousing, as well as an employment loss of 37% in primary metals and fabricated metal products. Most corresponding percentage changes in the employment of settled migrants were substantially lower, and roughly equal in two cases. This pattern gives a hint that recent and settled migrants do not simply respond differently to the business cycle because they work in different sectors. It also seems that, in the same detailed sectors, the employment of recent migrants tends to be more volatile than that of settled migrants.

In conclusion, the first half of this chapter has presented evidence that recent migrants typically have less favourable labour market outcomes than settled migrants. Their employment rates have mostly fallen or stagnated in the last years, relative to the employment rates of settled migrants and native-born persons, so that gaps between the two groups often widened. The rates of young persons not in employment, education or training are especially high among recent migrants. The employment of recent migrants appears to be more volatile than for settled migrants, likely because of a greater exposure to business cycle effects. These results underline that recent migrants might require special attention in integration policies, while policies tailored to settled migrants could fail to address the quite different situation of recent migrants. This chapter next proceeds to presenting the latest developments in integration policies across OECD countries, including those targeting recent refugees and asylum seekers.

Recent changes in integration policies in OECD countries

Throughout the second half of 2015 and into 2016, large flows of asylum seekers have put heavy pressure on the integration systems of many OECD member countries, particularly those in Europe. However, alongside newly-introduced integration measures targeted particularly at the growing numbers of asylum seekers and refugees, integration policy in OECD member countries has been evolving on many levels. This section provides an update on these recent policy changes in OECD countries as well as in Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, and Romania.

OECD countries are streamlining the process of naturalisation

Access to the host-country nationality is an important instrument of integration policy. Throughout 2015, a plethora of changes have been made to naturalisation laws across OECD member countries. Many countries are making efforts to streamline the naturalisation process and to promote take-up of host-country citizenship, while other countries are focusing efforts on facilitating naturalisation among certain groups.

Reforms to Canada’s Citizenship Act, which came into force in mid-2015, have resulted in faster processing of applications for Canadian citizenship. The legislative changes were intended to strengthen the attachment of newcomers to Canada and to help ensure new citizens are prepared for participation in Canadian society. Switzerland has made efforts to facilitate naturalisation through harmonising application procedures and, in 2014, a new law was passed, reducing the duration of residence required before application for naturalisation from 12 to 10 years. In Bulgaria, on the contrary, various institutional changes may render the system more complex. Alongside the Citizenship Council at the Ministry of Justice, which is currently tasked with reviewing citizenship applications, a further advisory council has been established to re-review applications before final decision is made.

Elsewhere, countries such as the United States, Portugal and New Zealand have made efforts to promote take-up of naturalisation. To this end, the United States is exploring ways to address the barriers that currently impede take-up of citizenship, including: permitting the use of credit card fee payment; exploring a partial fee waiver, and conducting a media campaign to promote English language learning for citizenship, increase education on the rights and responsibilities of citizenship, and encourage application for US citizenship (see Box 2.1 for details and further efforts). In Sweden, efforts to promote naturalisation have included municipal-organised ceremonies for new Swedish citizens to celebrate their new citizenship.

Box 2.1. The White House Task Force on New Americans

In November 2014, US President Obama established a White House Task Force on New Americans, an interagency effort to identify and support State and local efforts at integration that are working and to consider how to expand and replicate successful models.

Since its creation, the Task Force has been prominent in highlighting local models of success and building co-operation across cities, counties, or towns that strive to bring immigrants and native-born residents together to create a positive environment for all. In April 2015, the Task Force unveiled a first-time National Integration Plan, providing a detailed strategy to build upon efforts undertaken across federal agencies and in collaboration with state and local entities. The focus of activities outlined in the plan has been on:

1. Building welcoming communities

Believing that much of integration occurs at the local level the Task Force has put substantial emphasis on building local capacity and encouraging initiatives that build bridges among immigrants and receiving communities. To this end the Task Force is working with local governments to develop and implement integration strategies tailored to their communities’ needs and is providing resources and models to enable local communities welcome their immigrant populations.

2. Strengthening existing pathways to naturalisation and promoting civic engagement

Task Force efforts to promote naturalisation among immigrants have included national multilingual media campaigns to raise awareness about the rights, responsibilities and importance of citizenship as well as to raise awareness of citizenship preparation tools. In support of this funding for the development of local citizenship preparation programmes has been provided by the US Citizenship and Immigration Services and the Task force has worked to collect inspirational stories of new Americans who have acquired citizenship and investigating the provision of mobile immigration services. Alongside this the taskforce has made efforts to engage immigrants in civil society activities.

3. Supporting skill development, and fostering entrepreneurship and small business growth

To highlight and enhance the extent to which New Americans contribute to the economy of the United States, the Task Force has been promoting the economic integration of immigrants and refugees through the provision of small business training courses, and campaigns to highlight the stories of successful entrepreneurs. In addition the Task Force has released a toolkit to help states and localities to develop immigrant-focused career-pathways programmes and the provision of information on workers’ rights.

Many countries have facilitated access to citizenship for certain groups and increasingly allowed dual citizenship

Over the course of 2015 many OECD member countries have made amendments to their citizenship laws to facilitate access to citizenship among certain groups. Principal among these groups are the children of migrants and changes in this ilk have been undertaken in Sweden, Greece and Germany. Amendments to the Swedish Citizenship Act have extended the right to automatically transfer Swedish citizenship irrespective of whether it passes through the mother or the father such that, from mid-2015, a child always becomes a Swedish citizen at birth if one parent is a Swedish citizen. In Greece, reforms to the Greek Nationality Code have provided for access to Greek citizenship among minors whose parents lawfully reside in Greece as well as for those who have attended nine years of compulsory education or who have graduated from a Greek university or technical college in the past three years. Along similar lines, a draft law in Italy, if passed by the upper legislative chamber, will enable the acquisition of Italian citizenship for the children of immigrants born in Italy to parents in possession of an EU long term residence permit. These changes will also apply to children who arrived before the age of twelve, who have completed school in Italy and have resided in Italy for at least five years.

In Estonia, amendments to the Citizenship Act of 2014-15 have facilitated access to Estonian citizenship. Young immigrants who, if they have lived in Estonia for eight years, and are not a permanent resident of another country, may now apply for Estonian citizenship when turning 15 even if they have not held a residence permit for the full eight years. At the same time, those over 65 will now be exempt from the written component of the language exam. In Spain, a law granting the right to Spanish citizenship for descendants of Sephardic Jews has been passed.

Alongside the facilitation of access to citizenship for certain groups, elsewhere countries such as Denmark, Latvia and the Czech Republic have made moves to allow migrants to naturalise without requiring them to renounce their previous nationality – that is, to hold dual (or multiple) citizenship. In Germany, the children of immigrants raised in Germany, will now be able to maintain dual nationality as long as, by their 21st birthday, they have lived in Germany for eight years, and attended a German school for six years or completed vocational training. Previously, such children of immigrants were obliged to choose only one citizenship upon turning 23.

Alongside this, however, language and other requirements to earn citizenship have been raised

While many OECD countries are working to promote and facilitate the acquisition of citizenship, there is a concurrent trend in tightening the requirements for naturalisation. These are largely focused around strengthening language requirements, as in Spain, Portugal and Norway, and in some cases have extended the period of legal residence required before applying for citizenship becomes possible. In this ilk, the Netherlands are considering extending minimum residency requirements for naturalisation from five to seven years, while in Denmark, the requirements for obtaining Danish citizenship have been strengthened on a number of tangents. In late 2015, the Danish Parliament passed changes including higher language requirements, a higher passing mark on the citizenship exam and proof of self-sufficiency for 4.5 of the previous five years.

Elsewhere, Canada has increased the fees involved in applications for citizenship with the goal of transferring more of the cost of the service towards the applicants themselves, and in Bulgaria, where fears over misuse of the provision giving access to citizenship following a large investment in the country have prompted debate regarding the size and the form of requisite investment.

New grounds for citizenship revocation have been introduced

Several OECD member countries are also considering circumstances under which citizenship should be revoked. Reforms to the Canadian Citizenship Act have created more tools to prevent fraud and new grounds for the revocation of Canadian citizenship while in several other OECD member countries, fears of radicalisation among migrants and their children have prompted legislative changes to strip dual nationals involved in terrorist activities of their citizenship. Proposals of this type have been introduced in the Netherlands, proposed in Australia, and are discussed in other countries as well, such as in Norway. In a similar vein, the United Kingdom has proposed measures to allow the Home Office to strip dual nationals who are convicted of sexual crimes from their UK citizenship. In France, however, plans to strip convicted terrorists with dual nationality of their French passports have been abandoned in response to concerns that such measures risk discriminating against those holding dual nationality.

Integration activities are frequently tailored to the needs of the migrant

While naturalisation is an important step in the integration process, clearly integration efforts must start long before this. It is now widely acknowledged that effective integration depends critically on early intervention. Future integration pathways are heavily dependent on early access to integration measures – including language training, labour market training, job search and, in some cases, civic orientation. Despite the emergent consensus regarding the importance of such multi-faceted integration efforts, the approaches adopted by OECD member countries in the provision of such integration activities have differed along a number of tangents.

The first respect in which integration programmes have differed from country to country is the extent to which these programmes are tailored – tailored either to the needs of the migrant, to the needs of the local labour market, or to both. While many of the Nordic countries have, for some time, made efforts to tailor their integration efforts to the needs of the individual migrant, this approach has been gaining momentum across the OECD – including Estonia and Poland. And while some countries tailor the content of integration programmes to the skills, education and experience of the migrant, others have also tailored the duration of activities. In Denmark, for example, migrants who lack basic skills may extend language training beyond the three-year introduction programme for up to an additional two years. Through the development of its integration plan “Living Together 2015”, the Czech Republic has outlined plans to make the composition of integration measures contingent upon the period and purpose of an individual’s stay in the country.

A second way in which integration activities can be tailored is to adapt them to the local context. Several countries – including Sweden, Denmark and to some extent Norway – have made efforts to settle newly-arrived migrants in localities where their skills are demanded on the local labour market. Another approach taken for example in Portugal, has been to tailor the content of integration activities to the needs of the local labour market. With the support of the European Integration Fund, in 2015, 19 Portuguese municipalities approved integration plans that are adjusted to local specificities – these plans are to incorporate elements of professional training, entrepreneurship support, and mentoring.

The approaches of OECD member countries to the design of their integration programmes have also differed in the extent to which participation is voluntary, or whether social benefits depend on participation – as in many Nordic countries and more recently in Poland. Some countries, such as Finland, are increasingly involving private actors in the procurement of integration services – such as language training and job-search support – and considering innovative financing mechanisms that are based upon integration outcomes.

Streamlining qualification recognition

Beyond general introduction programmes, which are frequently targeted at humanitarian migrants and their family, many OECD member countries have also instated new integration policies targeting those migrants who bring skills, education and experience with them to their host country. While, over the past decade, skilled labour migration has increasingly been used by many OECD countries to help fill skill shortages, family migrants and many of those who arrive seeking international protection also frequently have valuable skills. These migrants, however, may need additional support in identifying appropriate employment and in translating their skills and education so that they can be interpreted by local employers.

The possibility to have foreign qualifications recognised exists across the OECD. However, in many member countries the process can be a long one and, involving many actors, can be off-putting in its lack of transparency. Recent policy development in the field of qualification recognition has therefore focused on speeding up the process, streamlining the recognition system and raising awareness of recognition procedures.

Several OECD countries have taken steps and launched new initiatives to speed up the recognition procedure. A prime example of an innovative approach to this is provided by Norway which, in 2014, launched a “turbo evaluation” to help employers to evaluate job applicants with foreign higher education credentials in non-regulated professions. While the evaluation is not legally binding, the online procedure enables employers to ascertain, within five days, whether or not the qualification is equivalent to a Norwegian degree.

In Sweden, newly-launched Fast Track initiatives, which began operating in early 2016, go beyond qualification recognition to develop a comprehensive package of measures to speed up the entry of skilled immigrants into shortage occupations. The sector-specific initiatives begin by mapping, validating and bridging the skills of programme participants in their mother tongue, while at the same time offering language tuition alongside these activities. A key difference with previous initiatives of this type is that Swedish language skills, a requirement that, in the past, has substantially slowed down bridging and limited the number of eligible participants, will not be required prior to the commencement of validation and bridging efforts. Fast Track discussions are currently ongoing in 14 sectors covering 20 different professions, including a number of licensed professions such as physicians, pharmacists, dentists, nurses, teachers and kindergarten teachers. For blue collar workers, Fast Tracks have been agreed for painters, butchers, chefs and professional drivers as well as for construction engineers and industrial engineers.

Raising awareness, enhancing transparency and facilitating recognition for those without proof of their qualifications

Given that procedures often vary with the profession, the level and type of degree, and even across the country, the recognition process can be difficult to navigate for newly-arrived migrants. As a result, streamlining the process, to enhance efficiency but also increase transparency, has been an emergent trend in OECD member countries in recent years. Towards this end, both Ireland and Sweden have made substantial efforts to restructure and simplify the recognition of foreign qualifications. Indeed, in recent years, both countries have created new co-ordinating bodies to streamline the process. In Sweden, the result of the institutional reorganisation has been that in 2014 the newly-created agency saw the highest number of requests for assessments of foreign qualifications that had ever been recorded in the country. Likewise, Bulgaria has removed some of the administrative procedures to allow for more flexibility in the recognition process.

Alongside simplifying the recognition process, other countries have been strengthening efforts to raise awareness of the benefits of recognition through awareness campaigns. In Portugal, the new “Strategic Plan for Migration – 2015-20” incorporates measures to strengthen awareness campaigns – undertaken both at universities and in National Centres of Integration.

Countries have also been developing recognition systems that do not require formal documentation in order to facilitate recognition for those migrants who have no proof of their qualifications – frequently those who migrated on humanitarian grounds. Countries at the forefront of these efforts include Norway, where the Recognition Procedure for Persons without Verifiable Documentation utilises a combination of academic assessments, home assignments, and a mapping of work history. Similarly in Germany, the Professional Qualifications Assessment Act has created a “qualification analysis” which assesses skills, knowledge and capabilities on the basis of work samples. In addition, the German Federal Employment Agency has designed a pilot project with funding from the Federal Ministry of Education and Research to support those undertaking analysis of qualifications through decentralised training sessions, individual consultations, and knowledge management tools. In the Netherlands, the Dutch Centre of Expertise for International Credential Evaluation has worked with refugee organisations and the business community to develop a credential evaluation instrument from the information provided by refugees.

Countries are working to increase access and incentives to undertake language training…

Language training remains a central component of integration efforts across OECD member countries, and there is an increasing move to strengthen this element. In many countries, language classes have, for a long time, been at the heart of introduction activities. In others that have not traditionally been major immigrant destinations – such as Estonia – or have previously had linguistically homogenous immigrant populations – such as Spain – language tuition is only gradually coming to the forefront of integration efforts. In Spain, the evolving composition of the migrant population has meant that language training has become a primary focus of integration policy. And as already mentioned, since 2015, knowledge of Spanish is a requirement for the acquisition of citizenship. In a similar vein, alongside efforts to expand access to language training, Portugal has increased the level of proficiency required to obtain Portuguese citizenship.

… to strengthen the pedagogical basis of language tuition…

Alongside enhanced access to language training, OECD member countries are increasingly concentrating on the quality of the pedagogical tuition. In Sweden, the government has announced its intention to combine the teaching of Swedish for immigrants with other relevant education, such as upper-secondary vocational education. As part of these efforts, the provision of Swedish for immigrants will, in the future, be undertaken within the municipal adult education system and the National Agency for Education has been tasked with drawing up a new syllabus for Swedish as a second language and developing new modular courses in municipal adult education at the basic level. In Luxembourg, new pedagogical tools have been developed. These include teacher training courses, publications and the development of a new interactive website for sharing information between teachers in charge of newly-arrived pupils. In an attempt to increase national consistency in the quality of language tuition, Citizenship and Immigration Canada has introduced a number of changes to language programming and is currently developing a standardised national test.

… and to enhance the vocational focus and flexibility of language learning

The previous dichotomy between policies targeted towards the education of migrants and policies targeted towards labour market integration is becoming increasingly obsolete when it comes to the development of integration policy. Nowhere is this more true than in the field of language learning. While on-the-job language study remains limited, vocationally-oriented language courses able to provide the vocabulary needed for certain professions, and language learning options that are flexible in terms of location, timing, and structure are increasingly being adopted to enable migrants to combine work with their language study.

There has been a great deal of change in the field of integration policy over the course of 2015-16. Many of the changes outlined above have been prompted, or their introduction accelerated, in light of the large flows of asylum seekers that arrived in OECD countries in the latter half of 2015. And while the policy developments outlined above largely affect all immigrants, others are targeted specifically at these asylum seekers and refugees. These more targeted policies are outlined below.

Recent policy changes to foster the integration of refugees and their children

In 2015-16, many OECD countries in Europe have implemented policies to respond to the unprecedented inflow of persons seeking asylum. While there have been significant changes with regards to asylum legislation and border controls, integration measures have become an increasingly important aspect of countries’ policy responses.

This section therefore puts its focus on recent changes in integration policy for those who are in the process of applying for asylum (asylum seekers) or have been granted asylum or some form of subsidiary or temporary protection (refugees or humanitarian migrants). More specifically, the section maps out general trends in integration policies for refugees and asylum seekers across the OECD in 2015 and early 2016 and then provides an overview of the most important policy developments in the areas of housing, language and education, labour market integration, and civic education.

Policy responses across the OECD have been rather mixed for a variety of reasons. First, not all countries are equally affected. Some countries have only experienced a moderate or no increase in asylum applications, and subsequently adjusted their integration policies marginally, if at all. Other countries such as Austria, Finland, Germany, Norway and Sweden have experienced much larger inflows of asylum seekers in 2015-16 and as a response often adapted or rolled out integration policies. Other countries, including Hungary and Slovenia, were predominantly transit countries. Turkey hosts worldwide the largest number of people in need of international protection. Syrians in Turkey are not granted refugee status but instead are admitted to the country under a temporary protection regime. Greece and Italy, as the first countries of entry in the European Union, were also strongly affected.

In 2015, a number of general developments could be observed, which are discussed in more detail below. A considerable number of countries have implemented integration measures that target asylum seekers and refugees early on, for instance by opening up integration programmes to asylum seekers. Furthermore, many governments have increased co-operation with other governance levels, social partners, the private sector and civil society as a reaction to the humanitarian crisis. Housing and dispersal policies have been at the centre of attention as several OECD countries with high inflows of asylum seekers had to tackle housing shortages. In addition, there have been attempts to avoid the concentration of asylum seekers and refugees in disadvantaged areas. In the policy area of education and language learning, most OECD countries with large numbers of newcomers have increased expenditure on education, hired more teachers and expanded language courses for adults. Public Employment Services continue to play an important part in the integration process, as most OECD countries consider the labour market integration of refugees, and in some cases asylum seekers, a top priority. To this end, adapting vocational training schemes to the needs of asylum seekers and refugees has become an increasingly widespread policy response to facilitate entry into the labour market. Lastly, also as a reaction to higher numbers of asylum seekers and refugees from non-European countries, civic integration measures have been rolled out, often with a focus on gender equality.

Early interventions are becoming more prominent

In order to start integration early on, a large number of countries, including Germany, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Finland, Denmark and Sweden, have changed legislation in the past year that opens up or facilitates access to certain integration measures for asylum seekers, granting, for instance, earlier access to the labour market and skill assessment programmes. However, in many cases, for instance Germany, access is only granted to asylum seekers with good prospects to remain. Often, these early intervention measures have been framed as necessary to ‘not waste time’ and as a lesson learnt from previous refugee cohorts for whom delayed access to integration measures has yielded unfavourable integration outcomes, particularly with regards to finding employment.

Belgium, Bulgaria, Germany, the Czech Republic and Italy, for instance, have recently reduced waiting periods for asylum seekers to access the labour market. Although in practice asylum seekers can face bureaucratic hurdles such as applying for a work permit or having to pass a labour market test, it might indicate a growing awareness that integration is most effective when initiated early on. By summer 2016, Germany will decide on a legislative proposal that seeks to abolish labour market testing for asylum seekers for a period of three years to reduce bureaucratic hurdles for employers. Prior to this change, the Employment Agency was obliged to check whether there are any German or EU nationals registered with them who are suitable for the job and would then be given priority.

In addition, a number of countries have started to assess the skills of asylum seekers already in reception centres to speed up the pathway to employment later on. For example, Finland, Denmark and Germany (in the case of Germany only for those with good prospects to remain) are working on rolling out such programmes on a national scale. In Finland, for instance, government agencies will assess language skills, educational background and professional experience of asylum seekers in reception centres and share the assessment with the municipalities where they will be settled once asylum is granted. The Netherlands and Sweden have introduced pilot projects.

As of 2015, approximately half the OECD countries allow asylum seekers to enrol in (basic) language courses. Legislation was changed in Germany where asylum seekers from Syria, Iraq, Iran and Eritrea are now entitled to take part in language and civic integration courses.

Many governments have increased co-operation between different levels of governance and actors in order to respond to asylum seekers and refugees in a faster and more efficient manner

Across the OECD, the responsibility for integration policy design and implementation lies at different levels of government. Unsurprisingly, integration policies tend to be more decentralised in federal countries. In Canada, Belgium and Germany, for instance, lower level governments are given considerably more discretion how to integrate asylum seekers and refugees than in countries where integration policies are more centralized. However, also in more centralised governance structures, local communities play an important role in the integration of asylum seekers and refugees. Regardless of the level of centralisation, however, co-operation between different government levels, service providers and civil society organisations is crucial to enable effective policy responses. The high numbers of newly-arrived asylum seekers in 2015-16 required governments and other stakeholders to respond in a quick and flexible manner. However, co-ordination and communication between different levels of government has remained a challenge.

To tackle this, a number of countries have implemented policies that facilitate co-operation and information sharing among different stakeholders. Germany will issue special ID cards to all asylum seekers by the summer of 2016. These ID cards will contain information on fingerprints and contact data, but also information on health status and professional qualifications. A centralised system then allows all government agencies to access this information. Platforms to better co-ordinate reception and integration services for asylum seekers and refugees were created in other countries, including in Austria, Finland, Germany, Sweden and Spain. In Greece, the Alternate Minister for Migration Policy, together with the police and local governance structures, has opened a registration procedure for voluntary groups who are providing services to asylum seekers at the main entry points, to better co-ordinate service provision. The Irish government has set up a cross-departmental task force to co-ordinate and implement integration measures for resettled refugees, together with municipal authorities, NGOs and faith groups.

There have also been efforts to include volunteer initiatives and work with the private sector more closely

The increased influx of asylum seekers and refugees has led many governments to rely heavily on NGOs and volunteer support and to give additional funding to civil society initiatives and volunteering programmes. The German government, for instance, will fund 10 000 additional spaces within the Federal Voluntary Service solely dedicated to the integration of asylum seekers and refugees. Asylum seekers and refugees are themselves also eligible to apply for the programme.

In addition, the social partners are increasingly involved in the integration process. A number of countries have launched projects that seek closer co-operation with the private sector, try to increase funding for integration-related expenses and encourage businesses to hire refugees. The Canadian Ministry for Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship, for instance, directly addressed the private sector to contribute financially to the settlement of Syrian refugees in Canada. Three large corporations initiated the “Welcome Fund for Syrian Refugees” which, by March 2016, had raised CAD 30 million (app. EUR 20 million) for refugee integration.

To facilitate labour market integration, the German government and the Chamber of Commerce and Industry have jointly set up the network “Companies integrate refugees” to encourage businesses to employ refugees and to share information and experiences. Similarly, the Danish government has established so-called Business Partnerships with firms to provide more internship placements for refugees. Other countries have initiated sector-specific co-operations. In Switzerland, for instance, the national Farmers’ Union and the federal government have started a pilot project to increase the employment of refugees in the agricultural sector.

There have been sustained efforts to address housing shortages

Finding accommodation for asylum seekers and refugees can be a challenge, particularly when inflows increase quickly or when countries are already facing a shortage of affordable or social housing. In 2015, the provision of housing has been one of the key challenges for governments and an important area of policy development. Although the provision of housing is part of the emergency response, housing and dispersal policies can have a long-term impact on integration. First, long stays in reception centres can be a barrier to integration when access to integration programmes is limited. Second, local labour market conditions have an important impact on finding employment. Yet, in regions where housing is cheap, the labour market situation is often not as favourable as in urban areas. In such regions, however, affordable housing is often less available.

OECD countries have implemented different policies to distribute refugees more evenly across the country. While some countries assign recognised refugees to municipalities, e.g. Denmark, Estonia and the Netherlands, others allow refugees to freely choose where they wish to settle after the recognition of their status, e.g. France, Greece and Italy. In addition, countries take into account a diverging set of dispersal criteria ranging from labour market needs and housing availability to the presence of relatives, the availability of specialized health care or the concentration of immigrants in the dispersal area.

Many OECD countries have, in some cases significantly, increased their spending on accommodation, both with regards to reception centres and long-term housing for refugees. A number of countries, including Germany, Sweden and some of Austria’s federal states, have relaxed building codes and regulations to accelerate the building of reception centres and the renovation of vacant buildings.

However, finding accommodation for asylum seekers and refugees has been difficult in some countries where municipality can refuse to let them settle. In Sweden, municipalities used to have considerable discretion in deciding whether they wanted to host refugees. The law was changed in early 2016 obliging municipalities to accept all refugees who have not found housing themselves and are therefore referred to them through a central mechanism at the Public Employment Service. In Austria, legislation was changed that authorises the central government to build accommodation for asylum seekers and refugees in its federal states if those do no fulfil their reception quotas. In the United Kingdom, where housing for asylum seekers is provided by private contractors, local governments have been reluctant to participate in the voluntary distribution scheme and have not allowed contracted corporations to settle asylum seekers in their municipalities. This has not only led to an increased concentration of asylum seekers in some parts of the country, but further increased housing shortages. The government is currently trying to find ways to expand the number of municipalities participating in the distribution scheme.

Countries have attempted to avoid the concentration of asylum seekers and refugees in urban and disadvantaged areas

There is evidence that refugees tend to move to urban areas or parts of the country where they have relatives or other networks once they have obtained their residence permit. In some countries, governments have been worried that this will lead to a concentration of asylum seekers and refugees in areas where housing is cheaper and the presence of co-ethnics is higher, thereby potentially obstructing integration. At the same time, recognised refugees with a residence permit are normally free to move within the country and restricting the right to internal movement for a specific group runs the risk of being in contradiction with human rights provisions. Therefore, a number of governments are trying to incentivise refugees to remain in the municipalities they were allocated to during their asylum procedure.

To avoid the clustering of asylum seekers and refugees in urban areas, the Finnish government has changed legislation aiming to discourage refugees to move to Helsinki to search for a job. In the past, the Immigration Service had paid security deposits necessary to rent an apartment in the Helsinki area. If refugees want to move, they now have to do this at their own costs unless they have a job offer in the capital region prior to moving. In order to avoid segregation, the German government is currently discussing whether asylum seekers and refugees should be obliged to remain in the areas to which they were initially allocated for their asylum procedure. As for refugees, those who have found work and who are self-sufficient will be allowed to change municipalities. These and other changes are discussed in the framework of a new law on integration, which is planned to pass parliament by the summer.

However, only some countries distribute asylum seekers and refugees according to local labour market needs or migrants’ skills

Policies placing refugees in regions where their prospects of finding a job are high, might not be feasible when the numbers of refugees is high and housing is limited. However, when countries have the capacity to factor in local labour market needs and refugees’ skills profiles, it is advisable to do so as evidence suggests that integration outcomes are more favourable (OECD, 2016). In Sweden, for example, refugees are at liberty to find their own housing, but can also be settled by the Public Employment Service (PES). Since 2010, the Swedish PES assigns these refugees to municipalities taking into account local labour market needs. In practice, however, this is often not feasible given the current housing shortage in Sweden which has been exacerbated by the large influx of asylum seekers in 2015.

Norway is currently developing a fast-track skills assessment procedure in reception centres that is planned to be fully implemented in 2016. Asylum seekers are then sent to municipalities where local labour market demand matches their professional skills. Since 2013, Estonia also takes into account employment possibilities in municipalities when distributing refugees. Denmark has taken a slightly different approach, which, however, also takes into consideration employment. As of 2016, municipalities are obliged to take in refugees who already have a job offer in that municipality, even if the municipality has already fulfilled its reception quota.

Many countries had to increase the capacities of schools and teachers

In 2015, a number of countries, notably Turkey, Sweden, Germany and Austria, have experienced a significant increase in the number of school-aged children and youth arriving on humanitarian grounds. This requires not only recruiting more teachers in general, but ideally also finding teachers who are qualified to teach these youth, including in special reception classes for newly-arrived refugee children and youth. As a result, many countries affected by the recent humanitarian crisis have increased their education budget.

In Sweden, for instance, the government has allocated more funding directly to schools by increasing the lump sum that schools receive per pupil who is seeking asylum. To address teacher shortages, the government has also introduced fast-track bridging programmes for refugees with teaching degrees. Other countries, such as Norway and Germany, have begun to recruit more teachers, also by encouraging retired teachers to take up temporary employment. However, in most countries, the numbers of teachers who are qualified to teach second language learners remain relatively low, and adjusting teacher training curricula as well as teacher training itself needs time. To foster second language learning of refugee children, the Norwegian Ministry of Education has developed an online portal that provides translations of school books and learning materials currently used in Norwegian schools in Arabic and Dari.

The Turkish government estimates that additional cost of educating Syrian pupils in 2014-15 amounts to TRY 700 million (about EUR 220 million). Turkey currently hosts around 700 000 school-aged children from Syria, of whom approximately one third has been enrolled in school between 2014 and 2015 after the Turkish government had adopted legislation that grants Syrian children access to public schools. Turkey is starting to develop language learning material for non-native pupils. The government is furthermore accrediting private ‘education centres’ that teach a modified Syrian curriculum in Arabic. In 2015, the Turkish Ministry of Education has also supervised the administration of Syrian high school leaving exams that will be recognised by Turkish universities. The Ministry has stated that it aims at increasing school enrolment to 370 000 children by the end of the 2015-16 school year.

Many countries have rolled out language courses for adult asylum seekers and refugees

Almost all countries that have taken in large numbers of asylum seekers and refugees have worked on increasing the availability of language courses. Sweden, Germany, the Netherlands, Finland and Austria, for instance, have increased their integration-related budgets for 2015-16, of which considerable parts are spent on the provision of language courses. Yet, given the often significant increase of asylum seekers and refugees, waiting lists are often long and hiring enough teachers remains a challenge. Given these bottlenecks, most OECD countries have focused on expanding previously-existing measures and reducing waiting times rather than designing new programmes.

Moreover, asylum seekers and refugees are far from being a homogenous group and arrive with often very different skill levels. Therefore, language courses should ideally be tailored to the abilities of asylum seekers and offer, for instance, targeted support to illiterate or very low-educated asylum seekers and refugees as well as to the highly-educated who are likely to learn the language faster. As of 2015, approximately half of the OECD countries offer special language training for poorly as well as highly educated asylum seekers and refugees.

Public Employment Services play an important role in delivering integration programmes for asylum seekers and refugees

Since previous cohorts of refugees have often struggled to gain a foothold in the labour market, almost all OECD countries that received large numbers of asylum seekers and refugees in 2015 put considerable attention on how to bring them into employment more quickly. In a number of countries, such as Denmark, Germany and Sweden, there have been discussions on whether asylum seekers and refugees should be exempt from the minimum wage to facilitate entry into labour market. However, in 2015, no such measures were introduced. Nevertheless, wages subsidies have been a measure, mostly used in Nordic countries and the Netherlands, to lower the costs for employers to hire disadvantaged workers, including humanitarian migrants.

Public Employment Services (PES) continue to play an important part in supporting asylum seekers and refugees in finding work or obtaining additional training. Given the focus of many OECD countries on employment, a variety of programmes have been introduced that give PES agencies a central role in assessing skills, providing access to additional training and up-skilling measures, and supporting asylum seekers and refugees in the application process.

The German Employment Office, for instance, has initiated a pilot programme for asylum seekers that assesses within three months the participants’ skills, supports them in writing job applications and provides vocational language courses. Similarly, the Austrian PES has started a pilot project for refugees in Vienna, the so-called Competence Check that assesses prior qualifications and provides individual coaching.

The PES has also been strongly involved in Sweden’s recently launched Fast-Track initiative, which aims to facilitate the entry into shortage occupations. Fast-track programmes usually include a validation process to assess professional skills and an individually tailored training or study programme leading to the necessary qualification. For some professions, these programmes also include work experience. Teachers, for instance, will be placed into schools already during the bridging programme. In Sweden, the fast-track programmes are in principle open to all newly-arrived immigrants, yet have been a direct response to the recent increase of asylum seekers are refugees. The government has announced additional fast-track programmes for humanitarian migrants with previous experience in teaching and the health care sector as well as programmes for shortage occupations in low- and medium-skilled occupations such as butchers, chefs and painters.

Vocational education and training schemes are rolled out to facilitate labour market integration

Many OECD countries, and particularly those with well-developed schemes for vocational education and training, have sought to integrate young refugees and occasionally also asylum-seekers into the labour market by combining language training, vocational education and company-based apprenticeships.

In Austria, the majority of young refugees lives in Vienna, where apprenticeship placements are relatively scarce, while in other parts of the country businesses cannot fill their vacancies. The government has therefore initiated a pilot project that offers refugees under the age of 26 apprenticeship places and an individual mentor in regions where training places remain vacant. Similarly, the Swiss government has introduced a pilot project that provides vocational education and language training for young refugees in sectors with labour shortage. In Netherlands, three specialised information centres for young refugees have been opened that provide information on vocational education as part of a pilot project. In addition, a pilot project is under preparation that will offer specialised preparatory training to refugees before entering the mainstream vocational track.

In early 2016, the German government and the national Confederation of Skilled Crafts presented a three-step programme that aims to get 10 000 young refugees and asylum seekers with good prospects to remain into vocational training. PES agencies are tasked with identifying suitable candidates who are then offered language training, internships and counselling before entering vocational education.

Civic integration measures are strengthened

In 2015, a number of governments have introduced measures that aim at teaching ‘national or Western values’ to refugees and asylum seekers. Courses and information material cover a wide range of topics, ranging from human rights and democratic values to etiquette and social norms. Countries also increasingly focus on women’s rights, gender equality and sexual and reproductive rights.

The Austrian government recently introduced ‘value and orientation courses’ for refugees. These courses are being rolled out nationally in 2016 as part of the integration measures provided by the Public Employment Service. The eight-hour course discusses basic values and social norms as well as the Austrian education system, labour market and health care. Norway, Belgium, Denmark and Finland have introduced or are currently developing similar programmes, with a strong focus on sexual norms and gender equality. Norway was the first country to introduce classes in “Western sexual norms” for asylum seekers in 2013. Classes are based on group discussions, mediated by a teacher and translator from Norway’s largest contracted service provider for the reception and integration of asylum seekers and refugees. Similarly, the Belgian government announced in early 2016 that participation in classes that “teach respect for women” will become mandatory for non-European immigrants and refugees. In Finland, refugees will have to sign a ‘commitment agreement’ in which they affirm Finnish values. Furthermore, the Finnish Immigration Service has launched an online course about gender equality, sexual rights and health.

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Poeschel, F. (2016), “Raising the Mobility of Third-Country Nationals in the EU: Effects from Naturalisation and Long-Term Resident Status”, OECD Social, Employment and Migration Working Papers, No. 187, OECD Publishing, Paris, http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5jlwxbvfdkr3-en.

Annex 2.A1.

Additional tables

Table 2.A1.1. Employment, unemployment and participation rates by region of birth in selected OECD countries in 2008 (2007 in the United States), 2011 and 2015
Percentages
| Region of birth | Employment rate | Unemployment rate | Participation rate
2008 | 2011 | 2015 | 2008 | 2011 | 2015 | 2008 | 2011 | 2015
Australia | Oceania | 77.5 | 76.9 | 76.5 | 4.6 | 6.1 | 6.3 | 81.3 | 81.9 | 81.7
Europe | 71.4 | 73.6 | 75.1 | 3.1 | 3.8 | 4.8 | 73.7 | 76.5 | 78.9
North Africa and the Middle East | 49.1 | 48.2 | 46.4 | 8.9 | 9.5 | 11.8 | 53.9 | 53.3 | 52.6
Sub-Saharan Africa | 75.0 | 76.2 | 74.2 | 5.1 | 5.3 | 8.0 | 79.1 | 80.5 | 80.7
Asia | 67.6 | 67.6 | 66.7 | 5.8 | 5.8 | 6.6 | 71.8 | 71.7 | 71.4
Americas | 74.1 | 73.9 | 74.6 | 4.5 | 5.3 | 4.7 | 77.6 | 78.1 | 78.3
Foreign-born (total) | 69.8 | 70.5 | 69.9 | 4.7 | 5.2 | 6.2 | 73.2 | 74.4 | 74.6
Native-born | 75.0 | 73.8 | 73.5 | 4.2 | 5.2 | 6.2 | 78.2 | 77.9 | 78.3
Canada | Sub-Saharan Africa | 68.7 | 66.7 | 68.5 | 10.4 | 12.6 | 10.9 | 76.6 | 76.4 | 76.9
Northern Africa | 62.2 | 63.8 | 64.0 | 16.1 | 14.8 | 14.9 | 74.1 | 74.9 | 75.1
Middle East | 60.5 | 59.0 | 58.9 | 10.7 | 12.1 | 12.1 | 67.8 | 67.1 | 67.0
Asia | 69.9 | 67.7 | 70.6 | 7.1 | 8.8 | 6.9 | 75.3 | 74.2 | 75.8
Europe | 73.0 | 73.0 | 76.2 | 5.2 | 6.6 | 5.1 | 77.1 | 78.1 | 80.3
Oceania | 82.0 | 75.3 | 79.5 | 3.9 | 6.7 | 2.7 | 85.4 | 80.7 | 81.7
North America | 76.1 | 72.2 | 72.5 | 5.0 | 5.6 | 4.7 | 80.1 | 76.5 | 76.0
Central and South America and Caribbean | 72.3 | 70.2 | 73.3 | 8.5 | 10.6 | 8.3 | 79.0 | 78.5 | 79.9
Foreign-born (total) | 70.7 | 68.9 | 70.9 | 7.2 | 8.9 | 7.4 | 76.1 | 75.6 | 76.7
Native-born | 74.3 | 72.7 | 73.0 | 6.0 | 7.2 | 6.9 | 79.0 | 78.3 | 78.4
European OECD countries | EU28 + EFTA | 69.8 | 66.0 | 70.0 | 7.5 | 8.6 | 10.7 | 75.5 | 72.1 | 78.4
Other European countries | 62.7 | 58.8 | 58.2 | 9.4 | 15.4 | 17.1 | 69.3 | 69.5 | 70.1
North Africa | 55.1 | 48.4 | 46.3 | 15.8 | 25.0 | 27.3 | 65.5 | 64.5 | 63.7
Sub-Saharan Africa | 67.0 | 60.4 | 60.2 | 12.3 | 18.5 | 18.0 | 76.4 | 74.1 | 73.4
Middle East | 54.3 | 50.7 | 52.1 | 15.7 | 22.0 | 20.5 | 64.3 | 65.0 | 65.6
North America | 68.9 | 67.6 | 69.5 | 5.2 | 6.8 | 6.8 | 72.7 | 72.5 | 74.5
Central and South America and Caribbean | 70.3 | 61.5 | 59.4 | 12.7 | 22.6 | 22.7 | 80.6 | 79.4 | 76.9
Asia | 63.2 | 62.1 | 63.2 | 7.6 | 10.0 | 9.1 | 68.4 | 69.0 | 69.6
Others | 79.6 | 80.2 | 79.0 | 3.7 | 3.4 | 5.6 | 82.6 | 83.0 | 83.7
Foreign-born (total) | 65.5 | 61.5 | 62.1 | 10.2 | 15.5 | 15.3 | 72.9 | 72.8 | 73.2
Native-born | 65.8 | 63.7 | 65.1 | 6.4 | 9.6 | 9.7 | 70.3 | 70.4 | 72.1
United States | Mexico | 70.3 | 65.2 | 68.8 | 4.9 | 10.2 | 5.0 | 74.0 | 72.6 | 72.4
Other Central American countries | 77.0 | 69.9 | 71.2 | 4.7 | 10.7 | 6.0 | 80.8 | 78.3 | 75.8
South America and Caribbean | 73.2 | 68.6 | 70.8 | 4.9 | 10.7 | 6.4 | 76.9 | 76.8 | 75.6
Canada | 74.1 | 70.3 | 71.8 | 3.6 | 5.7 | 4.3 | 76.9 | 74.5 | 75.0
Europe | 73.4 | 71.1 | 72.7 | 3.6 | 7.4 | 3.6 | 76.1 | 76.8 | 75.4
Africa | 70.4 | 66.9 | 67.6 | 6.0 | 11.4 | 7.5 | 75.0 | 75.5 | 73.1
Asia | 70.9 | 67.4 | 67.5 | 3.4 | 7.0 | 3.8 | 73.4 | 72.5 | 70.1
Other regions | 68.5 | 63.0 | 62.2 | 4.7 | 10.1 | 6.0 | 71.8 | 70.1 | 66.2
Foreign-born (total) | 71.8 | 67.5 | 67.5 | 4.4 | 9.1 | 5.4 | 75.1 | 74.3 | 71.4
Native-born | 70.3 | 65.1 | 67.2 | 4.9 | 9.2 | 5.6 | 73.9 | 71.7 | 71.1

Notes: The population refers to working-age population (15-64) for the employment and participation rates and to active population aged 15-64 for the unemployment rate. European OECD countries do not include Germany and Turkey because no data by region of birth are available for these countries. The regions of birth could not be more comparable across countries of residence because of the way aggregate data provided to the Secretariat are coded.

Source: European countries: Labour Force Surveys (Eurostat), 2008, 2011 and 2015; Australia, Canada: Labour Force Surveys 2008, 2011 and 2015; United States: Current Population Surveys 2007, 2011 and 2015.

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933396324

Table 2.A1.2. Employment of foreign-born persons by industry, 2015
Percentage of total foreign-born employment
| Agriculture and fishing (%) | Mining, manufacturing and energy (%) | Construction (%) | Wholesale and retail trade (%) | Hotels and restaurants (%) | Education (%) | Health (%) | Activities of households as employers (%) | Admin. and ETO (%) | Other services (%) | Total (%) | Total foreign-born employed (thousands) | Foreign-born in total employment (%)
Austria | 1.0 | 16.6 | 10.6 | 13.9 | 11.4 | 5.3 | 9.6 | 0.5 | 9.9 | 21.3 | 100.0 | 752 | 18.7
Belgium | 0.6 | 11.5 | 7.9 | 12.5 | 7.3 | 5.7 | 13.3 | 0.2 | 20.6 | 20.4 | 100.0 | 688 | 15.4
Czech Republic | 1.1 | 25.5 | 10.7 | 19.9 | 6.0 | 4.2 | 6.7 | 0.5 | 6.7 | 18.7 | 100.0 | 175 | 3.6
Denmark | 3.2 | 12.7 | 3.6 | 11.8 | 10.5 | 10.2 | 16.2 | 0.4 | 10.4 | 20.9 | 100.0 | 308 | 11.9
Estonia | 0.7 | 29.8 | 7.1 | 10.2 | 3.7 | 8.6 | 7.4 | - | 7.9 | 24.5 | 100.0 | 66 | 10.8
Finland | 2.3 | 13.0 | 7.0 | 11.0 | 9.4 | 7.5 | 14.2 | 0.2 | 9.8 | 25.7 | 100.0 | 128 | 5.6
France | 1.5 | 10.2 | 9.8 | 11.9 | 7.0 | 7.0 | 14.5 | 2.8 | 13.3 | 21.9 | 100.0 | 2 846 | 11.2
Germany | 0.6 | 24.1 | 7.7 | 13.6 | 8.7 | 4.4 | 11.3 | 1.1 | 10.0 | 18.3 | 100.0 | 6 292 | 16.2
Greeceé | 10.7 | 12.8 | 11.1 | 16.3 | 16.4 | 2.3 | 3.6 | 11.5 | 6.3 | 9.1 | 100.0 | 284 | 9.0
Hungary | 4.7 | 21.7 | 6.5 | 14.8 | 5.8 | 7.5 | 10.5 | 0.3 | 10.8 | 17.3 | 100.0 | 90 | 2.3
Iceland | 2.9 | 18.3 | 5.7 | 8.8 | 12.0 | 12.1 | 11.2 | - | 9.4 | 19.7 | 100.0 | 16 | 9.5
Ireland | 1.8 | 14.2 | 5.3 | 14.4 | 14.7 | 4.2 | 13.4 | 1.2 | 7.1 | 23.7 | 100.0 | 396 | 21.3
Israel | 0.5 | 18.8 | 3.5 | 11.2 | 3.4 | 8.3 | 15.2 | 5.0 | 12.1 | 22.0 | 100.0 | 841 | 24.2
Italy | 5.0 | 19.6 | 9.2 | 9.3 | 10.0 | 2.1 | 4.8 | 19.9 | 7.3 | 12.7 | 100.0 | 2 873 | 13.8
Luxembourg | 0.6 | 6.0 | 8.4 | 9.4 | 5.5 | 5.4 | 8.6 | 2.3 | 19.4 | 34.4 | 100.0 | 142 | 61.4
Netherlands | 1.0 | 13.9 | 3.7 | 15.4 | 7.5 | 6.0 | 13.8 | 0.1 | 14.5 | 24.2 | 100.0 | 840 | 11.3
Norway | 0.8 | 12.0 | 9.3 | 11.4 | 7.1 | 6.6 | 19.6 | 0.1 | 12.9 | 20.1 | 100.0 | 349 | 13.9
Poland | 2.0 | 13.3 | 9.4 | 24.0 | 5.9 | 4.6 | 7.7 | 0.5 | 6.1 | 26.6 | 100.0 | 57 | 0.4
Portugal | 2.5 | 14.9 | 6.8 | 14.3 | 8.2 | 9.7 | 8.6 | 3.6 | 11.9 | 19.5 | 100.0 | 411 | 9.8
Slovak Republic | - | 20.9 | 5.8 | 16.5 | 3.8 | 7.7 | 11.9 | - | 8.7 | 24.7 | 100.0 | 15 | 0.6
Slovenia | 1.6 | 30.2 | 14.6 | 8.9 | 6.7 | 4.7 | 5.7 | 0.0 | 8.6 | 19.0 | 100.0 | 83 | 9.4
Spain | 6.6 | 9.5 | 6.8 | 15.5 | 17.5 | 3.1 | 5.1 | 13.3 | 7.6 | 14.9 | 100.0 | 2 477 | 15.0
Sweden | 0.7 | 10.4 | 4.4 | 9.8 | 7.4 | 12.3 | 19.7 | 0.0 | 11.6 | 23.5 | 100.0 | 806 | 17.5
Switzerland | 1.0 | 15.8 | 7.2 | 12.4 | 7.2 | 6.3 | 14.3 | 1.6 | 6.8 | 27.3 | 100.0 | 1 298 | 30.4
Turkey | 3.2 | 37.7 | 7.4 | 12.8 | 5.3 | 5.5 | 4.8 | 2.0 | 6.7 | 14.7 | 100.0 | 521 | 2.1
United Kingdom | 0.6 | 11.2 | 5.5 | 12.4 | 9.3 | 8.1 | 14.7 | 0.3 | 9.8 | 28.0 | 100.0 | 4 857 | 16.4
United States | 2.0 | 12.5 | 10.2 | 13.5 | 9.8 | 5.8 | 12.1 | 1.4 | 2.5 | 30.3 | 100.0 | 25 280 | 18.0
Notes: A dash indicates that the estimate is not reliable enough for publication. ETO stands for extra-territorial organisations. The population refers to the employed population aged 15 to 64.
Source: European countries and Turkey: Labour Force Surveys (Eurostat); Israel: Labour Force Survey; United States: Current Population Surveys.
StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933396335

Table 2.A1.3. Quarterly employment rates by place of birth and gender in OECD countries, 2011-15
Percentage of the population aged 15-64
MEN AND WOMEN
|  | AUS | AUT | BEL | CAN | CHE | CHL | CZE | DEU | DNK | ESP | EST | FIN | FRA | GBR | GRC | HUN | IRL | ISL | ISR | ITA | LUX | MEX | NLD | NOR | NZL | POL | PRT | SVK | SVN | SWE | TUR | USA
Native-born | 2011 Q1 | 73.7 | 71.3 | 63.0 | 71.1 | 80.9 | .. | 64.9 | 72.9 | 74.3 | 58.6 | 63.6 | 67.6 | 64.3 | 69.8 | 56.1 | 54.2 | 58.6 | 77.4 | .. | 56.1 | 60.0 | 59.1 | 75.2 | 75.5 | 73.5 | 58.5 | 64.0 | 58.9 | 64.0 | 74.4 | 46.0 | 64.6
2011 Q2 | 74.0 | 72.1 | 64.3 | 73.3 | 81.1 | .. | 65.7 | 73.6 | 74.9 | 59.2 | 65.0 | 70.4 | 64.9 | 69.7 | 55.5 | 55.3 | 59.1 | 79.9 | .. | 56.3 | 58.8 | 59.9 | 75.7 | 75.8 | 73.1 | 59.4 | 64.0 | 59.4 | 64.6 | 76.5 | 49.2 | 65.1
2011 Q3 | 73.7 | 73.4 | 63.5 | 73.8 | 80.7 | .. | 66.1 | 74.0 | 75.2 | 58.9 | 67.4 | 70.7 | 65.3 | 69.8 | 54.7 | 55.9 | 58.6 | 79.5 | .. | 56.2 | 60.5 | 60.1 | 76.1 | 76.4 | 73.2 | 59.8 | 63.5 | 59.7 | 65.4 | 77.4 | 49.9 | 65.4
2011 Q4 | 73.9 | 72.2 | 64.0 | 72.4 | 81.4 | .. | 66.1 | 74.7 | 74.5 | 58.0 | 66.0 | 68.9 | 64.8 | 70.1 | 52.8 | 55.8 | 59.0 | 78.2 | .. | 56.3 | 58.8 | 61.2 | 76.3 | 76.2 | 73.8 | 59.6 | 61.9 | 59.3 | 64.7 | 75.6 | 48.3 | 65.3
2011 | 73.8 | 72.3 | 63.7 | 72.7 | 81.0 | 56.8 | 65.7 | 73.8 | 74.7 | 58.7 | 65.5 | 69.4 | 64.8 | 69.8 | 54.8 | 55.3 | 58.8 | 78.7 | .. | 56.2 | 59.5 | 60.1 | 75.8 | 76.0 | 73.4 | 59.3 | 63.4 | 59.3 | 64.7 | 76.0 | 48.4 | 65.1
2012 Q1 | 73.3 | 71.6 | 63.5 | 70.9 | 80.6 | .. | 65.6 | 73.4 | 73.9 | 56.9 | 65.9 | 68.2 | 64.5 | 70.0 | 51.9 | 55.0 | 58.3 | 77.4 | 63.4 | 56.0 | 58.8 | 60.1 | 75.9 | 76.2 | 73.3 | 58.8 | 61.4 | 59.6 | 64.0 | 74.8 | 46.3 | 64.7
2012 Q2 | 73.8 | 72.6 | 63.9 | 73.3 | 80.5 | .. | 66.5 | 73.8 | 74.4 | 56.9 | 67.0 | 70.7 | 65.2 | 70.3 | 51.4 | 56.3 | 58.7 | 80.9 | 64.0 | 56.5 | 60.6 | 61.4 | 76.1 | 76.7 | 72.8 | 59.7 | 61.5 | 59.8 | 63.8 | 76.6 | 49.9 | 65.7
2012 Q3 | 73.5 | 73.6 | 64.1 | 73.6 | 81.1 | .. | 67.0 | 74.3 | 74.4 | 56.5 | 68.3 | 70.9 | 65.4 | 70.8 | 50.5 | 57.4 | 59.0 | 81.7 | 64.9 | 56.3 | 62.2 | 61.5 | 76.3 | 76.7 | 72.2 | 60.2 | 61.1 | 60.1 | 64.3 | 77.6 | 49.9 | 66.0
2012 Q4 | 73.8 | 72.9 | 63.8 | 72.6 | 81.3 | .. | 67.0 | 74.5 | 74.0 | 55.7 | 67.4 | 68.7 | 65.0 | 71.2 | 49.9 | 57.1 | 59.3 | 79.3 | 63.9 | 56.0 | 61.3 | 60.8 | 76.2 | 76.2 | 71.9 | 60.0 | 59.7 | 59.3 | 64.2 | 75.9 | 49.6 | 65.9
2012 | 73.6 | 72.7 | 63.8 | 72.6 | 80.9 | .. | 66.5 | 74.0 | 74.2 | 56.5 | 67.1 | 69.6 | 65.0 | 70.6 | 50.9 | 56.4 | 58.9 | 79.8 | 64.1 | 56.2 | 60.7 | 60.9 | 76.1 | 76.5 | 72.5 | 59.7 | 60.9 | 59.7 | 64.1 | 76.2 | 48.9 | 65.6
2013 Q1 | 73.1 | 71.8 | 63.0 | 71.6 | 81.3 | .. | 66.8 | 73.9 | 73.5 | 55.0 | 67.1 | 67.7 | 64.6 | 70.7 | 48.8 | 55.8 | 59.4 | 78.1 | 64.2 | 55.0 | 59.5 | 60.0 | 75.5 | 76.0 | 72.7 | 58.7 | 59.1 | 59.8 | 62.8 | 75.5 | 47.9 | 65.0
2013 Q2 | 73.4 | 73.0 | 64.1 | 73.4 | 80.7 | .. | 67.8 | 74.5 | 74.3 | 55.4 | 69.1 | 70.5 | 65.3 | 70.8 | 49.2 | 57.7 | 60.2 | 81.9 | 64.6 | 55.3 | 60.4 | 61.1 | 75.7 | 76.5 | 72.5 | 59.8 | 60.2 | 59.8 | 63.2 | 77.2 | 50.8 | 65.9
2013 Q3 | 73.2 | 73.8 | 64.1 | 73.8 | 80.8 | .. | 68.0 | 74.7 | 74.4 | 56.0 | 69.0 | 70.3 | 65.7 | 71.4 | 49.1 | 58.7 | 60.9 | 84.3 | 65.1 | 55.2 | 59.3 | 60.9 | 75.6 | 76.6 | 73.6 | 60.7 | 61.0 | 60.0 | 64.7 | 78.7 | 50.3 | 66.2
2013 Q4 | 73.4 | 72.8 | 63.3 | 73.0 | 81.9 | .. | 68.2 | 75.1 | 73.6 | 55.8 | 68.6 | 68.2 | 65.0 | 71.6 | 48.4 | 59.2 | 61.4 | 81.1 | 64.8 | 55.3 | 61.9 | 61.6 | 75.3 | 75.9 | 74.7 | 60.8 | 61.4 | 59.8 | 63.5 | 77.2 | 49.2 | 65.8
2013 | 73.3 | 72.8 | 63.6 | 73.0 | 81.2 | 58.1 | 67.7 | 74.5 | 73.9 | 55.6 | 68.5 | 69.2 | 65.1 | 71.1 | 48.9 | 57.9 | 60.5 | 81.2 | 64.7 | 55.2 | 60.3 | 60.9 | 75.5 | 76.3 | 73.4 | 60.0 | 60.4 | 59.8 | 63.5 | 77.2 | 49.6 | 65.7
2014 Q1 | 72.6 | 71.8 | 63.2 | 71.6 | 80.8 | .. | 67.9 | 74.4 | 72.8 | 55.6 | 68.1 | 67.7 | 64.5 | 71.8 | 48.6 | 60.5 | 60.8 | 80.5 | 65.3 | 54.8 | 62.6 | 60.4 | 74.4 | 75.5 | 75.0 | 60.3 | 61.1 | 60.2 | 62.9 | 76.3 | 48.0 | 65.6
2014 Q2 | 72.9 | 72.5 | 63.5 | 73.3 | 80.9 | .. | 68.5 | 74.7 | 74.0 | 56.6 | 70.4 | 70.6 | 65.1 | 72.1 | 49.3 | 61.2 | 61.4 | 84.2 | 65.6 | 55.2 | 60.3 | 60.5 | 74.7 | 76.6 | 74.7 | 61.3 | 62.2 | 60.7 | 64.9 | 78.0 | 50.9 | 66.8
2014 Q3 | 72.6 | 73.3 | 64.1 | 73.9 | 81.3 | .. | 69.3 | 75.2 | 74.9 | 57.1 | 70.3 | 70.4 | 65.1 | 72.7 | 50.0 | 62.4 | 62.4 | 84.8 | 65.3 | 55.5 | 61.3 | 60.4 | 75.4 | 76.5 | 75.0 | 62.5 | 63.0 | 61.3 | 65.3 | 79.3 | 50.3 | 66.8
2014 Q4 | 72.8 | 72.7 | 64.3 | 72.9 | 82.9 | .. | 69.7 | 75.3 | 74.9 | 57.3 | 70.2 | 68.3 | 64.8 | 73.0 | 49.4 | 62.4 | 62.9 | 82.8 | 65.1 | 55.7 | 61.8 | 60.5 | 75.4 | 75.9 | 76.1 | 62.6 | 62.5 | 61.6 | 64.9 | 77.2 | 49.3 | 66.9
2014 | 72.7 | 72.6 | 63.8 | 72.9 | 81.5 | .. | 68.9 | 74.9 | 74.2 | 56.6 | 69.8 | 69.2 | 64.9 | 72.4 | 49.3 | 61.6 | 61.9 | 83.1 | 65.3 | 55.3 | 61.5 | 60.4 | 75.0 | 76.1 | 75.2 | 61.7 | 62.2 | 60.9 | 64.5 | 77.7 | 49.6 | 66.5
2015 Q1 | 72.7 | 72.0 | 63.6 | 71.5 | 82.4 | .. | 69.4 | 74.8 | 74.5 | 57.0 | 70.3 | 67.8 | 64.5 | 73.0 | 49.3 | 62.2 | 62.7 | 83.7 | 65.2 | 55.2 | 63.3 | 60.2 | 75.5 | 75.5 | 75.3 | 61.9 | 62.5 | 61.9 | 64.3 | 77.0 | 48.5 | 66.4
2015 Q2 | 73.5 | 72.3 | 63.7 | 73.6 | 81.6 | .. | 70.1 | 74.7 | 75.3 | 58.3 | 72.1 | 70.0 | 65.2 | 72.8 | 50.7 | 63.6 | 63.4 | 85.8 | 66.2 | 55.9 | 65.4 | 60.6 | 76.1 | 76.4 | 74.6 | 62.6 | 63.7 | 62.6 | 65.8 | 78.6 | 51.3 | 67.5
2015 Q3 | 73.4 | 73.8 | 63.6 | 74.1 | 81.5 | .. | 70.5 | 75.3 | 75.3 | 58.8 | 74.0 | 70.6 | 65.5 | 73.3 | 51.4 | 64.6 | 63.8 | 86.4 | 66.3 | 56.4 | 62.4 | 60.7 | 76.5 | 76.4 | 73.7 | 63.5 | 63.9 | 63.0 | 66.9 | 80.0 | 51.3 | 67.4
2015 Q4 | 74.3 | 73.0 | 63.7 | 72.7 | 82.5 | .. | 70.8 | 75.8 | 75.2 | 59.1 | 71.9 | 68.3 | 65.1 | 73.8 | 51.2 | 64.7 | 63.9 | 84.7 | 65.8 | 56.3 | 61.0 | 61.6 | 76.4 | 75.3 | 74.8 | 63.7 | 63.9 | 63.5 | 65.6 | 78.5 | 50.2 | 67.3
2015 | 73.5 | 72.8 | 63.6 | 73.0 | 82.0 |  | 70.2 | 75.2 | 75.1 | 58.3 | 72.1 | 69.2 | 65.1 | 73.2 | 50.6 | 63.8 | 63.4 | 85.2 | 65.9 | 55.9 | 62.6 | 60.8 | 76.1 | 75.9 | 74.6 | 62.9 | 63.5 | 62.8 | 65.7 | 78.5 | 50.3 | 67.2
Foreign-born | 2011 Q1 | 70.5 | 64.3 | 52.4 | 67.9 | 74.0 | .. | 68.4 | 65.4 | 59.7 | 55.0 | 61.3 | 57.5 | 57.9 | 66.4 | 59.1 | 61.7 | 57.8 | 74.7 | .. | 61.6 | 72.3 | 50.2 | 63.6 | 68.2 | 70.6 | 54.1 | 66.8 | 58.3 | 61.7 | 61.2 | 49.4 | 66.7
2011 Q2 | 70.4 | 65.9 | 52.9 | 69.1 | 75.7 | .. | 67.8 | 67.3 | 61.6 | 56.2 | 60.9 | 62.6 | 58.6 | 66.5 | 60.2 | 61.7 | 59.4 | 77.9 | .. | 63.0 | 69.4 | 52.1 | 62.3 | 70.7 | 70.2 | 55.6 | 69.0 | 58.6 | 63.1 | 62.1 | 49.8 | 67.8
2011 Q3 | 70.7 | 66.5 | 52.0 | 69.6 | 76.1 | .. | 67.1 | 67.6 | 63.4 | 55.0 | 67.7 | 61.8 | 57.8 | 66.6 | 57.8 | 63.3 | 59.7 | 80.4 | .. | 61.3 | 70.0 | 54.9 | 62.6 | 71.4 | 69.6 | 56.5 | 69.2 | 60.0 | 61.6 | 63.3 | 49.0 | 67.5
2011 Q4 | 70.4 | 65.7 | 53.0 | 68.9 | 76.1 | .. | 67.8 | 67.4 | 61.8 | 53.1 | 66.3 | 62.8 | 56.5 | 65.7 | 54.9 | 63.6 | 58.9 | - | .. | 59.8 | 69.7 | 54.4 | 63.9 | 70.4 | 70.8 | 55.1 | 68.8 | - | 61.2 | 63.2 | 50.5 | 68.2
2011 | 70.5 | 65.6 | 52.6 | 68.9 | 75.5 | 68.1 | 67.8 | 66.9 | 61.7 | 54.8 | 64.1 | 61.1 | 57.7 | 66.3 | 58.1 | 62.6 | 59.0 | 76.3 | .. | 61.4 | 70.3 | 52.9 | 63.1 | 70.2 | 70.3 | 55.2 | 68.4 | 59.4 | 61.9 | 62.5 | 49.7 | 67.5
2012 Q1 | 70.0 | 64.6 | 51.8 | 68.3 | 75.4 | .. | 66.3 | 66.8 | 60.8 | 51.7 | 66.5 | 61.7 | 57.0 | 65.0 | 50.9 | 62.1 | 58.1 | - | 74.5 | 59.5 | 70.8 | 52.1 | 62.9 | 69.3 | 71.0 | 58.1 | 67.5 | - | 63.5 | 61.8 | 44.3 | 67.0
2012 Q2 | 70.1 | 66.3 | 51.7 | 70.2 | 76.4 | .. | 66.6 | 68.2 | 60.9 | 52.2 | 68.0 | 64.7 | 57.7 | 66.3 | 49.5 | 65.4 | 59.3 | 80.4 | 74.9 | 60.9 | 71.4 | 53.6 | 63.3 | 72.4 | 70.4 | 63.1 | 67.7 | 63.0 | 63.5 | 63.5 | 45.0 | 67.9
2012 Q3 | 69.9 | 66.3 | 52.1 | 70.9 | 76.8 | .. | 68.0 | 68.4 | 61.9 | 53.0 | 67.8 | 65.5 | 58.3 | 67.2 | 50.4 | 67.9 | 59.0 | - | 74.5 | 60.2 | 71.3 | 53.2 | 64.1 | 71.9 | 70.2 | 66.1 | 66.7 | - | 64.3 | 63.4 | 47.5 | 68.0
2012 Q4 | 70.0 | 65.1 | 52.3 | 70.8 | 75.9 | .. | 68.0 | 68.4 | 61.0 | 51.5 | 66.5 | 63.4 | 57.4 | 67.2 | 47.5 | 70.6 | 59.0 | 81.0 | 75.3 | 59.4 | 71.9 | 55.8 | 62.3 | 70.0 | 70.5 | 61.3 | 63.7 | 67.4 | 64.2 | 62.6 | 47.5 | 67.8
2012 | 70.0 | 65.6 | 52.0 | 70.1 | 76.1 | .. | 67.3 | 68.0 | 61.1 | 52.1 | 67.2 | 63.8 | 57.6 | 66.5 | 49.6 | 66.6 | 58.8 | 79.0 | 74.8 | 60.0 | 71.3 | 53.6 | 63.1 | 70.9 | 70.5 | 61.9 | 66.4 | 63.7 | 63.9 | 62.8 | 46.1 | 67.7
2013 Q1 | 70.0 | 64.1 | 53.0 | 69.6 | 75.0 | .. | 67.6 | 67.5 | 61.9 | 50.0 | 69.8 | 62.0 | 56.0 | 66.5 | 45.8 | 68.8 | 58.7 | 79.7 | 76.2 | 58.3 | 71.5 | 54.7 | 60.9 | 68.8 | 71.4 | 60.0 | 61.7 | 69.4 | 57.4 | 61.7 | 45.9 | 67.4
2013 Q2 | 70.1 | 65.6 | 51.8 | 71.3 | 76.3 | .. | 69.9 | 68.3 | 63.6 | 51.1 | 71.3 | 65.8 | 57.0 | 67.0 | 47.3 | 67.7 | 60.2 | 79.2 | 75.6 | 57.9 | 70.5 | 53.3 | 60.9 | 70.2 | 71.6 | 59.6 | 62.1 | 64.5 | 61.0 | 63.6 | 47.7 | 68.7
2013 Q3 | 69.6 | 66.5 | 53.3 | 71.7 | 76.0 | .. | 70.6 | 69.0 | 63.4 | 50.8 | 67.2 | 63.4 | 57.6 | 68.0 | 48.7 | 66.7 | 61.7 | 80.4 | 75.6 | 58.1 | 73.6 | 55.5 | 61.4 | 71.1 | 70.6 | 59.5 | 63.1 | 64.4 | 62.8 | 63.5 | 47.2 | 69.0
2013 Q4 | 69.4 | 64.5 | 52.8 | 69.8 | 76.3 | .. | 71.1 | 68.2 | 62.7 | 51.0 | 65.5 | 62.5 | 57.0 | 68.5 | 48.5 | 67.8 | 61.6 | 80.4 | 76.0Y | 58.2 | 70.6 | 52.6 | 61.7 | 70.9 | 72.5 | 58.0 | 63.4 | 67.6 | 60.8 | 62.5 | 45.5 | 68.4
2013 | 69.7 | 65.2 | 52.7 | 70.6 | 75.9 | 74.2 | 69.8 | 68.3 | 62.9 | 50.7 | 68.4 | 63.4 | 56.9 | 67.5 | 47.6 | 67.8 | 60.5 | 79.9 | 75.8 | 58.1 | 71.5 | 54.0 | 61.2 | 70.3 | 71.5 | 59.2 | 62.6 | 66.4 | 60.5 | 62.9 | 46.6 | 68.4
2014 Q1 | 69.1 | 63.1 | 53.1 | 68.9 | 75.2 | .. | 72.1 | 67.5 | 60.7 | 49.9 | 63.4 | 60.1 | 55.8 | 68.4 | 48.1 | 69.4 | 60.6 | 76.7 | 77.6 | 57.5 | 70.0 | 53.0 | 60.2 | 69.4 | 72.0 | 67.4 | 65.6 | 62.4 | 58.3 | 61.7 | 47.3 | 68.4
2014 Q2 | 69.6 | 66.0 | 53.9 | 70.4 | 77.0 | .. | 73.1 | 68.2 | 64.3 | 52.5 | 66.5 | 61.4 | 56.5 | 69.6 | 50.5 | 69.2 | 61.1 | 85.6 | 76.7 | 59.1 | 73.7 | 55.1 | 61.7 | 70.1 | 71.5 | 67.3 | 66.7 | 63.9 | 60.6 | 63.1 | 47.4 | 69.1
2014 Q3 | 69.6 | 65.9 | 51.8 | 70.5 | 76.2 | .. | 71.1 | 69.5 | 65.9 | 53.3 | 70.4 | 61.3 | 56.9 | 70.0 | 52.0 | 70.2 | 61.5 | 83.3 | 77.0 | 58.9 | 70.8 | 51.9 | 61.2 | 69.5 | 71.2 | 58.5 | 67.1 | 69.0 | 57.8 | 65.2 | 46.7 | 69.7
2014 Q4 | 70.0 | 64.6 | 52.3 | 70.8 | 76.8 | .. | 71.0 | 68.4 | 64.5 | 53.6 | 72.1 | 60.0 | 56.2 | 69.5 | 50.7 | 72.8 | 61.5 | 82.5 | 78.4 | 57.9 | 73.5 | 53.8 | 62.3 | 70.2 | 73.0 | 58.2 | 67.1 | 69.5 | 56.0 | 64.1 | 44.2 | 69.4
2014 | 69.6 | 64.9 | 52.8 | 70.1 | 76.3 | .. | 71.8 | 68.4 | 63.9 | 52.3 | 68.0 | 60.7 | 56.4 | 69.4 | 50.3 | 70.4 | 61.2 | 81.9 | 77.4 | 58.4 | 72.0 | 53.4 | 61.4 | 69.8 | 71.9 | 63.0 | 66.6 | 66.1 | 58.2 | 63.5 | 46.3 | 69.1
2015 Q1 | 69.9 | 63.3 | 54.0 | 69.8 | 76.2 | .. | 70.2 | 68.3 | 62.8 | 52.9 | 66.3 | 58.2 | 55.3 | 69.5 | 48.1 | 70.5 | 60.4 | - | 78.2 | 57.0 | 68.8 | 49.2 | 60.8 | 67.7 | 74.0 | 64.6 | 65.7 | - | 56.8 | 62.6 | 43.6 | 68.5
2015 Q2 | 70.1 | 64.9 | 50.8 | 71.0 | 77.0 | .. | 71.1 | 68.3 | 62.1 | 55.3 | 68.6 | 58.9 | 55.6 | 70.1 | 53.4 | 72.5 | 62.1 | 84.0 | 77.1 | 59.0 | 72.3 | 50.7 | 61.9 | 68.4 | 73.4 | 55.8 | 69.3 | 60.5 | 62.7 | 63.9 | 44.8 | 69.3
2015 Q3 | 69.4 | 65.6 | 55.0 | 71.5 | 76.1 | .. | 71.1 | 68.8 | 64.2 | 56.4 | 74.4 | 59.3 | 56.2 | 71.5 | 54.7 | 72.0 | 63.8 | - | 78.0 | 59.2 | 68.3 | 53.7 | 61.0 | 69.0 | 72.4 | 57.8 | 68.7 | - | 64.3 | 65.0 | 44.2 | 69.2
2015 Q4 | 70.3 | 64.9 | 53.3 | 71.4 | 76.8 | .. | 72.1 | 68.1 | 65.3 | 56.4 | 71.9 | 60.6 | 54.8 | 71.0 | 53.0 | 69.1 | 64.0 | 80.4 | 78.6 | 59.2 | 69.9 | 53.5 | 60.6 | 69.5 | 74.2 | 65.4 | 68.3 | 51.2 | 61.6 | 64.7 | 44.8 | 69.9
2015 | 69.9 | 64.7 | 53.3 | 70.9 | 76.5 |  | 71.1 | 68.4 | 63.6 | 55.2 | 70.2 | 59.3 | 55.5 | 70.5 | 52.2 | 71.1 | 62.6 | 80.7 | 78.0 | 58.6 | 69.5 | 51.8 | 61.1 | 68.6 | 73.5 | 60.7 | 68.0 | 58.4 | 61.3 | 64.1 | 44.4 | 69.2

Table 2.A1.3. Quarterly employment rates by place of birth and gender in OECD countries, 2011-15
Percentage of the population aged 15-64
MEN
|  | AUS | AUT | BEL | CAN | CHE | CHL | CZE | DEU | DNK | ESP | EST | FIN | FRA | GBR | GRC | HUN | IRL | ISL | ISR | ITA | LUX | MEX | NLD | NOR | NZL | POL | PRT | SVK | SVN | SWE | TUR | USA
Native-born | 2011 Q1 | 79.1 | 75.3 | 67.5 | 72.3 | 85.7 | .. | 72.9 | 76.9 | 76.5 | 64.6 | 65.8 | 68.8 | 68.1 | 74.0 | 66.4 | 59.0 | 62.1 | 78.2 | .. | 66.2 | 67.5 | 77.3 | 80.1 | 76.8 | 78.7 | 64.7 | 68.2 | 65.3 | 67.2 | 75.9 | 66.7 | 67.2
2011 Q2 | 79.0 | 76.8 | 69.1 | 75.2 | 85.6 | .. | 74.0 | 77.6 | 77.0 | 64.8 | 66.7 | 72.0 | 68.7 | 74.0 | 66.0 | 60.6 | 62.4 | 80.7 | .. | 66.5 | 65.6 | 77.8 | 80.4 | 77.3 | 78.6 | 66.0 | 67.9 | 66.2 | 67.3 | 78.0 | 69.9 | 68.4
2011 Q3 | 78.4 | 78.2 | 67.4 | 77.0 | 86.0 | .. | 74.4 | 78.1 | 77.7 | 64.8 | 69.8 | 72.1 | 69.1 | 74.2 | 64.8 | 61.4 | 62.2 | 81.9 | .. | 66.6 | 66.0 | 78.2 | 80.9 | 78.3 | 78.6 | 66.9 | 68.0 | 66.5 | 68.5 | 79.0 | 71.3 | 69.2
2011 Q4 | 78.8 | 77.0 | 68.7 | 74.5 | 86.0 | .. | 74.2 | 78.8 | 77.0 | 63.4 | 67.9 | 70.1 | 68.2 | 74.3 | 62.3 | 61.1 | 62.5 | 81.6 | .. | 66.0 | 64.4 | 78.6 | 81.0 | 78.0 | 78.9 | 66.3 | 65.7 | 66.2 | 67.5 | 77.1 | 69.5 | 68.8
2011 | 78.8 | 76.8 | 68.2 | 74.8 | 85.8 | 70.7 | 73.9 | 77.9 | 77.1 | 64.4 | 67.5 | 70.8 | 68.6 | 74.1 | 64.9 | 60.5 | 62.3 | 80.6 | .. | 66.3 | 65.9 | 78.0 | 80.6 | 77.6 | 78.7 | 66.0 | 67.5 | 66.1 | 67.6 | 77.5 | 69.4 | 68.4
2012 Q1 | 78.2 | 75.3 | 68.1 | 72.1 | 85.2 | .. | 73.5 | 77.3 | 75.8 | 61.8 | 67.5 | 68.9 | 67.9 | 74.0 | 61.3 | 59.8 | 61.8 | 79.3 | 68.2 | 65.4 | 63.9 | 77.8 | 80.5 | 77.8 | 78.7 | 65.1 | 64.8 | 66.4 | 66.1 | 75.9 | 66.1 | 68.0
2012 Q2 | 78.5 | 77.0 | 68.8 | 75.4 | 85.3 | .. | 74.5 | 77.8 | 76.3 | 61.7 | 68.3 | 71.8 | 68.6 | 74.5 | 60.8 | 61.2 | 62.0 | 82.5 | 69.1 | 65.8 | 66.9 | 79.0 | 80.6 | 78.2 | 77.9 | 66.4 | 64.9 | 66.6 | 66.5 | 77.6 | 70.0 | 69.4
2012 Q3 | 78.1 | 77.7 | 68.4 | 76.5 | 85.9 | .. | 75.1 | 78.5 | 76.5 | 61.5 | 71.5 | 71.9 | 68.9 | 75.1 | 60.0 | 62.3 | 62.8 | 83.5 | 69.4 | 66.0 | 66.8 | 79.2 | 80.7 | 78.4 | 76.8 | 67.1 | 64.1 | 67.2 | 67.8 | 78.8 | 70.7 | 70.2
2012 Q4 | 78.6 | 77.1 | 67.5 | 74.4 | 86.2 | .. | 74.8 | 78.6 | 76.6 | 60.4 | 70.8 | 69.9 | 68.2 | 75.3 | 59.1 | 62.3 | 62.6 | 80.5 | 68.5 | 65.3 | 67.6 | 78.3 | 80.2 | 77.5 | 77.2 | 66.6 | 62.8 | 66.4 | 67.6 | 77.2 | 70.0 | 69.7
2012 | 78.3 | 76.8 | 68.2 | 74.6 | 85.6 | .. | 74.5 | 78.1 | 76.3 | 61.4 | 69.5 | 70.6 | 68.4 | 74.7 | 60.3 | 61.4 | 62.3 | 81.4 | 68.8 | 65.6 | 66.3 | 78.6 | 80.5 | 78.0 | 77.7 | 66.3 | 64.2 | 66.7 | 67.0 | 77.4 | 69.2 | 69.3
2013 Q1 | 77.9 | 75.3 | 67.0 | 72.7 | 85.5 | .. | 74.5 | 77.3 | 76.0 | 59.6 | 69.9 | 67.9 | 67.6 | 74.5 | 57.9 | 60.5 | 63.3 | 79.5 | 68.8 | 64.0 | 64.0 | 77.7 | 79.3 | 77.1 | 77.8 | 65.2 | 61.9 | 66.5 | 65.7 | 76.7 | 67.5 | 68.5
2013 Q2 | 78.1 | 76.9 | 68.7 | 75.3 | 84.9 | .. | 75.6 | 78.1 | 76.3 | 60.1 | 71.6 | 71.4 | 68.3 | 74.8 | 58.4 | 63.4 | 64.0 | 83.7 | 68.8 | 64.2 | 64.8 | 78.3 | 79.6 | 78.0 | 77.7 | 66.5 | 63.1 | 66.6 | 66.2 | 78.2 | 70.6 | 69.5
2013 Q3 | 78.0 | 77.7 | 67.4 | 76.6 | 85.0 | .. | 76.0 | 78.3 | 75.9 | 61.0 | 72.4 | 71.8 | 68.7 | 75.5 | 58.4 | 64.7 | 65.1 | 87.1 | 70.1 | 64.4 | 66.1 | 78.3 | 79.7 | 78.3 | 78.2 | 67.5 | 64.2 | 66.5 | 68.0 | 80.1 | 70.8 | 70.1
2013 Q4 | 77.9 | 76.9 | 67.1 | 74.9 | 85.5 | .. | 76.0 | 78.7 | 75.8 | 60.5 | 71.2 | 68.8 | 67.8 | 75.8 | 57.4 | 65.0 | 65.9 | 83.3 | 69.8 | 64.1 | 66.6 | 79.0 | 79.5 | 77.1 | 79.3 | 67.2 | 64.5 | 65.7 | 66.8 | 78.2 | 69.3 | 69.2
2013 | 78.0 | 76.7 | 67.5 | 74.8 | 85.2 | 71.0 | 75.5 | 78.1 | 76.0 | 60.3 | 71.3 | 70.0 | 68.1 | 75.2 | 58.0 | 63.4 | 64.6 | 83.2 | 69.4 | 64.2 | 65.3 | 78.3 | 79.5 | 77.6 | 78.2 | 66.6 | 63.4 | 66.3 | 66.6 | 78.3 | 69.6 | 69.3
2014 Q1 | 77.4 | 75.1 | 66.7 | 72.9 | 84.3 | .. | 75.7 | 77.8 | 75.2 | 60.0 | 70.9 | 68.0 | 67.2 | 75.7 | 57.1 | 66.2 | 65.2 | 82.8 | 69.3 | 63.4 | 68.4 | 78.0 | 78.9 | 76.8 | 80.0 | 66.3 | 64.0 | 66.2 | 65.4 | 77.0 | 68.0 | 68.6
2014 Q2 | 77.3 | 76.1 | 66.7 | 75.1 | 84.4 | .. | 76.7 | 77.9 | 76.5 | 61.3 | 73.1 | 71.0 | 68.0 | 76.1 | 58.0 | 67.0 | 65.7 | 87.3 | 69.8 | 64.1 | 65.4 | 77.9 | 79.2 | 78.0 | 80.0 | 67.9 | 65.5 | 67.3 | 67.8 | 78.8 | 71.0 | 70.7
2014 Q3 | 76.8 | 77.4 | 66.9 | 76.6 | 84.9 | .. | 77.4 | 78.9 | 77.4 | 62.4 | 73.2 | 70.8 | 68.3 | 76.9 | 58.6 | 68.7 | 67.3 | 87.3 | 69.6 | 64.7 | 65.2 | 78.2 | 79.8 | 78.0 | 79.5 | 69.4 | 66.5 | 68.2 | 68.9 | 80.0 | 70.6 | 71.2
2014 Q4 | 77.0 | 76.2 | 67.4 | 74.9 | 85.5 | .. | 77.4 | 78.7 | 76.8 | 62.2 | 73.8 | 69.0 | 67.7 | 76.9 | 57.7 | 68.3 | 67.7 | 84.4 | 69.8 | 64.3 | 67.6 | 78.4 | 79.6 | 76.8 | 80.5 | 69.2 | 65.8 | 68.5 | 68.5 | 78.3 | 68.9 | 70.3
2014 | 77.1 | 76.2 | 66.9 | 74.9 | 84.8 | .. | 76.8 | 78.3 | 76.5 | 61.5 | 72.8 | 69.7 | 67.8 | 76.4 | 57.9 | 67.6 | 66.5 | 85.5 | 69.6 | 64.1 | 66.6 | 78.2 | 79.4 | 77.4 | 80.0 | 68.2 | 65.4 | 67.6 | 67.6 | 78.5 | 69.6 | 70.2
2015 Q1 | 77.0 | 75.0 | 66.5 | 72.6 | 85.0 | .. | 76.7 | 77.8 | 76.4 | 62.0 | 72.8 | 68.0 | 67.2 | 76.9 | 57.7 | 68.0 | 67.6 | 86.1 | 69.5 | 63.7 | 66.6 | 78.0 | 79.7 | 77.0 | 79.9 | 68.1 | 65.6 | 68.4 | 68.0 | 77.8 | 67.9 | 69.8
2015 Q2 | 77.6 | 75.6 | 66.9 | 75.4 | 84.5 | .. | 77.6 | 77.6 | 77.6 | 63.3 | 75.6 | 70.3 | 67.9 | 76.7 | 59.1 | 69.8 | 68.6 | 88.7 | 70.9 | 64.7 | 70.6 | 78.3 | 80.2 | 77.5 | 79.4 | 68.7 | 66.3 | 69.4 | 69.1 | 79.3 | 70.8 | 71.4
2015 Q3 | 77.5 | 77.0 | 66.5 | 76.9 | 84.3 | .. | 78.0 | 78.6 | 78.1 | 64.3 | 78.1 | 71.4 | 68.2 | 77.5 | 60.0 | 71.0 | 69.1 | 89.7 | 70.8 | 65.9 | 67.4 | 78.4 | 80.6 | 77.5 | 78.0 | 70.1 | 66.9 | 69.8 | 71.0 | 80.5 | 71.5 | 71.6
2015 Q4 | 78.0 | 76.3 | 66.3 | 74.4 | 85.0 | .. | 78.4 | 79.0 | 77.8 | 64.0 | 74.7 | 68.7 | 67.6 | 78.2 | 59.6 | 71.1 | 68.4 | 85.0 | 70.2 | 65.2 | 64.5 | 78.9 | 80.5 | 76.6 | 79.4 | 70.2 | 67.0 | 70.2 | 68.8 | 79.4 | 69.6 | 70.7
2015 | 77.5 | 76.0 | 66.5 | 74.8 | 84.7 |  | 77.7 | 78.2 | 77.5 | 63.4 | 75.3 | 69.6 | 67.7 | 77.3 | 59.1 | 70.0 | 68.4 | 87.4 | 70.4 | 64.9 | 66.7 | 78.4 | 80.3 | 77.1 | 79.2 | 69.2 | 66.5 | 69.5 | 69.2 | 79.3 | 69.9 | 70.9
Foreign-born | 2011 Q1 | 79.7 | 70.5 | 60.9 | 73.5 | 82.4 | .. | 80.7 | 74.5 | 63.2 | 58.4 | 68.2 | 64.3 | 65.9 | 75.3 | 71.3 | 66.9 | 62.2 | - | .. | 74.6 | 80.5 | 67.9 | 70.5 | 70.8 | 78.4 | 59.8 | 69.2 | - | 66.7 | 66.3 | 64.6 | 76.7
2011 Q2 | 79.1 | 74.3 | 60.4 | 75.4 | 84.4 | .. | 80.5 | 76.5 | 66.4 | 58.9 | 64.6 | 68.1 | 66.5 | 75.6 | 71.6 | 70.1 | 64.1 | 79.1 | .. | 77.8 | 77.3 | 68.7 | 69.9 | 74.5 | 76.2 | 58.7 | 70.8 | 74.8 | 69.8 | 67.5 | 67.1 | 78.5
2011 Q3 | 79.5 | 75.2 | 61.9 | 76.0 | 85.4 | .. | 79.6 | 76.5 | 67.7 | 58.0 | 72.9 | 66.6 | 66.3 | 75.3 | 69.9 | 75.5 | 65.3 | 87.6 | .. | 76.3 | 79.4 | 67.0 | 71.1 | 75.1 | 76.5 | 63.4 | 71.2 | 75.7 | 69.2 | 68.7 | 65.4 | 78.4
2011 Q4 | 79.1 | 73.3 | 62.1 | 75.3 | 84.7 | .. | 79.9 | 77.2 | 67.0 | 56.6 | 71.6 | 68.2 | 64.6 | 75.1 | 65.7 | 72.5 | 64.1 | 76.7 | .. | 73.7 | 78.6 | 65.1 | 71.9 | 73.6 | 77.4 | 70.5 | 70.4 | 70.4 | 68.3 | 67.7 | 66.5 | 78.6
2011 | 79.3 | 73.3 | 61.3 | 75.1 | 84.2 | 79.3 | 80.2 | 76.2 | 66.1 | 58.0 | 69.5 | 66.8 | 65.8 | 75.3 | 69.7 | 71.3 | 63.9 | 77.9 | .. | 75.6 | 78.9 | 67.2 | 70.9 | 73.5 | 77.1 | 62.9 | 70.4 | 73.0 | 68.4 | 67.5 | 65.9 | 78.1
2012 Q1 | 79.0 | 71.6 | 60.6 | 74.4 | 83.0 | .. | 77.8 | 76.3 | 66.1 | 54.1 | 69.4 | 67.3 | 64.4 | 75.3 | 61.2 | 70.5 | 62.4 | 76.4 | 77.6 | 71.9 | 79.2 | 62.2 | 71.4 | 72.5 | 78.4 | 65.9 | 69.9 | 65.8 | 70.7 | 65.9 | 61.7 | 77.2
2012 Q2 | 78.7 | 74.5 | 60.1 | 76.1 | 84.6 | .. | 77.9 | 77.0 | 65.0 | 54.6 | 73.7 | 69.4 | 66.0 | 77.0 | 57.9 | 71.3 | 64.3 | 84.0 | 78.2 | 73.7 | 79.4 | 64.1 | 71.6 | 75.9 | 76.2 | 67.7 | 68.3 | 71.4 | 71.4 | 68.4 | 62.8 | 78.7
2012 Q3 | 78.2 | 75.4 | 59.4 | 77.3 | 85.3 | .. | 81.5 | 77.8 | 65.7 | 55.4 | 72.7 | 71.0 | 67.4 | 77.7 | 58.6 | 75.9 | 64.7 | 84.9 | 78.0 | 73.0 | 78.9 | 62.9 | 71.5 | 76.3 | 75.9 | 76.5 | 68.6 | 67.4 | 70.5 | 68.3 | 69.2 | 79.4
2012 Q4 | 78.6 | 72.4 | 59.8 | 76.6 | 83.5 | .. | 80.8 | 77.3 | 67.5 | 53.9 | 68.3 | 67.6 | 67.0 | 76.6 | 54.7 | 76.0 | 65.4 | 83.6 | 78.0 | 70.7 | 79.2 | 66.9 | 69.9 | 75.8 | 76.7 | 74.9 | 65.5 | 69.1 | 73.0 | 67.6 | 64.3 | 78.6
2012 | 78.6 | 73.5 | 60.0 | 76.1 | 84.1 | .. | 79.5 | 77.1 | 66.1 | 54.5 | 70.9 | 68.9 | 66.2 | 76.7 | 58.1 | 73.5 | 64.2 | 82.1 | 78.0 | 72.3 | 79.2 | 64.0 | 71.1 | 75.2 | 76.8 | 71.1 | 68.1 | 68.4 | 71.4 | 67.5 | 64.5 | 78.5
2013 Q1 | 78.5 | 70.5 | 60.1 | 74.9 | 82.1 | .. | 79.3 | 76.0 | 66.3 | 51.7 | 70.9 | 67.7 | 65.0 | 75.1 | 53.5 | 75.5 | 64.5 | 81.6 | 78.8 | 68.3 | 79.2 | 67.0 | 69.5 | 74.4 | 78.0 | 72.8 | 63.3 | 75.8 | 69.6 | 66.3 | 60.9 | 78.1
2013 Q2 | 78.3 | 74.0 | 60.0 | 77.3 | 83.4 | .. | 80.4 | 77.2 | 67.5 | 54.1 | 79.2 | 70.2 | 66.2 | 75.8 | 55.6 | 80.1 | 67.1 | 83.2 | 78.8 | 68.3 | 77.1 | 68.8 | 68.6 | 74.7 | 77.9 | 68.9 | 64.5 | 70.7 | 70.1 | 67.9 | 64.3 | 80.2
2013 Q3 | 77.2 | 74.9 | 61.2 | 78.2 | 83.3 | .. | 81.5 | 77.9 | 67.2 | 52.8 | 71.6 | 69.6 | 67.7 | 78.2 | 58.1 | 78.3 | 68.9 | 83.6 | 78.6 | 69.1 | 81.2 | 70.1 | 67.6 | 75.2 | 77.3 | 70.6 | 63.6 | 68.7 | 74.1 | 68.2 | 64.4 | 80.4
2013 Q4 | 77.2 | 71.6 | 60.8 | 75.4 | 84.6 | .. | 81.3 | 77.5 | 68.1 | 54.3 | 66.1 | 68.1 | 66.3 | 77.9 | 58.2 | 80.2 | 68.9 | 82.4 | 78.2 | 68.6 | 80.0 | 67.1 | 69.4 | 75.7 | 80.0 | 65.7 | 64.9 | 75.4 | 71.0 | 67.1 | 64.1 | 79.8
2013 | 77.8 | 72.7 | 60.5 | 76.5 | 83.3 | 83.3 | 80.6 | 77.2 | 67.3 | 53.2 | 71.9 | 68.9 | 66.3 | 76.7 | 56.3 | 78.4 | 67.4 | 82.7 | 78.6 | 68.6 | 79.4 | 68.2 | 68.8 | 75.0 | 78.3 | 69.5 | 64.1 | 72.5 | 71.3 | 67.4 | 63.5 | 79.6
2014 Q1 | 77.0 | 68.1 | 61.4 | 74.0 | 82.9 | .. | 84.3 | 76.2 | 67.3 | 52.6 | 70.1 | 65.5 | 63.9 | 78.4 | 57.6 | 82.6 | 67.7 | - | 79.7 | 67.0 | 73.7 | 67.6 | 66.9 | 74.3 | 78.7 | 73.5 | 67.6 | - | 67.4 | 66.5 | 63.1 | 79.7
2014 Q2 | 77.6 | 71.6 | 60.6 | 76.2 | 83.6 | .. | 84.2 | 76.5 | 70.6 | 56.3 | 76.8 | 67.0 | 63.8 | 79.5 | 59.0 | 83.9 | 68.7 | 85.7 | 78.7 | 69.4 | 81.7 | 71.1 | 69.8 | 74.3 | 79.1 | 72.0 | 69.7 | 76.3 | 69.5 | 67.6 | 67.0 | 81.0
2014 Q3 | 77.7 | 72.9 | 58.7 | 77.7 | 83.9 | .. | 84.9 | 77.6 | 73.2 | 57.7 | 73.8 | 66.2 | 63.8 | 79.6 | 60.7 | 82.1 | 68.9 | 87.9 | 79.1 | 69.5 | 80.1 | 63.1 | 70.3 | 75.7 | 78.2 | 72.6 | 70.9 | 82.0 | 64.4 | 69.5 | 65.8 | 81.9
2014 Q4 | 78.5 | 71.8 | 60.6 | 77.3 | 84.5 | .. | 82.9 | 77.6 | 72.2 | 57.3 | 77.3 | 65.7 | 63.8 | 78.4 | 58.4 | 82.5 | 68.7 | 87.8 | 80.6 | 68.8 | 80.1 | 68.9 | 71.7 | 74.5 | 79.8 | 69.9 | 69.6 | 81.9 | 65.6 | 68.7 | 62.6 | 80.9
2014 | 77.7 | 71.1 | 60.3 | 76.3 | 83.7 | .. | 84.1 | 77.0 | 70.9 | 56.0 | 74.6 | 66.1 | 63.8 | 79.0 | 58.9 | 82.7 | 68.5 | 84.3 | 79.5 | 68.7 | 78.9 | 67.7 | 69.7 | 74.7 | 79.0 | 72.1 | 69.5 | 78.6 | 66.8 | 68.1 | 64.6 | 80.9
2015 Q1 | 79.1 | 69.9 | 61.8 | 76.4 | 83.4 | .. | 81.9 | 76.5 | 69.4 | 56.6 | 72.2 | 62.7 | 62.3 | 78.5 | 56.2 | 79.5 | 67.9 | 75.2 | 79.8 | 67.7 | 75.7 | 64.4 | 69.9 | 71.9 | 81.7 | 74.6 | 68.5 | 73.4 | 64.0 | 66.4 | 64.9 | 80.2
2015 Q2 | 78.8 | 72.3 | 56.3 | 78.2 | 84.5 | .. | 82.5 | 75.9 | 69.5 | 60.3 | 72.7 | 66.1 | 62.7 | 78.7 | 61.4 | 83.3 | 69.3 | 85.4 | 79.0 | 70.2 | 75.7 | 66.8 | 70.8 | 72.9 | 80.7 | 67.7 | 72.1 | 66.6 | 70.9 | 67.7 | 65.1 | 81.6
2015 Q3 | 78.1 | 73.3 | 64.0 | 79.6 | 83.3 | .. | 83.5 | 77.2 | 71.1 | 61.3 | 80.0 | 65.1 | 63.7 | 79.7 | 63.8 | 84.4 | 71.2 | 89.3 | 80.6 | 71.3 | 74.9 | 66.9 | 70.9 | 73.4 | 79.4 | 70.0 | 73.1 | 63.5 | 71.5 | 68.8 | 63.9 | 82.1
2015 Q4 | 79.3 | 71.3 | 60.1 | 78.6 | 83.6 | .. | 83.7 | 77.4 | 72.3 | 61.9 | 77.4 | 66.7 | 63.1 | 79.7 | 63.1 | 82.1 | 71.4 | 87.1 | 81.0 | 71.0 | 75.6 | 68.2 | 70.4 | 74.6 | 80.8 | 81.3 | 72.4 | 56.5 | 69.7 | 68.0 | 64.3 | 81.4
2015 | 78.8 | 71.7 | 60.5 | 78.2 | 83.7 |  | 82.9 | 76.8 | 70.6 | 60.0 | 75.7 | 65.2 | 62.9 | 79.1 | 61.0 | 82.4 | 69.9 | 84.5 | 80.1 | 70.0 | 75.4 | 66.6 | 70.5 | 73.2 | 80.6 | 73.1 | 71.5 | 65.0 | 69.0 | 67.7 | 64.6 | 81.3

Table 2.A1.3. Quarterly employment rates by place of birth and gender in OECD countries, 2011-15
Percentage of the population aged 15-64
WOMEN
|  | AUS | AUT | BEL | CAN | CHE | CHL | CZE | DEU | DNK | ESP | EST | FIN | FRA | GBR | GRC | HUN | IRL | ISL | ISR | ITA | LUX | MEX | NLD | NOR | NZL | POL | PRT | SVK | SVN | SWE | TUR | USA
Native-born | 2011 Q1 | 68.2 | 67.4 | 58.4 | 69.9 | 75.9 | .. | 56.7 | 68.8 | 71.9 | 52.4 | 61.5 | 66.4 | 60.5 | 65.6 | 45.9 | 49.5 | 55.2 | 76.6 | .. | 45.8 | 52.4 | 42.5 | 70.2 | 74.2 | 68.6 | 52.4 | 59.9 | 52.3 | 60.6 | 72.8 | 25.9 | 62.0
2011 Q2 | 68.9 | 67.5 | 59.4 | 71.2 | 76.4 | .. | 57.2 | 69.6 | 72.8 | 53.3 | 63.3 | 68.8 | 61.2 | 65.4 | 45.2 | 50.2 | 55.8 | 79.1 | .. | 46.2 | 51.8 | 43.5 | 70.9 | 74.4 | 68.0 | 52.8 | 60.3 | 52.7 | 61.7 | 74.9 | 29.0 | 61.9
2011 Q3 | 69.0 | 68.7 | 59.5 | 70.6 | 75.2 | .. | 57.6 | 69.9 | 72.7 | 52.8 | 65.0 | 69.2 | 61.5 | 65.5 | 44.7 | 50.6 | 55.0 | 77.0 | .. | 45.7 | 54.7 | 43.6 | 71.2 | 74.3 | 68.1 | 52.8 | 59.2 | 52.9 | 62.2 | 75.8 | 28.9 | 61.7
2011 Q4 | 69.0 | 67.5 | 59.3 | 70.2 | 76.6 | .. | 57.8 | 70.5 | 71.8 | 52.4 | 64.1 | 67.7 | 61.4 | 65.9 | 43.4 | 50.7 | 55.6 | 74.6 | .. | 46.6 | 53.1 | 45.4 | 71.5 | 74.2 | 69.0 | 52.8 | 58.2 | 52.4 | 61.9 | 74.1 | 27.6 | 61.9
2011 | 68.8 | 67.8 | 59.1 | 70.5 | 76.0 | 44.1 | 57.3 | 69.7 | 72.3 | 52.7 | 63.5 | 68.0 | 61.1 | 65.6 | 44.8 | 50.2 | 55.4 | 76.9 | .. | 46.1 | 53.0 | 43.7 | 71.0 | 74.3 | 68.4 | 52.7 | 59.4 | 52.6 | 61.6 | 74.4 | 27.9 | 61.9
2012 Q1 | 68.4 | 67.9 | 58.8 | 69.7 | 75.9 | .. | 57.5 | 69.3 | 71.9 | 51.8 | 64.3 | 67.5 | 61.1 | 66.1 | 42.6 | 50.4 | 54.9 | 75.5 | 58.5 | 46.5 | 53.4 | 43.9 | 71.3 | 74.5 | 68.1 | 52.6 | 58.2 | 52.7 | 61.9 | 73.6 | 26.5 | 61.6
2012 Q2 | 69.0 | 68.1 | 58.9 | 71.2 | 75.7 | .. | 58.2 | 69.7 | 72.5 | 51.9 | 65.7 | 69.5 | 61.8 | 66.1 | 42.1 | 51.6 | 55.4 | 79.3 | 58.8 | 47.1 | 54.0 | 45.4 | 71.4 | 75.1 | 67.9 | 53.1 | 58.4 | 52.9 | 60.9 | 75.5 | 29.8 | 62.1
2012 Q3 | 69.0 | 69.4 | 59.7 | 70.6 | 76.3 | .. | 58.7 | 70.0 | 72.2 | 51.2 | 65.1 | 69.9 | 62.0 | 66.5 | 41.3 | 52.6 | 55.2 | 79.8 | 60.2 | 46.4 | 57.6 | 45.3 | 71.7 | 74.9 | 67.8 | 53.4 | 58.2 | 52.9 | 60.7 | 76.4 | 29.2 | 62.0
2012 Q4 | 69.1 | 68.7 | 60.0 | 70.7 | 76.3 | .. | 59.0 | 70.4 | 71.3 | 50.7 | 64.0 | 67.6 | 61.8 | 67.1 | 41.0 | 52.0 | 56.0 | 78.0 | 59.3 | 46.6 | 54.7 | 44.9 | 72.0 | 74.8 | 67.0 | 53.4 | 56.8 | 52.2 | 60.6 | 74.6 | 29.1 | 62.3
2012 | 68.9 | 68.5 | 59.4 | 70.5 | 76.0 | .. | 58.3 | 69.8 | 72.0 | 51.4 | 64.8 | 68.6 | 61.7 | 66.4 | 41.8 | 51.7 | 55.4 | 78.2 | 59.2 | 46.7 | 54.9 | 44.9 | 71.6 | 74.8 | 67.7 | 53.1 | 57.9 | 52.7 | 61.0 | 75.0 | 28.7 | 62.0
2013 Q1 | 68.2 | 68.3 | 58.9 | 70.4 | 77.0 | .. | 58.9 | 70.4 | 70.8 | 50.2 | 64.4 | 67.6 | 61.6 | 66.9 | 40.0 | 51.3 | 55.6 | 76.6 | 59.4 | 45.9 | 54.7 | 43.9 | 71.6 | 74.8 | 68.0 | 52.3 | 56.4 | 53.0 | 59.9 | 74.3 | 28.3 | 61.6
2013 Q2 | 68.7 | 69.0 | 59.5 | 71.5 | 76.5 | .. | 59.7 | 70.7 | 72.2 | 50.6 | 66.5 | 69.6 | 62.3 | 66.8 | 40.3 | 52.2 | 56.4 | 80.0 | 60.3 | 46.3 | 55.7 | 45.4 | 71.6 | 74.8 | 67.7 | 53.0 | 57.4 | 53.0 | 60.0 | 76.2 | 31.0 | 62.4
2013 Q3 | 68.5 | 69.8 | 60.8 | 71.0 | 76.4 | .. | 59.8 | 71.0 | 72.8 | 50.9 | 65.6 | 68.8 | 62.7 | 67.2 | 40.1 | 52.8 | 56.7 | 81.4 | 60.0 | 45.8 | 52.4 | 45.0 | 71.3 | 74.9 | 69.2 | 54.0 | 57.9 | 53.5 | 61.2 | 77.1 | 29.9 | 62.4
2013 Q4 | 68.8 | 68.6 | 59.5 | 71.2 | 78.1 | .. | 60.2 | 71.3 | 71.2 | 51.1 | 66.1 | 67.7 | 62.3 | 67.5 | 39.5 | 53.6 | 56.9 | 78.9 | 59.6 | 46.3 | 57.3 | 45.7 | 71.0 | 74.7 | 70.3 | 54.4 | 58.4 | 53.8 | 60.0 | 76.1 | 29.1 | 62.5
2013 | 68.6 | 68.9 | 59.7 | 71.0 | 77.0 | 46.6 | 59.6 | 70.8 | 71.7 | 50.7 | 65.7 | 68.4 | 62.2 | 67.1 | 40.0 | 52.5 | 56.4 | 79.1 | 59.8 | 46.1 | 55.0 | 45.0 | 71.4 | 74.8 | 68.8 | 53.4 | 57.6 | 53.3 | 60.3 | 75.9 | 29.6 | 62.2
2014 Q1 | 67.7 | 68.5 | 59.6 | 70.2 | 77.1 | .. | 59.9 | 71.0 | 70.4 | 51.0 | 65.3 | 67.4 | 62.0 | 68.0 | 40.2 | 54.8 | 56.5 | 78.0 | 61.2 | 46.0 | 56.5 | 44.3 | 69.7 | 74.1 | 70.1 | 54.3 | 58.4 | 54.0 | 60.3 | 75.5 | 28.0 | 62.7
2014 Q2 | 68.4 | 68.9 | 60.2 | 71.5 | 77.2 | .. | 60.2 | 71.5 | 71.4 | 51.7 | 67.8 | 70.2 | 62.2 | 68.1 | 40.8 | 55.5 | 57.0 | 80.9 | 61.3 | 46.3 | 55.0 | 44.5 | 70.0 | 75.2 | 69.7 | 54.7 | 59.1 | 54.1 | 61.9 | 77.1 | 30.7 | 63.1
2014 Q3 | 68.3 | 69.2 | 61.2 | 71.1 | 77.6 | .. | 60.9 | 71.4 | 72.4 | 51.6 | 67.4 | 69.9 | 62.0 | 68.4 | 41.5 | 56.4 | 57.6 | 82.3 | 60.9 | 46.3 | 57.3 | 44.0 | 70.9 | 75.0 | 70.6 | 55.7 | 59.6 | 54.3 | 61.6 | 78.6 | 29.9 | 62.6
2014 Q4 | 68.5 | 69.1 | 61.1 | 70.9 | 80.2 | .. | 61.9 | 71.9 | 73.0 | 52.3 | 66.8 | 67.7 | 62.0 | 69.0 | 41.3 | 56.6 | 58.2 | 81.1 | 60.2 | 46.9 | 55.9 | 44.2 | 71.1 | 75.0 | 72.0 | 56.1 | 59.5 | 54.6 | 61.2 | 76.1 | 29.5 | 63.5
2014 | 68.3 | 68.9 | 60.5 | 70.9 | 78.0 | .. | 60.7 | 71.4 | 71.8 | 51.7 | 66.8 | 68.8 | 62.1 | 68.4 | 40.9 | 55.8 | 57.3 | 80.6 | 60.9 | 46.4 | 56.1 | 44.3 | 70.4 | 74.8 | 70.6 | 55.2 | 59.1 | 54.3 | 61.2 | 76.8 | 29.5 | 63.0
2015 Q1 | 68.3 | 68.9 | 60.6 | 70.4 | 79.7 | .. | 61.8 | 71.7 | 72.6 | 51.9 | 67.8 | 67.5 | 61.9 | 69.1 | 41.0 | 56.6 | 57.8 | 81.2 | 60.8 | 46.6 | 59.8 | 44.0 | 71.2 | 73.9 | 71.0 | 55.8 | 59.5 | 55.3 | 60.5 | 76.1 | 29.0 | 63.1
2015 Q2 | 69.2 | 69.0 | 60.3 | 71.8 | 78.6 | .. | 62.4 | 71.9 | 72.9 | 53.1 | 68.5 | 69.6 | 62.6 | 68.9 | 42.4 | 57.5 | 58.2 | 82.8 | 61.3 | 47.0 | 60.2 | 44.5 | 71.9 | 75.2 | 69.9 | 56.5 | 61.2 | 55.6 | 62.3 | 77.8 | 31.6 | 63.7
2015 Q3 | 69.3 | 70.5 | 60.7 | 71.2 | 78.6 | .. | 62.7 | 72.0 | 72.4 | 53.2 | 70.0 | 69.9 | 62.8 | 69.1 | 42.8 | 58.4 | 58.6 | 83.1 | 61.5 | 46.7 | 57.3 | 44.6 | 72.4 | 75.2 | 69.5 | 57.0 | 61.1 | 56.2 | 62.6 | 79.4 | 31.0 | 63.4
2015 Q4 | 70.6 | 69.7 | 60.9 | 71.0 | 79.9 | .. | 62.9 | 72.6 | 72.5 | 54.0 | 69.1 | 67.9 | 62.6 | 69.5 | 42.8 | 58.5 | 59.5 | 84.4 | 61.3 | 47.2 | 57.4 | 45.7 | 72.1 | 74.0 | 70.5 | 57.3 | 60.9 | 56.8 | 62.2 | 77.5 | 30.6 | 64.1
2015 | 69.4 | 69.5 | 60.7 | 71.1 | 79.2 |  | 62.5 | 72.1 | 72.6 | 53.0 | 68.9 | 68.7 | 62.5 | 69.2 | 42.3 | 57.7 | 58.5 | 82.9 | 61.2 | 46.9 | 58.4 | 44.7 | 71.9 | 74.6 | 70.2 | 56.7 | 60.7 | 56.0 | 61.9 | 77.7 | 30.5 | 63.6
Foreign-born | 2011 Q1 | 61.7 | 58.6 | 44.6 | 62.8 | 65.9 | .. | 55.3 | 57.0 | 57.0 | 51.9 | 55.6 | 51.0 | 50.6 | 58.3 | 47.4 | 57.4 | 53.5 | 81.4 | .. | 50.8 | 63.6 | 31.9 | 57.3 | 65.5 | 63.0 | 47.6 | 64.7 | 45.3 | 55.7 | 56.6 | 27.3 | 56.4
2011 Q2 | 61.9 | 58.3 | 45.7 | 63.3 | 67.3 | .. | 53.7 | 58.8 | 57.7 | 53.7 | 58.0 | 57.4 | 51.5 | 58.1 | 49.0 | 55.0 | 54.8 | 76.7 | .. | 50.7 | 61.1 | 34.5 | 55.5 | 66.9 | 64.6 | 52.4 | 67.5 | 43.2 | 55.3 | 57.3 | 25.1 | 56.5
2011 Q3 | 62.1 | 58.8 | 42.7 | 63.6 | 67.1 | .. | 53.2 | 59.3 | 59.6 | 52.2 | 63.5 | 57.1 | 50.2 | 58.4 | 46.2 | 52.9 | 54.3 | - | .. | 48.9 | 60.3 | 42.4 | 55.0 | 67.7 | 63.2 | - | 67.5 | - | 53.3 | 58.4 | 26.7 | 56.1
2011 Q4 | 61.9 | 58.7 | 44.8 | 63.1 | 67.7 | .. | 54.4 | 58.2 | 57.5 | 49.9 | 61.7 | 57.8 | 49.2 | 57.2 | 44.6 | 56.5 | 53.8 | 69.4 | .. | 48.5 | 60.6 | 42.8 | 56.7 | 67.2 | 64.6 | 43.1 | 67.3 | 53.1 | 52.8 | 58.9 | 28.7 | 57.6
2011 | 61.9 | 58.6 | 44.4 | 63.2 | 67.0 | 59.7 | 54.1 | 58.3 | 58.0 | 51.9 | 59.7 | 55.8 | 50.3 | 58.0 | 46.8 | 55.4 | 54.1 | 74.9 | .. | 49.7 | 61.4 | 38.0 | 56.1 | 66.8 | 63.9 | 48.1 | 66.7 | 46.7 | 54.3 | 57.8 | 27.0 | 56.7
2012 Q1 | 61.1 | 58.4 | 43.4 | 62.6 | 68.1 | .. | 54.1 | 57.8 | 56.3 | 49.5 | 64.5 | 56.5 | 50.3 | 55.6 | 41.1 | 54.9 | 54.0 | 74.9 | 71.7 | 49.2 | 62.5 | 40.6 | 55.3 | 66.1 | 64.2 | 50.4 | 65.2 | 56.2 | 54.6 | 58.0 | 31.9 | 56.7
2012 Q2 | 61.5 | 59.0 | 44.1 | 64.7 | 68.3 | .. | 55.1 | 60.0 | 57.5 | 50.0 | 64.1 | 60.2 | 50.0 | 56.5 | 41.5 | 60.3 | 54.6 | 76.6 | 72.0 | 50.5 | 63.5 | 43.0 | 55.9 | 69.0 | 64.8 | 57.7 | 67.2 | 56.4 | 54.6 | 58.9 | 32.4 | 57.1
2012 Q3 | 61.8 | 58.3 | 45.2 | 65.0 | 68.2 | .. | 54.5 | 59.4 | 58.5 | 50.8 | 63.8 | 60.1 | 50.1 | 57.4 | 42.6 | 60.6 | 53.9 | - | 71.5 | 49.9 | 63.1 | 42.4 | 57.5 | 67.4 | 64.6 | - | 65.0 | - | 57.3 | 58.9 | 31.0 | 56.7
2012 Q4 | 61.6 | 58.7 | 45.4 | 65.5 | 68.2 | .. | 54.7 | 59.9 | 55.1 | 49.3 | 65.1 | 59.4 | 48.6 | 58.6 | 40.8 | 65.5 | 53.1 | 78.6 | 72.9 | 50.2 | 64.5 | 42.6 | 55.4 | 64.1 | 64.5 | 45.4 | 62.0 | 66.0 | 54.6 | 57.9 | 33.3 | 57.2
2012 | 61.5 | 58.6 | 44.5 | 64.5 | 68.2 | .. | 54.6 | 59.3 | 56.8 | 49.9 | 64.4 | 59.1 | 49.8 | 57.0 | 41.5 | 60.4 | 53.9 | 75.8 | 72.0 | 50.0 | 63.4 | 42.2 | 56.0 | 66.7 | 64.5 | 51.7 | 64.8 | 59.7 | 55.2 | 58.4 | 32.1 | 56.9
2013 Q1 | 61.9 | 58.4 | 46.2 | 64.8 | 67.8 | .. | 55.3 | 59.3 | 57.6 | 48.5 | 68.9 | 56.6 | 47.9 | 58.6 | 38.7 | 62.6 | 53.2 | 78.1 | 73.9 | 49.9 | 63.9 | 40.6 | 53.4 | 63.0 | 65.1 | 45.1 | 60.3 | 64.1 | 44.2 | 57.3 | 34.6 | 56.8
2013 Q2 | 62.0 | 58.4 | 44.3 | 65.7 | 69.2 | .. | 58.9 | 59.9 | 60.3 | 48.3 | 65.7 | 61.8 | 48.6 | 59.0 | 39.5 | 56.7 | 53.9 | 75.6 | 72.8 | 49.2 | 63.8 | 37.3 | 54.2 | 65.7 | 65.6 | 49.3 | 60.0 | 58.8 | 51.2 | 59.5 | 35.7 | 57.4
2013 Q3 | 62.2 | 59.1 | 45.6 | 65.5 | 68.7 | .. | 58.8 | 60.5 | 60.4 | 49.0 | 64.0 | 57.0 | 48.5 | 58.6 | 40.0 | 56.3 | 54.8 | - | 73.0 | 48.9 | 65.5 | 40.5 | 56.0 | 66.7 | 64.4 | 48.5 | 62.6 | - | 50.5 | 59.0 | 33.5 | 58.1
2013 Q4 | 61.8 | 58.2 | 44.9 | 64.5 | 68.2 | .. | 60.6 | 59.3 | 58.1 | 47.9 | 65.0 | 57.2 | 48.7 | 59.8 | 39.7 | 57.4 | 54.5 | 78.5 | 74.1 | 49.5 | 60.6 | 38.0 | 54.8 | 66.0 | 65.3 | 48.2 | 62.2 | 59.3 | 49.5 | 58.3 | 30.2 | 57.2
2013 | 62.0 | 58.5 | 45.3 | 65.1 | 68.5 | 66.7 | 58.4 | 59.8 | 59.1 | 48.4 | 65.9 | 58.2 | 48.4 | 59.0 | 39.5 | 58.3 | 54.1 | 77.5 | 73.4 | 49.4 | 63.4 | 39.0 | 54.6 | 65.4 | 65.1 | 47.7 | 61.3 | 60.5 | 48.9 | 58.5 | 33.5 | 57.4
2014 Q1 | 61.3 | 58.5 | 45.2 | 64.2 | 67.6 | .. | 59.5 | 59.1 | 54.7 | 47.5 | 58.4 | 54.7 | 48.6 | 59.3 | 39.4 | 58.2 | 53.8 | 77.7 | 75.7 | 49.6 | 66.3 | 38.8 | 54.4 | 64.0 | 65.8 | 60.8 | 64.1 | 50.1 | 48.2 | 57.1 | 32.8 | 57.2
2014 Q2 | 61.8 | 60.9 | 47.7 | 64.9 | 70.4 | .. | 61.9 | 60.1 | 58.1 | 49.1 | 58.4 | 55.6 | 50.2 | 60.6 | 42.8 | 56.7 | 54.0 | 85.6 | 74.9 | 50.4 | 65.8 | 39.3 | 54.6 | 65.7 | 64.3 | 63.3 | 64.3 | 52.1 | 51.1 | 58.9 | 29.5 | 57.5
2014 Q3 | 61.8 | 59.4 | 45.3 | 63.8 | 68.5 | .. | 57.5 | 61.6 | 59.2 | 49.4 | 67.4 | 56.1 | 51.0 | 61.2 | 44.2 | 60.1 | 54.5 | 79.7 | 75.1 | 50.0 | 61.4 | 42.2 | 53.3 | 63.1 | 64.7 | 45.1 | 63.9 | 57.7 | 50.8 | 61.1 | 30.3 | 57.5
2014 Q4 | 62.0 | 58.3 | 44.4 | 64.8 | 69.3 | .. | 59.2 | 59.6 | 57.3 | 50.3 | 67.1 | 54.3 | 49.6 | 61.3 | 43.7 | 63.4 | 54.7 | 77.5 | 76.7 | 48.7 | 66.6 | 39.3 | 54.2 | 65.7 | 66.5 | 47.2 | 65.0 | 59.2 | 46.4 | 59.9 | 27.5 | 57.9
2014 | 61.7 | 59.3 | 45.6 | 64.4 | 69.0 | .. | 59.5 | 60.1 | 57.4 | 49.1 | 62.5 | 55.2 | 49.9 | 60.6 | 42.5 | 59.5 | 54.3 | 80.0 | 75.6 | 49.7 | 65.0 | 39.9 | 54.1 | 64.6 | 65.3 | 54.2 | 64.3 | 54.7 | 49.1 | 59.3 | 29.8 | 57.5
2015 Q1 | 61.2 | 57.2 | 46.9 | 63.7 | 69.0 | .. | 58.3 | 60.1 | 57.1 | 49.6 | 61.7 | 54.1 | 49.1 | 61.1 | 41.1 | 63.0 | 53.5 | 76.6 | 76.8 | 48.0 | 61.7 | 35.6 | 52.9 | 63.3 | 66.8 | 56.0 | 63.3 | 59.7 | 49.3 | 59.1 | 24.5 | 57.2
2015 Q2 | 61.7 | 58.1 | 45.9 | 64.4 | 69.3 | .. | 60.2 | 60.9 | 55.9 | 50.9 | 65.5 | 52.3 | 49.2 | 62.2 | 46.4 | 62.9 | 55.5 | 82.6 | 75.4 | 49.7 | 68.7 | 35.5 | 54.4 | 63.6 | 66.5 | 46.1 | 67.0 | 55.3 | 53.8 | 60.4 | 27.2 | 57.3
2015 Q3 | 61.0 | 58.5 | 46.7 | 64.0 | 68.9 | .. | 58.6 | 60.5 | 57.7 | 51.9 | 68.8 | 54.2 | 49.6 | 63.7 | 46.5 | 60.6 | 57.0 | 75.8 | 75.9 | 49.1 | 61.5 | 40.1 | 52.4 | 64.3 | 65.7 | 43.4 | 65.3 | 50.6 | 56.1 | 61.6 | 26.9 | 56.4
2015 Q4 | 61.6 | 59.0 | 47.0 | 64.8 | 70.0 | .. | 60.2 | 59.0 | 58.6 | 51.3 | 66.4 | 54.9 | 47.5 | 63.0 | 43.9 | 57.5 | 57.3 | - | 76.8 | 49.2 | 63.9 | 38.5 | 52.0 | 64.1 | 67.8 | 51.4 | 65.0 | - | 53.0 | 61.7 | 27.4 | 58.5
2015 | 61.4 | 58.2 | 46.6 | 64.2 | 69.3 |  | 59.3 | 60.1 | 57.3 | 50.9 | 65.4 | 53.9 | 48.8 | 62.5 | 44.4 | 61.0 | 55.8 | 76.8 | 76.2 | 49.0 | 63.3 | 37.4 | 52.9 | 63.8 | 66.7 | 49.3 | 65.2 | 53.1 | 53.0 | 60.7 | 26.5 | 57.4
Notes: Data refer to the working-age population (15-64). Data are not adjusted for seasonal variations. Comparisons should therefore be made for the same quarters of each year, and not for successive quarters within a given year.
Source: European countries and Turkey: Labour Force Surveys (Eurostat); Australia, Canada, Israel, New Zealand: Labour Force surveys; Chile: Encuesta de Caracterización Socioeconómica Nacional (CASEN); Mexico: Encuesta Nacional de Ocupación y Empleo (ENOE); United States: Current Population Surveys.
StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933396348

Table 2.A1.4. Quarterly unemployment rates by place of birth and gender in OECD countries, 2011-15
Percentage of the active population aged 15-64
Men and women
|  | AUS | AUT | BEL | CAN | CHE | CHL | CZE | DEU | DNK | ESP | EST | FIN | FRA | GBR | GRC | HUN | IRL | ISL | ISR | ITA | LUX | MEX | NLD | NOR | NZL | POL | PRT | SVK | SVN | SWE | TUR | USA
Native-born | 2011 Q1 | 5.5 | 4.0 | 5.9 | 8.0 | 3.2 | .. | 7.2 | 6.1 | 7.3 | 19.1 | 14.0 | 8.4 | 8.4 | 7.7 | 15.7 | 11.9 | 13.8 | 7.3 | .. | 8.3 | 3.5 | 5.3 | 4.6 | 2.7 | 7.1 | 10.2 | 12.3 | 14.0 | 8.1 | 6.8 | 10.5 | 9.6
2011 Q2 | 4.9 | 3.7 | 5.1 | 7.4 | 2.6 | .. | 6.8 | 5.3 | 6.6 | 18.7 | 12.6 | 8.7 | 7.7 | 7.8 | 16.4 | 11.0 | 14.3 | 8.2 | .. | 7.4 | 2.8 | 5.4 | 4.1 | 3.0 | 6.7 | 9.6 | 12.3 | 13.3 | 7.5 | 7.1 | 8.6 | 9.2
2011 Q3 | 5.1 | 3.4 | 6.5 | 7.1 | 3.4 | .. | 6.5 | 5.2 | 6.8 | 19.3 | 10.4 | 6.5 | 7.7 | 8.4 | 17.7 | 10.8 | 14.9 | 5.8 | .. | 7.4 | 3.4 | 5.7 | 4.1 | 2.7 | 6.4 | 9.4 | 12.7 | 13.2 | 7.7 | 5.5 | 8.4 | 9.4
2011 Q4 | 5.1 | 3.9 | 5.8 | 6.6 | 3.0 | .. | 6.5 | 4.8 | 6.8 | 20.4 | 11.0 | 6.6 | 8.6 | 8.1 | 20.6 | 10.8 | 14.2 | 5.5 | .. | 9.0 | 4.0 | 5.0 | 4.6 | 2.5 | 6.4 | 9.8 | 14.4 | 14.1 | 8.6 | 5.8 | 8.2 | 8.5
2011 | 5.2 | 3.7 | 5.8 | 7.2 | 3.0 | 8.1 | 6.8 | 5.3 | 6.9 | 19.4 | 12.0 | 7.6 | 8.1 | 8.0 | 17.6 | 11.1 | 14.3 | 6.7 | .. | 8.0 | 3.4 | 5.4 | 4.3 | 2.7 | 6.7 | 9.8 | 12.9 | 13.7 | 8.0 | 6.3 | 8.9 | 9.2
2012 Q1 | 5.8 | 3.9 | 5.4 | 7.7 | 3.1 | .. | 7.1 | 5.3 | 7.3 | 21.9 | 11.5 | 7.8 | 8.8 | 8.0 | 22.1 | 12.0 | 14.6 | - | 7.3 | 10.4 | - | 5.1 | 5.1 | 2.6 | 7.2 | 10.7 | 15.2 | 14.1 | 8.5 | 6.7 | 9.5 | 8.8
2012 Q2 | 5.1 | 4.1 | 5.5 | 7.0 | 2.7 | .. | 6.7 | 4.9 | 7.1 | 22.4 | 9.9 | 8.5 | 8.3 | 7.9 | 23.0 | 11.1 | 14.7 | 6.8 | 7.1 | 10.2 | 3.2 | 4.9 | 4.9 | 2.8 | 6.8 | 10.0 | 15.3 | 13.7 | 8.1 | 7.3 | 7.4 | 8.3
2012 Q3 | 5.2 | 4.4 | 6.2 | 7.1 | 3.6 | .. | 7.0 | 4.9 | 6.7 | 23.2 | 9.2 | 6.9 | 8.3 | 8.0 | 24.2 | 10.6 | 14.8 | 4.5 | 7.5 | 9.6 | 3.8 | 5.3 | 5.0 | 2.7 | 7.3 | 10.0 | 16.2 | 13.7 | 9.1 | 5.9 | 7.9 | 8.4
2012 Q4 | 5.1 | 4.0 | 6.5 | 6.5 | 3.2 | .. | 7.2 | 4.6 | 6.3 | 23.9 | 8.9 | 6.8 | 9.4 | 7.5 | 25.2 | 10.8 | 13.4 | - | 7.6 | 11.2 | - | 5.0 | 5.4 | 2.6 | 7.0 | 10.2 | 17.3 | 14.5 | 9.5 | 6.0 | 8.4 | 7.7
2012 | 5.3 | 4.1 | 5.9 | 7.1 | 3.1 | .. | 7.0 | 4.9 | 6.8 | 22.9 | 9.9 | 7.5 | 8.7 | 7.8 | 23.6 | 11.1 | 14.4 | 5.7 | 7.4 | 10.4 | 3.8 | 5.1 | 5.1 | 2.7 | 7.1 | 10.2 | 16.0 | 14.0 | 8.8 | 6.5 | 8.3 | 8.3
2013 Q1 | 6.0 | 4.6 | 6.6 | 7.4 | 3.1 | .. | 7.5 | 5.3 | 7.2 | 24.9 | 10.1 | 8.6 | 9.5 | 7.7 | 26.4 | 11.7 | 13.1 | 5.7 | 7.1 | 12.2 | 3.9 | 5.0 | 6.3 | 2.8 | 6.9 | 11.4 | 17.9 | 14.6 | 10.5 | 7.1 | 9.6 | 8.3
2013 Q2 | 5.6 | 4.2 | 6.6 | 7.0 | 2.9 | .. | 6.8 | 4.7 | 6.2 | 24.4 | 8.0 | 9.0 | 8.9 | 7.6 | 26.3 | 10.3 | 13.5 | 6.5 | 6.7 | 11.4 | - | 5.2 | 6.4 | 3.0 | 6.8 | 10.6 | 16.6 | 14.1 | 10.0 | 7.4 | 8.1 | 7.8
2013 Q3 | 5.6 | 4.6 | 7.1 | 7.0 | 3.5 | .. | 7.0 | 4.7 | 6.6 | 23.8 | 7.7 | 6.8 | 8.7 | 7.7 | 26.3 | 9.9 | 12.7 | 3.9 | 6.7 | 10.8 | 5.0 | 5.4 | 6.5 | 2.8 | 6.4 | 9.9 | 15.8 | 14.1 | 9.2 | 5.7 | 8.9 | 7.7
2013 Q4 | 5.7 | 4.5 | 7.0 | 6.2 | 2.9 | .. | 6.8 | 4.5 | 5.9 | 24.0 | 8.4 | 7.5 | 9.2 | 7.0 | 27.0 | 9.2 | 11.4 | - | 6.1 | 12.2 | - | 4.8 | 6.7 | 2.6 | 6.3 | 9.9 | 15.6 | 14.3 | 9.3 | 5.7 | 9.0 | 6.9
2013 | 5.7 | 4.5 | 6.8 | 6.9 | 3.1 | 7.5 | 7.0 | 4.8 | 6.5 | 24.3 | 8.6 | 8.0 | 9.1 | 7.5 | 26.5 | 10.2 | 12.7 | 5.1 | 6.7 | 11.7 | 4.1 | 5.1 | 6.5 | 2.8 | 6.6 | 10.4 | 16.5 | 14.3 | 9.7 | 6.5 | 8.9 | 7.7
2014 Q1 | 6.6 | 4.9 | 7.4 | 7.3 | 3.3 | .. | 6.9 | 5.0 | 6.7 | 24.0 | 8.3 | 8.8 | 9.7 | 6.6 | 26.9 | 8.3 | 11.6 | - | 6.0 | 13.0 | - | 5.0 | 7.3 | 2.9 | 6.2 | 10.7 | 15.5 | 14.2 | 10.5 | 6.9 | 10.3 | 7.2
2014 Q2 | 6.0 | 4.6 | 6.6 | 6.9 | 3.2 | .. | 6.1 | 4.5 | 5.7 | 22.9 | 6.7 | 9.3 | 9.0 | 6.1 | 25.8 | 8.2 | 11.5 | 6.0 | 5.9 | 11.9 | 4.0 | 5.1 | 6.9 | 2.8 | 5.5 | 9.2 | 14.3 | 13.2 | 9.3 | 6.9 | 8.9 | 6.4
2014 Q3 | 6.3 | 4.7 | 6.8 | 6.7 | 4.0 | .. | 5.9 | 4.4 | 5.9 | 22.2 | 7.6 | 7.2 | 9.2 | 6.2 | 24.9 | 7.5 | 11.1 | 3.8 | 6.9 | 11.5 | 6.2 | 5.4 | 6.4 | 3.0 | 5.6 | 8.3 | 13.4 | 13.0 | 9.2 | 5.5 | 10.2 | 6.6
2014 Q4 | 6.1 | 4.5 | 6.6 | 6.1 | 2.9 | .. | 5.8 | 4.3 | 5.6 | 22.2 | 6.7 | 8.1 | 10.1 | 5.5 | 25.4 | 7.2 | 9.8 | 4.1 | 6.2 | 12.9 | - | 4.5 | 6.3 | 2.8 | 6.2 | 8.2 | 13.7 | 12.7 | 9.3 | 5.7 | 10.8 | 5.7
2014 | 6.3 | 4.7 | 6.9 | 6.8 | 3.3 | .. | 6.2 | 4.5 | 6.0 | 22.8 | 7.3 | 8.3 | 9.5 | 6.1 | 25.8 | 7.8 | 11.0 | 4.8 | 6.3 | 12.3 | 4.4 | 5.0 | 6.7 | 2.9 | 5.9 | 9.1 | 14.2 | 13.3 | 9.6 | 6.2 | 10.0 | 6.5
2015 Q1 | 6.9 | 4.6 | 6.9 | 7.3 | 2.9 | .. | 6.0 | 4.5 | 5.9 | 22.2 | 6.5 | 9.3 | 9.9 | 5.4 | 25.8 | 7.8 | 9.5 | 3.6 | 5.6 | 12.5 | 4.6 | 4.4 | 6.7 | 3.1 | 6.3 | 8.7 | 13.9 | 12.5 | 9.5 | 6.4 | 11.4 | 6.1
2015 Q2 | 6.1 | 4.6 | 6.5 | 6.9 | 2.8 | .. | 4.9 | 4.2 | 5.2 | 20.9 | 6.5 | 10.5 | 9.1 | 5.4 | 24.1 | 6.9 | 9.6 | 5.3 | 5.1 | 11.8 | - | 4.5 | 6.2 | 3.6 | 5.9 | 7.5 | 12.2 | 11.3 | 9.1 | 6.4 | 9.5 | 5.5
2015 Q3 | 6.1 | 4.7 | 6.9 | 6.9 | 3.7 | .. | 4.9 | 3.9 | 5.5 | 19.9 | 5.2 | 8.0 | 9.1 | 5.4 | 23.6 | 6.5 | 9.0 | 3.3 | 5.9 | 10.2 | 5.3 | 4.8 | 6.0 | 3.6 | 6.3 | 7.1 | 12.2 | 11.3 | 8.5 | 4.7 | 10.2 | 5.5
2015 Q4 | 5.8 | 4.6 | 7.1 | 6.4 | 3.3 | .. | 4.5 | 3.9 | 5.2 | 19.7 | 6.2 | 8.5 | 9.8 | 4.8 | 23.9 | 6.2 | 8.4 | - | 5.5 | 11.4 | - | 4.3 | 6.0 | 3.2 | 5.5 | 7.0 | 12.6 | 11.0 | 8.2 | 4.6 | 10.6 | 5.1
2015 | 6.2 | 4.6 | 6.8 | 6.9 | 3.2 |  | 5.1 | 4.1 | 5.4 | 20.7 | 6.1 | 9.1 | 9.5 | 5.2 | 24.4 | 6.8 | 9.1 | 3.9 | 5.5 | 11.5 | 4.4 | 4.5 | 6.2 | 3.4 | 6.0 | 7.6 | 12.7 | 11.5 | 8.8 | 5.5 | 10.4 | 5.6
Foreign-born | 2011 Q1 | 5.5 | 10.4 | 14.6 | 9.2 | 7.7 | .. | 7.3 | 10.2 | 15.7 | 30.7 | 19.2 | 17.1 | 15.0 | 8.8 | 21.5 | 9.6 | 17.7 | 13.2 | .. | 11.5 | 6.9 | 7.6 | 9.8 | 8.3 | 7.2 | 8.4 | 18.9 | - | 13.2 | 17.0 | 13.2 | 10.1
2011 Q2 | 5.3 | 8.3 | 15.5 | 8.7 | 6.1 | .. | 8.2 | 9.2 | 14.4 | 30.1 | 19.3 | 14.1 | 13.8 | 9.0 | 19.6 | 10.1 | 17.2 | 12.7 | .. | 10.8 | 7.6 | 6.1 | 10.0 | 8.4 | 6.2 | 9.4 | 16.7 | 16.7 | 10.9 | 17.3 | 11.4 | 8.7
2011 Q3 | 5.1 | 7.3 | 15.6 | 9.1 | 6.5 | .. |  | 8.9 | 14.1 | 31.0 | - | - | 13.2 | 9.8 | 22.0 | - | 17.2 | - | .. | 10.0 | - | 4.0 | 9.7 | .. | 7.1 | .. | 16.0 | - |  | 15.5 | 9.8 | 9.0
2011 Q4 | 5.0 | 9.4 | 14.8 | 8.7 | 6.9 | .. | 7.8 | 8.7 | 13.8 | 33.1 | 14.5 | 14.4 | 15.2 | 10.0 | 26.5 | 9.3 | 17.2 | 11.5 | .. | 13.9 | 5.4 | 7.4 | 9.7 | 7.4 | 6.9 | 15.2 | 16.2 | 16.2 | 11.2 | 15.3 | 9.7 | 8.7
2011 | 5.2 | 8.9 | 15.1 | 8.9 | 6.8 | 5.9 | 8.0 | 9.2 | 14.5 | 31.2 | 16.8 | 15.2 | 14.3 | 9.4 | 22.3 | 9.6 | 17.3 | 11.1 | .. | 11.6 | 6.3 | 6.2 | 9.8 | 7.7 | 6.8 | 11.9 | 16.9 | 15.6 | 11.5 | 16.3 | 11.1 | 9.1
2012 Q1 | 5.5 | 9.1 | 17.0 | 8.9 | 7.5 | .. | 9.3 | 9.4 | 16.0 | 35.2 | 13.0 | 15.2 | 15.8 | 10.2 | 31.3 | 11.8 | 18.1 | 10.7 | 5.0 | 15.0 | 7.1 | 9.0 | 11.2 | 7.8 | 8.0 | 5.1 | 18.6 | - | 10.6 | 16.3 | 12.7 | 9.2
2012 Q2 | 5.3 | 8.7 | 15.5 | 8.5 | 6.5 | .. | 8.9 | 8.3 | 14.9 | 34.4 | 13.4 | 14.4 | 14.8 | 8.8 | 33.2 | 11.1 | 17.3 | 11.6 | 5.0 | 13.3 | 4.8 | 8.8 | 11.4 | 6.7 | 7.1 | - | 18.3 | - | 10.2 | 16.1 | 12.5 | 7.7
2012 Q3 | 5.2 | 8.7 | 16.6 | 8.4 | 6.5 | .. | 8.6 | 8.2 | 14.5 | 33.2 | 13.3 | 13.0 | 13.3 | 9.2 | 33.4 | 9.0 | 17.3 | - | 5.5 | 11.9 | 7.5 | 6.5 | 10.7 | 5.7 | 7.9 | - | 19.1 | - | 11.4 | 15.7 | 9.0 | 7.8
2012 Q4 | 5.5 | 9.3 | 18.3 | 8.0 | 7.6 | .. | 8.7 | 8.2 | 13.4 | 35.2 | 12.0 | 14.2 | 15.7 | 9.2 | 37.4 | 6.6 | 16.4 | - | 5.3 | 15.1 | 6.4 | 4.9 | 11.9 | 7.0 | 7.4 | 10.9 | 21.5 | - | 11.4 | 16.2 | 11.4 | 7.9
2012 | 5.4 | 8.9 | 16.9 | 8.4 | 7.0 | .. | 8.9 | 8.5 | 14.7 | 34.5 | 12.9 | 14.2 | 14.9 | 9.3 | 33.8 | 9.5 | 17.3 | 9.5 | 5.2 | 13.8 | 6.4 | 7.3 | 11.3 | 6.8 | 7.6 | 6.9 | 19.4 | 11.6 | 10.9 | 16.1 | 11.4 | 8.1
2013 Q1 | 6.2 | 11.5 | 18.1 | 8.6 | 8.5 | .. | 9.0 | 8.9 | 13.5 | 37.3 | 11.0 | 15.4 | 17.4 | 9.6 | 40.1 | 10.1 | 17.0 | - | 4.8 | 17.6 | 6.9 | 5.8 | 13.2 | 8.7 | 6.5 | 10.9 | 23.0 | - | 19.1 | 16.9 | 10.9 | 8.1
2013 Q2 | 6.0 | 9.3 | 16.6 | 7.9 | 7.4 | .. | 8.1 | 8.3 | 12.2 | 35.2 | 10.4 | 14.6 | 15.8 | 8.8 | 38.2 | 8.4 | 16.4 | 10.8 | 4.5 | 17.3 | 8.5 | 5.6 | 13.1 | 7.8 | 5.9 | 10.7 | 23.0 | 12.1 | 15.7 | 16.5 | 11.7 | 6.6
2013 Q3 | 5.9 | 9.0 | 17.1 | 8.3 | 7.8 | .. | 8.0 | 7.7 | 11.7 | 35.5 | 10.6 | 15.1 | 15.0 | 9.2 | 37.0 | 11.2 | 15.4 | - | 4.8 | 15.2 | 6.3 | 7.1 | 13.3 | 7.7 | 6.6 | 14.2 | 21.1 | 13.6 | 12.5 | 16.0 | 10.7 | 6.7
2013 Q4 | 5.7 | 9.9 | 17.2 | 8.1 | 7.3 | .. | 8.1 | 7.7 | 12.3 | 35.0 | 12.0 | 14.3 | 16.7 | 7.9 | 36.6 | 10.1 | 14.3 | - | 4.6 | 16.7 | 8.1 | 8.8 | 13.9 | 7.1 | 6.1 | 13.1 | 20.0 | - | 14.5 | 16.3 | 11.1 | 6.5
2013 | 5.9 | 9.9 | 17.2 | 8.2 | 7.7 | 3.9 | 8.3 | 8.1 | 12.4 | 35.8 | 11.0 | 14.8 | 16.2 | 8.9 | 38.0 | 9.9 | 15.7 | 8.6 | 4.7 | 16.7 | 7.5 | 6.9 | 13.4 | 7.8 | 6.2 | 12.2 | 21.8 | 10.7 | 15.3 | 16.4 | 11.1 | 7.0
2014 Q1 | 6.6 | 11.3 | 16.2 | 8.3 | 8.7 | .. | 7.1 | 8.5 | 14.8 | 36.3 | 11.9 | 16.0 | 17.9 | 7.9 | 37.6 | 8.5 | 15.0 | 12.2 | 4.8 | 18.1 | 9.0 | 6.2 | 14.7 | 8.5 | 7.5 | 12.0 | 17.9 | 10.8 | 14.9 | 17.3 | 13.7 | 6.9
2014 Q2 | 6.0 | 9.2 | 17.1 | 8.1 | 7.5 | .. | 6.4 | 7.8 | 11.6 | 33.1 | 10.9 | 18.1 | 16.5 | 7.2 | 34.7 | 5.2 | 14.3 | - | 4.8 | 15.6 | 5.9 | 7.4 | 12.9 | 7.2 | 6.1 | 10.9 | 16.7 | - | 11.4 | 17.7 | 11.5 | 5.6
2014 Q3 | 5.9 | 9.8 | 18.7 | 8.5 | 7.3 | .. | 6.9 | 7.5 | 11.7 | 31.7 | 8.8 | 15.7 | 15.1 | 6.9 | 32.4 | 6.3 | 13.3 | - | 4.5 | 14.8 | 6.6 | 7.6 | 11.3 | 7.9 | 6.2 | 14.4 | 16.7 | - | 12.1 | 15.5 | 11.7 | 5.2
2014 Q4 | 5.9 | 10.3 | 18.4 | 6.9 | 7.1 | .. | 7.7 | 7.8 | 11.2 | 32.1 | 5.5 | 17.3 | 16.7 | 6.4 | 33.4 | 3.9 | 11.4 | 5.7 | 4.4 | 17.2 | 7.1 | 5.9 | 12.5 | 8.2 | 5.3 | 10.9 | 16.4 | - | 13.6 | 15.1 | 13.9 | 5.3
2014 | 6.1 | 10.1 | 17.6 | 8.0 | 7.7 | .. | 7.0 | 7.9 | 12.3 | 33.3 | 9.3 | 16.8 | 16.6 | 7.1 | 34.5 | 6.0 | 13.5 | 7.6 | 4.6 | 16.4 | 7.2 | 6.8 | 12.9 | 7.9 | 6.3 | 12.1 | 16.9 | 7.4 | 13.0 | 16.4 | 12.7 | 5.8
2015 Q1 | 6.6 | 11.4 | 18.2 | 7.4 | 7.8 | .. | 7.8 | 8.0 | 12.7 | 32.7 | 8.3 | 18.9 | 18.0 | 6.5 | 36.1 | 7.2 | 12.7 | 11.4 | 4.1 | 17.1 | 9.6 | 4.6 | 13.2 | 11.4 | 6.5 | 10.7 | 17.7 | - | 13.9 | 17.3 | 12.3 | 5.7
2015 Q2 | 6.1 | 11.1 | 18.2 | 7.4 | 7.5 | .. | 6.9 | 7.7 | 13.0 | 30.4 | 7.8 | 18.0 | 17.6 | 6.7 | 30.9 | 6.0 | 11.5 | - | 4.1 | 15.6 | 6.3 | 5.3 | 12.3 | 9.7 | 6.1 | 15.2 | 13.8 | - | 11.6 | 17.3 | 10.5 | 4.9
2015 Q3 | 6.6 | 9.7 | 14.9 | 7.8 | 8.0 | .. | 6.3 | 7.4 | 12.3 | 28.3 | 6.5 | 17.2 | 16.6 | 6.6 | 29.8 | 6.6 | 11.3 | - | 4.2 | 13.8 | 9.8 | 6.1 | 11.1 | 10.0 | 6.1 | 8.8 | 13.7 | 16.2 | 10.6 | 14.8 | 15.2 | 4.7
2015 Q4 | 5.6 | 10.6 | 16.8 | 7.2 | 8.1 | .. | 6.3 | 7.8 | 10.9 | 27.9 | 8.5 | 15.9 | 17.2 | 6.1 | 31.2 | 7.5 | 10.3 | - | 4.6 | 16.1 | 7.8 | 5.4 | 11.9 | 10.5 | 5.4 | 7.2 | 13.8 | 20.7 | 11.8 | 15.5 | 13.3 | 4.5
2015 | 6.2 | 10.7 | 17.0 | 7.5 | 7.9 |  | 6.8 | 7.7 | 12.2 | 29.8 | 7.8 | 17.5 | 17.3 | 6.4 | 32.0 | 6.8 | 11.4 | 7.0 | 4.3 | 15.7 | 8.7 | 5.4 | 12.1 | 10.4 | 6.0 | 10.6 | 14.8 | 13.6 | 11.9 | 16.2 | 12.8 | 5.0

Table 2.A1.4. Quarterly unemployment rates by place of birth and gender in OECD countries, 2011-15
Percentage of the active population aged 15-64
Men
|  | AUS | AUT | BEL | CAN | CHE | CHL | CZE | DEU | DNK | ESP | EST | FIN | FRA | GBR | GRC | HUN | IRL | ISL | ISR | ITA | LUX | MEX | NLD | NOR | NZL | POL | PRT | SVK | SVN | SWE | TUR | USA
Native-born | 2011 Q1 | 5.4 | 4.0 | 5.9 | 9.4 | 3.0 | .. | 6.5 | 6.5 | 7.9 | 18.4 | 15.6 | 9.1 | 8.1 | 8.6 | 12.9 | 12.4 | 17.4 | 9.3 | .. | 7.7 | - | 5.5 | 4.2 | 3.0 | 6.5 | 10.1 | 11.9 | 14.1 | 8.3 | 6.7 | 10.2 | 10.9
2011 Q2 | 5.0 | 3.8 | 4.8 | 8.2 | 2.6 | .. | 5.9 | 5.6 | 7.2 | 18.3 | 13.6 | 9.3 | 7.5 | 8.5 | 13.4 | 10.9 | 17.8 | 9.5 | .. | 6.9 | - | 5.4 | 3.8 | 3.1 | 6.5 | 9.1 | 12.1 | 13.6 | 8.0 | 7.1 | 8.2 | 9.8
2011 Q3 | 5.3 | 3.5 | 6.3 | 7.1 | 2.9 | .. | 5.6 | 5.3 | 6.7 | 18.6 | 10.3 | 6.9 | 7.3 | 9.2 | 14.7 | 10.7 | 18.1 | 5.7 | .. | 6.6 | 3.6 | 5.5 | 3.8 | 2.6 | 6.3 | 8.4 | 12.2 | 13.2 | 8.1 | 5.7 | 7.5 | 9.5
2011 Q4 | 5.1 | 3.6 | 5.7 | 7.2 | 2.7 | .. | 5.5 | 4.8 | 6.8 | 19.9 | 12.3 | 7.5 | 8.6 | 8.8 | 17.4 | 10.8 | 17.8 | 5.8 | .. | 8.4 | - | 5.1 | 4.1 | 2.8 | 6.3 | 9.0 | 14.4 | 13.9 | 8.4 | 5.9 | 7.7 | 9.0
2011 | 5.2 | 3.7 | 5.7 | 8.0 | 2.8 | 6.7 | 5.9 | 5.5 | 7.2 | 18.8 | 13.0 | 8.2 | 7.9 | 8.8 | 14.6 | 11.2 | 17.8 | 7.6 | .. | 7.4 | 3.0 | 5.4 | 4.0 | 2.9 | 6.4 | 9.1 | 12.7 | 13.7 | 8.2 | 6.3 | 8.4 | 9.8
2012 Q1 | 5.9 | 3.7 | 5.2 | 9.0 | 3.0 | .. | 6.3 | 5.8 | 7.7 | 21.4 | 12.7 | 8.7 | 8.9 | 8.8 | 18.9 | 12.4 | 18.0 | 7.4 | 7.0 | 9.8 | 5.1 | 5.2 | 4.8 | 3.2 | 6.7 | 10.3 | 15.1 | 13.9 | 8.5 | 6.9 | 9.3 | 9.5
2012 Q2 | 5.1 | 4.2 | 5.4 | 7.7 | 2.5 | .. | 5.8 | 5.0 | 7.4 | 22.2 | 11.3 | 9.3 | 8.3 | 8.7 | 19.7 | 11.6 | 18.4 | 6.8 | 6.8 | 9.6 | 3.4 | 4.9 | 4.6 | 3.4 | 6.3 | 9.3 | 15.5 | 13.4 | 7.9 | 7.5 | 7.1 | 8.7
2012 Q3 | 5.5 | 4.4 | 5.9 | 7.0 | 3.7 | .. | 5.9 | 5.0 | 6.8 | 22.5 | 9.3 | 7.1 | 8.2 | 8.6 | 20.6 | 10.9 | 18.1 | 4.7 | 7.2 | 8.8 | - | 5.2 | 4.7 | 2.8 | 6.9 | 9.1 | 16.8 | 13.0 | 8.5 | 6.1 | 7.1 | 8.4
2012 Q4 | 5.2 | 4.0 | 6.9 | 7.2 | 3.2 | .. | 6.2 | 4.7 | 6.4 | 23.3 | 9.3 | 7.4 | 9.4 | 8.1 | 21.9 | 11.0 | 16.8 | 5.4 | 7.6 | 10.5 | 2.8 | 5.0 | 5.2 | 3.2 | 6.6 | 9.5 | 17.3 | 14.0 | 9.3 | 6.2 | 7.7 | 8.0
2012 | 5.4 | 4.1 | 5.8 | 7.7 | 3.1 | .. | 6.0 | 5.1 | 7.1 | 22.3 | 10.6 | 8.1 | 8.7 | 8.6 | 20.3 | 11.5 | 17.8 | 6.1 | 7.1 | 9.7 | 3.7 | 5.1 | 4.8 | 3.1 | 6.7 | 9.6 | 16.2 | 13.6 | 8.6 | 6.7 | 7.8 | 8.6
2013 Q1 | 6.1 | 4.7 | 6.5 | 8.4 | 3.1 | .. | 6.6 | 5.7 | 7.3 | 24.3 | 10.8 | 9.6 | 9.8 | 8.4 | 23.2 | 12.5 | 15.7 | 5.8 | 6.9 | 11.4 | - | 5.0 | 6.4 | 3.2 | 6.2 | 10.9 | 18.3 | 14.2 | 10.4 | 7.3 | 9.0 | 9.0
2013 Q2 | 5.6 | 4.3 | 6.4 | 7.8 | 2.9 | .. | 5.7 | 5.1 | 5.9 | 23.7 | 8.4 | 10.0 | 9.0 | 8.4 | 22.9 | 10.3 | 16.1 | - | 6.5 | 10.9 | - | 5.2 | 6.5 | 3.5 | 6.1 | 10.0 | 16.7 | 13.8 | 9.9 | 7.6 | 7.4 | 8.3
2013 Q3 | 5.8 | 4.5 | 7.1 | 6.9 | 3.5 | .. | 5.8 | 5.0 | 6.8 | 22.9 | 8.0 | 7.2 | 8.7 | 8.3 | 23.0 | 9.7 | 15.0 | - | 6.2 | 10.4 | - | 5.3 | 6.5 | 2.7 | 5.9 | 9.2 | 15.5 | 13.7 | 8.5 | 5.6 | 7.9 | 8.0
2013 Q4 | 6.0 | 4.2 | 7.3 | 7.0 | 3.2 | .. | 5.6 | 4.7 | 5.5 | 23.2 | 8.6 | 8.0 | 9.2 | 7.7 | 23.7 | 9.0 | 13.3 | 4.1 | 5.8 | 11.7 | 3.8 | 4.7 | 6.5 | 2.8 | 5.8 | 9.3 | 15.2 | 14.5 | 8.9 | 5.9 | 8.0 | 7.4
2013 | 5.9 | 4.4 | 6.8 | 7.5 | 3.2 | 6.6 | 5.9 | 5.1 | 6.4 | 23.5 | 9.0 | 8.7 | 9.2 | 8.2 | 23.2 | 10.4 | 15.0 | 5.4 | 6.4 | 11.1 | 4.3 | 5.1 | 6.5 | 3.1 | 6.0 | 9.8 | 16.4 | 14.0 | 9.4 | 6.6 | 8.1 | 8.2
2014 Q1 | 6.4 | 4.8 | 7.8 | 8.7 | 3.4 | .. | 5.9 | 5.4 | 6.5 | 23.2 | 9.1 | 9.6 | 10.1 | 7.3 | 23.9 | 8.2 | 13.8 | - | 6.0 | 12.5 | - | 4.9 | 7.0 | 3.2 | 5.6 | 10.4 | 15.6 | 14.3 | 10.2 | 7.3 | 9.7 | 8.1
2014 Q2 | 6.1 | 4.9 | 7.1 | 7.7 | 3.3 | .. | 5.1 | 4.9 | 5.5 | 22.0 | 7.8 | 10.1 | 9.3 | 6.6 | 22.5 | 8.1 | 13.8 | 5.8 | 5.6 | 11.1 | - | 5.1 | 6.6 | 3.2 | 5.0 | 8.8 | 14.0 | 13.0 | 8.6 | 7.2 | 8.1 | 6.6
2014 Q3 | 6.6 | 4.7 | 7.0 | 6.9 | 3.8 | .. | 4.8 | 4.6 | 6.1 | 20.9 | 8.2 | 7.7 | 9.2 | 6.5 | 21.8 | 7.2 | 12.6 | 3.6 | 6.6 | 10.8 | 6.8 | 5.4 | 6.2 | 3.1 | 4.8 | 7.6 | 12.7 | 12.4 | 8.1 | 5.8 | 9.1 | 6.5
2014 Q4 | 6.3 | 4.9 | 6.9 | 6.7 | 2.9 | .. | 4.9 | 4.5 | 5.8 | 21.1 | 6.6 | 9.1 | 10.5 | 6.0 | 22.3 | 7.2 | 11.8 | - | 5.9 | 12.0 | - | 4.4 | 6.0 | 3.2 | 5.7 | 7.7 | 13.4 | 12.0 | 8.8 | 6.1 | 9.8 | 5.9
2014 | 6.3 | 4.8 | 7.2 | 7.5 | 3.4 | .. | 5.2 | 4.8 | 6.0 | 21.8 | 7.9 | 9.1 | 9.8 | 6.6 | 22.6 | 7.7 | 13.0 | 5.0 | 6.0 | 11.6 | 4.7 | 5.0 | 6.5 | 3.2 | 5.3 | 8.6 | 13.9 | 12.9 | 8.9 | 6.6 | 9.2 | 6.8
2015 Q1 | 7.0 | 5.1 | 7.6 | 8.7 | 3.2 | .. | 5.2 | 5.0 | 6.2 | 20.9 | 7.8 | 10.3 | 10.4 | 5.9 | 22.3 | 7.8 | 11.4 | 3.0 | 5.6 | 12.2 | 4.4 | 4.4 | 6.4 | 3.5 | 5.7 | 8.6 | 13.2 | 11.8 | 8.6 | 6.6 | 10.5 | 6.7
2015 Q2 | 6.2 | 5.0 | 7.1 | 7.9 | 2.8 | .. | 4.1 | 4.5 | 5.2 | 19.5 | 6.6 | 11.1 | 9.5 | 5.8 | 20.7 | 6.8 | 10.9 | 4.7 | 5.0 | 11.5 | - | 4.4 | 5.9 | 4.2 | 5.2 | 7.4 | 12.3 | 10.1 | 8.3 | 6.6 | 8.5 | 5.8
2015 Q3 | 6.4 | 5.1 | 7.1 | 7.2 | 3.6 | .. | 4.0 | 4.2 | 5.1 | 18.4 | - | 8.3 | 9.4 | 5.7 | 20.0 | 6.2 | 10.3 | - | 5.6 | 9.8 | - | 4.6 | 5.7 | 3.9 | 5.9 | 6.8 | 12.0 | 10.1 | 7.2 | 5.0 | 8.8 | 5.4
2015 Q4 | 6.1 | 4.8 | 7.7 | 7.4 | 3.1 | .. | 3.7 | 4.2 | 5.1 | 18.3 | 6.1 | 9.1 | 10.2 | 5.0 | 20.4 | 6.0 | 10.3 | - | 4.9 | 11.0 | - | 4.2 | 5.7 | 3.4 | 5.2 | 6.9 | 12.7 | 9.6 | 7.9 | 4.7 | 9.5 | 5.5
2015 | 6.4 | 5.0 | 7.4 | 7.8 | 3.2 |  | 4.3 | 4.5 | 5.4 | 19.3 | 6.3 | 9.7 | 9.9 | 5.6 | 20.9 | 6.7 | 10.7 | 3.7 | 5.3 | 11.1 | 4.4 | 4.4 | 5.9 | 3.7 | 5.5 | 7.4 | 12.6 | 10.4 | 8.0 | 5.7 | 9.3 | 5.8
Foreign-born | 2011 Q1 | 4.7 | 11.3 | 16.0 | 9.2 | 7.3 | .. | 4.4 | 10.7 | 16.3 | 31.7 | 15.9 | 17.2 | 13.9 | 8.6 | 19.9 | 11.1 | 20.8 | - | .. | 10.2 | 4.8 | 5.3 | 9.7 | 9.2 | 7.1 | 8.4 | 20.0 | - | 13.0 | 17.3 | 12.6 | 10.4
2011 Q2 | 4.6 | 8.9 | 16.0 | 8.5 | 5.9 | .. | 6.5 | 9.5 | 12.9 | 31.6 | 18.6 | 15.7 | 13.5 | 9.0 | 19.5 | 9.3 | 19.8 | - | .. | 8.2 | 5.9 | 4.5 | 10.0 | 9.3 | 6.2 | - | 17.2 | - | 8.8 | 17.3 | 10.1 | 8.4
2011 Q3 | 4.5 | 6.7 | 15.0 | 8.3 | 5.4 | .. | 7.4 | 9.0 | 13.1 | 32.8 | 14.0 | 16.4 | 12.5 | 9.4 | 21.5 | 8.6 | 19.3 | - | .. | 8.3 | 3.5 | 4.0 | 9.2 | 6.8 | 6.4 | 11.7 | 17.9 | - | 8.2 | 15.6 | 9.0 | 8.2
2011 Q4 | 4.7 | 8.8 | 14.9 | 7.9 | 6.2 | .. | 6.2 | 8.7 | 13.2 | 34.4 | 14.7 | 14.7 | 14.4 | 9.5 | 26.1 | 6.4 | 19.3 | - | .. | 11.7 | 4.7 | 6.7 | 9.2 | 7.8 | 7.7 | 11.0 | 16.8 | - | 8.2 | 16.2 | 9.2 | 8.4
2011 | 4.6 | 8.9 | 15.5 | 8.5 | 6.2 | 3.9 | 6.2 | 9.5 | 13.8 | 32.6 | 15.7 | 16.0 | 13.6 | 9.1 | 21.7 | 8.8 | 19.8 | 11.7 | .. | 9.6 | 4.7 | 5.1 | 9.5 | 8.3 | 6.8 | 9.7 | 18.0 | 11.4 | 9.7 | 16.6 | 10.3 | 8.9
2012 Q1 | 4.8 | 9.0 | 17.8 | 8.5 | 7.3 | .. | 8.1 | 9.7 | 15.0 | 37.0 | 15.3 | 14.8 | 16.4 | 9.4 | 30.7 | 10.6 | 21.0 | 10.3 | 5.0 | 13.1 | 6.6 | 10.9 | 10.0 | 9.2 | 7.2 | 4.9 | 19.2 | 14.6 | 8.4 | 17.5 | 12.9 | 9.0
2012 Q2 | 4.7 | 9.7 | 15.1 | 8.3 | 5.7 | .. | 8.0 | 8.5 | 13.9 | 36.3 | 15.1 | 14.4 | 14.3 | 7.6 | 34.3 | 12.8 | 19.5 | - | 5.2 | 12.0 | - | 9.6 | 10.6 | 8.1 | 6.6 | - | 20.3 | - | 7.3 | 16.4 | 11.1 | 7.1
2012 Q3 | 4.8 | 9.0 | 17.7 | 8.2 | 5.4 | .. | 6.2 | 8.3 | 13.8 | 35.7 | 12.9 | 12.8 | 13.0 | 7.9 | 34.5 | 9.4 | 18.9 | - | 6.0 | 10.3 | 5.6 | 6.6 | 10.4 | 5.6 | 8.2 | - | 19.2 | 15.9 | 9.4 | 16.6 | 6.9 | 6.9
2012 Q4 | 5.3 | 10.6 | 19.6 | 7.9 | 6.7 | .. | 6.9 | 8.3 | 11.2 | 36.9 | 16.3 | 15.9 | 15.4 | 8.4 | 39.2 | 6.7 | 18.2 | - | 5.4 | 14.0 | 5.8 | 4.0 | 11.1 | 6.2 | 6.5 | 3.5 | 21.9 | - | 8.2 | 17.2 | 11.6 | 7.0
2012 | 4.9 | 9.6 | 17.6 | 8.2 | 6.3 | .. | 7.3 | 8.7 | 13.5 | 36.5 | 14.9 | 14.5 | 14.8 | 8.3 | 34.6 | 9.8 | 19.4 | 9.1 | 5.4 | 12.4 | 5.4 | 7.8 | 10.5 | 7.2 | 7.1 | 3.5 | 20.1 | 14.1 | 8.3 | 16.9 | 10.6 | 7.5
2013 Q1 | 6.1 | 12.9 | 20.1 | 8.7 | 8.1 | .. | 8.5 | 9.5 | 12.6 | 39.6 | 12.9 | 14.7 | 17.4 | 9.1 | 40.8 | 9.7 | 18.6 | - | 5.5 | 17.1 | 6.2 | 5.7 | 12.1 | 7.8 | 5.1 | - | 23.6 | - | 14.5 | 17.6 | 12.5 | 7.6
2013 Q2 | 5.9 | 9.8 | 17.9 | 7.5 | 7.2 | .. | 7.0 | 8.3 | 11.0 | 35.9 | 7.2 | 15.7 | 16.0 | 8.3 | 37.8 | 4.4 | 17.2 | 9.1 | 5.0 | 16.8 | 7.9 | 5.3 | 12.9 | 7.9 | 5.3 | - | 22.7 | 13.9 | 11.8 | 17.3 | 11.3 | 6.2
2013 Q3 | 5.7 | 9.0 | 17.6 | 7.7 | 7.6 | .. | 6.8 | 7.8 | 12.0 | 38.1 | - | 14.5 | 14.5 | 8.1 | 35.1 | 8.7 | 16.1 | - | 5.8 | 14.8 | 5.7 | 7.1 | 14.0 | 7.0 | 6.1 | - | 22.8 | - | 7.7 | 16.2 | 8.5 | 6.1
2013 Q4 | 5.6 | 9.9 | 17.1 | 8.2 | 6.0 | .. | 7.1 | 7.8 | 9.8 | 35.8 | 15.6 | 13.0 | 16.1 | 6.8 | 35.2 | 6.3 | 15.2 | - | 5.6 | 15.0 | 6.3 | 9.3 | 13.6 | 7.0 | 5.0 | 7.9 | 20.8 | - | 10.1 | 16.8 | 10.3 | 6.1
2013 | 5.8 | 10.4 | 18.2 | 8.0 | 7.2 | 4.1 | 7.3 | 8.3 | 11.4 | 37.4 | 11.2 | 14.5 | 16.0 | 8.1 | 37.3 | 7.4 | 16.7 | 9.1 | 5.5 | 15.9 | 6.5 | 6.9 | 13.1 | 7.4 | 5.4 | 5.7 | 22.5 | 11.8 | 11.0 | 17.0 | 10.6 | 6.5
2014 Q1 | 6.4 | 12.4 | 17.1 | 8.2 | 8.3 | .. | 5.8 | 9.1 | 13.3 | 37.5 | - | 16.3 | 18.7 | 6.6 | 36.2 | - | 15.8 | - | 5.8 | 17.8 | 12.1 | 6.6 | 15.0 | 7.8 | 6.6 | - | 18.5 | - | 10.6 | 17.6 | 13.5 | 6.3
2014 Q2 | 5.4 | 10.1 | 19.3 | 7.7 | 7.0 | .. | 5.3 | 8.2 | 9.8 | 33.7 | 7.9 | 18.0 | 16.8 | 6.3 | 34.2 | - | 14.7 | - | 4.9 | 15.5 | 5.0 | 6.4 | 12.2 | 7.4 | 4.4 | 11.8 | 17.5 | - | 9.3 | 18.2 | 10.6 | 5.2
2014 Q3 | 5.2 | 10.5 | 19.7 | 7.7 | 7.0 | .. | 5.2 | 7.8 | 10.7 | 32.2 | 10.3 | 15.4 | 15.2 | 6.2 | 31.7 | 4.1 | 14.2 | - | 5.0 | 13.9 | 4.7 | 9.0 | 9.8 | 5.6 | 5.5 | 12.2 | 15.8 | - | 13.0 | 15.8 | 9.4 | 4.3
2014 Q4 | 5.5 | 10.2 | 18.6 | 6.6 | 6.2 | .. | 6.5 | 8.1 | 9.7 | 32.8 | - | 16.2 | 16.1 | 5.4 | 33.0 | - | 11.9 | - | 4.9 | 15.3 | 6.4 | 7.0 | 11.9 | 9.5 | 4.3 | 8.6 | 17.3 | - | 11.8 | 15.0 | 13.1 | 4.8
2014 | 5.7 | 10.8 | 18.7 | 7.5 | 7.1 | .. | 5.7 | 8.3 | 10.8 | 34.0 | 8.8 | 16.5 | 16.7 | 6.1 | 33.8 | 4.0 | 14.2 | 7.3 | 5.2 | 15.6 | 7.1 | 7.2 | 12.2 | 7.6 | 5.2 | 9.8 | 17.2 | 6.0 | 11.1 | 16.6 | 11.6 | 5.1
2015 Q1 | 6.2 | 11.7 | 18.2 | 7.2 | 7.8 | .. | 7.1 | 8.5 | 11.0 | 33.2 | 7.2 | 19.1 | 18.3 | 5.5 | 35.9 | 6.2 | 13.5 | 17.0 | 4.7 | 15.8 | 8.0 | 6.1 | 12.0 | 10.8 | 5.9 | 7.9 | 18.5 | - | 13.8 | 17.5 | 10.7 | 5.6
2015 Q2 | 5.7 | 11.7 | 21.0 | 6.8 | 6.9 | .. | 6.2 | 8.3 | 11.9 | 29.8 | - | 17.3 | 18.9 | 5.8 | 31.2 | - | 13.1 | - | 4.4 | 14.5 | - | 6.3 | 12.1 | 9.6 | 5.1 | 13.7 | 15.5 | - | 9.1 | 17.3 | 9.5 | 4.5
2015 Q3 | 6.2 | 10.0 | 15.7 | 6.7 | 7.6 | .. | - | 7.9 | 11.1 | 28.5 | - | 16.1 | 16.8 | 6.0 | 28.9 | - | 13.1 | - | 3.9 | 13.1 | - | 6.2 | 10.1 | 10.6 | 5.8 | - | 12.7 | - | - | 15.4 | 15.3 | 3.8
2015 Q4 | 5.0 | 11.3 | 16.8 | 6.8 | 8.0 | .. | - | 7.5 | - | 26.6 | - | - | 17.3 | 5.6 | 29.5 | - | 11.8 | - | 4.6 | 14.7 | - | 4.7 | 10.3 | 9.6 | 5.0 | - | 12.4 | - | - | 16.1 | 12.6 | 4.0
2015 | 5.8 | 11.1 | 17.9 | 6.9 | 7.6 |  | 5.3 | 8.1 | 10.8 | 29.5 | 7.0 | 17.0 | 17.8 | 5.7 | 31.4 | 5.2 | 12.9 | 7.8 | 4.4 | 14.5 | 7.8 | 5.8 | 11.1 | 10.2 | 5.5 | 8.1 | 14.9 | 8.4 | 10.0 | 16.5 | 12.1 | 4.4

Table 2.A1.4. Quarterly unemployment rates by place of birth and gender in OECD countries, 2011-15
Percentage of the active population aged 15-64
Women
|  | AUS | AUT | BEL | CAN | CHE | CHL | CZE | DEU | DNK | ESP | EST | FIN | FRA | GBR | GRC | HUN | IRL | ISL | ISR | ITA | LUX | MEX | NLD | NOR | NZL | POL | PRT | SVK | SVN | SWE | TUR | USA
Native-born | 2011 Q1 | 5.7 | 4.0 | 5.9 | 6.4 | 3.5 | .. | 8.2 | 5.6 | 6.6 | 19.9 | 12.1 | 7.6 | 8.8 | 6.8 | 19.4 | 11.4 | 9.4 | - | .. | 9.1 | - | 5.0 | 5.0 | 2.4 | 7.7 | 10.3 | 12.7 | 13.9 | 8.0 | 6.9 | 11.2 | 8.2
2011 Q2 | 4.9 | 3.5 | 5.4 | 6.4 | 2.7 | .. | 7.9 | 4.9 | 5.9 | 19.2 | 11.5 | 8.1 | 7.9 | 7.0 | 20.4 | 11.1 | 9.9 | 6.7 | .. | 8.2 | 2.7 | 5.4 | 4.4 | 2.8 | 7.0 | 10.2 | 12.5 | 12.8 | 6.9 | 7.0 | 9.7 | 8.5
2011 Q3 | 4.9 | 3.3 | 6.7 | 7.1 | 3.8 | .. | 7.8 | 5.1 | 6.8 | 20.2 | 10.6 | 6.1 | 8.1 | 7.4 | 21.7 | 11.0 | 11.0 | 6.0 | .. | 8.5 | - | 6.0 | 4.5 | 2.9 | 6.6 | 10.7 | 13.4 | 13.3 | 7.4 | 5.4 | 10.5 | 9.2
2011 Q4 | 5.1 | 4.3 | 5.9 | 5.9 | 3.3 | .. | 7.6 | 4.8 | 6.8 | 21.0 | 9.5 | 5.6 | 8.6 | 7.2 | 24.6 | 10.9 | 9.8 | - | .. | 10.0 | - | 4.9 | 5.1 | 2.1 | 6.6 | 10.9 | 14.4 | 14.4 | 8.9 | 5.6 | 9.6 | 7.9
2011 | 5.2 | 3.8 | 6.0 | 6.5 | 3.3 | 10.0 | 7.9 | 5.1 | 6.5 | 20.1 | 10.9 | 6.9 | 8.3 | 7.1 | 21.5 | 11.1 | 10.0 | 5.8 | .. | 8.9 | 4.0 | 5.3 | 4.7 | 2.5 | 7.0 | 10.5 | 13.3 | 13.6 | 7.8 | 6.2 | 10.2 | 8.5
2012 Q1 | 5.8 | 4.1 | 5.8 | 6.4 | 3.3 | .. | 8.1 | 4.8 | 6.8 | 22.5 | 10.2 | 6.8 | 8.6 | 7.1 | 26.2 | 11.5 | 10.4 | 5.7 | 7.8 | 11.4 | 3.9 | 4.8 | 5.4 | 1.9 | 7.7 | 11.1 | 15.3 | 14.5 | 8.5 | 6.5 | 10.1 | 8.0
2012 Q2 | 5.2 | 3.9 | 5.6 | 6.3 | 2.9 | .. | 7.9 | 4.7 | 6.8 | 22.7 | 8.4 | 7.7 | 8.3 | 6.9 | 27.2 | 10.4 | 10.2 | 6.9 | 7.5 | 11.0 | - | 5.0 | 5.3 | 2.2 | 7.2 | 10.8 | 15.2 | 14.1 | 8.4 | 7.0 | 8.2 | 7.9
2012 Q3 | 4.8 | 4.4 | 6.6 | 7.2 | 3.4 | .. | 8.3 | 4.8 | 6.5 | 24.0 | 9.1 | 6.7 | 8.4 | 7.2 | 28.8 | 10.2 | 10.6 | 4.4 | 7.8 | 10.6 | - | 5.5 | 5.3 | 2.5 | 7.6 | 11.0 | 15.6 | 14.6 | 9.7 | 5.8 | 9.7 | 8.4
2012 Q4 | 5.0 | 4.1 | 5.9 | 5.7 | 3.1 | .. | 8.5 | 4.6 | 6.1 | 24.7 | 8.5 | 6.1 | 9.3 | 6.9 | 29.4 | 10.6 | 9.4 | 4.0 | 7.7 | 12.3 | 4.6 | 5.0 | 5.7 | 2.1 | 7.4 | 11.1 | 17.2 | 15.1 | 9.7 | 5.8 | 10.2 | 7.3
2012 | 5.2 | 4.1 | 5.9 | 6.4 | 3.2 | .. | 8.2 | 4.7 | 6.6 | 23.5 | 9.0 | 6.8 | 8.7 | 7.0 | 27.9 | 10.7 | 10.1 | 5.2 | 7.7 | 11.3 | 3.9 | 5.1 | 5.4 | 2.2 | 7.5 | 11.0 | 15.8 | 14.6 | 9.1 | 6.3 | 9.5 | 7.9
2013 Q1 | 5.9 | 4.4 | 6.7 | 6.2 | 3.2 | .. | 8.6 | 4.8 | 7.0 | 25.7 | 9.4 | 7.5 | 9.2 | 6.9 | 30.4 | 10.8 | 10.0 | 5.5 | 7.3 | 13.2 | - | 5.0 | 6.2 | 2.4 | 7.7 | 12.0 | 17.5 | 15.1 | 10.5 | 6.9 | 11.0 | 7.6
2013 Q2 | 5.6 | 4.0 | 6.8 | 6.2 | 3.0 | .. | 8.2 | 4.4 | 6.5 | 25.2 | 7.5 | 7.9 | 8.7 | 6.7 | 30.5 | 10.3 | 10.5 | 5.6 | 7.0 | 11.9 | - | 5.1 | 6.2 | 2.5 | 7.4 | 11.3 | 16.4 | 14.5 | 10.1 | 7.2 | 9.6 | 7.3
2013 Q3 | 5.4 | 4.8 | 7.1 | 7.0 | 3.4 | .. | 8.5 | 4.4 | 6.4 | 24.9 | 7.4 | 6.4 | 8.6 | 7.1 | 30.6 | 10.0 | 9.8 | - | 7.3 | 11.5 | - | 5.6 | 6.6 | 2.9 | 6.8 | 10.9 | 16.0 | 14.6 | 10.0 | 5.9 | 11.2 | 7.4
2013 Q4 | 5.4 | 4.7 | 6.7 | 5.4 | 2.5 | .. | 8.1 | 4.4 | 6.2 | 25.0 | - | 7.0 | 9.2 | 6.3 | 31.2 | 9.3 | 9.0 | - | 6.5 | 13.0 | - | 4.8 | 6.8 | 2.4 | 6.9 | 10.6 | 16.1 | 14.2 | 9.7 | 5.5 | 11.3 | 6.5
2013 | 5.6 | 4.5 | 6.8 | 6.2 | 3.0 | 8.7 | 8.4 | 4.5 | 6.5 | 25.2 | 8.1 | 7.2 | 8.9 | 6.7 | 30.7 | 10.1 | 9.8 | 4.9 | 7.0 | 12.4 | 3.9 | 5.1 | 6.4 | 2.6 | 7.2 | 11.2 | 16.5 | 14.6 | 10.1 | 6.4 | 10.8 | 7.2
2014 Q1 | 6.9 | 4.9 | 6.9 | 5.9 | 3.2 | .. | 8.1 | 4.5 | 6.8 | 24.9 | 7.4 | 7.9 | 9.3 | 5.9 | 30.7 | 8.4 | 8.9 | 4.2 | 6.0 | 13.8 | 3.2 | 5.0 | 7.6 | 2.4 | 6.8 | 11.1 | 15.4 | 14.0 | 10.8 | 6.5 | 11.6 | 6.4
2014 Q2 | 5.9 | 4.3 | 6.0 | 6.0 | 3.1 | .. | 7.4 | 4.0 | 5.9 | 24.0 | 5.4 | 8.5 | 8.7 | 5.6 | 30.0 | 8.3 | 8.7 | 6.1 | 6.2 | 13.0 | 3.9 | 5.0 | 7.1 | 2.4 | 6.1 | 9.8 | 14.7 | 13.5 | 10.1 | 6.6 | 10.6 | 6.1
2014 Q3 | 5.9 | 4.6 | 6.7 | 6.5 | 4.1 | .. | 7.4 | 4.3 | 5.8 | 23.9 | 7.1 | 6.7 | 9.3 | 5.7 | 29.0 | 7.7 | 9.2 | 4.1 | 7.3 | 12.4 | 5.5 | 5.4 | 6.6 | 2.9 | 6.4 | 9.1 | 14.2 | 13.7 | 10.4 | 5.2 | 12.7 | 6.7
2014 Q4 | 5.9 | 4.2 | 6.3 | 5.3 | 2.9 | .. | 6.9 | 4.0 | 5.3 | 23.5 | 6.7 | 7.0 | 9.7 | 5.0 | 29.3 | 7.3 | 7.5 | - | 6.6 | 14.0 | - | 4.7 | 6.7 | 2.4 | 6.7 | 8.8 | 14.0 | 13.6 | 10.0 | 5.2 | 13.1 | 5.5
2014 | 6.1 | 4.5 | 6.5 | 5.9 | 3.3 | .. | 7.4 | 4.2 | 6.0 | 24.1 | 6.7 | 7.5 | 9.2 | 5.5 | 29.8 | 7.9 | 8.6 | 4.5 | 6.5 | 13.3 | 4.0 | 5.0 | 7.0 | 2.5 | 6.5 | 9.7 | 14.6 | 13.7 | 10.3 | 5.9 | 12.0 | 6.1
2015 Q1 | 6.7 | 4.0 | 6.1 | 5.7 | 2.6 | .. | 6.9 | 4.0 | 5.6 | 23.6 | 5.1 | 8.4 | 9.3 | 4.9 | 30.3 | 7.9 | 7.2 | 4.3 | 5.6 | 13.0 | 4.7 | 4.3 | 7.0 | 2.8 | 6.9 | 8.8 | 14.6 | 13.4 | 10.5 | 6.1 | 13.4 | 5.4
2015 Q2 | 5.9 | 4.2 | 5.8 | 5.7 | 2.8 | .. | 6.0 | 3.8 | 5.2 | 22.7 | 6.4 | 9.8 | 8.7 | 4.9 | 28.3 | 7.1 | 7.9 | 5.9 | 5.2 | 12.2 | - | 4.7 | 6.6 | 2.9 | 6.7 | 7.5 | 12.1 | 12.8 | 9.9 | 6.2 | 11.7 | 5.3
2015 Q3 | 5.8 | 4.2 | 6.7 | 6.5 | 3.9 | .. | 6.0 | 3.5 | 5.9 | 21.7 | - | 7.7 | 8.9 | 5.1 | 28.1 | 6.7 | 7.5 | - | 6.2 | 10.9 | - | 5.0 | 6.2 | 3.4 | 6.7 | 7.5 | 12.5 | 12.8 | 10.0 | 4.5 | 13.3 | 5.6
2015 Q4 | 5.4 | 4.4 | 6.4 | 5.4 | 3.4 | .. | 5.5 | 3.6 | 5.2 | 21.3 | 6.3 | 7.8 | 9.4 | 4.5 | 28.2 | 6.4 | 6.2 | - | 6.2 | 12.0 | - | 4.5 | 6.3 | 3.0 | 5.8 | 7.2 | 12.5 | 12.6 | 8.5 | 4.4 | 13.1 | 4.7
2015 | 6.0 | 4.2 | 6.2 | 5.8 | 3.2 |  | 6.1 | 3.7 | 5.5 | 22.3 | 5.9 | 8.4 | 9.0 | 4.8 | 28.7 | 7.0 | 7.2 | 4.0 | 5.8 | 12.0 | 4.4 | 4.6 | 6.5 | 3.0 | 6.5 | 7.8 | 12.9 | 12.9 | 9.7 | 5.3 | 12.8 | 5.2
Foreign-born | 2011 Q1 | 6.5 | 9.5 | 12.8 | 9.2 | 8.1 | .. | 11.6 | 9.6 | 15.2 | 29.6 | 22.2 | 16.9 | 16.4 | 9.0 | 23.6 | 8.1 | 13.8 | - | .. | 13.2 | 9.5 | 12.4 | 10.0 | 7.3 | 7.3 | - | 17.9 | - | 13.5 | 16.7 | 15.1 | 9.6
2011 Q2 | 6.2 | 7.8 | 14.9 | 9.0 | 6.3 | .. | 10.8 | 8.9 | 15.7 | 28.6 | 20.0 | 12.3 | 14.1 | 9.0 | 19.7 | 11.0 | 14.1 | - | .. | 13.9 | 9.8 | 9.2 | 10.0 | 7.3 | 6.2 | - | 16.2 | - | 13.8 | 17.2 | 15.9 | 9.1
2011 Q3 | 6.0 | 8.1 | 16.3 | 9.8 | 7.8 | .. | 11.0 | 8.7 | 15.1 | 29.0 | 15.0 | 13.6 | 14.1 | 10.3 | 22.8 | - | 14.6 | - | .. | 12.2 | - | 4.0 | 10.4 | 6.4 | 7.9 | - | 14.0 | - | 13.2 | 15.5 | 12.3 | 10.1
2011 Q4 | 5.3 | 9.9 | 14.6 | 9.5 | 7.6 | .. | 10.2 | 8.6 | 14.4 | 31.7 | 14.4 | 14.0 | 16.2 | 10.7 | 27.0 | 12.0 | 14.6 | - | .. | 16.5 | 6.4 | 8.5 | 10.3 | 7.0 | 5.9 | 19.9 | 15.6 | - | 15.5 | 14.3 | 11.3 | 9.2
2011 | 6.0 | 8.8 | 14.6 | 9.4 | 7.5 | 7.7 | 10.9 | 9.0 | 15.1 | 29.7 | 17.9 | 14.2 | 15.2 | 9.7 | 23.3 | 10.5 | 14.3 | 10.4 | .. | 14.0 | 8.4 | 8.2 | 10.2 | 7.0 | 6.8 | 14.5 | 15.9 | 20.9 | 14.0 | 15.9 | 13.6 | 9.5
2012 Q1 | 6.3 | 9.3 | 15.8 | 9.3 | 7.6 | .. | 11.0 | 9.0 | 16.9 | 33.4 | 11.1 | 15.7 | 15.1 | 11.0 | 32.2 | 13.0 | 14.6 | - | 5.0 | 17.1 | 7.7 | 5.4 | 12.6 | 6.2 | 8.8 | - | 18.0 | - | 13.9 | 15.0 | 12.3 | 9.4
2012 Q2 | 6.0 | 7.6 | 16.0 | 8.8 | 7.4 | .. | 10.1 | 8.0 | 15.9 | 32.3 | 12.0 | 14.4 | 15.3 | 10.2 | 31.8 | 9.2 | 14.8 | - | 4.9 | 14.8 | 6.3 | 7.7 | 12.2 | 5.2 | 7.6 | - | 16.3 | - | 14.3 | 15.9 | 14.3 | 8.5
2012 Q3 | 5.8 | 8.2 | 15.2 | 8.7 | 7.9 | .. | 12.0 | 8.0 | 15.3 | 30.5 | 13.6 | 13.1 | 13.6 | 10.9 | 32.0 | 8.5 | 15.5 | - | 5.1 | 13.8 | 9.9 | 6.3 | 10.9 | 5.9 | 7.7 | 12.8 | 19.0 | - | 14.2 | 14.7 | 12.5 | 9.0
2012 Q4 | 5.9 | 7.7 | 16.7 | 8.1 | 8.8 | .. | 11.5 | 8.1 | 15.7 | 33.5 | 8.0 | 12.2 | 16.0 | 10.1 | 35.0 | 6.4 | 14.2 | - | 5.1 | 16.3 | 7.1 | 6.6 | 12.8 | 7.9 | 8.3 | 22.3 | 21.1 | - | 15.7 | 14.9 | 11.1 | 9.0
2012 | 6.0 | 8.2 | 15.9 | 8.7 | 7.9 | .. | 11.2 | 8.2 | 15.9 | 32.4 | 11.2 | 13.8 | 15.0 | 10.6 | 32.7 | 9.2 | 14.8 | 9.9 | 5.1 | 15.5 | 7.8 | 6.5 | 12.1 | 6.3 | 8.1 | 11.7 | 18.6 | 9.1 | 14.5 | 15.1 | 12.6 | 9.0
2013 Q1 | 6.5 | 9.9 | 15.4 | 8.5 | 8.9 | .. | 9.9 | 8.1 | 14.5 | 34.9 | 9.4 | 16.1 | 17.3 | 10.1 | 39.3 | 10.6 | 15.1 | - | 4.2 | 18.2 | 7.7 | 5.9 | 14.5 | 9.6 | 8.0 | 17.7 | 22.4 | - | 25.9 | 16.2 | 8.6 | 8.8
2013 Q2 | 6.1 | 8.7 | 14.9 | 8.3 | 7.5 | .. | 9.8 | 8.3 | 13.3 | 34.4 | 12.9 | 13.4 | 15.6 | 9.4 | 38.6 | 12.9 | 15.4 | - | 4.0 | 17.8 | 9.2 | 6.3 | 13.2 | 7.7 | 6.5 | 21.1 | 23.2 | - | 20.7 | 15.4 | 12.3 | 7.2
2013 Q3 | 6.0 | 8.9 | 16.4 | 8.9 | 8.0 | .. | 9.7 | 7.7 | 11.5 | 32.8 | 11.7 | 15.9 | 15.6 | 10.5 | 39.3 | 14.1 | 14.5 | - | 3.8 | 15.6 | 7.1 | 7.1 | 12.6 | 8.7 | 7.1 | 24.6 | 19.4 | - | 19.1 | 15.7 | 14.0 | 7.4
2013 Q4 | 5.7 | 9.8 | 17.3 | 8.0 | 8.8 | .. | 9.5 | 7.6 | 14.7 | 34.2 | 9.0 | 15.7 | 17.5 | 9.1 | 38.5 | 14.2 | 13.2 | - | 3.7 | 18.5 | 10.6 | 7.8 | 14.2 | 7.3 | 7.2 | 20.9 | 19.2 | - | 20.6 | 15.8 | 12.5 | 7.1
2013 | 6.1 | 9.3 | 16.0 | 8.4 | 8.3 | 3.7 | 9.7 | 7.9 | 13.5 | 34.1 | 10.8 | 15.2 | 16.5 | 9.8 | 38.9 | 12.8 | 14.5 | 8.1 | 3.9 | 17.5 | 8.6 | 6.8 | 13.6 | 8.3 | 7.2 | 21.1 | 21.0 | 9.5 | 21.4 | 15.8 | 11.9 | 7.6
2014 Q1 | 6.9 | 10.1 | 14.9 | 8.5 | 9.3 | .. | - | 7.8 | 16.4 | 35.1 | - | - | 17.0 | 9.5 | 39.4 | - | 14.0 | - | 3.8 | 18.5 | - | 5.6 | 14.5 | - | 8.6 | - | 17.4 | - | - | 17.1 | 14.1 | 7.8
2014 Q2 | 6.7 | 8.3 | 14.3 | 8.4 | 8.0 | .. | - | 7.3 | 13.6 | 32.6 | - | - | 16.2 | 8.3 | 35.3 | - | 13.8 | - | 4.6 | 15.7 | - | 9.0 | 13.6 | - | 7.9 | - | 16.1 | - | - | 17.3 | 13.4 | 6.2
2014 Q3 | 6.6 | 9.1 | 17.5 | 9.5 | 7.7 | .. | 9.3 | 7.0 | 12.8 | 31.1 | - | 16.0 | 14.9 | 7.7 | 33.2 | 8.8 | 12.3 | - | 4.1 | 15.7 | 9.0 | 5.6 | 13.0 | 10.7 | 7.1 | 17.5 | 17.6 | - | 10.9 | 15.1 | 15.8 | 6.4
2014 Q4 | 6.4 | 10.4 | 18.2 | 7.3 | 8.2 | .. | 9.3 | 7.5 | 13.0 | 31.4 | 6.6 | 18.7 | 17.4 | 7.5 | 33.8 | - | 10.8 | - | 4.0 | 19.5 | 8.0 | 4.0 | 13.2 | 6.6 | 6.4 | 14.0 | 15.6 | - | 16.0 | 15.3 | 15.4 | 5.9
2014 | 6.6 | 9.5 | 16.3 | 8.4 | 8.3 | .. | 8.8 | 7.4 | 13.9 | 32.6 | 9.7 | 17.2 | 16.4 | 8.2 | 35.4 | 8.3 | 12.7 | 7.9 | 4.1 | 17.4 | 7.3 | 6.1 | 13.6 | 8.4 | 7.5 | 14.8 | 16.7 | 9.1 | 15.7 | 16.2 | 14.8 | 6.6
2015 Q1 | 7.2 | 11.1 | 18.2 | 7.5 | 7.9 | .. | - | 7.4 | 14.4 | 32.1 | - | 18.7 | 17.7 | 7.6 | 36.3 | - | 11.6 | - | 3.6 | 18.6 | 11.7 | 2.0 | 14.6 | 12.1 | 7.1 | - | 17.0 | - | - | 17.2 | 15.8 | 5.9
2015 Q2 | 6.7 | 10.5 | 14.8 | 8.1 | 8.2 | .. | 7.7 | 6.8 | 14.2 | 31.1 | 7.7 | 18.7 | 15.9 | 7.7 | 30.7 | 7.7 | 9.6 | - | 3.8 | 17.0 | - | 3.3 | 12.6 | 9.8 | 7.3 | 16.9 | 12.3 | - | 15.0 | 17.4 | 12.4 | 5.6
2015 Q3 | 7.2 | 9.4 | 13.9 | 9.0 | 8.5 | .. | 9.2 | 6.8 | 13.7 | 28.1 | - | 18.3 | 16.2 | 7.3 | 30.8 | 9.0 | 9.0 | - | 4.4 | 14.8 | 11.3 | 5.9 | 12.3 | 9.3 | 6.5 | - | 14.5 | - | 13.1 | 14.3 | 14.9 | 6.0
2015 Q4 | 6.3 | 9.8 | 16.8 | 7.7 | 8.3 | .. | 9.5 | 8.1 | 12.8 | 29.3 | 9.4 | 16.3 | 17.2 | 6.7 | 33.3 | 9.9 | 8.6 | - | 4.7 | 17.8 | 8.1 | 6.7 | 13.7 | 11.5 | 5.7 | 9.5 | 15.0 | - | 16.2 | 14.9 | 14.5 | 5.1
2015 | 6.8 | 10.2 | 16.0 | 8.1 | 8.2 |  | 8.8 | 7.3 | 13.8 | 30.1 | 8.6 | 18.0 | 16.8 | 7.3 | 32.8 | 8.7 | 9.7 | 6.1 | 4.1 | 17.0 | 9.7 | 4.5 | 13.3 | 10.7 | 6.7 | 13.7 | 14.7 | 18.1 | 14.6 | 15.9 | 14.4 | 5.7
Notes: Data refer to the working-age population (15-64). Data are not adjusted for seasonal variations. Comparisons should therefore be made for the same quarters of each year, and not for successive quarters within a given year.
Source: European countries and Turkey: Labour Force Surveys (Eurostat); Australia, Canada, Israel, New Zealand: Labour Force surveys; Chile: Encuesta de Caracterización Socioeconómica Nacional (CASEN); Mexico: Encuesta Nacional de Ocupación y Empleo (ENOE); United States: Current Population Surveys.
StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933396354

Table 2.A1.5. Quarterly participation rates by place of birth and gender in OECD countries, 2011-15
Percentage of the population aged 15-64
MEN AND WOMEN
|  | AUS | AUT | BEL | CAN | CHE | CHL | CZE | DEU | DNK | ESP | EST | FIN | FRA | GBR | GRC | HUN | IRL | ISL | ISR | ITA | LUX | MEX | NLD | NOR | NZL | POL | PRT | SVK | SVN | SWE | TUR | USA
Native-born | 2011 Q1 | 78.0 | 74.3 | 66.9 | 77.3 | 83.6 | .. | 70.0 | 77.6 | 80.1 | 72.4 | 73.9 | 73.8 | 70.2 | 75.6 | 66.5 | 61.5 | 68.0 | 83.5 | .. | 61.1 | 62.2 | 62.4 | 78.8 | 77.6 | 79.1 | 65.2 | 73.0 | 68.5 | 69.6 | 79.8 | 51.4 | 71.4
2011 Q2 | 77.8 | 74.9 | 67.7 | 79.1 | 83.3 | .. | 70.4 | 77.7 | 80.3 | 72.7 | 74.4 | 77.2 | 70.3 | 75.6 | 66.4 | 62.1 | 69.0 | 87.0 | .. | 60.9 | 60.4 | 63.3 | 78.9 | 78.2 | 78.4 | 65.7 | 73.0 | 68.5 | 69.8 | 82.3 | 53.9 | 71.7
2011 Q3 | 77.7 | 76.0 | 67.9 | 79.5 | 83.5 | .. | 70.7 | 78.1 | 80.7 | 73.0 | 75.2 | 75.6 | 70.7 | 76.2 | 66.4 | 62.7 | 68.9 | 84.4 | .. | 60.7 | 62.6 | 63.7 | 79.4 | 78.5 | 78.2 | 66.1 | 72.8 | 68.8 | 70.9 | 82.0 | 54.5 | 72.2
2011 Q4 | 77.9 | 75.2 | 67.9 | 77.5 | 83.9 | .. | 70.6 | 78.4 | 79.9 | 72.8 | 74.1 | 73.8 | 70.8 | 76.2 | 66.4 | 62.6 | 68.8 | 82.7 | .. | 61.9 | 61.2 | 64.4 | 80.0 | 78.1 | 78.9 | 66.1 | 72.3 | 69.0 | 70.8 | 80.3 | 52.7 | 71.3
2011 | 77.9 | 75.1 | 67.6 | 78.3 | 83.6 | 61.7 | 70.4 | 78.0 | 80.2 | 72.7 | 74.4 | 75.1 | 70.5 | 75.9 | 66.4 | 62.2 | 68.7 | 84.4 | .. | 61.1 | 61.6 | 63.5 | 79.3 | 78.1 | 78.7 | 65.7 | 72.8 | 68.7 | 70.3 | 81.1 | 53.1 | 71.7
2012 Q1 | 77.9 | 74.5 | 67.1 | 76.9 | 83.2 | .. | 70.6 | 77.5 | 79.7 | 72.9 | 74.5 | 74.0 | 70.6 | 76.1 | 66.6 | 62.5 | 68.3 | 82.9 | 68.4 | 62.5 | 61.6 | 63.3 | 80.0 | 78.2 | 79.0 | 65.9 | 72.4 | 69.4 | 70.0 | 80.2 | 51.2 | 71.0
2012 Q2 | 77.8 | 75.7 | 67.6 | 78.8 | 82.8 | .. | 71.2 | 77.6 | 80.1 | 73.3 | 74.4 | 77.3 | 71.1 | 76.3 | 66.7 | 63.3 | 68.8 | 86.9 | 68.9 | 62.9 | 62.6 | 64.6 | 80.0 | 78.9 | 78.1 | 66.4 | 72.7 | 69.3 | 69.4 | 82.6 | 53.9 | 71.6
2012 Q3 | 77.6 | 77.0 | 68.3 | 79.2 | 84.1 | .. | 72.1 | 78.1 | 79.7 | 73.5 | 75.2 | 76.2 | 71.4 | 76.9 | 66.7 | 64.2 | 69.3 | 85.5 | 70.1 | 62.2 | 64.7 | 64.9 | 80.3 | 78.8 | 77.8 | 66.9 | 72.9 | 69.6 | 70.7 | 82.5 | 54.2 | 72.0
2012 Q4 | 77.8 | 75.9 | 68.2 | 77.7 | 83.9 | .. | 72.2 | 78.2 | 78.9 | 73.2 | 73.9 | 73.7 | 71.7 | 77.0 | 66.8 | 64.0 | 68.5 | 83.2 | 69.2 | 63.1 | 63.6 | 64.0 | 80.5 | 78.3 | 77.4 | 66.8 | 72.2 | 69.4 | 70.9 | 80.8 | 54.1 | 71.4
2012 | 77.8 | 75.8 | 67.8 | 78.1 | 83.5 | .. | 71.5 | 77.8 | 79.6 | 73.2 | 74.5 | 75.3 | 71.2 | 76.6 | 66.7 | 63.5 | 68.7 | 84.6 | 69.2 | 62.7 | 63.1 | 64.2 | 80.2 | 78.6 | 78.1 | 66.5 | 72.5 | 69.4 | 70.3 | 81.5 | 53.4 | 71.5
2013 Q1 | 77.8 | 75.2 | 67.4 | 77.3 | 84.0 | .. | 72.2 | 78.0 | 79.1 | 73.3 | 74.7 | 74.1 | 71.4 | 76.6 | 66.4 | 63.2 | 68.4 | 82.8 | 69.1 | 62.6 | 61.9 | 63.2 | 80.6 | 78.2 | 78.2 | 66.3 | 72.0 | 70.0 | 70.2 | 81.3 | 53.0 | 70.9
2013 Q2 | 77.8 | 76.2 | 68.7 | 78.9 | 83.2 | .. | 72.7 | 78.2 | 79.2 | 73.3 | 75.1 | 77.5 | 71.6 | 76.6 | 66.8 | 64.4 | 69.7 | 87.6 | 69.3 | 62.4 | 62.6 | 64.4 | 80.8 | 78.8 | 77.8 | 66.8 | 72.1 | 69.6 | 70.2 | 83.4 | 55.3 | 71.5
2013 Q3 | 77.6 | 77.4 | 69.1 | 79.3 | 83.7 | .. | 73.1 | 78.4 | 79.6 | 73.5 | 74.8 | 75.4 | 71.9 | 77.3 | 66.7 | 65.1 | 69.7 | 87.8 | 69.7 | 61.9 | 62.4 | 64.4 | 80.9 | 78.8 | 78.6 | 67.4 | 72.4 | 69.9 | 71.3 | 83.4 | 55.3 | 71.7
2013 Q4 | 77.8 | 76.2 | 68.1 | 77.9 | 84.3 | .. | 73.1 | 78.6 | 78.1 | 73.5 | 75.0 | 73.8 | 71.6 | 77.0 | 66.3 | 65.2 | 69.2 | 84.7 | 69.0 | 63.0 | 64.6 | 64.7 | 80.7 | 78.0 | 79.7 | 67.4 | 72.8 | 69.8 | 70.0 | 81.9 | 54.0 | 70.7
2013 | 77.7 | 76.2 | 68.3 | 78.4 | 83.8 | 62.8 | 72.8 | 78.3 | 79.0 | 73.4 | 74.9 | 75.2 | 71.6 | 76.9 | 66.5 | 64.5 | 69.3 | 85.6 | 69.3 | 62.5 | 62.9 | 64.1 | 80.7 | 78.5 | 78.6 | 67.0 | 72.3 | 69.8 | 70.4 | 82.5 | 54.4 | 71.2
2014 Q1 | 77.7 | 75.5 | 68.2 | 77.2 | 83.6 | .. | 72.9 | 78.3 | 78.0 | 73.1 | 74.3 | 74.2 | 71.5 | 76.9 | 66.5 | 65.9 | 68.8 | 84.8 | 69.4 | 63.0 | 65.0 | 63.6 | 80.2 | 77.7 | 79.9 | 67.5 | 72.4 | 70.1 | 70.3 | 81.9 | 53.5 | 70.7
2014 Q2 | 77.5 | 76.0 | 68.0 | 78.8 | 83.5 | .. | 73.0 | 78.2 | 78.5 | 73.4 | 75.5 | 77.8 | 71.5 | 76.8 | 66.5 | 66.6 | 69.3 | 89.5 | 69.7 | 62.7 | 62.9 | 63.7 | 80.2 | 78.8 | 79.1 | 67.5 | 72.6 | 70.0 | 71.6 | 83.8 | 55.8 | 71.4
2014 Q3 | 77.4 | 76.9 | 68.8 | 79.2 | 84.7 | .. | 73.7 | 78.6 | 79.7 | 73.4 | 76.1 | 75.8 | 71.8 | 77.4 | 66.6 | 67.5 | 70.2 | 88.2 | 70.2 | 62.7 | 65.4 | 63.8 | 80.6 | 78.9 | 79.4 | 68.2 | 72.7 | 70.4 | 71.9 | 84.0 | 56.0 | 71.5
2014 Q4 | 77.6 | 76.1 | 68.9 | 77.6 | 85.4 | .. | 74.0 | 78.7 | 79.4 | 73.7 | 75.3 | 74.3 | 72.1 | 77.2 | 66.3 | 67.3 | 69.7 | 86.3 | 69.4 | 63.9 | 64.0 | 63.4 | 80.5 | 78.1 | 81.1 | 68.2 | 72.5 | 70.6 | 71.6 | 81.9 | 55.2 | 70.9
2014 | 77.6 | 76.1 | 68.5 | 78.2 | 84.3 | .. | 73.4 | 78.5 | 78.9 | 73.4 | 75.3 | 75.5 | 71.7 | 77.1 | 66.5 | 66.8 | 69.5 | 87.2 | 69.7 | 63.1 | 64.3 | 63.6 | 80.4 | 78.4 | 79.9 | 67.8 | 72.5 | 70.3 | 71.4 | 82.9 | 55.1 | 71.1
2015 Q1 | 78.1 | 75.5 | 68.3 | 77.2 | 84.8 | .. | 73.8 | 78.3 | 79.2 | 73.3 | 75.2 | 74.8 | 71.6 | 77.2 | 66.5 | 67.5 | 69.3 | 86.8 | 69.1 | 63.2 | 66.3 | 63.0 | 80.9 | 78.0 | 80.4 | 67.9 | 72.6 | 70.7 | 71.1 | 82.2 | 54.7 | 70.7
2015 Q2 | 78.2 | 75.8 | 68.1 | 79.0 | 83.9 | .. | 73.8 | 78.0 | 79.4 | 73.7 | 77.1 | 78.2 | 71.7 | 76.9 | 66.8 | 68.3 | 70.1 | 90.6 | 69.7 | 63.3 | 67.1 | 63.5 | 81.1 | 79.2 | 79.3 | 67.6 | 72.6 | 70.5 | 72.4 | 84.0 | 56.6 | 71.5
2015 Q3 | 78.2 | 77.4 | 68.3 | 79.5 | 84.6 | .. | 74.1 | 78.4 | 79.6 | 73.4 | 78.1 | 76.8 | 72.1 | 77.5 | 67.3 | 69.1 | 70.1 | 89.4 | 70.4 | 62.8 | 65.9 | 63.8 | 81.4 | 79.2 | 78.6 | 68.4 | 72.8 | 71.1 | 73.1 | 84.0 | 57.1 | 71.4
2015 Q4 | 78.9 | 76.5 | 68.5 | 77.7 | 85.3 | .. | 74.1 | 78.9 | 79.3 | 73.5 | 76.6 | 74.6 | 72.1 | 77.5 | 67.2 | 69.0 | 69.8 | 87.5 | 69.7 | 63.5 | 63.8 | 64.3 | 81.3 | 77.8 | 79.2 | 68.5 | 73.0 | 71.4 | 71.4 | 82.3 | 56.1 | 71.0
2015 | 78.3 | 76.3 | 68.3 | 78.4 | 84.7 |  | 73.9 | 78.4 | 79.4 | 73.5 | 76.7 | 76.1 | 71.9 | 77.3 | 66.9 | 68.5 | 69.8 | 88.6 | 69.7 | 63.2 | 65.5 | 63.7 | 81.2 | 78.6 | 79.4 | 68.1 | 72.8 | 70.9 | 72.0 | 83.1 | 56.1 | 71.1
Foreign-born | 2011 Q1 | 74.6 | 71.8 | 61.4 | 74.8 | 80.1 | .. | 73.9 | 72.9 | 70.9 | 79.4 | 75.8 | 69.3 | 68.1 | 72.8 | 75.3 | 68.3 | 70.2 | 86.1 | .. | 69.6 | 77.6 | 54.3 | 70.5 | 74.4 | 76.0 | 59.0 | 82.4 | 66.3 | 71.1 | 73.8 | 56.9 | 74.2
2011 Q2 | 74.4 | 71.9 | 62.7 | 75.8 | 80.6 | .. | 73.9 | 74.2 | 72.0 | 80.4 | 75.5 | 72.9 | 68.0 | 73.1 | 74.9 | 68.7 | 71.7 | 89.2 | .. | 70.6 | 75.1 | 55.5 | 69.2 | 77.2 | 74.9 | 61.3 | 82.8 | 70.4 | 70.8 | 75.1 | 56.2 | 74.3
2011 Q3 | 74.5 | 71.8 | 61.5 | 76.5 | 81.3 | .. | 73.5 | 74.2 | 73.9 | 79.7 | 79.2 | 72.7 | 66.7 | 73.8 | 74.2 | 70.0 | 72.2 |  | .. | 68.2 | 74.0 | 57.1 | 69.3 | 76.4 | 74.9 | 66.3 | 82.4 |  | 68.7 | 75.0 | 54.4 | 74.1
2011 Q4 | 74.1 | 72.5 | 62.2 | 75.5 | 81.7 | .. | 73.6 | 73.8 | 71.8 | 79.4 | 77.6 | 73.3 | 66.6 | 73.1 | 74.7 | 70.1 | 71.2 | 82.5 | .. | 69.5 | 73.7 | 58.7 | 70.8 | 76.1 | 76.0 | 65.0 | 82.0 | 72.8 | 68.9 | 74.6 | 55.9 | 74.7
2011 | 74.4 | 72.0 | 61.9 | 75.6 | 80.9 | 72.4 | 73.7 | 73.8 | 72.1 | 79.7 | 77.1 | 72.0 | 67.3 | 73.2 | 74.8 | 69.3 | 71.3 | 85.8 | .. | 69.5 | 75.1 | 56.4 | 70.0 | 76.0 | 75.4 | 62.7 | 82.4 | 70.4 | 69.9 | 74.6 | 55.9 | 74.3
2012 Q1 | 74.0 | 71.1 | 62.3 | 74.9 | 81.5 | .. | 73.1 | 73.7 | 72.4 | 79.8 | 76.5 | 72.8 | 67.7 | 72.3 | 74.1 | 70.3 | 70.9 | 84.7 | 78.4 | 70.0 | 76.2 | 57.2 | 70.8 | 75.2 | 77.1 | 61.3 | 83.0 | 70.5 | 71.1 | 73.9 | 50.7 | 73.7
2012 Q2 | 74.0 | 72.6 | 61.2 | 76.8 | 81.7 | .. | 73.1 | 74.4 | 71.5 | 79.6 | 78.5 | 75.5 | 67.7 | 72.7 | 74.2 | 73.6 | 71.7 | 91.0 | 78.9 | 70.3 | 75.0 | 58.8 | 71.4 | 77.7 | 75.8 | 66.0 | 82.9 | 70.6 | 70.8 | 75.7 | 51.4 | 73.6
2012 Q3 | 73.7 | 72.6 | 62.4 | 77.5 | 82.1 | .. | 74.5 | 74.5 | 72.4 | 79.3 | 78.2 | 75.2 | 67.3 | 74.1 | 75.7 | 74.6 | 71.4 | 87.3 | 78.8 | 68.4 | 77.0 | 56.8 | 71.8 | 76.3 | 76.2 | 70.8 | 82.5 | 73.0 | 72.6 | 75.3 | 52.2 | 73.7
2012 Q4 | 74.1 | 71.8 | 64.1 | 76.9 | 82.1 | .. | 74.5 | 74.5 | 70.4 | 79.6 | 75.6 | 73.9 | 68.1 | 74.0 | 76.0 | 75.5 | 70.5 | 86.1 | 79.5 | 70.0 | 76.8 | 58.7 | 70.7 | 75.3 | 76.1 | 68.7 | 81.1 | 73.6 | 72.5 | 74.7 | 53.6 | 73.5
2012 | 74.0 | 72.0 | 62.5 | 76.5 | 81.9 | .. | 73.8 | 74.3 | 71.7 | 79.6 | 77.2 | 74.3 | 67.7 | 73.3 | 75.0 | 73.6 | 71.1 | 87.3 | 78.9 | 69.7 | 76.2 | 57.9 | 71.2 | 76.1 | 76.3 | 66.4 | 82.4 | 72.0 | 71.7 | 74.9 | 52.0 | 73.7
2013 Q1 | 74.6 | 72.4 | 64.6 | 76.2 | 81.9 | .. | 74.3 | 74.1 | 71.5 | 79.7 | 78.3 | 73.3 | 67.8 | 73.6 | 76.5 | 76.5 | 70.7 | 86.5 | 80.0 | 70.7 | 76.8 | 58.0 | 70.2 | 75.3 | 76.3 | 67.3 | 80.1 | 76.6 | 71.0 | 74.3 | 51.5 | 73.3
2013 Q2 | 74.5 | 72.3 | 62.1 | 77.4 | 82.3 | .. | 76.1 | 74.5 | 72.4 | 78.8 | 79.6 | 77.0 | 67.7 | 73.5 | 76.5 | 73.9 | 72.1 | 88.8 | 79.1 | 70.0 | 77.0 | 56.5 | 70.0 | 76.2 | 76.1 | 66.7 | 80.7 | 73.4 | 72.3 | 76.2 | 54.1 | 73.6
2013 Q3 | 73.9 | 73.1 | 64.3 | 78.1 | 82.4 | .. | 76.8 | 74.8 | 71.9 | 78.8 | 75.1 | 74.7 | 67.8 | 74.9 | 77.2 | 75.1 | 72.9 | 87.8 | 79.4 | 68.4 | 78.5 | 59.7 | 70.8 | 77.1 | 75.6 | 69.4 | 79.9 | 74.5 | 71.7 | 75.6 | 52.9 | 74.0
2013 Q4 | 73.6 | 71.6 | 63.7 | 75.9 | 82.3 | .. | 77.4 | 73.9 | 71.5 | 78.4 | 74.4 | 72.9 | 68.5 | 74.3 | 76.6 | 75.4 | 71.8 | 86.6 | 79.7 | 69.8 | 76.9 | 57.6 | 71.6 | 76.4 | 77.1 | 66.7 | 79.3 | 73.3 | 71.0 | 74.7 | 51.2 | 73.1
2013 | 74.1 | 72.3 | 63.7 | 76.9 | 82.2 | 77.2 | 76.2 | 74.3 | 71.8 | 78.9 | 76.9 | 74.4 | 67.9 | 74.1 | 76.7 | 75.2 | 71.9 | 87.4 | 79.6 | 69.7 | 77.3 | 58.0 | 70.7 | 76.2 | 76.3 | 67.5 | 80.0 | 74.4 | 71.5 | 75.2 | 52.4 | 73.5
2014 Q1 | 74.0 | 71.1 | 63.4 | 75.2 | 82.4 | .. | 77.6 | 73.8 | 71.3 | 78.4 | 72.0 | 71.5 | 68.0 | 74.4 | 77.0 | 75.9 | 71.3 | 87.3 | 81.5 | 70.2 | 77.0 | 56.6 | 70.7 | 75.8 | 77.9 | 76.5 | 80.0 | 70.0 | 68.5 | 74.6 | 54.9 | 73.5
2014 Q2 | 74.0 | 72.7 | 65.1 | 76.6 | 83.3 | .. | 78.1 | 73.9 | 72.7 | 78.6 | 74.7 | 75.0 | 67.7 | 75.0 | 77.3 | 73.0 | 71.4 | 91.0 | 80.5 | 70.0 | 78.3 | 59.4 | 70.8 | 75.6 | 76.1 | 75.6 | 80.0 | 70.3 | 68.4 | 76.7 | 53.6 | 73.3
2014 Q3 | 74.0 | 73.0 | 63.7 | 77.0 | 82.2 | .. | 76.4 | 75.1 | 74.6 | 78.1 | 77.2 | 72.7 | 67.0 | 75.2 | 77.0 | 75.0 | 71.0 | 89.1 | 80.6 | 69.1 | 75.8 | 56.1 | 69.1 | 75.5 | 76.0 | 68.3 | 80.6 | 72.8 | 65.8 | 77.1 | 52.9 | 73.5
2014 Q4 | 74.4 | 72.1 | 64.1 | 76.1 | 82.7 | .. | 77.0 | 74.2 | 72.7 | 79.0 | 76.2 | 72.6 | 67.5 | 74.3 | 76.0 | 75.7 | 69.5 | 87.5 | 82.0 | 70.0 | 79.1 | 57.2 | 71.2 | 76.4 | 77.1 | 65.4 | 80.3 | 72.3 | 64.8 | 75.6 | 51.3 | 73.2
2014 | 74.1 | 72.2 | 64.1 | 76.2 | 82.6 | .. | 77.3 | 74.2 | 72.8 | 78.5 | 74.9 | 72.9 | 67.6 | 74.7 | 76.8 | 74.9 | 70.8 | 88.7 | 81.2 | 69.8 | 77.6 | 57.3 | 70.4 | 75.8 | 76.8 | 71.6 | 80.2 | 71.3 | 66.9 | 76.0 | 53.0 | 73.4
2015 Q1 | 74.9 | 71.4 | 66.1 | 75.4 | 82.7 | .. | 76.2 | 74.2 | 72.0 | 78.6 | 72.3 | 71.8 | 67.5 | 74.3 | 75.3 | 76.0 | 69.2 | 85.7 | 81.6 | 68.8 | 76.2 | 51.6 | 70.1 | 76.4 | 79.2 | 72.3 | 79.8 | 71.4 | 65.9 | 75.7 | 49.8 | 72.7
2015 Q2 | 74.7 | 73.0 | 62.1 | 76.7 | 83.2 | .. | 76.4 | 74.0 | 71.4 | 79.5 | 74.5 | 71.8 | 67.4 | 75.1 | 77.4 | 77.1 | 70.2 | 88.5 | 80.3 | 70.0 | 77.2 | 53.5 | 70.6 | 75.7 | 78.2 | 65.8 | 80.5 | 67.5 | 70.9 | 77.3 | 50.0 | 72.9
2015 Q3 | 74.3 | 72.6 | 64.7 | 77.5 | 82.7 | .. | 75.9 | 74.3 | 73.2 | 78.6 | 79.6 | 71.6 | 67.3 | 76.5 | 77.8 | 77.1 | 72.0 | 88.7 | 81.4 | 68.7 | 75.7 | 57.2 | 68.6 | 76.6 | 77.1 | 63.4 | 79.6 | 67.1 | 71.9 | 76.3 | 52.1 | 72.6
2015 Q4 | 74.4 | 72.6 | 64.1 | 77.0 | 83.6 | .. | 76.9 | 73.8 | 73.3 | 78.2 | 78.6 | 72.0 | 66.2 | 75.6 | 77.0 | 74.7 | 71.4 | 84.4 | 82.5 | 70.5 | 75.8 | 56.6 | 68.7 | 77.6 | 78.4 | 70.5 | 79.3 | 64.5 | 69.9 | 76.6 | 51.6 | 73.2
2015 | 74.6 | 72.4 | 64.2 | 76.7 | 83.1 |  | 76.3 | 74.1 | 72.5 | 78.7 | 76.2 | 71.8 | 67.1 | 75.4 | 76.9 | 76.3 | 70.7 | 86.8 | 81.4 | 69.5 | 76.1 | 54.7 | 69.5 | 76.6 | 78.2 | 67.9 | 79.8 | 67.6 | 69.6 | 76.5 | 50.9 | 72.9

Table 2.A1.5. Quarterly participation rates by place of birth and gender in OECD countries, 2011-15
Percentage of the population aged 15-64
MEN
|  | AUS | AUT | BEL | CAN | CHE | CHL | CZE | DEU | DNK | ESP | EST | FIN | FRA | GBR | GRC | HUN | IRL | ISL | ISR | ITA | LUX | MEX | NLD | NOR | NZL | POL | PRT | SVK | SVN | SWE | TUR | USA
Native-born | 2011 Q1 | 83.7 | 78.4 | 71.7 | 79.8 | 88.3 | .. | 78.0 | 82.3 | 83.1 | 79.2 | 78.0 | 75.7 | 74.2 | 80.9 | 76.3 | 67.4 | 75.1 | 86.2 | .. | 71.7 | 68.6 | 81.7 | 83.6 | 79.1 | 84.1 | 72.0 | 77.5 | 76.1 | 73.3 | 81.3 | 74.3 | 75.4
2011 Q2 | 83.2 | 79.8 | 72.6 | 82.0 | 87.9 | .. | 78.6 | 82.2 | 83.0 | 79.3 | 77.2 | 79.4 | 74.3 | 80.9 | 76.2 | 68.1 | 76.0 | 89.2 | .. | 71.4 | 67.5 | 82.3 | 83.5 | 79.7 | 84.1 | 72.6 | 77.3 | 76.6 | 73.2 | 84.0 | 76.1 | 75.8
2011 Q3 | 82.8 | 81.0 | 71.9 | 82.9 | 88.6 | .. | 78.8 | 82.5 | 83.3 | 79.6 | 77.8 | 77.4 | 74.6 | 81.7 | 76.0 | 68.8 | 76.0 | 86.8 | .. | 71.3 | 68.5 | 82.8 | 84.1 | 80.4 | 83.9 | 73.1 | 77.4 | 76.6 | 74.5 | 83.7 | 77.1 | 76.5
2011 Q4 | 83.1 | 79.9 | 72.8 | 80.3 | 88.4 | .. | 78.5 | 82.8 | 82.7 | 79.1 | 77.5 | 75.8 | 74.6 | 81.5 | 75.4 | 68.5 | 76.1 | 86.6 | .. | 72.0 | 66.9 | 82.9 | 84.5 | 80.3 | 84.2 | 72.8 | 76.8 | 76.9 | 73.6 | 81.9 | 75.3 | 75.6
2011 | 83.2 | 79.8 | 72.3 | 81.2 | 88.3 | 75.8 | 78.5 | 82.4 | 83.0 | 79.3 | 77.6 | 77.1 | 74.4 | 81.3 | 76.0 | 68.2 | 75.8 | 87.2 | .. | 71.6 | 67.9 | 82.4 | 83.9 | 79.9 | 84.1 | 72.6 | 77.2 | 76.5 | 73.7 | 82.7 | 75.7 | 75.8
2012 Q1 | 83.1 | 78.2 | 71.8 | 79.2 | 87.8 | .. | 78.5 | 82.0 | 82.1 | 78.7 | 77.4 | 75.5 | 74.5 | 81.2 | 75.6 | 68.3 | 75.3 | 85.7 | 73.3 | 72.5 | 67.3 | 82.1 | 84.6 | 80.4 | 84.4 | 72.5 | 76.3 | 77.1 | 72.2 | 81.5 | 72.9 | 75.1
2012 Q2 | 82.7 | 80.3 | 72.7 | 81.7 | 87.4 | .. | 79.1 | 82.0 | 82.3 | 79.3 | 77.0 | 79.2 | 74.8 | 81.5 | 75.7 | 69.2 | 76.0 | 88.6 | 74.1 | 72.9 | 69.2 | 83.1 | 84.5 | 80.9 | 83.2 | 73.2 | 76.8 | 76.9 | 72.2 | 83.9 | 75.3 | 76.0
2012 Q3 | 82.7 | 81.3 | 72.7 | 82.3 | 89.2 | .. | 79.9 | 82.6 | 82.0 | 79.4 | 78.9 | 77.4 | 75.1 | 82.2 | 75.5 | 69.9 | 76.7 | 87.5 | 74.8 | 72.4 | 69.3 | 83.6 | 84.7 | 80.7 | 82.6 | 73.8 | 77.0 | 77.3 | 74.1 | 83.9 | 76.1 | 76.6
2012 Q4 | 83.0 | 80.3 | 72.5 | 80.2 | 89.0 | .. | 79.7 | 82.5 | 81.8 | 78.7 | 78.0 | 75.5 | 75.3 | 81.9 | 75.7 | 70.0 | 75.3 | 85.1 | 74.1 | 73.0 | 69.6 | 82.5 | 84.6 | 80.1 | 82.7 | 73.6 | 76.0 | 77.2 | 74.6 | 82.3 | 75.9 | 75.8
2012 | 82.8 | 80.0 | 72.4 | 80.9 | 88.4 | .. | 79.3 | 82.3 | 82.1 | 79.0 | 77.8 | 76.9 | 74.9 | 81.7 | 75.6 | 69.3 | 75.8 | 86.7 | 74.1 | 72.7 | 68.9 | 82.8 | 84.6 | 80.5 | 83.2 | 73.3 | 76.5 | 77.1 | 73.3 | 82.9 | 75.1 | 75.9
2013 Q1 | 83.0 | 79.0 | 71.7 | 79.4 | 88.3 | .. | 79.7 | 82.0 | 82.0 | 78.7 | 78.4 | 75.1 | 75.0 | 81.4 | 75.4 | 69.1 | 75.1 | 84.4 | 73.9 | 72.3 | 67.3 | 81.8 | 84.6 | 79.7 | 83.0 | 73.2 | 75.8 | 77.5 | 73.3 | 82.8 | 74.2 | 75.3
2013 Q2 | 82.8 | 80.3 | 73.3 | 81.6 | 87.4 | .. | 80.2 | 82.3 | 81.1 | 78.7 | 78.3 | 79.3 | 75.1 | 81.6 | 75.8 | 70.7 | 76.3 | 90.3 | 73.6 | 72.1 | 67.0 | 82.6 | 85.1 | 80.8 | 82.7 | 73.9 | 75.8 | 77.2 | 73.5 | 84.6 | 76.3 | 75.8
2013 Q3 | 82.8 | 81.4 | 72.5 | 82.3 | 88.1 | .. | 80.7 | 82.4 | 81.4 | 79.2 | 78.7 | 77.3 | 75.2 | 82.4 | 75.8 | 71.7 | 76.6 | 90.8 | 74.7 | 71.9 | 69.7 | 82.7 | 85.3 | 80.5 | 83.1 | 74.4 | 76.0 | 77.1 | 74.3 | 84.9 | 76.8 | 76.2
2013 Q4 | 82.9 | 80.3 | 72.3 | 80.5 | 88.3 | .. | 80.5 | 82.6 | 80.3 | 78.7 | 78.0 | 74.8 | 74.7 | 82.1 | 75.3 | 71.5 | 76.0 | 86.9 | 74.1 | 72.6 | 69.3 | 82.9 | 85.1 | 79.3 | 84.2 | 74.1 | 76.0 | 76.8 | 73.3 | 83.1 | 75.3 | 74.7
2013 | 82.9 | 80.3 | 72.5 | 80.9 | 88.0 | 76.0 | 80.3 | 82.3 | 81.2 | 78.8 | 78.3 | 76.6 | 75.0 | 81.9 | 75.6 | 70.7 | 76.0 | 88.0 | 74.1 | 72.2 | 68.3 | 82.5 | 85.0 | 80.1 | 83.2 | 73.9 | 75.9 | 77.2 | 73.6 | 83.8 | 75.7 | 75.5
2014 Q1 | 82.6 | 78.9 | 72.3 | 79.8 | 87.3 | .. | 80.4 | 82.2 | 80.5 | 78.2 | 78.0 | 75.3 | 74.7 | 81.7 | 75.0 | 72.2 | 75.6 | 88.1 | 73.7 | 72.5 | 71.5 | 82.1 | 84.9 | 79.4 | 84.8 | 74.0 | 75.9 | 77.3 | 72.9 | 83.1 | 75.3 | 74.6
2014 Q2 | 82.3 | 80.0 | 71.8 | 81.3 | 87.3 | .. | 80.8 | 81.8 | 81.0 | 78.6 | 79.3 | 78.9 | 74.9 | 81.5 | 74.8 | 73.0 | 76.2 | 92.7 | 73.9 | 72.2 | 68.1 | 82.1 | 84.8 | 80.5 | 84.2 | 74.4 | 76.1 | 77.4 | 74.1 | 84.9 | 77.2 | 75.7
2014 Q3 | 82.2 | 81.3 | 71.9 | 82.3 | 88.3 | .. | 81.3 | 82.6 | 82.4 | 78.8 | 79.7 | 76.7 | 75.3 | 82.3 | 74.9 | 74.0 | 77.0 | 90.5 | 74.5 | 72.5 | 70.0 | 82.7 | 85.1 | 80.6 | 83.5 | 75.1 | 76.2 | 77.8 | 75.0 | 85.0 | 77.6 | 76.2
2014 Q4 | 82.3 | 80.1 | 72.4 | 80.3 | 88.1 | .. | 81.3 | 82.4 | 81.5 | 78.8 | 79.0 | 75.9 | 75.6 | 81.9 | 74.3 | 73.7 | 76.7 | 88.3 | 74.2 | 73.1 | 70.2 | 82.1 | 84.7 | 79.3 | 85.3 | 74.9 | 76.0 | 77.8 | 75.0 | 83.4 | 76.4 | 74.8
2014 | 82.3 | 80.1 | 72.1 | 81.0 | 87.7 | .. | 81.0 | 82.3 | 81.3 | 78.6 | 79.0 | 76.7 | 75.1 | 81.8 | 74.8 | 73.2 | 76.4 | 89.9 | 74.1 | 72.5 | 69.9 | 82.3 | 84.9 | 80.0 | 84.4 | 74.6 | 76.0 | 77.6 | 74.3 | 84.1 | 76.6 | 75.3
2015 Q1 | 82.8 | 79.1 | 72.0 | 79.5 | 87.8 | .. | 81.0 | 81.9 | 81.5 | 78.5 | 78.9 | 75.8 | 75.0 | 81.7 | 74.3 | 73.8 | 76.3 | 88.8 | 73.6 | 72.6 | 69.7 | 81.7 | 85.2 | 79.8 | 84.8 | 74.5 | 75.6 | 77.6 | 74.3 | 83.4 | 75.9 | 74.8
2015 Q2 | 82.8 | 79.6 | 72.0 | 81.9 | 86.9 | .. | 80.9 | 81.2 | 81.9 | 78.6 | 80.9 | 79.1 | 75.1 | 81.4 | 74.5 | 74.9 | 77.0 | 93.0 | 74.6 | 73.1 | 72.4 | 81.9 | 85.2 | 80.8 | 83.8 | 74.2 | 75.6 | 77.2 | 75.4 | 85.0 | 77.3 | 75.8
2015 Q3 | 82.8 | 81.2 | 71.5 | 82.8 | 87.4 | .. | 81.3 | 82.0 | 82.3 | 78.8 | 82.0 | 77.8 | 75.3 | 82.2 | 75.0 | 75.7 | 77.1 | 92.6 | 75.1 | 73.0 | 70.7 | 82.2 | 85.5 | 80.6 | 82.9 | 75.2 | 76.1 | 77.7 | 76.5 | 84.7 | 78.4 | 75.7
2015 Q4 | 83.1 | 80.1 | 71.8 | 80.4 | 87.8 | .. | 81.4 | 82.4 | 82.1 | 78.3 | 79.5 | 75.5 | 75.3 | 82.3 | 74.9 | 75.7 | 76.2 | 88.6 | 73.9 | 73.3 | 67.9 | 82.4 | 85.4 | 79.3 | 83.8 | 75.3 | 76.7 | 77.7 | 74.7 | 83.4 | 76.8 | 74.8
2015 | 82.9 | 80.0 | 71.8 | 81.1 | 87.5 |  | 81.1 | 81.9 | 81.9 | 78.6 | 80.3 | 77.1 | 75.2 | 81.9 | 74.7 | 75.0 | 76.6 | 90.8 | 74.3 | 73.0 | 69.8 | 82.0 | 85.3 | 80.1 | 83.8 | 74.8 | 76.0 | 77.5 | 75.2 | 84.1 | 77.1 | 75.3
Foreign-born | 2011 Q1 | 83.7 | 79.5 | 72.4 | 81.0 | 88.9 | .. | 84.4 | 83.5 | 75.5 | 85.6 | 81.2 | 77.7 | 76.6 | 82.4 | 89.0 | 75.3 | 78.5 | 84.6 | .. | 83.0 | 84.6 | 71.7 | 78.1 | 78.0 | 84.4 | 65.3 | 86.5 | 78.9 | 76.7 | 80.2 | 73.9 | 85.6
2011 Q2 | 82.9 | 81.5 | 71.9 | 82.4 | 89.7 | .. | 86.0 | 84.4 | 76.2 | 86.1 | 79.4 | 80.7 | 76.8 | 83.1 | 88.9 | 77.3 | 79.9 | 88.8 | .. | 84.8 | 82.1 | 72.0 | 77.7 | 82.1 | 81.2 | 63.9 | 85.5 | 81.7 | 76.6 | 81.6 | 74.6 | 85.7
2011 Q3 | 83.2 | 80.5 | 72.8 | 82.9 | 90.2 | .. | 86.0 | 84.0 | 77.9 | 86.3 | 84.8 | 79.7 | 75.8 | 83.1 | 89.1 | 82.6 | 80.9 | 92.6 | .. | 83.3 | 82.2 | 69.8 | 78.3 | 80.6 | 81.7 | 71.8 | 86.7 | 86.5 | 75.4 | 81.3 | 71.9 | 85.5
2011 Q4 | 82.9 | 80.4 | 73.0 | 81.8 | 90.2 | .. | 85.2 | 84.6 | 77.2 | 86.3 | 83.9 | 80.0 | 75.5 | 82.9 | 89.0 | 77.4 | 79.5 | 87.0 | .. | 83.5 | 82.4 | 69.8 | 79.3 | 79.8 | 83.9 | 79.2 | 84.6 | 83.1 | 74.3 | 80.8 | 73.3 | 85.8
2011 | 83.2 | 80.5 | 72.5 | 82.0 | 89.8 | 82.6 | 85.4 | 84.1 | 76.7 | 86.1 | 82.4 | 79.5 | 76.2 | 82.9 | 89.0 | 78.2 | 79.7 | 88.2 | .. | 83.6 | 82.8 | 70.8 | 78.3 | 80.1 | 82.8 | 69.6 | 85.8 | 82.4 | 75.8 | 81.0 | 73.5 | 85.6
2012 Q1 | 83.0 | 78.7 | 73.7 | 81.3 | 89.5 | .. | 84.7 | 84.4 | 77.8 | 85.8 | 82.0 | 79.0 | 77.0 | 83.2 | 88.2 | 78.9 | 79.0 | 85.1 | 81.7 | 82.7 | 84.8 | 69.8 | 79.4 | 79.9 | 84.5 | 69.3 | 86.5 | 77.1 | 77.2 | 79.8 | 70.9 | 84.9
2012 Q2 | 82.6 | 82.6 | 70.8 | 83.0 | 89.8 | .. | 84.6 | 84.1 | 75.5 | 85.8 | 86.8 | 81.1 | 77.0 | 83.3 | 88.0 | 81.8 | 79.9 | 94.9 | 82.5 | 83.8 | 82.2 | 70.9 | 80.1 | 82.6 | 81.6 | 70.1 | 85.7 | 81.9 | 77.0 | 81.7 | 70.6 | 84.7
2012 Q3 | 82.1 | 82.8 | 72.2 | 84.2 | 90.2 | .. | 86.9 | 84.9 | 76.2 | 86.1 | 83.5 | 81.5 | 77.5 | 84.3 | 89.6 | 83.7 | 79.8 | 92.5 | 83.0 | 81.3 | 83.5 | 67.4 | 79.8 | 80.8 | 82.7 | 78.0 | 85.0 | 80.2 | 77.7 | 81.9 | 74.3 | 85.2
2012 Q4 | 83.0 | 81.0 | 74.4 | 83.1 | 89.5 | .. | 86.8 | 84.4 | 76.0 | 85.4 | 81.5 | 80.4 | 79.2 | 83.6 | 90.0 | 81.4 | 80.0 | 88.8 | 82.4 | 82.2 | 84.1 | 69.7 | 78.6 | 80.8 | 82.1 | 77.6 | 83.9 | 79.3 | 79.5 | 81.7 | 72.8 | 84.5
2012 | 82.7 | 81.3 | 72.8 | 82.9 | 89.7 | .. | 85.7 | 84.4 | 76.4 | 85.7 | 83.3 | 80.5 | 77.7 | 83.6 | 88.9 | 81.5 | 79.6 | 90.3 | 82.4 | 82.5 | 83.7 | 69.4 | 79.5 | 81.0 | 82.7 | 73.6 | 85.3 | 79.7 | 77.8 | 81.3 | 72.2 | 84.9
2013 Q1 | 83.5 | 81.0 | 75.1 | 82.0 | 89.4 | .. | 86.6 | 84.0 | 75.9 | 85.6 | 81.4 | 79.3 | 78.7 | 82.6 | 90.2 | 83.6 | 79.3 | 90.3 | 83.4 | 82.4 | 84.5 | 71.1 | 79.1 | 80.7 | 82.2 | 78.2 | 82.9 | 85.0 | 81.4 | 80.4 | 69.6 | 84.6
2013 Q2 | 83.2 | 82.0 | 73.0 | 83.6 | 89.9 | .. | 86.4 | 84.2 | 75.8 | 84.5 | 85.4 | 83.3 | 78.9 | 82.6 | 89.5 | 83.8 | 81.0 | 91.6 | 82.9 | 82.1 | 83.7 | 72.6 | 78.8 | 81.1 | 82.3 | 70.5 | 83.4 | 82.1 | 79.5 | 82.1 | 72.4 | 85.5
2013 Q3 | 81.8 | 82.3 | 74.3 | 84.8 | 90.1 | .. | 87.4 | 84.5 | 76.3 | 85.3 | 78.8 | 81.4 | 79.1 | 85.1 | 89.5 | 85.8 | 82.2 | 92.6 | 83.4 | 81.1 | 86.1 | 75.4 | 78.6 | 80.9 | 82.4 | 74.4 | 82.4 | 81.4 | 80.3 | 81.5 | 70.4 | 85.6
2013 Q4 | 81.8 | 79.5 | 73.4 | 82.1 | 90.0 | .. | 87.4 | 84.0 | 75.5 | 84.6 | 78.4 | 78.2 | 79.1 | 83.6 | 89.7 | 85.5 | 81.2 | 89.4 | 82.8 | 80.7 | 85.4 | 74.1 | 80.3 | 81.3 | 84.2 | 71.3 | 82.0 | 81.1 | 79.0 | 80.6 | 71.4 | 84.9
2013 | 82.6 | 81.2 | 74.0 | 83.1 | 89.8 | 86.8 | 87.0 | 84.2 | 75.9 | 85.0 | 80.9 | 80.5 | 78.9 | 83.5 | 89.7 | 84.6 | 80.9 | 91.0 | 83.1 | 81.6 | 84.9 | 73.3 | 79.2 | 81.0 | 82.8 | 73.7 | 82.7 | 82.2 | 80.0 | 81.1 | 71.0 | 85.1
2014 Q1 | 82.3 | 77.7 | 74.1 | 80.7 | 90.4 | .. | 89.5 | 83.8 | 77.6 | 84.1 | 80.6 | 78.3 | 78.6 | 83.9 | 90.3 | 86.5 | 80.4 | 88.4 | 84.6 | 81.5 | 83.8 | 72.4 | 78.7 | 80.6 | 84.3 | 78.6 | 82.9 | 82.8 | 75.3 | 80.7 | 73.0 | 85.0
2014 Q2 | 82.0 | 79.7 | 75.1 | 82.6 | 89.9 | .. | 89.0 | 83.3 | 78.3 | 84.9 | 83.4 | 81.7 | 76.7 | 84.8 | 89.6 | 87.0 | 80.5 | 90.5 | 82.8 | 82.1 | 85.9 | 76.0 | 79.5 | 80.2 | 82.8 | 81.6 | 84.5 | 83.8 | 76.6 | 82.6 | 74.9 | 85.5
2014 Q3 | 82.0 | 81.4 | 73.1 | 84.1 | 90.2 | .. | 89.6 | 84.2 | 82.0 | 85.2 | 82.2 | 78.3 | 75.2 | 84.8 | 88.9 | 85.6 | 80.2 | 92.5 | 83.3 | 80.8 | 84.0 | 69.3 | 78.0 | 80.2 | 82.8 | 82.8 | 84.2 | 83.9 | 74.0 | 82.6 | 72.6 | 85.6
2014 Q4 | 83.1 | 79.9 | 74.4 | 82.8 | 90.1 | .. | 88.7 | 84.5 | 79.9 | 85.2 | 80.8 | 78.4 | 76.1 | 82.9 | 87.1 | 85.7 | 78.0 | 92.1 | 84.7 | 81.2 | 85.6 | 74.1 | 81.4 | 82.4 | 83.4 | 76.4 | 84.1 | 84.1 | 74.3 | 80.7 | 72.0 | 85.0
2014 | 82.4 | 79.7 | 74.2 | 82.5 | 90.1 | .. | 89.2 | 83.9 | 79.5 | 84.8 | 81.8 | 79.2 | 76.7 | 84.1 | 89.0 | 86.2 | 79.8 | 90.9 | 83.9 | 81.4 | 84.8 | 73.0 | 79.4 | 80.8 | 83.3 | 79.9 | 83.9 | 83.6 | 75.1 | 81.7 | 73.1 | 85.3
2015 Q1 | 84.3 | 79.1 | 75.6 | 82.4 | 90.5 | .. | 88.1 | 83.6 | 78.0 | 84.7 | 77.8 | 77.5 | 76.2 | 83.1 | 87.7 | 84.7 | 78.5 | 90.5 | 83.7 | 80.4 | 82.2 | 68.5 | 79.4 | 80.6 | 86.8 | 81.0 | 84.1 | 75.6 | 74.3 | 80.4 | 72.7 | 84.9
2015 Q2 | 83.5 | 81.9 | 71.3 | 83.9 | 90.7 | .. | 88.0 | 82.8 | 78.8 | 85.8 | 79.0 | 80.0 | 77.3 | 83.5 | 89.1 | 87.2 | 79.8 | 90.5 | 82.6 | 82.0 | 81.0 | 71.3 | 80.5 | 80.6 | 85.1 | 78.5 | 85.4 | 72.1 | 78.0 | 81.9 | 72.0 | 85.4
2015 Q3 | 83.2 | 81.4 | 76.0 | 85.3 | 90.1 | .. | 87.1 | 83.8 | 80.0 | 85.7 | 84.3 | 77.6 | 76.6 | 84.7 | 89.8 | 88.5 | 81.9 | - | 83.9 | 82.0 | 81.9 | 71.4 | 78.9 | 82.1 | 84.3 | 74.3 | 83.7 | - | 78.3 | 81.3 | 75.5 | 85.4
2015 Q4 | 83.4 | 80.3 | 72.2 | 84.3 | 90.9 | .. | 87.1 | 83.7 | 79.7 | 84.4 | 83.8 | 79.0 | 76.2 | 84.5 | 89.4 | 86.8 | 80.9 | - | 84.8 | 83.2 | 81.8 | 71.6 | 78.4 | 82.5 | 85.0 | 86.0 | 82.7 | - | 76.0 | 81.0 | 73.6 | 84.7
2015 | 83.6 | 80.7 | 73.7 | 84.0 | 90.5 |  | 87.6 | 83.5 | 79.2 | 85.2 | 81.4 | 78.5 | 76.6 | 83.9 | 89.0 | 86.9 | 80.3 | 91.6 | 83.7 | 81.9 | 81.8 | 70.8 | 79.3 | 81.5 | 85.3 | 79.5 | 84.0 | 71.0 | 76.7 | 81.1 | 73.5 | 85.1

Table 2.A1.5. Quarterly participation rates by place of birth and gender in OECD countries, 2011-15
Percentage of the population aged 15-64
WOMEN
|  | AUS | AUT | BEL | CAN | CHE | CHL | CZE | DEU | DNK | ESP | EST | FIN | FRA | GBR | GRC | HUN | IRL | ISL | ISR | ITA | LUX | MEX | NLD | NOR | NZL | POL | PRT | SVK | SVN | SWE | TUR | USA
Native-born6 | 2011 Q1 | 72.3 | 70.2 | 62.1 | 74.7 | 78.6 | .. | 61.8 | 72.9 | 77.0 | 65.4 | 70.0 | 71.8 | 66.3 | 70.3 | 56.9 | 55.9 | 61.0 | 80.7 | .. | 50.4 | 55.6 | 44.8 | 73.9 | 76.0 | 74.3 | 58.3 | 68.7 | 60.8 | 65.8 | 78.3 | 29.1 | 67.6
2011 Q2 | 72.4 | 69.9 | 62.7 | 76.1 | 78.5 | .. | 62.1 | 73.2 | 77.4 | 66.0 | 71.6 | 74.8 | 66.5 | 70.3 | 56.8 | 56.4 | 62.0 | 84.8 | .. | 50.3 | 53.3 | 45.9 | 74.2 | 76.5 | 73.1 | 58.7 | 68.9 | 60.4 | 66.3 | 80.5 | 32.2 | 67.7
2011 Q3 | 72.6 | 71.0 | 63.8 | 76.0 | 78.2 | .. | 62.5 | 73.6 | 78.0 | 66.1 | 72.7 | 73.7 | 67.0 | 70.8 | 57.0 | 56.8 | 61.8 | 82.0 | .. | 49.9 | 56.5 | 46.4 | 74.6 | 76.5 | 72.9 | 59.1 | 68.4 | 61.0 | 67.1 | 80.1 | 32.3 | 68.0
2011 Q4 | 72.7 | 70.5 | 63.0 | 74.6 | 79.2 | .. | 62.5 | 74.0 | 77.0 | 66.3 | 70.8 | 71.7 | 67.1 | 71.0 | 57.6 | 56.8 | 61.6 | 78.6 | .. | 51.7 | 55.4 | 47.7 | 75.3 | 75.8 | 73.8 | 59.3 | 68.0 | 61.2 | 67.9 | 78.5 | 30.5 | 67.2
2011 | 72.5 | 70.4 | 62.9 | 75.4 | 78.6 | 49.0 | 62.2 | 73.4 | 77.3 | 65.9 | 71.3 | 73.0 | 66.7 | 70.6 | 57.1 | 56.5 | 61.6 | 81.5 | .. | 50.6 | 55.2 | 46.2 | 74.5 | 76.2 | 73.5 | 58.9 | 68.5 | 60.9 | 66.8 | 79.4 | 31.0 | 67.6
2012 Q1 | 72.6 | 70.9 | 62.4 | 74.4 | 78.4 | .. | 62.5 | 72.9 | 77.1 | 66.9 | 71.6 | 72.4 | 66.9 | 71.1 | 57.7 | 57.0 | 61.3 | 80.0 | 63.4 | 52.5 | 55.5 | 46.1 | 75.3 | 76.0 | 73.8 | 59.2 | 68.7 | 61.6 | 67.7 | 78.8 | 29.5 | 67.0
2012 Q2 | 72.9 | 70.9 | 62.4 | 75.9 | 77.9 | .. | 63.2 | 73.1 | 77.8 | 67.1 | 71.7 | 75.3 | 67.4 | 71.0 | 57.9 | 57.7 | 61.7 | 85.2 | 63.6 | 52.9 | 55.6 | 47.7 | 75.4 | 76.8 | 73.3 | 59.6 | 68.8 | 61.6 | 66.5 | 81.2 | 32.5 | 67.4
2012 Q3 | 72.5 | 72.7 | 63.9 | 76.1 | 79.0 | .. | 64.0 | 73.5 | 77.2 | 67.4 | 71.6 | 74.9 | 67.7 | 71.7 | 58.0 | 58.6 | 61.8 | 83.5 | 65.3 | 51.9 | 60.1 | 48.0 | 75.8 | 76.9 | 73.4 | 60.1 | 68.9 | 62.0 | 67.3 | 81.1 | 32.3 | 67.7
2012 Q4 | 72.7 | 71.6 | 63.8 | 75.0 | 78.7 | .. | 64.5 | 73.8 | 75.9 | 67.4 | 69.9 | 72.0 | 68.1 | 72.1 | 58.1 | 58.1 | 61.8 | 81.3 | 64.2 | 53.2 | 57.3 | 47.3 | 76.3 | 76.4 | 72.4 | 60.1 | 68.5 | 61.5 | 67.1 | 79.2 | 32.4 | 67.2
2012 | 72.7 | 71.5 | 63.1 | 75.4 | 78.5 | .. | 63.6 | 73.3 | 77.0 | 67.2 | 71.2 | 73.7 | 67.5 | 71.5 | 57.9 | 57.8 | 61.6 | 82.5 | 64.1 | 52.6 | 57.2 | 47.3 | 75.7 | 76.5 | 73.2 | 59.7 | 68.7 | 61.7 | 67.1 | 80.1 | 31.7 | 67.3
2013 Q1 | 72.5 | 71.4 | 63.1 | 75.1 | 79.6 | .. | 64.5 | 73.9 | 76.2 | 67.6 | 71.1 | 73.1 | 67.9 | 71.8 | 57.5 | 57.5 | 61.8 | 81.1 | 64.1 | 52.9 | 56.3 | 46.2 | 76.3 | 76.6 | 73.7 | 59.4 | 68.4 | 62.4 | 66.9 | 79.8 | 31.8 | 66.6
2013 Q2 | 72.8 | 71.9 | 63.8 | 76.2 | 78.9 | .. | 65.0 | 73.9 | 77.2 | 67.7 | 71.9 | 75.6 | 68.2 | 71.7 | 58.0 | 58.2 | 63.1 | 84.7 | 64.9 | 52.5 | 57.9 | 47.8 | 76.3 | 76.7 | 73.1 | 59.8 | 68.7 | 62.0 | 66.7 | 82.0 | 34.4 | 67.4
2013 Q3 | 72.4 | 73.3 | 65.5 | 76.4 | 79.2 | .. | 65.3 | 74.2 | 77.8 | 67.7 | 70.9 | 73.5 | 68.6 | 72.3 | 57.7 | 58.7 | 62.9 | 84.7 | 64.7 | 51.8 | 55.0 | 47.7 | 76.4 | 77.1 | 74.3 | 60.6 | 69.0 | 62.6 | 68.0 | 81.9 | 33.7 | 67.3
2013 Q4 | 72.7 | 72.0 | 63.8 | 75.2 | 80.2 | .. | 65.5 | 74.6 | 75.9 | 68.1 | 72.0 | 72.7 | 68.6 | 72.0 | 57.5 | 59.1 | 62.5 | 82.5 | 63.8 | 53.2 | 59.9 | 48.0 | 76.2 | 76.6 | 75.5 | 60.8 | 69.7 | 62.7 | 66.4 | 80.5 | 32.8 | 66.8
2013 | 72.6 | 72.2 | 64.1 | 75.7 | 79.4 | 51.0 | 65.1 | 74.2 | 76.8 | 67.8 | 71.5 | 73.7 | 68.3 | 72.0 | 57.7 | 58.4 | 62.5 | 83.2 | 64.4 | 52.6 | 57.3 | 47.4 | 76.3 | 76.8 | 74.2 | 60.1 | 68.9 | 62.4 | 67.0 | 81.1 | 33.2 | 67.0
2014 Q1 | 72.8 | 72.1 | 64.1 | 74.6 | 79.7 | .. | 65.2 | 74.3 | 75.5 | 67.9 | 70.5 | 73.2 | 68.3 | 72.2 | 58.0 | 59.9 | 62.0 | 81.5 | 65.1 | 53.3 | 58.3 | 46.7 | 75.4 | 76.0 | 75.2 | 61.0 | 69.0 | 62.8 | 67.6 | 80.7 | 31.7 | 67.0
2014 Q2 | 72.7 | 72.0 | 64.1 | 76.1 | 79.7 | .. | 65.0 | 74.5 | 75.9 | 68.0 | 71.6 | 76.7 | 68.2 | 72.1 | 58.3 | 60.5 | 62.4 | 86.2 | 65.3 | 53.2 | 57.2 | 46.8 | 75.4 | 77.0 | 74.3 | 60.7 | 69.2 | 62.5 | 68.9 | 82.5 | 34.3 | 67.1
2014 Q3 | 72.6 | 72.5 | 65.6 | 76.0 | 80.9 | .. | 65.8 | 74.6 | 76.8 | 67.8 | 72.6 | 74.9 | 68.3 | 72.6 | 58.4 | 61.1 | 63.5 | 85.7 | 65.7 | 52.8 | 60.6 | 46.5 | 75.9 | 77.2 | 75.5 | 61.2 | 69.5 | 62.9 | 68.7 | 82.9 | 34.2 | 67.1
2014 Q4 | 72.8 | 72.1 | 65.3 | 74.9 | 82.6 | .. | 66.5 | 74.9 | 77.1 | 68.4 | 71.6 | 72.8 | 68.6 | 72.6 | 58.4 | 61.1 | 62.9 | 84.2 | 64.5 | 54.6 | 57.8 | 46.3 | 76.2 | 76.8 | 77.2 | 61.5 | 69.1 | 63.3 | 68.0 | 80.2 | 33.9 | 67.2
2014 | 72.7 | 72.2 | 64.8 | 75.4 | 80.7 | .. | 65.6 | 74.6 | 76.3 | 68.0 | 71.6 | 74.4 | 68.4 | 72.4 | 58.3 | 60.6 | 62.7 | 84.4 | 65.1 | 53.5 | 58.5 | 46.6 | 75.7 | 76.8 | 75.5 | 61.1 | 69.2 | 62.9 | 68.3 | 81.6 | 33.5 | 67.1
2015 Q1 | 73.2 | 71.8 | 64.6 | 74.7 | 81.8 | .. | 66.4 | 74.7 | 76.9 | 67.9 | 71.5 | 73.7 | 68.2 | 72.7 | 58.7 | 61.4 | 62.3 | 84.8 | 64.4 | 53.6 | 62.8 | 46.0 | 76.6 | 76.1 | 76.2 | 61.2 | 69.7 | 63.9 | 67.6 | 81.0 | 33.4 | 66.7
2015 Q2 | 73.6 | 72.0 | 64.0 | 76.1 | 80.9 | .. | 66.4 | 74.7 | 76.8 | 68.6 | 73.2 | 77.2 | 68.5 | 72.5 | 59.2 | 61.9 | 63.2 | 88.1 | 64.7 | 53.5 | 61.8 | 46.7 | 76.9 | 77.5 | 74.9 | 61.1 | 69.7 | 63.7 | 69.2 | 83.0 | 35.7 | 67.3
2015 Q3 | 73.5 | 73.6 | 65.0 | 76.2 | 81.7 | .. | 66.7 | 74.7 | 76.9 | 67.9 | 74.3 | 75.7 | 68.9 | 72.8 | 59.6 | 62.6 | 63.3 | 86.2 | 65.6 | 52.4 | 60.8 | 47.0 | 77.2 | 77.8 | 74.5 | 61.7 | 69.8 | 64.5 | 69.6 | 83.2 | 35.7 | 67.2
2015 Q4 | 74.7 | 72.8 | 65.1 | 75.0 | 82.7 | .. | 66.6 | 75.4 | 76.5 | 68.5 | 73.8 | 73.7 | 69.1 | 72.8 | 59.6 | 62.5 | 63.4 | 86.3 | 65.3 | 53.6 | 59.5 | 47.9 | 77.0 | 76.2 | 74.8 | 61.7 | 69.5 | 65.0 | 68.0 | 81.1 | 35.2 | 67.3
2015 | 73.7 | 72.6 | 64.7 | 75.5 | 81.8 |  | 66.5 | 74.9 | 76.8 | 68.3 | 73.2 | 75.1 | 68.7 | 72.7 | 59.3 | 62.1 | 63.0 | 86.3 | 65.0 | 53.3 | 61.1 | 46.9 | 76.9 | 76.9 | 75.1 | 61.4 | 69.7 | 64.3 | 68.6 | 82.1 | 35.0 | 67.1
Foreign-born | 2011 Q1 | 66.0 | 64.7 | 51.1 | 69.1 | 71.7 | .. | 62.6 | 63.0 | 67.3 | 73.7 | 71.5 | 61.4 | 60.5 | 64.0 | 62.1 | 62.4 | 62.0 | 87.6 | .. | 58.5 | 70.3 | 36.4 | 63.7 | 70.6 | 68.0 | 51.9 | 78.8 | 53.4 | 64.4 | 67.9 | 32.1 | 62.4
2011 Q2 | 66.0 | 63.3 | 53.7 | 69.6 | 71.9 | .. | 60.2 | 64.5 | 68.4 | 75.1 | 72.5 | 65.5 | 59.9 | 63.8 | 61.1 | 61.8 | 63.8 | 89.6 | .. | 58.9 | 67.8 | 38.0 | 61.7 | 72.2 | 68.9 | 58.7 | 80.6 | 59.6 | 64.2 | 69.2 | 29.8 | 62.2
2011 Q3 | 66.0 | 64.0 | 51.0 | 70.5 | 72.8 | .. | 59.8 | 64.9 | 70.2 | 73.6 | 74.7 | 66.0 | 58.4 | 65.2 | 59.9 | 59.2 | 63.6 | 80.6 | .. | 55.7 | 65.4 | 44.2 | 61.3 | 72.3 | 68.6 | 61.5 | 78.5 | 60.0 | 61.5 | 69.1 | 30.5 | 62.5
2011 Q4 | 65.3 | 65.2 | 52.4 | 69.7 | 73.3 | .. | 60.6 | 63.7 | 67.3 | 73.1 | 72.1 | 67.2 | 58.6 | 64.0 | 61.1 | 64.2 | 63.1 | 78.2 | .. | 58.1 | 64.8 | 46.8 | 63.2 | 72.3 | 68.7 | 53.8 | 79.7 | 64.1 | 62.5 | 68.7 | 32.4 | 63.4
2011 | 65.8 | 64.3 | 52.1 | 69.7 | 72.4 | 64.7 | 60.8 | 64.0 | 68.3 | 73.9 | 72.7 | 65.1 | 59.3 | 64.2 | 61.0 | 61.9 | 63.1 | 83.6 | .. | 57.8 | 67.0 | 41.4 | 62.5 | 71.9 | 68.6 | 56.2 | 79.4 | 59.1 | 63.1 | 68.7 | 31.2 | 62.6
2012 Q1 | 65.2 | 64.3 | 51.6 | 69.0 | 73.7 | .. | 60.8 | 63.5 | 67.8 | 74.3 | 72.5 | 67.0 | 59.3 | 62.5 | 60.6 | 63.1 | 63.2 | 84.3 | 75.5 | 59.4 | 67.7 | 43.0 | 63.3 | 70.5 | 70.4 | 53.2 | 79.5 | 64.8 | 63.4 | 68.2 | 36.3 | 62.6
2012 Q2 | 65.5 | 63.9 | 52.5 | 70.9 | 73.8 | .. | 61.3 | 65.2 | 68.3 | 73.9 | 72.9 | 70.3 | 59.0 | 63.0 | 60.8 | 66.4 | 64.0 | 86.9 | 75.7 | 59.3 | 67.8 | 46.6 | 63.6 | 72.8 | 70.2 | 61.2 | 80.3 | 61.7 | 63.7 | 70.1 | 37.8 | 62.4
2012 Q3 | 65.6 | 63.6 | 53.3 | 71.3 | 74.0 | .. | 61.9 | 64.6 | 69.0 | 73.2 | 73.9 | 69.2 | 58.0 | 64.5 | 62.6 | 66.3 | 63.8 | 81.8 | 75.4 | 57.9 | 70.1 | 45.2 | 64.6 | 71.6 | 70.0 | 62.8 | 80.3 | 66.6 | 66.7 | 69.0 | 35.4 | 62.3
2012 Q4 | 65.5 | 63.6 | 54.5 | 71.2 | 74.8 | .. | 61.8 | 65.2 | 65.3 | 74.2 | 70.8 | 67.7 | 57.9 | 65.2 | 62.7 | 70.0 | 61.9 | 83.5 | 76.9 | 60.0 | 69.4 | 45.7 | 63.6 | 69.6 | 70.3 | 58.4 | 78.6 | 69.0 | 64.7 | 68.1 | 37.4 | 62.8
2012 | 65.5 | 63.8 | 53.0 | 70.6 | 74.1 | .. | 61.5 | 64.6 | 67.6 | 73.9 | 72.5 | 68.5 | 58.5 | 63.8 | 61.7 | 66.4 | 63.2 | 84.1 | 75.9 | 59.1 | 68.7 | 45.1 | 63.8 | 71.1 | 70.2 | 58.5 | 79.7 | 65.7 | 64.6 | 68.9 | 36.7 | 62.5
2013 Q1 | 66.1 | 64.8 | 54.6 | 70.8 | 74.5 | .. | 61.3 | 64.5 | 67.4 | 74.5 | 76.1 | 67.5 | 57.9 | 65.2 | 63.6 | 70.0 | 62.7 | 83.5 | 77.2 | 61.0 | 69.2 | 43.1 | 62.4 | 69.7 | 70.7 | 54.7 | 77.6 | 69.7 | 59.7 | 68.4 | 37.8 | 62.3
2013 Q2 | 66.0 | 64.0 | 52.1 | 71.6 | 74.8 | .. | 65.3 | 65.3 | 69.5 | 73.7 | 75.4 | 71.4 | 57.6 | 65.2 | 64.4 | 65.1 | 63.6 | 86.3 | 75.8 | 59.9 | 70.3 | 39.8 | 62.5 | 71.2 | 70.2 | 62.6 | 78.2 | 65.3 | 64.6 | 70.4 | 40.8 | 61.9
2013 Q3 | 66.1 | 64.9 | 54.6 | 71.8 | 74.7 | .. | 65.2 | 65.6 | 68.2 | 72.8 | 72.5 | 67.8 | 57.5 | 65.5 | 65.9 | 65.5 | 64.1 | 83.6 | 75.8 | 58.0 | 70.5 | 43.6 | 64.1 | 73.0 | 69.3 | 64.4 | 77.6 | 67.7 | 62.4 | 70.1 | 38.9 | 62.7
2013 Q4 | 65.5 | 64.5 | 54.3 | 70.2 | 74.8 | .. | 67.0 | 64.2 | 68.1 | 72.9 | 71.4 | 67.8 | 59.0 | 65.8 | 64.6 | 66.9 | 62.8 | 83.9 | 76.9 | 60.8 | 67.7 | 41.2 | 63.8 | 71.2 | 70.3 | 60.9 | 77.0 | 65.1 | 62.4 | 69.1 | 34.6 | 61.6
2013 | 66.0 | 64.5 | 53.9 | 71.1 | 74.7 | 69.3 | 64.7 | 64.9 | 68.3 | 73.5 | 73.9 | 68.6 | 58.0 | 65.4 | 64.6 | 66.9 | 63.3 | 84.3 | 76.4 | 59.9 | 69.4 | 41.9 | 63.2 | 71.3 | 70.1 | 60.5 | 77.6 | 66.9 | 62.3 | 69.5 | 38.0 | 62.1
2014 Q1 | 65.8 | 65.1 | 53.2 | 70.2 | 74.5 | .. | 65.3 | 64.1 | 65.5 | 73.2 | 65.5 | 64.8 | 58.6 | 65.5 | 64.9 | 66.8 | 62.6 | - | 78.6 | 60.9 | 70.0 | 41.2 | 63.7 | 70.6 | 72.0 | 74.3 | 77.6 | - | 60.9 | 68.9 | 38.2 | 62.1
2014 Q2 | 66.2 | 66.4 | 55.7 | 70.9 | 76.6 | .. | 67.1 | 64.8 | 67.3 | 72.8 | 67.8 | 68.0 | 60.0 | 66.0 | 66.1 | 61.2 | 62.6 | - | 78.5 | 59.8 | 70.7 | 43.2 | 63.2 | 70.6 | 69.9 | 70.3 | 76.6 | - | 59.7 | 71.2 | 34.1 | 61.4
2014 Q3 | 66.2 | 65.3 | 54.8 | 70.4 | 74.2 | .. | 63.4 | 66.2 | 67.8 | 71.7 | 72.8 | 66.8 | 60.0 | 66.4 | 66.2 | 65.9 | 62.1 | 86.4 | 78.3 | 59.3 | 67.5 | 44.7 | 61.3 | 70.6 | 69.6 | 54.7 | 77.6 | 63.4 | 57.0 | 72.0 | 35.9 | 61.5
2014 Q4 | 66.2 | 65.1 | 54.4 | 69.9 | 75.5 | .. | 65.3 | 64.4 | 65.8 | 73.3 | 71.8 | 66.7 | 60.1 | 66.3 | 66.0 | 66.2 | 61.3 | 83.1 | 79.8 | 60.5 | 72.4 | 40.9 | 62.4 | 70.3 | 71.1 | 54.8 | 77.0 | 62.6 | 55.2 | 70.7 | 32.6 | 61.5
2014 | 66.1 | 65.5 | 54.5 | 70.4 | 75.2 | .. | 65.3 | 64.9 | 66.6 | 72.7 | 69.3 | 66.6 | 59.6 | 66.1 | 65.8 | 65.0 | 62.2 | 86.8 | 78.8 | 60.1 | 70.2 | 42.5 | 62.6 | 70.5 | 70.6 | 63.7 | 77.2 | 60.2 | 58.2 | 70.7 | 35.0 | 61.6
2015 Q1 | 66.0 | 64.4 | 57.3 | 68.9 | 74.9 | .. | 63.9 | 64.9 | 66.7 | 73.1 | 68.0 | 66.5 | 59.6 | 66.1 | 64.5 | 68.7 | 60.5 | 81.6 | 79.7 | 58.9 | 69.9 | 36.3 | 61.9 | 71.9 | 71.9 | 64.9 | 76.3 | 68.0 | 57.3 | 71.4 | 29.1 | 60.8
2015 Q2 | 66.1 | 64.8 | 53.9 | 70.1 | 75.5 | .. | 65.2 | 65.3 | 65.2 | 73.8 | 70.9 | 64.4 | 58.5 | 67.4 | 66.9 | 68.1 | 61.4 | 86.4 | 78.4 | 59.8 | 73.1 | 36.7 | 62.2 | 70.5 | 71.7 | 55.5 | 76.4 | 63.6 | 63.3 | 73.1 | 31.1 | 60.7
2015 Q3 | 65.8 | 64.5 | 54.2 | 70.4 | 75.3 | .. | 64.5 | 64.9 | 66.8 | 72.3 | 74.9 | 66.3 | 59.2 | 68.7 | 67.3 | 66.6 | 62.6 | 82.8 | 79.4 | 57.6 | 69.3 | 42.6 | 59.7 | 70.8 | 70.3 | 50.6 | 76.4 | 65.6 | 64.6 | 71.8 | 31.6 | 60.0
2015 Q4 | 65.8 | 65.5 | 56.5 | 70.2 | 76.3 | .. | 66.5 | 64.1 | 67.3 | 72.5 | 73.3 | 65.5 | 57.3 | 67.5 | 65.9 | 63.9 | 62.6 | 76.4 | 80.5 | 59.8 | 69.5 | 41.3 | 60.3 | 72.4 | 71.9 | 56.8 | 76.5 | 62.4 | 63.3 | 72.5 | 32.0 | 61.7
2015 | 65.9 | 64.8 | 55.5 | 69.9 | 75.5 |  | 65.0 | 64.8 | 66.5 | 72.9 | 71.6 | 65.7 | 58.7 | 67.4 | 66.1 | 66.8 | 61.8 | 81.8 | 79.5 | 59.0 | 70.1 | 39.2 | 61.0 | 71.4 | 71.4 | 57.1 | 76.4 | 64.9 | 62.0 | 72.2 | 31.0 | 60.8
Notes: Data refer to the working-age population (15-64). Data are not adjusted for seasonal variations. Comparisons should therefore be made for the same quarters of each year, and not for successive quarters within a given year.
Source: European countries and Turkey: Labour Force Surveys (Eurostat); Australia, Canada, Israel, New Zealand: Labour Force surveys; Chile: Encuesta de Caracterización Socioeconómica Nacional (CASEN); Mexico: Encuesta Nacional de Ocupación y Empleo (ENOE); United States: Current Population Surveys.
StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933396361

Note

 1. The statistical data for Israel are supplied by and under the responsibility of the relevant Israeli authorities. The use of such data by the OECD is without prejudice to the status of the Golan Heights, East Jerusalem and Israeli settlements in the West Bank under the terms of international law.

Chapter 3.

The economic impact of migration: Why the local level matters¹

Much of the empirical evidence on the impact of migration in the host countries focuses on the national level, although it is at the local level where many of the relevant interactions with native-born actually occur. This is an important shortcoming, as one can expect significant variation in the local impact across areas, since immigrants are not evenly spread through the country, and their characteristics also tend to vary locally. This Chapter intends to provide a first step towards filling this important gap. It summarises the empirical literature on the local impact of migration on the labour and housing markets, as well as on local public infrastructure and local finances, together with some novel comparative data.

Introduction

Most analysis on the impact of immigration on the labour market and other areas has been concerned with the impact at the national level or the national average impact. After all, the national level is the level at which immigration policies are shaped. In addition, data are often only available at this level. While some empirical studies use sub-national data, they still tend to be concerned with the average effect across the country. The main reason for this is methodological as it allows researchers to increase the number of geographical units available and exploit the variation in the location patterns of migrants. In general, empirical studies on the impact of migration find little effect at the national level, for example on the labour market (see Longhi et al., 2006, 2010b) or in fiscal terms (OECD, 2013a). At the same time, public opinion tends to perceive the economic impact of migration often to be negative (see OECD and European Union, 2015).

How can these contradicting findings be reconciled? First of all, it is obviously the local level where contacts and possible competition between immigrants and the native-born are most direct and visible. Second, migrants² do not spread out equally across countries and tend to be quite heavily concentrated in certain areas. In all OECD countries, immigrants are overrepresented in urban areas (Figure 3.1), especially in metropolitan areas (Brezzi et al., 2010). What is more, immigrants with unfavourable background characteristics often tend to be concentrated in disadvantaged neighbourhoods within these urban areas (see OECD, 2006). This is due to a number of effects. A large part of the post-World War II low-skilled labour migration went to the industrial centres. At the time of the labour immigration, these were prosperous areas which have often suffered from economic restructuring – and indeed decline – since. Network effects contributed to further immigration inflows into these areas in spite of changing local economic conditions. In addition, cheap housing tends to be more readily available in these areas, thereby making the areas more easily accessible to persons at the lower end of the income distribution, such as immigrants and in particular recent arrivals. In such cases, although immigration is not the cause, there is a correlation between high immigrant concentration and poor local conditions which native-born might misinterpret as causality. More generally, immigrants are also attracted by metropolitan areas because of the perceived better job opportunities associated with the larger labour market.

Figure 3.1. Distribution of the population by population density and place of birth, 2013

Percentage of the working age population who live in densely populated or intermediate density areas

Notes: The Figure shows the percentage of population who live in densely and intermediate density areas, as defined by Eurostat. This percentage together would be a good approximation to the ‘urban population’. The rest of the population live in thinly populated areas, which would correspond to “rural population”. The data for Canada, the United States, Israel and Australia is not directly comparable with the data for the European countries.

Source: Authors calculations based on: European countries: Labour Force Survey; United States: Current Population Survey – Annual Social and Economic Supplement; Australia: Census; Canada: National Household Survey; Israel: Labour Force Survey.

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395554

In several European OECD countries with large immigrant populations, unemployment also tends to be higher in densely-populated areas than in rural areas (Figure 3.2). The rural-urban differences in unemployment rates are particularly large in Belgium, Austria, Germany, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands. A similar picture is found with respect to employment (Annex Figure 3.A1.1). In addition, the composition of the immigrant population also varies across regions (e.g. regarding duration of residence, educational attainments, age, and category of immigration), which might also lead to different effects in different regions. For example, in all of the above-mentioned countries with significantly higher unemployment among immigrants in urban areas, as well as in France, very low-educated immigrants are also disproportionately often found in such areas (Figure 3.3).

Figure 3.2. Difference between the unemployment rates of persons living in densely-populated areas and the persons living in intermediate or thinly-populated areas

Percentage points difference by place of birth, persons aged 15-64, 2013, selected European OECD countries

Source: Labour Force Surveys (Eurostat), 2013.

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395567

Figure 3.3. Difference in the share of very-low educated among persons living in densely populated areas and among persons living in intermediate or thinly populated areas

Percentage points difference by place of birth, persons aged 25-64, 2013, selected European OECD countries

Note: Very low-educated refers to levels 0 and 1 in the International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED).

Source: Labour Force Surveys (Eurostat), 2013.

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395570

Against this backdrop, looking at the national or average economic and labour market impact of migration conceals a diversity of outcomes. This holds especially if effects are non-linear – that is, if the impact increases disproportionately with the size of the immigrant population or if there are threshold effects. In this case, there may be a strong impact in a few areas with a very large immigrant concentration. Indeed, in contrast to most empirical studies, anecdotal evidence and qualitative studies often focus on such areas rather than the national average. The public opinion on the impact of migration might thus be influenced by such particular cases.

Immigration can affect many different aspects of the structure and daily life of a city or a region, both directly and indirectly. For example, an influx of migrants changes the effective labour supply in the local labour market and as a result, it has a direct effect on economic activity, local wages, employment and local demand for goods and services. Moreover, the bottom-line impact of immigration at the local level depends on possible subsequent adjustments like residential mobility (that is, outmigration by others), occupational and task mobility (that is, locals change occupations and tasks) and reallocation of resources that might follow from immigration.

In order to estimate the impact of migrants on a municipality or region, one needs to distinguish between general impacts that are associated with the migration-induced change in the size of the population and “migrant-specific” impacts (see for a discussion Tsang and Rohrm, 2011). In general, like every other additional citizen moving to a municipality, additional migrants increase the local demand for jobs, housing, goods and services and have therefore an impact on their provision. However, since migrants tend to differ in their characteristics and labour market outcomes, behaviours and preferences from the native-born population, there is likely to be a migrant-specific impact. Furthermore, migrants also have specific needs, e.g. in regard to integration measures such as language training which have an impact on the local infrastructure and budget.

This chapter provides an overview of the issues and a discussion of the main findings from the literature on the local impact of migration. It starts with the labour market, followed by the impact on housing, local public infrastructure, and on the local budget.³ Besides these economic aspects, immigration entails a wider societal impact, for example on the cultural life and the diversity of certain local amenities, such as restaurants. These issues are beyond the scope of this chapter.⁴

Main findings

In all OECD countries, immigrants are overrepresented in urban areas, often because of network effects and the perceived more easily available housing and larger number of job opportunities. At the same time, in many European countries with large immigrant populations such as Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, unemployment – both of immigrants and of the native-born – is higher in urban areas. In these countries, very low-educated immigrants are also overrepresented in urban areas.

Although it is difficult to generalise across domains (labour market, education, housing, etc.), overall the local impact of immigration tends to vary with the socio-economic characteristics of immigrants and how these compare with the native-born. It also differs among local native-born residents with different characteristics, and a negative impact – if any – is predominantly on those with similar characteristics. Immigrants can also have different needs and preferences regarding public services than the native-born, which results in effects on the different markets and public infrastructure which differ from that of native-born with otherwise similar characteristics.

The majority of empirical studies on the labour market impact of migration look at the aggregate or average local impact, rather than on concrete case studies. Most of these studies find no effect of immigration on local wages nor on employment, while a minority find a small effect, either negative or positive. This is due to a number of reasons. First, migrants’ skills often complement those of the native-born. Second, some native-born residents move up the occupational ladder in response to new foreign-born arrivals. Third, some previous residents move to other areas in reaction to new inflows. Fourth, any local impact is likely to be diluted by adjustment processes, for example changes in the industrial composition and production technologies as well as capital flows.

However, the absence of large aggregate or average effects does rule out threshold effects or other non-linearities. Indeed, the few available case studies suggest that there can be a substantive impact on the local labour market in cases of very high inflows.

Immigrants are less likely to own their homes than the native-born. The few studies show that the sign and the magnitude of the impact on the local housing market varie greatly. It depends on a number of factors including housing/rent and construction regulations, whether immigrants are predominantly high- or low-earners, and on the mobility response by previous residents. In contrast to public opinion, which often expresses concern over competition for social housing, immigrants are underrepresented in the social housing sector in most countries.

An important component of the local infrastructure are health services. The available evidence suggests that immigrants tend to consume less such services than the native-born. At the same time, they are important providers of health services, since they tend to be overrepresented among health care professionals.

Immigrants tend to use public transportation more often than the native-born.

Large inflows of immigrants can put pressure on local infrastructure, which is often not able to adapt quickly and thus lead to congestion effects. However, while immigration can exacerbate structural problems, notably in the local housing and education infrastructure, it is generally not the source of these.

In the school system, children of immigrants, especially recent arrivals, often require higher per-capita expenditure, notably because of language training support. Evidence suggests that a large concentration of children of immigrants with low-educated parents can lead to negative peer effects in classrooms. However, it is not the concentration of immigrants itself which is the issue, but the concentration of low-educated parents and its interaction with their immigrant status.

In contrast to what is generally observed at the national level, the fiscal impact of migration in local areas with high immigration tends to be negative, at least initially, largely because a disproportionate share of the services with a higher take-up by immigrants tends to be provided by subnational governments.

Labour market impact of immigration

Similarly to nation-wide impact analysis, for the analysis of the local impact of migration it is helpful to distinguish between the short and long-run effects. In the short run, the immediate impact of immigration would be expected to manifest itself at the narrowly-defined local labour market, like the district or the neighbourhood. However, immigration to a specific neighbourhood can generate commuting or other adjustments in the local labour market and thus make it difficult to measure any meaningful impact at the very local level. Nevertheless, the local labour market effects could still persist in the long run if there are obstacles that hinder spatial adjustment within commuting distance. There is an extensive literature that investigates the spatial segregation of vacancies and low-skill workers within cities, mainly as a result of extensive suburbanisation and poor intra-city transport connections which increase the cost of commuting (for an overview on the United States see Gobillon et al., 2007).

Looking at larger geographical entities like metropolitan areas or regions that might more adequately reflect local labour markets (OECD, 2000), the observable result induced by immigration would be the outcome of the adjustments that take place within that geographical entity. In the short run, inward immigration would generate an increase in the labour supply and trigger labour market adjustment processes that would depend on the local mix of skills and industries.

An extensive literature attempts to estimate the impact of migration on the labour market and results differ depending on the approach, the country and the geographical scale used. Most of the studies find no discernible effects on the wages and employment on average, and if there is any negative impact, this concentrates on low-skill workers, or past migrants. The geographical scale of the research should in principle affect the findings on the estimation of the relevant impact (see Box 3.1 for an overview of the concepts used in the empirical literature). As mentioned, adjustments like residential mobility, changes in the industrial composition and production technologies as well as capital flows could dilute any long-term impact of immigration on the local labour market (Borjas et al., 1997; Card, 2001). According to this reasoning, the smaller the geographical extent of the locality, the smaller the impact that is anticipated on average, since the spatial adjustments that take place would be stronger.

Box 3.1. Labour market data by spatial scale

Empirical research on the labour market impact of migration has examined various spatial scales. Most of the available evidence comes from the United States, where the spatial analysis has examined larger regional entities, like states or regions (Borjas et al., 1997; Borjas, 2003) or finer ones like metropolitan areas or cities (Borjas et al., 1997; Card, 2001; Card, 2009). For Europe, studies have looked to enlarged counties for Germany (Pischke and Velling, 1997), regions for the United Kingdom (Dustmann et al., 2013) or counties and municipalities for the Netherlands, Norway and the United Kingdom (Zorlu and Hartog, 2005). Longi et al. (2010b) argue that US studies tend to estimate smaller impacts of immigration compared to the European ones, due to the greater degree of openness and flexibility of the US local economies. Most of these geographical units are standard administrative entities, whose boundaries have been determined by historical or political reasons. Although there are still good reasons to use them, as policy decisions are taken at this level and statistical data are available, the urban labour market might have shifted beyond its initial boundaries. The advantage of using functional definitions of cities, like the Metropolitan Statistical Areas for the United States (Card, 2009) or the travel-to-work-areas in the United Kingdom (Nathan, 2011), is that they better approximate the local labour market, which might extend beyond the official boundaries.

Labour market services in many OECD countries have defined functional economic regions that correspond to labour markets regions which differ from administrative boundaries, for example the French Bassin Emploi or the German Arbeitsagenturbezirke and the UK Travel-to-work-Areas. The OECD, in collaboration with Eurostat, constructed a new methodology for identifying cities, in the form of Functional Urban Areas, that is comparable across all its member states and is based on population density and commuting flows (OECD, 2012).

The empirical evidence regarding the impact of immigration on mobility of previous residents in the local community is mixed. Card (2001) does not find evidence that immigration in US cities has a significant effect on residential mobility of native-born workers. At the same time, he finds a small impact on employers’ mobility. Pischke and Velling (1997) also find no significant relationship between immigration and subsequent mobility of natives for 167 German regions. Similarly, Lemos and Portes (2008) find no systematic pattern of native outflow when analysing the impact of immigration on UK regions, counties and districts. In contrast, Hatton and Tani (2005) find that immigration is correlated with higher internal mobility of native-born for 11 British regions. However, results are significant only for the southern regions where the share of immigrants is comparatively high. Ortega and Verdugo (2015) also find evidence of a strong mobility pattern in France, using administrative data covering three decades. Their results show that mobility is higher for blue collar workers in immigrant-intensive industries. Mocetti and Porello (2010) use data from Italy and find heterogeneous effects: immigration increases the inflow of the young and high-skilled natives to the area, and decreases the inflows of the lower-skilled. This suggests that internal migration of the native-born is an important adjustment mechanism that furthermore diffuses local labour market effects. It highlights that beyond the local effect, one has to take into consideration the general equilibrium effects, as migration to one locality may affect the population in other localities as well.

Borjas’ (2006) analysis for the United States suggests that internal migration of the native-born attenuates the measured impact of immigration on wages in a local labour market by 40 to 60%. Indeed, studies with narrower geographical definitions tend to estimate a smaller magnitude for the impact of migration (Longhi et al., 2010a). However, while there seems to be an impact on wages, the geographical size of the labour market does not seem to affect the findings on the employment impact of migration.

The “spatial approach” that looks at cities or regions in estimating the impact of immigration has been debated extensively, as it can potentially underestimate the true impact at the national level if native workers relocate to other cities or regions (see Box 3.2). Borjas (2003) proposes a national approach where the analysis looks at the impact of immigration at different skill groups. His findings suggest that immigration has a greater downward impact on wages than the one estimated with the spatial approach, with the elasticity in the range of 0.3-0.4. However, this approach has been criticised as it assumes that employers consider natives and migrants as perfects substitutes, although this might not be the case even when natives and migrants have similar education and experience. By relaxing this assumption, many studies find substantially lower estimates for the negative effect on wages of the low-skilled, while there is a positive effect on the wages of the high-skilled (Ottaviano and Peri, 2012 for the United States; Manacorda et al., 2012 for the United Kingdom).

Box 3.2. Estimating the impact of migration on the labour market: the role of infra-national data

It is difficult to estimate the true relationship between migration and local labour market outcomes, since not only migration affects the local labour market but the reserve is also true, since local labour market conditions affect the scale and type of migration. If immigrants select to settle disproportionally in cities or regions that are booming and have higher employment rate and wages, then any adverse effects of migration might be underestimated in the empirical analysis. In order to address this issue and find estimates closer to the true impact of immigration, the literature has employed two main approaches. The standard approach has been to use historical patterns of migration that are less influenced by current local labour market conditions. Since migrants tend to follow, at least to a significant degree, past patterns of migration when they settle locally, researchers consider the historical geographical distribution of migrants in order to predict current migratory influxes (Altonji and Card, 1991; Card, 2009; Nathan, 2011). Dustmann et al. (2005) use long time lags of the migration shares across 17 UK regions and find no impact of immigration on wages or employment of the natives. For the US Metropolitan Statistical Areas, Card (2001) finds evidence of small adverse employment effects to the low-skilled natives from immigration. Nathan (2011) applies a similar approach for 79 primary urban travel-to-work areas in the United Kingdom and finds a positive effect on wages, particularly of the high-skilled natives, and a negative effect on employment of the low-skilled natives.

This approach has been criticised since previous waves of migrant flows might have been based on anticipation of future local economic conditions. In order to address these concerns, alternative instruments have been used to predict geographical patterns of migration, like ports and land borders as plausible entry points in a country (Ottaviano and Peri, 2006; Bellini et al., 2013). Ottaviano and Perri (2006) use the distance of US cities from Miami, New York and Los Angeles, in order to predict their share of immigrants.* They find that the share of foreign-born in employment is positively related with the average prevailing wages in the city.

The alternative approach that the literature has used is to examine natural experiments that have drastically increased the migration flow into an area. This literature is much more limited and, because of the specific local contacts, difficult to generalize. Card (1990) examined the influx of 125 000 Cuban migrants in Miami after a change of policy in Cuba in 1980. The so-called “Mariel boatlift” increased the migrant population of Miami by 7%, but Card (1990) found no significant impact on native labour market outcomes, even for the low-skilled or earlier waves of Cubans. Besides examining natives’ outward mobility as a plausible explanation, subsequent research has suggested that this puzzling outcome might be due to adoption of labour-intensive production technologies by local employers that made use of the increased supply of cheap labour (Lewis, 2004). Other natural experiments that have been studied are the repatriation of the Algerian pieds noirs to France in 1962 (Hunt, 1992) or the retornados from Angola and Mozambique to Portugal (Carrington and di Lima, 1996), as well as immigration from former Yugoslavia to Western Europe in the 1990s following the conflicts during the separation of the country (Angrist and Kugler, 2003). A recent study by Balkan and Tumen (2015) looked at the impact of displaced Syrians in Turkey’s border regions with Syria on prices and labour market outcomes. They find that while prices fell significantly in sectors that (informally) employ Syrian refugees, wages and employment of natives were not negatively affected.

The papers discussed above measure local effects for different educational and occupational levels by comparing the evolution of wages in an area that received high numbers of migrants to the evolution of wages in other areas with less immigration. However, such measures can be biased for a number of reasons.

First, the mentioned possibility that immigration causes the outflow of natives to other areas, but also the inflow of natives to this area from other regions, can be changing the composition of the local population. Consider the following example: as a response to high immigration, within each education category, high-wage natives move to other areas, whereas the low-wage natives stay. The average wage of natives will be perceived to have fallen, because the composition of the population is now different. Even if stayers enjoy a modest rise in their wages, the observed average wage of natives is lower. One would thus wrongly conclude that migration caused wages to fall, while in fact wages have increased. Ortega and Verdugo (2015) tackle this issue by looking at whether migration caused an outflow of natives, and if so, whether predominantly high- or low educated natives changed location. They indeed find strong evidence that low-educated natives are more likely to leave the area as a response to increased immigration than those with higher education. Thus, simply comparing pre- and post-immigration wages without accounting for the mobility of natives and their wage structure is likely to produce misleading results about the impact of immigrants on local wages.

Second, natives’ response to migration can be to move up the task or occupation ladder. For example, a native carpenter could hire an immigrant carpenter to take over his and her manual tasks and then spend more time on sales, marketing or business development. Evidence of such upward task mobility among natives has been found in Switzerland (Beerli and Peri, 2015), the United States (Peri and Sparber, 2009), in Denmark (Foged and Peri, 2015) and more generally in Europe (D’Amuri and Peri, 2014). These studies find that low-skilled natives move from manually-intensive occupations to more communication-intensive occupations, where they have a comparative advantage vis-a-vis immigrants. Thus, simply comparing wages within each occupation is also prone to a downward bias, as those natives who did not move up to a different occupation might have been the ones with lower wages to begin with.

Third, if an area’s wages change greatly compared to other areas in the country, there are general equilibrium effects that will push them towards the level of the rest of the country. Localised shocks can have an impact on the rest of the economy through changes in employment, wages and local prices (Moretti, 2011). For example, if natives leave as a reaction to local labour market shocks, it might equalize wages across locations. Immigration will then not have a local but a national impact, as discussed in Borjas (2006). Furthermore, even in the absence of labour mobility, if there is capital or product mobility, non-immigration areas will be affected, thus dampening the initial local area effect. Given that within a country, labour, product and capital are considered relatively mobile, the general equilibrium response is plausible. This response implies that the local effect is dissipated nation-wide, thus limiting the scope for measuring it at the local level.

* The hypothesis is that the foreign-born share is exogenous since it is based on the predetermined physical distance of the cities, rather than the current economic situation.

Several studies have attempted to combine an analysis of the impact on the various skill groups with a regional approach (Card, 2009; Dustmann et al., 2013; Ortega and Verdugo, 2014). Typically, this literature does not look specifically at the local impact but uses the variation across regions to identify average effects. Often, rather than focusing on skill groups for such analysis, occupational groups have been used. Studies for UK regions tend to find a small downward impact of immigration on wages in elementary service occupations (Nickell and Salehen, 2009; Gordon and Kaplanis, 2014). The advantage of using occupational groups rather than educational groups is that this way captures more accurately where the migrant workers are actually placed in the local labour market and what jobs they do that might not correspond to their formal qualifications.⁵ Therefore, a comparison of the migrants with natives who hold similar formal qualification levels could be problematic, since migrants might not compete with them but with natives with lower qualifications, at least initially. Dustmann et al. (2013) argue that the initial skills downgrading of migrant workers might blur the estimates of the impact of migration found in previous studies. In their analysis for 17 UK regions, they take into account that migrants and natives might not compete within the same skill group and find that immigration has a negative effect for those natives with low wages and a slight positive effect for those natives with high wages. Overall, there is a small positive impact on the average native wage.

Table 3.1 summarises the results of the literature on the labour market impact of immigration. The first panel looks at the impact on natives’ wages from 1 percentage point rise in the immigrant share of the labour force, while the second panel at the impact on employment or unemployment rates of natives. The results vary substantially from study to study, depending on country-specific characteristics, the geographical definitions used and the reference period of the study. Overall, the estimated impact tends to be insignificant, while some studies find small effects (both negative and positive, depending on the study). The magnitude tends to be larger if estimated at the national level and is more pronounced on the low-skilled end, whereas the high-skilled sometimes tend to benefit. Given the variation in results, research that uses meta-analysis has tried to make findings comparable in a consistent way. Longhi et al. (2005) reviewed 18 comparable empirical studies and found that with a 1 percentage point increase of the proportion of immigrants in the workforce, local wages fall just 0.12%. Since migrants often only constitute a relatively small part of the population, this would imply an almost negligible fall in the wages. A recent meta-analysis by Kerr and Kerr (2011) updates the list of papers estimating the effect of immigration on wages. Results from more recent papers are very similar to Longhi et al. (2005). Of the 28 countries and studies reviewed, 13 find no significant effect, 7 find a small positive effect (0.01% is the highest positive impact found) and 8 find a small negative effect. A similar meta-analysis for employment has shown that a 1 percentage point increase in the share of immigrants has an almost negligible impact on the native employment, reducing it by 0.024% (Longhi et al., 2006). Overall, only about half of studies found a downward effect on wages or employment that is statistically significant at the 10% level (Longhi et al., 2010b).

It is clear that is difficult to make comparisons across countries and studies, but a comparison is more meaningful for the studies that use similar methodologies for different spatial scales. Borjas (1997) finds that the effects are smaller in magnitude for cities, possibly due to the mentioned mobility response of natives, and get stronger for states and regions.

As mentioned, an important shortcoming of most studies is that they predominantly look at average effects, and only few studies compare the effects across regions. However, it is possible that the effects are non-linear – that is, the impact increases disproportionately with the size of the immigrant population. In this case, there may be a strong impact in a few areas with a very large immigrant concentration.

Table 3.1. Overview of studies on the labour market impact of migration using national and sub-national data
A. Impact on wages of native-born
Country | Reference Period | Author(s) | Year of publication | Spatial level | Impact of a 1 percentage point increase in the immigrant share of the labour force
Australia | 1982-96 | Addison and Worswick | 2002 | States (6) | No significant impact
Austria | 1988-91 | Winter-Ebmer and Zweimüller | 1996 | Regions (93) | +2.1% to +3.7% (for young native blue collar workers)
France | 1962, 1968 | Hunt | 1992 | National; Major Regions (9); Regions (21) | No significant impact
France | 1976-2007 | Ortega and Verdugo | 2015 | Commuting zones (297 zones d’emploi) | -0.36% (for low-educated natives in non-tradable sectors)
Israel | 1990-1994 | Friedberg | 2001 | National | No significant impact
Italy | 1986-95 | Gavosto et al. | 1999 | Regions (20) | +0.1%
Netherlands | 1997-98 | Zorlu and Hartog | 2005 | Municipalities (548) | -0.4% to +0.6%
Norway | 1989, 1996 | Zorlu and Hartog | 2005 | Counties (19) | +0.2% to + 0.9%
Portugal | 1974-76 | Carrington and de Lima | 1996 | Districts (18) | No significant impact
Spain | 1989-92 | Dolado et al. | 1996 | Provinces (50) | +0.03% to +0.05%
Spain | 1991-2002 | Carrasco et al. | 2008 | National; Regions (17) | No significant impact
Switzerland | 1999-2007 | Beerli and Peri | 2015 | Regions | No significant impact
United Kingdom | 1992-2000 | Dustmann et al. | 2005 | Regions (17) | No significant impact
United Kingdom | 1997-98 | Zorlu and Hartog | 2005 | Counties (66) | No significant impact
United Kingdom | 1997-2005 | Dustmann et al. | 2013 | Regions (17) | -0.5% in 1st wage decile. +0.6% for wages at the median. +0.4% in 9th wage decile.
United States | 1979-85 | Card | 1990 | City (Miami) | No significant impact
United States | 1960-90 | Borjas et al. | 1997 | Cities (Metropolitan Statistical Areas) | No significant impact
United States | 1989 | Card | 2001 | Cities (175 largest Metropolitan Statistical Areas) | -0.04% to 0.6%
United States | 1960-2000 | Borjas | 2003 | National | -0.4% to -0.3%
United States | 1990-2006 | Ottaviano and Peri | 2012 | National | +0.6% to +1.7% (for low educated natives)
United States | 1972-1983 | Peri and Yasenov | 2015 | City (Miami) | No effect
United States | 1960-2000 | Peri and Sparber | 2009 | States | +0.03%
Western Germany | 1996-2001 | Glitz | 2012 | Labour market regions (112) | No significant impact
Meta-analysis (multiple studies)
18 studies for various OECD countries |  | Longhi et al. | 2005 | Various | No significant impact
22 studies for various OECD countries |  | Kerr and Kerr | 2011 | Various | 9 studies: no significant impact; 6 studies: positive impact, but less than 0.1%; 7 studies: negative impact, near zero.

Table 3.1. Overview of studies on the labour market impact of migration using national and sub-national data (cont.)
B. Impact on employment and unemployment
Country | Reference Period | Author(s) | Year of publication | Spatial level | Impact of a 1 percentage point increase in the immigrant share of the labour force
Australia | 1982-96 | Addison and Worswick | 2002 | States (6) | U: no significant impact
France | 1962 | Hunt | 1992 | Regions (21) | U: +0.2%
France | 1976-2007 | Ortega and Verdugo | 2015 | Commuting zones (297 zones d’emploi) | E: no significant impact (of low-educated immigrants on native blue-collar workers)
Portugal | 1974-76 | Carrington and de Lima | 1996 | National | U: +0.24% E: no significant impact
Spain | 1989-92 | Dolado et al. | 1996 | Provinces (50) | E: no effect for low skilled, positive effect (0.05%) on total employment
Spain | 1991 and 2001 | Carrasco et al. | 2008 | Regions (17) | E: no effect
United Kingdom | 1983-2000 | Dustmann et al. | 2005 | Regions (17) | U: no significant impact
United States | 1989 | Card | 1990 | City (Miami) | U: no significant impact
United States | 1972-79 | Peri and Yasenov | 2015 | City (Miami) | E: no effect U: no effect
United States | 1970-80 | Altonji and Card | 1991 | Metropolitan Statistical Areas | E and U: no significant effect, at all skill levels
United States | 1985-90 | Card | 2001 | Cities (175 largest Metropolitan Statistical Areas) | E: -0.05% to -0.1%
Western Germany | 1985-89 | Pischke and Velling | 1997 | Regions (167 labour market regions) | E and U: no significant impact
Western Germany | 1996-2001 | Glitz | 2012 | Labor market regions (112) | E: -0.13% to -0.35%
various EU countries | 1983-99 | Angrist and Kugler | 2003 | National | E:-0.07% to -0.02%
Meta-analysis (multiple studies)
9 studies for various OECD countries |  | Longhi et al. | 2006 | Various | E: -0.024% (unweighted mean) range: -0.39% to 6.2%
Note: W = wages, E = Employment rate, U = Unemployment rate.
Source: See References at the end.

This is an underexplored issue on which further research is needed. Indeed, the few studies that have looked into this issue suggest that for areas that have experienced large influxes of immigrants, the impact can indeed be quite substantive. For example, estimates by Card (2001) suggest that, in cities like Los Angeles and Miami that saw large increases in their immigrant flows during 1985-90 of mainly low-skilled migrants, the wages were reduced by up to 3% for low-skilled occupations. Ottaviano and Peri (2006), in contrast, find that the increase in the share of the foreign-born by 25 percentage points in Los Angeles during 1970-90 has been associated with an increase in average wages of the natives by 14.5%.

There are fewer studies examining the effect of migration on employment or unemployment rates. The majority of studies tend to find no or only a small negative impact on the employment rate. Again, although the average effect is often small, when one looks at the cities or regions that accounted for the bulk of the immigrant inflow, the estimated impact has been often larger. For example, Hunt (1992) argues that the estimated impact from 1 percentage point increase in the proportion of French repatriates raised unemployment on average by 0.2 percentage points. Hence, in departments such as Var, where the share of repatriates increased by 7 percentage points between 1962 and 1968, unemployment increased by up to 1.4 percentage points.

The impact of migration on housing

Overview

Even though the majority of studies on the local impact of migration focus on the labour market, its impact on housing is an important issue as well, not least because housing costs account for a significant proportion of many households’ budgets. Furthermore, many native-born see immigrants as direct competitors when it comes to the availability of affordable housing in their cities. For instance, a YouGov poll from June 2013 has shown that the British perceived migration to be the biggest cause of housing shortages. The impact of migration on the availability of affordable housing in the United Kingdom was perceived to be greater than the impact of the economic downturn or other factors such as the lack of available social housing or the lack of government investment into new homes (Duffy and Frere-Smith, 2014). On the other hand, immigrant workers are overrepresented in the construction sector in most countries (OECD, 2009) and thus also contribute to the construction of new housing. Furthermore, data have shown that in the large majority of countries, immigrants occupy on average fewer rooms per person than the native-born (Figure 3.4). The difference is particularly large in countries such as Ireland, Luxemburg, Spain, and the United Kingdom, where persons in native-born households occupy at least half a room more than persons in immigrant households. The only countries where persons in immigrant households have more rooms at their disposal than persons in native-born household are Poland and the Slovak Republic, which have small immigrant populations (OECD and European Union, 2015).

Figure 3.4. Average number of rooms per occupant by immigration status of the household, selected OECD countries, 2013

Notes: “immigrant household” refers to households where all heads of household are foreign-born. Children are considered as half a person. Rooms considered include only bedrooms and living-rooms. The OECD average is the average of all countries presented in the chart.

Source: European countries: Survey on Income and Living Conditions 2013 (Eurostat); United States: American Community Survey 2013.

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395589

Thus far, most studies on this topic have looked into the impact of migration on rents and housing prices. The first part of this section will deal with these two points. Another important issue is the impact on social housing and possible competition with native-born, which is covered in the second part. With the current large inflows of asylum seekers into many European OECD countries, the issue accommodation of asylum seekers and the incurring costs for the host municipalities are of specific importance and will be dealt with in the third part of this section. There are also several other issues related to housing such as the segregation and housing quality. While clearly linked with housing, these issues are mainly related to the question of how well migrants are integrated in their host country’s society and are therefore beyond the scope of this paper.

As has been the case for the labour market, when looking at the impact of immigration on housing it is important to account for the fact that the concentration of immigrants varies strongly from city to city and even between neighbourhoods of the same city. Again similar to the labour market impact, higher levels of immigration might trigger outward-migration of natives to other neighbourhoods or municipalities, which also impacts on housing demand and prices at the local scale (see Sá, 2014). Furthermore, it is generally the local authorities who are responsible for the provision of social housing and the accommodation of refugees and asylum seekers. For all these reasons, outcomes at the local level might differ significantly from the aggregated national outcomes.

The bulk of literature comes from long-standing migration countries and settlement countries like the United States, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and (to a lesser extent) Germany and Switzerland. Most of the studies only cover one country (or even only one city) at the time; there has been no comprehensive international comparative study to date.

Impact on housing demand, housing prices and rents

Migration affects housing demand, since newly arrived immigrants require accommodation and emigrants leave vacancies. In combination with an upward-sloping housing supply, this increase of demand will lead to an increase in house prices and rents and the construction of new housing units in the long run. In places where the housing supply is price-inelastic, an increase in migration is expected to translate into larger increases in the housing prices than in places where the housing supply can more easily expand. However, as just mentioned, in the longer run, immigration might also cause some outward-migration by previous residents, which can at least partially offset the initial increase in population size caused by migration, and thus dampen the impact on the housing market (Sá, 2014).

More generally, there are significant differences in the impact of migration on both house prices and rents between the short- and the long-term. Since housing supply tends to be rather inelastic in the short term, the impact of migration appears to be larger in the short term (Saiz, 2003a), while studies which focus on the long-term impact tend to find a smaller impact (Stillman and Maré, 2008; Akbari and Aydede, 2012; Greulich et al., 2004).

Housing prices are not only affected by changes in the population, but also by other factors such as interest rates and the economic situation of the local area. This economic situation itself affects migration (and vice versa), which makes it difficult to establish causality between these variables. For example, newly-arrived labour migrants tend to locate in regions with good economic prospects and thus with likely rising housing prices for the near future. In contrast, the inflow of immigrants might also influence the economic expectations of natives which can in turn affect their housing decisions (Fry, 2014). Furthermore, if immigration causes outward-migration of previous residents, this will change the composition of the local population. If the inward migrants have other preferences and or financial means than the out-movers, this can affect housing demand via an income effect (Sá, 2014).

In order to capture the effect of migration on house prices (and rents), most studies use an empirical model similar to the one used by Saiz (2003b, 2007) which considers initial city characteristics, changes in city attributes and national trends and economic variables (see Box 3.3). Furthermore, many studies discussed in this section make use of an instrumental variable approach to address the issue that migration itself might be endogenous to the evolution of housing prices, for example if migrants prefer to settle in areas with lower house price inflation. However, the studies differ significantly in the level of geographic disaggregation used and range from the regional to the neighbourhood level.

Box 3.3. A model of the impact of migration on housing prices

The first systematic studies looking at the influence of immigration on housing values and rents in an analytical way using an empirical model were by Saiz (2003b, 2007). His empirical model was subsequently adapted by many other studies. The model takes the following form for a number of cities (subscript k) and years (subscript t):

The dependent variable is the annual change in the log of rents. By taking differences in the rent series, the model eliminates the impact of city-specific characteristics that account for rent levels and might be correlated with immigrant settlement pattern. The main independent variable is the annual inflow of immigrants, divided by the initial population (that is, prior to the inflow). β has an intuitive interpretation as the percentage point change in rents if there is an immigrant inflow equal to 1% of the city’s original population. Xk stands for a vector of initial city attributes such as the crime rate, local amenities and other factors such as the initial share of population with a bachelor’s degree. Wkt-1 stands for lagged city characteristics such as the local unemployment rate and ΔZkt-1 stands for changes in city attributes like changes in local income. Finally, Λt are year dummies which capture national trends in inflation and other national economic variables.

Studies that looked at the effect of migration on housing prices find on average that for each one percentage point increase in the immigrant share in the population, house prices increase between 0% in Canada (Akbari et al., 2012) to 1.6% in Spain and 2.7% in Switzerland. The largest positive impact of migration on housing prices was found at the regional level in Switzerland and Spain.⁶ Degen and Fischer (2010) conducted a study for 85 Swiss districts and found that from 2001 to 2006, a one percentage point increase of immigrants in a given district is associated with a 2.7% increase in prices for single-family homes. The overall immigration effect for single-family houses captured therefore almost two-thirds of the total house price increase in this time period. Gonzales and Ortega (2013) found a slightly smaller effect of immigration on housing prices in Spanish provinces. The average Spanish province received between 1998 and 2008 an immigrant inflow equal to 17% of its initial working-age population. They find that a 1 percentage point increase in the share of immigrants raises housing prices by 1 to 1.6% in the following year and increases the number of dwellings by 0.8 to 1%.

Smaller positive effects were found in studies for Canada and New Zealand, which all used census data for their calculations. Akbari and Aydede (2012), looking at Canadian census divisions⁷ for the years 1996 to 2006, found that recently-arrived migrants had no impact on housing prices and that only immigrants who had been in the country for more than ten years have had a significant, but very small impact. They suggest that out-migration of natives or the increased supply of housing might explain these small effects. A study by Stillman and Maré (2008), which looked at the house prices at regional level in New Zealand, found that in general a 1% increase in a region’s population was associated with a 0.2 to 0.5% increase in local housing prices. In their study, immigration had no impact on housing prices on a local level, although there appears to be a correlation on the national level. In contrast, New Zealanders returning to the country increase housing prices. A 1 percentage point increase of returning nationals is associated with a 6% to 9% increase in local housing prices.⁸

In contrast to the studies discussed above which look at larger areas, available studies for the municipality and neighbourhood level show different outcomes in regard to the impact of migration on house prices, in both magnitude and sign. Table 3.2 summarises the results. A study carried out by Sá (2014), using data for 2004 to 2010 disaggregated by local authority, found that migration to the United Kingdom had in fact a negative effect on housing prices. An increase in the immigrant share of the local population by 1 percentage point reduced house prices by 1.7%. This effect was mainly driven by areas with a high concentration of low-educated immigrants and out-migration of natives with higher wages.

Table 3.2. Empirical studies on the impact of immigration on housing prices

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933396377

As for the United States, Saiz and Wachter (2011) look at different neighbourhoods in metropolitan areas and find that between 1980 and 2000, housing values have grown more slowly in neighbourhoods with increasing immigrant density. Like Sá (2014), Saiz and Wachter (2011) relate this outcome to the phenomenon of “native flight” where natives move out of neighbourhoods in which the shares of low-educated, non-white immigrants increase. The same results were found by Saiz (2011), who examined the impact of Hispanic immigration into US cities. While he found that on a metropolitan area level, a rise in the Hispanic population led to an increase in house prices, the opposite holds on the neighbourhood level. Neighbourhoods with increasing Hispanic share experienced comparatively slower house price appreciations. He argues that this is due to the forming of enclaves that other residents consider to be less attractive places to live.

Figure 3.5 shows the share of foreign-born household among owner-occupied and rented dwellings at market rate in OECD countries. On average, foreign-born households account for about 10% of the owner-occupied housing and for about 20% of rentals at market price. Indeed, in the large majority of OECD countries, immigrants are less likely to be home owners than natives. Figure 3.6 shows that on average in the OECD, 46% of immigrants are home owners, compared with 67% of natives. In most countries, adjusting for immigrants’ age and income reduces the gap, but in the large majority of OECD countries, differences in home ownership remain.

Figure 3.5. Share of immigrant households among all owner-occupied and rented dwellings, 2012

As a percentage of all dwellings

Notes: “immigrant household” refers to households where at least one of the heads of household is foreign-born.

1. For these countries “immigrant households” refers to households where all heads are foreign-born.

Source: European countries: Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (Eurostat) 2012; Australia: Census on Population and Housing 2011; Canada: National Household Survey 2011; Israel: Household Expenditure Survey 2012; New Zealand: Household Economic Survey 2013; United States: American Community Survey 2012.

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395596

Figure 3.6. Immigrant households renting at a reduced-rate rent, 2012

Note: “Immigrant household” refers to households where all heads of household are foreign-born.

Source: OECD and European Union (2015); European countries: Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (Eurostat) 2012; Canada: National Household Survey 2011; Israel: Household Expenditure Survey 2012.

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395608

In many countries, renting markets are regulated. This might distort the effects of migration on rent levels and makes it difficult to estimate the real impact of migration. For example, Switzerland applies a system of so-called cost rents (Kostenmiete). Landlords can only raise rents for existing tenancy agreements if their maintenance costs are increasing, but not in response to increased demand. This can lead to lock-in effects, little turn-over and high competition for the small share of vacant apartments with the result of disproportionally high rents for new tenants. Therefore, in Switzerland, migration is likely to increase rental prices since competition only takes place for a small share of new or vacant apartments while tenants with an existing rent agreement still benefit from their “old” low rents (Schellenbauer, 2011).⁹

There are a number of studies which looked at the impact of migration on rents in the United States. One of the first studies was conducted by Saiz (2003a), who focused on the short-term effects of the mentioned Mariel boatlift on rents in Miami between 1987 and 1981, which increased the renter population by 9%. He found that rental prices increased by 8 to 11% during this period. In 1983, the differential increase was still 7%. Units that were occupied by poor Hispanic renters in 1979 experienced the highest rent hikes, while units in the highest quartile of the Miami rent distribution were not affected. Greulich et al. (2004) found that monthly housing expenses were higher in metropolitan areas with larger immigrant populations. In addition, native-born households in areas with large immigrant populations also consumed fewer rooms and were more likely to reside in crowded apartments than natives residing in areas with smaller immigrant populations. However, the effects on both rent and overcrowding were comparable for both native households in direct competition with immigrants (due to similar housing patterns) and native households that were less likely to compete with migrants in the housing market. These findings thus indicate that immigration had only a small impact on the housing outcomes of the native-born (Greulich et al., 2004).

At the national level, studies suggest that immigration tends to be associated with an increase in housing prices, whereas the few studies on the local level show that the sign of the impact on the local housing prices varies.

Impact on social housing

In most countries, the housing market is not only composed of rented or owner-occupied property. Another distinct part of the housing market is social housing, which captures all kind of tenancies which are owned and supplied or subsidised by the state, the municipalities or independent organisations, such as housing associations (Andrews et al., 2011). In general, it refers to housing that is rented at below-market rates and/or allocated by some administrative procedure instead of market mechanisms.

Across OECD countries, the structure of social housing systems varies highly. The governance of social housing is usually shared between the national and sub-national levels. In general, national governments are responsible for the overall policies and the budget, while the local governments are responsible for the programme implementation and housing allocation. In regard to migrants, the access to the public housing system differs from country to country and sometimes even within countries, since it is often the municipal level which is responsible for the allocation of social housing.

The share of social housing among tenancies differs significantly, both across and within countries. In many countries, there seems to be a positive correlation between the size of the city and the proportion of social housing (see Fougère et al., 2011 for France). Overall, social housing in OECD countries is typically concentrated in older industrialised cities and within these, in the periphery – reflecting the availability of low-cost land (Andrews et al., 2011). This concentration of social housing in specific areas and neighbourhoods in combination with targeted needs-based allocation systems can lead to spatial segregation, which is often mentioned as an issue when it comes to migrants and social housing.

In contrast to housing prices and rents, there is only little literature so far which deals with the implications of immigration on social housing. The few available studies focus on different aspects of social housing and therefore do not allow for direct cross-country comparisons as it is the case for house prices and rents. That notwithstanding, the available literature provides some important insights regarding the relations between immigration, public housing and public opinion.

Social housing is a particularly important issue because it is an area where immigrants and natives tend to be in more direct and visible competition than in other areas. In the short-run, social housing supply is inelastic and one more migrant household living in social housing translates into one less native household. Therefore, the consumption of social housing by migrants tends to be more visible for the public than the consumption of other welfare benefits (Battiston et al., 2014). This is even more the case, since unlike for housing supply allocated by the market, more demand for social housing does not necessarily translate into more supply even in the long term. The amount of available social housing is not set by the market but by political decisions of the national or local governments. In addition, even in cities with a large supply of social housing, natives might see new immigrants as rivals for social housing if most units are already occupied and there is little turn-over. Hence, the demand will concentrate on a small share of the social housing stock (which is already a small section of the total housing sector) and – at least in the short term – queues will build up. The competition for social housing becomes even more an issue in times of recession, when many OECD countries experience social housing shortages in general. Furthermore, in many countries immigrants are overrepresented in the lowest decile of the household income distribution and social housing allocation is needs-based in most countries.

The direct rivalry about access to social housing and its inelasticity in regard to higher demand might have important implications for the public opinion about migration. In the United Kingdom, migrants are seen as one of the main reasons for social housing shortages (Duffy and Frere-Smith, 2014). Furthermore, native-born even feel discriminated against when it comes to the allocation of social housing. According to a Citizenship Survey, more than 20% of white Britons stated that they were treated worse than people of other races by social landlords. This perception to be discriminated against was significantly elss in regard to the education and health systems and vis-à-vis private landlords (Battiston et al., 2014).

Such sentiments have contributed to policies which aimed at making the access to social housing more difficult for immigrants in the United Kingdom. In 2013, the government passed a statutory guidance on social housing allocations for local authorities, which was meant to “address concerns that the system favours households who have little connection to the local area over local people” (Department for Communities and Local Government, 2013). The guidance recommends a residency requirement of at least two years. Austria made social housing available to foreigners only in 2006 to comply with EU legislation.

The share of reduced-rent rentals inhabited by migrants varies greatly across countries and reflects to a large degree the population share of immigrants: while in Luxembourg, 61% of all reduced-rent rentals are occupied by immigrant households, it is less than 5% in countries such as Hungary, Portugal or the Czech Republic. On average, the share is slightly higher than the population share of immigrants. However, considering that immigrants are more likely to be tenants, they are on average actually underrepresented in social housing on average in the OECD (Figure 3.6). In the OECD, on average 13% of rentals rent at reduced rates are inhabited by migrant households, while it is 18% of all market-price rentals (OECD and European Union, 2015). For example, and in stark contrast to the mentioned public perception in the United Kingdom, already prior to the 2013 guidance immigrant tenants were almost 20 percentage points less likely than their native-born peers to live in subsidized housing.¹⁰

Only a handful of OECD countries, namely Finland, France, Germany and Canada, have an overrepresentation of immigrants among reduced-rate rentals. What is more, when considering the fact that immigrants tend to be concentrated in cities with a higher incidence of social housing, this overrepresentation is greatly diminished or disappears. For France, Fougère et al. (2011) looked at the housing of immigrants at the municipal level and found that in large cities, the probability of immigrants living in social housing was actually lower than that of the native-born.

The recent strong increase in asylum applications in many countries poses a number of challenges for the receiving countries and municipalities, especially in regards to housing (Box 3.4). Most asylum seekers arrive in their host countries only with little means of their own and are in many countries accommodated by the state (or rather the municipalities) in specific facilities until their asylum cases are decided.

The impact of migration on public infrastructure

An inflow of migrants to a region does not only affect house prices, rents and the consumption of social housing, but also the general public infrastructure and public services such the education and health systems, and public transport. Like any other additional person moving into a municipality, immigrants increase the local demand for public services and have therefore an impact on their provision. However, as already mentioned, if migrants differ in their behaviour and preferences from the native-born population, there might also be a migrant-specific impact on the consumption of the different public goods.

Box 3.4. Specific issues related to the housing of asylum seekers

In most European countries, asylum seekers are accommodated in public reception centres until their cases are decided.* In other countries, such as the United States and Australia, asylum seekers are supposed to find housing independently after they are released from the initial detention centres.

As for countries which accommodate asylum seekers in reception centres, larger inflows have resource implications since governments have to provide more accommodation capacities. Yet, there are differences regarding responsibilities for the financing of these capacities. While in countries such as Belgium, France, Greece, Sweden or the United Kingdom, it is the central government’s task to provide the financial means, in other countries such as Austria or Italy, the financial burden is shared between the national level and regional (in the case of Austria) or local authorities (in the case of Italy). In Germany, the costs are shared between the federal, regional and the local level. The federal states receive a fixed amount of money per month from the central government for each asylum seeker they receive. The states forward this money to the local authorities either in the form of an annual lump sum per asylum seeker or via a case-by-case reimbursement scheme. Where the lump-sum payment does not cover the full expenses for accommodation, subsistence and integration, local authorities are expected to cover the rest from their own budget. Financially speaking, the housing of asylum seekers thus affects municipalities in different OECD countries with reception centres to a varying degree.

Several OECD countries seek to distribute – or disperse – asylum seekers in locations evenly across the country to ensure an equal distribution of the costs of hosting asylum seekers (Annex Table 3.A1.1). In practice, however, even in countries with dispersal policies, asylum seekers are not equally distributed. This holds especially in countries that maintain collective reception centres, as not all municipalities have such reception centres.

Due to a lack of capacities in reception centres, many municipalities faced with a strong increase in asylum figures use hotels, schools, military barracks or even tents as emergency accommodations (EMN, 2014). The result is often overcrowding or otherwise inadequate housing conditions.

* For a detailed discussion, see EMN (2014).

Across OECD countries, arrangements vary with regard to local responsibilities for the provision and financing of public services. For example in the education system, in some countries like the United States, schools are administrated by local school boards and jointly financed by the local, state and federal level.¹¹ Schools in the United Kingdom are administrated by the local government authorities, but financed through grants by the central government. In Germany on the other hand, both the funding and organisation of schooling is a regional (Länder) responsibility. However, even if municipalities are not responsible themselves for the provision and financing of a specific public good, increasing numbers of immigrants still have a local impact, especially where there is competition in consumption and where the supply is fixed or inelastic in the short term. In most cases, it takes some time (and money) for services to expand to cope with higher demand.

There are several studies which analyse the impact of migrants on infrastructure at both the local and the aggregated national level. In addition, the bulk of the literature on the impact of migration on the public infrastructure to date has been qualitative or anecdotal. The scarce empirical literature mainly relates to the United States, Canada and the United Kingdom.

Impact on the school system

Immigrant students do not only add to the number of pupils in the classroom, but may also need additional help, such as intensive language training or – in the case of refugee children – psychological support. Particularly when there is a sudden inflow of newly-arrived children, as recently experienced by several European OECD countries in the context of the refugee crisis, classrooms can become overcrowded. What is more, integrating these children is often more resource-intensive, particularly in the early phase after arrival in the new host country. Additional funding is thus often needed to successfully integrate immigrant children into schools. However, funds are not always available or are only adapted infrequently, which complicates the organisation of integration measures and adds to the cost for the local public purse (see below). In many countries, funding is based on a school census and determined at the beginning of the school year. Thus, there is often no additional budget for immigrant students who arrived during the year (George et al., 2011).

Moreover, there have been concerns that the presence of children of immigrants can negatively affect the educational outcomes of their native-born peers, particularly if the former have language difficulties and or low-educated immigrant parents. In classrooms with many immigrant students teachers may be overburdened, not adequately prepared or spend considerably more time on immigrant students – potentially at the expense of native-born pupils. Additionally, in most OECD countries, on average immigrant students perform worse than their native-born peers (OECD and European Union, 2015). This gap often decreases considerably when controlling for socio-economic background, yet in many OECD countries differences remain. Evidence also shows that immigrant students who arrive at a later age often face more difficulties in school than those who immigrated as young children (OECD, 2012).

Lastly, the literature has been discussing whether higher immigration increases ‘white flight’ – a phenomenon where more affluent, white or non-immigrant parents move away from disadvantaged neighbourhoods and enrol their children elsewhere, thereby increasing residential and school segregation along class and ethnic lines.¹²

However, the impact of immigrant students on the quality of the education and schooling system, especially on the local and neighbourhood level, is far from clear. As immigrant families often settle in disadvantaged neighbourhoods, the schools that immigrant students attend often already have a considerable share of disadvantaged native-born students, including native-born students with immigrant parents. Therefore, this sorting almost automatically leads to a negative correlation between the share of immigrant students in a school and the test scores of native-born students (see Brunello and Rocco, 2011). To disentangle such effects, studies estimating the impact of immigrant students on their peers therefore need to take students’ socio-economic background into account.

Several studies have looked at the impact of immigrant students on the school performance of native-born students in different OECD countries. Gould et al. (2009) have examined the impact of the large inflow of Jewish immigrants from the former Soviet Union on the performance of native Israeli students. To avoid selection bias, they exploit the random allocation of students to the 5th grade and additionally control for the share of immigrants in the 4th and 5th grade. Findings suggest that the presence of immigrants reduces the chances of native-born students to pass the high school-leaving exam, which is the prerequisite for enrolling in university. Similar results were found by Jensen and Rasmussen (2011) who study immigrant peer effects in Denmark. Even after controlling for potential parental sorting across neighbourhoods by using an instrumental variable approach, immigrant concentration seems to be remain important in determining mathematics test scores of both native-born and immigrant students.

In contrast, Ohinata and van Ours (2011) do not find strong evidence for the Netherlands that the presence of children of immigrants in the classroom negatively impacts on the educational outcomes of children of native-born. Immigrant children, however, are found to experience negative language spill-over effects from a high share of immigrant children in their class, yet no such effects are found for maths or science skills. Similar results are found by Schneeweis (2013), who studies the impact of immigrant concentration in primary schools on educational outcomes of native and immigrant students in a major Austrian city. She finds that spill-over effects are particularly strong among students from the same area of origin, indicating that peer groups in schools form along ethnic and linguistic lines. Lastly, a study from the United Kingdom, having controlled for some basic characteristic of the native-born students, does not find any correlation between the share of immigrant students and the performance of their native-born peers (Geay et al., 2012). Qualitative research from the United Kingdom even suggests that immigration might have positive impacts on the educational achievements of native-born students (Poppleton et al., 2013). Teachers who were interviewed for the study stated that support measures for immigrant students also benefitted their native-born peers. Furthermore, immigrant children were often viewed as attentive and eager to learn – attitudes that might have a positive effect on the overall learning climate.

Although the evidence on the impact of immigrant students on native-born learners is mixed, it nevertheless demonstrates that it is not the concentration of immigrant students per se, but rather its combination with the concentration of socio-economic disadvantage of all students that matters. Lemaître (2012) finds that in many OECD countries going to a disadvantaged school, i.e. a school with high shares of students with low-educated parents, has a larger effect on education outcomes than parental country of origin or predominantly speaking a foreign language at home. Instead, attending a disadvantaged school has a strong adverse impact on reading performance regardless of the students’ country of birth. Similar to the findings for Austria (Schneeweis, 2013) and the Netherlands (Ohinata and van Ours, 2011), the penalty for going to a disadvantaged school is even higher for children of immigrants than for the native-born.

Lastly, the literature has investigated whether a large influx of immigrant students can trigger native-born parents to send their children to schools where shares of immigrant students are smaller, thereby increasing the concentration of disadvantage in certain schools. This question was first studied by Betts and Fairlie (2003) using census data from 132 metropolitan areas in the United States. They found a significant positive link between immigration and private school enrolment for secondary schools, but not for primary schools. For every four immigrant students entering public high school, one native student is estimated to switch to a private school. The majority of students changing schools if found to be white. Furthermore, native parents seem to respond mainly to the presence of immigrant children who speak a language other than English at home. Dottori and Shen (2009) find that wealthier locals in the United States are more likely to enrol their children in private schools when the share of low-skilled immigrants is large. Similar results were found for Denmark (Gerdes, 2010). Native Danes seem to be more likely to enrol their children in private schools when the share of children with immigrant background becomes larger in their municipalities. However, while this effect is significant in small and medium-sized municipalities, it appears to be absent in larger towns. The authors argue that this might be due to more pronounced residential segregation in larger towns. Hence, parents can move to a different school district in the same municipality where the neighbourhood composition is different and enrol their child in another public school, rather than opting for private education.

Health care system

The bulk of the literature on migrants and health services has focussed on migrants’ access to health care. There has been little study on the impact of migration on the (local) health care system, even though the access of migrants to the health care system is of course an important determinant of this impact. The few available studies on the impact are from the United Kingdom. As for social housing and education, there is the public perception in some countries that immigrants are taking advantage of the public health systems of the host country and are detracting the quality and efficiency of the health system as a whole. For example, in the United Kingdom media and the National Health Service were discussing “health tourism” of foreign nationals and its effects on public health services for the last years, with resulting provisions in the 2014 Immigration Act which aim at limiting the free access to health care for people who have stayed in the country for less than five years.

On average across OECD countries, immigrants actually more often report to be in good health or better than native-born do (OECD and European Union, 2015). This reflects the so-called “healthy-migrant-effect”, which researchers found in several North-American and Western European countries. In addition, in most countries, the migrant population is younger than the native-born population.

In most countries, migrants do not only more often report to be in better health than native-born, they also report more often not having seen a doctor in the last 12 months (Figure 3.7). This finding is also supported by various country-specific studies. As for the United Kingdom, migrants tend to have lower rates of general practitioner (GP) registration than native-born (George et al., 2011; Hargreaves et al., 2006). In Germany, immigrants tend to visit GPs less often than the native-born. Furthermore, there are less likely to use medical preventive care and ambulant care services. On the other hand, in both countries, immigrants are more likely to come to rescue centres and emergency services. This different use of services might be related to communication and language problems and information deficits (Kohls, 2011). Furthermore, some migrant groups, notably labour migrants and students, often return to their home countries for medical treatment, which contributes to lower GP registration rates and GP visits (George et al., 2011).

Figure 3.7. Migrants’ health status

1. Note by Turkey: The information in this document with reference to “Cyprus” relates to the southern part of the Island. There is no single authority representing both Turkish and Greek Cypriot people on the Island. Turkey recognizes the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). Until a lasting and equitable solution is found within the context of United Nations, Turkey shall preserve its position concerning the “Cyprus issue”.

2. Note by all the European Union member states of the OECD and the European Union: The Republic of Cyprus is recognised by all members of the United Nations with the exception of Turkey. The information in this document relates to the area under the effective control of the Government of the Republic of Cyprus.

Source: Panel A: European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) 2012. US National Health Interview Survey (NHIS) 2012. Canadian Community Health Survey (CCHS) 2011-12. Panel B: European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions ad hoc module (EU-SILC) 2009.

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395613

However, even if these results suggest that immigrants pose a smaller per-capita burden on public health systems than the native-born, there are also some migrant-specific issues which might impose additional costs on the local health care system. In Germany, migrants are more affected by work-related accidents and inability to work than native-born, especially immigrants from Turkey (Kohls, 2011), possibly because of their high concentration in occupations with a higher accident hazard. Furthermore, several qualitative studies stated that according to local stakeholders, language interpretation and translation impose additional costs when providing health care to migrants (Scullion and Morris, 2009; Poppleton et al., 2013), although the magnitude of these additional costs is not clear.¹³ There is also evidence that the health care of asylum seekers and refugees might pose additional costs on the health care systems of the receiving countries, since some of them have complex health issues related to their journey, family separation and traumas faced prior to their arrival (OECD, 2016).

In any case, any negative direct impact via use of services must be weighed against the fact that the local public health system also benefits from migration since a number of doctors and nurses are actually migrants themselves. In 2008, 35% of the doctors in the United Kingdom were foreign-born, and in New Zealand, Australia, Israel and Switzerland, the share was even higher. For nurses, the share was smaller but still significant with on average 14% of nurses being foreign-born across OECD countries (Figure 3.8), which is a much higher share than among the total population which is about 10%. Therefore, the health care systems of many OECD countries actually rely heavily on the inflow of migrants (see Mercay, Dumont and Lafortune, 2015 for an in-depth discussion).

Figure 3.8. Share of foreign-born health professionals, 2010 and 2011

Source: Mercay, Dumont and Lafortune (2015).

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395629

Transportation

The transportation choices of immigrants and the impact of migration on both public transportation and road-use have been relatively well studied, especially in the United States. Most studies find a higher rate of public transport utilisation among immigrants than among natives, meaning that immigrants are more likely to take the bus, the train or the subway.¹⁴ Blumenberg and Evans (2010) find that migrants in California use public transport twice as often as native-born commuters and comprise therefore almost 50% of all commuters using public transportation in the state. Heisz and Schellenberg (2004), who look at Census Metropolitan Areas (CMA) in Canada, find similar results. These findings hold even after controlling for demographic characteristics, income, commute distance and distance from the city centre. Therefore, the higher likelihood of migrants to use public transportation cannot solely be explained by their concentration in metropolitan areas with higher public transportation provision or by possible lower incomes, which might prevent them from buying a car. However, as migrants reside longer in the host country, differences in transportation choices start to diminish, suggesting a transport assimilation of migrants with time (Tsang and Rohr, 2011).

In their study focussing on the United Kingdom, Tsang and Rohr (2011) tried to quantify the impact of non-EEA migrants on the transportation system by looking at the impact of migrants’ car and public transportation use for society. Since migrants use more often public transportation than native-born, the overall impact of an additional migrant for society is less negative than the impact of a potential additional native-born.¹⁵ Due to lack of data, their analysis does not incorporate the negative impact of crowding on the public transportation system. However, the authors argue that migrants in the United Kingdom mostly rely on buses for transportation and that it is relatively easy to address crowding problems by providing more buses, either on existing routes or new routes, within a relatively short time frame. Therefore, increased patronage due to migration should not be a problem per se. Nevertheless, due to immigrant concentration in certain areas, possible effects of crowding and congestion will be more noticeable on the local than on the state level. Due to their distinct transportation choices and travel patterns, if anything, there may rather be an impact on the public transportation system than on the roads.

Overall, the impact of immigration on the local public infrastructure is more complex than the picture media reports and the public opinion may draw. As every other additional citizen arriving to a municipality, they generate more demand for public services. However, in regard to health and transport, there is evidence that migrants actually have less effect than native-born on these two services due to migrant-specific characteristics and preferences. Furthermore, immigrants help to tackle shortages for example in the public health care system. Nevertheless, there are also some migrant-specific issues resulting into higher costs for the public infrastructure system in the case of the education system and some specific health care services, which include language barriers.

Local fiscal impact of migration

In many countries, there is widespread concern in the public opinion about the negative impact of migration on public finances and the welfare system. The issue of fiscal impact of migration – both on the national and subnational level – has gained even more prominence with the global economic crisis, which has exacerbated imbalances in the government budgets of many OECD countries. Furthermore, western societies are ageing, which puts additional pressure on public finances. Therefore, there has been a growing body of studies dealing with the fiscal impact of immigration on the host countries (for an overview see Liebig and Mo, 2013). Most of these studies show that at the national level migration has only a small impact on public finances and on average across the OECD, the impact is broadly neutral.

This being said, the fiscal impact on the local level might differ from the impact at the national/federal level. Local governments have other sources of revenues than the national level, which might be affected differently by higher inflows of immigrants than the revenues of the national level. For example, in most countries it is the national government that collects personal income taxes, while local governments collect property taxes (e.g. in some Scandinavian countries) or corporate income taxes (e.g. Germany). Both these taxes are less relevant for immigrants because they on average less often property owners and have smaller companies than native-born do if they are business owners (OECD and European Union, 2015).

Likewise, expenditures of municipalities are also different from the expenditures of the national government, even though it is difficult to make general statements that hold true for all OECD countries. As for the revenues, the expenditure structure of municipalities differs widely across countries. Measured as a percentage of GDP, local government expenditures in countries such as Greece or Mexico account for less than 5%, while local government expenditures account for around a quarter of the GDP in Sweden and Finland and even for more than one third in Denmark (OECD, 2013b). The services associated with the local level also differ widely. In some countries, municipalities provide mainly property-oriented services (e.g. garbage collection, road maintenance or water supply), in others their main responsibilities are services to people. There are particularly large differences across countries in regard to the extent of social service provision by local authorities. While in the Nordic countries and Germany, a substantial part of the local budget goes to the provision of social protection, there is little social service provision by the local level in some OECD settlement countries such as Canada and New Zealand (Shah, 2006). There is also significant variation of the provision of services by municipalities within countries. For example in Italy, welfare services tend to be more generous in the North than in the South of the country (Pellizzari, 2011). Therefore, the local fiscal impact of immigration is likely to vary substantially, both across and within countries.

Furthermore, there are some issues which make the analysis of the local fiscal impact trickier than the examination of the national impact: most existing data on local revenues and expenditures are approximate and presents a state- or country-wide average, thus hiding variation between the different municipalities. Furthermore, in many countries, local tax levels also differ across municipalities, depending on the degree to which local governments have tax autonomy and make use of it. As a result, there are only few studies that look at the fiscal impact of immigrants on the local level.

Most existing studies examine the situation in the United States (e.g. Clune, 1998; Garvey et al., 2002; Lee and Miller, 2002), with the exception being Wadensjö (2007) who looked at the fiscal impact of migrants in Denmark. A shortcoming of studies from the United States is that they tend to focus on the state level and make it therefore impossible to look solely at fiscal impact on the receiving municipalities. Most studies in the United States undertaken so far come to the conclusion that, in contrast to the federal level, immigration poses a fiscal burden on receiving municipalities. This can be mainly explained by immigrants’ demographic and socioeconomic characteristics. In most OECD countries, immigrants are on average younger than native-born. Furthermore, they tend to have higher fertility rates (OECD and European Union, 2015). As result, in the OECD, 41% of all immigrant households are families with children (either single adults or more than one adult with one child or more), while among the native-born households, only 28% are households with children. In countries such as Portugal, Spain or Ireland that experienced, prior to the global economic crisis, large inflows of immigrants, they tend to be largely overrepresented among households with children. The only countries where migrants live more often in households without children, are Central European and Baltic Countries, where the foreign-born population tends to be older than the native-born population (OECD and European Union, 2015).

Due to their specific demographic characteristics, in most countries migrants draw less on elderly care and pensions, which are often disbursed from the national public purse, but are more in need of childcare and schooling for their offspring, which are often paid out of the local budget. While immigrant have on average only a slightly higher take-up of unemployment benefits, they receive much more often social assistance, since in most countries foreign-born have lower incomes than the native-born (see Annex, Table 3.A1.2).¹⁶ This social assistance is often paid out of the local budget.

Since most of the services with a higher take up by foreign-born are provided by subnational governments, it is not surprising that the mentioned studies for the United States and Denmark show that immigrants tend to be a larger net fiscal burden for these authorities than native-born. For example, in New Jersey, the average immigrant household incurs a 37% higher state fiscal deficit than natives and a 59% greater local fiscal burden (Garvey et al., 2002).

Furthermore, in most countries, the national government also provides a range of “pure public goods” like defence, which are not affected by the presence of additional migrants. Therefore, migrants tend to be less of a burden for the national than for the local level.

In contrast, studies focusing on the national fiscal impact of immigration do not take integration costs into account, as these are often relatively small as a percentage of GDP (see Liebig and Mo, 2013). However, a large part of costs related to the integration of immigrants are borne by the local level, which may account for a significant part of the local budget in areas of high immigrant concentration. These may include language training and interpreting services due to language barriers, language classes for children and adults. The same can be said about the education system: in municipalities with high inflows of immigrants, new school buildings will have to be built and new teachers be hired. All these costs will often be borne by the local level, at least initially. In many cases, the national level will reimburse them at least to some extent through the provision of grants. However, this often occurs with a time lag, which is an issue in times of tight local budgets.

The fiscal impact of migration differs between groups of immigrants, and this holds equally for the local level. In particular, labour migrants tend to be less in need of integration measures than other groups like refugees. Specific issues arise from the presence of irregular migrants. A study by the Congressional Budget Office of the United States (CBO, 2007) examined the impact of irregular migrants on the budget. As for migrants in general, the authors find that irregular migrants are net contributors to the federal budget, but present a net burden to local and state budgets. In the case of irregular migrants, these differences between the federal and the subnational level tend to be more significant, because irregular migrants are prohibited from many benefits that the federal government provides through social security and need-based programs such as Food Stamps, Medicare or Temporary Assistance for families in need. At the same time, local and state governments are still required to provide a range of their services to all individuals regardless of their immigration status or ability to pay.

A further issue is that grants to state and local governments are often allocated by formulas based on demographic characteristics. In most cases, these formulas do not take into account irregular migrants, since they do not appear in any population register or statistics concerning unemployment or income levels which provide the basis for the calculations. On the other hand, most services and programmes for which the grants are provided are still used by irregular migrants as well since despite their irregular status, they also use roads and public transportation, hospitals or the school system.¹⁷

Conclusion

There is a certain disconnect between the results of empirical research that studies the impact of immigration at the national level and the publicly perceived impact. Where the former generally find little impact in key areas such as the labour market, the infrastructure or the public purse – be it positive or negative – in many countries the majority of people assume a negative impact.

One possible explanation for this could be a lack of information. Another possibility is that individual perceptions are based on the local impact, especially the impact in areas with high immigrant concentration. Many studies that focus on the impact of migration at the national level exploit the variance across local units but look at the average effect rather than how it is distributed across local areas. As immigrants are indeed concentrated in specific regions and urban areas, notably the most disadvantaged areas, the local impact may actually significantly deviate from the average impact at the national level, although in most cases, the local impact still does not seem to be very large. Immigrants’ socio-economic characteristics are also not evenly split across the country, and notably immigrant unemployment tends to be higher in densely-populated areas. It is also these areas with high immigrant concentration and unemployment to which media attention is disproportionately directed to, providing a biased picture of the overall situation.

That notwithstanding, there are clearly specific local challenges related to immigration. Some evidence, for example, suggests that the impact of migration on the labour market tends to grow disproportionately with the population share of immigrants although this is an underexplored area that requires more research. At the same time, there is no generalisation possible across all different domains (labour market, housing, education, transport, health care and fiscal) included in this overview. In many domains, however, perhaps unsurprisingly, the socio-economic composition of immigrants appears to be a larger determinant of the local impact than their population share. For example, immigration of high earners tends to lead to an increase of the average level of local rents, while the opposite seems to be the case when immigrants are poor.

The fact that immigrants tend to have different characteristics – and needs – from the native-born also leads to a situation in which the costs and benefits from immigration are unevenly distributed across levels of government. Services which are disproportionately consumed by immigrants tend to be provided by local governments, whereas those which immigrants consume less are often disbursed out of the national budget.

In some cases, for example in many OECD countries in secondary education, local governments are refunded for additional costs, but this refund is often only partial and with a time-lag. While a full discussion is beyond the scope of this chapter, in many countries there seems to be a need to rethink some of the refunding schemes in place, to better reflect local costs, and to improve co-ordination between levels of government. However, a full assessment of this issue requires an in-depth study that includes also the revenue side, including the local tax mix which varies between countries.

In any case, adaptations in the local infrastructure tend to take time, which can create specific challenges in the case of large and sudden inflows such as currently experienced in many local communities in Europe as a result of the refugee crisis. Large inflows have also exacerbated more longstanding structural problems in local infrastructure, such as housing and teacher shortages in Sweden for example (see OECD, 2016). Acknowledging the fact that migration is not the primary cause of such challenges is an important first step to reconcile public opinion, which is often negative, with the empirical facts, which draw a much more nuanced picture.

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Annex 3.A1.

Supplementary tables and figures

Figure 3.A1.1. Employment rates of the persons who live in urban and rural areas

Notes: The population living in densely populated and intermediate density areas is considered ‘urban’. The population living in thinly populated areas is considered “rural”.

Source: Labour Force Surveys (Eurostat).

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395632

Table 3.A1.1. Share of households with children by migration status of the household, 2012
| Immigrant (%) | Native-born (%) | Difference immigrant/native-born (percentage points)
Australia | 44 | 44 | +0.6
Austria | 38 | 23 | +14.9
Belgium | 36 | 26 | +10.4
Canada | 52 | 39 | +12.9
Croatia | 30 | 30 | +0.2
Cyprus1, 2 | 34 | 33 | +0.7
Czech Republic | 25 | 28 | -3.2
Denmark | 26 | 24 | +2.4
Estonia | 12 | 30 | -17.8
Finland | 39 | 23 | +16.6
France | 27 | 27 | -0.4
Germany | 19 | 20 | -1.7
Greece | 42 | 27 | +14.3
Hungary | 34 | 28 | +6.2
Iceland | 42 | 36 | +6.6
Ireland | 58 | 37 | +20.9
Israel | 25 | 55 | -30.0
Italy | 41 | 26 | +15.8
Latvia | 13 | 30 | -17.0
Lithuania | 13 | 29 | -15.5
Luxembourg | 38 | 24 | +13.8
Malta | 18 | 29 | -10.8
Netherlands | 29 | 26 | +3.8
New Zealand | 37 | 29 | +7.7
Norway | 32 | 27 | +4.7
Poland | 7 | 33 | -25.7
Portugal | 49 | 31 | +18.1
Slovenia | 25 | 29 | -4.0
Spain | 47 | 28 | +18.8
Sweden | 38 | 26 | +12.6
Switzerland | 32 | 23 | +9.7
United Kingdom | 39 | 27 | +12.6
United States | 46 | 30 | +15.5
EU total (28) | 34 | 26 | +7.9
OECD total (29) | 41 | 28 | +12.3
Note: “Immigrant household” refers to households where all heads of household are foreign-born.
1. Note by Turkey:

The information in this document with reference to “Cyprus” relates to the southern part of the Island. There is no single authority representing both Turkish and Greek Cypriot people on the Island. Turkey recognizes the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). Until a lasting and equitable solution is found within the context of United Nations, Turkey shall preserve its position concerning the “Cyprus issue”.

2. Note by all the European Union member states of the OECD and the European Union:

The Republic of Cyprus is recognised by all members of the United Nations with the exception of Turkey. The information in this document relates to the area under the effective control of the Government of the Republic of Cyprus.

Source: Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (Eurostat) 2012; United States: American Community Survey 2012; Australia: Census 2011; Canada: National Household Survey 2011; New Zealand: Household Economic Survey 2012; Israel: Household Expenditure Survey 2012.

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933396381

Table 3.A1.2. Dispersal and housing policies for asylum seekers in OECD countries, 2015
| Deliberate dispersal policy for asylum seekers | Dispersal criteria | Can asylum seekers stay in individually arranged housing?
Australia | No | x | Yes (in some circumstances)
Austria | Yes | Size of municipality | Yes
Belgium | Yes | Family and health situation of asylum seeker Knowledge of national languages Number of inhabitants and share of immigrants in municipality | Yes (but they are no longer entitled to financial assistance)
Canada | .. | .. | ..
Chile | No | x | ..
Czech Republic | No | x | Yes
Denmark | No | x | Yes (after 6 months)
Estonia | No | x | Yes (if they have sufficient financial means)
Finland | Yes | Willingness of community to receive asylum seekers Availability of places in the reception centres | Yes
France | Yes | .. | No
Germany | Yes | Fixed quota according to tax revenue and size of population (“Königstein Key”) | Yes (only under certain conditions)
Greece | No | x | No
Hungary | Yes | Family situation of asylum seeker | Yes (if they can be accommodated by family or friends or have the necessary resources)
Ireland | Yes | Asylum seeker population in centres as a percentage of the Health Service Executive (HSE) area | Yes (but they are no longer entitled to [financial] assistance)
Italy | Yes (only for asylum seekers without financial resources, who formally request accommodation in reception facilities) | Even dispersal | Yes
Availability of places
Asylum seeker profile
Integration prospects
Voluntary participation of municipalities in the call of tender (SPRAR network)
Japan | No | x | Yes
Luxembourg | No (but attempts to avoid concentrations of asylum seekers from the same country or region of origin) | x | Yes (but only under exceptional circumstances and with the asylum seeker contributes financially)
Netherlands | No | x | No
New Zealand | No | x | Yes
Norway | Yes | Available offers of suitable asylum centres through public tender | Yes (but they are no longer entitled to cash benefits)
Poland | Yes | Cost of housing (45%) | No
Additional local conditions (20%)
Number of inhabitants and unemployment rate in municipality (15%)
Housing supply (15%)
Distance from the Office for Foreigners (5%)
Portugal | Yes | Housing supply in dispersal area | Yes
Willingness of community to host migrants
Size of municipality
Cost of living in dispersal area
Concentration of foreign-born and humanitarian migrants in dispersal area
Employment prospects for individual in dispersal area
Availability of language courses
Slovak Republic | No (not systematic) | x | Yes (but they are no longer entitled to financial assistance)
Slovenia | Yes (not systematic) | x | Yes
Spain | No | x | Yes (and in exceptional cases the costs of rented accommodation may be covered)
Sweden | Yes (if asylum seekers cannot find accommodation on their own) | Negotiation between regional governments and municipalities based on a four-year prognosis drawn from national statistics and assumed recognition and refusal ratio | Yes
Switzerland | Yes | Population in the region (even distribution between regions) | Yes
Availability of reception facilities in the region
Presence of family members
Presence of ethnic communities (to avoid concentrations of nationalities)
Individual reception needs
Turkey | Yes | Family and health situation of asylum seeker | Yes
Number of inhabitants and share of immigrants in municipality
United Kingdom | Yes | Supply of housing (generally outside London) | Yes (but individually arranged accommodation is not paid for)
Cultural fit of asylum seekers
Capacity of support services
Local housing strategies
Risk of increasing social tension
United States | No | x | Yes
.. Information not available.
x Not applicable.
Source: European Migration Network (2013), Ad hoc Query on allocation of refugees to municipalities for integration purposes and OECD (2016). Making Integration Work: Refugees and Others in Need of Protection, OECD Publishing, Paris.

Table 3.A1.3. Take-up of social benefits by immigrant households relative to native-born households in European OECD countries, 2011-12
| Social assistance | Unemployment benefits | Pensions | Family allowances | Housing allowances
| Native-born (%) | Immigrant (%) | Native-born (%) | Immigrant (%) | Native-born (%) | Immigrant (%) | Native-born (%) | Immigrant (%) | Native-born (%) | Immigrant (%)
Austria | 3 | 9 | 15 | 36 | 42 | 24 | 27 | 43 | 45 | 9
Belgium | 2 | 13 | 18 | 24 | 36 | 18 | 30 | 38 | 1 | 1
Switzerland | 21 | 29 | 4 | 14 | 37 | 23 | 28 | 39 | 1 | 2
Czech Republic | 2 | 6 | 5 | 3 | 42 | 38 | 12 | 14 | 3 | 8
Denmark |  |  | 25 | 33 | 28 | 14 | 23 | 36 | 21 | 42
Estonia | 2 | 1 | 7 | 5 | 34 | 69 | 31 | 12 | 2 | 1
Finland | 7 | 29 | 19 | 43 | 35 | 13 | 22 | 31 | 20 | 50
France | 8 | 16 | 16 | 21 | 43 | 44 | 25 | 27 | 22 | 39
Germany | 3 | 7 | 13 | 12 | 33 | 54 | 28 | 23 | 11 | 13
Greece | 5 | 3 | 6 | 16 | 52 | 11 | 11 | 7 | 0 | 0
Hungary | 6 | 2 | 10 | 2 | 46 | 41 | 30 | 34 | 7 | 3
Iceland | 3 | 10 | 14 | 26 | 35 | 19 | 25 | 19 | 57 | 50
Ireland | 5 | 6 | 29 | 41 | 34 | 9 | 42 | 65 | 36 | 31
Italy | 2 | 2 | 17 | 36 | 50 | 11 | 24 | 32 | 1 | 4
Luxembourg | 4 | 14 | 4 | 14 | 44 | 22 | 24 | 41 | 10 | 15
Netherlands | 7 | 20 | 8 | 15 | 41 | 32 | 23 | 31 | 15 | 37
Norway | 3 | 15 | 6 | 12 | 35 | 12 | 27 | 38 | 4 | 13
Poland | 4 | 3 | 5 |  | 47 | 93 | 12 | 3 | 2 | 4
Portugal | 3 | 3 | 11 | 12 | 48 | 22 | 15 | 22 | 7 | 6
Slovak Republic | 6 | 2 | 5 |  | 44 | 81 | 42 | 16 | 0 |
Slovenia | 10 | 16 | 9 | 11 | 44 | 29 | 33 | 32 | 1 | 4
Spain | 4 | 5 | 29 | 43 | 40 | 10 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 3
Sweden | 2 | 13 | 8 | 18 | 38 | 24 | 23 | 30 | 8 | 22
United Kingdom | 9 | 15 | 5 | 7 | 41 | 24 | 25 | 35 | 16 | 24
OECD Europe average | 5 | 10 | 12 | 20 | 40 | 31 | 24 | 28 | 12 | 17
Source: Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (Eurostat) 2012, except for Germany: Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (Eurostat) 2011.
StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933396390

Notes

 1. The statistical data for Israel are supplied by and under the responsibility of the relevant Israeli authorities. The use of such data by the OECD is without prejudice to the status of the Golan Heights, East Jerusalem and Israeli settlements in the West Bank under the terms of international law.

 2. The terms “migrant”, “immigrant” and “foreign-born” are used synonymously throughout this chapter. They refer to people born abroad.

 3. There are also some other aspects related to the impact of migration on the local economy such as the impact on growth, entrepreneurship and innovation. A full discussion of these is, however, beyond the scope of this review.

 4. In general, the impact of immigration on the cultural life is viewed favourably by respondents in surveys (OECD and European Union, 2015).

 5. Indeed, highly-educated immigrants often experience a strong discount of their foreign qualifications, at least upon arrival in the country (Damas de Matos and Liebig, 2014). Furthermore, immigrants with foreign qualifications tend to have lower skills (Bonfanti and Xenogiani, 2014).

 6. Note that these studies analyse the overall effect of immigration and do not control for the composition of the immigrant flow, such as age and education.

 7. Census divisions in Canada refer to a county, a municipalité régionale de comté or a regional district.

 8. These results differ from the findings of studies at the national level in New Zealand, which found a large positive impact of migration on housing prices. Coleman and Landon-Lane (2007) found that net migration flows equal to 1% of the population are associated with an 8 to 12% increase in housing prices. The increase estimated by McDonald (2013) is somewhat smaller (8%), but still large compared to other studies. However, these papers do not look at within-country variations in migration effect.

 9. Another example for the role of rent regulations which can distort the effect of migration on rent levels is Germany, where the government adopted in 2015 the so-called Mietpreisbremse, a system of rent control which states that the rent for new tenant cannot be more than 10% higher than the local comparative rent.

 10. These findings are in line with a study by Rutter and Latorre (2009), which also finds no evidence that migrants receive preferential treatment in regard to social housing access.

 11. In 2012, the federal government contributed on average 10.1% of the public elementary and secondary school funding, the state governments 45.1% and the local governments 44.8% (Source: National Center for Education Statistics).

 12. The term “white” is used mainly because the bulk of the literature on this phenomenon comes from the United States.

 13. In addition, research in Wales found some health professionals reporting difficulties treating migrant patients because they lacked access to their prior treatment records and immunisation history (Wales Rural Observatory, 2006).

 14. However, Chatman and Klein (2011) find an opposite result for the US State of New Jersey.

 15. According to the calculations of Tsang and Rohr, which set off vehicle taxes and duty on fuel with the costs associated with congestion, infrastructure damage, accidents and the negative impact on air quality, noise pollution as well as the wider impact on the environment, migrants impose a cost of GBP 2 368 per year through road used compared to GBP 2 459 per native-born. As for the use of the public transportation system (bus, rail and underground), immigrants contribute per year and per person GBP 225 through fares (minus the subsidies by the government), while native-born only contribute GBP 148 per year and per person, due to a lesser use of the public transportation system. Therefore, immigrants have on average per year a negative net impact of GBP 2 143, while the negative net impact of native-born is GBP 2 311.

 16. The same holds for housing allowances.

 17. However, it should be noted that the amount which state and local governments spend on services to irregular immigrants represents only a small percentage of their total spending. Even in California which has the largest population of irregular migrants, spending for these migrants represented less than 10% of total spending for those services (CBO, 2007).

Chapter 4.

International migration following environmental and geopolitical shocks: How can OECD countries respond?¹

Environmental and geopolitical shocks – i.e. sudden, often unpredictable, changes with sweeping social and economic consequences – are often associated with large-scale migration flows both within and across borders. All these events have, to different degrees, put legal migration and protection systems under strain.

The chapter analyses how OECD countries have responded to major shock-related migration in recent times and identifies key lessons learnt. It also explores the various options for more structural responses – notably the use of alternative legal migration pathway for refugees – with the objective of improving the responsiveness and efficiency of migration and protection systems to both environmental and geopolitical shocks. The chapter also analyses the actual and potential use of alternative migration pathways in response to the Syrian crisis.

The analysis highlights three important lessons: i) effective international co-operation cannot be taken for granted; ii) protracted crises generate growing tensions between the need to find durable solutions and the general preference for short-term protection measures; iii) selection, which is a common feature of most migration systems, needs to be rethought in the context of the international protection framework.

Introduction

Environmental and geopolitical shocks – i.e. sudden, often unpredictable, changes with sweeping social and economic consequences – are often associated with large-scale migration flows both within and across borders. In the past 10 years, major natural disasters such as tsunamis, earthquakes, flash floods, volcanic eruptions and hurricanes have affected a considerable number of countries, forcing populations to seek temporary or permanent shelter elsewhere. The Yugoslavian Wars of the early 1990s, the aftermath of the so-called “Arab Spring” uprisings and, in particular, the conflict in Syria have driven, and still drive, many people to flee their country in search of protection elsewhere, both near and far. In 2015, more than 1.5 million people sought asylum in the OECD area, and Turkey alone is now hosting almost 3 million Syrians.

All these events have, to different degrees, put legal migration and protection systems under strain. Responses have been different from one country and one crisis to another, raising a number of questions. What lessons have OECD countries learnt from recent shock-related migration? How many people have been affected and how have policies been adjusted to cope? How can the risks associated with shock-related migration be factored into national migration policies and can international co-operation be strengthened to that end? How can OECD countries augment their tool boxes to respond more efficiently to shock-related migration?

This paper focuses on two types of shocks – environmental and geopolitical – although others, such as epidemics or outbreaks of diseases, like the Ebola virus, may also be associated with substantial movements of people or require robust migration policy responses. Economic shocks affecting destination countries may also compel them to adjust their migration policies (OECD, 2009; Chaloff et al., 2012), although this analysis does not cover that issue.

The first section briefly overviews the salient features of mass displacement prompted by environmental or geopolitical shocks and outlines the international legal and co-operation framework for managing flows of people on such a large scale. The next section goes on to analyse how OECD countries have responded to major shock-related migration in recent times and identifies key lessons learnt. The third section explores the various options for more structural responses – notably the use of alternative legal migration routes for refugees – with the objective of improving the responsiveness and efficiency of migration and protection systems to both environmental and geopolitical shocks. The last section gathers together the chapter’s different strands of thought and draws conclusions.

Main findings

Lessons learnt from past policy responses to migration-related shocks

There is a limited range of international instruments for dealing with shock-related migration. Apart from the UNHCR’s 1951 Refugee Convention, few instruments are designed specifically to address migration flows in the aftermath of geopolitical shocks. As for tools for migration stemming from environmental shocks, most are still in the making (e.g. COP21 and the Nansen Initiative).

Most OECD countries use short-term visas or tolerated statuses with temporary suspension of deportation to support people stranded in their territory. Few countries have facilitated regular legal channels in response to shock-related migration.

The use of temporary and subsidiary protection, rather than 1951 Refugee Convention status, has become more and more widespread since the 1990s, particularly in Europe.

Few OECD countries – other than the United States, Australia and Canada – have large resettlement programmes. Although such programmes have generally been slow to respond and under-funded, they remain one of the most effective protection channels for people fleeing war zones or civil conflicts, especially the most vulnerable. State-led programmes for resettling recognised refugees are still very small-scale, as less than 1% of refugees registered with the UNHCR are resettled every year. Increasing resources for resettlement programmes should remain a priority for the international community.

More attention should also be paid to understanding and addressing the root causes of shocks (i.e. crisis prevention), especially those of a geopolitical nature. Countries of first asylum must improve the economic and social plight of refugees but containment cannot be the only, or even the main, response to severe humanitarian crises.

Alternative pathways for beneficiaries of international protection

Alternative pathways are channels of migration not necessarily designed for refugees but which can be used to complement resettlement programmes. They include labour, international study and family migration channels, together with humanitarian visas and private sponsorship schemes. Large unmet resettlement needs have prompted much recent interest in alternative pathways, although proper evaluation is still pending.

Using general labour migration channels for refugees necessitates policy and incentives for employers to enable refugees to compete with other migrant workers. Incentives should, of course, be in line with general labour standards for native workers to avoid undermining public support and ongoing efforts to integrate refugees already in the country into the labour market.

Of all alternative pathways for refugees, student programmes elicit the greatest public support in destination countries, particularly in the academic community. Such programmes must, however, rise to a number of challenges, such as ascertaining candidates’ levels of education in the selection process and adapting services to beneficiaries’ special needs. Although student scholarship programmes for refugees are generally the most expensive alternative pathway, they have a valuable role to play in building a highly qualified workforce in post-conflict situations.

Family migration is the alternative pathway that can be used to create the most places for displaced people in need of protection. Although international law and standards contain family reunification provisions for UNHCR refugees, people who have been granted temporary or subsidiary protection have to meet more stringent conditions. A number of OECD countries, especially in Europe, have recently stiffened requirements for family reunification. Building on the examples of Ireland and Switzerland, both of whom allow temporary family reunification, would avert the risk of reunification rights becoming a pull factor. Setting minimum standards for those under temporary/subsidiary protection would limit the risk of “race to the bottom” in terms of conditions for family reunification. Finally, wider use of private sponsorship, as in Canada and Germany, could also be considered.

Humanitarian visas are used to enable people to lawfully enter a destination country to file a formal asylum application. About one-third of OECD countries have developed this pathway, a highly flexible tool that complements traditional resettlement speedily and cost-effectively. The non-discretionary use of humanitarian visas is, however, a very unlikely prospect, and the number of visas granted is more likely to increase extensively (as more countries use them) than intensively (as countries that already use them issue more).

Private sponsorship programmes share the costs of resettlement and other alternative pathways. Canada has been a pioneer and runs a large programme. A few other OECD countries (e.g. Germany) use it intensively or are considering doing so (the United Kingdom, for instance). Australia has operated a trial community support programme since 2013. Private sponsorship programmes require careful regulation and safeguards, notably if the sponsors can play an active role in the selection process.

Evaluating the potential of alternative pathways in the context of the current refugees crisis

OECD countries have mostly overlooked the labour migration route in their responses to the Syrian crisis. They have granted only about 18 200 work permits to Syrian workers in the past five years, even though almost 2 million 18-to-59 year-olds have been displaced to countries bordering their homeland. Despite the obstacles that are likely to arise, particularly skills matching, it would be useful to explore the potential of the labour migration channel more closely.

About 15 300 young Syrians have benefited from student visas to OECD countries in the past five years. This may represent up to 10% of all displaced Syrian university students to date. Building on grass roots support, the student pathway may gain further importance in coming years. Welcoming refugees into international student programmes, however, requires more than just covering scholarship and living costs. It requires an environment that enables Syrian students to study and takes their special needs into account.

More than 72 000 Syrians have been reunited in the past five years with family members in OECD countries. However, family reunification to Syrian refugees remains quite low so far (about 27 600) – partly because of delays in processing applications from refugees and partly because the family reunification entitlements of people under temporary/subsidiary protection are more restrictive. Family reunification with other family members who are already in OECD countries is more important and increasing, partly as a result of private sponsorship. But family-related migration still offers ample potential as a way of affording protection to Syrians. It could be considered with more attention and less prejudice.

Building a bold, comprehensive, global response to mass displacement

Effective international co-operation cannot be taken for granted. There is no de facto obligation for one country to assist (in kind or in cash) another that is grappling with mass displacements. Improving solidarity and the sharing of responsibility at international level requires incentives (or rules) for co-operation.

Protracted crises that displace large numbers of people generate a growing tension between the need to find – and fund – durable solutions and the general preference for short-term protection measures.

One way to avoid that countries systematically opt for temporary protection measures – which may jeopardise integration prospects – would be to gradually increment refugees’ rights and obligations the longer they stay. At the least, international guidelines could be useful to set minimum standards in terms of short-term protection and tolerated statuses and to facilitate a pathway towards more stable protection where necessary.

The criteria on which displaced people are selected for protection programmes need to be rethought as part of an international protection framework. UNHCR resettlement programmes are highly selective by nature as they target the most vulnerable. Alternative pathways which target a different group of people would be a useful complement. One way of affording opportunities for a wider range of potential beneficiaries would be to allocate a certain number of resettlement places (as complements to those set aside for the most vulnerable) on the basis of alternative selection criteria (e.g. a lottery).

In the context of the current refugee crisis, short-term policy responses need to be complemented by action that is more focused on the medium and long term. Accordingly, such action should include measures to foster the local integration of immigrants and their children; to strengthen co-ordination and responsibility/burden sharing mechanisms; to better anticipate future developments and appropriate policy responses; and to start rebuilding public trust with regard to migration issues.

Understanding the links between external shocks and international migration

How do environmental and geopolitical shocks affect international movements?

Shocks – whether environmental or geopolitical – are associated with the displacement of millions of people, both within their own countries and across international borders, and sometimes over considerable distances. Geopolitical shocks were estimated to have forced 65 million people out of their homes as they fled conflicts and violence at the end of 2015. That number includes more than 41 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) and almost 20 million refugees (UNHCR, 2016a). Altogether, the total number of displaced people has increased by 86% since 2005, when statistics recorded 35 million. And, partly because of the unfolding conflict in Syria, the trend is currently accelerating. In 2015 alone, 12.4 million people became newly displaced due to conflict or persecution– about four times more than in 2013.

Even though exact numbers are more difficult to ascertain, natural disasters are clearly another factor behind people on the move, both within and beyond the borders of their country of usual residence (Cohen and Bradley, 2010). Between 2001 and 2011, nearly 400 major natural disasters were registered annually worldwide, affecting about 268 million people and killing more than 100 000 per annum (Guha-Sapir, Hoyois and Below, 2013). Annex 4.A1 catalogues major recent environmental shocks, suggesting that almost 86 million people have been displaced within their countries of residence since 2009 – although it is unclear for how long or over what distance they moved.

And although long-standing environmental changes, such as rising water levels or slow-onset droughts, might not necessarily be seen as shocks because they are not sudden, they can nevertheless prompt massive displacements of people over relatively short periods of time. There are huge controversies over the number of people that climate change is projected to displace. The first estimates by Norman Myers (2005) – 25 million in 1995, 50 million by 2010, and up to 200 million when global warning takes hold – have been challenged, and researchers now recognise that the human displacement due to climate change will largely depend on policies and the ability to adapt. In other words, mechanical projections lead to unrealistic predictions (Ionesco, Mokhnacheva and Gemenne, 2016). Nevertheless, the consensus is that natural disasters and environmental shocks will contribute to displacements on an even larger scale in the years and decades to come.

A wide range of factors can influence the nature and scope of movements due to environmental and geopolitical shocks. While the fear of persecution or eroded human security are – almost by definition – the key driver of humanitarian migration, it is too simplistic to assume that only the nature of the initial shock (e.g. violence, conflict, natural disaster) determines the scale (who and how many), type (internal or cross-border) and direction (where to). Many other factors come into play.

The age structure of the affected population, the distance to the border of areas of conflict and how easily it can be reached across different types of terrain influence how far people can travel and whether migration is mainly internal or international. Patterns and impacts of migration are also shaped by the resources migrants can mobilise, as Van Hear (2014) shows. And although resources are largely determined by socio-economic background, they can also be affected by the shock. Finally, the ability to draw on networks overseas plays a key role in determining the relative importance of international movements and choices of destination.

Any analysis of the determinants of migration, including shock-related migration, also needs to take into account the linguistic, geographical, colonial or political connections that tie countries to each other and shape migration systems. Indeed, migration systems can create relatively stable migration corridors that are also used by forced migrants. Finally, the extent to which neighbouring countries are affected, and more generally the socio-economic conditions that prevail within them, are also important parameters.

The same type of shock can also elicit different responses in different countries. Studies by Feng, Krueger and Oppenheimer (2010) on Mexico and by Bohra-Mishra et al. (2014) on Indonesia suggest, for example, that there is a significant likelihood of increased migration as the weather grows dryer and warmer in the future. However, a series of studies in Uganda, Kenya, Bangladesh, and Ecuador did not observe the same migratory responses. As soil quality improved in Kenya, rural out-migration fell, while the opposite was observed in neighbouring Uganda (Gray, 2011). As for Ecuador, migration fluctuated with the success or failure of agricultural harvests (Gray, 2009), while in flood-prone Bangladesh, crop failures unrelated to flooding had stronger effects on migration than those caused by flooding.

More research is clearly needed to better anticipate the consequences of shocks on human mobility and – to that end – better understand the importance of contextual parameters, be they associated with geographic, demographic, economic, historical and/or political factors.

National and international policy frameworks

The speed at which countries respond to geopolitical and environmental shocks is extremely important – for both the people and countries concerned. Effects are generally first felt at national level – especially when shocks are small or limited to specific countries. The capacity of legal migration systems and international protection instruments (e.g. resettlement programmes) to adjust swiftly is critical if countries are to respond to shock-related migration in a timely manner.

Although the flexibility of national policies is key to swift responses, more structural adaptations and greater international co-ordination are required in the event of major shocks. Some countries may have institutional frameworks that are flexible enough for them to act on ministerial instructions and adapt conditions of entry or open up new migration channels to meet unexpected needs. In most countries, however, changing the legal system involves long timelines and negotiations.

When international agreement is required, adapting fast to shock-related migration is more challenging, partly because there is no predefined framework to that effect. A case in point is the European Union which has struggled to draw up a bold, comprehensive and co-ordinated response to the current refugee crisis. (For more details on the EU policy response to the Libyan and Syrian crises, see Annexs 4.A3 C and 4.A3 D).

At international levels,² all existing arrangements are voluntary or purely consultative. Furthermore, apart from the 1951 Refugee Convention, few instruments are designed specifically for geopolitical shocks and most measures to manage migrant flows in the aftermath of environmental shocks are still in the making. Altogether, international instruments for addressing shock-related migration are limited in number and scope. However, three broad modes of international co-ordination may be distinguished: multilateralism, embeddedness, and informal networks.

Multilateralism

“Multilateralism” is the enactment of concerted policies and actions (that may or may not be binding) in a wide number of participating countries. The 1951 Refugee Convention is the only robust multilateral treaty to address migration issues or, to be more precise, the conditions of acceptance of international refugees. Countries which have signed the convention are bound to comply with a number of international standards regarding the reception of refugees and processing of asylum applications, but they have no obligation to accept those not within their territory nor to contribute to any sort of burden-sharing mechanism.

Embeddedness

Embeddedness is the incorporation – or embedding – of new situations and events (e.g. shock-related migration) in binding agreements and policy instruments that are already in place. There have been, for example, attempts to expand the definitions and scope of the UN’s 1951 Refugee Convention so that it covers not only people fleeing the outbreak of a conflict or civil war, but those displaced by environmental pressures (Kraler, et al., 2012). It remains, however, highly unlikely that countries will endorse any new, expanded definitions. In practice, indeed, the most recent changes go in the opposite direction – particularly the growing tendency to respond to mass displacements with instruments not linked to the Convention, such as temporary and subsidiary protection, ad hoc humanitarian statuses.

Nevertheless, the United Nations added a protocol on climate-induced migration provision to its Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Agreed at the 16th Conference of Parties to the UNFCCC (COP16) in 2010, the Cancun Adaptation Framework recognised the need for migration, displacement and relocation policy measures, so ushering in the possibility of using international climate adaptation funds to those ends (Warner, 2011). It invited parties to adopt measures to enhance understanding, co-ordination and co-operation with regard to displacements, migration and planned relocation brought about by climate change.

A more recent development was the Disaster Risk Reduction Framework 2015-30, which was approved in Sendai, Japan, in March 2015. It calls for action to prevent and mitigate displacement and encourages a broader, more nuanced view of migration (Guadagno, 2015). It acknowledges in particular that migrants contribute to the resilience of communities and societies, and that they can play a useful role in disaster risk reduction (Paragraph 36.a.vi). Also in relation to climate change and natural disasters, the 21st UNFCC, or COP21, decided to create a taskforce to look at integrated responses to displacement (Box 4.1).

Box 4.1. The Paris Agreement (COP21)

In December 2015, at the 21st Conference of Parties (COP21) of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 195 countries adopted a legally binding global climate deal (European Commission, 2016; Government of France, 2016) which will enter into force in 2020 – the Paris Agreement. In Article II, “Nationally Determined Contributions”, it sets out a global action plan that “aims to strengthen the global response to the threat of climate change” by:

“holding the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels and to pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels”;

“increasing the ability to adapt to the adverse impacts of climate change and foster climate resilience and low greenhouse gas emissions development”;

“making finance flows consistent with a pathway towards low greenhouse gas emissions and climate-resilient development (Article 2, Paris Agreement 2015)”.

Although 20% of the submitted Intended Nationally Determined Contributions referred to migration (Lambert, 2015; IDMC, 2016; Ionesco, 2015), migration is mentioned only in the Agreement’s Preamble and addressed in the section “Loss and Damage” which requests (in Paragraph 50) a task force that would develop “recommendations for integrated approaches to avert, minimize and address displacement related to the adverse impacts of climate change”.

Some analysts had hoped for stronger wording (Lambert, 2015; Burns, 2016). Savaresi (2016, p. 9), for example, argues that “the Paris Agreement does little more than acknowledge extant institutional arrangements, without encapsulating a reference to a climate change displacement coordination facility, which had appeared in earlier drafts of the text”. She argues that her view is confirmed by Paragraph 52 which states that Article 8 of the Agreement (which focusing loss and damage) “does not involve or provide a basis for any liability or compensation”.

Other commentators, by contrast, consider that the inclusion of displacement was – given the particular historical circumstances under which the agreement was signed – a clear “step in the right direction” (Bettini, 2015). In particular, the International Organization of Migration (IOM) welcomed the Paris Agreement, as an important stepping stone that gave it “the political impetus that it [needed]” in times of “multiple, complex migration crises” (Ionesco, 2015). Indeed, migration and displacement in connection with climate change received unprecedented visibility at the Paris negotiations (IDMC, 2016; Ionesco, 2015). Savaresi (2016, p. 11), too, acknowledges that the Agreement addresses issues that were “missing or inadequately addressed in the climate architecture”.

Informal networks

Informal networks between countries are non-binding debates that sometimes set the stage for future multilateral co-operation. There are many consultation processes at regional level (the Bali, Budapest, Khartoum, Puebla and Rabat processes, for example)³ and, on specific issues, at the global level (e.g. the Annual Tripartite Consultation on Resettlement).⁴ However, most are no more than policy platforms with no proper decision-making mechanism. Since 1973, the OECD, too – through its Working Party on Migration and the OECD Expert Group on Migration (SOPEMI) – has also provided a forum to discuss migration management and integration issues. Another example of an informal network specifically focused on the needs of people displaced across international borders by disasters and the effects of climate change is the Nansen Initiative⁵ (Box 4.2).

Box 4.2. The Nansen Initiative

The Nansen Initiative is a “state-led consultative process to build consensus on a protection agenda addressing the needs of people displaced across borders in the context of disasters and the effects of climate change” (The Nansen Initiative, 2016).

On 12-13 October 2015, in Geneva, a global intergovernmental consultation, held in Geneva, endorsed the Agenda for the Protection of Cross-Border Displaced Persons in the Context of Disasters and Climate Change. The Protection Agenda “consolidates the outcomes of a series of regional intergovernmental consultations and civil society meetings convened by the Nansen Initiative” (The Nansen Initiative, 2015).

The initiative does not call for a new binding international convention on cross-border disaster-displacement. Instead, it encourages states and sub-regional organisations to incorporate into their normative frameworks effective practices that meet the specific challenges they face. It aims to “complement and support, rather than duplicate” by providing evidence and identifying best practices in an effort to promote the co-ordination of fragmented policies and action areas. The Global Consultation Conference Report points out that “a number of States have admitted disaster displaced persons relying upon national legislation”, “the discretionary power of migration authorities” and, sometimes, “applicable refugee law” (Paragraph 31).

Host countries generally offer protection to cross-border disaster-displaced people by admitting them or by refraining from returning them to a disaster-affected country. Both entail the implementation of temporary measures, even though– as the Global Consultation Conference Report highlights – longer-term solutions would be desirable. The report also flags the discretionary, unpredictable nature of current humanitarian protection measures and calls for harmonisation at regional and sub-regional levels to “facilitate international co-operation and solidarity in situations when national authorities cannot find solutions on their own” and to “ensure that all their citizens benefit from humanitarian protection measures in case of cross-border disaster- displacement”.

A further example of informal networks is the Migrants in Countries in Crisis Initiative (MICIC),⁶ co-chaired by the United States and the Philippines. It seeks to boost the ability of countries and other stakeholders to afford greater protection to migrants caught in crisis situations so that they are less vulnerable. Unlike refugees, where the roles of states and international actors are clearly identified, there is no clear framework for migrants stranded in countries in crisis. The MICIC is a voluntary, bottom-up, state-led process that seeks to coordinate international responses more effectively. At the same, time, it acknowledges that the governments of sending countries continue to bear significant responsibility for the safety and welfare of their citizens, even when they are traveling, residing or working abroad. The guidelines published in June 2016 include 10 Principles and 15 Guidelines, and Practices sorted in three main chapters: crisis preparedness, emergency response and post crisis action. These are non-binding, voluntary principles and guidelines that govern the different stakeholders’ duties and roles in protecting migrants in countries in crisis (IOM, 2016).

Lessons learnt from past policy responses to shock-related migration

This section analyses how OECD countries have responded to major recent environmental and geopolitical shocks in recent decades and identifies some key lessons learnt.

Migration related to environmental shocks

Over the past 10 to 15 years a large number of natural disasters have affected countries of origin and destination, international movements of people and migration policies. They include the Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami in 2004, the Haiti earthquake in 2010 and those of Japan and New Zealand in 2011, the hurricanes Katrina and Sandy, a series of floods, cyclones and volcano eruptions, and droughts and famines (Annex 4.A2). Which policy instruments were used in response and how did OECD countries adapt their migration legislations and regulations?

Countries provide relief for the victims of natural disasters through constitutional asylum;⁷ subsidiary or temporary protection; humanitarian admissions; the suspension of removals; and, more rarely, by facilitating family reunification or legal migration through other channels (Cooper, 2012; EMN, 2010).

The United States, for example, created the Temporary Protected Status (TPS) in its 1990 Immigration Act. Here, the list of reasons that may result in a country being designated for TPS and, thus, qualify a national of that country for protection does include instances where “an earthquake, flood, drought, epidemic, or other environmental disaster in the state [has resulted] in a substantial, but temporary, disruption of living conditions in the area affected”. This piece of legislation gives beneficiaries, who must already be in the United States as of specific eligibility dates set at the time of a country’s designation, provisional protection against deportation. TPS beneficiaries are also eligible for work authorization incident to their status. Employment restrictions on their original visas can also be eased but this is not systematic. The United States for instance allowed qualifying non-immigrants (i.e. students in a regular situation) to obtain employment authorisation after the Haitian earthquake and (for those facing economic hardship) after the Japanese earthquake and tsunami.

At the close of 2015, according to the Department of Homeland Security approximately 430 000 people were holding TPS in the United States. New TPS designations in the past two years have been Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone, designated for TPS in November 2014 because of the Ebola crisis; Yemen, designated for TPS in September 2015 due to an ongoing armed conflict; and Nepal, designated for TPS in June 2015 following the devastating magnitude 7.8 earthquake (USCIS, 2014c; 2015b; 2015c). The countries that currently benefit from TPS as a consequence of natural disasters are Nepal, Haiti (2010, earthquakes), Honduras and Nicaragua (1999, Hurricane Mitch), El Salvador (2001, earthquakes), and Somalia (1991, conflict and insecurity and indirectly drought and famine). Designations based on the environmental disaster provision of the TPS law require the country being designated to officially request a designation giving a bilateral dimension to this policy.

The length of a country’s initial designation for TPS can range from six to 18 months, but the designation can be extended for an unlimited number of 6, 12, or 18-month periods if conditions in the designated country continue to support the designation. TPS is a temporary immigration status that does not lead to beneficiaries becoming legal permanent residents in the United States through their TPS status, unless a special act of Congress is passed. Some nationalities (e.g. Somalia) have been under TPS for more than 20 years, creating the risk of “permanent temporariness for beneficiaries” (Messick and Bergeron, 2014).

Temporary residence permits were granted under similar conditions after environmental events in a number of other OECD countries:

Canada after the 2010 Haitian earthquake. Migrants were also allowed to apply for a change or extension of their non-immigrant status. Changes of status, however, did not result in permanent residence status.

France after the 2010 Haitian earthquake.

Australia after the 2011 earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear emergency in Japan.

In the EU context, two European Union directives, the Temporary Protection Directive (TPD) and the Qualification Directive (QD), could be used to grant international protection to victims of natural disasters. The TPD provides member states the ability to offer temporary protection in situations of “mass influxes”, or when large numbers of people migrate for unexpected reasons and cannot be dealt with on an individual basis (Kolmannskog, 2009). As for the Qualification Directive, it has provisions for granting subsidiary protection to those who face a “real risk of suffering serious harm” if they had to return to their country of origin, even if they do not qualify as refugees under the terms the 1951 Refugee Convention (Council of the European Union, 2004, Article 2). However, neither directive explicitly cites environmental reasons as the grounds for forced migration, leaving individual member states free to interpret them as they see fit.

At the national level, the most commonly observed policy response of countries to environmental shocks is to suspend the deportation of the affected foreign citizens who are on their soil because the authorities of their origin country would typically be unable to cope with the returnees. As with the TPS, these measures affect only those migrants already in the host country. For example, following the 2004 tsunami:

Canada suspended the deportation of roughly 4 000 migrants.

Switzerland delayed the deportation of asylum seekers from Sri Lanka until February 2005.

The United Kingdom announced the postponement of forced repatriations.

The United States halted deportations of migrants from Sri Lanka and the Maldives until April 2005 (although in that case the countries were not designated for TPS).

Likewise, in the aftermath of the Haiti earthquake, Canada, France, Mexico, and the United States –traditionally the four main Haitian migration destinations – together with Costa Rica, Denmark, Germany, Lebanon, Paraguay, Romania, the Slovak Republic, and Slovenia all suspended forced returns of Haitian nationals (Independent Expert).⁸

Similarly, although the environmental shock occurred on its own soil, the United States also granted fee waivers to immigrants in areas affected by Hurricanes Katrina and Sandy and expedited the processing of their service/benefit requests and employment authorisations under “Special Situations” provisions (Box 4.3). New Zealand and Japan also took actions to support immigrants after their earthquakes in 2011. And, very recently, the wildfire in Fort McMurray in the Canadian province of Alberta, displaced thousands of migrant workers. The Minister of Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada (IRCC) has authorized a public policy with special measures for temporary residents and approved special measures for citizens and permanent residents directly affected by the crisis situation.

Box 4.3. Natural disasters that have affected immigrants in OECD destination countries

Shocks that affect origin countries usually have policy implications for neighbouring and immigration host countries. However, migration crises can occur anywhere. That includes OECD destination countries where migrants may be travelling, living or working. Indeed, a number of them have experienced natural shocks that have compelled them to address the situations of migrants, especially temporary migrants.

The United States

A prominent policy experience was how the United States took relief measures to help the foreign nationals affected by Hurricanes Katrina (2005) and Sandy (2012) who may have lost housing, employment, and personal documentation because of the disaster. The federal government offered support to both temporary and permanent residents. Measures to ease the plight of temporary migrants included:

allowing individuals who were in the United States at the time of the hurricanes to switch to non-immigrant status, or extend it, even after the authorised period of admission had expired;

extending paroles already granted by the Citizenship Immigration Services, or re-paroling;

expediting the processing of applications for permission to work (including off-campus) for students experiencing economic hardship;

extending deadlines and increasing support for rescheduling interviews.

As for lawful permanent residents, consular assistance was extended to those stranded overseas without immigration or travel documents such as Green Cards. Immigration relief was also offered more recently as a result of the floods in South Carolina (2015).

Japan

The Great East Earthquake in Japan in 2011 led to a significant outflow and the negative net migration of foreigners.¹ Immediately after the natural disaster and the accident at the Fukushima No. 1 nuclear power plant, 2 600 foreign trainees – or about 60% of the 4 100 in the three prefectures affected – left Japan. But, by late 2013, that number had recovered to 80% of pre-disaster levels.² In the wake of the earthquake, a number of foreign trainees and technical interns had quit Japan, some without obtaining re-entry permission. However, the Japanese government recognised the urgent nature of the circumstances and allowed them to return and complete their training.³

Shocks that affect origin countries usually have policy implications for neighbouring and immigration host countries. However, migration crises can occur anywhere. That includes OECD destination countries where migrants may be travelling, living or working. Indeed, a number of them have experienced natural shocks that have compelled them to address the situations of migrants, especially temporary migrants.

New Zealand

New Zealand experienced a severe earthquake in the Christchurch area on 22 February 2011. It affected native-born and migrants alike. An immediate policy response was the special direction issued by the Minister for Immigration (1 March 2011) allowing temporary migrants whose visa was due to expire before 31 March 2011 to apply for an extension of their visas. The extension added an extra three months of validity that allowed multiple entry travel to work or study. In addition, temporary migrants who were out of the country at the time saw their visas extended by an extra three months. To enable the rapid entry of emergency personnel from countries offering help, the Minister also issued special directions (even though most came from visa exempt countries).

Christchurch is a key region of resettlement of refugees. Those who had recently arrived and were living in Christchurch were mostly relocated to Auckland and, with the agreement of the UNHCR, Christchurch’s quota for the next two years was reduced. After averaging around 120 quota refugees annually between 2005 and 2010, the number that Christchurch welcomes has dropped to single digits in the last few years.⁴

1. Policy Research Institute, Ministry of Finance, Japan, Public Policy Review, Vol. 10, No 1, March 2014.

2. http://ajw.asahi.com/article/0311disaster/recovery/AJ201403070079.

3. www.moj.go.jp/nyuukokukanri/kouhou/nyuukokukanri01_00074.html.

4. www.immigration.govt.nz/NR/rdonlyres/2BBF70DC-6C0B-4041-B914-FE20566D068A/0/RQBStatPakInternet.pdf.

Some of the salient practices to emerge from host countries’ experience of responding to environment-related migration are:

they extend relief measures on a case-by-case basis to temporary migrants living, working or studying on their soil;

they help migrants by easing their legal entitlement to seek work in the event of financial distress or to extend their legal status where it is about to expire;

they lighten administrative burdens and fees so as not to add to migrants’ woes at times of such acute crisis;

they do not open up any special measures to the possibility of permanent settlement.

Another important policy option used by some host countries is to allow people in affected areas to join members of their family already living on their soil. Most policy changes of this nature have involved simplifying or expediting procedures:

France allowed members of Haitian migrants’ families to enter without temporary visas and processed without delay their applications to stay temporarily.

The Haitian Family Reunification Parole Programme in the United States not only facilitated and accelerated applications, but authorised applicants to reside and work in the United States before their application was completed.

After the volcanic eruptions in Guatemala in 2010, United States expedited the processing of visa applications from Guatemalans who were family members of US citizens and lawful permanent residents.

After the tsunami that swept the Indian Ocean in 2004, Canada took measures to admit members of the families of Canadian citizens or permanent residents who originated from the affected countries.

it expedited the processing of Family Class applications from Canadian citizens and permanent residents who wished to sponsor close relatives affected by the disaster in a serious and personal way;

it examined case-by-case applications from people affected by the disaster who had relatives in Canada but did not qualify under Family Class;

it waived new application processing fees and the Permanent Residence (Right of Landing) fee for all classes of applicants affected by the disaster.

Some countries facilitate protection for migrants both within and outside their borders in the wake of environmental disasters. After the 2004 tsunami, for example, Australia fast-tracked pending applications from immigrants already present in the country and temporary visa requests from asylum seekers from affected countries (DIMIA, 2005; IOM, 2009; Laczko and Collett, 2005).

Very few countries have, however, taken steps to enact new programmes or adapt legal pathways to enable people fleeing natural disaster to come temporarily or settle. Countries that have include Brazil and, after some delay, the United States in response to the Haitian earthquake. Brazil introduced humanitarian visas for Haitian nationals in 2010. The United States added in January 2012 Haiti to the list of countries whose nationals were eligible for H2-A and H2-B visas (for temporary workers in agriculture and non-agricultural sectors, respectively).

In the European Union, Sweden, Finland, and Italy have – individually – granted temporary protection and relief to people whose countries of origin have been affected by natural disaster. Unlike the policies discussed above, those of the three European countries allow refugees who have sought initial shelter in a third country to settle temporarily. In other words, they need not be in the country of destination to apply. Sweden has included aliens “unable to return to the country of origin because of an environmental disaster” in the category of “persons otherwise in need of protection”. On principle, Sweden – and Finland – also allows environmental refugee status to be claimed under existing asylum laws (Baldinelli and Black, 2016). As for Italy, the law provides for temporary protection for those affected by humanitarian events, specifically including natural disasters outside the European Union.

From the case studies examined in Annex 4.A2 and, more generally, the past experience of OECD countries in dealing with environmental shocks, three key lessons are to be learnt:

Although the COP21 and the Nansen Initiative have improved matters, the international legal framework governing the migration effect of environmental shocks is still limited. A soft-law approach, building on the example of the UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement which have made their way into some national legislation, may actually be more pragmatic.

National legal frameworks have found ways to respond to the migration and displacement triggered by extreme environmental events. Responses have taken similar forms in the United States, the EU and other OECD countries, with all focusing on short-term visas and the temporary suspension of deportations. Practices vary, however, significantly from country to country. Internationally agreed guidelines could be useful to set minimal standards in terms of short-term and tolerated statuses to those stranded on their soil because of natural disasters.

Few OECD countries have the legal instruments for a more proactive response – only a handful make explicit reference to natural-cum-environmental disasters in their legislation on protection. They should seek to develop more stable instruments to protect migrants on their soil in the event of protracted environmental crises in countries of origin.

Migration related to geopolitical shocks

Recent years have been marked by a series of major geopolitical shocks and conflicts, notably in Africa and Western Asia, that have generated massive displacements of population. Past and present conflicts include those in Darfur, Somalia, Iraq and Afghanistan as well as those in Libya and Syria (Annex 4.A3) against the background of the Arab Spring uprisings. In the 1990s, the main geopolitical shocks took place in Europe, the prime example being the break-up of former Yugoslavia (Annex 4.A3). Earlier mass migration flows to the OECD sprang from different parts of the world – be it in the context of decolonisation or the Cuban and Vietnamese boat people, for instance (Annex 4.A3). In all cases, large numbers of people were affected and the protection systems of the main destination countries were challenged. How have OECD countries responded over time and what have the main policy trade-offs been?

This section discusses the different types of protection statuses, how OECD countries use them and how they approach the provision of protection – e.g. 1951 Refugee Convention versus temporary protection status and resettlement versus asylum. It then examines international co-operation in managing migration the aftermaths of geopolitical shocks, going on to analyse the role of overseas development assistance (ODA) and humanitarian aid.

1951 Refugee Convention status versus subsidiary and temporary protection

Most OECD countries have ratified the 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1967 protocol relating to the status of refugees?⁹ They are, therefore, obliged under international law to receive claims for asylum and provide protection to people who meet the Convention’s definition of a “refugee” – i.e. a person who “is unable or unwilling to return to their country of origin owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion”. An important requirement of the Convention is non-refoulement whereby “no one shall expel or return (“refouler”) a refugee against his or her will, in any manner whatsoever, to a territory where he or she fears threats to life or freedom.”

Importantly, not all people fleeing a geopolitical shock will qualify as refugees under the 1951 Refugee Convention, as it calls for protection against targeted rather than generalised persecution. In other words, people who flee a conflict or civil war but cannot prove that they are specific targets of the violence may not qualify as refugees under the 1951 Refugee Convention. In practice, the applicability of the Geneva Convention depends on the conflict. For example, the UNHCR’s latest guidance on “International Protection Considerations with Regard to People Fleeing the Syrian Arab Republic” suggests that “most Syrians seeking international protection are likely to fulfil the requirements of the refugee definition contained in Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Refugee Convention, since they will have a well-founded fear of persecution linked to one of the Convention grounds” (UNHCR, 2015a).

In response to the sudden and massive inflows of people fleeing geopolitical crises, countries have created special temporary and subsidiary protection statuses. The pioneers were European countries seeking a response to the large-scale outflows of people from the conflict in the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s.¹⁰ The UNHCR endorses temporary protection as an emergency response to an overwhelming situation (UNHCR, 2000a).

In 1981, Australia adopted a Special Humanitarian Programme for those who would not qualify as refugees under the Geneva Convention. Ten years later came the Special Assistance Category for people fleeing civil disorder. In between times, it had introduced the so-called “Safe Haven Visa” in 1999 to give temporary refuge to people from Kosovo and a three-year temporary protection visa with reduced rights for unauthorised arrivals who qualified for protection. It was abolished in 2008. However, in 2014 Temporary Protection Visas were reintroduced, along with a 5 year variant, the Safe Haven Enterprise Visa. The Safe Haven Enterprise Visa provides a pathway to apply for other visas if holders work or study in a designated regional area for 3.5 years.

Alternative temporary/subsidiary protection statuses encompass the “principle of non-refoulement” but, compared with convention refugee status, are generally associated with fewer rights and the idea that people will not settle in the destination country. Things, however, do not always work out that way.

For example, large numbers of the Bosnian refugees who fled the Balkan conflict between 1992 and 1995 – the first large refugee group to fall under a ‘temporary protection regime’ – did not go home. They feared “ethnic cleansing” and preferred to stay abroad, even after the Dayton Peace Agreement of 1995 (Koser and Black, 1999). As it became ever more apparent that many refugees would not return, some OECD countries (e.g. Austria, Finland and Luxemburg) allowed them to transition over time from a temporary protection status to some form of permanent residence. Germany, which initially welcomed 60% of the Bosnian population who sought refuge in the EU, promoted voluntary returns. But it was estimated that, by 1997, only one-third had gone home (Koser and Black, 1999).

In contrast, Kosovar refugees returned home en masse soon after the end of the Kosovo War in 1999. During the conflict, over 100 000 people were given temporary protection in European and other OECD countries through the Humanitarian Evacuation Programme organised by the UNHCR and IOM. Only the United States offered refugees fleeing the warzone permanent residence. Proximity to the country of origin, the relatively short-lived nature of the conflict, and robust post-war action by the international community were undoubtedly critical factors.

In Europe, in a context of mushrooming national legislation, two council directives sought to set common criteria and standards across the EU with the Temporary Protection Directive (Council Directive 2001/55/EC) and the Qualification Directive (Council Directive 2004/83/EC).¹¹ The Temporary Protection Directive built temporary protection for mass influxes on solidarity and shared responsibility between EU member states. It has never been activated since it was first agreed in 2001 (Box 4.4).

Box 4.4. Why has the Temporary Protection Directive never been used?

In 2001 the EU adopted the Temporary Protection Directive (TPD). It spells out harmonised standards for the temporary protection of displaced persons in cases of “mass influx” on the basis of solidarity and responsibility-sharing between EU member states. The TPD was intended to provide a formal legal framework for temporary protection in the wake of the refugee crises in former Yugoslavia in the 1990s, when many European countries gave temporary shelter (mainly through the Humanitarian Evacuation Programmes) to refugees fleeing the wars in Bosnia and Kosovo.

The TPD defines a “mass influx” as “the arrival in the community of a large number of displaced persons, who came from a specific country or geographical area, whether the arrival in the Community was spontaneous or aided, for example through an evacuation programme” (Article 2d). It is particularly meant to apply when “there is also a risk that the asylum system will be unable to process this influx without adverse effects for its efficient operation, in the interests of the persons concerned and other persons requesting protection” (Article 2a). The TPD incorporates an activation mechanism. To trigger it, the European Commission must propose activation and the Council (made up of representatives of the member states) adopt a resolution by a qualified majority.

The protection provided under the directive would be temporary and generally last for a year, although it could be extended by a Council decision to two years at the most. Temporary protection would not come with the full rights associated with refugee status. For example, while those provided with temporary protection would be entitled to emergency health care, accommodation, work, and their children’s education, they would have only limited family reunification rights. And refugee status would be denied until the temporary protection status ends.

The EU’s Temporary Protection Directive has never been implemented. Why has it not been used, for example, to help EU member states cope with the mass inflows of Syrian and other refugees over the past few years?

There are three possible explanations. First, the Directive builds on the sharing of responsibility between EU member states (though it does not say so in so many words). Yet it does not specify precisely how refugees would be distributed across countries, preferring to leave it up to the European Council.

Second, a number of EU countries already offer temporary protection statuses through national schemes (European Migration Network, 2010), though the degrees of protection and rights granted vary widely from one to another. Most schemes provide standards protection that are lower than those stipulated in the TPD. Some EU countries already harbouring displaced Syrians may be reluctant to agree to an EU-wide harmonised policy that would require them to grant greater protection and more rights.

Third, there appears to have been considerable concern in some member states that activating the Directive would act as a “pull-factor” and encourage an ever greater number of refugees to make their way to Europe.

Resettlement versus asylum seeking

Resettlement is the transfer of refugees from one asylum country to another that has agreed to admit and ultimately grant them permanent settlement. It is a key protection policy instrument, though not all OECD countries make use of it.¹² Over the past 20 years, over 1.5 million refugees have arrived in the OECD area through resettlement programmes. And, since 2009, around 100 000 have been resettled annually (Figure 4.1) – between a third and a quarter of all humanitarian permits granted each year.

Figure 4.1. Resettlement arrivals in OECD countries

Source: UNHCR.

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395649

The United States alone accounts for some two-thirds of all resettlements in the OECD in the past 10 years, followed by Canada and Australia. Apart from in the Nordic countries, resettlement is not, however, common practice in Europe and most countries require refugees to seek asylum in the destination country. In 2015, Italy became a new resettlement country and Korea announced a three-year pilot programme, so increasing the number of resettlement countries to 28 worldwide.

Some OECD countries (Australia, Canada, United States and New Zealand) have made intensive use of resettlement in previous geopolitical crises. Between 1975 and 1995, over 3 million people from Viet Nam, Laos, and Cambodia fled to neighbouring countries to seek asylum. During these two decades, the UNHCR resettled more than 1.3 million. Less than 200 000 were resettled in Europe, with France accounting for half. And, although Europe took in the most people fleeing the Yugoslavian Wars, the largest resettlement programme was again in the United States which became home to more than 125 000 refugees over a 10-year period starting in 1992.

The US Refugee Admissions Program resettles about 70 000 refugees every year and there are plans to increase that number to 85 000 in 2016 and 100 000 in 2017. In the Syrian refugee crisis, though, the United States has not been in the forefront so far. Since 2011, it has admitted only about 2 200 Syrian refugees, although the government has announced it will resettle at least 10 000 in fiscal year 2016.13

Since 2013, Canada has resettled 45 130 refugees of all nationalities. Regarding Syrian refugees in particular, from 2013-15, Canada resettled approximately 9 000 Syrian refugees; additionally, Canada recently met its commitment to resettle 25 000 Syrian refugees (arrived in Canada between November 4, 2015 and February 29, 2016). In September 2015, New Zealand announced 750 resettlement places for Syrian refugees, including 600 in addition to its annual quota of 750 (ie. 150 places are offered within the quota). Australia, will increase its humanitarian programme with 16 250 places in 2017-18 and 18 750 places in 2018-19. In 2015, Australia committed an additional 12 000 places for people who are fleeing the conflict in Syria and Iraq.

In 2015, Germany commenced a programme to resettle 500 refugees per year. It came on top of a three-stage federal admission plan that took in a total of 20 000 Syrian refugees in need of special protection: a first intake of 5 000 refugees in May 2013, a further 5 000 in December 2013 and a third group of 10 000 in July 2014. What is more, over 20 000 resettlement places have also been available since 2011 under private sponsorships for people with family links with Syrians. The various schemes make Germany one of the OECD’s most generous resettlement countries for Syrian refugees with an intake so far of 42 000.

Few other European countries run sizeable resettlement programmes for Syrian refugees. Two that do are Norway and Sweden, and a growing number are planning to (Annex 4.A3). The United Kingdom, for example, announced the expansion of its Vulnerable Person Resettlement Scheme to up to 20 000 Syrian refugees by 2020.

In March 2016, the European Union agreed with Turkey on a plan to resettle 72 000 Syrians. Although the deal opens a new safe and legal pathway to Europe, the intake is tiny relative to the yearly number of asylum applications from Syrians in the European Economic Area – 378 000 in 2015 and 140 000 in the first three months of 2016.

Emergency measures for temporary resident and legal pathways

Conflicts and instability in countries of origin also raise a number of practical questions for migrants who are on temporary visas, especially when visas have nearly expired; who have received a court order to leave the host country; who are undocumented; and who have family members in the country at war and would like to be reunited with them.

As they do in the event of environmental shocks, most countries also temporarily suspend deportations of migrants from countries affected by major geopolitical shocks. The United States, for example, has recently added Yemen and Syria to the list of countries covered by TPS (Table 4.1). In Europe, all countries have taken steps to provide temporary protection to Syrian nationals or, at the very least, suspend removing them.¹⁴

Table 4.1. Countries whose nationals in the United States currently benefit from Temporary Protection Status
| Arrival Date | Current Expiration Date | Number
El Salvador | 13 February 2001 | 9 September 2016 | 263 876
Guinea | 20 November 2014 | 21 November 2016 | 820
Haiti | 12 January 2011 | 22 July 2017 | 58 954
Honduras | 30 December 1998 | 5 January 2018 | 86 573
Liberia | 20 November 2014 | 21 November 2016 | 2 046
Nepal | 24 June 2015 | 24 December 2016 | 3 325
Nicaragua | 30 December 1998 | 5 January 2018 | 5 368
Sierra Leone | 20 November 2014 | 21 November 2016 | 1 121
Somalia | 1 May 2012 | 17 March 2017 | 486
South Sudan | 25 January 2016 | 2 November 2017 | 27
Sudan | 9 January 2013 | 2 November 2017 | 1 023
Syria | 5 January 2015 | 30 September 2016 | 4 999
Yemen | 3 September 2015 | 3 March 2017 | 0
Total |  |  | 428 618
Note: Cumulative figures as of 31 December 2015. For Yemen, applications had not yet been adjudicated as of that date.
Source: Department of Homeland Security compilation of USCIS data.
StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933396403

Some OECD countries have developed special, generally time-bound, programmes to fast-track family reunification, as Ireland and Switzerland have done for Syrians. Few OECD countries, however, have actively used regular non-humanitarian legal pathways to accommodate people in need of protection as a result of geopolitical shocks. This question will be discussed more in depth in the next section.

International agreements and international co-operation

International co-operation with countries of first asylum, transit countries and, when possible, with countries of origin is usually a key element in OECD countries’ policy responses to any humanitarian crisis. It is particularly critical in the fight against irregular migration and smuggling networks (Box 4.5), but helps create an orderly environment for protection.

Box 4.5. Can people smuggling be ended?

In 2015, over a million people entered Europe illegally. They came mainly from Libya entering Europe through Italy and from Turkey into Greece. Most of the migrants who used those routes put their lives in the hands of unscrupulous human smugglers and traffickers, who make big money out of the business. Tackling this criminal trade has become a top priority for policy makers. In May 2015 the EU issued an action plan against people smuggling.*

People smuggling takes different forms and may involve a large number of intermediaries. It can be structured as transnational networks or, more often, comprise loosely connected informal organisations and individuals. It can be organised from origin to destination or made up of a succession of short travel routes. It can involve irregular borders crossings or the use of fraudulent travel documents.

Past experience of OECD countries shows that co-operation with countries of transit and origin is an important component in the fight against human smuggling. In the longer term, however, it may not be sufficient if the smugglers’ business model cannot be undermined.

In addition to stronger border controls and closer international police co-operation, policies should target smugglers’ profits and the demand for smuggling. Reducing the profitability of smuggling without tackling the demand side carries the risk that smugglers will simply increase their offer on low-cost, deadlier routes.

For refugees, one of the few available options to curb demand seems to be, at least in the short term, to offer more – and quicker – resettlement options. For economic migrants, curbing demand would entail stepping up prevention, information campaigns and employment options in origin countries as well as increasing opportunities for legal labour migration, particularly in sectors which are structurally dependent on undocumented migrants. It would also require reinforcing controls and sanctions against the illegal employment of foreign workers.

Tackling people smuggling also requires new medium- and longer-term approaches to development programmes and development assistance. Countries should move towards development-led strategies to counter smuggling, adapt development programmes to serve those more likely to use smuggling routes, and increase employment opportunities at the regional level while promoting intra-regional mobility.

* http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/e-library/documents/policies/asylum/general/docs/eu_action_plan_against_ migrant_smuggling_en.pdf.

Source: OECD (2015).

Here again, historical examples are telling. In the late 1980s the Second International Conference on the Indochinese Refugee Crisis resulted in the adoption of the Comprehensive Plan of Action (CPA). The CPA directly involved Viet Nam – as the major refugee-producing country in this crisis. It sought to curb illegal departures from Viet Nam – not only by resettling refugees who were still in Viet Nam but also by forcibly returning to Viet Nam those whose asylum applications had been rejected. International co-operation was also critical at the time of the migration upsurge from Albania to Italy in 1992 (more than 300 000 arrivals) and, more recently, in managing illegal migration between Morocco and Spain.

However, geopolitical shocks can disrupt national and bilateral instruments for managing migration. By the same token, international co-operation in the fight against human trafficking and irregular migration is also significantly weakened, legal labour migration channels are closed, repatriation agreements are terminated, consular services are thrown into disorder or shut down, and the exchange of information is curtailed.

Poor co-operation over border control with neighbouring transit countries can also cause problems at times of geopolitical crisis. Libya is a case in point. In this context, the issue has been less an upsurge in refugees, at least until recently, and the fact that Libya’s political instability and endemic insecurity has paved the way for the expansion of smuggling networks and illegal migration, particularly from Sub-Saharan Africa.

Improving the economic and social situation of refugees in countries of first asylum and containment

Financial assistance, often through Official Development Assistance (ODA), is also part of the policy response that OECD countries can provide notably to improve the capacity of countries neighbouring the conflict area to support the sudden and often massive influx of refugees. Development has three main objectives in these situations: addressing the root causes of the crisis, to the extent possible; improving the self-reliance – or resilience – of refugees in the country of first asylum; and ensuring that development gains in refugee hosting countries are not eroded by the knock-on effects of the crisis (such as the loss of key markets, or insecure borders) or by the pressures that the influx has placed on basic services, social cohesion, natural resources and other assets. Beyond humanitarian considerations, another key foreign policy objective is often to increase containment in the region and reduce intercontinental displacements.

This approach was central to the resolution of the Indochinese refugee crisis in the 1970s and remains a top priority for the international community as it seeks to respond to the current crisis. Traditional forms of ODA to developing countries in crisis have not always been properly adapted to needs. For example, better tools need to be devised to support middle-income countries, such as Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey, who host very large refugee populations.

In the context of the Syrian crisis, in February 2016, the United Kingdom, Germany, Kuwait, Norway, and the United Nations co-hosted a conference in London to raise new funding to meet the immediate and longer-term needs of those affected by the conflict in Syria. The conference secured over USD 11 billion in pledges – USD 5.8 billion for 2016 and a further USD 5.4 billion for 2017-20. A comprehensive approach was also endorsed, particularly to assist Jordan. It comprised support for medium-term growth and greater employment opportunities for refugees and Jordan workers alike.

Much still needs to be done, however, simply to cope with the urgency of the situation. In May 2016, for example, less than a quarter of the funding needs estimated by the UNHCR for Syria for the year had been met. Generally, though, there is a need for further action to strengthen the self-reliance of displaced Syrians by fostering more legal opportunities for them to work and giving them better access to education in their current country of residence.

UNICEF estimates that more than 2.1 million children inside Syria and 700 000 in neighbouring countries (including 400 000 in Turkey) are out of school. In response, it launched the “No Lost Generation Initiative” in 2013. Much more recently, in May 2016, the United Nations started a new initiative, “Education cannot wait” aimed at raising USD 3.85 billion from private and public donors over the next five years to provide (mostly Syrian) displaced children and school-age refugees with some schooling. Legal or practical obstacles to formal employment for Syrians in Jordan,¹⁵and to a some extent Turkey,¹⁶ may also bar Syrian refugees from the means to sustain themselves and drive them into secondary migration.

Humanitarian response typically focuses on providing protection and basic needs in countries of first asylum. When a crisis becomes protracted more is clearly required. The challenge becomes to enable people to make a sustainable living, which calls for a different approach and, in many cases, greater synergy between humanitarian and development action. Development actors need to focus more on the short-term effects of policy changes and investments, while their humanitarian counterparts must seek to build refugees’ self-sufficiency. Strengthening the resilience of regionally displaced people in the event of long-lasting crises is certainly part of the answer, although it can of course not be the only one.

UNHCR resettlement programmes remain a key instrument for protecting the most vulnerable, like those with special medical needs. Directing greater resources into programmes to speed up processing and increase the number of potential beneficiaries should remain a priority for the international community.

Resettlement is not, however, accessible to less disadvantaged, middle-income refugee groups. While some of them may prefer to remain close to their home country, others consider alternative options, particularly as the conflict drags on.¹⁷ Although these are the refugees who have the means to pay smugglers, they are not targeted by humanitarian aid or traditional development programmes. More needs to be done to understand this group, how they differ from those who do not migrate, and to what types of development programmes they would best respond. It could be highly worthwhile considering alternative legal migration pathways for less disadvantaged, middle-income refugees.

From the case studies examined above six key lessons emerge:

OECD countries make use of temporary relief measures for people already on their soil who originate from countries in conflict – much as they do for people displaced by environmental shocks. Although most would be entitled to apply for asylum in the event of protracted conflicts, in some case restrictions apply and keep people relatively under precarious protection statuses.

Few OECD countries have large resettlement programmes. Though generally slow and of limited scope, resettlement is still one of the most effective protection channels for people, particularly the most vulnerable, fleeing war zones and civil conflicts. A growing number of European member states and European Union itself have developed new resettlement programmes or scaled up existing ones. Increasing the resources for these programmes should be a priority for the international community.

Temporary and subsidiary protection remains, especially in Europe, the most common response to upsurges in number of asylum seekers fleeing, including in the current humanitarian crisis.

Very few countries have developed specific policy responses or made use of alternative legal pathways so far. The upshot is that people not prioritised by UNHCR resettlement programmes and who struggle to integrate in their country of first asylum may have little alternative but irregular migration in the context of protracted crises.

International co-operation is a critical component of responses to all humanitarian crises. But it has become more difficult and complex due to countries’ reluctance to share responsibilities for protecting migrants displaced by recent geopolitical shocks. Co-ordination between humanitarian and development actors is emerging as a key part of responses to protracted displacement crises.

More effort and resources must go into understanding and addressing the root causes of shocks to prevent crises. Development assistance for countries of first asylum to improve the economic and social plight of refugees is necessary, but containment cannot be the main response to acute humanitarian crises.

OECD countries who have, in the past, experienced migration caused by environmental and geopolitical shocks may have the capacity to adapt relatively quickly, but draw on only a limited range of instruments. They have particularly made very little use so far of legal migration channels as ways of affording protection to refugees and other beneficiaries on international protection in the event of protracted crises. The next section of this chapter reviews and evaluates the alternative available options.

Alternative pathways for people in need of international protection

People in need of international protection usually flee first to neighbouring countries to save their lives. Some may then be resettled in another country through UNHCR programmes or country-specific humanitarian arrangements. In case of protracted crises, others are left with two choices unless they are able to go home: rebuild their life in the country of first asylum or onward movement to seek a better future further away.

Alternative pathways¹⁸ are migration channels which, though not always originally designed for international protection, can complement resettlement schemes. There are two kinds – general mobility and humanitarian. Alternative general mobility pathways encompass labour, international study and family migration visas. As for alternative humanitarian channels, they refer to humanitarian visas and private sponsorship schemes. With humanitarian visas people can lawfully enter a destination country where they submit a formal asylum application. In sponsorship schemes, private stakeholders share the costs of resettling refugees or of facilitating the use of alternative general mobility pathway. The aim is to increase the number of potential beneficiaries. Figure 4.2 schematically illustrates the different options and links them to relevant target groups.

Figure 4.2. Resettlement and alternative pathways for people in need of international protection

This section discusses alternative pathways, drawing on research in the area – e.g. Long (2009, 2013, 2015); FRA (2015); Kumin (2015); Collett et al. (2016). It seeks to offer a detailed, positive, normative evaluation of the potential of both options, assessing how widely they have been used, their potential, and the different pathways currently available for Syrian refugees.

An important question should first be asked, however: who should be able to access alternative pathways? The target group should be displaced people living inside and outside refugee camps. It would cover those who have been granted temporary protection and those who have conventional refugee status. It would exclude those who are not yet registered in a country of first asylum.

Alternative general mobility pathways for beneficiaries of international protection

The general mobility pathways for potential beneficiaries of international protection are, on one hand, labour and study migration and, on the other, family migration. The former generally offer fewer rights than the latter. The implications of these limitations are discussed in a separate section before assessing the impact of family migration as a third “alternative general mobility pathway” for beneficiaries of international protection.

Labour migration

Labour migration accounts for a substantial share of all movements to the OECD. In 2014, more than 500 000 permanent migrants settled in the OECD for the purpose of employment -14% of the total – and more than 2 million were granted a temporary work permit. How could labour immigration policies be an alternative pathway for refugees and other beneficiaries of international protection?¹⁹

There are three broad approaches:

solely help refugees to access existing labour immigration channels

create incentives for employers to recruit people under international protection from abroad within the broad parameters of labour migration policies

draw up new labour migration programmes specifically for refugees.

Any consideration of the three options should not lose sight that, under almost all existing labour migration programmes, it is the employer rather than the foreign worker who applies for the work permit. So, if the policy goal is to enable refugees to access labour migration programmes, employer demand is of central importance.

Helping refugees access existing labour immigration programmes

In principle, employers can recruit refugees from abroad through existing labour migration programmes. In practice, they do so only if they deem them to be the most suitable candidates for job vacancies. A range of factors determine employers’ hiring decisions – e.g. skills, work experience, and the costs of recruitment, which includes any on-the-job training that may be necessary. In other words, refugees will have to compete with migrant workers from all over the world.

There are a number of reasons why refugees are at a disadvantage to other migrants when competing for admission as labour migrants. First, they know little about employment opportunities and labour migration programmes. Similarly, employers and recruitment agencies in OECD countries are unlikely to be aware of the availability and attributes of the potential labour supply provided by refugees from regions in conflict.

To help match skills with vacancies, an obvious first step is therefore to inform refugees in first countries of asylum and employers in OECD countries. Information portals could be useful to that end. The European Science4Refugees²⁰ initiative is aimed precisely at better matching refugee skills with available job offers in research. The privately sponsored project in the United States, Talent Beyond Boundaries,²¹ also seeks to link employer demand with refugees’ skills by mapping the skills of refugees in Lebanon, Jordan, and Turkey.

A second fundamental set of disadvantages that refugees face relates to the many administrative requirements of the labour migration process – proof of identity, international travel documents, the certification of migrants’ skills and qualifications, the requirement to prove a clean criminal record, etc. If refugees are to stand an acceptable chance of gaining admission to OECD countries under existing labour migration programmes, those countries should lend more active support, particularly in speeding up security screening and evaluations of skills requirements.

Destination countries could also waive part of the visa fees or permit delayed payment to avoid that high cost prevents refugees from using legal labour channels. More generally, mobility of refugees with a job offer could be facilitated within the OECD to enable a better use and allocation of skills and talents of refugees. These questions can be illustrated in the EU context (Box 4.6 addresses those questions in the EU context). Overall, though, simply granting access to labour migration programmes is unlikely to lead to OECD countries admitting large numbers of refugees as migrant workers. Even if some of the challenges outlined above were to be resolved, employers may still prefer to recruit migrant workers over refugees.

Box 4.6. Addressing bottlenecks for skilled refugees and asylum seekers in the EU legal migration framework

Asylum seekers and refugees are not generally covered by EU labour migration directives. Most refugees benefit from relatively favourable rights under the asylum acquis, but the EU restricts mobility among countries to avoid asylum shopping. In practice, therefore, beneficiaries of international protection in one EU country who find a job in another one would not be entitled to take it up without applying for a standard work permit and losing the benefit of their protection status. Further, EU Directives have specifically excluded beneficiaries of international protection. This means that EU permits under the Students and Researchers Directives, the EU Blue Card, and the Seasonal Workers directive cannot be issued to beneficiaries of international protection (the latter because it is only for applicants outside the EU). National permits may still be issued.

The exclusion was one concern during discussion of revision of the Blue Card Directive. Skilled refugees outside Europe have struggled to get their qualifications recognised and to access job offers in destination countries. Those who enjoy protection status in one EU country are locked into that country even if they qualify for a Blue Card permit in another. One solution, suggested by the UNHCR (2015b), would be to include refugee populations in a revised Blue Card Directive as a distinct category of qualified workers. The proposal by the Commission in June 2016 would indeed allow beneficiaries of international protection to apply for Blue Card permits in a second member state, without losing their protection in the first State or acquiring protection in the second.

A more complex question is that of asylum seekers whose application has been denied. Some countries, such as Sweden, have provisions for those who worked while awaiting a decision on their application to switch to labour migrant status if their application is refused. This was introduced as an incentive to seek employment during the long asylum procedure. Other countries oppose that course of action on the grounds that it would constitute a pull factor and become an incentive to abuse the asylum channel.

Source: OECD-EU, 2016.

Give employers incentive to recruit refugee workers from abroad

Beyond the provision of better information it would be possible to take measures aiming at providing incentives for employers to recruit refugees from abroad. In principle, this could be achieved either by encouraging the recruitment of refugees in addition to or instead of other migrant workers. In the latter case it would change the make-up of admissions, with more refugee-workers and fewer migrant workers, though it would not necessarily change the overall magnitude of labour migration programmes.

In practice, countries which regulate labour migration through quotas (e.g. the United States, Italy, Korea) could set aside a number of places for specific groups of refugees. As for those that use a points-based system to select migrant workers (Australia, Austria, Canada, Japan, Korea, the Netherlands, New Zealand and the United Kingdom), they could award bonus points for being under international protection. Destination countries with labour demand systems could adjust other parameters. They could adjust minimum pay thresholds for admission or skills requirements (by applying lower thresholds), ease labour market tests and shortage occupation lists (by relaxing the mandatory advertising period for refugees or by applying an extended occupation shortage list).

Reducing the administrative fees that employers need to pay when making a work permit application sounds constructive. However, this indirect subsidy, like other measures to facilitate recruitment, affect employers’ hiring costs only, not their direct employment costs – in other words, it would make it cheaper for employers to recruit, but not to employ a refugee-worker.

The IMF proposed allowing employers to hire refugees already in OECD countries at a wage below the minimum or prevailing level (Aiyar et al., 2016). Applied to overseas recruitments, the measure would allow employers to recruit refugee-workers at lower cost. There are a number of reasons why such an approach would not, however, be really efficient or desirable.

First of all, it would probably affect only the demand for low-skilled workers where existing labour migration channels are largely limited to seasonal activities and, in the case of Europe, concentrated on EU mobile workers. Second, refugees would be perceived as competing with, and potentially undercutting, domestic employment. The third, and most important, reason is that the move would, in all likelihood, undermine ongoing efforts to facilitate the economic integration of refugees already living in OECD countries and damage public support for refugees.

An alternative tack might be to encourage employers to recruit refugee-workers on the grounds of ethical recruitment and social corporate responsibility. If there were a widespread public perception that taking on refugees would be a “good thing to do”, companies might benefit from an ethical recruitment label appreciated by customers. Unfortunately, the argument would likely have traction only in certain countries and predominately with large companies.

Creating new temporary labour migration channels for overseas refugees

The third, and most ambitious, way to facilitate the recruitment of refugees from abroad would be through new temporary labour migration programmes specifically for people under international protection in third countries. To be politically and economically acceptable, though, the numbers admitted through such schemes would have to be capped, or at least tightly regulated.

Programmes could start as relatively small pilots that could eventually be scaled up. Their eventual size would depend on assessments of host countries’ demand for migrant labour and how it squares with the skills of the refugee population in question.

The rationale behind refugee-specific labour migration programmes would have to be based on the impossibility or inappropriateness of amending existing programmes. That would be the case for example if specific selection mechanisms in terms of skills, occupations and/or nationality are considered for refugees or if recruitments are taking place within specific bilateral labour migration agreements. The latter case raises the important question of who would negotiate and implement the provisions of the agreement on behalf of the refugee, given that countries of first asylum are unlikely to be effective advocates or negotiators in the context.

More generally, though, if alternative labour migration pathways are to work on a relatively large scale, the overall policy narrative would need to highlight the positive economic contribution that refugees can make and, at the same time, emphasise the realities and special regulatory requirements of what would, in effect, be migration for mixed motives. Indeed, in contrast to most existing policies that regulate different types of migration, the use of alternative labour migration pathways for refugees would amount to an explicitly “mixed-migration” policy. Despite the difficulties, though, history teaches us that this option might actually be realistic (Box 4.7), though implementation today would, of course, have to adjust to current protection practices and to the functioning of the labour markets and its evolving needs.

Box 4.7. Matching refugee skills with labour needs during the interwar period 1920-30

As Long (2015) recalls, one objective of the international protection system in the 1920s was to facilitate the entry of refugees through existing labour migration channels. The Nansen Passport, created in 1922 by Fridtjof Nansen who served as the League of Nations first High Commissioner for Refugees from 1920-30, was a travel document designed to enable stateless people to move around, particularly after the October Revolution. More than 450 000 Nansen passports had been issued by 1939.

Between 1925 and 1929, the International Labor Office assumed operational responsibility for refugees (Sallinen, 2013; Long, 2013). During that period the Refugee Service of the ILO was tasked with matching receiving countries’ employment needs with refugee quotas, often broken down by occupation. It has been calculated that some 60 000 refugees were able to find employment between 1924 and 1928 as a result of the efforts of the International Labour Office, mostly in the agricultural sector. In 1926, for example, more than 10 000 Ukrainians were placed on Canadian farms.

Student visas

The United States, the United Kingdom, France and Australia run extensive programmes for university students. In 2013 each of those four countries hosted between 250 000 and 750 000 international students, most of them in higher education. Germany and Canada, albeit to a lesser extent, are also important receiving countries. In total, almost 3 million international students are currently pursuing their education in OECD countries and most countries have greatly facilitated the switch from student visa to work permit in recent years (a notable exception being the United Kingdom).

The benefits of foreign student programmes are well known and amply documented. They are good for the host country, as they bring income through tuition fees, a potentially highly skilled labour supply, and direct links with countries of origin. There are potential benefits for countries of origin too, which do not have to foot the bill for higher education and may get back highly skilled workers when students return on completion of their courses.

When it comes to refugee students, young people with university diplomas in post-conflict societies may play a critical role in their country’s future. Members of the diaspora with special skills are indeed often enlisted by their countries of origin to contribute to post-conflict stabilisation efforts and help strengthen the development of fragile states by helping to rebuild government structures, promoting the rule of law and taking up management, technical and administrative jobs in key sectors such as health, education and banking (OECD, 2010).

A considerable proportion of the world’s refugees, especially those fleeing Syria, are young people, many of whom are in higher education or have the qualifications which would enable them to start university or post-secondary education. In principle, many refugees would be eligible for and would benefit from a student pathway into OECD countries. In practice, though, there are obstacles.

The first relates to who will pay the tuition fees and living costs of refugees and other beneficiaries of international protection when they become students.²² Only a relatively small group of relatively privileged refugees is likely to have their own resources.

In the case of Syria, a large number of public and private organisations have launched initiatives to fund Syrian students.²³The World University Service of Canada (WUSC) has partnered with many universities to finance scholarships and sponsor refugee students and their families, while the Canadian government recently announced its intention to help to expand the WUSC programme.²⁴ The German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD) has created a well endowed scholarship programme for Syrian students,²⁵ Portugal has offered 700 tuition waivers (most of which, however, remain unused), and France recently announced 1 000 scholarships for Syrian students. Japan and Morocco also announced that they were considering admitting Syrian refugees through scholarship programmes.²⁶

All the above initiatives are of relatively small scale. As for scholarships, they should cover not only tuition fees, but transport costs and enable decent living standards so that refugee students do not need to self-finance. Nor can refugee-student programmes be based simply on the expansion of existing scholarship programmes for foreign students. Universities need to adapt their courses – by tailoring curricula to needs and providing upskilling courses and language training. Scholarship levels have to be adjusted and psychological support provided. OECD countries should also consider if and on what conditions students can stay on irrespective of whether they graduate or not or whether they have a job offer or not. They should also think about allowing students to bring their spouses and children with them to maximise their chances of success and ensure basic rights compatible with international protection standards.

The UNHCR (2015c) identifies some conditions that higher education programmes in third countries must meet to be a viable option. These include inter alia to provide financial support so that students can pay tuition fees and meet the costs of studying and living for the duration of their course; to take the refugees’ situation into account and tailor academic programmes accordingly; and to not jeopardise the rights or legal status of refugees and ensure clear provisions for post-graduate options.

Although there appears to be a consensus on refugee students and many grass roots initiatives champion their cause, the full cost of the pathway for refugee students in higher education should not be underestimated. It amounts to the cost of resettlement (more than EUR 10 000 on average for the first year), plus additional higher education costs (which, though they vary widely across the OECD, but can be estimated at around EUR 10 000 per year). The foreign education programme is probably the most expensive of all alternative and traditional humanitarian pathways.

Some have argued that refugee-student programmes could be funded by sharing the cost between universities, the government and non-governmental sponsors. Employers could also get involved, especially if refugee-student programmes include vocational training and targeted shortage skills. However, in a context of limited financial resources and growing needs, particularly those of refugees already in OECD countries, there seems little prospect of any significant expansion of the student pathway.

Another obstacle to admitting refugees as students relates to the requirements applicants must typically meet to be admitted as foreign students to OECD higher education establishments. These include proof of educational qualifications (e.g. high-school diplomas), a formal record of past grades, proof of proficiency in English and domestic languages, etc. Many refugees have escaped conflicts in their home countries by leaving suddenly in fraught circumstances. They may well find it difficult to comply with requirements and produce the proper documents. In the global marketplace where there is fierce competition for foreign students, educational institutions are likely to be reluctant to drastically lower requirements for admission.

In Europe, the ENIC-NARIC network for the recognition of qualifications has published guidelines for assessing refugees’ qualifications and supports member states in doing so.²⁷ The World Education Service also published recently a description of worldwide practices for assessing the credentials of refugees which looks at available options for alternative forms of documentary evidence and recognition (Loo and Ortiz, 2016). A number of valuable initiatives are indeed taking place in various OECD countries, particularly in Nordic countries (OECD, 2016). However, most of them focus on refugees already in the country. Evaluating refugee students in third countries often proves extremely difficult, if at all possible. This difficulty is exemplified by the outcomes of Syrian applications to the European Erasmus Mundus programme (now Erasmus +). In 2013, more than 350 Syrian students applied at master’s level but only 21 were successful.

Unless answers are found to some of the key obstacles addressed above, it is unlikely that, despite the potential of this international studies channel, large numbers of refugees will find protection in OECD countries as students in the future. That being said, the development of a cohort of young people able to contribute to post-crisis recovery in their country goes well beyond short-term protection objectives.

Cross-cutting issues in the use of labour and student schemes for refugees

The challenge of creating or using alternative work- or study-related legal pathways raises at least four fundamental questions. They relate to the nature of policy objectives, migrants’ rights, whether refugees should be allowed to switch category, and what happens when the temporary mobility visa expires.

The nature of policy objectives

How important are humanitarian objectives (i.e. the protection of refugees) in the policy response? Clearly, alternative labour and study pathways for refugees cannot be designed purely on humanitarian grounds. Which prompts the question as to whether an alternative pathway for refugees is designed :

only to meet the objectives of the general mobility category – i.e. refugees are treated as labour migrants and their admission is governed by the same rules that regulate the admission of migrant workers

or is guided by mixed motives – in other words the objectives of general mobility policy and humanitarian objectives.

This question is important because it determines, among other things, the extent to which adjustments in general mobility policy to accommodate refugees as a special case can be used to justify the policy in domestic political and public debates. For example, if refugees are admitted under the umbrella of a labour migration programme and there is an explicit recognition that the programme includes a humanitarian component, it should be easier to justify and implement special policy measures such as the exemption from certain admission requirements that apply to other labour migrants.

Policy approaches that explicitly include a mix of objectives may have the best chance of success with regard to the likelihood of implementation and the numbers of refugees who would benefit. Treating refugees purely as labour migrants or students without any recognition of their special status would not be acceptable from a humanitarian standpoint. Nor would it be likely to result in large numbers of admissions, for the simple reason that refugees would need to compete for admission with other migrants from all over the world.

Migrants’ rights

To what rights are refugees who enter through labour or study migration channels entitled? Despite evidence that migration has usually a neutral or positive impact on public finance (OECD, 2013), public opinion harbours fears about the net fiscal impacts of immigration, especially low-skilled immigration. To allay those concerns, some countries restrict, at least temporarily, the social rights of migrants (e.g. their access to certain means-tested benefits). The same countries would probably be tempted to apply the same restrictions to refugees admitted as workers, which may contravene international law and standards. Similarly, many countries limit labour migrants’ to designated shortage occupations and sectors. The same practice applied to refugee-workers could fail to meet the international standards that govern the treatment of refugees and other beneficiaries of international protection.

Switching status

Should refugees who gain admission under a general mobility scheme be allowed to switch category and, for example, claim asylum? This is a difficult, but important, question. Most advocates of alternative pathways for refugees emphasise the importance of refugees retaining the right to protection. The UNHCR, for example, hopes that:

Through the use of additional pathways, existing migration programmes and systems can be made more accessible to refugees and their families, while ensuring compliance with basic refugee protection principles. With this in mind, some changes to existing visa and migration regimes could strengthen international protection overall while retaining the integrity and objectives of national systems.²⁸

However, it is clear that allowing refugees who use alternative pathways to claim asylum immediately would be perceived as a constraint and drastically limit the use of labour and student pathways for refugees. If the policy goal was simply to afford refugees a legal pathway through which to claim asylum in OECD countries, the required avenue would be resettlement or humanitarian visas, but not general mobility pathways. There cannot, of course, be any calling into question the right to claim asylum – doing so would actually breach international asylum law and standards. Admittedly, the obligation to comply with that right will probably result in fewer admissions. So there is a trade-off between the numbers of refugees admitted and the quality and conditions of the protection provided.

Return when temporary mobility visas expire

If refugees use temporary mobility schemes what are the implications for their return home when the temporary permit expires? Logically, they should be prepared to return to the country of first asylum where they benefitted from protection. But how could OECD host countries incite countries of first asylum to take back people who have found alternative shelter? The answer in most cases would be through a return and readmission agreement with countries of first asylum. Most countries of first asylum are low and lower-middle income countries themselves, so would be under considerable pressure to negotiate opportunities for their own citizens to access OECD countries – through visa-free regimes, bilateral labour migration agreements and preferential family migration rules, for example. They may well not view taking back refugees as a priority unless they obtain something in return for their own nationals.

There are also a number of other questions related to the terms and enforcement of returns. What if refugees whose temporary permits have expired refuse to return? What are the costs of forcibly returning the refugees and who will pay? What status will the refugees have on return to their country of first asylum? Can they be returned to countries of first asylum which are not signatories of the 1951 Refugee Convention?

Lastly, the sheer difficulty of procuring proper travel documents in countries of first asylum has a strong chance of excluding refugees from temporary mobility schemes. Many refugees do not actually have a valid passport that would enable them to travel. And if they do have one, they may be loathed to use it, as they would run the risk of forfeiting their protection status in their current country of residence. Refugees recognised under the Geneva Convention have – in theory – access to Convention travel documents (CTDs). Other people may be given laisser-passer documents that allow travel. In practice, limited numbers of such documents are issued because costs are prohibitive for refugees and procedures for obtaining them too complex. More importantly, many do not comply with the international standards that require machine-readable travel documents (only 45 countries currently issue machine-readable CTDs). Moreover, many states simply refuse to admit refugees traveling on CTDs, fearing that they will not return to their country of first asylum (Long, 2013).

All these questions are very sensitive and important because, if mechanisms are not in place to ensure that (some) returns happen in practice in the case of temporary permits, it may be hard to convince the general public that the alternative legal pathways for workers and students are different from humanitarian pathways. At the same time, the UNHCR (2016b) rightly emphasises that labour migration schemes which seek to ensure refugees’ safe, dignified economic participation should comply with the principle of non-refoulement; and that any new status assigned to a refugee should be no less favourable than their current refugee status with no risk of refoulement. Squaring that circle is probably the biggest challenge to making labour and student migration schemes a viable option for a significant number of refugees hosted outside the OECD.

Family migration as an alternative pathway for refugees

All OECD countries provide some channels for family migration, migrants’ main channel of entry into the OECD. In 2014, 1.3 million persons were admitted with permanent visas as family migrant to OECD countries, with the United States accounting for half. Conceptually, a distinction can be made between family reunification with citizens and immigrants with permanent residence status in an OECD country (e.g. dependent children are reunited with father or mother) on the one hand, and the admission of dependents of migrants with temporary residence status (e.g. the admission of a spouse of a temporary labour migrant or foreign student) on the other hand.

In both cases, OECD countries regulate and restrict the right to be joined by family members from abroad according to the different categories of migrants. Family migration is regulated:

by defining the “family” – i.e. what particular types of family members qualify for family migration

by stipulating a number of conditions that need to be met

by regulating the rights of family members after admission.

Most OECD countries define family in terms of the “nuclear family”, which includes spouses and dependent children. Some countries also include dependent parents – under specific conditions – and a few certain members of the “extended family”.

The conditions that govern family migration vary from country to country. However, they often include a minimum income threshold that must be met by the sponsor (i.e. the migrant in the host country asking to be joined by family members abroad). There are also insurance requirements (e.g. health insurance) and/or housing requirements. Some countries also impose “waiting periods”, whereby labour migrants or people under temporary or subsidiary protection must spend a certain length of time in the host country before they can be joined by family members from abroad.

EU minimum standards for (nuclear) family reunification are set in Council Directive 2003/86/EC since September 2003 (except for Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom which are not covered). That directive stipulates more favourable conditions for family members of refugees (see Chapter V of the directive), but the standard rules apply to sponsors who have subsidiary protection or another humanitarian status. Member states may not require refugees to have resided in their territory for a certain period of time before being joined by family members. Similarly if the application for family reunification is posted within three months of obtaining refugee status, member states cannot make reunification conditional on any housing or income requirement. Furthermore, applications for family reunification may not be denied solely on the lack of documentary evidence of family connection.

Most countries recognise that family reunification is a precondition for protecting and integrating refugees. Accordingly, EU countries generally grant them income, housing and health insurance conditions that are more favourable and longer-lasting than the Family Reunification Directive requires. The conditions for unaccompanied minors and beneficiaries of temporary and subsidiary protection, which are not covered by the EU directive, vary significantly across countries. In the past few months, a number of countries have restricted the conditions for family reunification for these groups, sometimes drastically. Annex 4.A4 provides detailed information on the conditions and recent changes in entry conditions for family members of humanitarian migrants in selected EU and OECD countries by status type.

Persons with refugee status generally have an immediate right to family reunification. In line with the EU directive on family reunification, the vast majority of countries exempt refugee sponsors either temporarily or permanently from meeting accommodation, income and health insurance conditions. Exceptions are Denmark and Turkey,²⁹ where such requirements may also be imposed for refugee sponsors.

Currently, only a few countries (e.g. Austria, Denmark, Sweden, Greece and to some extent Switzerland) strictly restrict beneficiaries of subsidiary protection the right to family reunification. Several other countries have also introduced very long waiting periods before beneficiaries of subsidiary protection can be reunited with their families: Germany and Latvia, 24 months; the Czech Republic, 15 months; and Austria and Turkey,³⁰ 12 months. Fees are generally modest but reach EUR 450 in Finland, EUR 600 in Norway and EUR 800 in Denmark. About half of all OECD countries require sponsors with subsidiary protection and temporary status to meet accommodation, health insurance or income requirements, although most countries waive them for a period as they do for convention refugees.

No country specifically denies unaccompanied minors the right to family reunification, but Denmark, Switzerland and the United Kingdom have stringent policies based on case by case assessments. Austria has introduced a 36 month waiting period for unaccompanied minors with subsidiary protection status and Sweden restricts family reunification to unaccompanied minors sponsors with refugee status until 2019. Many countries in fact allow only parents the right to family reunification. However, with the exception of Denmark, Hungary and Turkey, all countries systematically waive accommodation, health insurance and income for unaccompanied minor sponsors, either permanently or temporarily.

Outside Europe, only the United States facilitates family migration for refugees, although refugees in Canada, Australia and New Zealand can sponsor their family members who are in resettlement programmes. In Australia, for example, the Special Humanitarian Programme (introduced in 1981) targets the relatives of people who entered Australia under the Humanitarian Programme.

In response to the Syrian refugee crisis, Ireland and Switzerland took temporary measures to facilitate family migration among Syrian residents. From 14 March to 30 April 2014 the Irish government ran the Syrian Humanitarian Admission Programme (SHAP). Its purpose was to offer temporary Irish residence (up to two years) to vulnerable people living in Syria or who had fled to a neighbouring country and had close family residing in Ireland. The programme allows a maximum of two family members per sponsor, though sponsors can submit applications for up to four people. In December 2014, the Minister for Justice and Equality announced that it had received 308 applications and approved 111.

Similarly, from 4 September to 29 November 2013, Switzerland temporarily eased visa requirements for relatives of Syrian nationals living on Swiss soil. There was no requirement as to financial resources. The measure was designed to facilitate temporary stays for war-afflicted, non-core Syrian relatives. Switzerland accepted 6 600 applications. Switzerland also announced in March 2015 a new reinstallation programme which includes 1 000 temporary protection permits for displaced persons who have close relatives (spouse and children under 18) who have themselves been granted the temporary protection Status in Switzerland. Germany, through its recent private sponsorship resettlement programme, also targets family members and has already taken in more than 20 000 people.

Family migration is probably the alternative pathway with the greatest potential in terms of possible beneficiaries. In theory, it is possible to think of a range of measures to lower barriers to family reunification which brings together refugees with close relatives who are citizens of or permanent residents in OECD countries. Measures could include widening family reunification to include non-core family members, expediting procedures, and relaxing conditions of admissions. In practice, though, policy developments have been going exactly in the opposite direction, especially in Europe. Even countries which have not changed their rules are now issuing more subsidiary and temporary protection visas that curtail family reunification rights. Few countries made their programmes more flexible to respond to the Syrian crisis.

There are four main reasons for tighter family migration policy :

Recent flows of asylum seekers have been particularly concentrated in just a few countries. Family reunification, by definition, would be towards exactly the same countries, which are already under strain and calling for costs to be more equitably shared.

Family migration facilitates integration and long-term settlement. But many host countries in Europe view asylum as temporary and expect people to go back when the situation improves in their country of origin.

There is a fear that facilitating family migration will encourage other migrants to make the risky journey, claim asylum and exercise their right to family reunification – in other words, that opening family migration channels may act as a pull factor.

Closely related to the third reason is the fear of offering more favourable conditions than neighbouring countries and becoming the destination country of choice. There is indeed currently a risk of a race to the bottom, with countries aligning their policies to the least favourable to avoid appearing as more attractive than their neighbours.

It is important to understand such arguments. But they can be overcome. Building on the example of Ireland and Switzerland, temporary family reunification programmes exclusively for refugees who arrived over a specified period of time would avert the pull factor. There is also scope for making greater use of private sponsorship, as in Germany and Canada, to support the reunification of displaced people in need of international protection with their families. Setting minimum standards for those under temporary/subsidiary protection would limit the risk of a “race to the bottom”.

Alternative humanitarian pathways

There are two main types of alternative humanitarian pathways, namely humanitarian visas and private sponsorship schemes. They are of very different nature. With humanitarian visas, people can lawfully enter a country and file a formal asylum request. Under private sponsorship schemes, multiple stakeholders share the cost of resettlement or alternative general mobility pathways to increase the number of potential beneficiaries.

Humanitarian visas

Humanitarian admission programmes are in fact resettlement programmes which are not carried out under the auspices of the UNHCR, or at least for which the UNHCR does not individually select and submit refugees. Humanitarian admission applies to certain categories of refugees, determined by national legislation, such as the socio-economically vulnerable, family members, or people with special needs (e.g. medical needs). Beneficiaries are granted temporary or subsidiary protection, rather than a 1951 Refugee Convention status. Examples of humanitarian admission programmes are the UK Vulnerable Persons Relocation Scheme or the Australian Special Humanitarian Programme. However, many OECD countries have such schemes or the capacity to develop them according to the needs.

Humanitarian visas are of a different nature. The basic idea is to enable people to come to the host country to claim asylum (ie. before the recognition of their refugee status is completed). In absence of such a visa, the only option for people who want to seek refuge in the OECD and who are not entitled to resettlement or a legal pathway, is to risk their lives with smugglers.³¹

According to a study by the European Parliament (2014), eight EU member states (Belgium, Germany, France, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Luxembourg and Poland) have national long-stay humanitarian visas,³² while Malta and Portugal have been using LTV Schengen short-stay visas to offer protection. Outside the EU, Argentina, Brazil and Switzerland, for example, operate such visas. In the United States, Humanitarian Parole Visas which are granted for urgent humanitarian reasons could also fall into that category as a parolee can adjust to a permanent status – when they are granted asylum, for example.

Brazil started its humanitarian admission programme in 2010 after the earthquake in Haiti and has used it in response to the Syrian conflict. It had issued humanitarian visas to a total of 9 000 Syrians in March 2016 and refugee status to more than 2 200. France, too, uses humanitarian visas: since 2013, it has granted 2 600 to Syrian applicants³³ and the authorities recently pledged an additional 1 500. The Argentinian programme is both more recent, having started in 2014, and more modest, having admitted 200 Syrians on humanitarian grounds so far.

The United States has run Humanitarian Parole Programmes for the families of Haitians since 2014, the families of Cubans since 2007 and, since 2014, for children in El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras under the age of 21 whose parents are lawfully present in the United States. In November 2015, more than 60 members of Congress called on President Obama to put in place a parole programme for Syrians. They argued that it would bring emergency relief to more than 7 000 Syrian families. These family had already passed initial background checks but had still not received a visa due to annual numerical caps on visas. Similarly, in March 2016, the Civil Liberties committee (LIBE) of the European Parliament called for reform of the EU visa code to allow people in need of international protection to apply for a humanitarian visa in member state embassies or consulates outside the EU.

The availability of humanitarian visas is one thing. The selection of potential beneficiaries is another. Some have suggested that not only could more countries use them, but they could use them on a much larger scale. Currently, destination countries limit the number of humanitarian visas that they issue each year and/or screen beneficiaries of humanitarian visas to make sure that they have a high chance of obtaining refugee status after arriving in destination countries. Beneficiaries are often selected on the basis of family ties or emergency criteria which differ from standard resettlement programmes. In practice, humanitarian visas give countries a lot of leeway in terms of who to admit and are faster to process than resettlement visas.

A policy of issuing humanitarian visas with no numerical cap or prior screening would surely lead to huge numbers of applicants – at least in the most popular migrant and refugee destination countries – and to lower proportions of applications being accepted. Countries may also fear to be overwhelmed by applications as they do not necessary have the capacity to process large number of requests. As a result, a non-discretionary use of humanitarian visas is very unlikely and the number of visas delivered more likely to increase extensively than intensively – in other words, it is more likely that more countries will take them up that it is that countries already using them will expand their use.

Much greater use of humanitarian visas would add to the OECD policy tool box an instrument that responds efficiently to both environmental and geopolitical shocks. For it to be really effective, however, consular services worldwide would need to be more accessible to people displaced. The EU could contribute in that respect, with the consular services of the member states collaborating to increase their coverage.

Private sponsorship

Despite the rapid increase in global displacement, state-led programmes for resettling recognised refugees are still very small-scale, as less than 1% of refugees registered with the UNHCR are resettled every year. OECD countries have been very reluctant to expand this humanitarian protection pathway. The basic idea behind private sponsorship programmes is to draw on private donations (from individuals, corporations and other organisations) and community resources to help resettle a greater number of refugees, support them, and help integrate in destination countries.

Private sponsorship programmes are not migration programmes or an alternative pathway per se. They are more a way of sharing costs and responsibilities between stakeholders in destination countries. From that perspective, private sponsorship is a cross-cutting approach that can apply to any kind of legal pathways. Typically, private sponsorship schemes have been used to resettlement and reunite families. But they could also be a way of sponsoring refugee-students.

Private sponsorship programmes can take a variety of different forms and cover costs ranging from, for example, the transportation of refugees, medical expenses, housing, support with finding employment, and accessing education after resettlement. A sponsor is more than a co-financer (as in scholarship programmes). It requires being committed to covering settlement costs for a certain period of time as well as requires a commitment of community and other forms of non-financial support.

The oldest, and most emblematic, private sponsorship programme is the one developed in Canada, which dates back to the 1970s. Between 1979 and 2015, private sponsorship has helped resettle more than 250 000 refugees in the country. Canada has three main sponsorship programmes within its Private Sponsorship of Refugees Program: i) Sponsorship Agreement Holders (incorporated organisations that have signed a formal sponsorship agreement IRCC) and their Constituent Groups, ii) Groups of Five (group of at least five Canadians or permanent resident); and iii) Community Sponsors (organisations located in the community). The latter two groups need to submit a settlement plan directly to the Government of Canada to prove that they are able to commit the funds necessary for the sponsorship, as well as will have the other required supports in place. Although the government of Canada usually gives loans to refugees to pay for their medical examination overseas and their journey to Canada, sponsors should provide financial support for one year or until the refugee become self-sufficient.

To be sponsored as a refugee by a Group of Five or Community Sponsor, the principal applicant must already have refugee status overseas, though the condition has been lifted for Syrians and Iraqis. Private sponsors handle the refugee’s initial settlement and provide emotional and social support. The total estimated cost of sponsoring a single adult individual in 2014 was CAD 12 500, while for a family of six it was CAD 32 500. Canada also runs a blended programme where the government and private sponsor share responsibility for projects.

The Australian Special Humanitarian Programme has provided pathways for people to propose family members overseas for resettlement in Australia. Since 2013, Australia has operated a trial community support programme, known as the Community Proposal Pilot.

In Europe, Germany is the only country to have incorporated private sponsorship programmes into its regular humanitarian provision. Sponsorships are conducted at Länder level and all but one Land, Bavaria, runs a private sponsorship programme. One common prerequisite is that the sponsor, whether German citizen or permanent permit-holder, must have family ties with the refugee. Sponsors are also expected to assume financial responsibility for an unlimited period of time. There is no numerical limit, and sponsorship schemes have seen more than 20 000 permits granted to Syrians since mid-2013.

Other countries have used private sponsorship components in ad hoc programmes like those of Ireland and Switzerland that reunited Syrian refugees with members of their families. United States humanitarian programmes also comprise a co-financing element, though they cannot be formally considered private sponsorship programmes, as sponsoring agencies do not make long term financial commitments.³⁴

Private sponsorship programmes are also a potentially powerful expression of public support for refugees. This type of revealed preference may send a strong political signal to politicians at home and abroad. Conversely, critics of private sponsorship programmes have argued that state-led programmes and private sponsorship risk, at least in the long run, being substituted.

In practice, the size of private sponsorship schemes depends on government processing capacity but also on the magnitude of private donations and community support, which can be raised in a number of different ways. Crowdfunding has potential as a useful, transparent way of enabling the wider public to contribute to such programmes, although it raises the question of the sponsor’s responsibility.³⁵ Fiscal incentives could also be considered as state support for private donations and an indirect means of co-financing.

A central question in any resettlement programme is how to select refugees for resettlement. In state-led programmes, selection is typically carried out by UN officials using certain “vulnerability criteria” or criteria determined by national interest and priorities. Critics of private sponsorship contend that to win active support from the sponsor and/or the local community a certain degree of autonomy in the selection process. The risk is that faith-based organisations and ethnic or political groups focus on certain categories of people in need of protection to the exclusion of others. To help reduce this problem some or all the places available in a private sponsorship programme could be allotted by lottery or based on external criteria defined by UNHCR or the host country.

Private sponsorship programmes require careful regulation. Among many other things, the responsibilities of sponsors must be defined clearly, while procedures and safety nets need to be in place in the event of problems (e.g. a beneficiary remaining dependent, the failure of the sponsor to uphold their responsibilities). The roles and relationships between different types of donors and organisations (e.g. individual donors, corporations, community groups, NGOs, international institutions such as UNHCR etc.) must also be clearly delineated. Private sponsorship programmes have to be designed and implemented in close partnership with the public authorities. Furthermore, relying mainly on the support of the public at large to finance resettlement would run the risk of the scope and focus of the protection programme being driven by media attention, which is, by its very nature, highly volatile.³⁶

In practice, it is likely that the political feasibility of privately sponsored resettlement will depend on how much of the actual costs during and after resettlement will be borne by the sponsor and for how long. Private programmes that cover more costs over longer periods (and at less cost to the public purse, at least in theory) can be expected to appeal to OECD countries more than ones which focus on meeting minimal costs that arise in the short-term, like the costs of transport and immediate medical care. They will however require more funding and long-term support from local communities and sponsors. By contrast, programmes where a sponsor covers costs for shorter periods of time or which are less rigorous in their requirements are prone to issues of moral hazard – where sponsors take greater risks because they know that the authorities will bail them out.

Evaluating the potential of alternative pathways

This section seeks to gather together the chapter’s different findings and evaluate the potential of the different alternative pathways against three key criteria: “protection”, “acceptability” and “feasibility”. It succinctly presents the evaluation criteria, then synthesises the pros and cons of the various alternative pathways in a summary table (Table 4.2). An evaluation of the potential of “alternative general mobility pathways” in the specific case of Syria rounds off the section’s findings.

Protection

Any policy response to forced displacement within and across borders needs to be evaluated by the yardstick of the protection it provides to people fleeing conflict and violence. It is helpful – and important – to distinguish between three dimensions of protection: i) Scale of protection (How many people does the policy protect?); ii) Selection of beneficiaries (Who receives protection under the policy, who is excluded and why?); and iii) Conditions and quality of protection provided (How does the protection compare to UNHCR refugee status and standard temporary protection?)

The selection effect reflects whether and how a particular policy provides increased protection for some at the expense of others – whether sponsored resettled refugees are considered in addition or not to the overall resettlement policy objective. Similarly, it is easy to imagine scenarios where certain groups of people (e.g. Syrians) enjoy better access to protection than other refugee groups (e.g. by queue jumping or other forms of preferential treatment) or at the expense of other migrant groups not in need of protection (e.g. by reduce the intake of foreign workers or students). There is not necessarily a consensus on whether such selection effects are normatively problematic or not.

As for quality, different policies can give migrants different degrees of protection (e.g. physical safety, housing, access to basic services such as healthcare), economic opportunities (e.g. training, skills development, entry to the labour market), and varying levels of support for integration in the host country’s economy and society. A complementary question concerns whether, and to what degree, the policy provides refugees with opportunities for individual choice, self-reliance, and earning their own livelihoods.

Acceptability

A comprehensive evaluation of policy responses must include their economic and social (and any other) consequences for the host country and its residents, as they play a considerable, and in some cases, prime role in determining political feasibility. In practice, when countries design migration programmes they take into consideration not only foreign policy objectives, but a range of additional objectives relating to perceived and/or real effects on the economy, society, housing and security (OECD, 2016). They may also factor in questions of national identity (however that is defined) and national values and the degree to which the policy is in line with the fundamental values of the country.

Some of those objectives and effects are, of course, heavily influenced by public opinion. The relationship between public opinion and policy making can be complex, and there is considerable debate on the extent to which public opinion should influence policy making. In many OECD countries, the share of the public holding extreme views on migration has grown and public discourse on migration is increasingly defined less by moderate positions than by extremes. Governments must respond to such vocal, polarised positions, which make it difficult to keep policy evidence-based and may significantly restrict the political scope for proposing bold reform or adapting migration policy systems and programmes, including in the field of protection.

Feasibility

An important, but frequently overlooked, criterion in evaluations of policy proposals is the technical feasibility of policy, defined by the capacity of nation states to implement them.

One facet of feasibility has to do with the administrative requirements and capacities and the financial resources needed to implement policy. Obviously, reallocating resources can partially offset such constraints, but some infrastructure development may take time. For example, humanitarian visas require the availability of consular services, private resettlement and scholarship programmes require significant administrative processing, and promoting labour migration channels calls for the development of tools to match demand and supply for the particular target group in question.

Some policy constraints may also stem from the domestic legal framework, especially the protection afforded by an independent judiciary and the national constitution. In other words, the legality of the policy option should be assessed against national and international law. In some cases, the national legislation can be adapted to enable necessary policy changes, but in some other cases, more fundamental changes may be needed (e.g. constitutional revisions). Feasibility is also affected by the time it takes to implement policy changes, which includes building political consensus.

Finally, historical experience matters. What are the lessons from history for the likely effectiveness of the new policy proposed? Of course, history does not necessarily repeat itself, as both policy challenges and the tools and institutions available for dealing with them evolve over time. Still, the perceived successes and failures of past migration and integration policies do play an important role in shaping policy debates and decisions.

Evaluating the potential of alternative pathways

Although it may appear obvious, it is nevertheless important to emphasise that no single policy can ever be “the best” across all three criteria (protection, acceptability and feasibility) and that there might be tension between the different objectives. For example, a policy (e.g. temporary protection) may offer basic physical protection to a large number of people. However, the quality of that protection may be limited – it may not, for example, offer opportunities for longer-term human development and integration. There is thus a trade-off between the scale and quality of protection. Furthermore, the final policy assessment does not depend solely on how the different objectives are prioritised and how trade-offs are managed. It also depends on the timescale considered in the policy evaluation, as some policy options may appear more difficult or costly in the short-term may turn out to be more beneficial in the long term.

Table 4.2 maps the four alternative pathways discussed in this section against the three evaluation criteria. Although it may be argued that the assessment is necessarily subjective, its aim is simply to summarise the arguments and evidence presented in this chapter, to promote open and structured debate.

Table 4.2. Potential and feasibility of alternative pathways for persons in need of protection: a summary table of previous analyses
| Protection | Acceptability | Feasibility
Number of beneficiaries | Quality | Selection/displacement

Labour migration

Existing channels

Very low

Depends on the possibilities of changing status and/or applying for asylum.

Depends on access to integration support programmes and restricted social benefits

High/Low

Acceptability will probably be higher if

i) economic benefits are clearly identified and promoted

ii) temporary migration does not become permanent

iii) displacement is limited.

Can be implemented within current legislative frameworks but raises the question of readmission to country of first asylum

Existing channels adapted | Low | Medium/Low
Newly created channels | Potentially higher number than other labour migration options if open to medium or lower skilled workers | Depends on the conditions for admission | Would require legislative changes in most countries
Family migration | Nuclear family | Generally low except in countries with large recent inflows | High | Low/Medium | High if the risk of pull factor is contained | Can be implemented within current legislative frameworks
Extended family | High | High | Low/Low | Medium to low | Would require legislative changes in most countries
Humanitarian visa |  | Relatively low if selective, potentially high if not | High | Medium-high/Low | High degree of acceptability in countries which have such visas but the number of beneficiaries is low | Requires an administrative infrastructure (consular services with dedicated personnel) in countries of first asylum
Student visa |  | Limited to the number of displaced higher education students | Depend on the possibility of changing status and/or applying for asylum | High/medium | High | Relatively easy but costly
Private sponsorship |  | Potentially high but variable across countries | High | High/Low | Levels depend on support in public opinion | Would require most countries to develop their administrative capacity

It shows that the labour migration option, however appealing, may not be the easiest to implement. Within the context of existing labour migration schemes, which tend to be highly skills-oriented, the number of beneficiaries is likely to be relatively low. Facilitating the labour migration of lower-skilled refugees would have a much greater potential, but would also have to face the fact of forcible readmission to the country of first asylum or accept that most people would, in all likelihood, apply for asylum during or at the end of their contract.

Family migration has potential as the channel that would offer protection to the largest number of people, even when confined to spouse and children. The reason why several OECD countries have recently taken measures to restrict family reunification is partly the anticipated costs at a time of large inflows of asylum seekers, and partly to avert the perceived pull factor. The former could be mitigated through more intensive use of private sponsorship and, through time-bound programmes with more favourable conditions.

Private sponsorship – as long as its selection effects can be contained – and student scholarships have options that could potentially win greater support from public opinion. While private sponsorship schemes are, by definition, cheaper than traditional resettlement programmes, their cost should not be underestimated. The cost of the student programmes is clearly the largest but may also yield substantial dividends in the long term when students become fully integrated in the destination country or return to their countries of origin and maintain their ties to their country of asylum.

Humanitarian visas are available only in a handful of OECD countries, most of whom make only marginal use of them. If countries use humanitarian admissions to extend protection to selected groups of people, they could be a flexible, complementary instrument to resettlement.

Evaluating the potential of alternative general mobility pathways for Syrians

This section assesses the potential of various alternative pathways for Syrian refugees. It shows how many permits of different kinds have been delivered to Syrians by OECD countries between 2010 and 2015 and provides first estimates of the target population for each migration channel. It illustrates both the future potential and the operability of the various options discussed in previous sections.

Labour migration

Until recently, very few Syrian workers had qualified for work permits in OECD countries (Table 4.3) – some 18 200 in total. Turkey, with almost 7 800 permits granted, issued the most, although some of these work permits may have been granted to people under temporary protection. Sweden issued 3 500 permits, followed by the United States with 1 500 and Canada with 685.

Table 4.3. First work permits granted to Syrians in OECD countries, 2010-15
| 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | Total
Australia | 73 | 80 | 77 | 103 | 91 | 94 | 518
Austria | 6 | 3 | 4 | 11 | 6 | .. | 30
Belgium | 5 | 4 | 7 | 8 | 7 | .. | 31
Canada | 128 | 138 | 122 | 121 | 99 | 77 | 685
Chile | 4 | 5 | 15 | 20 | 17 | 23 | 84
Czech Republic | 56 | 37 | 14 | 7 | 8 | 12 | 134
Denmark | 14 | 10 | 5 | 10 | 21 | 20 | 80
Estonia | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | .. | 1
Finland | 3 | 2 | 5 | 7 | 3 | 4 | 24
France | 22 | 24 | 48 | 62 | 51 | 85 | 292
Germany | 27 | 29 | 89 | 134 | 151 | 231 | 661
Greece | 3 | 5 | 5 | 28 | 38 | 24 | 103
Hungary | 14 | 15 | 27 | 21 | 21 | 26 | 124
Iceland | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0
Ireland | 3 | 3 | 11 | 7 | 8 | .. | 32
Israel | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | ..
Italy | 311 | 123 | 64 | 55 | 28 | 23 | 604
Japan | 5 | 4 | 12 | 11 | 6 | 9 | 47
Korea | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | ..
Luxembourg | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 3 | 6
Mexico | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | ..
Netherlands | 6 | 6 | 12 | 10 | 9 | .. | 43
New Zealand | 39 | 32 | 74 | 23 | 28 | 40 | 236
Norway | 3 | 3 | 8 | 12 | 8 | 6 | 40
Poland | 48 | 136 | 28 | 47 | 21 | 46 | 326
Portugal | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 7 | .. | 11
Slovak Republic | 4 | 7 | 22 | 20 | 18 | 33 | 104
Slovenia | 1 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 9
Spain | 19 | 38 | 34 | 34 | 27 | 28 | 180
Sweden | 435 | 645 | 534 | 727 | 780 | 412 | 3 533
Switzerland | 32 | 44 | 45 | 50 | 94 | 82 | 347
Turkey | .. | 105 | 231 | 794 | 2 539 | 4 019 | 7 688
United Kingdom | 160 | 135 | 105 | 145 | 140 | .. | 685
United States | 317 | 334 | 259 | 312 | 304 | .. | 1 526
Total | 1 738 | 1 971 | 1 860 | 2 784 | 4 532 | 5 299 | 18 184
Source: National sources.
StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933396413

In most countries, however, the number peaked at the beginning of the crisis in 2010-11 and have declined since, possibly because many Syrians who had connections and the relevant skills, notably language skills, had already used them to find job opportunities in the OECD. The opposite trend, however has been observed in France and, to a lesser extent, in Australia.

According to UNHCR registration data, which partially undercounts Syrians, particularly in Lebanon, about 1.9 million Syrians in countries neighbouring Syria are aged between 18 and 59. A key question is the extent to which Syrian workers have skills that match those in demand in OECD countries. To assess whether they do or not, the distribution by occupation of Syrian workers before the war is compared to the distribution of employed migrants in the OECD who arrived recently, i.e. in the previous 5 years.

In 2007, before the Syrian conflict started, one in three, or 1.5 million, Syrians were working in elementary occupations (Table 4.4). The next largest category was craft and related trade workers (19%), while 16% were managers, professionals or technicians and associate professionals. However, the occupational structure of the Syrian population evolved rapidly. Indeed, between 2007 and 2010, the number of Syrian workers in these first three ISCO categories increased by 24% to 950 000 in 2010, and accounted for 19% of the total.

Table 4.4. Distribution of Syrian workers by occupation, 2007 and 2010
| 2007 | 2010
| Thousands | Distribution (%) | Thousands | Distribution (%)
Total | 4 946 | 100 | 5 055 | 100
1 Legislators, senior officials and managers | 71 | 1 |  |
2 Professionals | 273 | 6 |  |
3 Technicians and associate professionals | 424 | 9 |  |
Subtotal 1, 2, 3 | 767 | 16 | 948 | 19
4 Clerks | 433 | 9 |  |
5 Service workers and shop and market sales workers | 561 | 11 |  |
6 Skilled agricultural and fishery workers | 322 | 7 |  |
7 Craft and related trade workers | 940 | 19 |  |
8 Plant and machine operators and assemblers | 463 | 9 |  |
9 Elementary occupations | 1 459 | 30 |  |
X Not classifiable by occupation | 0.2 | 0 |  |
Source: ILO, ILOSTAT Annual indicators dataset – Employment by sex and occupation.
StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933396427

The most recent figures on educational attainment in Syria date back to 2009. They suggest that one-third of the Syrian population (over the age of 25) had not completed primary education, one-third had completed no more than primary education, and one third had a secondary school level or higher. About 6% of the Syrian population held a higher degree in 2009.

Profiling data on Syrians who have fled to Turkey, Jordan and Lebanon are limited. They tend to show a young, relatively gender-balanced population.³⁷ Data on the level of educational attainment of Syrians in Turkey, which go back to 2013, show that, among refugees aged 6 and over, 10% had reached higher education. In Lebanon, available data show that only 3% had reached university level (ILO, 2014). Similarly, most Syrians in Jordan had a relatively low level of education, with only 15% of Syrian refugees aged 15 and above having completed their secondary education or gone further (Stave and Hillesund, 2015).

Matching the skills of Syrian refugees in countries of first asylum to labour needs in OECD countries may seem particularly challenging. The employment distribution by occupation of third-country nationals in the EU who had arrived recently (in the previous five years) indeed shows a much larger share (32%) of professional and associate professional occupations (ISCO Levels 1, 2 and 3) than among workers in Syria before the war (16%) (Figure 4.3). However, a large share of recently recruited non-EU foreign workers are in low skilled jobs (25% in ISCO Level 9 and 7% in ISCO Level 7 occupations), suggesting that currently unmet labour needs in the EU are not to be found only at the higher end of the skills distribution. In total in 2013, 350 000 recent migrants in the OECD found jobs in elementary occupations, some of which could probably have been carried out by low- and medium-skilled refugees recruited in Syria’s neighbouring countries, provided that employers see them as potential candidates.

Figure 4.3. Distribution of the population born in third countries employed in European OECD countries by occupation, 2013

Source: Eurostat, Labour Force Surveys 2013.

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395651

Student migration

Since the beginning of the war in Syria only a handful of student permits have been delivered to Syrian refugees (Table 4.5). In total 15 300 Syrians have obtained their first student permit in the OECD since 2010, 1 600 of whom did so in 2015 (based on partial data)³⁸. The largest numbers were granted by the United States (4 800) followed by Germany (3 600) and the United Kingdom (2 200). France and Canada have also hosted more than 1 000 Syrian students each.

Table 4.5. First student permits granted to Syrians, 2010-15
| 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | Total
Australia | 63 | 59 | 32 | 23 | 28 | 22 | 227
Austria | 9 | 21 | 25 | 25 | 34 | .. | 114
Belgium | 19 | 15 | 11 | 26 | 18 | .. | 89
Canada | 215 | 216 | 182 | 190 | 205 | 215 | 1 223
Chile | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 2
Czech Republic | 59 | 32 | 55 | 36 | 28 | 68 | 278
Denmark | 2 | 6 | 4 | 5 | 15 | 9 | 41
Estonia | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 2 | .. | 3
Finland | 2 | 7 | 0 | 3 | 5 | 10 | 27
France | 274 | 240 | 102 | 146 | 197 | 115 | 1 074
Germany | 278 | 234 | 355 | 650 | 1 011 | 1 097 | 3 625
Greece | 6 | 10 | 18 | 24 | 18 | 21 | 97
Hungary | 6 | 13 | 16 | 31 | 16 | 36 | 118
Iceland | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 3
Ireland | 8 | 5 | 12 | 8 | 12 | .. | 45
Israel | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | ..
Italy | 54 | 54 | 66 | 59 | 59 | 29 | 321
Japan | 20 | 16 | 14 | 4 | 6 | 12 | 72
Korea | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | ..
Luxembourg | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 3
Mexico | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | ..
Netherlands | 7 | 9 | 6 | 15 | 14 | .. | 51
New Zealand | 18 | 10 | 9 | 8 | 11 | 10 | 66
Norway | 4 | 5 | 4 | 2 | 0 | 6 | 21
Poland | 9 | 8 | 23 | 45 | 39 | 39 | 163
Portugal | 1 | 1 | 4 | 1 | 48 | .. | 55
Slovak Republic | 2 | 5 | 10 | 6 | 6 | 7 | 36
Slovenia | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 2
Spain | 0 | 20 | 61 | 79 | 84 | 105 | 349
Sweden | 14 | 10 | 14 | 18 | 43 | 39 | 138
Switzerland | 20 | 19 | 26 | 16 | 6 | 12 | 99
Turkey | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | ..
United Kingdom | 650 | 720 | 345 | 255 | 190 | .. | 2 160
United States | 799 | 723 | 801 | 1 172 | 1 271 | .. | 4 766
Total | 2 540 | 2 460 | 2 196 | 2 847 | 3 368 | 1 857 | 15 268
Source: National sources.
StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933396438

According to figures from UNESCO, just under 600 000 (approximately 3% of the population) students were enrolled in Syrian higher-education institutions when the war broke out. This corresponds to a gross enrolment ratio of 26% at the tertiary level (Figure 4.4). In the period preceding the war, Syria had significantly increased tertiary enrolment, catching up with the average of the Arab countries, and only 3 points below the world average.

Figure 4.4. Gross enrolment ratio at higher education level, 2002 and 2010

Source: UNESCO Institute for Statistics, http://data.uis.unesco.org/.

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395666

Given the higher rates of departure among young and educated since the beginning of the war, up to a third of the higher-education-aged population has probably left the country. Most are in the neighbouring countries (Turkey, Jordan, and Lebanon) but many are in Europe. Indeed, between January 2011 and April 2016, more than 300 000 Syrians aged 18 to 34 years old, of whom probably 100 000 were of university age, sought asylum in an EU/EFTA country and almost all of them were or will be granted protection.

Alternatively, the calculation can be made based on survey data (although not based on a statistically random sample). Among Syrians who landed in Greece in February 2016,39 14% of all adult respondents were students when they left Syria. Applying that percentage to the total number of adult Syrians who reached Europe in 2015 (approximately 500 000) would suggest that there are 70 000 Syrian former university students in Europe. Giving them access to higher education should be a priority.

If about a quarter of young Syrians currently in countries bordering Syria were previously university students (a quarter being the enrolment rate in Syria before the war), then there were between 150 000 and 200 000 Syrian higher-education students in Turkey, Jordan or Lebanon at the beginning of 2016. Only a fraction of them are enrolled in higher education in those countries (Watenpaugh et al., 2014).

Family migration

Since the beginning of the war in Syria, 72 000 Syrians have been admitted to the OECD under various family schemes (Table 4.6). In some countries, like Sweden, where the number of asylum seekers rose very rapidly in 2014 and 2015, so have the number of family members joining them. Countries like Switzerland and Ireland, which have had special programmes for Syrians, and Germany, with its sponsorship programme, took in relatively high numbers through family migration.

Table 4.6. First permits granted to Syrians for family reasons, 2010-15
| Family of refugees and of people under other humanitarian statuses | Other Family categories
2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | Total | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | Total
Australia | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 15 | <5 | 29 | 21 | <5 | <5 | 65
Austria | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 33 | 42 | 32 | 35 | 32 | .. | 174
Belgium | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 212 | 186 | 161 | 206 | 464 | .. | 1 229
Canada | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | ..
Chile | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 2 | 1 | 4 | 7 | 9 | 6 | 29
Czech Republic | 45 | 38 | 49 | 43 | 35 | 29 | 239 | 7 | 4 | 10 | 15 | 11 | 23 | 70
Denmark | 68 | 57 | 178 | 365 | 1 440 | 6 562 | 8 670 | 18 | 14 | 21 | 12 | 27 | 74 | 166
Estonia | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | .. | 3
Finland | 17 | 19 | 11 | 28 | 73 | 122 | 270 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | ..
France | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 124 | 155 | 207 | 255 | 250 | 224 | 1 215
Germany | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 670 | 591 | 1 134 | 1 237 | 2 785 | 12 345 | 18 762
Greece | .. | .. | .. | .. | 2 | 20 | 22 | 252 | 237 | 302 | 203 | 138 | 188 | 1 320
Hungary | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 47 | 87 | 79 | 106 | 76 | 69 | 464
Iceland | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 1 | 0 | 2 | 3 | 0 | 1 | 7
Ireland | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 6 | 5 | 3 | 10 | 11 | .. | 35
Israel | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | ..
Italy | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 191 | 247 | 362 | 391 | 289 | 195 | 1 675
Japan | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 8 | 16 | 16 | 14 | 16 | 14 | 84
Korea | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | ..
Luxembourg | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 4
Mexico | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | ..
Netherlands | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 85 | 70 | 67 | 68 | 178 | .. | 468
New Zealand | 0 | 3 | 1 | 3 | 0 | 8 | 15 | 8 | 8 | 9 | 17 | 9 | 6 | 57
Norway | 5 | 2 | 13 | 83 | 186 | 604 | 893 | 35 | 44 | 20 | 26 | 23 | 43 | 191
Poland | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 24 | 18 | 47 | 47 | 10 | 8 | 154
Portugal | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 3 | 1 | 5 | 2 | 14 | .. | 25
Slovak Republic | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 798 | 798 | 3 | 5 | 16 | 23 | 17 | 49 | 113
Slovenia | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 7 | 0 | 7 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0
Spain | 1 | 0 | 0 | 26 | 42 | 110 | 179 | 21 | 33 | 41 | 34 | 52 | 60 | 241
Sweden | 42 | 50 | 141 | 718 | 5 209 | 9 053 | 15 213 | 726 | 1 109 | 1 281 | 2 129 | 2 312 | 1 363 | 8 920
Switzerland | 29 | 64 | 84 | 98 | 409 | 661 | 1 345 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | ..
Turkey | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | ..
United Kingdom | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 55 | 75 | 50 | 140 | 140 | .. | 460
United States | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 1 365 | 1 534 | 1 762 | 1 995 | 1 746 | .. | 8 402
Total | 207 | 233 | 477 | 1 364 | 7 403 | 17 968 | 27 652 | 3 913 | 4 483 | 5 662 | 6 997 | 8 610 | 14 668 | 44 333
Note: Data for Greece are included in the Table 4.A3.6.
.. Non available.
Source: National sources.
StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933396448

The 700 000 Syrian asylum seekers registered in the EU/EFTA since 2011 comprise about 375 000 adult men and 125 000 adult women. In a survey of Syrian refugees who arrived in Greece between April and September 2015 (1 245 interviews) conducted by the UNHCR, close to 50% of respondents stated they were single. On that basis, about 125 000 May have left their spouse behind. With a typical Syrian core family size of 5 people, an additional estimated 600 000 Syrians could come to Europe through immediate family reunification. That number should, however, be treated with extreme caution as much family reunification has already taken place. On the boats that landed in Europe so far in 2016, there were more children and adult women (55%) than adult men. In view of how difficult it is to access the family migration channel, the inference is either that more families are making the journey to Europe or more women are reuniting with their husbands who have already arrived.⁴⁰

Alternatively, the calculation can be made based on survey data (although not based on a statistically random sample). A recent UNHCR survey profiling Syrians who landed in Greece in February 2016⁴¹ suggested that 6% of adult respondents had left a spouse behind and 13% left their child. Extrapolating those figures for the full year 2015 suggests the number of spouses left behind is much smaller – 30 000. If the high share of people who declare they have left children behind is also factored in, the potential total of incomers through immediate family reunification would still be quite large – an estimated 250 000. This is however a lower bound estimate as there was a much higher proportion of single men in 2015 (compared to first months of 2016).

Families are extended in Syria. They include not only parents and children, but grandparents, aunts, uncles and cousins, too. It is not uncommon for extended and immediate family members to live together in a single dwelling. Given that wider definition of the family and the number of people who declare that they have left a parent behind (57%), family reunification would generate a much larger number of incomers, probably larger than the number of asylum claims filed by Syrians in 2015.

Summing up

Figure 4.5 offers a summary view of the actual and potential use of alternative migration pathways in response to the Syrian context. It emerges that the labour migration route has been widely overlooked so far. Although there are objective reasons why, as discussed above, the gaping discrepancy between the channel’s potential and its actual use are worth considering more closely. Narrowing the gap would necessitate mapping the skills of Syrian workers and matching them with potential labour demand in destination countries. It would also require finding practical working arrangements with countries of first asylum to facilitate the mobility of beneficiaries of international protection.

Figure 4.5. Assessing the potential of alternative pathways for Syrians in the OECD

Probably about 10% of all displaced Syrian university students have benefited from a student visa in the OECD to date. That percentage represents a sizeable number that could further swell in the coming years thanks to the strong grass roots backing for the alternative pathway of international studies and the many recent national and international initiatives in support of it. Welcoming refugees into international student programmes, however, requires more than just covering tuition fees and living costs. It entails creating an enabling environment for study which takes into account the special need of displaced Syrian students.

Unsurprisingly, family migration has already generated the highest numbers of arrivals. Family reunification among Syrian refugees, however, has been low. The reasons include inter alia that most people who arrived in late 2015 have not yet been able to apply; that family reunification is often restricted for beneficiaries of temporary protection, even though it is becoming the most common status for Syrian refugees in Europe; and that resettled refugees usually arrive with their family.

By contrast, reunion with relatives already living in OECD countries has been relatively widespread and is increasing, a development attributable to the growing use of private sponsorship. Still, the potential of family migration as a pathway to protection for Syrians remains considerable. It deserves greater attention and less prejudice.

Main points and concluding remarks

When environmental and geopolitical shocks trigger large-scale displacements, protection and migration management systems ill-equipped to provide effective, co-ordinated responses come under great strain. In many of the examples studied in this chapter, countries’ policy responses have been a mixed bag both in scope and timing and they are often ad hoc. Furthermore, in the rare instances when international action has been co-ordinated, it has usually taken many years to build a common response and interventions have involved only a small number of countries.

It is impossible to be sure if, all things being equal, environmental and geopolitical shocks will occur with greater frequency or intensity in the future. What is certain, though, is that their consequences, against a background of growing regional and intercontinental mobility, will be ever more global. Looking beyond the currently unfolding refugee crisis, therefore, it is in the best interest of all OECD countries to identify ways of strengthening response systems and international co-ordination mechanisms capable meeting the challenge of shock-related migration in the future. In that regard, analysis of past and ongoing experience highlights three important lessons:

effective international co-operation cannot be taken for granted;

protracted crises generate growing tensions between the need to find durable solutions and the general preference for short-term protection measures;

selection, which is a common feature of most migration systems, needs to be rethought in the context of the international protection framework.

On the first point, no country is legally obliged to assist in kind or in cash another one that is faced with mass displacements. The UNHCR budget is made up entirely of voluntary contributions, and resettlement offers are renegotiated on a yearly basis. In the EU, until a recent proposal, no automatic stabiliser had even been considered in the Common Asylum System to ensure effective burden sharing in the event of an upsurge of seeking protection. In the current refugee crisis, it is fair to say that solidarity and responsibility-sharing have been disappointingly weak, both globally and across the EU. That is not to say that co-operation cannot be improved and increase. But without incentives or rules to co-operate, countries are unlikely to step up to the plate.

The issue of responsibility and burden sharing also relates to the support that the international community lends to countries of first asylum, which generally border the crisis area. They often find themselves overwhelmed by protracted mass displacements. International co-operation is therefore needed to build the resilience and local integration of people who have been displaced regionally. This is important both in terms of global equity and to reduce secondary migration. Containment cannot be the only policy response to major humanitarian crises such as the one currently unfolding.

As for the second point, the fact is that the 1951 Refugee Convention status risks becoming the exception rather than the norm. When temporary protection measures are the main form of international protection in response to large-scale shock-related migration, a number of problems can arise.

Although the temporary suspension of removals and temporary/subsidiary protection statuses make sense when crises are short-lived, they seem less appropriate in the event of long-term displacement and protection needs. Indeed, experience has shown that displaced people may find themselves living with precarious statuses for decades. When this happens there is a risk of sub-optimal investment by the beneficiaries and the host countries in terms of country-specific skills, with long-term implications for humanitarian and social systems. Furthermore, there are large disparities across countries in terms of conditions associated with temporary protection statuses. Under certain conditions, this may induce a “race to the bottom” if countries want to avoid appearing as the most attractive place for people in need of international protection. To prevent countries from systematically opting for temporary protection measures even in response to protracted crises, some forms of graduation in the rights and obligations could be introduced with the duration of stay.⁴² At the least, international guidelines could set minimum standards of short-term protection and tolerated statuses to facilitate the pathway towards longer, more stable protection.⁴³

The last point is selection. UNHCR resettlement programmes are highly selective by nature as they target the most vulnerable people. Most of the people currently putting their lives in the hands of smugglers are not regarded as being among the most vulnerable and would seldom be chosen for resettlement. Scaling up traditional resettlement programmes, although desirable, would not be enough to stem the inflows of asylum seekers who arrive via smuggling routes, including in the context of the current crisis.

Alternative pathways – labour, study and family migration channels as well as humanitarian visas and private sponsorship schemes – can also be highly selective, though they generally address very different groups of people from those targeted by the UNHCR. Student and work migration channels, for example, are more likely to consider people with greater human and financial capital. Family migration and private sponsorship will, by definition, prioritise people and communities with more social capital and links abroad.

While family migration clearly has the potential to protect large numbers of people, the other alternative pathways cannot benefit as many because of practical limitations. However, even though they are smaller in scope, they should be seriously considered as part of the solution. The fact that they open new options to people who would not otherwise be resettled makes them a valuable complement. One way of affording all potential beneficiaries a chance of international protection would be to allot a certain number of resettlement places (as complements to those set aside for the most vulnerable) on the basis of alternative modes of selection. One such mode could be a neutral, lottery-based, selection process in which all UNHCR-registered people in countries of first asylum would stand a chance.⁴⁴ Provided that enough places are available, such an approach would act as a strong disincentive against using smuggling routes when even those at the bottom of the list for resettlement realise that they could be resettled if they stay where the UNHCR registers them.

Whatever form they take, future responses to shock-related migration need to be bolder, more comprehensive and global. The instruments to activate are well-known but need to be mobilised more systematically and quickly. More generally, one would hope that the response be more proactive than reactive and ultimately that the international community invest much more in crisis prevention than crisis resolution.

All the questions considered in this chapter are relevant both to better preparedness for forthcoming large-scale migration shocks and to the ongoing efforts to address the massive displacements caused by the Syrian crisis. In the current refugee crisis, immediate policy responses have been directed at saving lives at sea, providing refugees and asylum seekers with emergency support, reinforcing border controls and supporting countries of first asylum with humanitarian aid. Such action needs to be pursued and, in some cases, bolstered. But it also needs to be complemented by interventions that look to the medium and long term, such as:

foster the local integration of immigrants and their children;

strengthen co-ordination and responsibility- and burden- sharing mechanisms;

better anticipate future developments and appropriate policy responses;

start rebuilding public trust with regard to migration issues.

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USCIS (2011a), “Relief for Nationals from Central America Stranded in the U.S. Due to Extreme Flooding”, US Department of Homeland Security, www.uscis.gov/news/alerts/relief-nationals-central-america-stranded-us-due-extreme-flooding.

USCIS (2011b), “USCIS Reminds Japanese Nationals Impacted by Recent Disaster of Available Immigration Benefits”, US Department of Homeland Security, www.uscis.gov/news/uscis-reminds-japanese-nationals-impacted-recent-disaster-available-immigration-benefits.

USCIS (2010), “USCIS Reminds Guatemalans of Certain Immigration Benefits Available”, US Department of Homeland Security, www.uscis.gov/news/news-releases/uscis-reminds-guatemalans-certain-immigration-benefits-available.

USCIS (2005a), Fee Waivers for Hurricane Katrina Victims Hurricane, Vol. 7.

USCIS (2005b), Interim relief for certain foreign academic students adversely affected by Hurricane Katrina. Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ).

Valenta, M. and S.P. Ramet (2011), The Bosnian Diaspora: Integration in transnational communities, Ashgate. 2011. ISBN 978-1-4094-1252-6.

Van Hear, N. (2014), “Reconsidering Migration and Class”, International Migration Review, Vol. 48(S1).

Warner, K. (2011), Climate Change Induced Displacement: Adaptation Policy in the Context of the UNFCCC Climate Negotiations (No. PPLA/2011/02), Geneva.

Wasem, R. E. and K. Ester (2011), Congressional Research Service.

Watenpaugh, K.D., A.L. Fricke and J.R. King (2014), The War Follows Them, Institute of International Education, University of California.

Zetter, R. (2015), Protection in Crisis: Forced Migration and Protection in a Global Era, Migration Policy Institute, Washington, DC.

Annex 4.A1.

Environmental disasters 2009-14

Table 4.A1.1. Major environmental events, 2009-14
Disaster | Territory | Month and year | Displaced
Africa
Flood | Nigeria | September 2010 | 560 000
Flood | Niger: South and South-West | July-August 2012 | 530 000
Flood | Chad: Southern | July-October 2012 | 500 000
Flood | Nigeria | September-October 2012 | 6 089 000
Drought | Somalia | July 2011-August 2012 | 28 000
Flood | Sudan | July-September 2013 | 320 000
Americas
Flood | Brazil | April 2009 | 500 000
Earthquake | Haiti | January 2010 | 1 500 000
Earthquake | Chile | February 2010 | 2 000 000
Flood | Colombia | April 2010 | 1 500 000
Flood | Colombia | July 2010 | 1 500 000
Flood | Mexico | September 2010 | 810 000
Flood | Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica | October 2011 | 700 000
Hurricane Sandy | United States | October 2012 | 776 000
Iquique earthquake and tsunami | Chile | April 2014 | 972 500
Asia
Cyclone Alia | India | May 2009 | 2 300 920
Cyclone Alia | Bangladesh | May 2009 | 842 000
Flood | China | July 2009 | 938 000
Flood | India | July 2009 | 500 000
Typhoon Morakot | China | August 2009 | 1 620 000
Flood | India | September 2009 | 2 500 000
Earthquake | Indonesia: West Sumatra | September 2009 | 675 000
Tropical Storm Ketsana | Philippines | September 2009 | 561 242
Tyhoon Parma | Philippines | September 2009 | 500 000
Flood | China | May 2010 | 15 200 000
Flood | Pakistan | July-August 2010 | 11 000 000
Flood | India | September 2010 | 523 000
Flood | Thailand | October 2010 | 1 000 000
Flood | Philippines | January-February 2011 | 672 131
Flood | Sri Lanka | January 2011 | 362 646
Earthquake and tsunami | Japan | March 2011 | 492 000
Flood | China | June-September 2011 | 3 514 000
Flood | Bangladesh | July 2011 | 400 000
Earthquake and tsunami | Japan | March 2011 | 492 000
Landslide | Japan | July 2011 | 400 000
Flood | Thailand | August-December 2011 | 1 500 000
Flood | India | August-October 2011 | 570 000
Typhoon Kabayan | China | August 2011 | 360 000
Tropical Storm Washi | Philippines | December 2011 | 441 037
Flood | China | April-May 2012 | 443 000
Flood | India: Assam and Andhra Pradesh | June-September 2012 | 6 900 000
Flood | Philippines: Luzon, Visayas, Mindinao | June-August 2012 | 1 553 000
Flood | China | June 2012 | 1 420 000
Flood | Bangladesh | June 2012 | 600 000
Typhoon Haikui | China | August 2012 | 2079 000
Flood | Pakistan: Balochistan, Sindh, Punjab | August-September 2012 | 1 857 000
Typhoons Saola and Damrey | China | August 2012 | 867 000
Typhoon Kai-Tak | China | August 2012 | 530 000
Typhoon Pablo | Philippines: Mindanao | December 2012 | 1 932 000
Typhoon Haiyan (local name: Yolanda) | Philippines | November 2013 | 4 095 000
Typhoon Trami (local name: Maring) | Philippines | August 2013 | 1 744 000
Flood | China | June-July 2013 | 1 577 000
Tropical cyclone Mahasen | Bangladesh | May 2013 | 1 100 000
Flood | India | June-October 2013 | 1 042 000
Tropical cyclone Phailin | India | October 2013 | 1 000 000
Typhoon Fitow | China | October 2013 | 826 000
Typhoon Haiyan | Viet Nam | November 2013 | 800 000
Typhoon Usagi | China | September 2013 | 587 000
Typhoon Utor | China | August 2013 | 513 000
Typhoon Soulik | China | July 2013 | 500 000
Typhoon Nari (local name: Santi) | Philippines | October 2013 | 406 000
Flood | China | July-August 2013 | 354 000
Bohol earthquake | Philippines | October 2013 | 349 000
Typhoon Rammasun (local name: Glenda) | Philippines | July 2014 | 2 994 100
Typhoon Hagupit (local name: Ruby) | Philippines | December 2014 | 1 823 200
Flood | India | July 2014 | 1 073 700
Riverine flood | India | October 2014 | 812 000
Riverine flood | Pakistan | September 2014 | 740 150
Cyclone Hud-hud | India | October 2014 | 639 300
Typhoon Rammasun | China | July 2014 | 628 000
Typhoon Halong | Japan | August 2014 | 570 000
Flood | Bangladesh | August 2014 | 542 000
Storm | China | May 2014 | 447 000
Flood | China | July 2014 | 403 000
Tropical storm Lingling (local name: Agaton) | Philippines | January 2014 | 400 000
Flood | India | September 2014 | 367 000
Source: Black and Baldinelli 2016 elaboration of data from IDMC & NRC, 2010, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015 and FAO, 2011.

Annex 4.A2.

Responses to recent environmental disasters

The Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami (2004)

The undersea earthquake and tsunami that occurred in the Indian Ocean on 26 December 2004 sent shock waves around the world, both politically and physically. It caused coastal flooding, destroyed property and claimed lives in Sri Lanka, India, Thailand and Indonesia. It also attracted substantial public attention across a much wider area, perhaps – a critical point – because the citizens of many Western countries were caught up in the disaster. As a result, a number of OECD countries that were home to migrants from affected countries took policy measures.

One of the first measures was to suspend removals in response to the UNHCR recommendation of 12 January 2005 that all countries should temporarily suspend the involuntary deportation of migrants from affected areas in India, Indonesia, Sri Lanka and Somalia – including asylum seekers whose applications had been denied and undocumented immigrants. Canada, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States suspended the deportation of nationals from India, Indonesia, the Maldives, Seychelles, Somalia, Sri Lanka and Thailand (IOM, 2009; Laczko and Collett, 2005; Martin, 2009, 2010):

Canada suspended the removal of about 4 000 migrants from Sri Lanka, the Maldives, the Seychelles, India, Indonesia and Thailand.

Switzerland delayed the deportation of denied asylum seekers from Sri Lanka.

The United Kingdom announced the postponement of forced repatriations.

The United States halted the removal of migrants from Sri Lanka and the Maldives until 7 April 2005.

In the United States it was proposed that the citizens of India, Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Myanmar, Malaysia, Maldives, Seychelles and Somalia should be granted Temporary Protection Status (TPS). This proposal was based on the argument that the governments of those countries, grappling with the effects of the disaster, would be unable to cope with the returning migrants.

Host countries also introduced a number of other measures. In Canada, for example, the agency responsible, Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC):

sped-up the processing of Family Class applications from Canadian citizens and permanent residents who wished to sponsor close relatives affected by the disaster in a serious and personal way

took a case-by-case approach to the applications from people affected by the disaster who had relatives in Canada but did not qualify for Family Class visas

waived processing fees for new applications from all classes of visa applicants who were or had been affected by the disaster

waived the fee for Right of Permanent Residence visas (also known as Right of Landing visas) for all classes of applicants who were or had been affected by the disaster. The move applied to new applications and those being processed before the disaster.

All in all, in 2005 Canada fast-tracked about 1 000 applications from migrants coming from India, Sri Lanka, Thailand and Indonesia and expedited the processing of immigration applications from the citizens of affected countries who wanted to join immediate family members in Canada – spouses, common-law partners, conjugal partners and dependent children. Particular attention was given to orphaned siblings, the nieces and nephews of Canadian citizens or permanent residents. In addition, Canadian immigration officers met with migrants from Sri Lanka, India, Indonesia and Somalia to determine how communities in Canada could help in the resettlement process of displaced people in their countries of origin (Laczko and Collett, 2005).

Australia also prioritised the processing of temporary visas for citizens of the affected countries and fast-tracked existing applications (DIMIA, 2005; Laczko and Collett, 2005). As for new applications, priority was given to people with families in Australia and to orphans or last surviving family members.

The Haiti earthquake (2010)

Although it arguably attracted less media attention than the Indian Ocean tsunami, the earthquake that shook Haiti on 12 January 2010 also prompted policy measures in OECD countries directed at migration and displacement from Haiti. Several UN bodies issued joint emergency appeals to countries to suspend forced returns to Haiti (Human Rights Council, 2012). The bodies including the Independent Expert on the situation of human rights in Haiti, Michel Forst,⁴⁵ the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), and the High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). These last two issued a statement in January 2010 “urging countries to suspend all involuntary returns to Haiti due to the continuing humanitarian crisis […] pending stabilization and until such time as people can return safely and sustainably” (UNHCR, 2010).

According to the report of the Independent Expert,⁴⁶ policy reactions following the earthquake varied among UN Member States. France, the United States, Mexico and Canada, which traditionally receive most migrants from Haiti, reported that they were suspending all forced returns. Costa Rica, Denmark, Germany, Lebanon, Paraguay, Romania, the Slovak Republic and Slovenia also stated to the Independent Expert that they had suspended forcible returns of Haitians after the 2010 earthquake. However, it is unknown whether those countries ever hosted Haitian migrants.

The United States granted Haitian nationals on its soil Temporary Protection Status (TPS). In Canada, Haitians had benefitted from a Temporary Suspension of Removals (TSR) since 2004, because general conditions in Haiti were endangering the lives and safety of its population. After the earthquake, Canada suspended all forcible returns to Haiti, even for people who did not qualify for TSR. Mexico also expressed its willingness to halt deportations and expedite humanitarian visas for Haitians with family ties to Mexico (Human Rights Council, 2012).

In addition to TPS, France simplified family reunification procedures to allow the family members of Haitian migrants into the country without a temporary visa. It processed their applications without delay and granted temporary residence permits to immigrants whose visas and permits had expired after the date of the earthquake. In the United States, TPS translated into the suspension of some regulatory requirements, so that Haitian students were authorised to work, Haitian orphans were granted humanitarian parole, and Haitians with final removal orders were released and allowed to remain in the Unites States on a discretionary stay (Human Rights Council, 2012). According to USCIS, the validity of employment authorisation documents was extended to allow Haitian migrants to continue to work in the United States (USCIS, 2014b). Recipients of TPS are allowed travel to other countries and then return to the United States.

In order to be eligible for TPS, applicants had to show that they held Haitian citizenship and that they were residing in the United States when the earthquake occurred. People who had been convicted for one felony or two offenses did not qualify. In the aftermath of the disaster, TPS and work permit applications were fast-tracked and fees were waived for those unable to pay (Chishti and Bergeron, 2010).

However, despite such measures, most countries recommenced the deportation of Haitians shortly after the earthquake. In Canada, although TSR was maintained, forced removals were resumed (Human Rights Council, 2012). In the United States, although TPS remains in effect, a Policy for Resumed Removals to Haiti was approved in 2011 “to ensure the safety of US communities”. This policy mostly aimed at repatriating “aliens with final orders who pose a threat to public safety”. Mexico, too, along with other Latin American countries, resumed deportations. France, despite formally showing support for Haitian migrants and advocating the protection of human rights, closed the borders of its overseas territories in the Caribbean (Pelletan, 2012).

Neither France nor the United States accepted new arrivals of people fleeing from Haiti because, they argued, they could not be considered eligible as refugees under the 1951 Refugee Convention. Indeed, both took stern measures to prevent the mass immigration of Haitians, with United States even putting in place a naval blockade off its shores (Pelletan, 2012; Thomaz, 2013).

Earthquakes in Japan and New Zealand (2011)

After the 2011 earthquakes and tsunami in Japan, the United States granted Japanese nationals residing on its soil permission to request a series of benefits from the US Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS). Since “a natural disaster can affect an individual’s ability to establish or maintain lawful immigration status” (USCIS, 2011b), Japanese nationals were allowed access to temporary relief measures in the aftermath of the disaster. They were:

The possibility of applying for change or extension of non-immigrant status for someone who is already in the United States, even after the authorised period of admission has expired.

The re-parole of individuals granted parole by USCIS.

The extension in certain cases of the ability to request parole and obtain the rapid processing of such a request.

The expedited approval of requests for off-campus employment authorisation for students facing economic hardship.

The fast-track processing of employment authorisations and immigrant requests for relatives of US citizens or lawful permanent residents.

The granting of assistance to lawful permanent residents who are overseas without immigration documents such as Green Cards.

The Australian government offered visa extensions to Japanese residents affected by the natural disaster (Eliasson, 2011). In the aftermath of the 2011 environmental crisis the Australian Minister for Immigration and Citizenship, Chris Bowen, reassured Japanese citizens that visa assistance was available in Australia for the people affected by the earthquake (Australian Visa Bureau, 2011).

The New Zealand earthquake took place in February 2011. After dealing with its immediate impact, the government turned its attention to rebuilding the Canterbury region, which required immigrant workers. It drew up a special list, the Canterbury Skilled Shortage List, which identified immediate skill shortages with the emphasis on the construction sector. Another initiative was the Canterbury Skills and Employment Hub – a free job-matching service where employers could register vacancies which were then matched against a database of jobseekers to find the best fit. The Hub’s prime aim was to help firms find the staff they needed locally. When that was not possible, a streamlined process kicked in to help them access overseas migrants to meet their needs. Designed to help employers and job seekers, the Hub is a collaborative venture between four agencies.⁴⁷

To prevent worker exploitation at the operational level, the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment put in place a combined labour market compliance team in Christchurch which co-ordinates the work of labour inspectors, immigration compliance staff and health and safety teams. It boasts enhanced resources because of the labour market risks involved. The ministry also engages with employers and keeps them informed of the status of workers from diverse source countries who have suddenly increased in number.⁴⁸

Finally, work was undertaken with other agencies in the education export sector to protect the sector. In response to the 57% decline in international enrolments in Canterbury – from 15 210 in 2010 to 6 543 in 2012, ministers agreed to a policy change which extended the permission to work of some English language students enrolled in Canterbury. The purpose was to give a marketing advantage to providers of such courses. The policy switch was trialled as a pilot. It has now been rolled out nationwide.

By 2014, the situation in the region was back to normal. Although there was a net outflow of permanent and long-term migrants after the earthquake in February 2011, arrivals have increased by 49% since 2011-12. The positive trend continued and, in 2013-14, 6 591 people were approved for Essential Skills job offers in Canterbury, an increase of 40% over the previous year, making Canterbury the second-most popular New Zealand destination, with 25% of Essential Skills workers heading there. Additionally, 18% of Skilled Migrant Category principal applicants who had a job or job offer specified Canterbury as their region of employment – up from 12% in 2011-12.

Hurricanes Katrina (2005) and Sandy (2012)

USCIS granted relief measures to foreign-born victims of Hurricanes Katrina (2005) and Sandy (2012) who lost housing, employment and personal documentation because of the disaster. In the case of Hurricane Katrina, measures included fee waivers for people residing in the areas impacted by the disaster and the temporary suspension of certain restrictions on the on-campus and off-campus employment of students (USCIS, 2005a, 2005b). Foreign victims of Hurricane Sandy were offered the following benefits:

Change or extension of non-immigrant status for individuals who were in the United States at the time of the disaster, even when the request was filed after the authorised period of admission had expired.

Extension or re-parole of individuals previously granted parole by USCIS.

Fast-track processing and adjudication of employment authorisation applications for students experiencing economic hardship.

Fast-track processing and adjudication of off-campus employment authorisation applications.

Assistance to permanent legal residents stranded overseas without immigration or travel documents such as Green Cards.

Assistance for applicants who did not turn up for an interview or submit required forms of evidence. Delays in filing were allowed.

Assistance for people unable to respond to requests for evidence or notices of intent to deny. Deadlines were extended and applications or petitions were not denied on the grounds of abandonment (Batalova, 2005; USCIS, 2012).

Flood, cyclones and volcanic eruptions

The three big earthquakes reviewed above all elicited policy responses to the plights of individuals unable to return to disaster-affected countries. This pattern is mirrored somewhat in relation to floods and cyclones, although here the story is more specific to the Americas. Broadly speaking, a series of floods and extreme weather events affecting Central American countries over the last few decades have seen policy responses in North America. Similarly large events elsewhere in the world have elicited little or no discernible policy action.

Policy responses to floods and cyclones in Central America have a surprisingly long history. For example, the United States granted TPS to nationals from El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua in 1998 after Hurricane Mitch. And, more recently, TPS was extended in response to a range of other natural disasters (Terrazas, 2010). Thus, according to a Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, 217 000 Salvadorans benefitted from temporary protection between 2001 and 2012, along with 66 000 Hondurans and 3 000 Nicaraguans between 1998 and 2012 (Wasem and Ester, 2011).

Nationals of El Salvador were designated for TPS for the first time through the Immigration Act of 1990 due to the violent ongoing civil war – the only time the US Congress has ever introduced TPS for a the nationals of a single country (Messick and Bergeron, 2014; Wasem and Ester, 2011). Although TPS for Salvadorans expired in 1992, it was granted again in 2001 by the Bush Administration following three major earthquakes. Since then it has been renewed continuously.

Citizens of Honduras and Nicaragua were granted TPS in 1998 in the aftermath of Hurricane Mitch because of the “extraordinary displacement and damage” that followed the natural disaster (Wasem and Ester, 2011). Secretary of Homeland Security Janet Napolitano extended TPS for eligible nationals of both Nicaragua and Honduras until 2015 (USCIS, 2013a, 2013b). Salvadorans were not granted TPS after Hurricane Mitch (though, they were granted it in 2001), and neither were Guatemalans. However, both Salvadorans and Guatemalans benefited from a temporary halt to deportations.

Guatemala submitted a request for TPS to the US government in 2010 following a volcanic eruption and severe tropical storms in the country. It received no response (Terrazas, 2010). Nevertheless, following the tropical storm Agatha, USCIS did recognise the “special situation” of Guatemala. In the wake of the storm, in 2010, Guatemalan nationals were reminded of the relief measures that were available to them when they were affected by the catastrophe. The measures included:

The possibility for Guatemalan nationals already in the United States to apply for a change or extension of non-immigrant status.

Re-parole of individuals granted parole by USCIS.

The extension and expedited processing of certain advance parole grants.

Expedited adjudication and approval of requests for off-campus employment authorisation due to severe economic hardship and the expedited processing of immigrant petitions for the immediate relatives of US citizens and lawful permanent residents.

Assistance to lawful permanent residents stranded overseas without documents (USCIS, 2010).

In 2011, the USCIS again reminded nationals of Central American countries that, following the extreme flooding that affected the region, these same immigration benefits were available upon request to eligible people already residing in the United States (USCIS, 2011a).

However, while nationals from the Philippines residing in the United States were also able to benefit from immigration relief measures following Typhoon Haiyan, which devastated large swathes of their home country in 2013 (USCIS, 2013c), other Asian migrants whose country was likewise affected by natural disasters were never given the opportunity to apply for the same measures. For instance, Pakistani migrants in the United States could not benefit either from special relief provisions nor from TPS. A Pakistani advocacy group requested TPS following the severe flooding of 2010. The Pakistani Temporary Protected Status Act of 2011 was introduced, but the bill was referred to the House Subcommittee on Immigration Policy and Enforcement on 7 February 2011. The bill has not yet been enacted (Wasem and Ester, 2011).

Elsewhere, the response to Asian floods has hardly been more significant. Belgium decided to temporarily suspend forcible repatriations of Pakistani migrants during the floods, it was primarily for political reasons and prompted by the bilateral relations between the two countries (Kraler Cernei and Noack, 2011). Otherwise, there is no evidence of any response from any other migration destination country.

Droughts and famines

Somali nationals were assigned TPS by the United States in 1991 and since then the status has been renewed continuously. TPS was initially granted because of inter-clan fighting, anarchy and terrorist activity in the country. Subsequently, it was extended due to the continuing the civil war, drought and famine (Messick and Bergeron, 2014; USCIS, 2014a).

The Somali crisis has deep roots. The country has been in violent turmoil since the late 1980s, when the United States granted Somali nationals TPS (in 1991). Although civil unrest and lack of safety for the country’s population was the main reason why TPS was granted, the continuation of internal conflict, recurrent droughts, and famine are all intermingled causes of its extension (Messick and Bergeron, 2014; USCIS, 2014a). But, apart from TPS in the United States, it has not been possible to identify Somali-specific protection measures in any other OECD country, let alone provisions in response to the country’s environmental conditions and chronic drought and famine. There are two main reasons:

Somalia’s humanitarian and food security crisis, its lack of safety and the vulnerability of the Somali population cannot be reduced to a single main factor, as with the environmental crises described above. Recent conditions in Somalia are the result of a combination of political, economic and environmental elements – irregular rainfall, food price volatility, the fighting between on one side, the Transitional Federal Government and the African Union Mission to Somalia and, on the other, Al-Shabaab, which undermines the traditional coping strategies of the local population (IFRC, 2011; Lindley and Hammond, 2014; Maxwell et al., 2014).

Droughts and chronic famine are slow-onset catastrophes, generated by a series of factors which occur repeatedly over time, allowing better-off groups to plan their migration away from affected areas (Martin, 2009).

More than 1 million Somalis have been internally displaced, while others have migrated to neighbouring countries. Kenya currently hosts 429 000 registered Somali refugees, Ethiopia 245 000, and Yemen 237 000, according to UNHCR (2014c). Many have settled in OECD countries – Canada, the United States, the United Kingdom, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Italy, the Netherlands and Germany (UNDP, 2011). The result has been a large international diaspora.

Annex 4.A3.

Responses to geopolitical shocks

The Indochinese refugee crisis (1975-97)

In 1975, Saigon fell to North Vietnamese forces, an event that marked the end of the Viet Nam War. Following the withdrawal of the United States and other international troops, communist governments were established in South Viet Nam, Laos and Cambodia (the three former French colonies of Indochina). Large numbers of people who had supported and/or worked for the US government in the three countries during the Viet Nam War now found themselves in danger of persecution.

As a consequence, over 3 million people fled Viet Nam, Laos and Cambodia during the following 25 years or so. Many refugees fled by boat to neighbouring countries (like Hong Kong, China; Thailand; the Philippines; Malaysia; Singapore and Indonesia) and became known as “boat people”. Large numbers of refugees died during the crossings.

The exodus of Indochinese refugees to neighbouring countries started on a relatively small scale, but rose to very large numbers in the late 1970s. Just before the fall of Saigon, the United States evacuated and resettled about 14 000 people closely associated with the former South Vietnamese government. In addition, by the end of 1975, about 5 000 Vietnamese boat people had reached the shores of Thailand, about 4 000 had arrived in Hong Kong, China, 1 800 in Singapore and 1 250 in the Philippines (UNHCR, 2000a). By the end of 1978, there were almost 62 000 Vietnamese boat people in refugee camps across Southeast Asia. The number of monthly arrivals climbed rapidly, reaching a peak of 54 000 arrivals in June 1979. Between 1975 and 1979, an estimated 550 000 Indochinese refugees sought asylum in neighbouring Southeast Asian countries. By mid-1979, about 200 000 had been resettled and the rest remained in countries of first asylum in the region (UNHCR, 2000a).

In the late 1970s, new inflows of Indochinese refugees into Southeast Asian countries significantly exceeded the number of people who had been resettled in third countries. The trend was reversed in the 1980s after the UN conference on Indochinese refugees (Geneva, July 1979). When there was an upsurge in people fleeing Viet Nam in 1987-88, the UN organised another Indochinese refugee conference. What emerged from it was a new approach that became known as the Comprehensive Plan of Action (CPA) which remained in place for eight years. The CPA led to a drastic decline in new arrivals and a large increase in resettlement. The Unites States alone eventually resettled over a million Vietnamese boat people.

The Indochinese refugee crisis led to a major international policy response which involved a large number of countries in and outside the region. The two pillars of the international policy response were the plans made at the Geneva Conference on the Indochinese Refugee Crisis in 1979 and, 10 years later, the CPA agreed at the 1989 global conference.

The Geneva conference in 1979

The rapid increase in the number of boat people fleeing Viet Nam in the late 1970s put considerable pressure on Southeast Asian countries of first asylum. Toward the end of 1979, the ASEAN member states (which, at the time, comprised Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand and Singapore) announced that they would stop accepting new arrivals unless other countries made more places available under resettlement schemes. Concerned at the direct threat to the asylum system, and with “push-backs” already underway in some countries in the region, the UN convened an international conference in Geneva in July 1979 which resulted in a number of important commitments. First, worldwide resettlement pledges increased from 125 000 to 260 000 per year (UNHCR, 2000a). At the same time, Viet Nam agreed to stop “illegal departures” and facilitate “orderly departures”. Financial assistance to first countries of asylum increased considerably. Indonesia and the Philippines agreed to establish regional processing centres that would help facilitate speedy resettlement of refugees to third countries.

The general policy approach of the international agreement was to provide temporary asylum in Southeast Asian countries, followed by permanent resettlement in third countries. The policy resulted in a sharp fall in new arrivals and a substantial rise in resettlement during the early 1980s.

The Comprehensive Plan of Action (CPA) in 1989

In the late 1980s the number of new refugee arrivals in Southeast Asian countries increased again and the general policy approach agreed at the 1979 conference began to fall apart. Partly because many high-income countries were increasingly sceptical as to whether all Indochinese boat people should continue to obtain automatic refugee status (a policy which, some thought, acted as a pull-factor for economic migrants), resettlement schemes were gradually reduced.

The UN convened another major conference on the Indochinese Refugee crisis which resulted in the Comprehensive Plan of Action (CPA) that lasted eight years. Fontaine (1995) described it as a “unique experiment aimed at resolving a long-standing problem”. The CPA, which directly involved Viet Nam, as the major refugee-producing country in the crisis, had multiple aims (UNHCR, 2000a): to reduce illegal departures from Viet Nam through, among other things, “Orderly Departure Programmes”; to provide temporary asylum to all asylum seekers until their status was decided and a durable solution found; to use international standards when determining asylum claims; to resettle recognised refugees in third countries; and to return people not recognised as refugees to their home countries and assist them with reintegration.

One of the many effects of the CPA was to break the automatic link between asylum “in the region” and guaranteed resettlement in third countries. It did so through a new policy of returning Vietnamese asylum seekers whose claims for protection had been rejected. The CPA managed to drastically reduce and effectively end the outflow of Vietnamese asylum seekers. During the eight years it was in force, over half a million Vietnamese and Laotians were resettled in third countries and over 100 000 Vietnamese refugees were repatriated (UNHCR, 2000a).

Table 4.A3.1. Indochinese arrivals by territory of first asylum, 1975-95
| Territory of first asylum | 1975-79 | 1980-84 | 1985-89 | 1990-95 | Cumulative 1975-95
Vietnamese boat people | Hong Kong, China | 79 906 | 28 975 | 59 518 | 27 434 | 195 833
Indonesia | 51 156 | 36 208 | 19 070 | 15 274 | 121 708
Japan | 3 073 | 4 635 | 1 834 | 1 529 | 11 071
Korea | 409 | 318 | 621 | 0 | 1 348
Macau, China | 4 333 | 2 777 | 17 | 1 | 7 128
Malaysia | 124 103 | 76 205 | 52 860 | 1 327 | 254 495
Philippines | 12 299 | 20 201 | 17 829 | 1 393 | 51 722
Singapore | 7 858 | 19 868 | 4 578 | 153 | 32 457
Thailand | 25 723 | 52 468 | 29 850 | 9 280 | 117 321
Other | 2 566 | 340 | 321 | 0 | 3 227
Total Vietnamese boat people | 311 426 | 241 995 | 186 498 | 56 391 | 796 310
Cambodians | Thailand (overland) | 171 933 | 47 984 | 12 811 | 4 670 | 237 398
Laotians |  | 211 344 | 96 224 | 42 795 | 9 567 | 359 930
Vietnamese |  | 14 666 | 11 117 | 10 467 | 6 668 | 42 918
| Total to Thailand | 397 943 | 155 325 | 66 073 | 20 905 | 640 246
Total (boat and land) |  | 709 369 | 397 320 | 252 571 | 77 296 | 1 436 556 1
1. There were also 2 163 Cambodians who arrived in Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines after 1975.
Source: UNHCR, 2000a, p. 98.
StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933396456

Table 4.A3.2. Resettlement of Indochinese refugees by destination, 1975-95
Resettlement territory | Cambodians | Laotians | Vietnamese | Total 1975-95
Australia | 16 308 | 10 239 | 110 996 | 137 543
Belgium | 745 | 989 | 2 051 | 3 785
Canada | 16 818 | 17 274 | 103 053 | 137 145
Denmark | 31 | 12 | 4 682 | 4 725
Finland | 37 | 6 | 1 859 | 1 902
France | 34 364 | 34 236 | 27 071 | 95 671
Western Germany | 874 | 1 706 | 16 848 | 19 428
Japan | 1 061 | 1 273 | 6 469 | 8 803
Netherlands | 465 | 33 | 7 565 | 8 063
New Zealand | 4 421 | 1 286 | 4 921 | 10 628
Norway | 128 | 2 | 6 064 | 6 194
Sweden | 19 | 26 | 6 009 | 6 054
Switzerland | 1 638 | 593 | 6 239 | 8 470
United Kingdom | 273 | 346 | 19 355 | 19 974
United States | 150 240 | 248 147 | 424 590 | 822 977
Others | 8 063 | 4 688 | 7 070 | 19 821
Total | 235 485 | 320 856 | 754 842 | 1 311 183
Note: The resettlements in the United States exclude arrivals under the Orderly Departure Programme (ODP).
Source: UNHCR, 2000a, p. 99.
StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933396467

Evaluations of the CPA have been decidedly mixed. McConnahie (2014) points out that, while it has been described as a “successful international response to a desperate humanitarian emergency”, it also had a number of problematic aspects and adverse effects, such as forced repatriations and the consolidation of Southeast Asia as a region outside the global refugee regime. McConnahie concludes her assessment with this remark: “while the CPA established the potential for burden sharing, its precedential value is questionable” (McConnahie, 2014). Similarly, Courtland Robinson (2004) contends that the CPA was both a success in “burden-sharing” and an example of “international buck-passing and questionable compromises”. In a critical assessment, Hathaway (1993) argued that “for Vietnamese asylum seekers, neither the 1979 nor the 1989 international agreement resulted in the de facto implementation of the Convention definition of refugee status”. Betts (2006) identifies a range of policy lessons from the CPA for developing comprehensive regional approaches to protracted refugee situations in other parts of the world.

Break-up of Yugoslavia: Kosovo (1998-99) and Bosnia (1992-95)

Bosnia (1992-95)

The Bosnian War broke out in 1992 and lasted until 1995. It was part of the break-up of the Yugoslav Federation which had included six constituent federal units: the former Yugoslav Republics of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Slovenia and Serbia. In 1992, UNHCR asked European countries to provide temporary protection to people fleeing the fighting in Bosnia. In the ensuing years, almost a million refugees received protection outside the Yugoslav republics. In Europe, Germany accepted the largest number of refugees – 320 000 (Table 4.A3.3).

Bosnians who escaped to European countries were the first large refugee group to be protected under a temporary protection regime. Koser and Black (1999) argue that the prevailing political and economic conditions (e.g. public opposition and rising unemployment) played a key role in shaping such a policy response at the time.

Table 4.A3.3. Bosnia refugees, 1992-2005¹
Recipient country of refugees from Bosnia and Herzegovina 1992-95 | Recorded number of refugees from Bosnia and Herzegovina 1992-95 | Changed country of reception | Repatriation to Bosnia and Herzegovina 1996-2005 | Number of refugees from Bosnia and Herzegovina in host country 2005
Australia | 15 000 | .. | 800 | 14 200
Austria | 86 500 | 5 500 | 10 100 | 70 900
Belgium | 5 500 | .. | 500 | 5 000
Czech Republic | 5 000 | 1 000 | 1 000 | 3 000
Denmark | 17 000 | .. | 1 600 | 15 400
France | 6 000 | 100 | 900 | 5 000
Greece | 4 000 | 400 | 600 | 3 000
Netherlands | 22 000 | 2 000 | 4 000 | 16 000
Croatia | 170 000 | 50 000 | 56 000 | 62 000
Italy | 12 100 | 2000 | 2 000 | 8 100
Canada | 20 000 | 1 000 | 600 | 18 400
Hungary | 7 000 | 1 000 | 2 500 | 3 500
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia | 9 000 | 4 800 | 3 750 | 450
Norway | 12 000 | 1 300 | 2 500 | 8 200
Germany | 320 000 | 52 000 | 246 000 | 22 000
United States | 20 000 | 1 000 | 1 500 | 17 500
Slovenia | 43 100 | 23 200 | 15 000 | 4 900
Serbia and Montenegro | 297 000 | 50 000 | 110 000 | 137 000
Spain and Portugal | 4 500 | 1 000 | 1 000 | 2 500
Sweden | 58 700 | .. | 1 900 | 56 000
Switzerland | 24 500 | 2 600 | 11 000 | 10 900
Turkey | 23 500 | 17 800 | 4 650 | 1 050
United Kingdom and Ireland | 4 100 | 100 | 1 000 | 3 000
Other Countries | 13 500 | 1 200 | 1 100 | 11 200
Total | 1 200 000 | 220 000 | 480 000 | 500 000

Note: For the United States, the numbers presented are much lower than those given by the U.S. Census Bureau. According to this latter source, in the period 1992-2000, 37 000 Bosnian Refugees and Asylum seekers obtained legal permanent resident status. According to the U.S. Census Bureau the numbers were even larger in the period 2001-08 when 81 000 Bosnian Refugees and Asylum seekers obtained legal permanent resident status (see U.S. Census Bureau, 2001).

.. Non available.

1. According to the official data from Secrétariat d’Etat aux migrations (SEM) there are great discrepancies with the data from Valenta & Ramet (2011), which could be due to the inclusion of temporary admissions in the latter. The recorded number of refugees from Bosnia and Herzegovia in  1992-95 according to SEM data is around 14 861. The number of refugees in 2005 according to SEM data is 3 423. The number of repatriation to Bosnia and Herzegovia in 1996-2005 according to SEM data is around 1 400.

Source: Valenta and Ramet, 2011.

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933396475

European and other OECD countries hoped that, after the Dayton peace Agreement was signed in 1995, Bosnian refugees and internally displaced people would be able to return home. While many did, large numbers stayed abroad partly because “ethnic cleansing” during the war meant that many Bosnians could not return to the places that they originally fled (Koser and Black, 1999). Accordingly, many host countries in the EU changed the status of Bosnian refugees from temporarily protected to permanent residence.

As Table 4.A3.3 shows, a total of 1.2 million people were displaced during the Bosnian War (1992-95), 220 000 changed country of first asylum, 480 000 were repatriated to Bosnia-Herzegovina between 1996 and 2005, and half a million had settled in other countries in 2005 (Valenta and Ramet, 2011).

Kosovo (1998-99)

The Kosovo War lasted from February 1998 until June 1999. It broke when the Kosovo Liberation Army rebelled against Serbian rule. The conflict quickly escalated and led to the internal displacement (within Serbia) of over 200 000 people. In March 1999, NATO began air-strikes on specific targets in Kosovo in support of the rebels against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Over 850 000 Kosovo Albanians fled after the bombings and a great majority escaped to Albania, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) and Montenegro. By June 1999, there were 450 000 Kosovars in Albania, 250 000 in the former Yougoslav Republic of Macedonia, and over 50 000 in Montenegro (Figure 4.A3.1).

Figure 4.A3.1. Kosovo refugee inflows by destination during the emergency, 23 March-9 June 1999

Source: UNHCR, 2000.

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395674

Given the tensions with its own ethnic Albanian minority, the Macedonian government was concerned about the adverse impacts of the inflow of a quarter million Kosovo Albanians. It called on the international community to “share the burden” in response to which the UNHCR and IOM launched the “Humanitarian Evacuation Programme” (HEP) in early April 1999. The HEP helped evacuate just under 100 000 refugees to 28 countries. Other countries, for their part, received over 120 000 applications for asylum in 1999, with refugees arriving either under the HEP and/or “spontaneous arrivals” (i.e. regular asylum procedures) (Figure 4.A3.2). Almost all the host countries that took part in the HEP offered temporary rather than permanent protection to refugees from Kosovo. The sole exception was the United States, which offered both temporary and permanent.

Figure 4.A3.2. Humanitarian Evacuation Programme and total number of asylum application lodged in 1999

Source: UNHCR (1999b).

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395689

While temporary protection has long existed as a potential policy tool, the refugee crises caused by the break-up of the former Yugoslavia saw temporary protection become a principal way of providing protection to refugees. As Gibney (1999) points out, temporary protection aims to meet two objectives: a control objective and a humanitarian objective. A key aspect of the control objective is to ensure that temporarily protected refugees return to their home countries after the conflict has ended or at least subsided.

The large-scale of return of refugees from Kosovo in 1999 stands in stark contrast to the experience with Bosnian refugees admitted during the Bosnian war in 1992-95. Most countries were able to meet their control objectives under HEP and, according to UNHCR (1999), “within three weeks of the signing of a peace accord, more than 600 000 refugees had flooded back into Kosovo in one of the fastest returns in modern history”.

Libya (2011-)

The first Libyan Civil War, also referred to as the Libyan Revolution, broke out in February 2011. It resulted in over half a million internally displaced people (IDP), who included considerable numbers of migrant workers. According to the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, the peak number of IDPs was 550 000 (about 8% of the total population) in 2011. About 490 000 displaced people eventually returned home, “but little is known about the nature and sustainability of their return” (IDMC, 2014). The latest number available was 435 000 in July 2015 – up from 363 000 at the start of 2015.49 Estimates suggest that, before the uprising in early 2011, Libya hosted about 2.5 million migrant workers, including 1.5 million workers without legal status (Koser, 2011).

Most of those who fled the conflicts in Libya initially escaped to neighbouring countries, particularly Egypt and Tunisia. Just under 800 000 migrant workers and their families escaped Libya to neighbouring countries between 2011 and 2012 (IOM, 2012). Accordingly, 40% of migrants fled to Tunisia, while Egypt was the second biggest destination. In addition, over 300 000 Libyans fled to Tunisia and over 150 000 to Egypt (Koser, 2011), though most returned after a relatively short time. At the end of September 2011, the IOM also evacuated over 40 000 migrant workers trapped in Libya.

As part of the policy response, the IOM developed the Migration Crisis Operational Framework (MCOF). “The MCOF is a practical, operational, institution-wide tool for improving and systematizing the way in which the organisation supports its member states and partners to better prepare for and respond to migration crises.” More recently, the United States and the Philippines launched the Migrants in Countries in Crisis Initiative to meet the needs of migrants physically present in countries in conflict.

Migration to OECD countries

The available data suggest that the Libyan conflict displaced Libyan nationals to OECD countries, mainly in Europe, in 2011 and has done so again since 2014. The number of new applications for asylum filed by Libyan nationals in OECD countries had increased by a factor of four in 2011 (3 684 compared to 821 in 2010). In most of the OECD countries receiving the largest inflows, new applications by Libyan nationals rose in 2011, then declined or remained relatively stable in 2012 and 2013 (Figure 4.A3.3 and Table 4.A3.3). But in 2014 and 2015, they rose again very sharply to 5 800. The main OECD destination countries were Germany (1 100), the United Kingdom (900), France (700) and Canada (500).

Figure 4.A3.3. Applications for asylum by Libyan nationals in selected OECD countries (top 4 in 2015)

Source: UNHCR; OECD International migration database.

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395693

Has the Libyan conflict generated irregular migration flows to OECD countries, especially in the EU? Frontex, the European border management agency, provides statistics on detected illegal border crossings on certain migration routes to the European Union. As with all enforcement data, great care needs to be taken when interpreting them. Importantly, a change in the numbers of detected illegal crossings may reflect a change in the actual number of migrants trying to cross, a change in enforcement activities, or both.

Frontex data suggest that the number of overall detections of illegal crossings on the Central Mediterranean route (Italy and Malta) increased considerably, with spikes in 2011 and 2013, and a sharp rise to 75 000 in the third quarter of 2014 (Figure 4.A3.4). In 2015, illegal border-crossing detections on this route numbered 150 000, down from 170 000 in 2014. However, Libyans were not among the main nationalities in the Frontex statistics. In 2014, Syrians accounted for a quarter of all detections, while in 2015 Eritreans, Nigerians and Somalis were the top three nationalities.

Figure 4.A3.4. Detections of illegal border crossings in the Central Mediterranean route, 2008-15

Source: Frontex.

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395700

The conflict in Libya initially prompted a relatively small displacement of Libyan nationals to OECD countries in Europe and elsewhere. However, the sharp increase in movements observed in 2014 and 2015 deserves attention. It is also possible that some of the migrant workers displaced from Libya to neighbouring countries moved to Europe – though it is difficult to analyse what could be their onward migration with the existing data.

When assessing post-2011 migration flows (i.e. after the Arab Spring) from Northern Africa to Europe, it is important to keep in mind that there are well established trends and patterns of migration from Africa to Europe. Both Fargues and Fandrich (2012) and de Haas (2012) concur that migration to Europe is part of an ongoing trend and was only slightly accelerated by the Arab Spring.

Policy responses

European countries have been at the forefront and isolated in their policy response to the Libyan crisis. With a few exceptions, in the context of the Libyan crisis, most European countries very much emphasised border protection and enforcement as well as assisting countries in Northern Africa to manage displacement and migration flows over admitting migrants for protection. They have also sought to address the root cause of migration, particularly through mobility partnerships and co-operation with African countries at the Valletta Summit on Migration in 2015. A plan to relocate migrants from Italy was agreed in June 2015 and expanded in September 2015, but no resettlement programme has been envisaged so far either for Libyan nationals or for third-country national workers displaced from Libya.

In 2011, Frontex was strengthened and launched the Joint Operation EPN Hermes Extension to help Italy intercept vessels carrying migrants and refugees. EUROPOL also deployed a team of experts to Italy to help the country’s law enforcement authorities identify possible criminals among the arriving irregular migrants.

In October 2013, a boat from Libya carrying around 500 migrants sank off the coast of Lampedusa. In response the Italian government launched the naval Operation Mare Nostrum to save lives at sea. In a year more then 150 000 migrants, mainly from Africa and the Middle East, were rescued at sea. When the Mare Nostrum operation was phased out (October 2014), the EU launched Frontex Plus/Triton with a similar objective and geographical coverage, but lower capacity. In April 2015, after fresh tragedy in the Mediterranean, the EU tripled its budget for the Frontex joint-operations Triton and Poseidon.

In May 2015, the EU approved the crisis management concept for a military operation to disrupt networks in the human smuggling and trafficking trade in the Southern Central Mediterranean and launched Operation Sophia (EUNAVFOR MED). The aim of this military venture was a systematic drive to identify, arraign and dispose of vessels and assets used or, suspected of being used, by migrant smugglers and traffickers.

The EU had already – in 2013 – formed Task Force Mediterranean (at a meeting of Justice and Home Affairs Council of 7-8 October 2013). The taskforce’s objective is to reinforce co-operation with third countries and address the root causes of migration to prevent migrants from undertaking the dangerous crossing to the shores of the European Union. In that context, the EU has promoted new EU mobility partnerships with countries in North Africa – Morocco in June 2013 and Tunisia in March 2014, so far. They seek to reinforce co-operation in preventing irregular migration and trafficking, strengthen the migration-development nexus and build the capacity of North African countries in asylum and international protection.

Another aspect of the EU response to the Libyan crisis has been to provide financial assistance to help Northern African countries manage the regional displacement and forced migration caused by the Arab Spring uprisings. Since mid-2011, the EU has channelled EUR 100 million into work to manage the inflows of refugees and displaced persons in the countries neighbouring Libya.

The uprisings in North Africa have also fuelled debate in the EU on the Schengen Treaty at a time of large, sudden inflows – real or perceived – of third country nationals. In 2011, France temporarily closed its border with Italy and carried out checks on trains in response to Italy’s decision to issue residence permits to over 20 000 Tunisian migrants, which allowed them to move on to France or other countries within the Schengen system. More detailed information on the EU policy response to the refugee crisis induced by the Libyan and Syrian crises can be found in Annex 4.A3.

Table 4.A3.4. Libyan asylum seekers in selected OECD countries, 2005-15
| 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015
Germany | 49 | 30 | 31 | 33 | 14 | 18 | 170 | 138 | 346 | 602 | 1 127
United Kingdom | 182 | 128 | 56 | 69 | 101 | 117 | 1 204 | 408 | 497 | 733 | 939
Malta | 9 | 5 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 7 | 66 | 54 | 108 | 417 | 890
France | 10 | 11 | 0 | 7 | 5 | 13 | 151 | 61 | 82 | 276 | 682
Canada | 28 | 38 | 28 | 22 | 32 | 43 | 177 | 24 | 30 | 148 | 517
Sweden | 451 | 318 | 420 | 646 | 367 | 311 | 404 | 352 | 399 | 478 | 309
Italy | 0 | 0 | 0 | 18 | 15 | 2 | 444 | 68 | 51 | 91 | 278
United States | 8 | 2 | 6 | 2 | 9 | 7 | 165 | 52 | 69 | 152 | 264
Australia | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 7 | 12 | 202 | 188 | 318 | 322 | 178
Switzerland | 53 | 34 | 25 | 20 | 34 | 31 | 243 | 183 | 140 | 161 | 122
Norway | 23 | 13 | 40 | 71 | 61 | 32 | 116 | 59 | 70 | 81 | 42
OECD total | 964 | 689 | 675 | 1 000 | 822 | 810 | 3 770 | 1 848 | 2 389 | 3 379 | 4 796
Source: UNHCR Statistics database, http://popstats.unhcr.org/en/asylum_seekers_monthly.
StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933396487

Syria (2011-)

The Syrian conflict started in the spring 2011 with nationwide unrest that surfaced within the context of the Arab Spring protests. A UN Human Rights Office (OHCHR) reported that 191 369 people had been killed between March 2011 and the end of April 2014. Like Libya, Syria has long hosted large numbers of migrant workers and refugees. An estimated 1.8 million migrant workers, at least 135 000 Iraqi refugees and 240 000 Palestinian refugees were in Syria before the conflict began in 2011. Koser (2013) suggests there were about 150 000 migrant workers still in Syria in 2013.

Displacement to neighbouring countries of Syria

Since 2011, the conflict in Syria has affected millions of people. Within the country more than 6.5 million have been displaced (IDMC, 2015)⁵⁰ and, outside, 4.8 million Syrians are registered as refugees with the UNHCR in neighbouring countries, of whom almost 3 million in Turkey (Figure 4.A3.5). In addition, more than half a million Syrians have sought protection in Europe and the number of in the Gulf states has increased by up to one million (de Bel-Air, 2016). Altogether, more than half of the Syrian population are currently living outside their home country. According to available information, the make-up of the Syrian refugee populations in Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan differ significantly, although children account for half in all destinations:

Figure 4.A3.5. Syrian nationals in main host countries in 2014-15

Source: UNHCR, except for Turkey (Government estimate).

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395712

Turkey. The Syrian population in Turkey increased by 50% between mid-2015 and April 2016 to reach 2.75 million people. Of that number 20% of them are children, of whom nearly 4.2% are between 5 and 12 years old and 14% between 12 and 18. Some 1 160 000 refugees, or 42%, are aged between 18 and 59. Data on the educational attainment of Syrian refugees, based on surveys in 2013, show that among those aged 6 and over, 10% had reached higher education.

Lebanon. According to the UNHCR,⁵¹ the under-18s account for more than half of the 1.1 million Syrians in Lebanon – 18% are aged between 0 and 4, 23% between 5 and 11, and 13% are in the 12-to-17 age bracket. Altogether, 462 000, or 44%, are between 18 and 59 years old. A 2014 ILO assessment of the impact of Syrian refugees on Lebanon reported very similar figures. It found that, overall, Syrians in Lebanon had relatively low educational attainment, with only 3% having been educated to university level. Almost half (47%) were economically active and only one in three unemployed. Most Syrians who had found work were employed in personal services (27%) and agriculture (24%), while 13% of those surveyed worked in skilled jobs. The others were equally distributed in unskilled and semi-skilled jobs.

Jordan. There are 650 000 Syrians in Jordan -7% of the country’s population.⁵² The age pyramid of Syrians in Jordan is very similar to the one in Lebanon, with a little more than half being minors and almost identical distribution by age group (16% under 5 years old, 22% between 5 and 11, and 13% over 12).⁵³ Some 292 000 (45%) are aged between 18 and 59. Most Syrians in Jordan are relatively poorly educated, with only 15% of 15s-and-over having completed secondary education or higher (Stave and Hillesund, 2015). However, the distribution of Syrians by educational attainment is similar to that of the overall Syrian population in 2009. Between 35% and 40% of the Syrians in Jordan worked as craft-and-related workers when they were still in Syria, 20% as service and sales workers, 12% as plant and machine operators, while 10% were employed in skilled jobs. The labour force participation of Syrians in Jordan is quite low at 28%, partly due to legal restrictions.

Asylum application in OECD countries

Detected illegal crossing into the EU by Syrian nationals increased from fewer than 1 000 in 2009 to over 25 000 in 2013, 75 000 in 2014 and almost 600 000 in 2015. Frontex and UNHCR data for 2016 suggest that the trend reversed in the course of the first quarter of 2016, however. Most of those who arrive in Europe from Syria claim asylum. In 2015 about 370 000 formal applications for asylum from Syrian citizens were registered in OECD countries, which comes to 580 000 since 2011. Virtually all the applications filed in 2015 will have positive outcomes.

Table 4.A3.5. Syrian asylum seekers in selected OECD countries, 2005-15
| 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015
Germany | 878 | 608 | 604 | 744 | 819 | 1 490 | 2 634 | 6 201 | 11 851 | 39 332 | 158 657
Hungary | 18 | 32 | 48 | 16 | 19 | 26 | 91 | 145 | 960 | 6 749 | 64 081
Sweden | 392 | 433 | 440 | 551 | 587 | 427 | 646 | 7 814 | 16 317 | 30 313 | 50 909
Austria | 78 | 88 | 166 | 140 | 279 | 194 | 423 | 922 | 1 991 | 7 661 | 24 314
Netherlands | 280 | 293 | 36 | 48 | 101 | 125 | 168 | 454 | 2 673 | 8 748 | 18 675
Norway | 79 | 49 | 48 | 114 | 271 | 110 | 189 | 312 | 868 | 1 978 | 10 520
Belgium | 228 | 167 | 199 | 281 | 335 | 302 | 494 | 798 | 944 | 2 524 | 10 185
Denmark | 46 | 55 | 74 | 105 | 383 | 821 | 428 | 907 | 1 702 | 7 185 | 8 604
Bulgaria | 15 | 10 | 15 | 20 | 30 | 52 | 67 | 436 | 4 447 | 6 202 | 5 950
Spain | 35 | 15 | 31 | 97 | 30 | 19 | 97 | 255 | 725 | 1 666 | 5 627
France | 32 | 21 | 45 | 32 | 61 | 192 | 119 | 629 | 1 303 | 3 129 | 5 110
Switzerland | 82 | 125 | 285 | 357 | 370 | 387 | 688 | 1 146 | 1 852 | 3 768 | 4 649
Greece | 57 | 143 | 1 311 | 808 | 965 | 167 | 352 | 275 | 485 | 791 | 3 319
United Kingdom | 388 | 179 | 188 | 181 | 173 | 158 | 508 | 1 289 | 2 020 | 2 353 | 2 841
United States | 1 216 | 1 276 | 1 760 | 987 | 260 | 137 | 296 | 744 | 710 | 1 130 | 1 784
OECD total | 2 846 | 2 422 | 3 724 | 3 815 | 4 804 | 4 803 | 8 265 | 23 328 | 47 747 | 128 141 | 372 282
Source: UNHCR Statistics database, http://popstats.unhcr.org/en/asylum_seekers_monthly.
StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933396492

Table 4.A3.6. Refugee and other humanitarian statuses granted to Syrians, 2010-15
| 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | Total
Australia | 11 | 5 | 51 | 210 | 1 057 | 2 321 | 3 655
Austria | 121 | 409 | 781 | 1 091 | 3 928 | 8 305 | 14 635
Belgium | 222 | 95 | 504 | 1 189 | 1 278 | 2 730 | 6 018
Canada | 33 | 76 | 85 | 152 | 1 290 | 8 842 | 10 478
Chile | 0 | 0 | 5 | 5 | 6 | 8 | 24
Czech Republic | 11 | 26 | 68 | 209 | 113 | 130 | 557
Denmark | 409 | 460 | 753 | 1 382 | 4 126 | 6 017 | 13 147
Estonia | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0
Finland | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0
France | 49 | 74 | 189 | 539 | 1 069 | 1 963 | 3 883
Germany | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0
Greece | 2 | 7 | 11 | 171 | 702 | 3 205 | 4 098
Hungary | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 0
Iceland | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0
Ireland | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0
Israel | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | ..
Italy | 30 | 65 | 200 | 390 | 310 | 330 | 1 325
Japan | 0 | 0 | 7 | 26 | 15 | 9 | 57
Korea | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | ..
Luxembourg | 0 | 0 | 2 | 3 | 54 | 118 | 177
Mexico | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | ..
Netherlands | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0
New Zealand | 0 | 0 | 1 | 12 | 53 | 190 | 256
Norway | 35 | 8 | 245 | 691 | 1 247 | 1 550 | 3 776
Poland | 0 | 4 | 2 | 84 | 68 | 91 | 249
Portugal | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0
Slovak Republic | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 11 | 8 | 23
Slovenia | 0 | 0 | 2 | 7 | 2 | 10 | 21
Spain | 1 | 0 | 1 | 124 | 1 120 | 546 | 1 792
Sweden | 142 | 190 | 5 152 | 12 539 | 17 601 | 19 390 | 55 014
Switzerland | 134 | 464 | 385 | 715 | 3 522 | 3 476 | 8 696
Turkey | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | ..
United Kingdom | 40 | 147 | 919 | 1 455 | 1 423 | 2 053 | 6 037
United States | 278 | 459 | 780 | 1 209 | 1 808 | .. | 4 534
Total | 1 519 | 2 490 | 10 144 | 22 204 | 40 803 | 61 292 | 138 452
Source: National sources.
StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933396500

Obviously, Syrians who make the journey to Europe are not representative of the overall pre-war Syrian population or of those who have fled to neighbouring countries. They tend to be more highly qualified, and middle and higher social groups are over-represented. A recent UNHCR survey profiling the Syrians who landed in Greece in February 2016 (736 people interviewed in four main islands) found that 20% of the adults held a university degree and an additional 28% had completed high school. Still, 25% had no, or at most, primary education.⁵⁴

Policy response

Despite many initiatives at EU and international levels to promote a global, co-ordinated response to the Syrian crisis, the policy response has not been able, so far, to cope with the needs or to provide a sustainable answer to the humanitarian crisis. The Syrian crisis has somehow exposed the weakness of the common asylum system which was never meant for such large inflows of people in need of protection.

Although the European Union has been very active on the policy front,⁵⁵ it has struggled to find the common ground required for a bold, global, comprehensive response. Since April 2015, EU heads of state and government have met more than 10 times – almost once a month – on migration issues.

In May 2015, the European Commission proposed its European Agenda on Migration. It lays the foundations for a comprehensive response that includes relocation and resettlement plans, provisions for reinforcing returns, co-operation with third countries and the management of legal labour migration. The proposed measures were agreed in June 2015 on the basis of an emergency plan to relocate over a period of 2 years 40 000 people in need of protection from Italy and Greece and to resettle 20 000 outside the EU.

In September 2015, the European Commission put forward a second package of proposals to address the refugee crisis which the Council adopted. They included expanding the relocation plan to 120 000 (also to be implemented over a period of 2 years), though not all member states supported the package. In October, a first conference at ministerial level was held with counterparts from Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan and the Western Balkans. A second meeting brought together heads of state and government level, but only from selected EU countries and the Western Balkans.

In November, the Presidency of the EU decided to fully activate the Integrated Political Crisis Response. At the end of that month, the EU and Turkey adopted a joint action plan which included a financial deal and timeline for the concrete application of the existing readmission agreement and measures to end visa restrictions and speed up EU accession.

In December 2015, the European commission put forward a package of proposals aimed at securing the EU’s external borders and managing migration more effectively. In February 2016, concrete action was agreed on financing the EU-Turkey action plan and in 2016 the president of the European Council announced a EUR 3 billion humanitarian contribution for Syrians in Turkey at the London Conference.

In March 2016, EU leaders held a meeting with Turkey to strengthen co-operation on the migration crisis and fully implement the agreement signed in November 2015. In March, the Council also adopted a regulation and approved EUR 100 million for emergency assistance within the EU.

In mid-March, the EU and Turkey signed a joint statement aiming at stopping the flow of illegal migrants through Turkey to Europe. Both parties agreed that, as of 20 March 2016, all irregular migrants would be returned to Turkey and that, for every Syrian national sent to Turkey from the Greek islands, the EU would take one from Turkey. If that arrangement is to function, there will have to be a sufficient number of resettlement places. Existing commitments used for that purpose will include the 18 000 places left over from the July 2015 EU resettlement scheme of 22 504 places. They could be completed by the 54 000 unallocated places under existing relocation decisions.

In April 2016, the European Commission presented options for reforming the Common European Asylum System and developing safe, legal pathways to Europe. This proposal also includes harsh financial penalties for EU countries that refuse to comply with their relocation obligations.

In June 2016, the European Commission announced several initiatives:

A New Migration Partnership Framework with third countries to better manage migration.

An Action Plan on Integration of non-EU nationals residing legally in the EU.

Reform to the ‘Blue Card’ scheme for highly skilled workers from outside the EU.

A staff working document, “An economic take on the refugee crisis”.

Generally speaking, the response to this major humanitarian crisis has been timid. Much of the effort so far has concentrated on the resilience of refugees in countries of first asylum. The first joint UNHCR-UNDP Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan (3RP) is a good example of an innovative approach to the issue in this area. The 3RP plan seeks to combine humanitarian and development capacities in a regionally coherent strategy. It builds on the plans drawn up under the leadership of national authorities – namely, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey – to ensure protection, humanitarian assistance and strengthen resilience.⁵⁶

Another example is the World Humanitarian Summit, the first event of its kind. It took place in Istanbul in May 2016 and initiated a new co-ordinated, integrated approach for use by development and humanitarian actors in addressing situations of protracted displacement. The European Commission espoused that approach in a recent communication in May 2016.57

Resettlement has become a priority for UNHCR. It estimates that, to address the needs of the most vulnerable refugees and relieve the strain on Syria’s neighbours, well over 450 000 resettlement places will be needed before the end of 2018, in addition to the 100 000-plus which have been pledged already.⁵⁸ Yet despite its repeated calls, the resettlement effort has met with mixed response. The UNHCR has also encouraged states to consider other solutions for admitting Syrian refugees – such as individual sponsorship, the admission of relatives outside family reunification arrangements and even under labour mobility, student and investor migration schemes (UNHCR, 2014a, 2016b). Several OECD countries have significantly increased their resettlement effort, including Canada and Germany, but the overall response has so far fallen short of needs.

Finally, the UN Secretary General has, for the first time, convened a high-level plenary meeting on refugees as part of the General Assembly in September 2016. In his report, “Addressing large movement of refugees and migrants”,⁵⁹ he calls for a new global compact on responsibility-sharing in response to the need to offer refugees protection.

Annex 4.A4.

Conditions for family migration for humanitarian migrants by status

Table 4.A4.1. Conditions for family migration for Conventional Refugees
| Required duration of residence | Nuclear family allowed | Extended family allowed | Requirements after exemption period | Duration of exemption period (from granting of status to sponsor) | Specific conditions during exemption period | Fees
Economic resources | Accommodation | Health insurance
Australia | 0 month (people resettled from overseas by UNHCR) | Yes (family members must have been declared in original application except for new-born children and marriages concluded after visa grant) | Yes (but only given priority in specific circumstances) | No | No | No | Not limited | .. | No fee (except in specific circumstances)
Austria | 0 month | Yes | No | Yes (for sponsor’s and family’s costs) | Yes | Yes | 3 months | .. | No fee
Belgium | 0 month | Yes | Yes (disabled adult children) | Yes | Yes | Yes | 12 months | No exemption if family member is a disabled adult child or if family relationship did not exist before arrival | EUR 180
Canada | 0 month | Yes (spouse/common-law partner at least 18 years of age and single dependent children and grandchildren under 19) | Yes (de facto family members and parents and grandparents) | Yes (except for spouse/ partner/ dependent children) | Yes | No | 0 month | .. | CAD 550 (CAD 150 for children)
Czech Republic | 0 month | Yes (spouse at least 20 years of age) | Yes (parents over 65 years of age and foster children) | Yes for sponsor’s and family’s costs | Yes | Yes | 3 months | .. | CZK 2500 (~EUR 100)
Denmark | 0 month | Yes (spouse at least 24 and children at least 15 years of age) | No | Yes (can be waived on a case-by-case basis) | Yes (can be waived on a case-by-case basis) | Yes (can be waived on a case-by-case basis) | 0 month | .. | DKK 6000 (~EUR 805); can be waived on a case-by-case basis
Estonia | 0 month | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | 6 months | No exemption if family reunification is possible in another country | No fee
Finland | 0 month | Yes | Yes | No except if family was established after sponsor’s arrival (but planned) | No (but planned) | No (but planned) | Not limited (but planned: 3 months) | .. | EUR 455 for adult and EUR 230 for child family members
France | 0 month | Yes (except family formation) | No | No | No | No | Not limited | .. | EUR 19
Germany | 0 month | Yes | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | 3 months | No exemption if family reunification is possible in another country | No fee
Greece | 0 month | Yes | Yes (unmarried adult children, parents, unmarried partner) | Yes | Yes | Yes | 3 months | No exemption for parents of sponsors | EUR 450 (except for minor applicants)
Hungary | 0 month | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | 6 months | .. | EUR 60
Iceland | 0 month | Yes (except family formation) | Yes (ascendants) | No | No | No | 0 month | .. | ISK 12000 (~ EUR 86) (ISK 6000 for minors)
Ireland | 0 month | Yes (except family formation) | No | No | No | No | 0 month | .. | EUR 300
Italy | 0 month | Yes | Yes | No | No | No | Not limited | .. | EUR 16
Luxembourg | 0 month | Yes | Yes | Yes for sponsor’s and family’s costs | Yes | Yes | 3 months | .. | No fee
Netherlands | 0 month | Yes (except family formation) | Yes (adult children) | Yes | No | No | 3 months | .. | No fee
New Zealand | 0 month | Yes (spouse, single dependent children under the age of 24) | Yes (should be alone and/or sole caregiver in NZ) | Yes | No | Yes | 0 month | .. | No fee
Norway | 0 month | Yes (but plans to, among other things, introduce a min. age of 24 years for family formation) | Yes | Yes | No (except extended family and family formation) | No | 12 months exemption from income requirement (but plans to reduce the exemption period) | No exemption from income requirement for extended family and family formation | NOK 5900 (~EUR 630) (no fee for minor applicants)
Poland | 0 month | Yes | No | Yes for sponsor’s and family’s costs | Yes | Yes | 6 months | .. | PLN 340 (~EUR 80); possibility to apply for exemption
Portugal | 0 month | Yes | Yes | No | No | No | Not limited | .. | No fee
Slovak Republic | 0 month | Yes except family formation | Yes | Yes | Yes | No | 3 months | .. | No fee
Slovenia | 0 month | Yes | Yes | Yes | No | Yes | 3 months | .. | No fee
Spain | 0 month | Yes (except family formation; or if fm is in third country or has different nationality) | Yes (except family formation or if fm is in third country or has different nationality) | No | No | No | Not limited | .. | EUR 26
Sweden | 0 month | Yes (except family formation, minimum age of 21 for spouse) | No | Yes | Yes | No | 3 months | .. | No fee
Switzerland | 0 month | Yes | No (but: humanitarian visa; temporary opening for Syrians in 2013) | No (but for beneficiaries of subsidiary protection) | No (but for beneficiaries of subsidiary protection) | No (but for beneficiaries of subsidiary protection) | 0 month | .. | No fee (but travel/visa costs, in certain cases costs of proof of descent)
Turkey | 12 months | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | No | 0 month | .. | Varies
United Kingdom | 0 month | Yes (except family formation) | No | No | No | No | Not limited | .. | No fee
United States | 0 month | Yes | Parents through filing of an affidavit of relationship | No | No | No | No | No | No fee
Note: Sweden: According to a temporary law that entered into force 20 July 2016 restricting the possibilities of being granted a residence permit in Sweden. The temporary law will apply for three years.
Switzerland: Swiss law grants the so-called temporary admission (a form of subsidiary protection) to conventional refugees excluded from asylum under domestic law as well as to other foreigners, whose removal cannot be carried out for other legal reasons.

United States: US law allows for a refugee to complete a “follow-to-join” petition within 2 years of arrival in the US. Approval of this petition grants derivative refugee status to the spouse and unmarried child (under age 21) of a refugee who was the Principal Applicant on a case. In addition, certain refugee nationalities are eligible to file for parents, spouses and unmarried children under the age of 21 under the Priority 3 of US Refugee Processing priorities. In this instance, the relatives will be required to establish their own refugee claim. Refugees who have adjusted status to Permanent Residents or become naturalized US citizens may also file immigrant visa petitions to the same extent as other Permanent Residents or citizens - there are fees attached and family members enter as immigrants not refugees.

Table 4.A4.2. Conditions for family migration for beneficiaries of subsidiary protection
| Required duration of residence | Nuclear family allowed | Extended family allowed | Requirements after exemption period | Duration of exemption period (from granting of status to sponsor) | Specific conditions during exemption period | Fees
Economic resources | Accommodation | Health insurance
Australia | 0 month (Permanent Protection Visa holders who arrived as Irregular Maritime Arrivals have the lowest processing priority among family stream applicants) | Yes | Some extended family may qualify | Yes | Yes | No | 0 months | .. | Fee depends on visa subclass
Austria | 36 months | Yes | No | Yes (for sponsor’s own costs and family’s costs) | Yes | Yes | 0 months | .. | No fee
Belgium | 0 month | Yes | Yes (disabled adult child) | Yes | Yes | Yes | 12 months | No exemption if family member is a disabled adult child or if family relationship did not exist before arrival | EUR 180
Czech Republic | 15 months | Yes (spouse at least 20 years of age) | Yes (parents over 65 year of age and foster children) | Yes for sponsor’s and family’s costs | Yes | Yes | 0 month | .. | CZK 2500 (~EUR 100)
Denmark | 36 months | Yes (spouse at least 24 and children at least 15 years of age) | No | Yes (can be waived on a case-by-case basis) | Yes (can be waived on a case-by-case basis) | Yes (can be waived on a case-by-case basis) | 0 months | .. | DKK 6000 (~EUR 805)
Estonia | 0 month | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | 6 months | Requirements may apply if family reunification is possible in another country | No fee
Finland | 0 month | Yes | Yes | No except if family was established after sponsor’s arrival(but planned) | No (but planned) | No (but planned) | Not limited (but planned to introduce requirements without exemption period) | .. | EUR 455 for adult and EUR 230 for child family members
France | 0 month | Yes (except family formation) | No | No | No | No | Not limited | .. | EUR 19
Germany | 24 months | Yes | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | 3 months | No exemption if family reunification is possible in another country | No fee
Greece | No right to family reunification | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | ... | .. | ...
Hungary | 0 month | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | 0 months | .. | EUR 60
Iceland | 0 month | Yes (except in cases of family formation) | Yes (ascendants) | Yes | Yes | Yes | 0 months | .. | ISK 12000 (~ EUR 86) (ISK 6000 for minors)
Ireland | 0 month | Yes (except family formation) | No | No | No | No | 0 months | .. | EUR 300
Italy | 0 month | Yes | Yes | No | No | No | Not limited | .. | EUR 16
Luxembourg | 0 month | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | 3 months | .. | No fee
Netherlands | 0 month | Yes (except family formation) | Yes (adult children) | Yes | No | No | 3 months | .. | No fee
Norway | 0 month | Yes (but plans to, among other things, introduce a min. age of 24 years for family formation) | Yes | Yes | No (except extended family and family formation) | No | 12 months exemption from income requirement (but plans to reduce the exemption period) | No exemption from income requirement for extended family and family formation | NOK 5900 (~EUR 630) (no fee for minor applicants)
Poland | 0 month | Yes | No | Yes for sponsor’s and family’s costs | Yes | Yes | 6 months | .. | PLN 340 (~EUR 80); possibility to apply for exemption
Portugal | 0 month | Yes | Yes | No | No | No | Not limited | .. | No fee
Slovak Republic | 0 month | Yes except family formation | Yes | Yes | Yes | No | 3 months | .. | No fee
Slovenia | 0 month | Yes | Yes | Yes | No | Yes | 3 months | .. | No fee
Spain | 0 month | Yes (except family formation; or if fm is in third country or has different nationality) | Yes (except family formation or if fm is in third country or has different nationality) | No | No | No | Not limited | .. | EUR 26
Sweden | 0 months | No (unless sponsor had applied for asylum by 24 Nov. 2015 or a denial of reunification  would be contrary to international commitments) | No | Yes | Yes | No | 3 months | .. | No fee
Switzerland | 36 months (exceptions might apply; yet to be clarified) | Yes | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | 0 months | .. | No fee
Turkey | 12 months | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | No | 0 month | .. | Varies
United Kingdom | 0 month | Yes (except in cases of family formation) | No | No | No | No | Not limited | .. | No fee
Note: Sweden: According to a temporary law that entered into force 20 July 2016 restricting the possibilities of being granted a residence permit in Sweden. The temporary law will apply for three years.
Switzerland: Swiss law grants the so-called temporary admission (a form of subsidiary protection) to conventional refugees excluded from asylum under domestic law as well as to other foreigners, whose removal cannot be carried out for other legal.

Table 4.A4.3. Conditions for family migration for unaccompanied minors
| Required duration of residence | Nuclear family allowed | Extended family allowed | Requirements after exemption period | Duration of exemption period (from granting of status to sponsor) | Specific conditions during exemption period | Fees
Economic resources | Accommodation | Health insurance
Australia | 0 month | Yes (family members must have been previously declared in visa application) | Yes (but only given priority in specific circumstances) | No | No | No | Not limited | .. | No fee (except in specific circumstances)
Austria | 0 month if UAM has refugee status 36 months if UAM is beneficiary of subsidary protection | Yes | No | No | No | No | Not limited regardless of UAM’s status | Exemptions only apply for parents of minor sponsors | No fee
Belgium | 0 month | Yes (parents) | No | No | No | No | Not limited | ... | EUR 180
Czech Republic | 0 month | Yes (parents) | No | Yes for sponsor’s and family’s costs | Yes | Yes | 3 months | .. | CZK 2500 (~EUR 100); CZK 1000 (~ EUR 40) for minors under 15 years of age
Denmark | Not specific | Yes | No | Yes (can be waived on a case-by-case basis) | Yes (can be waived on a case-by-case basis) | Yes (can be waived on a case-by-case basis) | 0 month | .. | DKK 6000 (~EUR 805); can be waived on a case-by-case basis
Estonia | 0 month | Yes (for asylum seekers, discretion for other minor children) | Yes | No | No | No | Until UAM reaches 18 years of age | .. | No fee
Finland | 0 month | Yes | Yes | No except if family was established after sponsor’s arrival (but planned) | No (but planned) | No (but planned) | Not limited (but introduction of requirements without exemption period planned) | .. | No fee
France | 0 month | Yes (direct relatives in ascending line) | No | No | No | No | Not limited | .. | EUR 19
Germany | 0 month | Yes (parents) | No | No | No | No | Not limited | .. | No fee
Greece | 0 month | Yes (relatives in ascending line) | Yes | No | No | No | Not limited | .. | EUR 450
Hungary | 0 month | Yes (parents or legally appointed guardian) | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | 0 month | .. | EUR 60
Iceland | 0 month | Yes (parents) | Yes (ascendants) | No | No | No | 0 month | .. | ISK 12000 (~ EUR 86) (ISK 6000 for minors)
Ireland | 0 month | Yes (parents) | No | No | No | No | 0 month | .. | EUR 300
Italy | 0 month | Yes | Yes | No | No | No | Not limited | .. | ~ EUR 21
Luxembourg | 0 month | Yes | Yes (if UAM has no parents or legal guardian) | Yes for sponsor’s and family’s costs | Yes | Yes | 3 months | .. | No fee
Netherlands | 0 month | Yes (parents) | No | Yes | No | No | 3 months | .. | No fee
Norway | 0 month | Yes if UAM has refugee status | Yes (sibblings) if UAM has refugee status | No | No | No | 12 months (sponsors under the age of 18 do not have to fulfill requirements for economic resources) | .. | No fee
Poland | 0 month | Yes (ascendts or legal guardian) | No | Yes for sponsor’s and family’s costs | Yes | Yes | 6 months | .. | PLN 340 (~EUR 80); possibility to apply for exemption
Portugal | 0 month | Yes | No | No | No | No | Not limited | .. | No fee
Slovak Republic | 0 month | Yes (parents) | No | Yes | Yes | No | 3 months | .. | No fee
Slovenia | 0 month | Yes | Yes | Yes | No | Yes | 3 months | .. | No fee
Spain | 0 month | Yes | Yes (except family formation or if fm is in third country or has different nationality) | No | No | No | Not limited | .. | EUR 26
Sweden | 0 month | Yes, parents (if UAM has refugee status or had applied for asylum by 24 Nov 2015 or if denial of reunification  would be contrary to international commitments) | No | No | No | No | Not limited | .. | No fee
Switzerland | Not specific | Yes | No (but temporary opening for Syrians in 2013) | Varies | Varies | No | Varies | .. | Varies
Turkey | 12 months | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | No | 0 month | .. | Varies
United Kingdom | Not possible (exceptions may be made for “compelling, compassionate circumstances”) | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | ..
United States | .. | No | No | No. Note: the federal government does not have an “exemption period” for UC. | Yes UC receive accomodation while they are in federal government custody. | Health care provided while UC are in federal government custody. | The federal government does not have an “exemption period” for UC. Eligibility for benefits and services for the UC after release from federal custody and any family members depends on whether they are granted a lawful immigration status and the specific status they receive. | .. | Fees for immigration status applications vary.
Note: Sweden: According to a temporary law that entered into force 20 July 2016 restricting the possibilities of being granted a residence permit in Sweden. The temporary law will apply for three years.

Notes

 1. The statistical data for Israel are supplied by and under the responsibility of the relevant Israeli authorities. The use of such data by the OECD is without prejudice to the status of the Golan Heights, East Jerusalem and Israeli settlements in the West Bank under the terms of international law.

 2. EU legislations and instruments may however be binding for EU member states.

 3. See www.iom.int/regional-consultative-processes.

 4. See www.unhcr.org/pages/4a2cd39e6.html.

 5. See www.nanseninitiative.org.

 6. See https://micicinitiative.iom.int/.

 7. For instance, Germany and Italy recognize a right to asylum in their Constitution.

 8. The Independent Expert was established by the Commission on Human Rights in its resolution 1995/70 and with Presidential Statement PRST/15/1.

 9. See www.unhcr.org/3d9abe177.html and www.unhcr.org/4dac37d79.html.

 10. In the early 1990s a number of OECD countries also made major revision to their asylum laws and adopted fast track procedures for asylum applicants from “safe countries of origin” where there is a priori no risk of persecution, introduced the concept of “safe third country” which means that people are originating or have transited through countries where they would be safe or started to screen “manifestly unfounded” applications to accelerate procedures. Penalties against carriers of undocumented migrants were progressively increased as well as sanctions against smuggling and human trafficking (see for example Hatton, 2011 for a detailed description of the trends in asylum policies in the OECD since the early 1990s).

 11. In addition, the asylum directive (Council Directive 2013/33/EU -recast) and the reception directive (Council Directive 2013/33/EU -recast) respectively define common procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection and lay down standards for the reception of applicants for international protection.

 12. Resettlement is a complement to existing obligations under the 1951 Refugee Convention.

 13. UNHCR has, as of the end of February 2016, submitted more than 32 300 Syrian refugees to the United States for resettlement consideration.

 14. In the EU-Turkey Joint Statement of 18 March 2016 (effective as of 4 April 2016) it was however agreed that:

All new irregular migrants crossing from Turkey into Greek islands as from 20 March 2016 will be returned to Turkey, in full accordance with EU and international law, thus excluding any kind of collective expulsion. Migrants not applying for asylum or whose application has been found unfounded or inadmissible will be returned to Turkey.

Concerning Syrians in particular, for every Syrian being returned to Turkey from Greek islands, another Syrian is resettled from Turkey to the EU taking into account the UN Vulnerability Criteria.

 15. Since 1993, there is a bilateral agreement between Lebanon and Syria that abolished movement restrictions on persons and granted freedom to stay, work, and practice economic activity for nationals of both countries. In 2014 however a decree of the Minister for Labour (Decree 197) limits possible work for Syrian nationals to agriculture, construction and cleaning services. In February 2015, Lebanese authorities indicate that Syrians who want to renew their registration with UNHCR need to promise not to work.

 16. With the aims of preventing informal employment of Syrians who are under temporary protection, maintaining a balance between the demands of these foreigners and the demands of our labour market and ensuring the Syrians’ access to the labour market with “decent job”, Regulation on Work Permits of Foreigners Under Temporary Protection was enacted on 15 January 2016 and labour market access of Syrians under temporary protection has become possible.

 17. In a way it is not so surprising that the Syrian crisis – a lower middle income country- has generated much larger movements of refugees that other conflicts.

 18. Alternative pathways should be considered as complementary and additional to resettlement and granting asylum on-shore. As a result, they can also be refered to as “additional pathways” or “complementary pathways”.

 19. The rest of this section will refer simply to refugees or refugee-workers.

 20. http://ec.europa.eu/euraxess/index.cfm/jobs/science4refugees.

 21. www.talentbeyondboundaries.org/.

 22. The rest of this section will refer simply to refugees or refugee-students.

 23. See among others http://jusoorsyria.com/programs/jusoor-scholarship-program/ ; http://jusoorsyria.com/scholarships-for-syrian-students-and-refugees/ or www.iie.org/en/Programs/Syria-Scholarships#. VySnFk1f0pE; for a list of initiatives in specifically in Europe see http://ec.europa.eu/education/policy/higher-education/doc/inspiring-practices-refugees_en.pdf.

Furthermore, several countries offer scholarship for Syrians already on their territory. The Russian Federation recently announced 300 places and Saudi Arabia has announced in 2012 that they will admit 3 000 Syrian students free of charge under the “Programme of the Custodian of the Two Holy Shrines for the Syrian Students” (de Bel-Air, 2015). In the United States, the Emergency Student Fund of the Institute of International Education is also supporting Syrian students already in the country. In France, Qatar has financed scholarship (University la Sorbonne) for 100 Syrians students already in the country.

A number of initiatives have also been developed to facilitate the access of Syrian students to tertiary education in neighbouring countries of Syria, such as the HOPES project (http://bruessel.daad.de/medien/bruessel/short_description_hopes.pdf); The longstanding DAFI project is also providing such support to refugee worldwide www.unhcr.org/dafi-scholarships.html.

 24. WUSC has sponsored more than 1 400 refugee students since 1978 with more than 60 partner Universities, colleges and cégeps.

 25. www.daad.de/laenderinformationen/syrien/en/.

 26. www.unhcr.org/571dd1599.pdf.

 27. www.enic-naric.net/recognise-qualifications-held-by-refugees.aspx.

 28. http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/56f29f579.pdf.

 29. According to Article 35 of Law on Foreigners and International Protection, the conditions like 12 months waiting period, accommodation, income and health insurance for family reunification may not be sought for refugees and subsidiary protection beneficiaries who are in Turkey.

 30. See previous endnote.

 31. International carrier sanctions impose fines on airlines that transport people without valid visas and travel documents, so travel to OECD countries without proper documentation is restricted.

 32. EU visa code regulates visa for visits up to three months in EU member States that are part of the Schengen Area.

 33. This corresponds to about a fourth of all Syrians who have lodged an asylum application in France.

 34. In the United States, from 1987 to 1995, the Private Sector Initiative enabled individuals and groups to sponsor refugees. The sponsor was then paying for processing, travel, medical care and resettlement. More than 8 000 refugees benefited, the majority coming from Cuba and sponsored by the Cuban American National Foundation. In 1990, another pilot program was implemented to privately finance admission and resettlement of 8 000 Soviet Jews. Both programmes were discontinued.

 35. Crowdfunding is already being used to generate donations to help with the refugee crisis. For example, ‘Kickstarter’ has teamed up with UNHCR to help raise money for addressing the plight of refugees in conflict regions (www.kickstarter.com/aidrefugees)

 36. This effect may be more visible in new or small programs. In Canada, however, which has a well-established program, demand to sponsor refugees has consistently exceeded the government’s annual admissions for privately sponsored refugees.

 37. http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/country.php?id=122 (April 2016).

 38. No student permit data is available for Turkey, however, university enrolment of Syrians totalled 4 400 between 2010 and 2014, including 2 800 in 2014 alone.

 39. https://data.unhcr.org/mediterranean/download.php?id=874.

 40. In the survey ran in April-September 2015, 34% said the reason for choosing the destination country in Europe was “family and social network”. And in the February 2016 survey, 44% mentioned explicitly family reunification as the reason for the choice of the country of destination.

 41. https://data.unhcr.org/mediterranean/download.php?id=874.

 42. A parallel could be drawn here with the ongoing discussions among labour economists on single or unified contracts, which looks at ways to alleviate labour market dualism by making regulation as homogeneous as possible across contractual relationships (OECD, 2014).

 43. It is worth noting here that recognition under the refugee convention does not preclude a progressively increasing enjoyment of some rights, entitlements and liberties.

 44. UNHCR has successfully implemented selection by date of arrival -rather than by lottery- which may be seen as a fairer and safer approach, although it may not necessarily solve the incentive problem in case of a large backlog.

 45. The Independent Expert was established by the Commission on Human Rights in its resolution 1995/70 and with Presidential Statement PRST/15/1.

 46. The Independent Expert sent out a questionnaire to UN member States. States were asked to provide information on four issues: i) The number of returns/deportations of Haitian nationals since 12 January 2010; ii) The legal and administrative framework – including the availability of appeals – that applies to Haitian nationals with irregular migratory status or subject to forced removal; iii) Specific legal, administrative, or other, measures taken to address the specific circumstances of Haitians – especially those belonging to vulnerable groups; and iv) Follow-up measures to ensure returnees’ adequate reintegration in Haiti.

 47. The Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment, the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority, the Ministry of Social Development and the Tertiary Education Commission.

 48. www.immigration.govt.nz/NR/rdonlyres/A621A5.

 49. www.internal-displacement.org/middle-east-and-north-africa/libya/figures-analysis.

 50. www.internal-displacement.org/middle-east-and-north-africa/syria/figures-analysis.

 51. http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/country.php?id=122.

 52. According to the preliminary results of the 2015 Census.

 53. http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/country.php?id=107.

 54. https://data.unhcr.org/mediterranean/download.php?id=874.

 55. http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-16-222_fr.htm.

 56. www.unhcr.org/syriarrp6/docs/Syria-rrp6-full-report.pdf and http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/regional.php.

 57. http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/policies/refugees-idp/Communication_Forced_Displacement_Development_2016.pdf.

 58. Regular updates of all pledges for resettlement and other forms of admission of Syrian refugees can be found here www.unhcr.org/52b2febafc5.pdf.

 59. www.un.org/pga/70/wp-content/uploads/sites/10/2015/08/21-Apr_Refugees-and-Migrants-21-April-2016.pdf.

Chapter 5.

Country notes: Recent changes in migration movements and policies¹

Australia

Austria

Belgium

Bulgaria

Canada

Chile

Czech Republic

Denmark

Estonia

Finland

France

Germany

Greece

Hungary

Ireland

Israel

Italy

Japan

Korea

Latvia

Lithuania

Luxembourg

Mexico

Netherlands

New Zealand

Norway

Poland

Portugal

Romania

Russian Federation

Slovak Republic

Slovenia

Spain

Sweden

switzerland

Turkey

United Kingdom

United States

Sources and notes of the country tables of Chapter 5

Note

 1. The statistical data for Israel are supplied by and under the responsibility of the relevant Israeli authorities. The use of such data by the OECD is without prejudice to the status of the Golan Heights, East Jerusalem and Israeli settlements in the West Bank under the terms of international law.

Australia

Permanent migration fell by 1.2% in the 2014/15 programme year to 205 400. This comprised 189 100 places under Australia’s Migration Programme, 13 800 under the Humanitarian Programme, and an additional 2 500 places provided to New Zealand citizens. Two-thirds of the Migration Programme involved visas granted through the Skill stream (127 800 visas, 53.4% of which were granted to accompanying family migrants) and almost one-third through the Family stream (61 100). The remaining 240 visas (0.1 %) were delivered under the Special Eligibility visa category.

The Skill stream decreased slightly, by 0.6%. Overall, the sizeable decreases in regional sponsored categories were compensated by increases in other categories. Points-Tested Skilled Migration and permanent employer-sponsored visas accounted for 57.0% and 37.8% of the Skill stream, respectively. The remaining places (5.1%) were for Business, Innovation and Investment visas (three-quarters of them going to Chinese immigrants) and for the Distinguished Talent visa (0.2% or 200 places).

For the fourth year in a row, India was the top source country for the Migration Programme with 34 900 places (18.4%), down 10.6% from the previous year. China (27 900 places, up 4.1%) and the United Kingdom (21 100 places, down 9.2%) followed. In addition to this regulated migration, 23 400 New Zealand citizens entered Australia as permanent settlers under the Trans-Tasman Travel Arrangement.

In 2014/15, the Humanitarian Programme granted 13 800 visas – 11 000 under the offshore resettlement component and 2 700 under the onshore protection component. The leading countries of birth for people granted offshore visas were Iraq, Syria, Myanmar, Afghanistan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. In response to the Syrian humanitarian crisis, the Australian Government announced that over the next 12 to 18 months, it would resettle a total of 12 000 refugees registered with UNHCR who have been displaced by conflicts in Syria and Iraq. This almost doubles the 2015/16 Humanitarian Programme to 25 750 places.

Demand for the Temporary Work (Skilled) visa (Subclass 457) decreased slightly in 2014/15, with grants falling 2.5% over the year to 96 100. India (25 200) was the top nationality for the third year in a row, followed by the United Kingdom (14 700) and China (6 700).

The number of Student visa grants in 2014/15 rose by 2.6% to reach 299 540, their second highest level on record. Chinese students were the number one source with 65 700 visas granted, an increase of 9% over the previous year, followed by India (29 600, down 13.4%) and Korea (13 200, up 2.7%).

In 2014/15, 214 800 Work and Holiday visas were granted – a decrease of 6.3% from the visas granted the previous year. Grants of renewed Work and Holiday visas fell for the first time since their inception in 2005/06, from 45 600 in 2013/14 to 41 300 in 2014/15.

A record 4.3 million Visitor visas were granted in 2014/15 to applicants from outside Australia – an increase of 7.9% over 2013/14. China was the top nationality (658 400 visas granted), followed by the United Kingdom (556 100) and the United States (425 900).

Acting on recommendations of the Independent Review into the Subclass 457 Visa Programme, in 2015 the government implemented a number of changes. These included amendments to English language requirements; sponsorship approval periods; information-sharing provisions; and provision of more evidence-based policy. The government effected these changes by reinstating the Ministerial Advisory Council on Skilled Migration, and establishing a dedicated labour market resource that will provide technical advice on the current state of that market. The Migration Amendment (Charging for a Migration Outcome) Act was introduced in response to the Review’s recommendation to establish that it is an offence for sponsors to be paid for a migration outcome.

Further recommendations set for implementation include introduction of a new training scheme to improve opportunities for Australians and to streamline processing for low-risk sponsors in the Subclass 457 Visa Programme, as well as a review of the Temporary Skilled Migration Income Threshold.

In June 2015, the government announced the introduction of a simplified international student visa framework. The changes will mean a reduction in the number of student visa subclasses from eight to two, and introduction of a simplified single immigration risk framework for all international students.

In view of the tremendous increase in the number of visitors from China, the Department of Immigration and Border Protection is implementing new Visitor visa initiatives. In a trial run due to be implemented by the end of 2016, Chinese nationals will be eligible for a Visitor visa with a ten year validity. Applicants choosing this option will be entitled to visit Australia for up to three months on each entry. Other initiatives include a fast-track processing service and the expanded availability of online visa applications.

For further information

www.immi.gov.au

Recent trends in migrants’ flows and stocks

Australia

Notes and sources are at the end of the chapter.

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395835

Austria

In 2014, the total inflow of foreign nationals to Austria rose to 154 300 persons, an increase of 19 000 (14%) over 2013. Foreign nationals leaving the country numbered 76 500, a slight increase of 3% compared to 2013. Nearly two-thirds (64%) moved to European Economic Area (EEA) countries or Switzerland. This resulted in a positive net immigration of 77 700 foreign nationals, a 28% increase of 17 000 persons compared to the previous year. Factoring in the net outflow of 5 400 Austrian nationals in 2014 reduces the total net immigration rate to 72 300. By January 2015, the stock of foreign nationals amounted to 1.1 million (13% of the total population), constituting an increase of 80 000 persons compared to January of the previous year. The largest groups were German (170 000), Turkish (115 000) and Serbian nationals (114 000).

Of the 154 300 newly arrived foreign nationals, 96 600 (63%) came from the EEA or Switzerland. That figure includes 30 600 (20%) from EU15 countries –mainly Germany (17 300) and Italy (4 500) – and 64 800 (42%) from EU13 countries, mostly Romania (20 200), Hungary (14 200) and Poland (6 900). An additional 57 700 (37%) came from non-EU countries, the largest group (25 600, 16.6%) coming from other European countries and from Turkey. Inflows from southeast Europe and Turkey have decreased recently, but the number of immigrants from Asia is rising (14.5%), largely due to the influx of refugees from Syria and Afghanistan. Immigration from Africa (3.3%) and the Americas (2.6%) continues to be small in comparison.

In 2014, a total of 26 700 new residence permits were issued to third-country nationals, a number similar to that of 2013. Of these, 17 200 were permanent (settlement permits), a 4% decrease compared to 2013. About 22% were issued to family members of non-EU immigrants on the basis of a quota; the remaining 78% were issued to family members of Austrian or EEA citizens, holders of Red-White-Red cards (i.e. labour migrants), graduates of Austrian universities, and humanitarian migrants. Roughly 9 500 temporary permits were issued; the largest share went to students and their family members (71%), followed by temporary workers and their family members. Extensions of temporary permits were granted mostly to students (11 800, 68% of all extensions). In 2015, 29 500 employment permits were granted, compared to 28 500 in 2014 and 52 000 in 2013.

According to Eurostat data, Austria has experienced a steep increase in asylum applications –from 25 700 in 2014 to 85 500 in 2015. In 2015 the main groups were nationals of Afghanistan (29%), Syria (29%) and Iraq (15%). Moreover, Austria has become an important transit country for humanita-rian migrants who want to apply for asylum elsewhere in the European Union (EU). According to national data, over 11 500 applicants were granted asylum or other protection on humanitarian grounds in 2014.

Responding to the humanitarian crisis in the Middle East, Austria agreed to resettle 1 500 huma-nitarian migrants between 2013 and 2015. A shared admission scheme was adopted for Syrian refugees, some identified by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) as especially vulnerable.

According to the Austrian Ministry of the Interior, the number of arrests of foreigners entering or residing unlawfully in Austria has continued increasing in recent years, rising from 24 400 in 2012 to 27 500 in 2013 and 34 100 in 2014.

At the beginning of 2015, the Border Control Act was amended to prevent persons without valid travel documents from crossing Austrian borders. Fences were built at the country’s southern borders, and the Schengen Agreement has been temporarily suspended.

The government has budgeted EUR 248 million for the integration of refugees, mostly to finance additional German courses and to support the education and training of refugee children. An additional EUR 70 million has been earmarked for labour market integration policies for refugees.

In 2014, responsibility for integration policy was moved from the Ministry of the Interior to the Ministry of Europe, Integration and Foreign Affairs. In addition, the Ministry of the Interior established a new Federal Agency for Alien Affairs and Asylum, which is responsible for enforcing immigration and asylum law. In January 2016, the Austrian Government envisaged a standard reference point of up to 37 500 asylum applications in 2016, so as not to over-whelm the Austrian asylum system. A report commissioned by the government has found that actual caps could infringe EU and international law. In June 2016, the government reformed asylum legislation so as to decrease the duration of asylum proceedings, review the right to asylum after three years, and allow family reunification for holders of subsidiary protection only after three years.

In December 2015, a legislative initiative for a Recognition Act was proposed, to establish a right to assess, verify, and simplify the procedures for recognising qualifications acquired abroad. Parliamen-tary procedures started in April 2016; the Act is intended to enter into force in autumn 2016.

For further information

www.bmi.gv.at

www.sozialministerium.at

www.statistik.gv.at

www.migration.gv.at/en

Recent trends in migrants’ flows and stocks

Austria

Notes and sources are at the end of the chapter.

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395841

Belgium

In 2014, net immigration to Belgium amounted to 36 000 persons, compared to 27 000 in 2013. This increase is due to more sustained growth in inflows of foreigners than outflows. Net immigration of foreigners (including asylum seekers) rose by over 22% to 47 500 persons in 2014, whereas the net migration of Belgian citizens remained relatively stable (-11 100). Net flows of Romanians, Bulgarians and Italians increased the most in terms of the main nationalities in 2014.

Driven mainly by the combined effect of changes in immigration flows and naturalisations, the foreign population of Belgium increased by 36 600 persons in 2014 to a total of 1.3 million (representing 11.6% of the total population), two thirds of whom are European nationals. French, Italian and Dutch nationals made up the largest groups (each representing about 150 000 persons).

The number of first work permits for employees fell by over 50% between 2013 and 2014, from 13 000 to 5 500. This significant reduction is due to the liberalisation of the labour market for Bulgarian and Romanian nationals. Croatian nationals seeking paid employment are required to obtain a work permit until 30 June 2015. The inflow of new work permit holders (not including the Romanians and Bulgarians still registered in 2013) fell from 5 700 to 5 500 between 2013 and 2014. The number of highly skilled workers (8 300 permits granted in 2014, including renewals) has been relatively stable since 2008, but the proportion of highly skilled workers rose sharply in 2014 (54% in 2014 compared to 24% in 2013), due mainly to the fact that Romanians and Bulgarians, who are often recruited for seasonal work, especially in horticulture, are no longer included in the calculations. Almost 50% of these highly skilled workers are nationals of India, the United States and Japan.

According to figures from Eurostat, the number of asylum seekers rose from 14 130 to 39 100 between 2014 and 2015. Three main countries of origin (Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan) accounted for 50% of applications for asylum in 2015. Of the 19 400 first instance decisions on asylum applications in 2015, 54% were positive, compared to an average of 51% for the EU28.

Belgium has agreed to resettle 1 100 persons over a two-year period, slightly more than the number requested by the European Commission. Several missions were undertaken to Burundi and Lebanon in order to set in motion the UNHCR refugee resettlement programme (respectively concerning Congolese and Syrian nationals). Under this programme, 300 persons were resettled in Belgium in 2015.

Belgium spent an additional EUR 30 million (bringing the total in 2015 to EUR 51.7 million) on targeted emergency humanitarian aid for Syria and Iraq, mainly to support UNHCR and the World Food Programme.

Belgium increased its reception capacity for applicants for international protection from 16 200 places in July 2015 to 36 000 at the end of the year.

In September 2015, an amendment to the Immigration Law entered into force, containing provisions for a limit on the humanitarian protection provided for applicants who could prejudice Belgian society or who could represent a threat to national security.

In December 2015, a royal decree entered into force which reduces the time during which an asylum seeker is not allowed to work from six to four months as of the date on which the application is filed.

In the Flemish region, the minister responsible for civic integration announced that any non-European nationals settling in the region would have to take a course in citizenship, even if they have already lived in Wallonia or Brussels.

In December 2015, the Belgian authorities published an action plan designed to better combat human trafficking. Among other things, the plan includes changes to legislative provisions and greater investigation of traffickers’ networks, notably via analysis of financial movements.

Henceforth, the Immigration Office will only take into account the most recent applications in cases of multiple applications for regularisation of status. This measure, launched in May 2015, is designed to discourage excessive requests for residence based on huma-nitarian or medical grounds.

Since January 2015, an administrative fee has been introduced for applications for residence permits, varying from EUR 60 to EUR 215 depending on the type of request. For applications for family reunification or for study permits, the fee is EUR 160, and for requests for residency via regularisation or for economic migration it is EUR 215. There is no fee for vulnerable groups (refugees, unaccompanied minors and foreigners applying for authorisation on urgent medical grounds).

For further information

www.emploi.belgique.be

www.ibz.be

https://dofi.ibz.be

www.statbel.fgov.be

www.cgra.be

http://fedasil.be

www.relationdecomplaisance.be

Recent trends in migrants’ flows and stocks

Belgium

Notes and sources are at the end of the chapter.

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395851

Bulgaria

In 2014, both immigration and emigration flows increased, resulting in a net emigration of 2 100 persons. Net emigration of Bulgarians (-14 300) was not fully compensated by a net immigration of foreigners (+12 200). However, these figures – based on registered changes of permanent residence – may underestimate the true scale of migration flows. The number of foreigners entering (of whom nine in ten were non-EU citizens) increased from 13 900 to 17 100 between 2013 and 2014, while emigration flows increased by 33% to 4 900. The top three origin countries of foreign immigrants were Turkey (predominantly students), Syria (mainly asylum seekers) and the Russian Federation. Emigration of Bulgarian citizens rose by nearly 50% to 23 900. This flow is primarily labour migration of short and medium duration.

A record level of 124 800 foreign-born persons were residing in Bulgaria in 2014, representing 1.8% of the total population compared to 0.5% three years earlier. Among other factors, the country’s mem-bership in the EU and active policy measures to attract ethnic Bulgarians from abroad have likely played a role in this increase. Recent years have seen an increase of flows from countries where Bulgarian minorities are settled, as well as from other EU countries. EU citizens accounted for more than a third of the foreign-born population. Greece, the United Kingdom and Germany were the main origin countries of EU citizens in Bulgaria as well as the main destinations for Bulgarian emigrants.

The labour market situation in Bulgaria is still weak and labour demand has been shrinking. This likely contributed to a decline in the inflow of foreign workers. In 2014, less than 300 new work permits were issued, the lowest number since 2005; 300 work permits were renewed. However, posted workers and those employed in tourism are often exempt from the requirement of a work permit. Chinese and Turkish skilled workers constituted the largest groups.

The number of foreign students enrolled in the academic year 2014/15, at 11 500, remained stable compared with the previous year (4.3% of the total). Students from neighbouring countries and countries where Bulgarian minorities are settled (citizens of Bulgarian origin have free access to universities in Bulgaria) represented more than 80% of the total stock of foreign students. According to the national statistical institute, 27 900 Bulgarian students were studying abroad in 2014/15, representing around 10% of the number of students in Bulgarian universities. Their preferred destination countries were the United Kingdom and Germany, followed by Austria, France, Spain and the Netherlands.

There were 20 200 asylum applications in 2015 (including dependents), i.e. 1.6% of the applications received in the EU28. This number nearly doubled from that of 2014. The top three nationalities (Iraq, Afghanistan and Syria) accounted for more than two-thirds of total applications. More than 90% of the 5 600 decisions made at first instance in 2015 were positive, compared with 51% in the EU28. Migration pressure, mostly at the Bulgarian-Turkish border, intensified in 2014. The construction of a 30 km fence, as well as repeated interventions by the Bulgarian Border Police, resulted in a temporary slowdown of illegal border crossings, from 11 600 in 2013 to 6 500 in 2014, with the majority of these persons coming from Syria and Afghanistan.

To encourage foreign direct investment, a new simplified procedure has been put in place to grant permanent residence permits and citizenship to entrepreneurs from third countries who invest more than defined thresholds.

Changes to the Law on Bulgarian Citizenship stipulate that foreign citizens permanently residing in Bulgaria through marriage to a Bulgarian citizen, as well as EU citizens and citizens from countries that signed a reciprocity agreement with Bulgaria, may acquire Bulgarian citizenship without renouncing their former citizenship.

September 2015 saw the adoption of new amendments to the Refugee Law that transpose the Directive 2011/95/EU concerning the standards that qualify third-country nationals or stateless persons for international protection. The law introduces a new category, “temporary international protection”. This status will be granted in the case of a massive inflow of persons who are forced to leave their country of origin due to military conflict, civil war, foreign intervention, violation of civil rights, or violence within its territory. The government has also proposed introducing a simplified procedure for granting refugee status to ethnic Bulgarians victims of conflicts or civil wars.

For further information

www.nsi.bg

www.aref.government.bg

Recent trends in migrants’ flows and stocks

Bulgaria

Notes and sources are at the end of the chapter.

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395865

Canada

In 2014, 260 400 foreign nationals were granted permanent resident status in Canada, a rise of +0.5% compared with the 2013 level and within the planned admission range of 240 000-265 000. The number of family class immigrants declined by 18% to 66 660 in 2014, while that of refugees declined by 2% to 23 290. In contrast, the number entering as economic immigrants increased by 11% to 165 090 in 2014; of these, 86 950 were spouses and dependents. Within the family class, 48 510 entered as spouses, partners or children, and 18 150 (down by 78% from 2013) as parents or grandparents.

The top three source countries for permanent residents in 2014 were the Philippines (40 035), India (38 341) and China (24 640). While the sharp increase in entries from the first two nationalities (+35% and +16%, respectively) was mainly due to the influx of economic migrants, the decrease in permanent migration of Chinese citizens is driven by the family class flows.

The proportion of well-qualified migrants has continued increasing in 2014, with more than half (52%) of permanent residents between 25 and 64 years of age having completed post-secondary studies with a bachelor’s or master’s degree or a doctorate.

Over the same year, around 10 000 temporary resident permit holders were admitted, that is to say granted permanent residence after having lived continuously in Canada for three to five years under a temporary resident permit. In addition to permanent residents, Canada has admitted 556 550 temporary migrants, 1.9% fewer than in 2013 (567 190). The majority are work permit holders – 365 750 in 2014, down from 401 580 in 2013. In addition, there were 211 980 study permit holders, up from 194 050 the year before. Of those with work permits, 95 090 entered subject to a Labour Market Opinion (TFWP) and 197 920 with an exemption from a Labour Market Opinion (IMP). The 95 090 included 11 960 live-in caregivers, 39 550 agricultural workers, 26 650 higher skilled workers and 16 880 lower skilled work permit holders.

A number of changes were introduced to the country’s immigration programmes in 2014. Reform of the Live-in Caregivers Program in November 2014 ended the requirement for caregivers to live with the care recipients. Eligible caregivers were now provided with two new pathways to permanent residence: one for those who have provided child care in a home, and one for those who have provided care for individuals with a high level of medical needs.

In June 2014, the TFWP was reorganised into two distinct programmes. The International Mobility Programs (IMP) include those streams in which foreign nationals are not subject to a Labour Market Impact Assessment: their primary objective is to advance the broad economic and cultural national interests of Canada rather than filling particular jobs. The government also introduced a cap to limit the proportion of low-wage temporary foreign workers that a business can employ. The cap will significantly restrict access to the TFWP, while ensuring that Canadians and permanent residents are always considered first for available jobs, reducing employer reliance on the programme and increasing wages offered to Canadians.

The second programme is the International Student Program, which facilitates entry of foreign students into Canada’s post-secondary institutions. Reforms introduced to the programme in 2014 limit the issuance of study permits to foreign nationals who will be enrolled in designated learning institutions, ones that are vetted and held accountable by provincial and territorial ministries responsible for education. Beyond enrolment, the regulatory reforms introduced require foreign students to actively pursue their studies while on a study permit in Canada. The reforms also make it easier for international students to work off campus, by eliminating the requirement to obtain a separate work permit.

The overall planned admissions range for permanent residents in 2015 was between 260 000 and 285 000 (final data for 2015 are not yet available). Through Express Entry, the country’s new application management system for economic class immigrants, over 31 000 invitations to apply for permanent residence have been issued to a diverse range of highly skilled immigrants, resulting in receipt of 37 424 applications (principal applicants and their family), and almost 10 000 individuals entering Canada as permanent residents.

Finally, in October 2015, Canada elected a new government committed to streghthening the country’s economy and middle class; there is now a focus on expanding immigration in general and family reunification in particular. In response to the Syrian crisis, the government made a committment in November 2015 to resettle 25 000 Syrian refugees in Canada by February 2016, a significant milestone which it successfully reached.

For further information

www.cic.gc.ca

Recent trends in migrants’ flows and stocks

Canada

Notes and sources are at the end of the chapter.

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395876

Chile

According to the Ministry of the Interior and Public Security, close to 411 000 foreign nationals were living in Chile in 2014, accounting for 2.3% of the total population. Three-quarters were nationals of other South American countries. Nationals of European and North American countries together represented 17% that year, versus 24% in 2005.

The leading source countries of foreign residents were Peru (32% in 2014), Argentina (16%), Bolivia (9%), Colombia (6%) and Ecuador (5%); Spain (4%), the United States (3%) and China (2%) were the main source countries of residents not from South America. The foreign resident population is concentrated in the cities of Santiago and Arica, as well as in the mining regions of Tarapacá, Antofagasta and Atacama, where the share of foreign population has almost doubled since the mid-2000s.

In 2014, the number of permanent residence permits delivered rose by 39% to reach 39 000 after a 5% decrease in 2013. Holders of a permanent residence permit were primarily Peruvian (accounting for 28%), Bolivian (21%), Colombian (16%), and Argentinian and Spanish nationals (5% each). Compared to 2005, the number of permanent permits issued to Peruvians and Argentinians declined while the issuance to Bolivians, Colombians and Spaniards increased. Grants of permanent residency to Dominican and Haitian nationals were negligible in 2005 but represented 3% and 2% respectively of the permanent flow in 2014.

The number of newly issued visas more than tripled between 2005 and 2014, from 41 400 to 137 400. After one to two years under the visa regime (or after completion of studies), immigrants can apply for permanent residence. Approximately half of the visas were issued to foreigners based on an employment contract (66 600) in 2014. While Peruvian nationals were still the largest group of visa recipients (44% of employment contracts in 2014), the numbers of visas issued to the second group (Colombian nationals) and to the third group (Haitian nationals) were higher than in previous years. They accounted for 32% and 4% of the flows, respectively.

The other half newly issued visas were mainly temporary (68 500). There are several types of visas in this growing category, such as those granted to professionals and technicians; to relatives of Chileans or of permanent residents; and to nationals of a number of other South American countries that are signatories to the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR) Residence Agreement. In 2012, immigrants given special visas accorded to nationals of Mercosur represented 16% of the total annual inflows. Their share is likely to grow, blurring the relevance of the other visa categories as recipients can include workers, students or family migrants. More often than in the past decade, these migrants are heading to the northern regions, especially Antofagasta, while the trend in migration flows to the metropolitan and southern regions is declining. In 2014, the main source countries of migrants residing under this title are Bolivia – which benefits from the MERCOSUR Residence Agreement visas since 2010 (40%, versus 4% in 2005), Peru (15%), Colombia (10%) and Argentina (9%).

Student visas accounted for only 2% (2 300) of all newly issued visas, with Colombia, Peru, Ecuador and the United States the main origin countries.

In 2014, Chile received 280 asylum applications. Colombian nationals accounted for the vast majority of applications.

The year 2015 saw major changes in the Chilean migration regime. First, the procedure for applying for residence in the Antofagasta region – which attracts a growing number of temporary immigrants, mainly originating from Bolivia – was eased in January. Second, a new visa category (visa de unión civil) was created to allow foreigners who married a Chilean abroad and those who celebrated an agreement of civil union, either in Chile or abroad, to reside and work in Chile. A new labour-based visa (visa por motivos laborales) was also introduced. Third, an agreement was reached to offer better access to health services to vulnerable immigrants. Finally, in order to better comply with international laws, children under the age of 14 are now exempted from migration penalty.

In April 2016, a new agreement was signed between Chile and Hungary on the exchange of Working Holiday makers. This followed an earlier agreement with New Zealand in 2001.

For further information

www.extranjeria.gov.cl

www.interior.gov.cl

www.minrel.gov.cl

Recent trends in migrants’ flows and stocks

Chile

Notes and sources are at the end of the chapter.

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395884

Czech Republic

After an unprecedented net migration outflow in 2013 due to the high numbers of emigrating foreigners, the Czech Republic registered a rise in net immigration in 2014 (+21 000 national and foreign residents) and in 2015 (+16 000). The number of immigrants in 2014 rose to 41 600 – the highest level since 2008 – and decreased slightly in 2015 to 34 900. Emigrant numbers fell to 20 000 in 2014 and 2015, 10 900 fewer than in 2013. Ukrainians continued to be the most numerous group, among both immigrants and emigrants, followed by Slovaks and Russians (among immigrants) and Czech citizens and Vietnamese (among emigrants). There was a small net emigration of Czech citizens.

At the end of 2014, 449 370 foreigners (4.3% of the total population) were legally residing in the Czech Republic. Persons with visas for a stay over 90 days or long-term or temporary residence permits numbered 199 500, while 250 000 held a permanent residence permit, including registered EU nationals. The total represented an increase of 10 000 from the previous year, exceeding its pre-2008 crisis level. Citizens of EU28 countries accounted for 41% of all foreign residents. Their representation among the foreign population has been continuously increasing, from 32% in 2010. The largest national groups have traditionally been citizens of Ukraine, the Slovak Republic and Viet Nam; the three countries accounted for 57% of registered foreigners in 2014.

Among the 199 500 foreigners staying in the Czech Republic temporarily, employment and business activities were the main purposes of the stay at 48.4% of the total, followed by family purposes at 27.1%.

An estimated 261 000 foreign workers were employed in the Czech Republic in December 2014. Slovak nationals (129 220), Poles (19 600), Romanians (13 750) and Bulgarians (13 680) were the most numerous groups among the EU nationals, with those from Ukraine (35 320), the Russian Federation (4 720), Viet Nam (3 980) and the Republic of Moldova (2 110) the main sources from third countries.

In the academic year 2014/15, the number of international students continued to rise, reaching 41 180 – 11.9% of all university students in the Czech Republic. A majority of them (63.6% of the total number) came from EU28 countries, although their proportion has been decreasing. Slovaks (22 680) are the dominant group. Students of the Republics of the Former USSR dominate among the group of the third-country nationals, with Russian numbers rising the fastest. Half of the international students were enrolled in bachelor’s programmes, one-third in master’s programmes, and 5% in doctoral studies.

There were 1 240 asylum applications in 2015 (including dependents), i.e. less than 1% of the applications received in the EU28. This number increased by a third from 2014. The top three source countries (Ukraine, Syria, Cuba) accounted for two-thirds of the total applications received. Around 34% of decisions made at first instance were positive, compared with 51% in the EU28, irrespective of applicants who left the country before the end of the application process.

In response to the European refugee crisis, the Czech Government agreed to resettle 3 000 refugees by 2017. A first group of Syrian families arrived from Jordan in October 2015. The priority was accorded families with children with specific medical needs.

Following transposition of the Single Permit Directive (2011/98/EU) in mid-2014, a single document (“employee card”) was created to replace employment visas (for stays longer than three months) and permits granted for employment reason. The employee card carried regulations on family benefits and financial contributions.

Following transposition into national law of the EU directives relating to asylum, the period during which asylum seekers are not permitted to work is reduced from 12 months to 6 months.

In November 2015, the government approved a new Integration Programme for beneficiaries of international protection, mainly focused on housing, education, language courses and employment.

In January 2014 a new law on the acquisition of Czech citizenship entered into force. It allows double (or multiple) citizenship to a wider extent than hitherto. It also facilitates acquisition of citizenship for stateless persons and former Czech/Czechoslovak nationals and their descendants. The law resulted in a higher number of applications for Czech citizenship in 2014.

For further information

www.mvcr.cz

www.czso.cz

www.imigracniportal.cz

http://portal.mpsv.cz/sz/zahr_zam

Recent trends in migrants’ flows and stocks

Czech Republic

Notes and sources are at the end of the chapter.

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395895

Denmark

The migration inflow to Denmark has been increasing continuously since 2009, reaching 97 900 persons in 2015 (+13% over 2014), according to Statistics Denmark. The number of Danish citizens in the migration inflow basically remained constant at around 22 000. Among the foreigners immigrating in 2015, the largest groups were nationals of Syria (11 300, +109% over 2014), Romania (5 100, -1%) and Poland (4 800, -3%). The migration outflow plateaued at 49 000, of whom 20 500 were Danish citizens. The net migration inflow has been increasing by more than 25% each year since 2013, mainly due to the increase in the inflows of foreigners.

There were 540 000 immigrants residing in Denmark in January 2016 (defined as persons whose parents are both foreign citizens or were both born abroad). This number was 8% higher than one year earlier. Poland remained the immigrants’ main country of origin (+7% compared to 2014), followed by Turkey (+0.4%), Germany (+1.4%), Syria (+108%) and Romania (+17%). The share of immigrants in the country’s entire population grew from 8.9% in January 2015 to 9.5% in January 2016.

A total of 84 700 residence permits were issued in 2015, 17% more than in 2014 (72 300). EU/EEA nationals accounted for almost half of all permits over the past years. Other new permits (issued to third-country nationals) were relatively evenly distributed among the four main grounds (family, employment, humanitarian and study). The number of permits on family grounds doubled to 11 600 in 2015, while those on humanitarian grounds increased by 80%. Twelve thousand residence permits for work purposes were issued to non-EEA nationals, mainly to nationals of India, China and Iran.

According to Eurostat data, there were 20 900 asylum applications in 2015 (including dependents). This number represented an increase of more than 43% compared with 2014. The top three countries of origin (Syria, Iran, Afghanistan) accounted for two-thirds of the total applications received. Around 81% of the decisions made at first instance were positive, compared with 51% in the EU28.

In February 2015, an amendment of the Aliens Act introduced a new temporary subsidiary protection status for refugees who are entitled to asylum due to a general situation in the home country.

With the reform of international recruitment that entered into force in January 2015, the green card scheme was targeted to support the need of enterprises for highly qualified labour. Increased focus was placed on educational levels, and the point system changed to match the demands of the Danish labour market. At the same time, conditions for researchers were improved, granting them more flexibility regarding their residence in Denmark. They may now reside outside the country for more than six months without losing their residence and work permit.

A new Ministry of Immigration, Integration and Housing was formed, and made responsible for all immigration and integration policies. Furthermore, in July 2015 the new government presented a bill introducing a lower integration allowance aimed at giving newly arrived refugees and immigrants a greater incentive to work and become integrated into Danish society. The integration allowance also applies to newly arrived refugees, immigrants as well as to Danish citizens who have not been resident in Denmark for the past seven out of eight years. The allowance, which also includes a language bonus, entered into force in September 2015.

Other proposed changes by the new government were new and flexible rules on family reunification, and more restrictive requirements for foreigners wishing to obtain permanent residence and Danish nationality. A series of proposed measures would make it less attractive to seek asylum in Denmark; these include reintroduction of an integration potential criterion for selecting quota refugees, and stronger measures for checking the asylum seeker’s identity. Measures were also proposed to eliminate the possibility for refugees to obtain permanent residence without being able to speak Danish or being in employment. Subsequently the government announced its goal to reduce total spending on immigration by at least DKK 1 billion annually, and to reinforce aid to the refugees’ regions of origin.

In January 2016, the government adopted a bill to confiscate certain valuables from asylum seekers in order to help pay for the costs of processing and settlement.

For further information

www.ast.dk

www.sm.dk

www.justitsministeriet.dk

www.newtodenmark.dk

www.workindenmark.dk

Recent trends in migrants’ flows and stocks

Denmark

Notes and sources are at the end of the chapter.

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395905

Estonia

During 2014, a total of 4 600 persons emigrated from Estonia, a decrease of over 30% compared to 2013. However, this flow continued to exceed total immigration (3 900 persons), resulting in a net outflow of -700, down from -2 600 the previous year. Most emigrants (93%) were Estonian nationals; the main destination country was Finland (66%), followed by the United Kingdom (8%). At the same time, Estonian nationals returning from Finland comprised 65% of all immigrants. A third of all immigrants came from Finland, and the net migration with Finland was still negative (-1 800 persons) but falling (-4 000 in 2013).

Overall, the Estonian population was estimated at 1.31 million at 1 January 2015 (a 0.2% decline on the previous year), 16% of whom were foreigners. Russian citizens numbered 94 200; a further 88 100 of undetermined citizenship were mainly long-standing migrants who came from different parts of the USSR prior to 1991 together with their descendants.

In 2014, 4 100 temporary residence permits were issued to non-EU/EFTA nationals (including status changes), an increase of 16% on the previous year, and a further 4 800 permits (+11%) were extended. Family grounds continued to be the most important channel of migration, accounting for 34% (1 400) of temporary residence permits issued and 44% (2 100) of extensions in 2014. Employment accounted for 30% (1 000) of residence permits issued but only 8% (400) of extensions. In 2014, there were again significant increases (+32% to 900) in temporary residence permits issued for study, and in extensions (+45%). The share of temporary residence permits granted to Russians and to persons with undetermined citizenship fell. In contrast there were substantial increases in grants to Ukrainians, Georgians, Indians and Nigerians.

EU/EFTA nationals do not require a residence permit but receive a temporary right of residence, renewable after five years. On 1 January 2015, 23 000 EU/EFTA nationals lived in Estonia, of whom 3 000 had registered in 2014.

According to Eurostat data, there were 228 asylum applications in 2015 (including dependents), compared to 147 in 2014. The top three countries of origin (Ukraine, Syria and Iraq) accounted for half of the total number of applications. Around 44% of the 80 decisions made at first instance in 2015 were positive, compared with 51% in the EU28.

For the first time in 2015, Estonia has agreed to resettle around 550 people in need of international protection within two years under the EU Plan. A relocation system has been set up (including the creation of an additional accommodation centre), and the first refugee families were arriving by the end of March 2016. In addition, at the end of 2015, Estonia signed an agreement with Italy to relocate people in need of international protection.

From January to August 2015, 620 irregular migrants were identified, of whom 190 were Russian citizens and 200 had undetermined citizenship. This compares with 800 foreigners in 2014 and 1 000 in 2013.

In April 2015 the first national action plan aimed at attracting and retaining more highly skilled foreign migrants was approved for the years 2015-16. A newly created portal, “Work in Estonia”, includes information about the recruitment of foreigners and work and life in Estonia.

From August 2015, recent foreign immigrants (including EU citizens) who have legally resided in Estonia for less than five years can access one-day integration training as well as around 80 hours of basic Estonian language training (level A1). The integration day consists in training sessions tailored to the needs of the foreigner, and provides labour-related information as well as more general information for family members, students and migrants benefiting from humanitarian protection.

Amendments to the Aliens Act entered into force in 2016. Temporary residents, who have been living in Estonia for three years within the past five years, will be entitled to apply for a long-term residence permit through a simplified procedure. An opportunity to stay in Estonia for 90 additional days (183 days for students, researchers, teachers and lecturers) after the residence permit has expired will be offered to temporary residents, to allow them to find a job in Estonia. Several changes have been made to simplify the recruitment of foreigners, notably by offering them the possibility to work simultaneously with several employers or to be hired through a temporary work agency. This allows employers more flexibility in finding the appropriate worker for a limited period of time.

As a result of amendments to the Citizenship Act entering into force in 2016, children who were born in Estonia and whose parents have undetermined citizenship can automatically acquire Estonian citizenship by naturalisation at birth, if at least one of their parents has been residing in Estonia for a minimum of five years.

For further information

www.politsei.ee/en/

www.stat.ee/en

www.siseministeerium.ee

Recent trends in migrants’ flows and stocks

Estonia

Notes and sources are at the end of the chapter.

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395911

Finland

According to Statistics Finland, total net immigration decreased by 2 000 persons to +16 000 in 2014. This is due to a larger net emigration of Finnish citizens (from -1 600 to -2 200) and a decrease in net immigration of foreigners (from 19 600 to 18 200). One-third of the 15 500 persons who emigrated from Finland in 2014 were foreigners. Their number increased from 4 200 in 2013 to 5 500 in 2014. The main groups of new foreign immigrants were Estonian (4 700), Russian (2 400), Indian, Iraqi and Chinese citizens (800 each). Preliminary estimates indicate a decrease in the total population at the beginning of 2016, since net immigration did not compensate for the negative natural growth rate. At the end of 2015, a total of 231 300 foreigners lived in Finland, constituting 4.1% of the population – a 5% increase compared to 2014. As in 2014, the largest groups were Estonians (50 500, +8%), Russians (31 100, +0.6%) and Swedes (8 300, no change from the previous year).

The number of first residence permits granted to third-country nationals has been relatively stable over the past years (17 800 in 2015). In 2015, family reasons (34% of total new permits, -10% compared to the previous year) and study (33%, +5%) were the two main grounds for issuing a permit, while more than 30% were issued based on employment (+7%). An additional 11 000 registrations were issued to EU citizens and their family members.

Between January and August 2015, the Finnish Immigration Service issued 4 000 residence permits for employment purposes (first-time permits for third-country nationals). Fifty-seven per cent fell under the category of “residence permit for an employed person” which includes a labour market test; 680 were highly skilled specialists; fewer than 50 were self-employed workers; and 18 received an EU Blue Card. An additional 900 permits were issued to other types of workers.

In 2015, 1 600 individuals were issued a residence permit on the basis of international protection (compared with 1 000 in 2014); of this group, 1 100 were granted refugee status (500 in 2014). Most residence permits were granted to Iraqis (650), Somalis (490) and Afghans (120). Finland also admitted around 1 000 quota refugees from Lebanon, Egypt, Malawi, Zambia and Iran.

Among OECD countries, Finland faced the highest relative increase in asylum applications: 32 100 requests were received in 2015 compared to 3 500 the previous year. Over 3 000 unaccompanied minors were registered, compared to 200 the previous year. Iraqis accounted for two-thirds of the requests in 2015. Afghans, Somalis and Syrians followed, with 5 200, 2 000 and 900 applications respectively. Fifty-seven per cent of the 3 000 decisions made in 2015 at first instance were positive, compared with 51% in the EU28, according to Eurostat data.

A considerable number of new reception centres for asylum seekers had been established across the country (144 were opened by the end of 2015, compared to 20 in the previous year), and a special registration centre was established in Tornio to facilitate the registration process. Following the declining trend in asylum requests in 2016, the Finnish Immigration Service decided to close 33 reception centres and not to renew fixed-term agreements with an additional 10 centres.

The EU Seasonal Workers and Intra-company Transfers Directive will be transposed into national law in 2016.

Preparation of the Integration Programme for the 2016-19 period is under way. The programme includes four priority themes: 1) enhancing open dialogue on migration with zero tolerance on racism; 2) supporting innovations by harnessing migrants’ skills; 3) strengthening integration measures, especially those related to migrant women and youth; and 4) continuing to receive and resettle refugees.

In 2014, the duration that foreign students are allowed to remain in the country following graduation was increased from 6 to 12 months, to improve their chances of finding employment in Finland. Tuition fees will be introduced for non-EEA students.

In April 2016, the government submitted a proposal to Parliament for tightening criteria for the family reunification of beneficiaries of international or temporary protection. Principal applicants would need to prove that they have sufficient means to support their family before they could bring them to Finland. This amendment would not apply to refugees.

For further information

www.migri.fi

www.intermin.fi

www.stat.fi

Recent trends in migrants’ flows and stocks

Finland

Notes and sources are at the end of the chapter.

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395924

France

Estimates by the French National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies (Institut national de la statistique et des études économiques-INSEE) suggest that total entries, including minors, amounted to 333 000 in 2013. One third consisted of returning French citizens, and just over a quarter were other EU citizens exercising their right to free movement. Once account is taken of an outflow of 287 000, France had a net migratory inflow of 40 000, compared to 70 000 the previous year.

In 2014, France issued 211 000 new residence permits to migrants from outside the European Economic Area (EEA), compared to 205 000 in 2013. Immigration from these countries is dominated by three Maghreb countries (Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia), which account for 40% of permanent inflows.

Family migration remains the largest category within migration flows from countries outside the EU, with 92 000 new residence permits issued in mainland France in 2014. This figure was down by 1.5% from 2013, however, primarily as a result of the decline in the number of exceptional residence permits issued for family reasons, which peaked in 2013 following the entry into force of the 28 November 2012 circular. This circular amended the conditions of regularisation for illegal immigrants and led to a 50% increase in the number of exceptional residence permits issued between 2012 and 2013. The number of regularisations reached 35 000 before easing off to 32 000 in 2014. While the regularisation of foreign workers was unaffected by this fall, and grew by 18.5%, this economic category accounts for just 16% of all exceptional admissions, which therefore continue to be dominated by permits issued for family reasons.

Admissions of students rose by 3.5% to a historic high, with 65 000 new stay permits granted in 2014. While only 19 000 new stay permits were issued to migrant workers in 2014, this figure was up by 7% from 2013. The number of new permits issued to humanitarian migrants also grew substantially, and climbed by 16% to 14 000.

After rising steadily for six consecutive years, asylum requests dipped by 2.2% between 2013 and 2014, with 65 000 formal applications (including appeals and family members). The number of first applications also fell by 1%. There was a dramatic turnaround in 2015, however, with a 24% surge in the number of first applications for asylum, according to the Ministry of the Interior. France reached a record level of asylum applications with 73 500 new formal requests. Most asylum seekers came from Sudan, Syria and Kosovo, with these three regions accounting for 15% of requests. According to figures released by Eurostat, almost one quarter of first applications were accepted in 2015, compared to 51% for the whole of the EU28.

On 23 July 2014, the government presented two draft laws on immigration and asylum. The Asylum law was passed on 23 July 2015 and came into force on 1 November 2015. The law on foreigners in France was enacted on 7 March 2016 and is due to enter into force by 1 November 2016 at the latest.

The Asylum law grants new rights to asylum seekers. It automatically suspends decisions after appeals have been heard by the National Court of Asylum (CNDA), including fast-tracked cases, and allows asylum seekers to take advice from the French refugee protection agency (OFPRA), in line with EU directives. It also provides for improved assessment of and allowance for vulnerabilities at all stages of the application process (for those in poor health, female victims of violence, minors, etc.). On the other hand, the new law will speed up the processing of applications. The target is to be able to process an asylum application in an average of nine months by the end of 2016. To prevent large numbers of asylum seekers being concentrated in given parts of the country and to offer quality accommodation and social services, the new law has also set up a compulsory accommodation system.

The law on the rights of foreigners in France has three main goals. It is designed to secure the reception and integration pathway by establishing the acquisition of French language skills as a firm priority, and by replacing the Reception and Integration Contract with a Republican Integration Contract. After an initial year of residence, a card should be issued for between two and four years, to dispense with the need for frequent renewals.

The new law also aims to attract migrants with exceptional skills and know-how. Along the same lines as the residence card, a single card known as the “talent passport” and valid for a period of four years would be issued to highly qualified immigrants, covering the main cardholders and their family. Several measures, moreover, are designed to give the administration more room for manœuvre in combating illegal immigration, under judicial control and with enhanced transparency.

For further information

www.immigration.interieur.gouv.fr

www.ofii.fr/

www.ofpra.gouv.fr

Recent trends in migrants’ flows and stocks

France

Notes and sources are at the end of the chapter.

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395935

Germany

The Federal Statistical Office estimates that net immigration of foreigners (including asylum seekers) reached a record level at 1.1 million in 2015, with almost 2 million entries and 900 000 departures. This is nearly twice the level registered in 2014 (+577 000, 1.3 million entries), which was already the largest migration surplus since 1992. While net immigration of foreigners was largely driven by migratory flows to and from other EU countries until 2014, its composition in 2015 was dominated by the massive inflow of persons seeking asylum in Germany.

In 2015, 1 091 900 persons were registered in the so-called EASY system – an IT system for the pre-registration and first allocation of asylum seekers to initial reception facilities. Applicants for asylum (including dependents) numbered 441 900, representing more than a third of all applications received in the EU28 (Eurostat figures). This constitutes an increase of over 150% compared to 2014 and is the highest ever number of asylum seekers. The top three origins – Syria (159 000, +300%), Albania (54 000, +600%) and Kosovo (33 000, +400%) – accounted for 56% of all applications. The number of Serbian asylum applicants was stable at 17 000, and that of Eritreans down 2 000 at 11 000. Around 56% of decisions made at first instance were positive, compared to 51% in the EU28. Around 176 500 new asylum applications were submitted between January and March 2016 (January-March 2015: 75 000).

In the 2014/15 winter semester, 235 900 non-EEA students – mostly from China (13%), India (5%) and the Russian Federation (5%) – were enrolled at German universities. In 2014, 5 000 residence permits were issued to non-EEA graduates to allow them to find a job following graduation from a German university, compared with 4 500 in 2014.

After labour market restrictions were lifted in 2011 for the countries that joined the EU in 2004, employment of citizens of Central and Eastern European countries increased sharply, from 227 000 persons in April 2011 to 864 700 in June 2015. An EU Blue Card was held by 22 000 foreigners at the end of March 2015, 10 400 of whom worked in shortage occupations and 5 300 of whom had completed their education levels in Germany.

As a response to the large inflow of asylum seekers, Germany adopted a comprehensive legislative package in October 2015, the Act on the Acceleration of Asylum Procedures, Asylverfahrensbeschleunigungsgesetz. It aims to speed up asylum procedures, encourage integration of refugees, and facilitate the deportation of rejected applicants. The package included furnishing financial support to the Länder; providing better access to integration courses and linking courses to job-specific language training; relaxing building regulations for accommodation facilities (for instance, by extending the areas where municipalities and Länder are allowed to build or renovate accommodation dedicated to refugees and asylum seekers); improving assistance to unaccompanied minors; and expanding the list of safe origins to Albania, Kosovo and Montenegro. Serbia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) and Bosnia and Herzegovina have been considered safe countries of origin since May 2014, and the number of requests has started to decrease. In addition, asylum seekers and persons from safe countries of origin with a tolerated status who submitted their request after 31 August 2015 are not authorised to work.

The Act has also broadened the access to language and integration courses for asylum seekers with good prospects of remaining – i.e. applicants from Syria, Iran, Iraq and Eritrea; individuals with a tolerated status; and those with a temporary permit on humanitarian grounds who are unable to leave the country for legal or factual reasons. The aim of the integration course is for participants to obtain an adequate level of fluency in the German language and knowledge of Germany’s legal system, culture and history.

In March 2016, a second legislative package entered into force (Asylum Package II, Asylpaket II). It foresees the development of specialised reception centres where decisions on asylum for applicants from safe countries of origin can be made within three weeks. Applicants who appeal first-instance decisions or those who do not co-operate – for instance by submitting false documentation or refusing to have their fingerprints taken – can also be subjected to this accelerated procedure. Furthermore, deportations, which often did not take place due to the poor health status of rejected applicants, can now be enforced unless the migrant is severely ill. In addition, family reunification for humanitarian migrants with subsidiary protection status, including unaccompanied minors, is now only possible after two years.

For further information

www.bmas.bund.de

www.bmi.bund.de

www.bamf.de

www.destatis.de

www.anerkennung-in-deutschland.de

www.make-it-in-germany.com

Recent trends in migrants’ flows and stocks

Germany

Notes and sources are at the end of the chapter.

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395947

Greece

According to Labour Force Survey data the foreign population in Greece in the second quarter of 2015 numbered 647 700, accounting for 6% of the total population. Of these, 547 300 were third-country nationals and 100 300 were from the EU. The three main groups of foreigners were Albanians (412 500), Bulgarians (33 700) and Romanians (22 600).

Since the peak of December 2010 when over 600 000 valid residence permits for non-EU citizens were issued, the number has steadily decreased to just over 550 000 in June 2015. There was a slight increase between December 2014 and June 2015, partly driven by a seasonal effect. In June 2015, the largest group was Albanian (377 600, 70% of the total number of valid permits), followed by Russians (18 900) and Pakistanis (18 200). Around 45% of male non-EU citizens held long-term permits (of ten-year or indefinite duration), 31% were for family reunification and 2% for employment purposes. By contrast, two-thirds of female non-EU citizens held permits for family grounds, 23% held a long-term residence permit, and 11% held a work-related permit. The remainder includes a small number of permits for study (0.4%).

According to national data there were 13 300 asylum applications in 2015 (including dependents), representing 1% of all applications received in the EU28. This number increased by 41% compared with the 9 400 applications received in 2014. The top three nationalities – Syria (3 500 compared to 770 in 2014), Pakistan (1 800 compared to 1 600) and Afghanistan (1 720 compared to 1 700) – accounted for 53% of total applications. Around 42% of the decisions made at first instance in 2015 were positive, compared with 51% in the EU28. It should be noted that many applications are not taken into account in this calculation due to the high mobility of asylum applicants. In addition, many humanitarian migrants arriving in Greece wish to apply for asylum in other EU countries where support measures for accommodation, food, language training are more favourable and where they are more likely to find a job.

Arrivals at the Greek islands of those crossing from Turkey increased tremendously, from 11 450 in 2013 to 43 520 in 2014 and 872 520 in 2015 (Hellenic Police data). More than half of the migrants who entered between January 2015 and February 2016 were Syrians. The numbers of Afghans and Iraqis also increased dramatically, to 246 050 and 113 700, respectively. Apprehensions of nationals of Iran and Pakistan totalled 27 120 and 31 700, respectively.

A fast-track procedure for Syrian refugees was adopted in November 2014, providing them with refugee status on proof of nationality. Several measures were adopted by the new government in 2015 with a view to overhauling the overall detention policy implemented by previous governments. Asylum -seekers, vulnerable groups (women, children, ill and disabled persons, victims of torture, etc.) and anyone detained over six months have been released in stages and where possible directed to shelters and open reception centres, or simply left to find accommodation on their own.

Over recent years, Greece improved its asylum and irregular migration management policy. Up until January 2015 apprehensions of undocumented migrants, notably at the Greek-Turkish land and sea borders, have increased considerably, as have returns, whether voluntary or compulsory; Pakistani was the main returned nationality. However, in 2015 the overwhelming numbers arriving at the border have considerably challenged the Greek border control policy. Since March 2016, following the Joint Statement between the EU and Turkey, all new irregular migrants (economic migrants and asylum seekers) crossing from Turkey to the Greek islands are to be sent back to Turkey. For each Syrian readmitted by Turkey, another Syrian should be resettled somewhere within the EU.

The new government passed a citizenship reform bill in 2015 facilitating citizenship acquisition. It makes naturalisation possible with a simple declaration/application for children born in Greece who at least started primary school, and for youth who have completed most of their education in the country. Further new legislation in 2015 strengthens the Migration Code provisions concerning residence permits on exceptional and humanitarian grounds. The exceptional grounds include third-country nationals who have long-lasting ties with Greece and who fulfil certain conditions regarding the duration or previous titles of residence. The legislation also strengthens special provisions protecting vulnerable people, a category that now covers victims of trafficking and of particularly exploitative conditions, and people who are testifying in penal proceedings. Both the humanitarian and exceptional grounds permits are issued for an initial period of two years and then can be converted to regular residence permits.

Finally, a law enacted in April 2016 introduces changes to the institutional framework for first reception and asylum procedures in line with the EU Asylum Procedures Directive; regulates the employment rights of applicants for and beneficiaries of international protection or humanitarian status; reinforces the Asylum Service; and establishes the Secretariat General for Reception.

For further information

www.statistics.gr

www.ypes.gr

www.ypakp.gr

www.yptp.gr

www.astynomia.gr

Recent trends in migrants’ flows and stocks

Greece

Notes and sources are at the end of the chapter.

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395953

Hungary

In 2014, 26 000 foreign citizens migrated to Hungary, 22% more than in 2013 and a figure close to the 2008 peak of 25 000 entries. The top three countries of origin were China (18% of the total), Romania (14%) and -Germany (8%). Immigration from China more than doubled over the year, and the number of new Russian migrants rose by 75%. As in previous years, immigration from the neighbouring countries – especially from Romania – decreased, partly due to the introduction of a simplified naturalisation procedure for ethnic Hungarians in 2010 that can be conducted abroad. As a result, the neighbouring countries accounted for less than a quarter of total flows in 2014, compared with around 80% ten years ago.

In 2014, the outflow of foreigners decreased by 17% to 10 800. The main countries of origin were Romania (3 500), the Slovak Republic (700) and Ukraine (500).

According to the Hungarian Central Statistical Office, 146 000 foreigners were living in Hungary in 2014, accounting for 1.5% of the total population (a 4% increase compared to 2013). The three main countries of origin were Romania (28 600), Germany (18 800) and China (16 500).

The number of work permits, which were issued mostly to non-Europeans, decreased by half in 2014 to 4 700, partly due to administrative problems related to the introduction of the new single permit in January 2014. The top countries of origin were Ukraine (900) and China (850). In the first half of 2015, 2 600 work permits were issued. In addition, 2014 saw 340 seasonal work permits issued in the agriculture sector, a 21% rise on 2013.

In addition, the National Employment Office recorded 8 900 new registrations of foreign workers exempted from work authorisation in 2014 (+11% compared to 2013). Those flows have been declining steadily; the recent rise brings flows far below the 2009 peak (18 500 workers registered). The bulk of the registered foreign workers are EEA nationals. The remaining 10% are third-country nationals who are entitled to work in Hungary without a work permit. The main countries of origin were Romania (-3.7% from 2013 to 4 000), the Slovak Republic (1 400, twice the 2013 inflow) and the United Kingdom (-24% to 500).

In the academic year 2014/15, there were 22 000 international students in Hungary, 8% more than in the previous year. Most of them came from Germany and the neighbouring countries (part of whom were ethnic Hungarians).

Emigration continued to be an issue of concern: the latest estimations showed that 350 000 Hungarians were living abroad. In 2014 at least 31 000 left Hungary for more than a year; Germany, Austria and the United Kingdom were the main destinations, and employment the primary goal. In order to promote return migration, the government launched a pilot programme called “Youth, Come Home”.

The sudden enormous increase in the number of persons applying for asylum is a tremendous challenge for the Hungarian Government. The number of migrants attempting to cross the border and transit via Hungary to Western Europe has increased dramatically. In 2015 Hungary received the second highest number of asylum seekers in the EU, registering 15% of total first asylum applications. The number of asylum seekers increased dramatically from 18 600 in 2013 to 41 200 in 2014 and 174 400 in 2015. Kosovars were the largest group in 2014 with 21 000 requests, but in 2015 the main groups came from Syria (64 100) and Afghanistan (45 600).

According to UNHCR data, during the summer of 2015 nearly half a million people crossed through the Hungarian territory. In an attempt to stem the flow of migrants en route to the west, Hungary temporary closed its border with Croatia and deployed fences on its border with Serbia.

In terms of employment of third-country nationals, the most important policy change was the introduction, based on EU legislation, of the single application procedure in January 2014. The (former general) individual work permit process is still applicable for third-country nationals who work less than 90 days in Hungary. Third-country nationals, including stateless people possessing the single permit and residing lawfully within Hungary, now have access to non-contributory old age allowance, disability allowance and all family benefits, provided that they have been authorised to work in the country for a period exceeding six months.

In January 2014 an integration contract for refugees and beneficiaries of subsidiary protection was introduced which provides support with respect to all relevant fields of social and labour market integration. The family assistance centres of local governments play a key role in implementing the contracts. Asylum seekers are entitled to work within nine months from submission of their asylum application.

For further information

www.bmbah.hu

Recent trends in migrants’ flows and stocks

Hungary

Notes and sources are at the end of the chapter.

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395964

Ireland

Ireland registered a total net emigration of 11 600 persons in the year to April 2015, a decrease of almost 10 000 on the previous 12 months. Inward migration continued to increase, to almost 70 000 in the year to April 2015. The main immigrant groups were from the EU12 (13 400). Returning Irish nationals – showing a decrease in number since 2012 – increased slightly, to 12 100.

Emigration continued to decline, to 80 900 in the year to April 2015. Notable yearly increases can be seen in emigration to Canada and the United Kingdom. Irish nationals represented over 40% of total emigration (dropping from 40 700 in 2013/14 to 35 300 in 2014/15). Nationals of the new EU member countries (NEM) emigrated in large numbers in the first two years of the recession, but emigration has slowed considerably since: just over 8 500 nationals of the NEM emigrated in the year to 2015, the smallest number in many years.

In 2015 the total number of foreign residents reached 578 000, up from 564 300 the previous year (12.5% of the total population). The single largest group of non-nationals was from the NEM, increasing to over 237 000 in 2015. The number of third-country nationals also continued to increase – to over 193 000 – in part reflecting the continuing influx of highly skilled immigrants as well as the rising number of international students. A total of 4 900 new employment permits were issued during 2014 and a further 630 permits renewed, mainly for citizens of India (30%), the United States (12%) and Pakistan (9%).

The number of resident non-EEA nationals in possession of a valid residence permit (issued by the Garda National Immigration Bureau) decreased by 2% to 105 600. Permits on the grounds of family and education rose slightly from 2013 (by 3% and 6%, respectively), as did those on the grounds of subsidiary protection (although these last figures remained low: 290 in 2014). The main grounds remained education (39% of total valid permits), followed by family (22%) and employment (15%). The major groups were nationals of Brazil (15 100), India (11 100) and China (9 500).

There were 3 276 asylum applications in 2015 (including dependents). This number increased by more than 126% compared with 2014. The top three nationalities (Pakistan, Bangladesh and Albania) accounted for 57% of total applications received. Around 42% of decisions made at first instance were positive, compared with 51% in the EU28. At the beginning of 2015 there were a total of 1 792 cases pending for subsidiary protection applications. In total, 1 480 of these cases were finalised during 2015, with 181 grants of subsidiary protection awarded.

A number of changes were made to the employment permits regime in 2014, to facilitate access for highly qualified workers as well as to provide safeguards in case of employer exploitation. Provisions for nine new categories of employment permits became operational in October 2014. Changes to the Start-up Entrepreneur Programme (STEP) in March 2014 reduced the required minimum investment from EUR 75 000 to EUR 50 000.

A British-Irish Visa Scheme was launched in October 2014, with a new agreement regarding the sharing of immigration data between the two countries.

The International Protection Bill was signed into law on 30 December 2015. The Bill provides for introduction of a single application procedure. The single procedure will replace the current multi-layered and sequential protection application system in Ireland. It is intended to achieve the desired balance in treating asylum seekers humanely and with respect while also ensuring more efficient asylum and immigration procedures with the appropriate safeguards in place. The Bill will take effect during 2016. A working group to examine improvements to the protection process and system of direct provision, including various forms of support to applicants, was established by the government in October 2014. The report of the working group was published in June 2015. It furnished a total of 173 recommendations, many of which have implications for a number of government departments and services. In March 2014 Ireland announced a Syrian Humanitarian Admission Programme (SHAP) to assist vulnerable persons in Syria and surrounding countries affected by conflict in the region. The SHAP, which seeks to offer temporary Irish residence to vulnerable persons, either present in Syria or who have fled from Syria to surrounding countries since the outbreak of the conflict in March 2011, who have close family members residing in Ireland. A total of 119 beneficiaries were accepted into the programme. In September 2015, the government established the Irish Refugee Protection Programme, through which up to 4 000 persons will be admitted under the EU Relocation and Resettlement Programmes.

For further information

www.inis.gov.ie

www.entemp.ie/labour/workpermits

www.ria.gov.ie

Recent trends in migrants’ flows and stocks

Ireland

Notes and sources are at the end of the chapter.

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395973

Israel

Israel distinguishes two major categories of foreigners who may legally reside in Israel: immigrants with Jewish origin or ties, who may immigrate permanently to Israel under the Law of Return, as well as family members of nationals who receive legal status under the Entry into Israel Law; and foreign nationals who may enter Israel temporarily as tourists, students, foreign workers, etc. As of 30 June 2015, the total population of foreign nationals in Israel was 228 000, down from 230 300 two years earlier. This group of foreign nationals is made up mostly of temporary workers, asylum seekers and overstaying tourists, as permanent migrants entering under the Law of Return are usually granted immediate citizenship upon arrival.

According to the Central Bureau of Statistics and Ministry of Aliya and Immigrant Absorption, the number of immigrants who entered Israel under the Law of Return (excluding returning nationals and residents) increased sharply from about 19 000 in both 2011 and 2012 to 31 000 in 2015. Inflows from France increased from 3 400 in 2013 to 7 500 in 2015, and those from Ukraine more than tripled to 7 200. The other main origins in 2015 were the Russian Federation (6 700) and the United States (3 100).

As of 31 December 2015, the stock of foreign nationals who had entered Israel under a work permit stood at 93 100, up from 89 900 one year before, although 15 900 had fallen outside the legal temporary work system. The bilateral agreements signed with Romania, Bulgaria, the Republic of Moldova and Thailand -(concerning construction and agricultural workers) -contributed to this trend. The total number of foreign workers should continue rising due to higher quotas for foreign workers in agriculture and construction, and a new quota of 1 500 foreign workers from Jordan in the hotel industry in Eilat (on the top of the existing quota of 300 Jordanian daily workers). With manpower in the construction sector still tight, in 2016 Israel opened to expressions of interest from foreign contractors. Approved firms could bring up to 1 000 foreign workers to work on projects.

The number of Palestinian permanent daily workers increased from 25 000 at the end of 2011 to 48 350 by the end of 2015, while the number of Palestinian seasonal workers fluctuated over the same period to adjust to labour demand by employers (the latter number reached 7 550 by the end of 2015). The 48 350 Palestinians employed in Israel with a permanent daily work permit (compared with 42 800 one year before), were mainly employed in the construction sector, and 6 200 were employed as seasonal workers (5 300 the previous year) as of 23 December 2015.

The stock of former tourists illegally overstaying their visa was estimated at 91 000 as of 31 December 2014, up from 90 000 a year earlier.

Irregular border crossings, which peaked in 2011 at 1 500 monthly, have largely ceased since mid-2012, due to enforcement measures including long-term detention and the building of a fence along the Israeli-Egyptian border. As of 31 December 2015, a total of 43 200 irregular border crossers (down from 56 100 as of 31 December 2012) were estimated to reside in Israel, most of whom were from Eritrea and Sudan and entitled to group protection. Part of this decline is due to increased voluntary returns and resettlement in African third countries. Ninety-eight hundred persons, mostly Sudanese and Eritreans, were voluntarily returned or resettled in 2014 and 2015. During 2014 and 2015, about 10 200 people applied for asylum, most of whom were from Sudan and Eritrea.

Over the past few years, several bilateral agreements have been signed between Israel and partner countries regulating the entry of temporary foreign workers to Israel. In 2015 a pilot programme for bilateral recruitment of foreign caregivers was agreed with Nepal. In 2014 Israel signed Work and Holiday Visa Agreements with several countries, including Australia, Korea and Germany, in addition to the existing 2010 agreement with New Zealand.

In December 2014 a new amendment to the Infiltration Law (1954) was passed, which regulated the detention of all new infiltrators to Israel in a closed facility for the duration of one year, as well as the detention of those eligible for group protection in an open facility for no longer than 20 months. In August 2015, the High Court changed the time frame to no longer than 12 months.

For further information

www.cbs.gov.il

www.economy.gov.il

www.piba.gov.il

www.moia.gov.il

Recent trends in migrants’ flows and stocks

Israel

Notes and sources are at the end of the chapter.

Source: Information on data for Israel: http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932315602.

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395982

Italy

Migration inflows to Italy continued to fall in 2014 while outflows continued to grow, especially outflows of Italian citizens. The migration inflow stood at 277 630 in 2014 (-9.7% compared with 2013), and was composed of 248 360 foreigners (-11%) and 29 270 Italian citizens (+3%). Nationals of Romania (50 700), Morocco (17 640), China (15 830) and Bangladesh (12 670) were the largest groups of foreign citizens. The migration outflow  grew from 125 730 persons (including 82 100 Italians) in 2013 to 136 330 (including 88 860 Italians) in 2014. Emigration of Italian citizens more than doubled between 2010 and 2014. Their main destination countries were the United Kingdom, Germany, Switzerland and France.

About 5 million foreigners were residing in Italy in January 2015 (8.2% of the total population), up from 4.9 million in 2014. Regions with the highest shares of foreigners (more then 10%) were Emilia Romagna, Lombardy, Umbria, Latium and Tuscany. Almost 30% of foreign residents were EU citizens. The largest groups were nationals of Romania (1.1 million), Albania (490 480), Morocco (449 060), China (265 820) and Ukraine (226 060).

New residence permits issued in 2014 totalled 248 320, less than half the annual number between 2008 and 2010. Permits for family reasons issued in 2014 numbered 101 420 (41%) and were most frequently issued to nationals of Morocco (13 560), Albania (9 500) and China (7 520). New residence permits for work reasons were most frequently issued to nationals of Bangladesh (6 620), India (5 660) and Morocco (5 620) and totalled 57 000 in 2014.

Mainly due to persisting high levels of unemployment among foreign-born workers (16.6% and 16.3% in 2013 and 2014, respectively), quotas for new immigrant workers were accordingly set at low levels compared with previous years. Admissions for seasonal work in 2015 and 2016 were set at 13 000 (2 000 less than in 2014), restricted to specific categories and nationalities, and only to the needs of the agricultural and tourist sectors. Fifteen hundred inflows were kept for multi-year seasonal clearance, or were workers who had already entered Italy to provide seasonal employment for at least two consecutive years. In addition, 2015 and 2016 immigration quotas for non-seasonal workers were set at 5 500 and 3 600, respectively; 12 350 and 14 250 changed in status.

In the academic year 2014/15, 70 340 foreign students were enrolled at Italian universities; the countries of origin were mainly Albania (15%), China and Romania (10% each). Foreign students were primarily studying economics, statistics and engineering (totalling 36%), socio-political affairs and linguistics (11% each), and medical studies (10%).

According to the UNHCR, over 150 000 irregular migrants reached Italian shores in 2015. During the first quarter of 2016, 14 500 arrivals at sea have been recorded (+42% compared to the first quarter of 2015). The main nationalities were Nigerian, Gambian and Senegalese. There were 83 250 asylum applications in 2015 (including dependents), i.e. 7% of the applications received in the EU28. This number increased by more than 31% over 2014. The top three nationalities (Nigerian, Pakistani and Gambian) accounted for 43% of total applications received. Around 42% of decisions made at first instance were positive, compared with 51% in the EU28.

An additional funding scheme has been provided by the Ministry of the Interior to local authorities, which could provide temporary reception services to unaccompanied minors, regardless of whether or not they are seeking asylum. In 2015, around 1 500 new accommodation spaces have been provided. New procedures for the reception of asylum seekers and unaccompanied minors were adopted, transposing EU directives into national law. The procedure for granting an EU Blue Card has been simplified.

In October 2015, reform of citizenship provisions was approved by the Chamber of Deputies. According to the bill, two additional groups of foreigners will be entitled to acquire Italian citizenship: 1) children born in Italy of parents who have a long-term EU residence permit; 2) foreign-born children who arrived in Italy before their twelfth birthday and who have completed at least five years of schooling in Italy. In April 2016, the bill was still under discussion by the Senate.

A “Baby Bonus” has been extended to long-term foreign residents. Families with children born or adopted between 2015 and 2017 are entitled to receive EUR 960 per year, paid monthly, for up to three years.

For further information

www.interno.it

www.istat.it

www.lavoro.gov.it

Recent trends in migrants’ flows and stocks

Italy

Notes and sources are at the end of the chapter.

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395991

Japan

The number of foreign residents reached a record level at the end of 2015, with 2.23 million people registered. The largest group was of Chinese nationality with 665 800 people (30% of total foreign residents), followed by 457 800 South Koreans and 229 600 Filipinos.

Overall, 336 500 foreign nationals entered Japan in 2014 (excluding temporary visitors and foreign nationals with re-entry permits), a 10% increase on 2013. This brings immigration back to its 2008 level. The number of new arrivals entering for the purpose of work followed the same trend, reaching 67 100 in 2014 (up 5% on 2013). Among these, 53% were admitted as entertainers (down 5% on 2013). Intra-company transfers (+15%) and engineers (+42%) each accounted for 11% of the total flow, and a further 10% were specialists in humanities/international services. Not counting entertainers and intra-company transfers, the number of new labour migrants increased by 20%, from 20 500 in 2013 to 24 600 in 2014. The number of dependents accompanying foreign workers increased by 7% to 20 400, and 82 500 entered for training as technical interns (+22%).

According to the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare, the number of foreign workers in Japan increased from 788 000 at the end of October 2014 to 908 000 one year later. In 2015, the top three origin countries all saw increases: +10 700 to 322 500 Chinese workers; +48 800 to 110 000 Vietnamese; and +15 000 to 106 500 Filipinos. By legal status, 167 300 worked in professional or technical fields; 367 200 were registered on the basis of their status; 167 700 were foreign students engaged in part-time work; and 168 300 were technical interns.

According to JASSO (Japan Student Services Organization), in May 2015 152 100 foreign students were in higher education institutions in Japan, a 9% increase on the year before. This increase was driven by a larger number of foreign students in professional training colleges. In addition, 56 300 foreign students were enrolled in Japanese language courses, a 25% increase over the previous year. Chinese nationals comprised 45% of the total, down from 58% in 2013, while Vietnamese nationals comprised 19% of the total, up from 8% in 2013. Overall, the great majority of students were from the Asian region.

The number of applications for refugee status increased sharply in 2014 (+53%) and 2015 (+52%), reaching 7 586 in 2015. Some of those who do not qualify for refugee status are allowed to stay on humanitarian grounds (79 in 2015). In 2015, five origin countries (Nepal, Indonesia, Turkey, Myanmar and Viet Nam) accounted for over six in ten applications for refugee status. Japan accepted 11 319 Indo-Chinese refugees (originating from Viet Nam, Laos and Cambodia) from 1978 to 2005. In addition, Japan has accepted the resettlement of a total of 105 Myanmarese refugees comprising 24 families as of 2015.

As of the beginning of 2016, 62 800 foreign nationals were overstaying, up 4.7% compared with the previous year. The main nationalities were Koreans (13 400), Chinese (8 700), and Thai (6 000).

In September 2015 the Fifth Basic Plan for Immigration Control was formulated, producing guidelines for immigration control administration and other necessary policies. The five-year plan addresses key issues such as smooth acceptance of foreign nationals vitalising the Japanese economy and society; revisions of the Technical Intern Training System; and the promotion of appropriate and prompt protection of refugees and measures against illegal residents.

In June 2014, an amendment to the Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act established a new status of residence with an indefinite period of stay for highly skilled foreign professionals; the amendment was enacted in April 2015.

Under economic partnership agreements concluded with Indonesia, the Philippines and Viet Nam, Japan has accepted candidates for certified care workers from these countries since 2008, 2009 and 2014, respectively. To promote their activities in Japan, the Japanese Government reviewed the notification of qualifications and expanded the range of facilities that can accept them.

A programme for admitting foreign nationals conducting housekeeping services was introduced, allowing specified agencies to recruit them to provide these services to households in a National Strategic Special Zone, Kanagawa prefecture, with possible expansion.

In April 2015, emergency and temporary measures were introduced to accept former trainees in the construction and ship building sectors as employees in those sectors. These measures are in part intended to provide labour for the preparation for the 2020 Olympics.

For further information

www.immi-moj.go.jp

www.mhlw.go.jp

www8.cao.go.jp/teiju-portal/eng/index.html

Recent trends in migrants’ flows and stocks

Japan

Notes and sources are at the end of the chapter.

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933396003

Korea

Korea has experienced positive net migration of non-Koreans since the mid-2000s. In 2014, net migration was largely positive, reaching 136 500 compared to 92 400 the previous year. Labour migrants plateaued at 60% of all incoming foreign nationals, while students comprised 13% of entries and family migrants decreased to 10% of total inflows. The number of returning Korean nationals continued falling during 2014 but at a smaller pace, reversing their net emigration to a surplus of 5 100 persons.

The stock of foreign residents in Korea has been increasing steadily. The number of long-term foreign migrants (residing more than 90 days) increased from 1.38 million at the end of 2014 to 1.47 million one year later. Among these, the number of registered foreigners increased from 1.09 million to 1.14 million, while the number of registered ethnic Koreans increased from 286 400 to 324 800. The number of short-term stayers residing in Korea for less than 90 days also increased, from 419 700 to 431 700.

The stock of employment-based migration increased sharply, by 12% in 2014 and a further 1.3% in 2015, bringing the level of foreign workers (625 100) up to its 2011 level (595 100). The number of low skilled workers entering with an employment permit (E-9) decreased for the first time since 2009 to 51 600 (due to a reduction of the quota in 2014 to 53 000). Overall, 276 000 E-9 visa holders were registered in 2014, mainly working in manufacture. The H-2 visa allows working visits by ethnic Koreans (that quota was stable at 303 000). The number of new H-2 visas granted reached 278 600 in 2014 and 259 500 in 2015. In 2015, there were about 285 300 H-2 visa holders present in Korea, the majority of whom were Chinese nationals. For skilled employment, foreign language instructors (E-2) and special activity (E-7) visas remained the most common entry channels, with 7 000 and 3 900 new entrants, respectively in 2014.

Since 2010, the number of foreign students in degree programmes decreased steadily to 60 500 in 2013, but increased again over the following years to reach 66 300 in 2015 (but down its 2011 level). By contrast, language course students have been increasing continuously since 2010, reaching 30 000 in 2015. Chinese students accounted for two-thirds of all foreign students in 2014, followed by Vietnamese (6%) and Mongolians (4%).

The number of marriage migrants who had not yet naturalised reached 151 600 in 2015. Most marriage migrants were female. China was the main country of origin for foreign spouses (40%), followed by Viet Nam (26%), Japan (8%) and the Philippines (7%).

The number of asylum seekers has been growing over recent years, from 2 900 persons in 2014 to 5 700 in 2015. Main countries of origin were Pakistan (1 100), Egypt (800) and Syria (400). In 2015, 105 asylum seekers were recognised as refugees and 194 were granted humanitarian stay status.

The total number of unauthorised migrants who overstayed their visas rose slightly to 208 800 during 2014. Unauthorised status was more likely for low skilled labour migrants.

The procedure for an employer to notify a change in employment status for his or her low-skilled foreign worker (E-9, H-2) was simplified. The annual income requirement allowing high-tech professionals with at least a bachelor’s degree to acquire a permanent F-5 visa was lowered, from three times the Korean GNI per capita to that figure itself. With the introduction of a point system, the ways to access permanent resident status (F-5) have been diversified for professional foreign workers.

In 2015, a point system for selecting low-skilled foreign workers (for an E-9 visa) was pilot-tested and should be implemented in 2017. The points are based on Korean linguistic proficiency, work experience and occupation-related skill levels. The quotas of low-skilled foreign workers for the sectors of small establishments with high growth potential were increased by 20%. The quotas of these workers can now be adjusted across sectors, depending on how the foreign labour demand evolves in each sector. The required search duration for a domestic worker before hiring low-skilled foreign workers was shortened, from two weeks to one week for the sectors of agriculture, livestock and fishery.

The visa issue process for foreign students has been simplified. Moreover, foreign students are authorised to work 25 hours per week (five hours more than previously) during study.

For further information

www.eps.go.kr

www.immigration.go.kr

www.kostat.go.kr

Recent trends in migrants’ flows and stocks

Korea

Notes and sources are at the end of the chapter.

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933396014

Latvia

Between 2012 and 2014 the population of Latvia fell by 38 000 to 1 990 000, mainly because of emigration. Net emigration amounted to 8 700 in 2014 compared with 14 200 in 2013. In 2014 10 300 immigrants entered Latvia, 2 100 more than in 2013. About one-third of them (3 900) were Latvian returnees. Russians (3 190) were the largest group of foreign immigrants, followed by Ukrainians (650) and Poles (190). Emigrant numbers totalled 19 000, 3 500 fewer than the year before.

The resident non-Latvian population (composed of non-citizens and foreign nationals) slightly decreased, from 304 800 at the beginning of 2014 to 298 400 (15% of the total population) at the beginning of 2015. Non-citizens of Latvia, mainly longstanding residents from other parts of the Former USSR, comprised 81% of the non-Latvian and 12% of the total population. Their numbers have decreased from 730 000 in 1995 to 242 300 due to mortality, emigration and naturalisation. Russian nationals were the second largest group of foreign residents (41 900 at the beginning of 2015).

In 2015, 88 600 foreign nationals (around 4% of the total population) held residence permits in Latvia; of these, 15 200 were EU nationals. Three in five foreign nationals had a permanent permit; most of those in this category were citizens of the Russian Federation. The top three origin countries of temporary residents were the Russian Federation (13 500), Ukraine (3 800) and Germany (2 000). Compared with the stocks at the end of 2014, the number of temporary residents increased by 10% while the number of holders of a permanent residence permit remained relatively stable (+2%).

Recipients of temporary residence permits numbered 7 200, a decrease of 31% on 2014; part of the explanation lies in changes in the Investor visa law. The number of permits for investors fell dramatically, from 2 400 principal applicants in 2014 to 480 in 2015, and from 3 200 dependants in 2014 to 900 in 2015. The number of labour migrants rose in 2015, from 1 400 to 2 100, of whom 12% were highly skilled. Labour migrants altogether accounted for 29% of inflows, and their family members an additional 8%. Most labour migrants were from Ukraine, Belarus and the Russian Federation.

In 2015, 1 570 initial residence permits were issued for study purposes (1 050 in 2014, and so a 50% increase). Uzbekistan, India and Germany together accounted for over half of new student permits.

In 2015 there were 330 asylum applications (including dependents). This number decreased by 10% from 2014. The top three nations of origin (Iraq, Viet Nam, Ukraine) accounted for 63% of the total number of applications. There were only 20 decisions in 2015, 12% of which were positive.

In 2015, the Latvian Government approved the resettlement and relocation of 281 persons from Greece, Italy and third countries. In December, an Action Plan was introduced for the reception and integration of refugees.

In light of the demographic impact of emigration, an amendment to the Citizenship Law, which came into force in October 2013, allows dual citizenship as a way of maintaining ties with the country’s diaspora. On 31 December 2014 there were around 35 000 persons who held dual citizenship.

Amendments to the Immigration Law came into force on 1 January 2014. These provided more specific definitions of the return decision and removal order for third-country nationals and citizens of the European Union. A Register of Returned Foreigners and Entry Bans was launched in 2015, to ensure comprehensive control over irregular migration for officers of the Office of Citizenship and Migration Affairs and the State Border Guard.

On 1 January 2015, amendments made to the Immigration Law came into force, with respect to the investor’s residence permit, stipulating that a foreigner can be granted a temprary residence permit for up to five years if he/she invests a minimum of EUR 250 000.

In May 2015, Parliament voted for changes to the Repatriation law; these aimed to facilitate and support the return of Latvian citizens and people of Latvian and origin, and aid them in the adaptation period. The changes made to the law extend the policy of support, which was previously limited to two generations. There are also changes in the definition of people to whom the status of repatriated family member applies, including spouses, children under the age of 21 and dependent parents. The policy applies only to those who emigrated before 1990, are underage, or were born outside Latvia.

For further information

www.pmlp.gov.lv

www.csb.gov.lv

www.emn.lv

Recent trends in migrants’ flows and stocks

Latvia

Notes and sources are at the end of the chapter.

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933396025

Lithuania

The Lithuanian population numbers have continued to fall, from 3 million at the 2011 census to an estimated 2.88 million at the beginning of 2016. The number of foreign nationals residing in Lithuania increased by 0.8% over the past year to 41 138 at the beginning of 2016, equivalent to 1.42% of the total population. Almost half of all foreign residents (18 262) were from non-EEA countries and held long-term residence permits.

Lithuania has one of the highest emigration rates in Europe. An upsurge was noticed in 2015, with 44 600 emigrants compared to 36 600 emigrants in 2014. This figure includes only declared emigration while pre-2011 figures estimate non-declared emigration as well suggesting that the post-2010 increase may be even higher. More than 80% of all emigrants in 2015 were Lithuanians. Among Lithuanians, the United Kingdom remains the main destination in 2015 (43%), followed by Germany (7%), Ireland (7%) and Norway (6%). Forty-nine per cent of all emigrants in 2015 were between 20 and 34 years of age.

Immigration fell from 24 300 in 2014 to 22 130 in 2015, but was substantially higher than the 5 200 figure in 2010. Eighty-three per cent (18 400 persons) were returning Lithuanian nationals. Most of the 3 800 foreign nationals were citizens of Ukraine (31%), whose share increased by one-third compared with 2013, followed by Russians (19%), whose share fell by over one-third compared with 2013, and Belarusians (10%). EEA nationals accounted for 22% of the flow in 2015. Most people immigrating in 2015 had previously resided in the United Kingdom (40%), Norway (9%) and Ireland (9%). Taken together, the proportion of immigrants from the Russian Federation, Ukraine, and Belarus decreased from 15% in 2014 to 13% in 2015. The majority of foreign immigrants in 2015 came for economic reasons (60%), followed by family reunification (23%) and study (13%). With immigration falling and emigration rising, net emigration rose from 12 300 in 2014 to 22 400 in 2015, a level on a par with that seen in 2012.

The number of work permits issued to non-EU/EFTA nationals rose from 5 400 in 2014 to 6 900 in 2015, but their share in total employment remains marginal. Non-EU/EFTA nationals are mainly employed in transport (77% of all work permits in 2015), manufacturing, and accommodation and catering. Most permits were issued to nationals of the neighbouring countries: Ukraine (64%) and Belarus (25%), followed by the Republic of Moldova (3%). In addition, 197 EU Blue Cards were issued and 89 renewed to highly qualified non-EU/EFTA nationals.

After an increase in 2014, the number of asylum applications dropped again, by 59% to 291 in 2015. Ukrainians were the largest applicant group (22%), followed by Georgians (16%) and Russians (14%). Of 351 decisions taken in 2015, 30% led to the granting of refugee status or subsidiary protection. In 2015 a governmental commission was established to co-ordinate relocation and resettlement to Lithuania. In 2015, six persons were relocated to Lithuania under the EU relocation scheme.

Fifteen hundred foreigners were found to be in Lithuania illegally in 2015, most of them nationals of Belarus (32%), the Russian Federation (19%) and Ukraine (17%).

Several migration policy changes were introduced in 2015 that aimed at encouraging economic development and innovation by attracting selected highly skilled migrants. First, international students who have completed their studies or training in Lithuania are no longer required to provide evidence of work experience to take up employment in their field of study. Second, former students as well as some temporary workers can change status by applying for a highly skilled residence permit without leaving Lithuania. Third, the procedure for recognition of qualifications was simplified.

In addition, several proposals were made to facilitate employment procedures for highly skilled migrants. In particular, it was proposed to suppress the labour market test for immigrants who apply for a job specified in the shortage occupation list; for former students trained in Lithuania; and for posted workers hired by a foreign enterprise and coming to work for a Lithuanian enterprise for less than a year.

In 2016, the proposal to issue temporary residence permits to foreigners who engage in innovative business (start-ups) that meet all specified conditions was approved. However, requirements for all foreigners applying for a temporary residence permit were tightened, notably regarding criminal and security checks.

For further information

www.migracija.lt

www.stat.gov.lt/en

www.123.emn.lt/en/home

Recent trends in migrants’ flows and stocks

Lithuania

Notes and sources are at the end of the chapter.

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933396034

Luxembourg

The migration inflow to Luxembourg has continued to increase, reaching 22 300 in 2014 after 21 100 in 2013, while the migration outflow has grown moderately to 11 300. Net immigration stood at 11 000, the highest level in recent years (a 7% increase on 2013). Around two-thirds of the net increase comprised EU and other European citizens. The highest net immigration was recorded for French citizens, followed by Portuguese and Italian citizens.

There were 3 100 first residence permits delivered to third-country nationals in 2014 (down by 18%), 5 900 renewals and 800 long-term resident authorisations. The largest categories of first residence permits granted were family, salaried work and European Blue Cards. The main countries of origin of those receiving first issuance of residence permits (excluding long-term residence permits) were the United States, China and India. Applications for international protection have risen, while returns have continued to decrease. EU/EEA and Swiss citizens have to request a residence certificate. In 2014, 14 900 such certificates were delivered (down from 16 100 the previous year).

As of January 2015, 259 000 foreigners were residing in Luxembourg (+3.9% compared with the previous year), accounting for 46% of the population. EU citizens made up 86% of all foreigners and 39% of the total population. The increase in the population is mostly due to the immigration of EU citizens. The top five groups by nationality were from the EU: Portuguese (92 000), French (39 000), Italian and Belgian (19 000 each) and German (13 000) nationals accounted for 70% of the total foreign population. The main non-EU countries of origin were Montenegro (4 000), Cabo Verde (3 000) and China (2 500). The United States showed the highest increase in 2014 (+14%), followed by China (+12%) and Cabo Verde (+5%).

In 2014, EU foreign citizens accounted for 65% of the workforce (including self-employed), while third-country nationals represented 4%. Cross-border workers from Belgium, France and Germany represented 42% of the workforce.

At the end of 2014, the University of Luxembourg registered 6 300 students, 45% of whom were EU foreign citizens and 11% were third-country nationals. The Directorate of Immigration issued 200 first student visas for third-country nationals in 2014, mainly to Chinese, Russian and Indian students.

According to Eurostat data, the number of asylum seekers more than doubled in 2015 to 2 400. First requests from Syrians (630) and Iraqis (550) accounted for half of the total. Requests from Afghans (220), Kosovars (190) and Albanians (130) followed. A quarter of decisions made at first instance in 2015 were positive, compared with 51% on average in the EU. Less than 5% of decisions were to grant subsidiary protection.

Following a change of government at the end of 2013, several legislative changes were announced. These include the establishment of two new categories of residence permits for investors and business managers, and the creation of a legal framework for them. With regard to the existing Blue Card, the government is considering setting up a fast-track procedure for highly qualified migrants and for transferred workers.

Legislative amendments were adopted in December 2015 to transpose Directives 2013/32/EU and 2013/33/EU of the Common European Asylum System into national law. Reforms aim at improving the system to make it more efficient and reliable whilst enhancing the rights of vulnerable persons.

The government consulted the public on three key constitutional reforms through a referendum on 7 June 2015. The most debated question concerned the voting rights of foreign residents. This option was rejected, and the government refocused its efforts on a possible reform of the law on nationality through different options, to ease the conditions for obtaining Luxembourg citizenship. In that context, the Minister of Justice has officially introduced in March 2016 a new draft law on Luxembourg citizenship in the legislative process

For further information

www.mae.lu

www.statistiques.public.lu

www.olai.public.lu

Recent trends in migrants’ flows and stocks

Luxembourg

Notes and sources are at the end of the chapter.

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933396047

Mexico

Immigration to Mexico over the past two decades has been increasing sharply. Preliminary estimates for 2014 put the stock of foreign-born population at 939 900, down from 991 200 in 2013 but still almost twice its 2000 level.

In 2014, 43 500 foreigners were issued a new permanent residence permit and 51 300 a new temporary one. These figures represented record levels over the past ten years; the exception is the historic peak of 60 700 in 2013, primarily due to legislative changes in 2012 that made it easier for temporary residents to obtain permanent residence. The composition of permanent flows has changed substantially: family grounds increased from 39.6% in 2013 to 48.4% of total flows in 2014; work reasons fell from 27.2% to 23.7%, its lowest share since 2010; and humanitarian reasons increased slightly from 0.4 to 0.8%. Over the past five years the composition of permanent flows by nationality remained stable, with the United States, Colombia and Cuba as the principal countries of origin.

Work remained the primary reason for temporary migration (42%), although family (24.5%) has been rising since 2013. Student temporary residents (21%) showed a slightly smaller proportion than in 2013. Humanitarian reasons marginally increased, reaching 1.2% in 2014. Over the five-year period to 2014, the four main flows of temporary migrants consisted of immigrants from the United States, Colombia, Spain and Cuba. The flows from the United States have been diminishing, partly because more US citizens have been delivered permanent documents at arrival. Flows of Indian citizens have been increasing, although they only counted for 4% of the total in 2014.

Around 15 400 documents for border workers were granted in 2014, down from 15 800 in 2013; the loss was largely due to a lack of competitiveness in the primary sector. The largest group was employed in agriculture, and most of those workers came from Guatemala and (to a lesser extent) Belize. Men, mostly aged between 20 and 29 years old, accounted for 84% of the total flow.

In 2014, 107 800 foreigners were deported from Mexico, of whom 18 200 were under the age of 18. Most of these minors were from Central America: 44% from Honduras, 34% from Guatemala and 21% from El Salvador. In 2014 the number of unaccompanied minors deported by the Mexican authorities doubled to 8 300.

It is estimated that slightly over 12 million -Mexicans resided abroad in 2014, a proportion -equivalent to 10% of the total population, with 11.9 million Mexican-born in the United States. The growth rate of the Mexican-born population in the United States has demonstrated considerable stagnation in recent years, a trend that continued into 2014.

In 2014, the number of asylum seekers who were recognised as refugees almost doubled to 450 persons, most of them from Central America. In October 2014, the Law on Refugees and Complementary Protection was amended to become the Law on Refugees, Complementary Protection and Political Asylum. As a consequence of this change, political asylum acquired a separate definition from refugee status: it now includes any foreign person persecuted for political reasons or political offences whose life, freedom, or security is endangered. Adding this category to Mexican legislation widened the scope of international protection.

In December 2014, the General Law on the Rights of Children and Youth was adopted. It recognises the importance of special protection measures for young migrants, accompanied or unaccompanied. The law also institutionalises shelters for unaccompanied migrant children as well as a Federal Solicitor for Unaccompanied Child Migrants.

In June 2015, the government introduced a measure to facilitate enrolment into the national education system of children and youth coming back to Mexico. They will be authorised to enrol at elementary and high school levels without having to provide birth or study certificates.

In November 2015, Mexico hosted the Regional Conference on Migration. This meeting gathered the governmental migration authorities from 11 countries, from Panama to Canada, at a vice-ministerial level.

An ad hoc Temporary Migration Regularization Program was put in place in 2015. To benefit from this measure, foreign nationals must have entered the country before November 2012. Those who are granted temporary residence will be able to apply for a work permit.

For further information

www.politicamigratoria.gob.mx

www3.inegi.org.mx/sistemas/temas/default.aspx?s=est&c=17484

Recent trends in migrants’ flows and stocks

Mexico

Notes and sources are at the end of the chapter.

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933396059

Netherlands

In 2015, net immigration continued increasing, to 56 000 persons. While the number of emigrants was relatively stable, the number of migrants coming to the Netherlands increased sharply by nearly 20 000 relative to 2014. Of the 148 000 persons leaving the Netherlands in 2014, 64 420 were Dutch nationals. Their most frequent destinations were the neighbouring countries, especially Belgium and Germany.

Inflows of foreign nationals rose from 122 300 in 2013 to 139 350 in 2014. More than half of the new immigrants were EU citizens in 2014. New EU member states are well represented among the countries with the fastest growing numbers of immigrants, particularly Poland (23 800 in 2014, +16% compared with 2013), Bulgaria (5 200, +15%) and Italy (5 200, +21%). Inflows of Syrians increased sharply, from less than 1 000 to 6 900; the increase in new Indian immigrants was moderate (4 500 to 5 000 in 2014).

Based on data provided by the Immigration and Naturalisation Service (IND), 11 260 positive decisions were taken for highly skilled employment (knowledge and talent category) in 2014, a slight increase from the previous year (10 300). Most highly skilled workers were Indian, US or Chinese nationals. Work permits for other migrant labour categories dropped from 2 750 in 2013 to 1 700 in 2014, with the same leading nationalities. Decisions for family and relatives also dropped from 27 600 to 24 300; Indians, Turks and US citizens were the leading nationalities. Finally, the number of residence permit for study remained relatively stable at 12 750, with China, the United States and Indonesia as main countries of origin. In order to attract more international students, in July 2014 the government announced additional funding for scholarships for students from outside the European Union.

According to data provided by Eurostat, the number of asylum seekers (including dependents) nearly doubled in 2015 to 43 000 persons. This represented more than 3% of the applications received in the EU28. The top three nationalities (Syrian, Eritrean, Iraqi) accounted for 60% of total applications. Around 80% of decisions made at first instance in 2015 were positive, compared with 51% in the EU28. In addition, around 800 refugees benefited from the resettlement programme in 2014, 50% more than the year before. Most invited refugees were from Syria and Eritrea.

In order to attract innovative entrepreneurs to the Netherlands, a Start-up Visa was introduced on 1 January 2015. Applicants must have a sponsor (facilitator) with a good track record in supporting start-ups (in accelerator or incubator programmes), and can obtain a residence permit for a one-year period during which they can develop their innovative product or service.

Several policy changes in the field of asylum took place in 2014, often directly related to the implementation of the Common European Asylum System and aimed at introducing more efficient admission procedures. They include accelerated processing, earlier submission of claims at the initial registration process, and more favourable conditions for the family reunification of those who were granted refugee status. New guidelines were also implemented to improve the position of LGBT people (lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender) in the asylum procedure.

In response to the rapid increase in asylum seekers, especially from Syria and Eritrea, the Central Agency for the Reception of Asylum Seekers (COA), increased the capacity of existing reception centres and opened new (temporary/emergency) ones. In 2014, twenty new reception centres were created with a total capacity of nearly 10 000 beds, and in 2015 the COA sought to expand that capacity. The government also made more funding available for the return of failed asylum seekers.

From January 2015, additional measures were introduced to combat forced marriages, including among others a national centre of expertise, more decisive actions of consular staff at embassies in risk countries, and adjustment of rules for granting permission to provide travel documents to minor persons who have been left abroad.

A number of changes to the civic integration procedure, which is compulsory for many migrants, were introduced in November 2015. Courses to prepare for the civic integration exam need to be financed by the migrants themselves, with some exceptions for asylum seekers and some possibilities for other migrants to obtain loans.

Beginning in March 2016, the same rules apply to the job search years of international students who graduate in the Netherlands or abroad: they are eligible for this type of permit for three years after graduation and may take up any work during the search year.

For further information

www.ind.nl

www.cbs.nl

Recent trends in migrants’ flows and stocks

Netherlands

Notes and sources are at the end of the chapter.

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933396062

New Zealand

There was a high net migration gain in 2014/15 due to a low net migration loss of New Zealand citizens (5 600) combined with a large net gain of non-New Zealand citizens (63 900). There were net gains in migrants from India (12 000), China (8 000), the United Kingdom (4 300) and the Philippines (4 300). Annual departures of New Zealand citizens to Australia have declined since 2011/12, while the number of New Zealand citizens returning from Australia has increased. The net loss of New Zealand citizens to Australia in 2014/15 was well down from the net loss of 12 300 persons in 2013/14 and 32 700 in 2012/13.

In 2014/15, 43 100 persons were approved for a resident visa, down 2% from 44 000 in 2013/14. Driving the decrease in residence approvals in 2014/15 was the Family stream, down 14% to 15 200. The number of people approved in the Skilled Migrant category increased 4% compared with 2013/14, to 21 170. Residence approvals through the business categories have been increasing sharply by 38% and 18% over the past two fiscal years, although representing only 2% of total approvals.

China was the largest source country of residence approvals in 2014/15 (17%, down 2% compared with the previous year). Of the Chinese residence approvals, most were through the Skilled Migrant category (32%) and the Parent category (31%, down 29%). Other top source countries in 2014/15 were India (16%) and the United Kingdom (11%).

Of around 254 000 temporary entry approvals (excluding visitors) in 2014/15, a total of 170 800 people were granted a work visa, an increase of 10% over 2013/14. Essential Skills visas were issued to 28 500 persons (labour market-tested temporary workers), an 8% increase from the previous year. Admissions for seasonal work increased 7% in 2014/15 from the previous year, to 11 700 people. As regards the non-labour market-tested work visa categories, 61 400 temporary workers were approved under Working Holiday Scheme, an increase of 12%, and 29 300 temporary workers were approved under -Family policy, a 9% increase. The number of people admitted under the Study to Work Policy increased from 11 800 to 13 700 between 2013/14 and 2014/15. Driving this increase was the numbers admitted under the “Post-study work visa – open” (+53% to 9 600) while those under the “Post-study work visa – employer assisted” dropped by 23% to 4 100.

In 2014/15, 48 030 new international students were approved to study in New Zealand, an increase of 23% from 2013/14. New international students made up 57% of all international students. China has remained the largest source country of international students (27%), followed by India (23%) and South Korea (6%). The numbers from India continue to rise sharply.

In the past decade, the number of people seeking asylum in New Zealand has decreased significantly. In 2014/15, 328 people sought asylum in New Zealand, compared with 711 in 2003/04. China, Fiji and Pakistan were the largest source countries of asylum seekers (8% each). Refugee status was granted in 100 cases (35% of decisions). In addition, in 2014/15, 900 people were granted residence through the quota programme, compared with 760 in 2013/14.

The Immigration Amendment Act 2015 was given royal assent on 6 May 2015. Of particular note were the changes to address migrant exploitation and strengthen search powers for immigration officers.

Essential Skills work visas are subject to a labour market test to ensure that employers have made genuine attempts to hire New Zealanders and that suitable New Zealanders are not available to take up the vacancy offered to a migrant. There were a number of changes related to this in 2014/15, including removal of the labour market test for people who needed to apply for a temporary Essential Skills work visa while their Skilled Migrant Category (SMC) residence application was being assessed. Changes were also made to the Essential Skills work instructions in support of the Canterbury rebuild and to mitigate the exploitation of lower skilled workers. These changes extend the duration of work visas, allow work for multiple employers and introduce a new accreditation policy for labour hire companies seeking to employ workers. Other changes were made to the Essential Skills work instructions and related labour market test. The Recognised Seasonal Employer (RSE) limit was increased, and a unilateral change to all Working Holiday Schemes allows working holidaymakers to study for up to six months while in New Zealand.

Online forms were released allowing electronic submission of most student, work and visitor visa applications. In addition, the online immigration health screening system eMedical was implemented in November 2014.

For further information

www.immigration.govt.nz

www.employment.govt.nz/

www.investmentnow.govt.nz/index.html

Recent trends in migrants’ flows and stocks

New Zealand

Notes and sources are at the end of the chapter.

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933396078

Norway

From 2013 to 2014, total immigration to Norway (excluding asylum seekers) decreased by 5 800, to 70 000. Eighty-eight per cent of this immigration involved foreigners – the majority from EU countries, whose share decreased slightly to 58%. Poland continued to be the primary country of origin (9 900 new immigrants), followed by Sweden (4 600) and Lithuania (4 400). There were notable increases in immigration from Eritrea (2 800), Syria (2 100) and India (1 800). In 2014, 23 000 foreigners emigrated from Norway, a decrease of 1 700 compared with the previous year. The largest emigration flows in 2014 were of citizens of Sweden (3 800), Poland (2 900) and Lithuania (1 400). Net immigration of foreigners fell to 38 100, 3 800 fewer than the previous year and the lowest since 2006. At the beginning of 2015, 669 400 immigrants and 135 600 persons born in Norway to immigrant parents were registered as residents, representing 15.6% of the population – an increase of 0.7 percentage point from 2014.

Labour immigration in 2014 was down some 20% from peak levels in 2011, but is still considered high compared to levels prior to 2004. Over 21 000 non-Nordic labour migrants settled in Norway in 2014, which corresponds to roughly 43% of all new non-Nordic immigrants to the country. Meanwhile approximately 3 800 Nordic citizens immigrated to Norway; the vast majority of them were employed. Around 90% of labour immigrants came from Europe, the majority of whom were from central and Eastern Europe. The number of persons coming to work in Norway on short-term stays has continued to increase, particularly from EU countries in Eastern Europe.

Family-related immigration represented 32% of non-Nordic immigration in 2014, the same share as in the previous year. The total number of new family-related residence permits granted to third-country nationals decreased slightly, from 11 900 in 2013 to 11 100 in 2014. In addition, 11 200 non-Nordic EU citizens declared that family ties were the basis for immigration when they registered their move. In 2014, the major third countries of origin for family-related residence permits were Somalia, the Philippines and India. Major non-Nordic EU/EFTA countries of origin were Poland, Lithuania and Romania.

In 2014, 14% of non-Nordic immigrants were granted residence permits based on a need for protection or on humanitarian grounds, an increase from 13% in 2013.

In 2015, the number of asylum seekers almost tripled, to 31 150 persons. The main countries of origin were Syria (10 500 applicants, up from 2 000 in 2014), Afghanistan (6 900, up from 600) and Eritrea (stable at 2 900). In 2015, 75% of the nearly 8 400 first-instance decisions in examined cases were positive, compared to around 67% in 2014. Almost 2 400 refugees were resettled in Norway in 2015.

Several policy initiatives were announced in 2014-15. These included a proposal to increase from three to five years the required length of continuous residence before applying for a permanent residence permit. Immigration regulations have been changed to introduce a permanent arrangement when processing asylum applications, to ensure greater emphasis on the situation of children and to clarify when to give a child and their family legal residence based on the child’s ties to Norwegian society. New criteria for selecting quota refugees have been established. The intention is to select refugees with good chances of successful integration, but the need for protection is accorded highest priority. In addition, the quota for Syrian refugees to be resettled was increased from 1 000 in 2014 to 2 000 in 2015. However, because of the high number of asylum seekers arriving in the second half of 2015 and expected in 2016, the government has presented a supplementary provision for the 2016 budget and proposed several measures to reduce the number of asylum seekers.

Several initiatives concerned integration policies in 2014-15: from May 2015, a national subsidy scheme ensures that the parental fee for a place in kindergarten is limited to a maximum of 6% of the family income for low-income families. From August 2015, all four- and five-year-old children from low-income families are offered 20 hours of free time per week in kindergarten. Although children of immigrants are not explicitly targeted by these policies, they are expected to benefit largely. Moreover, amendments to the Introduction Act have been proposed in order to improve the quality of Norwegian language training; an evaluation kit has been introduced to assist employers who need to quickly assess foreign qualifications of migrants; and to qualify for Norwegian citizenship, applicants must now pass an oral test in Norwegian and a civic test, with some limited exemptions.

For further information

www.udi.no

www.ssb.no

www.regjeringen.no

www.imdi.no

Recent trends in migrants’ flows and stocks

Norway

Notes and sources are at the end of the chapter.

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933396088

Poland

In 2014, 91 380 persons who arrived from abroad registered in Poland for a stay longer than 3 months, 13% more than were recorded in 2013. Over 92% of all registered immigrants were foreigners, mainly from Europe (81% of the total number of foreigners). Recent increases were mainly of Ukrainian citizens: in 2014 they represented around 40% of the total number of foreigners compared with 33% in 2013. Germans (6.9%), Vietnamese (5.2%), Chinese (4.1%), and Russians (3.5%) were the other main groups. Over the period 2009-12, the estimated numbers of emigrants varied between 218 000 and 276 000 annually.

Data on residence permits show a similar pattern. In 2014, 42 600 temporary residence permits were issued (a 32% increase on 2013), as were 6 600 permanent residence permits (+82%), and around 8 600 stay registrations by EU citizens (+0.5%). The large increase in temporary residence permits is related to new regulations introduced in May 2014; to the regularisation process begun in 2012; and to the growing scale of immigration from Ukraine. As of December 2014, the number of foreigners holding all possible residence documents was 175 000, a 45% increase over the previous year. It increased by a further 10% to 193 700 as of end-July 2015. Ukrainians accounted for 37% of permanent residents and 39% of those with temporary permits. Germans were the largest group of registered citizens from the EU (31%).

The number of work permits issued to foreigners from outside the EU has been rising since 2007. In 2014 and 2015 the number reached 43 000 (a 11.6% increase over 2013) and 65 800, respectively. In 2015, the largest group were Ukrainians (77%), followed by Belarusians (3%) and Moldovans (2%). Following the progressive introduction of a simplified application procedure starting in 2006, there was a sharp rise in the number coming to work for up to six months – notably in 2014, with a 64% increase to 387 400 authorisations. Over 90% of that number were Ukrainians. Agriculture and construction were still the main sectors, although decreasing in share. In 2015, the number of registered declarations benefiting from the simplified procedure doubled to 782 200.

Around 46 000 international students were registered in the tertiary sector in Poland in 2014, an increase of almost 30% over the year. Around half were from Ukraine, followed by those from Belarus, Norway, Sweden, Spain, Turkey, the Russian Federation and Lithuania.

Based on Eurostat data, in 2015 the number of asylum applications almost doubled to 10 300 (including dependents), i.e. less than 1% of the 1 256 000 applications received in the EU28. The top three countries of origin (the Russian Federation, Ukraine, Tajikistan) accounted for nearly 90% of the total number of applications received. Around 18% of decisions made at first instance were positive, compared with 51% in the EU28. It is noteworthy that many applications are not taken into account in this calculation due to the high mobility of this group.

The entry into force of a new act on foreigners in May 2014 helped introduce more favourable conditions for some categories of migrants and to simplify some procedures. The validity of the temporary residence permit is extended to up to three years (it had been granted for up to two years). Labour migrants can now apply for a temporary residence and work permit through one single procedure. International students can now obtain a temporary residence permit with a longer period of validity, and graduates of Polish universities can apply for a one-year temporary residence permit for the purpose of seeking work. Holders of a temporary residence and work permit can now seek work for a month after losing a job. The right to unemployment benefits was extended to some groups of foreigners fulfilling the conditions determined by the regulations. An amendment to the Act on Polish Language in November 2014 contributed to lowering the level of ability in the Polish language required for naturalisation.

Since May 2015, the work permit requirement exemption was extended to persons giving occasional lectures, speeches or presentations of particular scientific or artistic value, and students.

In July 2015, the government announced that Poland would accept 2 000 foreigners in need of international protection originating from Syria and Eritrea. In September of that year, the government also agreed to relocate over two years (2016-17) 5 082 foreigners seeking asylum from refugee camps in Italy and Greece.

For further information

www.udsc.gov.pl

www.stat.gov.pl

www.mpips.gov.pl

http://cudzoziemcy.gov.pl/

Recent trends in migrants’ flows and stocks

Poland

Notes and sources are at the end of the chapter.

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933396091

Portugal

Overall net migration remained negative (30 100 persons) in 2014, though the number is slightly more favourable than in 2012 and 2013 (37 300 and 36 200, respectively). A continuous decline in foreign immigration began in 2009, reflecting the impact of the economic crisis. The crisis saw a rise in -Portuguese labour emigration after 2008, reaching 53 800 long-term emigrants in 2013 but falling to 49 600 in 2014. If short-term emigrants are included the total outflow continued the increase, from 128 100 in 2013 to 134 600 in 2014, of which 93% are of working age (15-64 years old). This is a level similar to that during the intense Portuguese emigration cycle to Europe of the late 1960s and early 1970s. Two-thirds go to EU27 destinations and around 96% of emigrants are Portuguese citizens. Although 70% of the emigrants are male, the proportion of women is growing, both in permanent and temporary outflows, being much more educated than men: the bulk of female emigrants are highly qualified (48%), against a -preponderance of low educated male emigrants (above 61%).

The fall in the number of new residence permits that began in 2008 stopped in 2014, with 35 270 permits issued compared with 33 200 in 2013. Brazil is still the major immigration source, but the inflow observed in 2014 (5 560) is half the inflow registered in 2012 (11 700) and well below that of 2008 (32 750). The number of Eastern European immigrants continued to decrease, from 2 400 in 2012 to 1 800 in 2013 and 1 700 in 2014. A declining trend is also observed for Portuguese-speaking African countries nationals (6 400 new issues in 2013 and 5 700 in 2014). Asians and EU15 citizens are the two groups that experienced increased inflows in 2014, following recent trends that began in 2012 (the former case) and in 2013 (the latter). The increased number of Chinese (up from 1 900 to 3 700) is related to the visas for investment purposes scheme launched in 2012. Small but increasing numbers of labour migrants also come from Thailand and Nepal.

Between October 2012 and December 2015, 2 800 residence permits for investment purposes were granted to first applicants and more than 4 000 to family members, involving a total investment of EUR 1.693 billion. Around four in five investors were Chinese nationals, followed by Brazilians, Russians and South Africans.

Between 2013 and 2014, the total number of long-term visas (granted to non-EEA citizens) increased from approximately 14 000 to almost 15 000. In 2014, 53.4% were issued for employment, 17.6% for education and 15.3% for family reasons. Brazil was the main source with 4 300, then the Portuguese-speaking African countries (4 280), Asia (3 350, of whom 1 100 were from China) and 1 100 from Europe. Reasons vary by nationality: family reunion was the major motive for visa applications in the cases of Indians, Nepalese and Cape Verdeans; work the main motive for Brazilians, Eastern Europeans, North Americans and other Asians.

There were 900 asylum applications in 2015 (including dependents), an increase of more than 86% compared with 2014. The top three countries of origin (Ukraine, Mali, Pakistan) accounted for more than half of total applications. Around half of decisions made at first instance were positive, a share comparable to the EU28 average.

In 2015, Portugal accepted a quota of 4 600 resettlements and relocations in the framework of the EU response to the current humanitarian crisis.

The new “Strategic Plan for Migration – 2015-20”, which includes measures for both immigration and emigration, was approved in March 2015. It proposes a revision of the visa scheme with the objective of creating a “talented visa” that would help attract talented immigrants. It also addresses seasonal immigrants in the agriculture sector, where two major initiatives are envisaged: 1) creation of a specific legal guide for immigrant workers, and 2) elaboration of an online guide to agricultural seasonal activities in Portuguese regions.

The Strategic Plan also establishes a set of actions aiming to attract and promote the mobility of tertiary students, such as the creation of a hosting and integration guide and promotion of a platform to facilitate visa procedures for them. A new regulation from March 2014 grants the Status of International Student to non-EU foreigners who do not live in Portugal, or have lived in the country for a period of less than two years when accepted by a Portuguese higher education institution. It also states that international students must pay a fee that cannot be inferior to the maximum fee established by law for graduation with a MA or PhD in Portuguese institutions. A further change in June 2014 facilitates the granting of visas to researchers and academics.

For further information

www.imigrante.pt

www.sef.pt

Recent trends in migrants’ flows and stocks

Portugal

Notes and sources are at the end of the chapter.

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933396104

Romania

After high net emigration from Romania following the country’s accession to the EU, official statistics on temporary and permanent migration inflows (172 700 persons, the majority of whom were returning Romanians) approached those on outflows (184 100) in 2014, leaving a net emigration of 11 000 persons.

In 2014, foreign residents accounted for 0.5% of the total population. Their number had fallen from 102 800 in 2012 to 98 600 in 2014, and of the latter 57 500 were third-country nationals. The main countries of origin were Italy (11 400), the Republic of Moldova (9 900), Turkey (8 800), China (7 400) and Germany (5 200). As in previous years, migrants who arrived through family reunification, together with those who were family members of a Romanian citizen, formed the majority of the immigrant population. More than half of the migrants were aged under 35, and around 60% were men.

Romania sets annual quotas for work authorisations to be issued, although historically demand has been lower than the quotas. For both 2014 and 2015 the quotas were set at 5 500, including 3 000 permanent workers; 900 intra-corporate transfers; and 900 other highly skilled migrants. In 2014, 2 300 visas were issued (compared to 2 100 the previous year); of these, 1 700 were granted to permanent workers. Estimates of the number of EU/EEA citizens posted to Romania fell to 4 700 in 2014. Hungary, Poland, Italy and Germany were the main countries of origin.

The number of migrants entering Romania for study has been growing. Data from the National Institute of Statistics show that the number of foreign students for the academic year 2013/14 in Romania was about 21 000; more than 14 000 students were from countries outside the European Union, including over 6 000 students from the Republic of Moldova.

According to Eurostat data, the number of asylum seekers (first requests) fell from 1 500 in 2014 to 1 200 in 2015. The main groups were from Pakistan (250), Iraq (170) and Bangladesh (170). A third of the 500 decisions taken at first instance were positive in 2015, compared to 51% on average in the EU. In addition, the government announced in September 2015 that Romania could receive around 1 500 refugees on a voluntary basis.

The number of migrants transiting through Romanian territory as a gateway to the Schengen Area increased, reflecting the situation in North Africa, Ukraine and the Middle East. Irregular migration increased at the borders with the Republic of Moldova, Ukraine and Serbia in 2014 and 2015. In 2015, around 1 500 foreigners who tried to cross the border illegally were detected, mostly at the borders with the Republic of Moldova and Serbia. Most of them came from Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan and Iran.

At the end of 2014, 3 million Romanians were estimated to be working or studying in another EU country. Spain and Italy were their main countries of destination, with around 2 million Romanians settled in one of those two countries for at least one year.

In 2014, a new National Strategy on Immigration was introduced. Measures were designed to attract highly skilled workers; to facilitate the access of foreigners to the country’s higher education institutions; to offer possibilities to highly skilled third-country nationals to search for a job in Romania at the end of their studies; to adopt a stricter approach to irregular immigration and readmission; and to adopt a better asylum policy.

Government Ordinance (GO) 25/2014 transposed into the national legislation EU Directives 2008/115/EC on common standards and procedures in member states for returning illegally staying third-country nationals, and 2011/98/EU on a single application procedure for a unique permit for third-country nationals to reside and obtain employment in the member states, and on a common set of rights for third-country workers legally residing in a member state. GO 25/2014 also introduced amendments to the employment and posting of foreign workers in Romania, and set conditions for the employment of permanent, seasonal and cross-border workers, interns, and highly skilled workers.

Additional categories of third-country workers will be exempted from a labour market test. In particular, this will be the case for those who have been residing legally in Romania for at least three years as family members of Romanian citizens; those having a right of temporary residence for studies; and holders of a long-term residence permit.

Government Decision No. 691/2015 approved a new procedure concerning care and education services for children whose parents work abroad.

For further information

www.insse.ro

www.mai.gov.ro

www.igi.mai.gov.ro

Recent trends in migrants’ flows and stocks

Romania

Notes and sources are at the end of the chapter.

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933396113

Russian Federation

The net migration inflow to the Russian Federation (excluding Crimea) decreased to around 220 000 persons in 2015, 18% less than in 2014 despite the 1% increase in immigration to 573 000. Flow data stated below are estimates which exclude movements to/from Crimea. About 30% of immigrants arrived from Ukraine (169 000, up 47%), Uzbekistan (74 000, down 47%), Kazakhstan (66 000), Tajikistan (47 000) and Armenia (46 000). Emigration from the Russian Federation increased by 14% to 362 000, mainly due to outflows of long-term labour migrants whose registration expired and who did not find a new job in Russia. The main destination countries were Uzbekistan (95 000), Ukraine (48 000), Tajikistan (36 000), Kazakhstan (30 000) and Armenia (25 000).

In 2015, the Federal migration service issued 382 000 temporary and 149 000 permanent residence permits. Over 78% of all permits went to nationals of Ukraine (216 000), Uzbekistan (64 000), Kazakhstan (53 000), Tajikistan (43 000) and Armenia (about 8 000). At the end of 2015, the stock of residence permit holders reached 1.05 million persons, almost 21% more than at the end of 2014. About 80% of these were nationals of Ukraine (306 000), Uzbekistan (138 000), Armenia (116 000), Tajikistan (100 000), Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan (86 000 each).

Temporary labour migration declined dramatically from its 3.7 million peak in 2014 to 1.9 million licences delivered to citizens of visa-free States and work permits issued in 2015. This decrease was due partly to the permit-free access of Kyrgyzstan and Armenian citizens to the Russian labour market, but more importantly to new rules of access to the labour market, the economic crisis and entry ban for over 1.5 million foreigners. In 2015, over 82% of licences and permits were issued to the citizens of Uzbekistan (893 000), Tajikistan (428 000) and Ukraine (209 000). Compared to 2014 the inflow of documented workers from Uzbekistan decreased by 37%, from the Republic of Moldova by 67%, and from Azerbaijan by 54%. There was also a considerable decline in labour migration from countries that are not members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) (apart the number of North Koreans, which remained stable at 33 000 new workers): citizens of China were issued only 54 000 work permits (93 000 in 2014), Turkey 24 000 (35 000 in 2014) and Viet Nam 11 000 (20 000 in 2014).

In 2015, the Russian Federation continued receiving migrants from the southeast parts of Ukraine. The stock of temporary asylum holders by 1 January 2016 amounted to 313 700 people, of whom 99.2% were Ukrainians. In 2014, a fast-track procedure reduced the application processing time for temporary asylum for Ukrainian nationals, from three months to three days. By 2016 many of these persons had acquired Russian citizenship.

New rules of admission for foreign workers were introduced from January 2015: compulsory testing of almost all foreigners on their basic knowledge of the Russian language, history and legislation; compulsory health insurance and a health examination; for citizens benefiting from a visa-free policy, extension of their right to work to private enterprises (previously limited to private households). Since 2015, monthly fees for the licence holders have been established at the regional level, and are relatively high in regions receiving large numbers of immigrants. More flexible salary criteria were also introduced for highly skilled professionals.

A Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) was created in May 2014, comprising Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and the Russian Federation. The newly formed common market enables the citizens of these countries to work without restrictions or licensing documents. Migrant workers from partner countries are exempted from the procedure for recognising their educational skills. Besides the ability to work without permits, citizens of the countries participating in the EEU have 30 days to register their stay, while citizens of other countries must do so within seven working days after arrival. Family members are allowed to come with the migrant worker and stay in the Russian Federation until the expiration of the job contract.

In January 2015, new restrictions on entry to the Russian Federation for previous overstayers were introduced. The new law specifies that if the period of illegal stay is between 180 and 270 days, re-entry would be denied for five years from the date of departure from the Russian Federation. If the foreigner had overstayed for more than 270 days, re-entry would be denied for ten years.

At the end of 2015 limitations were introduced regarding the citizens of Turkey that implied the end of the visa-free regime and recruitment of workers from Turkey. Only 53 Russian companies were still allowed to hire Turkish workers.

For further information

www.fms.gov.ru

www.fms.gov.ru/government_services

www.mid.ru

www.gks.ru

Recent trends in migrants’ flows and stocks

Russian Federation

Notes and sources are at the end of the chapter.

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933396125

Slovak Republic

Data on migration flows (based on change of permanent residence) show a slight increase in total immigration, from about 5 100 in 2013 to 5 400 in 2014; of the latter number, 4 800 were from Europe. There was a more pronounced increase in emigration, from 2 800 persons in 2013 to 3 600 in 2014, with 3 300 resettling within Europe. The net migration inflow decreased to 1 700 in 2014. The largest inflow in 2014 was from the Czech Republic (1 230), followed by the United Kingdom (710) and Hungary (410); the largest outflow was to the Czech Republic (1 160), followed by Austria (850) and the United Kingdom (350).

The number of newly granted residence permits has increased in the past two years, to 17 200 in 2014. Most of the recipients were third-country nationals (10 920 in 2014), mainly in the categories of temporary residence and tolerated residence (granted by the Foreign Police department). In 2014 the top five nationalities, which have remained more or less stable since 2011, were Ukrainians (3 020), Russians (1 280), Serbians (1 090), Koreans (910), and Chinese (590). The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries that were traditionally included among the top 10 nationalities gradually lost their position to Turkey, selected Asian countries (notably Viet Nam), and Balkan countries (Croatia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia – FYROM).

Inflows of foreign workers dropped substantially in 2013 (by about one-third) to 8 800 and decreased further to 8 000 persons in 2014. During the first half of 2015, about 5 000 entrees were recorded. The decline was recorded for both third-country nationals (working on the basis of work authorisation) and EEA citizens (registered by means of information cards): in 2014 it was more pronounced for the former group. The majority of work permits for third-country nationals are long term (over 12 months), while most EEA nationals tend to come for shorter periods (less than three months). Workers from third countries are predominantly male, graduates, and aged 25-34 years; age and educational ranges for those from the EEA are more evenly distributed.

Foreign worker stocks data for mid-2015 show that the vast majority came from the other new EU member states, notably Romania, Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Bulgaria. The numbers of Slovak workers abroad rose to about 134 000 in 2014 and 139 000 in the first half of 2015; their top five destination countries were the Czech Republic, Austria, Germany, the United Kingdom and Hungary.

According to Eurostat data, there were 270 asylum applications in 2015 (including dependents). This number increased by over 17% compared with 2014. The top three countries of origin (Iraq, Afghanistan and Ukraine) accounted for three-quarters of the total number of applications received. Among the 120 decisions made at first instance in 2015, about half were positive. This share disregards the applicants who left the country before the end of the application process.

A first group of 25 Iraqi families arrived in December 2015 as part of the resettlement programme agreed by the Slovak Government.

While no rise in irregular migration was observed through 2013 and 2014 (despite the conflict in Ukraine) the first half of 2015 showed an increasing dynamic, with more than 900 cases recorded. The top five countries of origin were Afghanistan, Ukraine, Viet Nam, Somalia, and Syria. The number of detected unauthorised residence cases inside the country reached 700 persons in 2013 and increased to 1 070 in 2014. The top five groups involved were from Ukraine, Kosovo, Syria, Afghanistan, and Viet Nam. More recently, people from Kosovo and Syria began to become the main groups among irregular migrants.

An amendment to the Act on Residence of Aliens came into effect as of January 2014. The amendment was prepared during the process of transposing Directives 2011/95/EU and 2011/98/EU into national legislation. The main changes include stipulation of a more effective process for granting a single permit for both work and residence for third-country citizens.

In 2015, the Slovak Republic adopted two further directives in the field of asylum: 2013/33/EU, stipulating the rules for accepting applicants for international protection, and 2013/32/EU, on common procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection. Adoption of these directives required further amendments to the Act on Asylum that came into effect in May 2015, and several amendments to other laws (e.g. the act on the stay of aliens, the act on the social and legal protection of children, rules for civil procedures, rules for administrative procedures, the act on social assistance to persons in need). By transposing these directives into its legal system, the Slovak Republic completed the second phase of building a common European asylum system.

For further information

www.minv.sk

www.employment.gov.sk

Recent trends in migrants’ flows and stocks

Slovak Republic

Notes and sources are at the end of the chapter.

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933396130

Slovenia

Immigration to Slovenia has remained both relatively stable and moderate. According to the National Statistical Office, 13 800 persons immigrated to Slovenia in 2014, compared to 13 900 in 2013. Of those, 2 500 were Slovene citizens and 11 300 were foreign nationals. A slightly positive net migration of 500 persons in 2013 reversed into a small negative net outflow of 500 persons in 2014 (13 800 immigrants and 14 300 emigrants). Of the 14 300 persons leaving the country, 8 100 were Slovenian citizens and 6 200 were foreign nationals.

The total stock of foreign nationals has increased in the past years from 85 600 in 2012 to 126 000 by December 2015. Foreign nationals thus account for 6% of the total population (about 2 million). Only 34% of foreign citizens are women. In 2015, the largest groups of foreign nationals living in Slovenia were from Bosnia and Herzegovina (44 900), Kosovo (12 100) and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (10 100). Overall, more than 75% of all foreign nationals in Slovenia came from countries of the former Yugoslavia and 17% from EU countries.

As of January 2015, about 13 000 Slovenian citizens aged 25 to 39 were living abroad. More than half of them had emigrated in the past four years, and about 40% hold a tertiary degree. The most prominent destination countries among this group were Austria, Germany and Croatia.

Slovenia issued 11 600 new temporary residence permits to third-country nationals in 2015, compared to 10 600 in 2014 and 9 100 in 2013; temporary permit renewals numbered 18 300. Furthermore, 7 000 registration certificates for EU citizens were issued, and 1 800 renewed. The stock of registration certificates for EU citizens remained stable, with 13 400 citizens certificated in 2014 and 13 700 in 2015. By the end of 2015, the stock of permanent residence permits stood at 71 600 for third-country nationals (67 700 in 2014), and at 9 900 for EU citizens (9 300 in 2014).

Regarding humanitarian migration, Slovenia has remained a country of transit in 2015, but experienced a significant increase in migrants crossing the country on their way north. Between mid-October 2015 and the end of January 2016, 423 000 migrants crossed Slovenia, the largest countries of origin being Syria (45%), Afghanistan (30%) and Iraq (17%). Flows have decreased from an average of almost 8 000 incoming humanitarian migrants a day in October 2015 to less than 2 000 a day in January 2016. According to Ministry of Interior data, 277 asylum applications were submitted in 2015, compared to 385 in 2014 and 272 in 2013. The main countries of origin were Afghanistan, Iraq (17% each) and Iran (12%). In 2015, 45 applicants were given international protection status out of the 130 decisions made.

In March 2016, Slovenia changed its policy and announced that only legal migrants, migrants who would apply for asylum in Slovenia, and those with clear humanitarian needs will be allowed to enter. In addition, legislation was passed that specifies criteria for inadmissible asylum requests, allowing authorities to reject the asylum claims of applicants who arrived to Slovenia through a “safe third country of asylum”, or who are nationals from safe countries of origin. Furthermore, authorities are now allowed to decide on claims made at borders and airports within 14 days. The government agreed to relocate 567 humanitarian migrants from Greece and Italy to Slovenia between 2016 and 2017 as part of the EU relocation plan, and to resettle an additional 20 people from third countries.

Legislation on labour migration was simplified in September 2015 by introducing a single work and residence permit for third-country nationals (except for Bosnian citizens and seasonal workers staying for less than three months), in line with the EU directive. Previously, residence and work permits were issued by two different authorities. However, third-country nationals still must pass a labour market test. Employers furthermore can now only hire third-country nationals for full-time employment, and stricter penalties have been introduced for employers violating immigration or labour laws. Provisions regarding family reunification have been amended and require sponsors to legally reside in Slovenia permanently or for a minimum of one year. The same applies to holders of subsidiary protection if such protection has been granted only for a year. Refugees and others under subsidiary protection are exempt from this rule, but if they fail to apply and to provide proof of family relations within 90 days after they were granted protection, they need to prove economic self-sufficiency.

For further information

www.mddsz.gov.si/en

www.mnz.gov.si/en

www.stat.si/eng

www.infotujci.si

Recent trends in migrants’ flows and stocks

Slovenia

Notes and sources are at the end of the chapter.

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933396141

Spain

As in previous years, Spain recorded net emigration in 2014. However, outflows of foreigners slowed down to 330 600, 28% less than the previous year, while immigration flows increased by 7% to 265 800. Overall, net emigration of foreigners reached 64 800 in 2014, compared with 211 000 in 2013. Net emigration was also observed among Spanish nationals (37 500, compared with 41 000 in 2013). Native-born Spanish nationals accounted for 64% of the emigration flow of nationals, while the remaining third were born abroad and mainly migrated back to their country of origin.

As of 31 December 2014, 4.9 million foreign nationals have a registration certificate or residence card: 2.7 million under the EU scheme (of whom 370 600 were third-country family members), and 1.7 million and 480 000 third-country nationals with long-term and temporary residence permits, respectively. Nearly half of the temporary residence permit holders were granted their permit for work reasons, while a third were family members. The most significant decreases in the stock of foreigners between 2013 and 2014 (partly due to naturalisations) were recorded for the nationals of Ecuador, Colombia and Bolivia. Conversely, the stocks of Romanian, Italian and British citizens tended to increase.

The number of new work permits issued to non-EU citizens has been decreasing continuously since 2008, reaching 2 900 in 2014. The top origin countries were the Philippines (13%), Peru (11%) and China (8%). As in 2013, another 3 100 permits were issued to seasonal workers; 76% of these workers were Moroccan nationals, and the rest were mainly from Colombia and Ecuador. Women accounted for 78% of all seasonal workers; they accounted for 98% of Moroccans. Overall, close to 1.86 million foreign nationals were registered as being employed in Spain in 2014. Over 623 000 were EU citizens. Services accounted for almost three-quarters of foreigners’ employment, followed by the agricultural sector (13%) and construction (6%); the level of qualification of foreign workers tended to increase.

During the academic year 2013/14, 74 900 foreign students (4.9% of total students) were enrolled in tertiary education in Spain. Foreign students represented more than 18% of students at the master’s level. More than half of the latter were from Latin America or the Caribbean, while 21% were EU27 nationals. The proportion of students from Asia and Oceania has increased. The agreement signed by education and migration authorities suppressed some administrative burdens for international students.

Spain has seen a sharp rise in applications for asylum. In 2014 there were 5 600 applications, 25% more than in 2013. This number nearly tripled in 2015, to 14 600 asylum applications (including dependents), i.e. 1.2% of the applications received in the EU28. The top three origins (Syria, Ukraine and West Bank and Gaza Strip) accounted for more than two-thirds of total applications. Around 31% of the 1 000 decisions made at first instance in 2015 were positive, compared with a 51% average in the EU28. In the framework of the National Resettlement Programme approved in 2013, Syrian families began to arrive in December 2014.

According to the European Frontex agency, the levels of irregular migrants landing in Spain or arriving in the country by boat intensified in 2014 and 2015. The arrivals to the Canary Islands jumped from 275 to 870 between 2014 and 2015, while illegal border crossings on the western Mediterranean route (sea and land) jumped to 7 840 and 7 160 in 2014 and 2015, respectively; this compares with 6 400 and 6 800 the two previous years. Almost 7 700 persons (9 000 in 2013) were expelled from Spain in 2014, and another 1 100 (1 200 in 2013) were sent back to other EU countries.

Several measures have been implemented, to improve the asylum procedure; enlarge reception capacity in co-operation with NGOs and sub-national authorities; and increase financial resources devoted to the reception and integration of refugees.

The Entrepreneurial Support and Internationalisation Act adopted in 2013 was amended in 2015 to further facilitate the entry and residence of international investors, entrepreneurs, highly qualified professionals, researchers and intra-corporate transferees. It smoothed the way for family reunification for those categories of workers, as well as introducing a “fast track” entry procedure for intra-corporate transferees in large companies and in strategic sectors. By August 2015, 5 900 visas and permits had been issued to these workers and 5 500 to their accompa-nying family.

An explicit reference to foreign minors was inserted into the law for the juridical protection of minors in 2015, in order to better protect their rights.

In July 2015 the government voted a new Labour Inspection Act to reduce illegal employment. It also introduced proposals to identify, protect and provide support for victims of trafficking and sexual exploitation.

For further information

http://extranjeros.empleo.gob.es/es/index.html

www.empleo.gob.es/es/estadisticas/index.htm

www.ine.es/inebmenu/mnu_migrac.htm

Recent trends in migrants’ flows and stocks

Spain

Notes and sources are at the end of the chapter.

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933396159

Sweden

Data from population registers (which exclude asylum seekers and temporary workers) show that immigration flows were the highest ever in 2015 (134 200, up 5.7% over the previous year) while emigration flows increased by 9% to 55 800. Swedish emigrants accounted for 30% of total emigration. Net emigration of Swedes increased to 4 100 in 2015 (4 000 in 2014), while net immigration of foreigners reached 82 500 (79 700 in 2014). Syrian nationals were the largest group of immigrants (28 000, +29% compared to 2014 flows) followed by returning Swedish nationals (20 400, -2%) and Eritreans (7 600, +28%). Finally, stateless and Polish nationals each accounted for 5 500. Flows of Somalis and Afghans decreased sharply, by 17% and 12% respectively.

In 2015, 109 200 persons were granted residence permits or rights of residence (excluding renewals as well as EU citizens who no longer need to register with the Migration Agency since May 2014). This is roughly the same number as in 2014, 110 600. Family migrants (43 400) accounted for 41% of the total, compared with 38% in 2014. The number of permits granted to refugees and persons otherwise in need of protection rose slightly, from 35 500 in 2014 to 36 600 (34% of the total) in 2015; of these, 1 900 were granted to quota refugees. Permits for employment (16%) rose again, from 15 900 to 17 000, and those for the purpose of study remained stable at 9 400 (or 9% of the total).

According to the Swedish Migration Agency, in 2015 the number of asylum applications more than doubled to around 163 000 (including dependents). This represented more than one in ten applications received in the EU28. The top three origin nations accounted for 72% of total applications; these were Syria (51 300, +68% compared to 2014), Afghanistan (41 600, compared with 2 900 requests in 2014), and Iraq (20 900, compared with 2 700 requests in 2014). More than 20% of the applications were for accompanied minors. According to Eurostat data, around 72% of decisions made at first instance were positive, compared with 51% in the EU28.

A total of 13 300 work permits were granted in 2015, most of which were accorded to migrants arriving from abroad. Berry pickers (3 800 permits) remained the leading occupational group among permits issued in 2015 for the purpose of employment. IT specialists (3 200, up from 2 500 in 2014) and engineering professionals (710) followed. The top three countries of origin were Thailand (4 200, up from 3 000 in 2014), India (3 300, stable compared with 2014 level) and China (740, down from 950 in 2014).

In August 2014, new rules entered into force to tackle abuses of the labour migration system. In July 2015, a national committee on labour migration was appointed to survey the extent of abuse and exploitation of labour migrants in Sweden, and to propose measures to counteract such exploitation.

In 2014, a six-month job search visa was introduced for international graduates from Swedish universities.

In the framework of its 2016 budget, the government has launched an introduction package to speed up the labour market integration of newly arrived immigrants. This initiative aims at accelerating the transition to gainful employment through language courses, training, skills validation and accommodation; increasing the support to municipalities to provide newly arrived children and young people a good education in preschools and schools; and strengthening the reception and integration of refugees all over the country. Since January 2016, increased funds have been made available to help municipalities receiving large numbers of asylum seekers. The government also proposed to increase the flat-rate reimbursement to municipalities for schooling of asylum-seeking minors by 50%.

Legislative changes entered into force in July 2014 with a view to facilitating circular migration between Sweden and third countries, in order to strengthen the positive effects of migration on development.

A new Fast Track initiative began operating in early 2016 to speed up the entry of skilled immigrants into shortage occupations. The sector-specific initiatives begin by mapping, validating and bridging the skills of programme participants in their mother tongue, offering language tuition alongside these activities. Swedish language skills will not be required prior to the commencement of validation and bridging efforts. Fast-track discussions are currently ongoing in 14 sectors covering 20 different professions. Many resources have been devoted to this bridging.

The government has announced its intention to combine the teaching of Swedish for Immigrants with other relevant education, such as upper-secondary vocational education. The provision of Swedish for Immigrants will, in the future, be undertaken within the municipal adult education system, and new modular courses in municipal adult education at the basic level will be developed.

For further information

www.migrationsverket.se

www.scb.se

www.regeringen.se

Recent trends in migrants’ flows and stocks

Sweden

Notes and sources are at the end of the chapter.

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933396166

switzerland

In 2015, almost 150 500 long-stay foreigners immigrated to Switzerland, or 1.1% less than in 2014, continuing a trend begun the previous year. Nationals of EU and EFTA countries made up almost three quarters of the total. The two biggest groups were Germans and Italians, accounting for 15% and 12% of the total respectively, followed by nationals of France (up sharply) and Portugal – 10% and 8%. While 63% of immigrants from the EU and EFTA went to Switzerland for professional reasons, nationals of countries outside these blocs generally immigrated to join their families (47% of inflow).

Emigration, corresponding to the number of foreigners de-registering their residence in Switzerland, amounted to 73 400 people in 2015, compared to 69 200 in 2014. The proportion of EU and EFTA nationals came to 75% in 2015, consisting of 15 800 Germans, 7 100 French, 6 900 Italians and 6 600 Portuguese. Net migration to Switzerland amounted to an inflow of 71 500 in 2015, down by 9.4% from 2014. In 2015, net inflows were dominated by migrants from Italy, France, Germany and Portugal.

At the end of 2015, almost 2 million foreigners were permanently settled in Switzerland, a figure up 46 900 from 2014. The foreign population was equivalent to almost one quarter of the total resident population, broadly unchanged from the previous year. The most strongly represented nationalities in this figure were Italians and Germans (15.7% and 15.1% of the foreign population respectively), Portuguese (13.4%) and French (6.2%).

Almost 71 000 foreign nationals settled in Switzerland permanently in 2015 in order to work, which was down by 5.1% from 2014. EU and EFTA nationals accounted for around 94% of this figure, and most came from Germany (15 900), Italy (10 800), France (8 900) and Portugal (6 900).

The student population taking a tertiary education or training course in the 2015/16 academic year numbered 43 600 foreigners in universities, including 36 300 who were previously educated abroad and who came to Switzerland to study. An additional 15 600 students are enrolled in the universities of applied sciences and in teacher training universities, of whom 10 070 were previously educated abroad. These figures show a rise from the previous academic year.

According to the Secretary of State for Migration, the number of asylum seekers grew from 23 800 to 39 500 between 2014 and 2015. The three main countries of origin for asylum seekers were Eritrea, Afghanistan and Syria, which together accounted for 57% of inflows in 2015. Of the 28 100 first applications processed in 2015, the recognition rate (granting of asylum) came to 25% and the protection rate (granting of asylum or provisional admission) to 53%, compared to 53% on average across the EU28.

In the course of 2014, Switzerland made 14 900 transfer requests to other Dublin States on the grounds that they were responsible for the asylum procedure. As a result, 2 600 people were transferred to the relevant Dublin State by air or road. Conversely, Switzerland received over 4 000 transfer requests from other Dublin States, of which it accepted 1 800, and over 900 people were effectively transferred to its territory. Because of the severe migratory pressure on the Italian coast and the resulting stress on the Italian asylum and reception system, Dublin transfers from Switzerland fell between 2013 and 2014, leading to the processing of an additional 3 000 cases under the national asylum procedure. Since 2009, however, Switzerland has transferred more people to other Dublin States than it has had to receive under this agreement.

In March 2016, the Federal Council introduced several bills designed to implement constitutional provisions on the restriction of immigration. First, in order to improve the exploitation of the worker potential already in Switzerland, the Federal Council intends to remove the red tape that complicates access to employment for those recognised as refugees or given temporary admission and in so doing improve their integration into the labour market. Second, a bill designed to speed up asylum procedures, passed by the Parliament, was approved through a popular vote in June 2016.

The draft bill to amend the federal law on foreigners and the law on supplementary benefits will introduce four measures designed to improve implementation of the agreement on the free movement of people. Foreigners and their families should be excluded from the social security system if they come to Switzerland with the sole aim of looking for work. Termination of residency rights for those who discontinue gainful activity will also be defined. New provisions governing data exchange between the bodies responsible for granting supplementary benefits and the cantonal authorities responsible for migration will improve the flow of information. And the law will clearly establish the exclusion of foreigners residing in Switzerland illegally from the supplementary benefit system.

For further information

www.sem.admin.ch

www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/portal/en/index/themen/01/07.html

Recent trends in migrants’ flows and stocks

Switzerland

Notes and sources are at the end of the chapter.

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933396171

Turkey

In 2014 nearly 380 000 residence permits (including renewals) were issued by the General Directorate of Security, Foreigners, Border and Asylum Bureau, up from 314 000 in 2013. In 2014, family reunification remained the major grounds for delivering residence permits, followed by education purposes. Residence permits were granted to nearly 61 000 people, up from 50 700 the previous year. By contrast, there was a decline in the number of residence permits for work reasons, which declined from 44 300 in 2013 to 18 500 in 2014. Recent years have seen a shift in the origin countries of foreigners receiving residence permits. In 2012 the top five were Georgia, the Russian Federation, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria and Germany. In 2014, there was a significant increase in the number of residence permits issued to Iraqis (38 700), Syrians (31 800), Afghans (29 800), Azerbaijanis (27 000) and Iranians (18 900).

For many years, contract-based labour migration has been the major component of Turkish emigration. More recently, the number of Turkish workers sent abroad by the Turkish Employment Agency has declined steadily, from 67 000 in 2012 to 55 400 in 2013 and 39 600 in 2014. The main destinations were the Russian Federation (23%), Iraq (19%), Saudi Arabia (9.5%), Turkmenistan (9%) and Azerbaijan (6%).

The number of work permits issued to foreigners has been rising, from 14 200 in 2010 to 64 550 in 2015. As in 2013 and 2014, citizens of Georgia received the highest number of permits in 2015 (13%), followed by citizens of Ukraine (9%), Kyrgyzstan (6%), Syria (6%) and Turkmenistan (5%). The number of work permits issued to Syrians has increased from 800 in 2013 to more than 4 000 in 2015.

According to statistics provided by the Council of Higher Education in Turkey, in 2013/14 there were 48 200 international tertiary students in Turkey, up from 43 300 the previous year. The top five countries of origin for international students in 2014 were Turkmenistan (6 900), Azerbaijan (6 900), Iran (4 300), Afghanistan (2 300) and Syria (1 800).

In 2014, 87 820 asylum applications were submitted in Turkey, almost double the number in 2013. Of these, 16 700 were from Afghans and 15 500 Iraqis. Between December 2011 and 2015, 2.5 million Syrian refugees had been registered under a temporary protection status.

In March 2015, the Strategy Document and National Action Plan on Irregular Migration was published by the Directorate General of Migration Management. It has six strategic aims: preventing irregular migration and strengthening measures related to fighting against organised crimes related to migration; reducing irregular labour migration through comprehensive policies; strengthening the return (removal) system for irregular migrants; developing systematic data collection, analysis and sharing regarding irregular migration; protecting vulnerable irregular migrants; strengthening regional and international co-operation to tackle irregular migration. The Plan, scheduled to be completed by the end of 2018, sets specific goals to be reached in the short and medium terms.

In response to the Syrian crisis, Turkey has implemented a temporary protection regime for Syrian refugees, consisting of three main principles: 1) an open border policy, 2) the principle of non-refoulement; and 3) registration with the Turkish authorities and support inside the precincts of the camps.

In February 2014, Turkey and the European Frontex agency signed a co-operation plan for the 2014-16 period, beginning with the sharing of statistical data, training activities and operational co-operation. As of September 2014, the Visa Information System (VIS), which requires Schengen visa applicants to furnish their biometric information (ten fingerprints and a facial image) to the nearest consulate, was put into effect in Turkey, both for incoming travellers and outgoing citizens.

In January 2016, the Turkish Government published new regulations to allow part of the 2.5 million Syrian refugees in the country (those who are registered and who have been in Turkey for at least six months) to apply for a work permit in order to reduce their likelihood of working in an irregular situation. In order to obtain a permit, Syrians should find an employer in Turkey ready to pay them at least the minimum wage. First estimates show that the number of permits issued is low, although the limit has been fixed at 10% of the total workforce at the workplace. Seasonal working refugees in agriculture and the stockbreeding field are exempted from requiring a work permit.

On 7 March 2016, the EU and Turkey concluded an agreement to return all undocumented migrants landing in Greece (both economic migrants and asylum seekers) to Turkey. The agreement includes provisions of the resettlement – for every Syrian readmitted by Turkey from the Greek islands – of another Syrian from Turkey to the EU. Financial compensation for Turkey has been agreed: in addition to the EUR 350 million already being provided by the Commission, EUR 3 billion has been disbursed to support Turkey. In March 2016, EUR 95 million was contracted for food and education. Further contracts will be signed before the end of the year.

The Provincial Directorate of Migration Management became operational as of May 2015, and took over the provincial duties previously handled by National Police.

For further information

www.iskur.gov.tr

www.tuik.gov.tr

www.nvi.gov.tr

www.csgb.gov.tr

www.mfa.gov.tr

www.goc.gov.tr

Recent trends in migrants’ flows and stocks

Turkey

Notes and sources are at the end of the chapter.

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933396184

United Kingdom

Immigration – which had more or less plateaued in the past few years – increased sharply in 2014 to 632 000. The outflow of 320 000 in 2014 was similar to the year before. The net outflow of 55 000 British citizens, similar to 2013, was more than compensated for by a net inflow of 367 000 non-British, 98 000 more than the year before. The main reasons given for migrating in 2014 by the non-British were work (44%) and study (36%).

The number of work-related visas (including dependents) decreased by 1% in 2015 to 166 000. The trend in Tier 1 work visas issued (-45%, 5 400 visas in 2015) contrasted with that of visas issued to skilled workers with a job offer under Tier 2 (and their dependents) as well as those issued under Tier 5 (youth mobility and temporary workers) +2% each, to 92 000 and 45 000, respectively.

Among Tier 2, 59 000 work visas were issued in the ICT categories. Sponsored visa applications for skilled work (Tier 2) increased by 3% to 56 000 in 2015 (main applicants). The Information and Communication sector alone (+3%) accounted for 42% of all skilled work-sponsored visa applications.

The number of work-related extensions of stay (including dependants) continued to fall, from 88 400 in 2014 to 80 200 in 2015. Around 59 000 of these were extensions for skilled work (-3% compared with 2014). Of the 35 000 extensions in Tier 2 (main applicants), some 23 400 were previously in Tier 2 (i.e. skilled work), 5 600 and 5 400 were grants to former students and individuals previously in the Tier 1 – Post-Study Work category (now closed to new entrants), respectively.

In 2015, the number of study-related visas granted fell to 210 400 (-4%); of the recipients, 15 000 were dependents. This trend results from government attempts to curb abuse of the student entry route. The university-sponsored study visa applications were the category least affected by the trend, with a 1% decrease to 166 400.

The number of people granted permission to stay permanently, which fell by about a third in 2014, decreased by 14% in 2015 to reach 90 000 in 2015, the lowest level since 2000. Forty-four per cent of grants in 2015 were for employment, 20% for asylum and 18% for family reasons – half its 2014 level.

According to Eurostat data, there were 38 900 asylum applications in 2015 (including dependents), i.e. 3% of the applications received in the EU28. This number increased 20% compared with 32 300 received in 2014. The top three origin nations (Eritrea, Iran and Pakistan) accounted for 28% of total applications. Around 36% of decisions made at first instance were positive, compared with 51% in the EU28.

Following most of the recommendations formulated by the Migration Advisory Committee, the government has begun to implement a major reform of Tier 2, which should be fully in place by April 2017. As a means of decreasing the number of migrants eligible under Tier 2 (general), salary thresholds will be increased to GBP 30 000 by 2017, with some exemptions. Non-EEA nurses have been put on the shortage list but will need a labour market test. All entries of ICT migrants will be conditional on a minimum salary threshold of GBP 41 500. Some conditions for extending the stay of those with higher salaries will be relaxed from April 2017. With certain exceptions, an immigration skills charge of GBP 1 000 per person per year will be implemented from April 2017.

In September 2015, the government announced an extension of the Vulnerable Persons Relocation Scheme to Syrian refugees, to resettle up to 20 000 refugees from Syria’s neighbouring countries over the next five years. Separate from those who claim asylum in the United Kingdom, a temporary concession allowing Syrians already in the United Kingdom to apply for an extension to their visa, or to switch to a different visa category, has been extended until February 2017.

To encourage integration, in January 2016 the government announced a new English language requirement for the family immigration route at level A2 of the Common European Framework of Reference for Languages. Non-EEA partners and parents now have to meet a pre-entry A1 requirement for a visa and a B1 requirement for settlement. Only then may they qualify, after two and a half years in the United Kingdom, for further leave to remain on a five-year route to settlement. The new A2 requirement will not be implemented before October 2016.

For further information

www.gov.uk/government/collections/migration-statistics

www.ons.gov.uk

Recent trends in migrants’ flows and stocks

United Kingdom

Notes and sources are at the end of the chapter.

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933396193

United States

The number of persons granted Lawful Permanent Resident (LPR) status in the United States during fiscal year 2014 increased by 2.6% from the previous year to 1 016 500. Approximately 481 400 persons granted LPR status (47%) were new arrivals to the United States (+5% compared with previous year).

The number of family-sponsored immigrants decreased by 0.6% to 645 600 (64% of new LPRs). There were 151 600 employment-based grants (15% of new LPRs), including both workers (71 000, down from 75 200 in 2013) and their family members (80 600, down from 85 900). The diversity programme (the “Green Card Lottery”) accounted for 5% of LPRs and was comparable to fiscal year 2013 levels. The largest annual increases were seen in two small programmes (including family members): victims of criminal activity (U non-immigrants visas adjusting to LPR, +212%), and Iraqis and Afghans employed by the US government (Special Immigrant Visa – SIV –  Program, +441%).

About two in three employment-based immigrants originated in Asia (the top origin countries being India, China, Korea and the Philippines). Nearly 41% of all family-sponsored preference immigrants originated within North America (Mexico, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador and Haiti) and 44% within Asia (Viet Nam, the Philippines, China and India).

A total of 70 000 refugees were physically admitted in 2014 (same level as in 2013), while the number of refugees admitted in previous years who adjusted to LPR status increased by 24% to 96 000, primarily due to an increase in the number of Cubans. The leading countries of origin for refugees admitted were Iraq, Burma and Somalia.

The number of persons issued non-immigrant visas in 2014 (other than tourists) increased to 2.25 million. The leading categories of visas issued were temporary workers and their families (732 000), students and their families (640 000), and exchange visitors and their families (373 000). In 2014, the highest number of non-tourist visas issued – 363 000 – went to nationals of China, followed by India (354 000) and Mexico (206 000). Temporary workers in specialty occupations (H-1B) totalled 161 400 in 2014 and 172 700 in 2015, up from 153 200 in 2013. H-1B visas went mostly to nationals of India (67%) and China (9%). For the fourth year in a row, the number of H-1B visa petitions filed in the first week of the fiscal year exceeded the total allotment, requiring US Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) to make use of a lottery to allocate available H-1B visas. In addition, 149 600 and 164 600 intra-company transferees were accepted in 2014 and 2015, respectively, up from 140 800 in 2013.

In May 2015, certain H-4 dependent spouses of temporary skilled workers (H-1B) became eligible for employment authorisation. The number of H-4 visas granted doubled since 2009 to 124 500 in 2015, but not all H-4 visa holders are eligible for employment authorisation.

The EB-5 programme for investors had record demand in 2015, with 17 700 applications filed, up from 11 800 in 2014 and 6 500 in 2013. The programme is capped at 10 000 annually (including family members), so pending applications increased to 22 000. The number of cases approved increased sharply, from 4 900 in 2014 to 8 800 in 2015.

The H-2B temporary work programme for non-agricultural workers is capped at 66 000 annually. Recent demand has exceeded the statutory limitation, and an amendment was introduced in December 2015 to allow certain H-2B workers who were previously counted against in the annual H-2B cap during 2013, 2014 or 2015 to be exempted from the H-2B cap for fiscal year 2016.

Due to a court order issued in February 2015, the proposed expansion of the existing Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) as well as Deferred Action for Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents (DAPA) has been suspended, pending review by the US Supreme Court. Approximately 788 000 requests for DACA were received from August 2012 through September 2015. Nearly 700 000 initial requests were approved, and nearly 479 000 persons with initial approval have requested renewal.

From May 2016, eligible F-1 students who receive degrees in science, technology, engineering and mathematics may apply for a 24-month extension of Optional Practical Training (OPT). This extension replaced the 17-month Science, Technology, Engineering and Math (STEM) OPT extension previously available to STEM students, and includes several new features that strengthen the oversight of the programme. The Summer Work Travel programme has also been bolstered following concern over abuses. General improvements to the programme have been made – for example, beginning in 2016, visa-waiver country nationals must secure an employment offer prior to coming to the United States.

For further information

www.dhs.gov/immigration-statistics

www.uscis.gov/tools/reports-studies/immigration-forms-data

https://travel.state.gov/content/visas/en/law-and-policy/statistics.html

www.foreignlaborcert.doleta.gov/

www.ice.gov/removal-statistics/

www.cbp.gov/newsroom/media-resources/stats

Recent trends in migrants’ flows and stocks

United States

Notes and sources are at the end of the chapter.

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933396208

Sources and notes of the country tables of Chapter 5

Migration flows of foreigners

OECD countries and the Russian Federation: sources and notes are available in the Statistical Annex (Metadata related to Tables A.1. and B.1.).

Bulgaria: Number of new permanent and long-term residence permits granted (Source: Ministry of the Interior); Lithuania: Arrivals and departures of residents (Source: Department of Statistics of the Government of the Republic of Lithuania); Romania: Source: Permanent residence changes (Source: Romanian Statistical Yearbook).

Long-term migration inflows of foreigners by type (standardised inflows)

The statistics are based largely on residence and work permit data and have been standardised, to the extent possible (cf. www.oecd.org/migration/imo).

Temporary migration

Based on residence or work permit data. Data on temporary workers generally do not cover workers who benefit from a free circulation agreement.

Inflows of asylum seekers

United Nations High Commission for Refugees (www.unhcr.org/statistics).

Components of population growth

Population and Vital Statistics (ALFS), OECD, 2015, and Eurostat: Population change - Demographic balance and crude rates at national level.

Total population

Foreign-born population

National sources and Secretariat estimates. Sources and notes of national sources are provided in the Statistical Annex (Metadata for Tables A.4 and B.4).

Foreign population

National sources. Exact sources and notes for the OECD countries are given in the Statistical Annex (Metadata related to Tables A.5 and B.5).

Lithuania: Residents’ Register Service (Ministry of the Interior); Romania: Ministry of the Interior.

Naturalisations

National sources. Exact sources and notes for the OECD countries are given in the Statistical Annex (Metadata related to Tables A.6 and B.6). Bulgaria and Lithuania: Ministry of the Interior.

Labour market outcomes

European countries and Turkey: Labour Force Surveys (Eurostat); Australia, Canada, Israel, New-Zealand: Labour Force Surveys; Chile: Encuesta de Caracterización Socioeconómica Nacional (CASEN); Mexico: Encuesta Nacional de Ocupación y Empleo (ENOE); United States: Current Population Surveys.

Statistical annexNote on Israel: The statistical data for Israel are supplied by and under the responsibility of the relevant Israeli authorities. The use of such data by the OECD is without prejudice to the status of the Golan Heights, East Jerusalem and Israeli settlements in the West Bank under the terms of international law.Note on Cyprus:1. Note by Turkey: The information in this document with reference to Cyprus relates to the southern part of the Island. There is no single authority representing both Turkish and Greek Cypriot people on the Island. Turkey recognizes the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). Until a lasting and equitable solution is found within the context of the United Nations, Turkey shall preserve its position concerning the Cyprus issue.2. Note by all the European Union member states of the OECD and the European Union: The Republic of Cyprus is recognised by all members of the United Nations with the exception of Turkey. The information in this document relates to the area under the effective control of the Government of the Republic of Cyprus.

Statistical annex¹

Introduction

Most of the data published in this annex have been provided by national correspondents of the continuous reporting system on migration appointed by the OECD Secretariat with the approval of the authorities of Member countries. Consequently, these data are not necessarily based on common definitions. Countries under review in this annex are OECD countries for which data are available, as well as the Russian Federation. The continuous reporting system on migration has no authority to impose changes in data collection procedures. It is an observatory which, by its very nature, has to use existing statistics. However, it does play an active role in suggesting what it considers to be essential improvements in data collection and makes every effort to present consistent and well-documented statistics.

The purpose of this annex is to describe the “immigrant” population (generally the foreign-born population). The information gathered concerns the flows and stocks of the total immigrant population as well as the acquisition of nationality. These data have not been standardised and are therefore not fully comparable across countries. In particular, the criteria for registering persons in population registers and the conditions for granting residence permits, for example, vary across countries, which means that measurements may differ greatly even if the same type of source is being used.

In addition to the problem of the comparability of statistics, there is the difficulty of the very partial coverage of unauthorised migrants. Part of this population may be counted in censuses. Regularisation programmes, when they exist, make it possible to identify and enumerate a far from negligible fraction of unauthorised immigrants after the fact. In terms of measurement, this makes it possible to better measure the volume of the foreign-born population at a given time, even if it is not always possible to determine the year these immigrants entered the country.

Each series in the annex is preceded by an explanatory note concerning the data presented. A summary table then follows (series A, giving the total for each destination country), and finally the tables by nationality or country of birth, as the case may be (series B). At the end of each series, a table provides the sources and notes for the data presented in the tables for each country.

General comments

The tables provide annual series covering the period 2004-14.

The series A tables are presented in alphabetical order by the name of the country. In the other tables, nationalities or countries of birth are ranked by decreasing order of frequency for the last year available.

In the tables by country of origin (series B) only the 15 main countries are shown. “Other countries” is a residual calculated as the difference between the total foreign or foreign-born population and the sum for all countries indicated in the table. For some countries, data are not available for all years and this is reflected in the residual entry of “Other countries”. This must be borne in mind when interpreting changes in this category.

There is no table by nationality for the series on outflows of the foreign population (series A.2). These statistics, as well as data by gender are available online (www.oecd.org/migration/imo).

The rounding of data cells may cause totals to differ slightly from the sum of the component cells.

The symbol “..” used in the tables means that the data are not available.

Note

 1. Note on Israel: The statistical data for Israel are supplied by and under the responsibility of the relevant Israeli authorities. The use of such data by the OECD is without prejudice to the status of the Golan Heights, East Jerusalem and Israeli settlements in the West Bank under the terms of international law.

Note on Cyprus:

1. Note by Turkey: The information in this document with reference to “Cyprus” relates to the southern part of the Island. There is no single authority representing both Turkish and Greek Cypriot people on the Island. Turkey recognizes the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). Until a lasting and equitable solution is found within the context of the United Nations, Turkey shall preserve its position concerning the “Cyprus issue”.

2. Note by all the European Union member states of the OECD and the European Union: The Republic of Cyprus is recognised by all members of the United Nations with the exception of Turkey. The information in this document relates to the area under the effective control of the Government of the Republic of Cyprus.

Inflows and outflows of foreign population

Inflows and outflows of foreign population

OECD countries seldom have tools specifically designed to measure the inflows and outflows of the foreign population, and national estimates are generally based either on population registers or residence permit data. This note describes more systematically what is measured by each of the sources used.

Flows derived from population registers

Population registers can usually produce inflow and outflow data for both nationals and foreigners. To register, foreigners may have to indicate possession of an appropriate residence and/or work permit valid for at least as long as the minimum registration period. Emigrants are usually identified by a stated intention to leave the country, although the period of (intended) absence is not always specified.

In population registers, departures tend to be less well recorded than arrivals. Indeed, the emigrant who plans to return to the host country in the future may be reluctant to inform about his departure to avoid losing rights related to the presence on the register. Registration criteria vary considerably across countries; in particular the minimum duration of stay for individuals to be registered ranges from three months to one year, which poses major problems of international comparisons. For example, in some countries, register data cover many temporary migrants, in some cases including asylum seekers when they live in private households (as opposed to reception centres or hostels for immigrants) and international students.

Flows derived from residence and/or work permits

Statistics on permits are generally based on the number of permits issued during a given period and depend on the types of permits used. The so-called “settlement countries” (Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United States) consider as immigrants persons who have been granted the right of permanent residence, and this right is often granted upon arrival. Statistics on temporary immigrants are also published in this annex for these countries. In the case of France, the permits covered are those valid for at least one year (excluding students).

Another characteristic of permit data is that flows of nationals are not recorded. Some flows of foreigners may also not be recorded, either because the type of permit they hold is not included in the statistics or because they are not required to have a permit (freedom of movement agreements). In addition, permit data do not necessarily reflect physical flows or actual lengths of stay since: i) permits may be issued overseas but individuals may decide not to use them, or delay their arrival; ii) permits may be issued to persons who have in fact been resident in the country for some time, the permit indicating a change of status.

Flows estimated from specific surveys

Ireland provides estimates based on the results of Quarterly National Household Surveys and other sources such as permit data and asylum applications. These estimates are revised periodically on the basis of census data. Data for the United Kingdom are based on a survey of passengers entering or exiting the country by plane, train or boat (International Passenger Survey). One of the aims of this survey is to estimate the number and characteristics of migrants. The survey is based on a random sample of approximately one out of every 500 passengers. The figures were revised significantly following the latest census in each of these two countries, which seems to indicate that these estimates do not constitute an “ideal” source either. Australia and New Zealand also conduct passenger surveys which enable them to establish the length of stay on the basis of migrants’ stated intentions when they enter or exit the country.

Table A.1. Inflows of foreign population into selected OECD countries and in Russia
| 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014
Australia |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
Permanent | 146.4 | 161.7 | 176.2 | 189.5 | 203.9 | 222.6 | 206.7 | 210.7 | 242.4 | 251.9 | 236.6
Temporary | 261.6 | 289.4 | 321.6 | 368.5 | 420.0 | 474.8 | 467.0 | 504.7 | .. | .. | ..
Austria | 104.2 | 98.0 | 82.9 | 91.5 | 94.4 | 91.7 | 96.9 | 109.9 | 125.6 | 135.2 | 154.3
Belgium | 72.4 | 77.4 | 83.4 | 93.4 | 106.0 | 102.7 | 113.6 | 117.9 | 128.9 | 117.6 | 123.6
Canada |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
Permanent | 235.8 | 262.2 | 251.6 | 236.8 | 247.2 | 252.2 | 280.7 | 248.7 | 257.9 | 259.0 | 260.4
Temporary | 227.1 | 228.5 | 248.6 | 278.0 | 311.5 | 291.5 | 282.0 | 293.2 | 315.9 | .. | ..
Chile | 32.1 | 38.1 | 48.5 | 79.4 | 68.4 | 57.1 | 63.9 | 76.3 | 105.1 | 132.1 | 138.0
Czech Republic | 50.8 | 58.6 | 66.1 | 102.5 | 76.2 | 38.2 | 28.0 | 20.7 | 28.6 | 27.8 | 38.5
Denmark | 18.7 | 20.1 | 24.0 | 31.4 | 37.0 | 32.0 | 33.4 | 34.6 | 35.5 | 41.3 | 49.0
Estonia | 0.8 | 1.0 | 1.5 | 2.0 | 1.9 | 2.2 | 1.2 | 1.7 | 1.1 | 1.6 | 1.3
Finland | 11.5 | 12.7 | 13.9 | 17.5 | 19.9 | 18.1 | 18.2 | 20.4 | 23.3 | 23.9 | 23.6
France | 141.6 | 135.9 | 159.4 | 145.9 | | 147.0 | 149.6 | 145.8 | 142.1 | 151.6 | 160.7 | 168.1
Germany | 602.2 | 579.3 | 558.5 | 574.8 | 573.8 | 606.3 | 683.5 | 841.7 | 965.9 | 1 108.1 | 1 342.5
Greece | .. | 65.3 | 63.2 | 46.3 | | 41.5 | 35.8 | 35.4 | 33.0 | 32.0 | 31.3 | 29.5
Hungary | 22.2 | 25.6 | 23.6 | 22.6 | 35.5 | 25.6 | 23.9 | 22.5 | 20.3 | 21.3 | 26.0
Iceland | 2.5 | 4.7 | 7.1 | 9.3 | 7.5 | 3.4 | 3.0 | 2.8 | 2.8 | 3.9 | 4.3
Ireland | 41.8 | 66.1 | 88.9 | 120.4 | 89.7 | 50.7 | 23.9 | 33.7 | 32.1 | 40.2 | 49.0
Israel | 20.9 | 21.2 | 19.3 | 18.1 | 13.7 | 14.6 | 16.6 | 16.9 | 16.6 | 16.9 | 24.1
Italy | 394.8 | 282.8 | 254.6 | 515.2 | 496.5 | 406.7 | 424.5 | 354.3 | 321.3 | 279.0 | 248.4
Japan | 372.0 | 372.3 | 325.6 | 336.6 | 344.5 | 297.1 | 287.1 | 266.9 | 303.9 | 306.7 | 336.5
Korea | 178.5 | 253.7 | 303.0 | 300.4 | 302.2 | 232.8 | 293.1 | 307.2 | 300.2 | 360.5 | 407.1
Luxembourg | 12.2 | 13.8 | 13.7 | 15.8 | 16.8 | 14.6 | 15.8 | 19.1 | 19.4 | 19.8 | 21.0
Mexico | 8.5 | 9.2 | 6.9 | 7.2 | 15.9 | 23.9 | 26.2 | 22.0 | 18.2 | 63.0 | 43.5
Netherlands | 65.1 | 63.4 | 67.7 | 80.3 | 103.4 | 104.4 | 110.2 | 118.5 | 115.7 | 122.3 | 139.3
New Zealand | 55.4 | 54.8 | 58.7 | 59.6 | 63.9 | 60.3 | 57.6 | 61.0 | 62.0 | 67.5 | 80.3
Norway | 27.9 | 31.4 | 37.4 | 53.5 | 58.8 | 56.7 | 65.1 | 70.8 | 70.0 | 66.9 | 61.4
Poland | 36.9 | 38.5 | 34.2 | 40.6 | 41.8 | 41.3 | 41.1 | 41.3 | 47.1 | 46.6 | 32.0
Portugal | 34.1 | 28.1 | 22.5 | 32.6 | 72.8 | 61.4 | 50.7 | 45.4 | 38.5 | 33.2 | 35.3
Russia | 119.2 | 177.2 | 186.4 | 287.0 | 281.6 | 279.9 | 191.7 | 356.5 | 417.7 | 482.2 | 578.5
Slovak Republic | 7.9 | 7.7 | 11.3 | 14.8 | 16.5 | 14.4 | 12.7 | 8.2 | 2.9 | 2.5 | 2.4
Slovenia | .. | .. | .. | 30.5 | 43.8 | 24.2 | 11.3 | 18.0 | 17.3 | 15.7 | 18.4
Spain | 645.8 | 682.7 | 803.0 | 920.5 | 567.4 | 365.4 | 330.3 | 335.9 | 272.5 | 248.4 | 265.8
Sweden | 47.6 | 51.3 | 80.4 | 83.5 | 83.3 | 83.8 | 79.0 | 75.9 | 82.6 | 95.4 | 106.1
Switzerland | 96.3 | 94.4 | 102.7 | 139.7 | 157.3 | 132.4 | 134.2 | 142.5 | 143.8 | 155.4 | 152.1
Turkey | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 29.9 | .. | .. | .. | ..
United Kingdom | 434.3 | 405.1 | 451.7 | 455.0 | 456.0 | 430.0 | 459.0 | 453.0 | 383.0 | 406.0 | 504.0
United States |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
Permanent | 957.9 | 1 122.4 | 1 266.3 | 1 052.4 | 1 107.1 | 1 130.8 | 1 042.6 | 1 062.0 | 1 031.6 | 990.6 | 1 016.5
Temporary | 1 299.3 | 1 323.5 | 1 457.9 | 1 606.9 | 1 617.6 | 1 419.2 | 1 517.9 | 1 616.8 | 1 675.9 | 1 787.7 | 1 949.1
Notes: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of Table A.2. Information on data for Israel: http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932315602.
StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395726

Table B.1. Inflows of foreign population by nationality
Thousands
Australia (Permanent)
| 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | Of which: Women 2014 (%)
India | 11.3 | 12.8 | 15.2 | 19.8 | 22.7 | 25.3 | 23.5 | 21.9 | 27.9 | 38.2 | 39.7 | ..
New Zealand | 18.7 | 22.4 | 23.8 | 28.3 | 34.5 | 33.0 | 24.4 | 34.6 | 44.3 | 41.2 | 27.3 | ..
China | 12.5 | 15.2 | 17.3 | 21.1 | 20.7 | 22.9 | 25.0 | 29.0 | 25.6 | 28.1 | 27.3 | ..
United Kingdom | 25.7 | 26.2 | 30.9 | 30.7 | 31.7 | 33.3 | 26.7 | 21.5 | 27.0 | 23.1 | 23.8 | ..
Philippines | 4.4 | 4.8 | 5.4 | 6.1 | 7.1 | 8.9 | 10.3 | 10.7 | 12.8 | 11.0 | 10.3 | ..
Ireland | 1.6 | 1.6 | 1.8 | 1.9 | 2.0 | 2.7 | 3.0 | 3.4 | 5.0 | 5.3 | 6.3 | ..
Pakistan | 1.4 | 1.7 | 1.6 | 1.8 | 1.9 | 2.1 | 2.0 | 2.1 | 4.3 | 4.5 | 6.1 | ..
Afghanistan | 1.3 | 3.5 | 3.5 | 2.6 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 3.2 | 3.4 | 3.6 | 4.6 | 6.0 | ..
Viet Nam | 2.5 | 2.5 | 2.9 | 3.4 | 3.0 | 3.3 | 3.9 | 4.8 | 4.8 | 5.7 | 5.2 | ..
South Africa | 7.1 | 5.7 | 4.8 | 5.4 | 6.9 | 11.3 | 11.1 | 8.1 | 8.0 | 5.8 | 4.9 | ..
Sri Lanka | 2.1 | 3.0 | 3.3 | 3.8 | 4.8 | 5.3 | 5.8 | 4.9 | 6.1 | 5.7 | 4.6 | ..
Malaysia | 5.1 | 4.7 | 4.8 | 4.8 | 5.1 | 5.4 | 4.9 | 5.0 | 5.4 | 5.6 | 4.5 | ..
Nepal | 0.5 | 0.6 | 0.6 | 0.7 | 0.9 | 1.0 | 1.3 | 2.1 | 2.5 | 4.1 | 4.4 | ..
Iraq | 1.8 | 3.3 | 5.1 | 2.5 | 2.6 | 4.4 | 2.9 | 3.3 | 2.5 | 3.6 | 4.1 | ..
United States | 3.0 | 3.0 | 2.9 | 2.8 | 3.0 | 3.1 | 3.2 | 3.0 | 3.3 | 3.8 | 3.8 | ..
Other countries | 47.3 | 50.8 | 52.4 | 53.9 | 54.9 | 58.6 | 55.6 | 53.1 | 59.2 | 61.4 | 58.3 |
Total | 146.4 | 161.7 | 176.2 | 189.5 | 203.9 | 222.6 | 206.7 | 210.7 | 242.4 | 251.9 | 236.6 | ..
Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.
StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395787

Table B.1. Inflows of foreign population by nationality
Thousands
Austria
| 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | Of which: Women 2014 (%)
Romania | 5.5 | 5.1 | 4.5 | 9.3 | 9.2 | 9.3 | 11.3 | 12.9 | 13.4 | 13.5 | 20.7 | 47
Germany | 13.2 | 14.7 | 15.9 | 18.0 | 19.2 | 17.6 | 18.0 | 17.4 | 17.8 | 17.7 | 16.8 | 46
Hungary | 3.2 | 3.4 | 3.6 | 4.5 | 5.2 | 5.8 | 6.4 | 9.3 | 13.1 | 14.9 | 14.5 | 47
Serbia | 11.6 | 11.7 | 7.4 | 6.4 | 6.1 | 4.6 | 7.2 | 6.1 | 6.8 | 7.2 | 7.6 | 44
Syria | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.1 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.3 | 0.2 | 0.4 | 0.9 | 1.7 | 7.4 | 22
Poland | 7.0 | 6.8 | 5.7 | 5.3 | 4.4 | 3.8 | 4.0 | 6.4 | 7.1 | 7.3 | 6.9 | 41
Slovak Republic | 3.5 | 3.6 | 3.5 | 3.6 | 4.9 | 4.0 | 4.0 | 5.3 | 6.0 | 6.2 | 6.5 | 53
Croatia | 3.3 | 2.8 | 2.5 | 2.3 | 2.0 | 1.9 | 1.9 | 1.9 | 2.0 | 4.2 | 6.0 | 42
Bulgaria | 1.7 | 1.4 | 1.2 | 2.2 | 2.5 | 2.6 | 3.1 | 3.2 | 3.6 | 3.9 | 5.8 | 47
Bosnia and Herzegovina | 5.4 | 4.6 | 3.2 | 3.0 | 2.9 | 2.4 | 2.5 | 3.9 | 4.1 | 5.0 | 5.2 | 45
Italy | 1.4 | 1.4 | 1.5 | 1.7 | 1.8 | 2.0 | 2.2 | 2.3 | 3.1 | 4.0 | 4.1 | 42
Turkey | 8.2 | 7.7 | 4.9 | 5.2 | 5.0 | 4.7 | 4.3 | 3.8 | 4.1 | 4.5 | 3.7 | 43
Afghanistan | 0.7 | 0.7 | 0.5 | 0.5 | 1.0 | 1.4 | 1.3 | 2.9 | 3.8 | 2.3 | 3.2 | 29
Russian Federation | 6.8 | 4.0 | 2.5 | 2.2 | 2.9 | 2.4 | 2.2 | 2.6 | 3.4 | 3.5 | 3.1 | 58
Slovenia | 0.6 | 0.5 | 0.6 | 0.7 | 0.7 | 0.8 | 0.8 | 1.3 | 1.9 | 2.5 | 3.1 | 41
Other countries | 31.8 | 29.5 | 25.4 | 26.4 | 26.4 | 28.0 | 27.4 | 30.0 | 34.6 | 36.7 | 39.7 |
Total | 104.2 | 98.0 | 82.9 | 91.5 | 94.4 | 91.7 | 96.9 | 109.9 | 125.6 | 135.2 | 154.3 | 44
Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.
StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395787

Table B.1. Inflows of foreign population by nationality
Thousands
Belgium
| 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | Of which: Women 2014 (%)
Romania | 1.4 | 2.3 | 3.1 | 5.5 | 6.8 | 6.1 | 8.0 | 10.9 | 11.2 | 10.0 | 13.7 | 42
France | 9.5 | 10.4 | 11.6 | 12.3 | 14.1 | 12.3 | 13.5 | 13.8 | 13.3 | 13.6 | 13.7 | 50
Netherlands | 8.8 | 10.1 | 11.5 | 11.4 | 11.7 | 8.8 | 9.3 | 9.5 | 9.1 | 9.0 | 9.2 | 48
Poland | 3.5 | 4.8 | 6.7 | 9.4 | 9.0 | 9.9 | 8.9 | 9.3 | 8.6 | 7.5 | 6.9 | 44
Italy | 2.3 | 2.5 | 2.6 | 2.7 | 3.7 | 3.6 | 4.3 | 4.7 | 5.2 | 5.7 | 6.3 | 45
Spain | 1.6 | 1.8 | 1.8 | 1.9 | 2.8 | 3.6 | 4.6 | 5.3 | 6.0 | 6.1 | 6.1 | 48
Bulgaria | 0.7 | 0.9 | 0.8 | 2.6 | 3.9 | 3.3 | 4.2 | 4.3 | 4.5 | 3.9 | 5.0 | 47
Morocco | 8.0 | 7.1 | 7.5 | 7.8 | 8.2 | 9.1 | 9.8 | 8.5 | 5.9 | 4.7 | 4.8 | 56
Portugal | 1.9 | 1.9 | 2.0 | 2.3 | 3.2 | 2.9 | 2.7 | 3.1 | 4.2 | 4.3 | 3.6 | 43
Syria | .. | .. | .. | .. | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.9 | 1.0 | 3.0 | 42
Germany | 3.3 | 3.3 | 3.3 | 3.4 | 3.8 | 3.4 | 3.3 | 3.1 | 2.9 | 2.9 | 2.8 | 53
India | 1.2 | 1.3 | 1.5 | 1.6 | 2.1 | 1.8 | 2.3 | 2.3 | 2.3 | 2.6 | 2.7 | 38
United States | 2.6 | 2.4 | 2.6 | 2.5 | 2.6 | 2.7 | 2.7 | 2.6 | 2.5 | 2.6 | 2.5 | 55
United Kingdom | 2.4 | 2.2 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.4 | 1.9 | 2.2 | 2.1 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 1.9 | 46
Turkey | 3.2 | 3.4 | 3.0 | 3.2 | 3.2 | 3.1 | 3.2 | 2.9 | 2.4 | 2.0 | 1.8 | 49
Other countries | 22.0 | 23.0 | 23.5 | 24.8 | 28.5 | 30.3 | 34.3 | 35.4 | 47.8 | 39.6 | 39.7 |
Total | 72.4 | 77.4 | 83.4 | 93.4 | 106.0 | 102.7 | 113.6 | 117.9 | 128.9 | 117.6 | 123.6 | 48
Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.
StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395787

Table B.1. Inflows of foreign population by nationality
Thousands
Canada (Permanent)
| 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | Of which: Women 2014 (%)
Philippines | 14.0 | 18.1 | 18.4 | 19.8 | 24.9 | 28.6 | 38.6 | 36.8 | 34.3 | 29.5 | 40.0 | 61
India | 28.2 | 36.2 | 33.8 | 28.7 | 28.3 | 29.5 | 34.2 | 27.5 | 30.9 | 33.1 | 38.3 | 48
China | 36.6 | 42.6 | 33.5 | 27.6 | 30.0 | 29.6 | 30.4 | 28.5 | 33.0 | 34.1 | 24.6 | 55
Iran | 6.3 | 5.8 | 7.5 | 7.0 | 6.5 | 6.6 | 7.5 | 7.5 | 7.5 | 11.3 | 16.8 | 51
Pakistan | 13.4 | 14.3 | 13.1 | 10.1 | 9.0 | 7.2 | 6.8 | 7.5 | 11.2 | 12.6 | 9.1 | 50
United States | 7.0 | 8.4 | 9.6 | 9.5 | 10.2 | 9.0 | 8.1 | 7.7 | 7.9 | 8.5 | 8.5 | 50
United Kingdom | 7.5 | 7.3 | 7.1 | 8.2 | 9.0 | 8.9 | 8.7 | 6.2 | 6.2 | 5.8 | 5.8 | 41
France | 4.4 | 4.4 | 4.0 | 4.3 | 4.5 | 5.1 | 4.6 | 4.1 | 6.3 | 5.6 | 4.7 | 46
Mexico | 2.3 | 2.8 | 2.8 | 3.2 | 2.9 | 3.1 | 3.9 | 3.9 | 4.2 | 4.0 | 4.5 | 49
Korea | 5.4 | 5.8 | 6.2 | 5.9 | 7.3 | 5.9 | 5.5 | 4.6 | 5.3 | 4.5 | 4.5 | 55
Nigeria | 1.5 | 2.2 | 2.6 | 2.4 | 2.1 | 3.2 | 3.9 | 3.1 | 3.4 | 4.2 | 4.2 | 49
Iraq | 1.8 | 2.2 | 1.8 | 2.4 | 3.5 | 5.5 | 5.9 | 6.2 | 4.0 | 4.9 | 3.9 | 50
Algeria | 3.6 | 3.6 | 4.8 | 3.6 | 4.0 | 5.4 | 4.8 | 4.3 | 3.8 | 4.3 | 3.7 | 50
Haiti | 1.7 | 1.7 | 1.6 | 1.6 | 2.5 | 2.1 | 4.7 | 6.5 | 5.9 | 4.2 | 3.3 | 54
Egypt | 2.4 | 2.5 | 2.2 | 2.4 | 3.3 | 3.5 | 6.0 | 4.7 | 5.6 | 4.2 | 3.2 | 47
Other countries | 99.7 | 104.1 | 102.5 | 99.9 | 99.2 | 99.3 | 106.9 | 89.7 | 88.3 | 88.2 | 85.4 |
Total | 235.8 | 262.2 | 251.6 | 236.8 | 247.2 | 252.2 | 280.7 | 248.7 | 257.9 | 259.0 | 260.4 | 52
Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.
StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395787

Table B.1. Inflows of foreign population by nationality
Thousands
Chile
| 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | Of which: Women 2013 (%)
Peru | 15.6 | 20.0 | 28.6 | 53.2 | 39.0 | 27.6 | 27.7 | 30.7 | 38.6 | 39.3 | 39.9 | ..
Colombia | 1.1 | 1.7 | 2.4 | 3.3 | 4.4 | 5.3 | 7.2 | 12.5 | 17.8 | 26.6 | 28.4 | ..
Bolivia | 1.4 | 1.6 | 1.9 | 6.0 | 4.5 | 3.6 | 5.8 | 7.2 | 13.6 | 26.9 | 27.4 | ..
Argentina | 4.3 | 4.1 | 3.5 | 3.0 | 3.7 | 3.9 | 3.8 | 3.8 | 4.9 | 6.0 | 6.6 | ..
Spain | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.6 | 0.6 | 0.7 | 0.8 | 0.9 | 1.2 | 2.5 | 4.9 | 4.7 | ..
Ecuador | 1.8 | 1.9 | 2.2 | 3.1 | 3.1 | 2.7 | 2.5 | 2.9 | 3.6 | 4.0 | 4.2 | ..
Haiti | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.3 | 0.7 | 0.9 | 1.8 | 2.6 | 3.6 | ..
United States | 1.3 | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.5 | 2.1 | 2.2 | 2.9 | 3.0 | 3.5 | 3.3 | 3.3 | ..
Venezuela | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.6 | 0.6 | 0.7 | 0.7 | 1.1 | 1.2 | 1.5 | 2.9 | ..
Dominican Republic | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.2 | 0.3 | 0.0 | 0.6 | 1.0 | 1.8 | 4.4 | 3.7 | 2.5 | ..
China | 0.6 | 0.7 | 0.7 | 0.9 | 1.3 | 1.3 | 1.3 | 1.6 | 1.9 | 1.9 | 2.2 | ..
Brazil | 0.8 | 0.8 | 1.1 | 1.2 | 1.2 | 1.1 | 1.3 | 1.4 | 1.7 | 1.6 | 1.7 | ..
Mexico | 0.3 | 0.4 | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.7 | 0.7 | 0.7 | 0.8 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 1.1 | ..
Paraguay | 0.2 | 0.3 | 0.4 | 0.6 | 0.7 | 0.7 | 0.7 | 0.8 | 0.9 | 1.1 | 1.0 | ..
France | 0.3 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.6 | 0.6 | 0.8 | 0.8 | 0.9 | ..
Other countries | 3.3 | 3.7 | 4.0 | 4.0 | 5.7 | 5.3 | 6.0 | 6.0 | 6.8 | 7.1 | 7.5 |
Total | 32.1 | 38.1 | 48.5 | 79.4 | 68.4 | 57.1 | 63.9 | 76.3 | 105.1 | 132.1 | 138.0 | ..
Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.
StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395787

Table B.1. Inflows of foreign population by nationality
Thousands
Czech Republic
| 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | Of which: Women 2014 (%)
Ukraine | 16.3 | 23.9 | 30.2 | 39.6 | 18.7 | 8.1 | 3.5 | 2.0 | 5.9 | 3.7 | 8.4 | 46
Slovak Republic | 15.0 | 10.1 | 6.8 | 13.9 | 7.6 | 5.6 | 5.1 | 4.4 | 4.8 | 6.5 | 6.9 | 47
Russian Federation | 2.0 | 3.3 | 4.7 | 6.7 | 5.8 | 4.1 | 3.7 | 2.1 | 3.2 | 3.1 | 4.9 | 59
Viet Nam | 4.5 | 4.9 | 6.4 | 12.3 | 13.4 | 2.3 | 1.4 | 0.7 | 1.6 | 1.2 | 1.7 | 48
Germany | 1.3 | 1.4 | 0.8 | 1.9 | 4.3 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 1.3 | 1.3 | 1.7 | 1.6 | 15
Romania | 0.3 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.9 | 0.6 | 0.5 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.7 | 0.9 | 1.2 | 33
Bulgaria | 0.7 | 0.8 | 0.8 | 1.1 | 1.0 | 0.6 | 0.6 | 0.5 | 0.7 | 1.0 | 1.1 | 40
Kazakhstan | 0.2 | 0.4 | 0.5 | 1.0 | 0.7 | 0.8 | 0.7 | 0.5 | 0.6 | 0.6 | 1.0 | 55
United States | 0.7 | 1.4 | 1.8 | 1.7 | 2.2 | 2.5 | 1.7 | 1.3 | 1.1 | 0.8 | 0.9 | 45
Hungary | 0.1 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.4 | 0.7 | 31
Poland | 1.8 | 1.3 | 0.9 | 2.3 | 1.2 | 0.9 | 0.7 | 0.6 | 0.6 | 0.6 | 0.6 | 44
China | 0.5 | 0.8 | 1.4 | 1.0 | 0.9 | 0.6 | 0.5 | 0.3 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.5 | 54
Belarus | 0.6 | 0.7 | 0.8 | 1.1 | 0.6 | 0.4 | 0.3 | 0.2 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.5 | 59
India | 0.1 | 0.2 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.4 | 29
Turkey | 0.1 | 0.2 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.5 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 36
Other countries | 6.9 | 8.7 | 9.9 | 18.1 | 18.2 | 9.2 | 6.7 | 5.5 | 6.5 | 5.9 | 7.5 |
Total | 50.8 | 58.6 | 66.1 | 102.5 | 76.2 | 38.2 | 28.0 | 20.7 | 28.6 | 27.8 | 38.5 | 44
Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.
StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395787

Table B.1. Inflows of foreign population by nationality
Thousands
Denmark
| 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | Of which: Women 2014 (%)
Syria | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.1 | 0.0 | 0.1 | 0.2 | 0.4 | 0.6 | 0.9 | 1.6 | 5.4 | 31
Romania | 0.2 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.8 | 1.4 | 1.5 | 2.0 | 2.7 | 3.2 | 3.6 | 4.2 | 38
Poland | 0.7 | 1.3 | 2.5 | 4.3 | 6.5 | 3.4 | 2.9 | 3.2 | 3.3 | 3.6 | 4.0 | 35
Germany | 1.0 | 1.3 | 1.9 | 3.0 | 3.0 | 2.2 | 1.9 | 1.9 | 1.8 | 1.8 | 2.0 | 52
Norway | 1.2 | 1.2 | 1.4 | 1.4 | 1.4 | 1.3 | 1.4 | 1.5 | 1.4 | 1.4 | 1.7 | 60
Ukraine | 0.6 | 0.9 | 1.3 | 1.8 | 1.8 | 1.4 | 1.2 | 1.2 | 1.2 | 1.3 | 1.5 | 42
Lithuania | 0.5 | 0.6 | 0.8 | 0.7 | 1.1 | 1.3 | 1.5 | 1.6 | 1.5 | 1.4 | 1.5 | 41
Philippines | 0.4 | 0.5 | 0.8 | 1.3 | 1.7 | 1.8 | 1.8 | 1.7 | 1.4 | 1.7 | 1.5 | 93
Bulgaria | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.3 | 0.7 | 0.9 | 0.9 | 1.0 | 1.2 | 1.4 | 1.4 | 40
Italy | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.4 | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.6 | 0.7 | 0.7 | 0.9 | 1.1 | 1.4 | 35
Sweden | 0.8 | 0.9 | 1.2 | 1.3 | 1.3 | 1.1 | 1.1 | 1.1 | 1.1 | 1.3 | 1.4 | 53
India | 0.4 | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.9 | 1.0 | 0.8 | 0.9 | 1.1 | 0.9 | 1.1 | 1.4 | 38
United Kingdom | 0.7 | 0.7 | 0.9 | 0.9 | 1.0 | 0.9 | 1.0 | 1.1 | 1.0 | 1.1 | 1.2 | 38
China | 1.2 | 1.0 | 0.8 | 1.0 | 1.3 | 1.0 | 0.8 | 0.8 | 0.8 | 1.2 | 1.2 | 55
Spain | 0.3 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.7 | 0.8 | 0.9 | 1.0 | 1.1 | 45
Other countries | 10.1 | 10.0 | 10.8 | 12.9 | 13.8 | 13.4 | 14.1 | 13.8 | 13.9 | 16.8 | 18.3 |
Total | 18.7 | 20.1 | 24.0 | 31.4 | 37.0 | 32.0 | 33.4 | 34.6 | 35.5 | 41.3 | 49.0 | 45
Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.
StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395787

Table B.1. Inflows of foreign population by nationality
Thousands
Estonia
| 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | Of which: Women 2009 (%)
Russian Federation | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.3 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.5 | 0.4 | 0.9 | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.4 | 52
Finland | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 0.3 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | ..
Ukraine | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 0.2 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | ..
Germany | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 0.1 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | ..
Latvia | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 0.1 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | ..
China | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 0.1 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | ..
Sweden | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 0.1 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | ..
United States | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 0.1 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | ..
Italy | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 0.1 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | ..
France | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 0.1 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | ..
Other countries | 0.5 | 0.7 | 1.1 | 1.5 | 1.5 | 0.6 | 0.8 | 0.8 | 0.6 | 1.1 | 0.9 |
Total | 0.8 | 1.0 | 1.5 | 2.0 | 1.9 | 2.2 | 1.2 | 1.7 | 1.1 | 1.6 | 1.3 | 39
Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.
StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395787

Table B.1. Inflows of foreign population by nationality
Thousands
Finland
| 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | Of which: Women 2014 (%)
Estonia | 1.7 | 1.9 | 2.5 | 2.9 | 3.0 | 3.2 | 3.9 | 4.7 | 6.0 | 5.9 | 4.7 | 49
Russian Federation | 1.9 | 2.1 | 2.1 | 2.5 | 3.0 | 2.3 | 2.3 | 2.8 | 3.1 | 2.9 | 2.4 | 59
India | 0.3 | 0.4 | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.6 | 0.6 | 0.5 | 0.6 | 0.6 | 0.7 | 0.8 | 43
Iraq | 0.3 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.4 | 0.5 | 0.9 | 1.1 | 0.7 | 0.6 | 0.9 | 0.8 | 41
China | 0.4 | 0.6 | 0.5 | 0.7 | 1.0 | 0.8 | 0.6 | 0.8 | 0.7 | 0.8 | 0.7 | 62
Somalia | 0.2 | 0.4 | 0.3 | 0.6 | 0.6 | 0.8 | 1.0 | 0.7 | 0.4 | 0.7 | 0.6 | 49
Sweden | 0.7 | 0.7 | 0.7 | 0.7 | 0.9 | 0.8 | 0.7 | 0.7 | 0.6 | 0.6 | 0.6 | 40
Syria | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.6 | 47
Thailand | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.6 | 0.6 | 0.6 | 0.6 | 0.6 | 0.6 | 0.6 | 0.6 | 82
Afghanistan | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.3 | 0.4 | 0.6 | 0.6 | 0.5 | 58
Poland | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.2 | 0.4 | 0.6 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.5 | 37
Viet Nam | 0.1 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.5 | 58
Philippines | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.5 | 71
Ukraine | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 56
Spain | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.2 | 0.3 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 44
Other countries | 4.8 | 5.3 | 5.6 | 7.1 | 8.0 | 6.6 | 6.2 | 7.0 | 8.2 | 8.0 | 9.0 |
Total | 11.5 | 12.7 | 13.9 | 17.5 | 19.9 | 18.1 | 18.2 | 20.4 | 23.3 | 23.9 | 23.6 | 49
Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.
StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395787

Table B.1. Inflows of foreign population by nationality
Thousands
France
| 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | Of which: Women 2014 (%)
Algeria | 27.9 | 24.8 | 31.1 | 26.8 | 24.4 | 23.1 | 21.4 | 21.2 | 23.7 | 23.6 | 24.1 | 50
Morocco | 22.2 | 20.0 | 23.0 | 22.1 | 24.9 | 21.5 | 20.1 | 18.8 | 19.8 | 20.0 | 21.1 | 55
Tunisia | 8.9 | 8.0 | 9.3 | 8.8 | 8.8 | 10.3 | 10.7 | 10.3 | 11.3 | 11.6 | 11.9 | 40
China | 2.9 | 2.8 | 6.0 | 5.0 | 5.2 | 5.5 | 5.7 | 5.5 | 6.3 | 7.6 | 7.6 | 58
Comoros | 1.0 | 1.1 | 2.8 | 2.8 | 3.1 | 3.3 | 2.9 | 2.5 | 3.1 | 4.8 | 5.6 | 59
Turkey | 9.1 | 8.9 | 9.3 | 7.9 | 7.2 | 6.7 | 5.7 | 5.5 | 5.8 | 5.9 | 5.3 | 46
Senegal | 2.5 | 2.5 | 3.3 | 3.3 | 3.3 | 3.9 | 4.0 | 4.0 | 4.2 | 4.4 | 4.6 | 45
Russian Federation | 2.9 | 3.0 | 3.2 | 2.9 | 3.1 | 3.4 | 3.5 | 3.8 | 3.8 | 4.1 | 4.3 | 67
Democratic Republic of the Congo | 1.8 | 2.4 | 4.0 | 3.6 | 3.7 | 3.5 | 3.4 | 3.6 | 3.9 | 4.3 | 4.3 | 54
Côte d’Ivoire | 4.0 | 3.8 | 4.0 | 3.7 | 3.4 | 3.5 | 3.3 | 3.2 | 3.4 | 3.6 | 4.3 | 56
Mali | 2.6 | 2.5 | 3.3 | 3.0 | 4.7 | 5.7 | 4.9 | 4.6 | 3.6 | 3.9 | 4.1 | 34
Cameroon | 4.1 | 4.3 | 4.5 | 4.1 | 3.8 | 3.9 | 3.6 | 3.6 | 3.8 | 3.8 | 4.1 | 58
Haiti | 3.1 | 3.2 | 3.2 | 2.5 | 2.2 | 2.6 | 4.8 | 3.4 | 3.2 | 3.4 | 3.2 | 55
United States | 2.6 | 2.4 | 2.9 | 2.7 | 2.8 | 3.5 | 3.0 | 3.1 | 3.1 | 3.1 | 3.1 | 54
Brazil | 1.4 | 1.4 | 2.2 | 2.3 | 2.2 | 2.3 | 2.7 | 2.3 | 2.6 | 2.7 | 3.1 | 61
Other countries | 44.5 | 45.0 | 47.4 | 44.4 | 44.1 | 47.0 | 46.2 | 46.8 | 50.3 | 53.8 | 57.3 |
Total | 141.6 | 135.9 | 159.4 | 145.9 | 147.0 | 149.6 | 145.8 | 142.1 | 151.6 | 160.7 | 168.1 | 52
Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.
StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395787

Table B.1. Inflows of foreign population by nationality
Thousands
Germany
| 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | Of which: Women 2014 (%)
Romania | 23.5 | 23.3 | 23.4 | 42.9 | 48.2 | 57.3 | 75.5 | 97.5 | 120.5 | 139.5 | 190.9 | 36
Poland | 125.0 | 147.7 | 151.7 | 140.0 | 119.9 | 112.0 | 115.6 | 164.7 | 177.8 | 190.4 | 190.9 | 36
Bulgaria | 11.6 | 9.1 | 7.5 | 20.5 | 24.1 | 29.2 | 39.8 | 52.4 | 60.2 | 60.9 | 77.4 | 37
Italy | 19.6 | 18.3 | 17.7 | 18.2 | 20.1 | 22.2 | 23.9 | 28.1 | 36.9 | 47.5 | 70.4 | 39
Syria | 2.2 | 2.1 | 1.7 | 1.7 | 2.0 | 2.3 | 3.0 | 4.6 | 8.5 | 19.0 | 64.7 | 33
Hungary | 17.4 | 18.6 | 18.6 | 22.2 | 25.2 | 25.3 | 29.3 | 41.1 | 54.5 | 60.0 | 56.4 | 31
Croatia | 10.5 | 9.3 | 8.3 | 8.4 | 8.7 | 9.1 | 10.2 | 11.5 | 12.9 | 25.8 | 43.8 | 32
Serbia | 21.7 | 17.5 | 10.9 | 2.2 | 7.0 | 9.1 | 19.1 | 18.4 | 24.1 | 28.7 | 41.9 | 45
Spain | 7.6 | 7.1 | 8.2 | 8.6 | 7.8 | 9.0 | 10.7 | 16.2 | 23.3 | 29.0 | 34.4 | 44
Greece | 10.2 | 9.0 | 8.2 | 8.0 | 8.3 | 8.6 | 12.3 | 23.0 | 32.7 | 32.1 | 30.6 | 43
Turkey | 42.6 | 36.0 | 29.6 | 26.7 | 26.7 | 27.2 | 27.6 | 28.6 | 26.2 | 23.2 | 23.5 | 44
China | 13.1 | 12.0 | 12.9 | 13.6 | 14.3 | 15.4 | 16.2 | 18.3 | 19.7 | 22.4 | 22.5 | 51
United States | 15.3 | 15.2 | 16.3 | 17.5 | 17.5 | 17.7 | 18.3 | 20.1 | 19.6 | 20.5 | 21.5 | 47
Bosnia and Herzegovina | 8.0 | 7.0 | 6.6 | 6.4 | 6.2 | 6.1 | 6.9 | 9.5 | 12.2 | 15.1 | 20.5 | 39
Russian Federation | 28.5 | 23.1 | 16.4 | 15.0 | 15.1 | 15.7 | 16.1 | 17.5 | 18.8 | 31.4 | 19.1 | 61
Other countries | 245.3 | 224.0 | 220.3 | 223.1 | 223.0 | 240.1 | 259.2 | 290.1 | 318.0 | 362.7 | 434.0 |
Total | 602.2 | 579.3 | 558.5 | 574.8 | 573.8 | 606.3 | 683.5 | 841.7 | 965.9 | 1 108.1 | 1 342.5 | 39
Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.
StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395787

Table B.1. Inflows of foreign population by nationality
Thousands
Hungary
| 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | Of which: Women 2014 (%)
China | 0.8 | 0.5 | 1.4 | 1.9 | 1.5 | 1.3 | 1.1 | 0.9 | 1.1 | 2.2 | 4.7 | 50
Romania | 12.1 | 8.9 | 7.9 | 6.7 | 10.0 | 7.1 | 6.6 | 5.8 | 4.2 | 4.0 | 3.7 | 29
Germany | 0.1 | 3.9 | 0.7 | 0.7 | 3.2 | 2.7 | 2.4 | 2.4 | 2.1 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 43
Slovak Republic | 0.1 | 1.6 | 0.6 | 0.7 | 1.3 | 1.2 | 1.2 | 1.1 | 1.0 | 1.1 | 1.2 | 57
United States | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.6 | 0.4 | 1.2 | 1.3 | 1.1 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 1.1 | 51
Russian Federation | 0.3 | 0.2 | 0.4 | 0.3 | 0.4 | 0.5 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.5 | 0.6 | 1.0 | 55
Ukraine | 3.6 | 2.1 | 3.7 | 2.9 | 4.1 | 1.9 | 1.6 | 1.3 | 0.9 | 0.6 | 0.7 | 46
Turkey | 0.2 | 0.1 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.7 | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.6 | 0.6 | 0.5 | 0.6 | 39
Italy | 0.0 | 0.3 | 0.2 | 0.1 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.5 | 25
Brazil | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.1 | 0.0 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.4 | 0.5 | 38
Serbia | 1.6 | 1.1 | 2.4 | 4.4 | 4.1 | 1.2 | 1.0 | 0.9 | 0.7 | 0.6 | 0.5 | 33
Austria | 0.0 | 0.8 | 0.4 | 0.3 | 0.7 | 0.7 | 0.6 | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.5 | 37
Japan | 0.2 | 0.3 | 0.4 | 0.3 | 0.5 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.4 | 0.5 | 41
Korea | 0.0 | 0.1 | 0.4 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.4 | 37
France | 0.0 | 0.7 | 0.1 | 0.0 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.4 | 46
Other countries | 2.8 | 4.7 | 4.0 | 3.2 | 6.8 | 5.9 | 5.9 | 6.2 | 6.3 | 6.4 | 7.8 |
Total | 22.2 | 25.6 | 23.6 | 22.6 | 35.5 | 25.6 | 23.9 | 22.5 | 20.3 | 21.3 | 26.0 | 43
Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.
StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395787

Table B.1. Inflows of foreign population by nationality
Thousands
Iceland
| 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | Of which: Women 2014 (%)
Poland | 0.2 | 1.5 | 3.3 | 5.6 | 3.9 | 1.2 | 0.8 | 0.8 | 0.9 | 1.3 | 1.4 | 38
Germany | 0.1 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.1 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 68
Spain | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 41
United States | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.2 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 51
Lithuania | 0.1 | 0.2 | 0.4 | 0.6 | 0.4 | 0.2 | 0.3 | 0.2 | 0.1 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 45
United Kingdom | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 39
Denmark | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 42
France | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.0 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 48
Czech Republic | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 35
Romania | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 49
Latvia | 0.0 | 0.1 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.3 | 0.2 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 47
Portugal | 0.5 | 0.2 | 0.4 | 0.2 | 0.3 | 0.1 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 39
Slovak Republic | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.2 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 30
Sweden | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.2 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 40
Italy | 0.2 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 39
Other countries | 0.9 | 1.6 | 1.5 | 1.3 | 1.3 | 0.8 | 0.9 | 0.9 | 0.9 | 1.1 | 1.2 |
Total | 2.5 | 4.7 | 7.1 | 9.3 | 7.5 | 3.4 | 3.0 | 2.8 | 2.8 | 3.9 | 4.3 | 45
Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.
StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395787

Table B.1. Inflows of foreign population by nationality
Thousands
Israel
| 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | Of which: Women 2014 (%)
Former USSR | 10.1 | 9.4 | 7.5 | 6.5 | 5.6 | 6.8 | 7.0 | 7.2 | 7.2 | 7.3 | 11.6 | 53
France | 2.0 | 2.5 | 2.4 | 2.3 | 1.6 | 1.6 | 1.8 | 1.6 | 1.7 | 2.9 | 6.5 | 51
United States | 1.9 | 2.0 | 2.2 | 2.1 | 2.0 | 2.5 | 2.5 | 2.4 | 2.3 | 2.2 | 2.4 | 51
United Kingdom | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.6 | 0.6 | 0.5 | 0.7 | 0.6 | 0.5 | 0.6 | 0.4 | 0.5 | 48
Italy | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.3 | 48
Argentina | 0.5 | 0.4 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.2 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 55
Canada | 0.2 | 0.3 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.3 | 54
Brazil | 0.2 | 0.3 | 0.2 | 0.3 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.3 | 51
Belgium | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.1 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 56
Ethiopia | 3.7 | 3.6 | 3.6 | 3.6 | 1.6 | 0.2 | 1.7 | 2.7 | 2.4 | 1.4 | 0.2 | 49
Australia | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 56
Hungary | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.0 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 50
South Africa | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.1 | 0.2 | 0.1 | 49
Cuba | 0.1 | 0.0 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 50
Germany | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 51
Other countries | 1.3 | 1.7 | 1.7 | 1.7 | 1.0 | 1.2 | 1.3 | 1.1 | 1.0 | 1.1 | 1.0 |
Total | 20.9 | 21.2 | 19.3 | 18.1 | 13.7 | 14.6 | 16.6 | 16.9 | 16.6 | 16.9 | 24.1 | 52
Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.
StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395787

Table B.1. Inflows of foreign population by nationality
Thousands
Italy
| 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | Of which: Women 2014 (%)
Romania | 66.1 | 45.3 | 39.7 | 271.4 | 174.6 | 105.6 | 92.1 | 90.1 | 81.7 | 58.2 | 50.7 | 64
Morocco | 34.8 | 26.1 | 21.8 | 23.5 | 37.3 | 33.1 | 30.0 | 23.9 | 19.6 | 19.6 | 17.6 | 48
China | 19.3 | 14.7 | 13.6 | 9.7 | 12.8 | 16.8 | 22.9 | 20.1 | 20.5 | 17.6 | 15.8 | 48
Bangladesh | 8.4 | 5.8 | 5.6 | 5.2 | 9.3 | 8.9 | 9.7 | 10.3 | 10.1 | 10.5 | 12.7 | 24
Albania | 38.8 | 28.4 | 23.1 | 23.3 | 35.7 | 27.5 | 22.6 | 16.6 | 14.1 | 12.2 | 11.4 | 58
India | 9.0 | 7.2 | 6.3 | 7.1 | 12.5 | 12.8 | 15.2 | 13.3 | 11.2 | 10.8 | 11.1 | 40
Ukraine | 35.0 | 15.7 | 14.8 | 15.5 | 24.0 | 22.6 | 30.4 | 17.9 | 11.5 | 12.8 | 9.7 | 78
Pakistan | 7.5 | 6.5 | 4.1 | 3.5 | 5.7 | 7.9 | 10.8 | 7.5 | 8.8 | 7.8 | 9.6 | 26
Egypt | 11.6 | 5.6 | 5.0 | 3.7 | 5.3 | 8.0 | 9.3 | 9.6 | 8.6 | 9.8 | 8.7 | 32
Senegal | 5.3 | 2.9 | 2.3 | 2.3 | 4.8 | 4.9 | 8.9 | 6.6 | 5.5 | 6.5 | 6.3 | 28
Philippines | 8.1 | 5.5 | 4.4 | 4.0 | 7.8 | 10.0 | 10.7 | 10.4 | 9.9 | 7.6 | 5.8 | 56
Nigeria | 3.8 | 2.7 | 2.6 | 2.5 | 3.7 | 4.0 | 4.8 | 4.5 | 6.7 | 6.3 | 5.3 | 38
Sri Lanka | 5.2 | 3.9 | 3.7 | 3.8 | 6.6 | 6.3 | 7.1 | 6.8 | 7.1 | 6.3 | 5.3 | 53
Brazil | 5.2 | 8.8 | 10.2 | 11.9 | 12.6 | 9.7 | 8.6 | 7.1 | 5.7 | 5.0 | 5.0 | 57
Moldova | 11.9 | 9.3 | 7.8 | 13.0 | 22.0 | 16.8 | 26.6 | 15.0 | 8.8 | 8.1 | 3.8 | 70
Other countries | 124.7 | 94.5 | 89.6 | 114.8 | 121.8 | 111.9 | 114.8 | 94.8 | 91.5 | 80.2 | 69.8 |
Total | 394.8 | 282.8 | 254.6 | 515.2 | 496.5 | 406.7 | 424.5 | 354.3 | 321.3 | 279.0 | 248.4 | 51
Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.
StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395787

Table B.1. Inflows of foreign population by nationality
Thousands
Japan
| 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | Of which: Women 2014 (%)
China | 90.3 | 105.8 | 112.5 | 125.3 | 134.2 | 121.2 | 107.9 | 100.4 | 107.0 | 93.0 | 98.6 | ..
Viet Nam | 6.5 | 7.7 | 8.5 | 9.9 | 12.5 | 10.9 | 11.9 | 13.9 | 19.5 | 31.7 | 43.0 | ..
United States | 21.3 | 22.1 | 22.2 | 22.8 | 24.0 | 23.5 | 22.7 | 19.3 | 21.0 | 21.1 | 22.0 | ..
Korea | 22.8 | 22.7 | 24.7 | 28.1 | 30.0 | 27.0 | 27.9 | 23.4 | 25.7 | 24.2 | 21.1 | ..
Philippines | 96.2 | 63.5 | 28.3 | 25.3 | 21.0 | 15.8 | 13.3 | 13.6 | 15.4 | 16.4 | 19.9 | ..
Thailand | 7.1 | 9.0 | 8.7 | 9.0 | 10.5 | 9.9 | 10.9 | 13.6 | 15.4 | 15.4 | 14.3 | ..
Indonesia | 10.7 | 12.9 | 11.4 | 10.1 | 10.1 | 7.5 | 8.3 | 8.4 | 9.3 | 9.6 | 11.8 | ..
Nepal | .. | .. | 1.6 | 2.2 | 3.6 | 3.6 | 2.9 | 3.5 | 4.8 | 8.3 | 11.5 | ..
Chinese Taipei | .. | .. | 4.5 | 4.9 | 5.5 | 5.4 | 6.6 | 5.6 | 6.6 | 6.6 | 7.7 | ..
India | .. | .. | 4.9 | 5.8 | 5.7 | 4.6 | 4.9 | 4.7 | 5.6 | 5.6 | 6.9 | ..
Brazil | 32.2 | 33.9 | 27.0 | 22.9 | 14.4 | 3.0 | 4.7 | 4.5 | 5.8 | 4.8 | 6.1 | ..
United Kingdom | 6.3 | 6.3 | 6.6 | 5.8 | 6.0 | 5.3 | 5.8 | 5.2 | 5.5 | 6.1 | 5.9 | ..
France | .. | .. | 3.8 | 4.2 | 4.5 | 3.9 | 4.0 | 2.9 | 4.0 | 4.5 | 4.5 | ..
Germany | .. | .. | 4.7 | 4.9 | 4.8 | 4.5 | 4.3 | 3.7 | 4.1 | 4.1 | 4.3 | ..
Australia | .. | .. | 4.1 | 3.8 | 3.5 | 3.1 | 1.1 | 2.8 | 2.9 | 3.0 | 3.3 | ..
Other countries | 78.5 | 88.4 | 52.2 | 51.7 | 54.1 | 47.9 | 50.0 | 41.5 | 51.3 | 52.3 | 55.5 |
Total | 372.0 | 372.3 | 325.6 | 336.6 | 344.5 | 297.1 | 287.1 | 266.9 | 303.9 | 306.7 | 336.5 | ..
Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.
StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395787

Table B.1. Inflows of foreign population by nationality
Thousands
Korea
| 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | Of which: Women 2013 (%)
China | 67.4 | 115.8 | 161.2 | 177.0 | 161.7 | 117.6 | 155.3 | 149.2 | 127.3 | 178.6 | 192.9 | ..
Thailand | 9.8 | 13.7 | 15.8 | 10.5 | 8.6 | 5.8 | 6.9 | 10.3 | 13.8 | 18.3 | 48.3 | ..
Viet Nam | 7.8 | 18.0 | 20.0 | 21.2 | 24.0 | 16.4 | 22.9 | 27.9 | 24.7 | 22.2 | 28.0 | ..
United States | 18.1 | 18.0 | 17.8 | 18.9 | 23.4 | 27.1 | 28.3 | 28.1 | 28.9 | 26.6 | 24.5 | ..
Uzbekistan | 3.6 | 3.2 | 4.8 | 4.9 | 9.4 | 4.7 | 8.6 | 8.2 | 11.4 | 12.3 | 12.9 | ..
Philippines | 10.1 | 16.5 | 17.9 | 12.2 | 9.1 | 8.9 | 9.1 | 9.6 | 9.9 | 12.0 | 10.7 | ..
Indonesia | 5.2 | 10.2 | 6.9 | 5.2 | 9.7 | 3.3 | 5.3 | 8.1 | 8.3 | 11.8 | 10.5 | ..
Cambodia | 0.9 | 0.8 | 2.2 | 1.9 | 3.4 | 2.6 | 3.7 | 6.4 | 9.5 | 10.5 | 9.5 | ..
Nepal | 1.5 | 0.6 | 1.1 | 0.8 | 2.4 | 2.6 | 2.7 | 4.3 | 6.9 | 6.0 | 6.8 | ..
Canada | 5.4 | 5.5 | 5.6 | 6.0 | 6.4 | 6.5 | 6.5 | 6.0 | 6.0 | 5.6 | 5.5 | ..
Myanmar | 0.8 | 0.6 | 1.8 | 0.5 | 0.5 | 1.7 | 0.6 | 2.6 | 4.1 | 4.6 | 5.1 | ..
Sri Lanka | 1.9 | 5.0 | 4.1 | 2.5 | 4.8 | 1.7 | 4.2 | 5.9 | 4.7 | 5.3 | 4.8 | ..
Japan | 7.0 | 6.8 | 5.5 | 5.0 | 4.7 | 4.4 | 4.7 | 5.5 | 5.8 | 5.9 | 4.7 | ..
Mongolia | 5.1 | 8.3 | 9.6 | 8.6 | 8.1 | 5.3 | 5.4 | 4.3 | 5.7 | 4.3 | 4.0 | ..
India | 2.5 | 2.0 | 2.3 | 2.5 | 2.2 | 1.8 | 2.3 | 2.4 | 2.6 | 2.9 | 3.4 | ..
Other countries | 31.6 | 28.5 | 26.6 | 22.6 | 23.8 | 22.4 | 26.6 | 28.5 | 30.7 | 33.5 | 35.4 |
Total | 178.5 | 253.7 | 303.0 | 300.4 | 302.2 | 232.8 | 293.1 | 307.2 | 300.2 | 360.5 | 407.1 | ..
Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.
StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395787

Table B.1. Inflows of foreign population by nationality
Thousands
Luxembourg
| 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | Of which: Women 2014 (%)
France | 2.0 | 2.2 | 2.5 | 2.8 | 3.2 | 2.7 | 2.9 | 3.2 | 3.5 | 3.5 | 3.9 | 44
Portugal | 3.5 | 3.8 | 3.8 | 4.4 | 4.5 | 3.8 | 3.8 | 5.0 | 5.2 | 4.6 | 3.8 | 44
Italy | 0.5 | 0.6 | 0.6 | 0.6 | 0.8 | 0.7 | 0.8 | 1.0 | 1.1 | 1.3 | 1.6 | 39
Belgium | 1.0 | 1.0 | 0.9 | 0.9 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 1.2 | 1.2 | 1.3 | 1.5 | 1.6 | 41
Germany | 0.8 | 0.8 | 0.9 | 1.0 | 1.1 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 1.1 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 47
Romania | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.2 | 0.3 | 0.5 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.8 | 56
United States | 0.2 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.4 | 0.5 | 0.7 | 51
Spain | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.3 | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.6 | 0.6 | 46
Poland | 0.2 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.4 | 0.5 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.5 | 48
United Kingdom | 0.3 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.5 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.5 | 0.5 | 41
China | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.4 | 0.3 | 55
Serbia | 0.1 | 0.3 | 0.2 | 0.4 | 0.3 | 0.1 | 0.3 | 0.9 | 0.5 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 51
Greece | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.2 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 51
Netherlands | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.3 | 0.2 | 0.3 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 37
Hungary | 0.1 | 0.2 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 48
Other countries | 3.0 | 3.2 | 2.8 | 3.4 | 3.3 | 3.1 | 3.5 | 4.0 | 3.8 | 4.2 | 4.6 |
Total | 12.2 | 13.8 | 13.7 | 15.8 | 16.8 | 14.6 | 15.8 | 19.1 | 19.4 | 19.8 | 21.0 | 46
Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.
StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395787

Table B.1. Inflows of foreign population by nationality
Thousands
Mexico
| 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | Of which: Women 2014 (%)
United States | .. | .. | .. | 1.4 | 2.2 | 2.9 | 4.0 | 4.3 | 4.0 | 14.4 | 9.4 | 43
Cuba | .. | .. | .. | 0.3 | 1.0 | 1.7 | 1.8 | 1.7 | 1.8 | 3.2 | 2.7 | 54
Guatemala | .. | .. | .. | 0.1 | 1.0 | 2.1 | 1.8 | 1.3 | 0.5 | 3.1 | 2.6 | 62
Venezuela | .. | .. | .. | 0.3 | 0.7 | 1.3 | 1.7 | 1.3 | 1.2 | 2.8 | 2.6 | 57
China | .. | .. | .. | 0.6 | 1.3 | 2.0 | 1.7 | 1.1 | 0.8 | 5.2 | 2.6 | 41
Colombia | .. | .. | .. | 0.3 | 1.1 | 1.9 | 2.3 | 1.8 | 1.4 | 3.2 | 2.5 | 61
Honduras | .. | .. | .. | 0.0 | 0.8 | 1.4 | 1.5 | 1.0 | 0.4 | 2.4 | 2.3 | 62
Argentina | .. | .. | .. | 0.5 | 0.9 | 1.4 | 1.4 | 1.0 | 0.9 | 3.2 | 2.1 | 47
Canada | .. | .. | .. | 0.2 | 0.4 | 0.6 | 0.7 | 0.8 | 0.8 | 3.5 | 2.0 | 45
Spain | .. | .. | .. | 0.3 | 0.6 | 0.9 | 1.0 | 0.8 | 1.0 | 2.6 | 1.8 | 37
El Salvador | .. | .. | .. | 0.1 | 0.5 | 0.8 | 0.7 | 0.7 | 0.4 | 1.6 | 1.2 | 57
France | .. | .. | .. | 0.2 | 0.4 | 0.5 | 0.6 | 0.5 | 0.4 | 1.4 | 1.0 | 39
Peru | .. | .. | .. | 0.2 | 0.4 | 0.7 | 0.8 | 0.6 | 0.4 | 1.2 | 0.9 | 46
Italy | .. | .. | .. | 0.2 | 0.3 | 0.5 | 0.6 | 0.5 | 0.4 | 1.5 | 0.9 | 34
Korea | .. | .. | .. | 0.3 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.5 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 1.3 | 0.8 | 40
Other countries | .. | .. | .. | 2.2 | 4.1 | 4.9 | 4.9 | 4.2 | 3.4 | 12.1 | 8.1 |
Total | 8.5 | 9.2 | 6.9 | 7.2 | 15.9 | 23.9 | 26.2 | 22.0 | 18.2 | 63.0 | 43.5 | 49
Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.
StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395787

Table B.1. Inflows of foreign population by nationality
Thousands
Netherlands
| 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | Of which: Women 2014 (%)
Poland | 4.5 | 5.7 | 6.8 | 9.2 | 13.3 | 12.7 | 14.5 | 18.6 | 18.3 | 20.4 | 23.8 | 46
Germany | 5.3 | 5.9 | 7.2 | 7.5 | 9.0 | 8.7 | 9.8 | 9.6 | 8.7 | 8.1 | 8.2 | 56
Syria | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.6 | 6.9 | 37
United Kingdom | 3.6 | 3.2 | 3.6 | 4.0 | 4.7 | 4.4 | 4.4 | 4.4 | 4.7 | 5.1 | 5.3 | 43
Bulgaria | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.5 | 4.9 | 5.2 | 4.3 | 4.3 | 5.4 | 5.0 | 4.5 | 5.2 | 48
Italy | 1.2 | 1.4 | 1.6 | 1.9 | 2.6 | 2.6 | 2.8 | 3.1 | 3.6 | 4.2 | 5.1 | 42
India | 0.6 | 1.2 | 2.0 | 2.5 | 3.5 | 3.1 | 3.2 | 3.8 | 4.0 | 4.5 | 5.1 | 39
Spain | 1.3 | 1.3 | 1.4 | 1.5 | 2.3 | 2.6 | 3.1 | 3.7 | 4.6 | 5.3 | 5.0 | 51
China | 3.0 | 3.0 | 2.9 | 3.4 | 4.2 | 4.3 | 4.5 | 5.5 | 5.2 | 4.7 | 4.8 | 60
Romania | 0.6 | 0.5 | 0.7 | 2.3 | 2.4 | 2.2 | 2.6 | 2.7 | 2.5 | 2.5 | 4.6 | 45
United States | 2.3 | 2.5 | 3.1 | 3.2 | 3.4 | 3.1 | 3.3 | 3.7 | 3.7 | 3.6 | 3.8 | 54
France | 1.8 | 1.8 | 2.0 | 2.2 | 3.0 | 2.9 | 2.9 | 2.9 | 3.0 | 3.2 | 3.6 | 50
Hungary | 0.6 | 0.6 | 0.6 | 1.0 | 1.7 | 2.2 | 2.4 | 2.6 | 3.1 | 2.9 | 2.9 | 46
Eritrea | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.1 | 0.0 | 0.1 | 2.9 | 27
Turkey | 4.1 | 3.1 | 2.8 | 2.4 | 3.3 | 3.5 | 3.7 | 3.4 | 3.2 | 3.0 | 2.8 | 46
Other countries | 35.8 | 32.7 | 32.6 | 34.1 | 44.5 | 47.8 | 48.6 | 48.9 | 45.8 | 49.6 | 49.4 |
Total | 65.1 | 63.4 | 67.7 | 80.3 | 103.4 | 104.4 | 110.2 | 118.5 | 115.7 | 122.3 | 139.3 | 49
Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.
StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395787

Table B.1. Inflows of foreign population by nationality
Thousands
New Zealand
| 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | Of which: Women 2014 (%)
India | 3.6 | 3.0 | 3.1 | 4.3 | 6.3 | 7.1 | 7.8 | 6.6 | 6.9 | 7.1 | 12.2 | 27
United Kingdom | 12.6 | 14.0 | 14.8 | 12.6 | 11.6 | 10.1 | 8.9 | 9.5 | 9.3 | 9.8 | 10.2 | 45
China | 6.7 | 4.2 | 4.4 | 4.0 | 4.7 | 5.6 | 5.8 | 7.2 | 7.6 | 7.9 | 9.1 | 54
Australia | 5.4 | 5.1 | 4.8 | 4.9 | 4.3 | 3.9 | 4.1 | 3.7 | 3.6 | 4.4 | 4.9 | 50
Philippines | 0.6 | 0.9 | 2.6 | 3.6 | 4.1 | 2.8 | 2.0 | 2.4 | 2.9 | 3.2 | 4.7 | 43
France | 0.7 | 0.6 | 0.7 | 0.8 | 1.1 | 1.4 | 1.4 | 1.9 | 1.9 | 2.7 | 3.8 | 44
Germany | 1.5 | 2.1 | 2.3 | 2.4 | 2.6 | 2.6 | 2.4 | 2.7 | 2.6 | 3.3 | 3.7 | 52
United States | 2.0 | 2.3 | 2.3 | 2.4 | 2.3 | 2.3 | 2.3 | 2.5 | 2.5 | 2.8 | 2.9 | 53
Japan | 3.5 | 3.1 | 2.8 | 2.3 | 2.2 | 1.9 | 1.9 | 1.8 | 1.8 | 1.9 | 2.0 | 62
Korea | 2.3 | 1.7 | 1.9 | 2.1 | 1.8 | 2.1 | 1.9 | 1.7 | 1.6 | 1.8 | 1.7 | 56
Ireland | 1.1 | 1.2 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 1.1 | 1.4 | 1.4 | 2.1 | 1.9 | 2.2 | 1.7 | 41
South Africa | 1.4 | 1.5 | 1.8 | 2.1 | 3.1 | 1.7 | 1.2 | 1.2 | 1.1 | 1.2 | 1.6 | 52
Samoa | 0.9 | 1.4 | 1.3 | 1.2 | 1.3 | 1.2 | 1.0 | 1.5 | 1.4 | 1.4 | 1.5 | 45
Fiji | 2.0 | 2.7 | 2.5 | 2.7 | 3.1 | 2.7 | 1.3 | 1.1 | 1.2 | 1.2 | 1.3 | 47
Canada | 0.9 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 1.1 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 1.1 | 1.1 | 1.1 | 1.3 | 58
Other countries | 10.2 | 10.2 | 11.3 | 12.3 | 13.3 | 12.5 | 13.0 | 13.9 | 14.7 | 15.5 | 17.8 |
Total | 55.4 | 54.8 | 58.7 | 59.6 | 63.9 | 60.3 | 57.6 | 61.0 | 62.0 | 67.5 | 80.3 | 45
Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.
StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395787

Table B.1. Inflows of foreign population by nationality
Thousands
Norway
| 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | Of which: Women 2014 (%)
Poland | 1.6 | 3.3 | 7.4 | 14.2 | 14.4 | 10.5 | 11.3 | 12.9 | 11.5 | 10.5 | 9.9 | 37
Sweden | 2.4 | 2.7 | 3.4 | 4.4 | 5.7 | 6.0 | 7.6 | 8.2 | 5.7 | 5.3 | 4.6 | 47
Lithuania | 0.5 | 0.8 | 1.3 | 2.4 | 2.9 | 3.2 | 6.6 | 7.7 | 6.6 | 5.6 | 4.4 | 40
Eritrea | 0.1 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.4 | 0.8 | 1.7 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.4 | 2.7 | 2.8 | 30
Philippines | 0.6 | 0.8 | 1.1 | 1.6 | 1.8 | 1.7 | 2.1 | 2.6 | 2.5 | 2.8 | 2.2 | 83
Romania | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.6 | 1.1 | 1.1 | 1.3 | 1.4 | 2.0 | 2.5 | 2.1 | 42
Syria | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.4 | 0.8 | 2.1 | 33
India | 0.3 | 0.4 | 0.6 | 1.0 | 1.1 | 0.8 | 0.8 | 1.2 | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.8 | 40
Denmark | 1.6 | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.3 | 1.3 | 1.4 | 1.6 | 1.8 | 2.0 | 1.7 | 43
Somalia | 1.2 | 1.1 | 1.2 | 1.6 | 1.2 | 1.3 | 1.6 | 1.7 | 3.6 | 2.8 | 1.7 | 48
Germany | 1.4 | 1.7 | 2.3 | 3.8 | 4.3 | 2.8 | 2.7 | 2.3 | 1.8 | 1.6 | 1.5 | 49
Spain | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.4 | 0.5 | 0.8 | 1.0 | 1.4 | 1.5 | 1.4 | 44
United Kingdom | 0.9 | 0.8 | 1.0 | 1.1 | 1.2 | 1.3 | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.4 | 1.3 | 1.3 | 33
Iceland | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 1.6 | 1.7 | 1.7 | 1.5 | 1.1 | 1.1 | 47
Latvia | 0.1 | 0.2 | 0.3 | 0.5 | 0.6 | 1.1 | 2.3 | 2.1 | 1.7 | 1.3 | 1.1 | 39
Other countries | 16.4 | 17.0 | 16.3 | 19.7 | 21.5 | 21.9 | 21.4 | 22.8 | 24.4 | 23.5 | 21.6 |
Total | 27.9 | 31.4 | 37.4 | 53.5 | 58.8 | 56.7 | 65.1 | 70.8 | 70.0 | 66.9 | 61.4 | 45
Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.
StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395787

Table B.1. Inflows of foreign population by nationality
Thousands
Poland
| 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | Of which: Women 2014 (%)
Ukraine | 10.2 | 9.8 | 9.6 | 9.4 | 10.3 | 10.1 | 10.3 | 10.1 | 11.8 | 11.9 | 7.8 | 58
Germany | 2.2 | 6.1 | 4.6 | 6.7 | 2.9 | 1.7 | 1.8 | 1.9 | 2.3 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 18
Viet Nam | 2.2 | 1.9 | 1.7 | 1.8 | 2.8 | 3.0 | 2.4 | 2.1 | 4.0 | 2.8 | 2.0 | 44
China | 0.5 | 0.6 | 0.4 | 0.7 | 1.2 | 2.0 | 2.3 | 2.8 | 2.9 | 3.0 | 1.6 | 46
Belarus | 2.4 | 2.4 | 2.3 | 2.6 | 3.1 | 3.2 | 2.9 | 2.5 | 2.6 | 2.3 | 1.4 | 55
Russian Federation | 2.1 | 1.9 | 1.8 | 1.6 | 1.8 | 1.6 | 1.6 | 1.6 | 1.9 | 1.9 | 1.1 | 62
Turkey | 0.5 | 0.6 | 0.7 | 0.7 | 0.9 | 1.0 | 1.1 | 1.2 | 1.3 | 1.4 | 0.9 | 17
Spain | 0.2 | 0.3 | 0.1 | 0.3 | 0.2 | 0.3 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.6 | 0.9 | 0.9 | 33
Armenia | 2.0 | 1.5 | 1.3 | 1.4 | 1.6 | 1.6 | 1.4 | 1.2 | 1.6 | 1.1 | 0.9 | 52
Italy | 0.7 | 0.7 | 0.3 | 0.7 | 0.5 | 0.6 | 0.5 | 0.6 | 0.7 | 0.9 | 0.9 | 17
India | 0.7 | 0.7 | 0.7 | 0.7 | 1.0 | 1.1 | 1.2 | 1.1 | 1.2 | 1.2 | 0.8 | 28
Korea | 0.3 | 0.4 | 0.5 | 0.9 | 1.1 | 1.0 | 1.1 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 1.1 | 0.6 | 44
France | 1.5 | 1.1 | 0.5 | 0.8 | 0.6 | 0.6 | 0.5 | 0.6 | 0.6 | 0.6 | 0.6 | 36
Bulgaria | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.6 | 1.2 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.3 | 0.4 | 0.6 | 0.6 | 42
United Kingdom | 1.0 | 0.9 | 0.4 | 0.8 | 1.5 | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.5 | 23
Other countries | 9.9 | 9.3 | 8.6 | 10.3 | 11.8 | 12.6 | 12.7 | 13.3 | 13.7 | 14.4 | 9.4 |
Total | 36.9 | 38.5 | 34.2 | 40.6 | 41.8 | 41.3 | 41.1 | 41.3 | 47.1 | 46.6 | 32.0 | 41
Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.
StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395787

Table B.1. Inflows of foreign population by nationality
Thousands
Portugal
| 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | Of which: Women 2014 (%)
Brazil | 14.4 | 9.5 | 6.1 | 5.0 | 32.8 | 23.1 | 16.2 | 12.9 | 11.7 | 6.7 | 5.6 | 59
China | 0.8 | 0.3 | 0.5 | 1.0 | 2.0 | 1.9 | 1.7 | 1.5 | 1.4 | 1.9 | 3.7 | 50
Romania | 0.8 | 0.8 | 0.6 | 0.2 | 5.3 | 8.1 | 6.0 | 4.6 | 3.0 | 2.7 | 2.5 | 42
Cabo Verde | 3.1 | 3.5 | 3.3 | 4.1 | 5.3 | 4.6 | 4.2 | 4.6 | 3.4 | 2.7 | 2.2 | 54
France | 0.5 | 0.4 | 0.2 | 0.8 | 0.7 | 0.7 | 0.7 | 0.7 | 0.5 | 0.7 | 1.9 | 44
United Kingdom | 1.2 | 1.0 | 0.8 | 3.9 | 2.7 | 2.2 | 1.8 | 1.7 | 1.2 | 1.4 | 1.5 | 45
Angola | 1.1 | 1.2 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 2.0 | 1.5 | 1.3 | 1.4 | 1.3 | 1.5 | 1.5 | 50
Spain | 0.6 | 0.6 | 0.3 | 1.4 | 1.3 | 1.5 | 1.7 | 1.5 | 1.4 | 1.5 | 1.5 | 47
Guinea-Bissau | 1.0 | 1.1 | 1.3 | 1.6 | 2.5 | 1.5 | 1.6 | 1.7 | 1.6 | 1.2 | 1.2 | 52
Italy | 0.4 | 0.3 | 0.1 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 0.8 | 0.7 | 0.8 | 1.1 | 48
Germany | 0.6 | 0.5 | 0.3 | 1.6 | 1.1 | 1.1 | 1.0 | 0.8 | 0.6 | 0.8 | 1.0 | 46
Ukraine | 1.9 | 1.6 | 1.5 | 2.0 | 3.6 | 2.4 | 2.1 | 1.8 | 1.5 | 1.1 | 1.0 | 58
Nepal | .. | .. | .. | .. | 0.1 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.4 | 0.5 | 0.8 | 0.9 | 31
India | 0.2 | 0.3 | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.9 | 1.0 | 0.9 | 1.1 | 0.9 | 1.0 | 0.9 | 36
Bulgaria | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.1 | 0.9 | 1.5 | 1.4 | 1.0 | 0.7 | 0.8 | 0.8 | 57
Other countries | 7.3 | 6.8 | 6.2 | 9.0 | 10.7 | 9.2 | 9.1 | 9.0 | 8.0 | 7.7 | 8.1 |
Total | 34.1 | 28.1 | 22.5 | 32.6 | 72.8 | 61.4 | 50.7 | 45.4 | 38.5 | 33.2 | 35.3 | 49
Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.
StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395787

Table B.1. Inflows of foreign population by nationality
ThoFsands
Russian federation
| 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | Of which: Women 2014 (%)
Ukraine | 17.7 | 30.8 | 32.7 | 51.5 | 49.1 | 45.9 | 37.2 | 50.0 | 56.2 | 56.2 | 147.1 | ..
Uzbekistan | 14.9 | 30.4 | 37.1 | 52.8 | 43.5 | 42.5 | 37.1 | 46.5 | 52.6 | 55.8 | 59.5 | ..
Kazakhstan | 40.2 | 51.9 | 38.6 | 40.3 | 40.0 | 38.8 | 6.4 | 10.2 | 39.6 | 45.1 | 52.5 | ..
Armenia | 3.1 | 7.6 | 12.9 | 30.8 | 35.2 | 35.8 | 31.4 | 43.1 | 48.9 | 49.6 | 50.8 | ..
Tajikistan | 3.3 | 4.7 | 6.5 | 17.3 | 20.7 | 27.0 | 27.8 | 34.4 | 37.5 | 37.4 | 36.9 | ..
Azerbaijan | 2.6 | 4.6 | 8.9 | 21.0 | 23.3 | 22.9 | 21.1 | 25.3 | 26.4 | 26.8 | 30.5 | ..
Moldova | 4.8 | 6.6 | 8.6 | 14.1 | 15.5 | 16.4 | 11.7 | 16.8 | 20.5 | 22.3 | 28.4 | ..
Kyrgyzstan | 9.5 | 15.6 | 15.7 | 24.7 | 24.0 | 23.3 | 2.4 | 2.6 | 14.0 | 16.1 | 18.7 | ..
Belarus | 5.7 | 6.8 | 5.6 | 6.0 | 5.9 | 5.5 | 2.2 | 2.5 | 6.1 | 7.1 | 8.3 | ..
Georgia | 4.9 | 5.5 | 6.8 | 10.6 | 8.8 | 7.5 | 5.1 | 7.4 | 8.3 | 7.6 | 7.7 | ..
Viet Nam | 0.0 | 0.1 | 0.2 | 0.9 | 0.7 | 1.0 | 3.0 | 3.5 | 3.4 | 3.3 | 2.7 | ..
China | 0.2 | 0.4 | 0.5 | 1.7 | 1.2 | 0.8 | 2.3 | 2.5 | 2.4 | 2.0 | 1.8 | ..
Turkmenistan | 3.7 | 4.1 | 4.1 | 4.8 | 4.0 | 3.3 | 1.5 | 1.9 | 2.0 | 1.9 | 1.6 | ..
Turkey | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.2 | 0.3 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 1.2 | 1.4 | 1.5 | 1.3 | 1.4 | ..
Syria | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.3 | 0.4 | 1.0 | 1.6 | 1.3 | ..
Other countries | 8.4 | 7.9 | 7.8 | 10.1 | 9.2 | 8.7 | 8.4 | 9.2 | 10.5 | 10.4 | 13.4 |
Total | 119.2 | 177.2 | 186.4 | 287.0 | 281.6 | 279.9 | 199.3 | 257.7 | 330.9 | 344.7 | 462.5 | ..
Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.
StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395787

Table B.1. Inflows of foreign population by nationality
Thousands
Slovak Republic
| 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | Of which: Women 2014 (%)
Hungary | 0.3 | 0.4 | 0.5 | 0.8 | 1.1 | 1.1 | 1.1 | 1.0 | 0.7 | 0.4 | 0.5 | 22
Czech Republic | 1.6 | 1.1 | 1.3 | 1.2 | 1.4 | 1.6 | 1.2 | 0.9 | 0.5 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 44
Romania | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.4 | 3.0 | 2.3 | 0.8 | 0.9 | 0.6 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 34
Poland | 0.9 | 0.5 | 1.1 | 0.7 | 0.6 | 0.7 | 0.5 | 0.3 | 0.1 | 0.2 | 0.1 | 46
Italy | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.2 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.1 | 18
Ukraine | 0.7 | 0.6 | 1.0 | 1.2 | 1.8 | 1.6 | 1.3 | 0.7 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 61
Germany | 0.6 | 0.9 | 0.9 | 0.9 | 1.1 | 0.6 | 0.5 | 0.3 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 28
Croatia | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.0 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 22
United Kingdom | 0.3 | 0.2 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.1 | 0.0 | 0.1 | 24
Bulgaria | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.8 | 0.5 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.3 | 0.2 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 13
France | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 19
Norway | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.0 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 58
Austria | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.1 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 23
Spain | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 45
Russian Federation | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.3 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 59
Other countries | 2.2 | 2.5 | 4.1 | 4.5 | 6.2 | 5.9 | 5.1 | 2.9 | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.4 |
Total | 7.9 | 7.7 | 11.3 | 14.8 | 16.5 | 14.4 | 12.7 | 8.2 | 2.9 | 2.5 | 2.4 | 33
Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.
StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395787

Table B.1. Inflows of foreign population by nationality
Thousands
Slovenia
| 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | Of which: Women 2014 (%)
Bosnia and Herzegovina | .. | .. | .. | 13.8 | 17.9 | 5.3 | 3.7 | 4.5 | 4.4 | 3.7 | 5.1 | 34
Croatia | .. | .. | .. | 2.2 | 2.3 | 2.0 | 1.8 | 1.9 | 2.2 | 0.8 | 2.4 | 26
Bulgaria | .. | .. | .. | 1.4 | 2.3 | 1.3 | 0.0 | 2.3 | 2.4 | 2.5 | 2.1 | 12
Serbia | .. | .. | .. | 6.3 | 7.6 | 2.6 | 1.6 | 1.9 | 1.7 | 1.5 | 1.6 | 21
Italy | .. | .. | .. | 0.2 | 0.0 | 0.2 | 0.0 | 0.4 | 0.5 | 0.6 | 0.7 | 33
Russian Federation | .. | .. | .. | 0.1 | 0.2 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.5 | 0.7 | 50
Former Yug. Rep. of Macedonia | .. | .. | .. | 2.7 | 5.0 | 2.2 | 1.0 | 1.2 | 0.8 | 0.6 | 0.6 | 50
Romania | .. | .. | .. | 0.3 | 0.4 | 0.2 | 0.0 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 27
Slovak Republic | .. | .. | .. | 0.6 | 0.5 | 0.3 | 0.0 | 0.6 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.3 | 46
Hungary | .. | .. | .. | 0.1 | 0.2 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 29
Spain | .. | .. | .. | 0.0 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.0 | 0.2 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 47
Poland | .. | .. | .. | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.0 | 0.2 | 0.4 | 0.8 | 0.3 | 42
Ukraine | .. | .. | .. | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.0 | 0.3 | 0.4 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.3 | 50
Germany | .. | .. | .. | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.0 | 0.2 | 0.3 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 45
Czech Republic | .. | .. | .. | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.2 | 0.0 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 69
Other countries | .. | .. | .. | 1.7 | 6.2 | 9.2 | 2.7 | 3.2 | 2.7 | 2.8 | 3.0 |
Total | .. | .. | .. | 30.5 | 43.8 | 24.2 | 11.3 | 18.0 | 17.3 | 15.7 | 18.4 | 34
Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.
StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395787

Table B.1. Inflows of foreign population by nationality
Thousands
Spain
| 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | Of which: Women 2014 (%)
Romania | 103.6 | 108.3 | 131.5 | 197.6 | 61.3 | 44.1 | 51.9 | 50.8 | 27.3 | 22.8 | 30.0 | 50
Morocco | 73.4 | 82.5 | 78.5 | 85.0 | 71.8 | 43.2 | 30.2 | 28.0 | 22.4 | 20.5 | 20.2 | 44
Italy | 15.0 | 16.5 | 18.6 | 21.2 | 15.9 | 11.8 | 11.2 | 11.6 | 12.0 | 12.2 | 15.0 | 44
United Kingdom | 48.4 | 44.7 | 42.5 | 38.2 | 23.8 | 17.9 | 16.2 | 15.7 | 16.4 | 14.1 | 14.2 | 47
China | 20.3 | 18.4 | 16.9 | 20.4 | 20.1 | 11.9 | 10.5 | 10.7 | 9.2 | 9.1 | 9.4 | 55
Colombia | 21.5 | 24.9 | 35.6 | 41.7 | 36.0 | 20.4 | 13.7 | 13.2 | 10.0 | 8.7 | 8.5 | 57
Russian Federation | 7.4 | 7.8 | 8.0 | 7.3 | 5.8 | 5.3 | 6.2 | 7.6 | 7.6 | 8.4 | 8.2 | 60
France | 9.9 | 11.1 | 12.7 | 13.0 | 8.9 | 7.7 | 7.8 | 7.8 | 7.4 | 7.3 | 8.1 | 47
Dominican Republic | 10.3 | 12.2 | 14.7 | 18.1 | 16.2 | 9.5 | 6.9 | 10.4 | 10.0 | 8.1 | 7.7 | 54
Venezuela | 12.1 | 12.5 | 11.7 | 12.9 | 8.7 | 5.7 | 6.5 | 6.8 | 4.6 | 4.7 | 7.2 | 56
Germany | 14.0 | 15.2 | 16.9 | 17.8 | 11.3 | 9.3 | 8.3 | 8.3 | 8.0 | 7.2 | 6.9 | 50
Brazil | 16.5 | 24.6 | 32.6 | 36.1 | 20.5 | 10.5 | 8.7 | 7.9 | 6.4 | 5.1 | 5.7 | 58
Honduras | 1.9 | 2.8 | 6.5 | 8.8 | 4.6 | 3.7 | 4.7 | 6.3 | 5.3 | 4.3 | 5.7 | 74
Ukraine | 11.9 | 10.0 | 10.7 | 11.1 | 6.9 | 4.8 | 4.9 | 5.1 | 3.7 | 3.3 | 5.7 | 57
Pakistan | 9.4 | 12.4 | 8.2 | 10.6 | 8.9 | 6.4 | 15.3 | 11.5 | 8.3 | 6.5 | 5.5 | 26
Other countries | 270.4 | 278.7 | 357.3 | 380.6 | 247.0 | 153.3 | 127.4 | 134.2 | 113.9 | 105.9 | 107.9 |
Total | 645.8 | 682.7 | 803.0 | 920.5 | 567.4 | 365.4 | 330.3 | 335.9 | 272.5 | 248.4 | 265.8 | 50
Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.
StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395787

Table B.1. Inflows of foreign population by nationality
Thousands
Sweden
| 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | Of which: Women 2014 (%)
Syria | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.9 | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.7 | 1.0 | 1.5 | 4.7 | 11.7 | 21.7 | 38
Eritrea | 0.3 | 0.6 | 0.8 | 0.8 | 1.2 | 1.4 | 1.6 | 2.1 | 2.2 | 3.3 | 5.9 | 36
Poland | 2.5 | 3.4 | 6.3 | 7.5 | 7.0 | 5.2 | 4.4 | 4.4 | 4.4 | 4.6 | 5.1 | 44
Somalia | 1.1 | 1.3 | 3.0 | 3.8 | 4.1 | 6.9 | 6.8 | 3.1 | 4.5 | 11.0 | 4.2 | 50
Afghanistan | 1.0 | 0.7 | 1.7 | 0.8 | 1.0 | 1.6 | 1.9 | 3.4 | 4.7 | 4.2 | 3.8 | 44
India | 0.8 | 1.1 | 1.0 | 1.1 | 1.5 | 1.8 | 2.2 | 1.7 | 2.0 | 2.4 | 3.0 | 39
Finland | 2.8 | 2.9 | 2.6 | 2.6 | 2.4 | 2.4 | 2.3 | 2.3 | 2.3 | 2.3 | 2.6 | 58
Iran | 1.5 | 1.1 | 2.0 | 1.4 | 1.8 | 2.4 | 2.8 | 2.2 | 2.1 | 2.0 | 2.4 | 51
China | 1.5 | 1.7 | 2.0 | 2.4 | 2.7 | 3.1 | 3.2 | 2.6 | 2.5 | 2.1 | 2.4 | 50
Germany | 1.8 | 2.0 | 2.9 | 3.6 | 3.4 | 2.8 | 2.2 | 2.2 | 2.2 | 2.2 | 2.2 | 51
Norway | 2.6 | 2.4 | 2.5 | 2.4 | 2.3 | 1.9 | 2.1 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.1 | 52
Denmark | 3.8 | 4.0 | 5.1 | 5.1 | 4.1 | 3.8 | 3.4 | 3.2 | 2.6 | 2.5 | 2.0 | 46
Romania | 0.3 | 0.4 | 0.3 | 2.6 | 2.5 | 1.8 | 1.7 | 1.9 | 1.7 | 1.9 | 2.0 | 45
United Kingdom | 1.2 | 1.1 | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.7 | 1.6 | 1.4 | 1.8 | 1.5 | 1.6 | 1.8 | 36
Serbia | 1.8 | 2.1 | 4.2 | 2.0 | 1.9 | 1.1 | 0.9 | 1.1 | 1.4 | 1.1 | 1.8 | 52
Other countries | 24.1 | 26.0 | 43.5 | 45.4 | 45.2 | 45.2 | 41.0 | 40.2 | 41.6 | 40.6 | 43.1 |
Total | 47.6 | 51.3 | 80.4 | 83.5 | 83.3 | 83.8 | 79.0 | 75.9 | 82.6 | 95.4 | 106.1 | 45
Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.
StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395787

Table B.1. Inflows of foreign population by nationality
Thousands
Switzerland
| 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | Of which: Women 2014 (%)
Germany | 18.1 | 20.4 | 24.8 | 41.1 | 46.4 | 33.9 | 30.7 | 30.5 | 27.1 | 26.6 | 23.8 | 42
Italy | 5.7 | 5.4 | 5.5 | 8.4 | 9.9 | 8.5 | 10.1 | 10.8 | 13.6 | 17.5 | 17.8 | 37
Portugal | 13.6 | 12.2 | 12.5 | 15.5 | 17.8 | 13.7 | 12.8 | 15.4 | 18.6 | 19.9 | 14.9 | 44
France | 6.7 | 6.9 | 7.6 | 11.5 | 13.7 | 10.9 | 11.5 | 11.5 | 11.4 | 13.5 | 13.8 | 43
Spain | 1.7 | 1.5 | 1.6 | 2.1 | 2.4 | 2.5 | 3.3 | 4.6 | 6.5 | 8.8 | 7.6 | 45
Poland | 0.7 | 0.8 | 1.3 | 2.1 | 2.4 | 2.1 | 2.0 | 3.4 | 3.3 | 2.9 | 4.8 | 42
United Kingdom | 2.9 | 3.0 | 3.4 | 5.1 | 5.6 | 4.8 | 5.5 | 5.4 | 4.4 | 4.6 | 4.2 | 42
Hungary | 0.4 | 0.3 | 0.5 | 0.7 | 1.1 | 1.1 | 1.2 | 2.1 | 2.5 | 2.5 | 4.2 | 43
United States | 2.7 | 2.9 | 3.2 | .. | .. | .. | 4.0 | 4.2 | 3.5 | 3.4 | 3.1 | 54
Austria | 2.3 | 1.9 | 2.0 | 2.8 | 3.2 | 2.8 | 2.6 | 2.9 | 3.1 | 2.9 | 3.0 | 42
China | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 1.9 | 2.1 | 2.4 | 2.9 | 2.9 | 60
Slovak Republic | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 1.2 | 1.1 | 1.0 | 1.9 | 1.6 | 1.5 | 2.7 | 43
India | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 2.4 | 2.4 | 2.6 | 2.5 | 2.6 | 43
Romania | 0.6 | 0.6 | 0.6 | 0.7 | 0.8 | 1.0 | 1.4 | 1.7 | 2.3 | 2.7 | 2.4 | 71
Russian Federation | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 1.9 | 2.0 | 2.1 | 2.1 | 1.9 | 66
Other countries | 40.8 | 38.2 | 39.6 | 49.6 | 52.8 | 50.1 | 41.9 | 41.6 | 38.9 | 41.1 | 42.4 |
Total | 96.3 | 94.4 | 102.7 | 139.7 | 157.3 | 132.4 | 134.2 | 142.5 | 143.8 | 155.4 | 152.1 | 46
Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.
StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395787

Table B.1. Inflows of foreign population by nationality
Thousands
Turkey
| 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | Of which: Women 2010 (%)
Azerbaijan | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 2.5 | .. | .. | .. | .. | 52
Afghanistan | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 2.2 | .. | .. | .. | .. | 36
Russian Federation | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 1.8 | .. | .. | .. | .. | 76
Germany | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 1.6 | .. | .. | .. | .. | 57
United States | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 1.5 | .. | .. | .. | .. | 54
Iran | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 1.5 | .. | .. | .. | .. | 40
Kazakhstan | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 1.4 | .. | .. | .. | .. | 55
Turkmenistan | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 1.2 | .. | .. | .. | .. | 47
Iraq | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 1.2 | .. | .. | .. | .. | 43
United Kingdom | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 1.1 | .. | .. | .. | .. | 51
Bulgaria | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 1.1 | .. | .. | .. | .. | 71
Kyrgyzstan | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 1.0 | .. | .. | .. | .. | 54
Ukraine | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 0.9 | .. | .. | .. | .. | 85
Syria | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 0.9 | .. | .. | .. | .. | 79
China | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 0.8 | .. | .. | .. | .. | 24
Other countries | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 9.1 | .. | .. | .. | .. |
Total | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 29.9 | .. | .. | .. | .. | 54
Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.
StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395787

Table B.1. Inflows of foreign population by nationality
Thousands
United Kingdom
| 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | Of which: Women 2014 (%)
India | 51 | 47 | 57 | 55 | 48 | 64 | 68 | 61 | 36 | 30 | 46 | ..
China | 32 | 22 | 23 | 21 | 18 | 22 | 28 | 45 | 41 | 46 | 39 | ..
Romania | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 10 | 7 | 8 | 6 | 19 | 37 | ..
Poland | 16 | 49 | 60 | 88 | 55 | 32 | 34 | 33 | 30 | 28 | 32 | ..
France | 10 | .. | .. | .. | .. | 14 | 11 | 17 | 14 | 15 | 24 | ..
Spain | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 11 | 5 | 8 | 17 | 21 | 21 | ..
United States | 14 | 15 | 16 | 15 | 17 | 17 | 16 | 16 | 17 | 12 | 20 | ..
Italy | .. | .. | .. | .. | 14 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 10 | 17 | 17 | ..
Australia | 27 | 20 | 26 | 18 | 14 | 12 | 18 | 13 | 16 | 11 | 15 | ..
Portugal | 5 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 4 | 5 | 7 | 12 | 15 | ..
Lithuania | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 13 | 17 | 9 | 11 | 14 | ..
Germany | .. | .. | 13 | 15 | 18 | 11 | 7 | 13 | 8 | 10 | 13 | ..
Pakistan | 21 | 16 | 31 | 27 | 17 | 17 | 30 | 43 | 19 | 10 | 11 | ..
Canada | .. | .. | 6 | .. | 7 | .. | 6 | 9 | 7 | 6 | 11 | ..
Brazil | .. | .. | 2 | .. | .. | .. | .. | 1 | 1 | 3 | 9 | ..
Other countries | 258 | 236 | 218 | 216 | 248 | 212 | 203 | 154 | 145 | 155 | 180 |
Total | 434 | 405 | 452 | 455 | 456 | 430 | 459 | 453 | 383 | 406 | 504 | ..
Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.
StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395787

Table B.1. Inflows of foreign population by nationality
Thousands
United States (Permanent)
| 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | Of which: Women 2014 (%)
Mexico | 175.4 | 161.4 | 173.8 | 148.6 | 190.0 | 164.9 | 139.1 | 143.4 | 146.4 | 135.0 | 134.1 | 56
India | 70.2 | 84.7 | 61.4 | 65.4 | 63.4 | 57.3 | 69.2 | 69.0 | 66.4 | 68.5 | 77.9 | 50
China | 55.5 | 70.0 | 87.3 | 76.7 | 80.3 | 64.2 | 70.9 | 87.0 | 81.8 | 71.8 | 76.1 | 56
Philippines | 57.8 | 60.7 | 74.6 | 72.6 | 54.0 | 60.0 | 58.2 | 57.0 | 57.3 | 54.4 | 50.0 | 62
Cuba | 20.5 | 36.3 | 45.6 | 29.1 | 49.5 | 39.0 | 33.6 | 36.5 | 32.8 | 32.2 | 46.7 | 52
Dominican Republic | 30.5 | 27.5 | 38.1 | 28.0 | 31.9 | 49.4 | 53.9 | 46.1 | 41.6 | 41.3 | 44.6 | 56
Viet Nam | 31.5 | 32.8 | 30.7 | 28.7 | 31.5 | 29.2 | 30.6 | 34.2 | 28.3 | 27.1 | 30.3 | 58
Korea | 19.8 | 26.6 | 24.4 | 22.4 | 26.7 | 25.9 | 22.2 | 22.8 | 20.8 | 23.2 | 20.4 | 56
El Salvador | 29.8 | 21.4 | 31.8 | 21.1 | 19.7 | 19.9 | 18.8 | 18.7 | 16.3 | 18.3 | 19.3 | 55
Iraq | 3.5 | 4.1 | 4.3 | 3.8 | 4.8 | 12.1 | 19.9 | 21.1 | 20.4 | 9.6 | 19.2 | 47
Jamaica | 14.4 | 18.3 | 25.0 | 19.4 | 18.5 | 21.8 | 19.8 | 19.7 | 20.7 | 19.4 | 19.0 | 55
Pakistan | 12.1 | 14.9 | 17.4 | 13.5 | 19.7 | 21.6 | 18.3 | 15.5 | 14.7 | 13.3 | 18.6 | 50
Colombia | 18.8 | 25.6 | 43.2 | 33.2 | 30.2 | 27.8 | 22.4 | 22.6 | 20.9 | 21.1 | 18.2 | 61
Haiti | 14.2 | 14.5 | 22.2 | 30.4 | 26.0 | 24.3 | 22.6 | 22.1 | 22.8 | 20.4 | 15.3 | 54
Bangladesh | 8.1 | 11.5 | 14.6 | 12.1 | 11.8 | 16.7 | 14.8 | 16.7 | 14.7 | 12.1 | 14.6 | 50
Other countries | 395.8 | 512.1 | 571.9 | 447.5 | 449.3 | 496.7 | 428.5 | 429.6 | 425.6 | 423.0 | 412.4 |
Total | 957.9 | 1 122.4 | 1 266.3 | 1 052.4 | 1 107.1 | 1 130.8 | 1 042.6 | 1 062.0 | 1 031.6 | 990.6 | 1 016.5 | 54
Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.
StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395787

Table A.2. Outflows of foreign population from selected OECD countries
Thousands
| 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014
Australia | 28.8 | 27.8 | 29.0 | 29.7 | 30.9 | 27.6 | 29.3 | 31.2 | 29.9 | 31.7 | ..
Austria | 50.0 | 49.8 | 55.0 | 56.6 | 60.2 | 67.2 | 68.4 | 72.8 | 74.4 | 74.5 | 76.5
Belgium | 37.7 | 38.5 | 39.4 | 38.5 | 44.9 | 49.1 | 50.8 | 56.6 | 69.5 | 78.8 | 76.1
Czech Republic | 33.8 | 21.8 | 31.4 | 18.4 | 3.8 | 9.4 | 12.5 | 2.5 | 16.7 | 27.2 | 16.1
Denmark | 15.8 | 16.3 | 17.3 | 19.0 | 23.3 | 26.6 | 27.1 | 26.6 | 29.1 | 29.7 | 31.4
Estonia | 0.6 | 0.6 | 0.6 | 0.4 | 0.5 | 0.7 | 0.6 | 0.6 | 0.4 | 0.3 | 0.3
Finland | 4.2 | 2.6 | 2.7 | 3.1 | 4.5 | 4.0 | 3.1 | 3.3 | 4.2 | 4.2 | 5.5
Germany | 547.0 | 483.6 | 483.8 | 475.8 | 563.1 | 578.8 | 529.6 | 538.8 | 578.8 | 657.6 | 765.6
Hungary | 3.5 | 3.3 | 4.0 | 4.1 | 4.2 | 5.6 | 6.0 | 2.7 | 9.9 | 13.1 | 10.8
Iceland | 1.5 | 0.9 | 1.5 | 4.0 | 5.9 | 5.8 | 3.4 | 2.8 | 2.2 | 2.3 | 2.5
Ireland | .. | 20.7 | 20.7 | 33.4 | 36.1 | 52.8 | 40.3 | 38.6 | 40.6 | 38.1 | 41.2
Italy | 14.0 | 16.0 | 17.0 | 20.3 | 27.0 | 32.3 | 32.8 | 32.4 | 38.2 | 43.6 | 47.5
Japan | 278.5 | 292.0 | 218.8 | 214.9 | 234.2 | 262.0 | 242.6 | 230.9 | 219.4 | 213.4 | 212.9
Korea | 150.5 | 264.6 | 174.2 | 152.1 | 210.0 | 233.5 | 196.1 | 217.7 | 290.0 | 268.1 | 270.5
Luxembourg | 7.5 | 7.2 | 7.7 | 8.6 | 8.0 | 7.3 | 7.7 | 7.5 | 8.6 | 8.9 | 9.5
Netherlands | 46.1 | 47.2 | 52.5 | 47.9 | 49.8 | 57.5 | 64.0 | 70.2 | 80.8 | 83.1 | 83.4
New Zealand | 22.2 | 22.8 | 20.5 | 21.4 | 23.0 | 23.6 | 26.3 | 26.4 | 24.4 | 23.2 | 21.7
Norway | 13.9 | 12.6 | 12.5 | 13.3 | 15.2 | 18.4 | 22.5 | 22.9 | 21.3 | 25.0 | 23.3
Slovak Republic | 5.0 | 1.1 | 1.5 | 2.0 | 3.3 | 3.3 | 2.9 | 1.9 | 2.0 | 2.8 | 0.1
Slovenia | 6.0 | 6.5 | 11.0 | 11.8 | 7.3 | 15.1 | 12.0 | 2.1 | 1.7 | 0.7 | 1.0
Spain | 41.9 | 48.7 | 120.3 | 199.0 | 254.9 | 344.1 | 363.2 | 353.6 | 389.3 | 459.0 | 330.6
Sweden | 16.0 | 15.9 | 20.0 | 20.4 | 19.2 | 18.4 | 22.1 | 23.7 | 26.6 | 24.6 | 26.4
Switzerland | 47.9 | 49.7 | 53.0 | 56.2 | 54.1 | 55.2 | 65.5 | 64.0 | 65.9 | 70.0 | 69.2
United Kingdom | 126.2 | 154.1 | 173.4 | 158.0 | 243.0 | 211.0 | 185.0 | 190.0 | 165.0 | 170.0 | 171.0
Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the table.
StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395739

Metadata related to Tables A.1., A.2. and B.1. Inflows and outflows of foreign population

| Types of migrant recorded in the data | Other comments | Source

Australia

Permanent migrants:

Includes persons who arrive from overseas and are entitled to stay permanently in Australia (Settler Arrivals) and persons who while already in Australia on a temporary basis are granted permanent residence status. Settler arrivals include holders of a permanent visa, holders of a temporary (provisional) visa where there is a clear intention to settle, citizens of New Zealand indicating an intention to settle and persons otherwise eligible to settle.

Temporary migrants:

Temporary entry visas granted (excluding visitors): Working Holiday Maker; International students; Skilled temporary residents and visas for social, cultural, international relations, training and research purposes, and for undertaking highly specialised short-stay work.

Outflows:

People leaving Australia for 12 months or more in a

16-month period. Net Overseas Migration (NOM).

Data refer to the fiscal year (July to June of the year indicated). Table B.1 presents the inflow of permanent migrants. From 2014, figures inferior to 5 individuals are not shown.

Department of Immigration and Border Protection.

Austria | Inflows and outflows: Foreigners holding a residence permit and who have actually stayed for at least 3 months. | Until 2001, data are from local population registers. Starting in 2002, they are from the central population register. The data for 2002-07 were revised to match with the results of the register-based census of 2006. Outflows include administrative corrections. | Population Registers, Statistics Austria.

Belgium

Inflows:

Foreigners holding a residence permit and intenting to stay in the country for at least 3 months.

Outflows:

Include administrative corrections.

From 2012, asylum seekers are included in inflow and outflow data.

Population Register, Directorate for Statistics and Economic Information (DGSIE).

Canada

Permanent migrants:

Total number of people who have been granted permanent resident status in Canada.

Temporary migrants:

Inflows (first entries) of people who are lawfully in Canada on a temporary basis under the authority of a temporary resident permit. Temporary residents include foreign workers (including seasonal workers), foreign students, refugee claimants, people allowed to remain temporarily in Canada on humanitarian grounds and other individuals entering Canada on a temporary basis who are not under a work or student permit and who are not seeking protection.

Table B.1 presents the inflow of persons who have acquired permanent resident status only. Country of origin refers to country of last permanent residence. Due to privacy considerations, the figures have been subjected to random rounding. Under this method, all figures in the table are randomly rounded either up or down to multiples of 5. 

Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada.

Chile | Temporary residence permits granted. |  | Register of residence permits, Department of Foreigners and Migration, Ministry of the Interior.

Czech Republic

Inflows:

Foreigners holding a permanent or a long-term residence permit (visa over 90 days) or who were granted asylum in the given year. From May 2004, excludes nationals of EU countries if they intend to stay for less than 30 days in the country.

Outflows:

Departures of foreigners who were staying in the country on a permanent or temporary basis.

Country of origin refers to country of last permanent or temporary residence. Inflows and outflows of nationals of EU countries are likely to be underestimated.

Register of Foreigners, Czech Statistical Office.

Denmark

Inflows:

Foreigners who live legally in Denmark, are registred in the Central population register, and have been living in the country for at least one year. From 2006 on, Statistics Denmark changed its methodology. The data from 2006 on are therefore not comparable with previous years.

Outflows :

Include administrative corrections.

Excludes asylum seekers and all those with temporary residence permits.

Central Population Register, Statistics Denmark.

Estonia | Foreigners expecting to stay in the country (out of the country in the case outflows) for at least 12 months. | The number of nationals from other EU countries who are staying temporarily in the country for at least 12 months may be underestimated. | Statistics Estonia.
Finland | Inflows and outflows: Foreign nationals with a residence permit valid for more than one year and nationals of EU countries who intend to stay in the country for more than 12 months. Nordic citizens who are moving for less than 6 months are not included. | Includes foreign persons of Finnish origin. Excludes asylum seekers and persons with temporary residence permits. Inflows and outflows of nationals of EU countries can be underestimated. | Central Population Register, Statistics Finland.
France | In 2004, the data are from the French Office for Immigration and Integration. From 2005 on, they are based on the first permanent-type permits delivered. Include status changes from a temporary-type permit to a permanent-type permit. | Excludes citizens from the European Economic Area. The data for the years 2008 to 2014 were revised retroactively in 2015. | Ministry of the Interior.

Germany

Inflows:

Foreigners who had previoulsy no registered address in Germany and intending to stay at least one week in the country.

Outflows:

Deregistrations from population registers of persons who move out of their address without taking a new address in the country and administrative deregistrations.

Includes asylum seekers living in private households. Excludes inflows of ethnic Germans (Aussiedler). In 2008, local authorities started to purge registers of inactive records. As a result, higher emigration figures were reported from this year.

Central Population Register, Federal Statistical Office.

Greece | Until 2007, initial issuance of residence permits. From 2008, estimation by the Hellenic Statistical Authority. |  | Ministry of Interior and Administrative Reconstruction; Hellenic Statistical Authority.

Hungary

Inflows:

Foreigners expecting to stay in the country for at least 90 days.

Outflows:

Foreign citizens having a residence or a settlement document and who left Hungary in the given year with no intention to return, or whose permission’s validity has expired and did not apply for a new one or whose permission was invalidated by authority due to withdrawal. From 2012, it contains estimations.

Population Register, Office of Immigration and Nationality, Central Statistical Office.

Iceland | Inflows and outflows: Foreigners expecting to stay in the country for a period of at least 12 months. |  | Register of Migration Data, Statistics Iceland.

Ireland

Figures are derived from the quarterly National Household Survey (QNHS) series. All figures are based on May to April of the year indicated.

Inflows:

The estimates relate to those persons resident in the country at the time of the survey and who were living abroad one year before (Table A.1)

Outflows:

Persons resident in the country at a point in the previous twelve-month period who are now living abroad (Table A.2).

Central Statistics Office.

Israel | Data refer to permanent immigrants by last country of residence. | The statistical data for Israel are supplied by and under the responsibility of the relevant Israeli authorities. The use of such data by the OECD is without prejudice to the status of the Golan Heights, East Jerusalem and Israeli settlements in the West Bank under the terms of international law. | Population register, Central Bureau of Statistics.
Italy | Inflows and outflows: Transfers of residence. | Excludes seasonal workers. Administrative corrections are made following censuses (the last census took place in 2011). | Administrative Population Register (Anagrafe) analysed by ISTAT.

Japan

Inflows:

Foreigners who entered the country, excluding temporary visitors and re-entries.

Outflows:

Foreigners who left Japan without re-entry permission. Excludes temporary visitors.

Ministry of Justice, Immigration Bureau.

Korea | Data refer to long-term inflows/outflows (more than 90 days). |  | Ministry of Justice.

Luxembourg

Inflows:

Foreigners holding a residence permit and intending to stay in the country for at least 12 months.

Outflows:

Foreigners who left the country with the intention to live abroad for at least 12 months.

Central Population Register, Central Office of Statistics and Economic Studies (Statec).

Mexico

Until 2012, number of foreigners who are issued an immigrant permit for the first time (“inmigrante” FM2). 2011 and 2012 also include new and former refugees who obtained immigrant status (“inmigrado”). From 2013 on, number of foreigners who are issued a permanent residence card, as the 2011 Migration Act came into effect.

Excludes changes form temporary to permanent migration status. The sharp increase in the numbers of 2013 is explained by administrative changes with the implementation of the 2011 Migration Act. Most of these “new residents” are foreigners already in the country on a temporary status ; the number of arrivals of new foreigners in the country is similar to previous years.

Ministry of Interior, National Migration Institute (INM).

Netherlands

Inflows:

Foreigners holding a residence permit and intending to stay in the country for at least four of the next six months.

Outflows:

Outflows include the “net administrative corrections”, i.e. unreported emigration of foreigners.

Inflows exclude asylum seekers who are staying in reception centres.

Population Register, Central Bureau of Statistics.

New Zealand

Inflows:

Permanent and long-term arrivals to live in the country for 12 months or more.

Outflows:

Permanent and long-term departures: Foreign-born returning to live overseas after a stay of 12 months or more in New Zealand.

Statistics New Zealand.

Norway

Inflows:

Foreigners holding a residence or work permit and intending to stay in the country for at least 6 months.

Outflows:

Foreigners holding a residence or work permit and who stayed in the country for at least 6 months.

Asylum seekers are registered as immigrants only after having settled in a Norwegian municipality following a positive outcome of their application. An asylum seeker whose application has been rejected will not be registered as an ‘immigrant’, even if the application process has taken a long time and the return to the home country is delayed for a significant period.

Central Population Register, Statistics Norway.

Poland

Number of permanent and “fixed-term” residence permits issued. Since 26 August 2006, nationals of European Union member states and their family members are no longer issued residence permits. However, they still need to register their stay in Poland, provided that they are planning to stay in Poland for more than three months.

Office for Foreigners.

Portugal

Data based on residence permits. 2004 figures include foreigners that entered the country with Long Term Visas (Temporary Stay, Study and Work) issued in each year and also foreigners with Stay Permits yearly delivered under the 2001 programme of regularisation (178 in 2004). In 2005, inflows include residence permits and long-term visas issued over the year. Since 2006, figures include long-term visas for non-EU25 citizens and new residence titles attributed to EU25 citizens (who do not need a visa).

In 2011, inflows exclude foreigners who have regularised their situation under art.88.2 of the foreigner law (continuous regularisation).

Immigration and Border Control Office (SEF); Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Russian Federation | Grants of temporary and permanent residence permits. |  | Federal Migration Service.
Slovak Republic | Inflows and outflows: Includes permanent, temporary, and tolerated residents. Break in series in 2012. |  | Register of Foreigners, Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic.

Slovenia

Inflows:

Number of first temporary residence permits.

Outflows:

Temporary and permanent migrants declaring moving abroad.

Central Population Register, Ministry of the Interior, and National Statistical Office.

Spain

Inflows and outflows:

Changes in regular residence for at least 12 months declared by foreigners, independently of their legal status (Variaciones Residenciales Exteriores). From 2008 on, data are based on the Migration Statistics (Flujo de inmigración): estimates based on the number of registrations and cancellations in the Municipal Registers by foreigners.

Including administrative corrections. Further corrections are implemented from 2006 on to exclude foreigners whose residence permit has expired.

Municipal Population Registers (Padron municipal de habitantes), National Statistical Institute (INE).

Sweden

Inflows:

Foreigners holding a residence permit and intending to stay in the country for at least one year (including nationals of EU countries).

Outflows:

Departures of foreigners who have the intention to live abroad for at least one year.

Excludes asylum seekers and temporary workers.

Population Register, Statistics Sweden.

Switzerland

Inflows:

Foreigners holding a permanent or an annual residence permit.Holders of an L-permit (short duration) are also included if their stay in the country is longer than 12 months.

Outflows:

Departures of foreigners holding a permanent or an annual residence permit and of holders of an L-permit who stayed in the country for at least one year. The data include administrative corrections, so that, for example, foreigners whose permit expired are considered to have left the country.

Register of Foreigners, Federal Office of Migration.

Turkey | Residence permits issued for the first time to foreigners intending to stay 12 months or more in the country. |  | General Directorate of Security, Ministry of the Interior.

United Kingdom

Inflows:

Non-British citizens admitted to the United Kingdom.

Outflows:

Non-British citizens leaving the territory of the United Kingdom.

Data in Table A.1 are adjusted to include short term migrants (including asylum seekers) who actually stayed longer than one year. Data by nationality in Table B.1. On inflows are not adjusted. Statistics whose coefficient of variation exceeds 30% are not shown separately but grouped under “Other countries”.

International Passenger Survey, Office for National Statistics.

United States

Permanent migrants:

Lawful Permanent Residents (LPRs) (“green card” recipients).

Temporary migrants:

Data refer to non-immigrant visas issued, excluding visitors and transit passengers (B and C visas) and crewmembers (D visas). Includes family members.

Includes persons already present in the United States who changed status. Certain LPRs are admitted conditionally and are required to remove their conditional status after two years; they are counted as LPRs when they first enter. Data cover the fiscal year (October to September of the year indicated).

Office of Immigration Statistics, Department of Homeland Security; Citizenship and Immigration Services, Department of Homeland Security.

Notes: Data for Serbia include persons from Serbia, Montenegro and Serbia and Montenegro.

Some statements may refer to figures prior to 2004 or to nationalities/countries of birth not shown in this annex but available on line at: http://stats.oecd.org/.

Inflows of asylum seekers

Inflows of asylum seekers

The statistics on asylum seekers published in this annex are based on data provided by the United Nations High Commission for Refugees. Since 1950, the UNHCR, which has a mission of conducting and co-ordinating international initiatives on behalf of refugees, has regularly produced complete statistics on refugees and asylum seekers in OECD countries and other countries of the world (www.unhcr.org/figures-at-a-glance.html).

These statistics are most often derived from administrative sources, but there are differences depending on the nature of the data provided. In some countries, asylum seekers are enumerated when the application is accepted. Consequently, they are shown in the statistics at that time rather than at the date when they arrived in the country. Acceptance of the application means that the administrative authorities will review the applicants’ claims and grant them certain rights during this review procedure. In other countries, the data do not include the applicants’ family members, who are admitted under different provisions (France), while other countries count the entire family (Switzerland).

The figures presented in the summary table (Table A.3) generally concern initial applications (primary processing stage) and sometimes differ significantly from the totals presented in Table B.3, which give data by country of origin. This is because the data received by the UNHCR by country of origin combine both initial applications and appeals, and it is sometimes difficult to separate these two categories retrospectively. The reference for total asylum applications remains the figures shown in summary Table A.3.

Table A.3. Inflows of asylum seekers into OECD countries and Russia
| 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015
Australia | 3 200 | 3 200 | 3 520 | 3 980 | 4 770 | 6 210 | 8 250 | 11 510 | 15 790 | 11 740 | 8 960 | 12 350
Austria | 24 630 | 22 460 | 13 350 | 11 920 | 12 840 | 15 820 | 11 010 | 14 420 | 17 410 | 17 500 | 28 060 | 85 620
Belgium | 15 360 | 15 960 | 11 590 | 11 120 | 12 250 | 17 190 | 21 760 | 26 000 | 18 530 | 12 500 | 13 870 | 38 700
Canada | 25 750 | 20 790 | 22 870 | 28 340 | 34 800 | 33 970 | 22 540 | 24 990 | 20 220 | 10 360 | 13 450 | 16 070
Chile | 200 | 380 | 570 | 760 | 870 | .. | 260 | 310 | 170 | 250 | 280 | ..
Czech Republic | 5 460 | 4 160 | 3 020 | 1 880 | 1 710 | 1 360 | 980 | 760 | 750 | 500 | 920 | 1 250
Denmark | 3 240 | 2 260 | 1 920 | 1 850 | 2 360 | 3 820 | 4 970 | 3 810 | 6 190 | 7 560 | 14 820 | 21 230
Estonia | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 40 | 30 | 70 | 80 | 100 | 150 | 230
Finland | 3 860 | 3 570 | 2 330 | 1 430 | 4 020 | 5 910 | 4 020 | 3 090 | 2 920 | 3 020 | 3 520 | 32 270
France | 58 550 | 49 730 | 30 750 | 29 390 | 35 400 | 42 120 | 48 070 | 52 150 | 55 070 | 60 230 | 59 030 | 74 300
Germany | 35 610 | 28 910 | 21 030 | 19 160 | 22 090 | 27 650 | 41 330 | 45 740 | 64 540 | 109 580 | 173 070 | 441 900
Greece | 4 470 | 9 050 | 12 270 | 25 110 | 19 880 | 15 930 | 10 270 | 9 310 | 9 580 | 8 220 | 9 450 | 11 370
Hungary | 1 600 | 1 610 | 2 120 | 3 430 | 3 120 | 4 670 | 2 100 | 1 690 | 2 160 | 18 570 | 41 370 | 174 430
Iceland | 80 | 90 | 40 | 40 | 80 | 40 | 50 | 80 | 110 | 170 | 160 | 360
Ireland | 4 770 | 4 320 | 4 310 | 3 990 | 3 870 | 2 690 | 1 940 | 1 420 | 1 100 | 950 | 1 440 | 3 280
Israel | .. | 940 | 860 | 5 760 | 4 630 | 4 140 | 5 580 | 6 460 | 5 700 | 4 760 | 5 560 | ..
Italy | 9 720 | 9 550 | 10 350 | 14 050 | 30 320 | 17 600 | 10 050 | 34 120 | 17 350 | 25 720 | 63 660 | 83 240
Japan | 430 | 380 | 950 | 820 | 1 600 | 1 390 | 1 200 | 1 870 | 2 550 | 3 260 | 5 000 | 7 580
Korea | 150 | 410 | 280 | 720 | 360 | 320 | 430 | 1 010 | 1 140 | 1 570 | 2 900 | 5 710
Luxembourg | 1 580 | 800 | 520 | 430 | 460 | 480 | 740 | 2 080 | 2 000 | 990 | 970 | 2 300
Mexico | 400 | 690 | 480 | 370 | 320 | 680 | 1 040 | 750 | 810 | 1 300 | 1 520 | ..
Netherlands | 9 780 | 12 350 | 14 470 | 7 100 | 13 400 | 14 910 | 13 330 | 11 590 | 9 660 | 14 400 | 23 850 | 43 100
New Zealand | 580 | 350 | 280 | 250 | 250 | 340 | 340 | 310 | 320 | 290 | 290 | 350
Norway | 7 950 | 5 400 | 5 320 | 6 530 | 14 430 | 17 230 | 10 060 | 9 050 | 9 790 | 11 470 | 12 640 | 30 520
Poland | 8 080 | 6 860 | 4 430 | 7 210 | 7 200 | 10 590 | 6 530 | 5 090 | 9 170 | 13 760 | 6 810 | 10 250
Portugal | 110 | 110 | 130 | 220 | 160 | 140 | 160 | 280 | 300 | 510 | 440 | 900
Russia | 910 | 960 | 1 170 | 3 370 | 5 420 | 5 700 | 2 180 | 1 270 | 1 240 | 1 960 | 6 670 | ..
Slovak Republic | 11 400 | 3 550 | 2 870 | 2 640 | 910 | 820 | 540 | 490 | 730 | 280 | 230 | 270
Slovenia | 1 170 | 1 600 | 520 | 430 | 240 | 180 | 250 | 370 | 310 | 240 | 360 | 260
Spain | 5 540 | 5 250 | 5 300 | 7 660 | 4 520 | 3 010 | 2 740 | 3 410 | 2 580 | 4 510 | 5 900 | 13 370
Sweden | 23 160 | 17 530 | 24 320 | 36 370 | 24 350 | 24 190 | 31 820 | 29 650 | 43 880 | 54 260 | 75 090 | 156 460
Switzerland | 14 250 | 10 060 | 10 540 | 10 390 | 16 610 | 16 010 | 13 520 | 19 440 | 25 950 | 19 440 | 22 110 | 38 120
Turkey | 3 910 | 3 920 | 4 550 | 7 650 | 12 980 | 7 830 | 9 230 | 16 020 | 26 470 | 44 810 | 87 820 | 133 590
United Kingdom | 40 630 | 30 840 | 28 320 | 28 300 | 31 320 | 30 680 | 22 640 | 25 900 | 27 980 | 29 400 | 31 260 | 38 570
United States | 44 970 | 39 240 | 41 100 | 40 450 | 39 360 | 38 080 | 49 310 | 70 030 | 78 410 | 84 400 | 121 160 | 172 740
OECD | 370 600 | 316 330 | 285 290 | 319 760 | 361 490 | 366 040 | 357 090 | 433 270 | 479 720 | 576 620 | 836 120 | 1 650 690
Notes: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of the Tables B.3. Information on data for Israel: http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932315602.
StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395741

Table B.3. Inflows of asylum seekers by nationality
Australia
| 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014
China | 833 | 981 | 1 044 | 1 215 | 1 238 | 1 197 | 1 191 | 1 190 | 1 155 | 1 537 | 1 541
India | 242 | 170 | 318 | 344 | 371 | 214 | 412 | 767 | 949 | 1 163 | 964
Pakistan | 61 | 105 | 93 | 146 | 220 | 266 | 470 | 821 | 1 538 | 1 104 | 828
Malaysia | 208 | 172 | 108 | 144 | 234 | 231 | 253 | 182 | 173 | 209 | 704
Iraq | 64 | 84 | 184 | 213 | 199 | 326 | 856 | 495 | 778 | 362 | 422
Libya | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 7 | 12 | 202 | 188 | 318 | 322
Fiji | 84 | 50 | 34 | 70 | 81 | 262 | 547 | 277 | 236 | 413 | 287
Viet Nam | 33 | 25 | 29 | 35 | 52 | 45 | 93 | 130 | 81 | 128 | 264
Iran | 66 | 94 | 79 | 87 | 162 | 350 | 1 354 | 2 142 | 1 851 | 967 | 262
Bangladesh | 130 | 62 | 56 | 67 | 135 | 70 | 104 | 127 | 162 | 382 | 250
Lebanon | 57 | 55 | 67 | 76 | 92 | 114 | 203 | 158 | 326 | 349 | 246
Nepal | 39 | 75 | 37 | 48 | 33 | 44 | 162 | 271 | 189 | 298 | 230
Egypt | 74 | 66 | 50 | 41 | 96 | 134 | 328 | 418 | 394 | 849 | 208
Sri Lanka | 126 | 320 | 325 | 448 | 423 | 1 105 | 796 | 371 | 2 468 | 806 | 176
Indonesia | 162 | 168 | 267 | 183 | 235 | 195 | 189 | 175 | 126 | 190 | 152
Other countries | 1 016 | 764 | 831 | 857 | 1 223 | 2 857 | 5 696 | 3 742 | 5 376 | 2 585 | 2 132
Total | 3 196 | 3 192 | 3 522 | 3 974 | 4 795 | 7 417 | 12 666 | 11 468 | 15 990 | 11 660 | 8 988
Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.
StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395794

Table B.3. Inflows of asylum seekers by nationality
Austria
| 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014
Syria | 134 | 78 | 88 | 166 | 140 | 279 | 194 | 423 | 922 | 1991 | 7 661
Afghanistan | 757 | 928 | 699 | 761 | 1 382 | 2 237 | 1 582 | 3 623 | 4 003 | 2 589 | 4 916
Serbia (and Kosovo: S/RES/1244 (1999)) | 2 841 | 4 409 | 2 515 | 1 760 | 1 702 | 2033 | 972 | 541 | 606 | 1 146 | 2046
Russian Federation | 6 185 | 4 362 | 2 441 | 2 676 | 3 435 | 3 559 | 2 322 | 2 319 | 3 098 | 2 841 | 1 484
Stateless | 199 | 375 | 204 | 185 | 134 | 149 | 165 | 191 | 149 | 253 | 1 293
Somalia | 45 | 87 | 183 | 467 | 411 | 344 | 190 | 611 | 483 | 433 | 1 152
Iraq | 231 | 221 | 380 | 472 | 490 | 399 | 336 | 484 | 491 | 468 | 1 051
Iran | 347 | 306 | 274 | 248 | 250 | 340 | 387 | 457 | 761 | 595 | 726
Nigeria | 1 825 | 881 | 421 | 394 | 535 | 837 | 573 | 411 | 400 | 691 | 544
Algeria | 235 | 187 | 138 | 109 | 173 | 248 | 304 | 446 | 573 | 949 | 442
Ukraine | 424 | 278 | 176 | 182 | 139 | 120 | 82 | 63 | 79 | 64 | 419
Georgia | 1 744 | 955 | 564 | 400 | 511 | 975 | 370 | 261 | 300 | 257 | 348
Pakistan | 575 | 498 | 110 | 103 | 106 | 183 | 276 | 952 | 1 827 | 1 037 | 330
India | 1 842 | 1 530 | 479 | 385 | 355 | 427 | 433 | 463 | 401 | 339 | 266
Armenia | 414 | 520 | 350 | 405 | 360 | 440 | 278 | 218 | 343 | 300 | 248
Other countries | 6 779 | 6 816 | 4 301 | 3 194 | 2 699 | 3 216 | 2 508 | 2 930 | 2 954 | 3 528 | 2 774
Total | 24 577 | 22 431 | 13 323 | 11 907 | 12 822 | 15 786 | 10 972 | 14 393 | 17 390 | 17 481 | 25 700
Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.
StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395794

Table B.3. Inflows of asylum seekers by nationality
Belgium
| 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014
Syria | 182 | 228 | 167 | 199 | 281 | 335 | 302 | 494 | 798 | 944 | 2 524
Iraq | 388 | 903 | 695 | 825 | 1 070 | 1 066 | 1 637 | 2 004 | 636 | 295 | 965
Eritrea | 24 | 20 | 20 | 27 | 35 | 63 | 106 | 83 | 65 | 57 | 745
Afghanistan | 287 | 253 | 365 | 696 | 879 | 1 228 | 1 124 | 2 773 | 2 349 | 892 | 744
Guinea | 565 | 643 | 413 | 526 | 661 | 1 112 | 1 455 | 2 046 | 1 370 | 1 023 | 657
Dem. Rep. of the Congo | 1 471 | 1 272 | 843 | 716 | 579 | 713 | 813 | 1 084 | 1 392 | 1 166 | 632
Russian Federation | 1 361 | 1 438 | 1 582 | 1 436 | 1 615 | 2 158 | 1 141 | 1 747 | 1 190 | 791 | 536
Serbia (and Kosovo: S/RES/1244 (1999)) | 1 294 | 1 203 | 778 | 1 219 | 1 050 | 2 808 | 4 545 | 3 067 | 995 | 747 | 526
Albania | 255 | 167 | 125 | 193 | 172 | 265 | 208 | 1 152 | 607 | 472 | 487
Ukraine | 82 | 75 | 52 | 27 | 61 | 28 | 47 | 62 | 73 | 36 | 481
Cameroon | 506 | 530 | 335 | 279 | 367 | 280 | 289 | 451 | 457 | 360 | 345
Georgia | 211 | 256 | 232 | 156 | 222 | 353 | 336 | 347 | 386 | 229 | 280
Somalia | 139 | 113 | 124 | 168 | 163 | 143 | 237 | 454 | 293 | 156 | 260
Senegal | 17 | 15 | 6 | 21 | 50 | 110 | 224 | 314 | 454 | 292 | 212
Rwanda | 427 | 565 | 370 | 321 | 273 | 338 | 1 065 | 368 | 284 | 193 | 211
Other countries | 7 995 | 8 097 | 5 352 | 4 170 | 4 641 | 5 995 | 7 943 | 9 218 | 6 929 | 4 572 | 4 271
Total | 15 204 | 15 778 | 11 459 | 10 979 | 12 119 | 16 995 | 21 472 | 25 664 | 18 278 | 12 225 | 13 876
Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.
StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395794

Table B.3. Inflows of asylum seekers by nationality
Canada
| 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014
China | 1 876 | 1 630 | 1 501 | 1 353 | 1 476 | 1 484 | 1 582 | 1 853 | 1 741 | 762 | 1 189
Pakistan | 880 | 596 | 578 | 349 | 368 | 397 | 492 | 828 | 808 | 630 | 776
Colombia | 3 631 | 1 117 | 1 373 | 2 577 | 3 069 | 2 292 | 1 354 | 892 | 724 | 597 | 579
Nigeria | 554 | 579 | 664 | 755 | 765 | 768 | 860 | 685 | 700 | 468 | 578
Iraq | 81 | 112 | 190 | 293 | 310 | 244 | 151 | 164 | 174 | 237 | 576
Syria | 74 | 67 | 45 | 68 | 76 | 89 | 126 | 176 | 336 | 493 | 558
Slovak Republic | 16 | 9 | 4 | 7 | 106 | 501 | 241 | 294 | 404 | 32 | 469
Afghanistan | 128 | 238 | 229 | 270 | 408 | 410 | 392 | 397 | 362 | 386 | 461
Hungary | 43 | 22 | 25 | 23 | 302 | 2 518 | 2 321 | 4 409 | 1 823 | 95 | 390
Haiti | 170 | 352 | 698 | 3 231 | 4 247 | 1 436 | 1 061 | 519 | 419 | 329 | 364
Ukraine | 205 | 213 | 283 | 242 | 241 | 184 | 85 | 51 | 66 | 62 | 360
Dem. Rep. of the Congo | 375 | 310 | 431 | 351 | 437 | 326 | 314 | 370 | 357 | 308 | 346
Somalia | 409 | 241 | 200 | 238 | 441 | 474 | 365 | 409 | 413 | 291 | 331
Bangladesh | 308 | 168 | 116 | 73 | 96 | 112 | 118 | 115 | 109 | 156 | 321
India | 1 064 | 888 | 852 | 641 | 674 | 546 | 593 | 751 | 765 | 228 | 294
Other countries | 15 612 | 13 126 | 15 607 | 17 767 | 23 693 | 21 304 | 13 043 | 13 370 | 11 260 | 5 261 | 6 069
Total | 25 426 | 19 668 | 22 796 | 28 238 | 36 709 | 33 085 | 23 098 | 25 283 | 20 461 | 10 335 | 13 661
Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.
StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395794

Table B.3. Inflows of asylum seekers by nationality
Chile
| 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014
Colombia | 182 | 347 | 540 | 713 | 816 | .. | 220 | 267 | 138 | 224 | ..
Syria | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | .. | 0 | 0 | 5 | 5 | ..
Afghanistan | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | .. | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | ..
West Bank and Gaza Strip | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | .. | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | ..
Russian Federation | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | .. | 0 | 2 | 0 | 3 | ..
Cuba | 7 | 1 | 0 | 4 | 2 | .. | 14 | 9 | 5 | 2 | ..
Albania | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | .. | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | ..
Bolivia | 1 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | .. | 3 | 4 | 4 | 1 | ..
Brazil | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | .. | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | ..
Dem. Rep. of the Congo | 0 | 9 | 3 | 3 | 3 | .. | 2 | 2 | 5 | 1 | ..
Mexico | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | .. | 0 | 0 | 3 | 1 | ..
Peru | 2 | 6 | 6 | 3 | 8 | .. | 5 | 1 | 0 | 1 | ..
El Salvador | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | .. | 0 | 3 | 0 | 1 | ..
Togo | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | .. | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | ..
Ukraine | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | .. | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | ..
Other countries | 10 | 17 | 24 | 29 | 43 | .. | 15 | 17 | 8 | 0 | ..
Total | 203 | 380 | 573 | 756 | 872 | .. | 260 | 305 | 168 | 249 | 282
Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.
StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395794

Table B.3. Inflows of asylum seekers by nationality
Czech Republic
| 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014
Ukraine | 1 599 | 988 | 571 | 293 | 328 | 202 | 64 | 101 | 101 | 68 | 416
Syria | 4 | 22 | 20 | 31 | 63 | 46 | 6 | 7 | 57 | 69 | 102
Viet Nam | 362 | 208 | 124 | 100 | 107 | 63 | 26 | 27 | 35 | 37 | 42
Stateless | 46 | 73 | 101 | 65 | 33 | 60 | 21 | 14 | 14 | 21 | 16
Cuba | 5 | 8 | 20 | 94 | 20 | 11 | 16 | 20 | 14 | 36 | 15
Moldova | 94 | 59 | 29 | 31 | 16 | 20 | 4 | 7 | 6 | 10 | 7
Iraq | 38 | 47 | 80 | 49 | 27 | 11 | 5 | 8 | 5 | 11 | 6
Afghanistan | 15 | 2 | 1 | 21 | 28 | 4 | 6 | 25 | 10 | 8 | 6
Serbia (and Kosovo: S/RES/1244 (1999)) | 21 | 30 | 27 | 49 | 30 | 29 | 6 | 1 | 8 | 16 | 6
Russian Federation | 1 499 | 260 | 170 | 99 | 80 | 57 | 36 | 25 | 29 | 40 | 5
Other countries | 1 762 | 2 319 | 1 871 | 1 045 | 958 | 745 | 295 | 257 | 238 | 187 | 293
Total | 5 445 | 4 016 | 3 014 | 1 877 | 1 690 | 1 248 | 485 | 492 | 517 | 503 | 914
Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.
StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395794

Table B.3. Inflows of asylum seekers by nationality
Denmark
| 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014
Syria | 56 | 46 | 55 | 74 | 105 | 383 | 821 | 428 | 907 | 1 702 | 7 185
Eritrea | 18 | 8 | 5 | 6 | 15 | 37 | 26 | 20 | 57 | 98 | 2 293
Stateless | 20 | 27 | 7 | 4 | 13 | 2 | 3 | 54 | 57 | 418 | 1 265
Somalia | 154 | 80 | 57 | 35 | 58 | 179 | 110 | 107 | 914 | 964 | 688
Russian Federation | 163 | 119 | 61 | 115 | 183 | 341 | 340 | 304 | 521 | 983 | 526
Afghanistan | 285 | 173 | 122 | 144 | 418 | 1 059 | 1 476 | 903 | 576 | 425 | 321
Iran | 140 | 123 | 89 | 109 | 196 | 334 | 597 | 461 | 548 | 374 | 285
Morocco | 17 | 14 | 14 | 7 | 19 | 31 | 29 | 45 | 108 | 162 | 226
Serbia (and Kosovo: S/RES/1244 [1999]) | 778 | 375 | 246 | 92 | 118 | 275 | 402 | 325 | 689 | 551 | 180
Iraq | 217 | 264 | 507 | 700 | 543 | 309 | 237 | 115 | 133 | 115 | 148
Algeria | 50 | 45 | 15 | 17 | 38 | 46 | 46 | 103 | 134 | 111 | 120
Ukraine | 20 | 9 | 3 | 5 | 7 | 9 | 3 | 19 | 15 | 38 | 118
Georgia | 32 | 10 | 16 | 6 | 25 | 17 | 15 | 19 | 75 | 69 | 104
Ethiopia | 6 | 15 | 8 | 3 | 5 | 6 | 8 | 4 | 13 | 22 | 102
Nigeria | 88 | 55 | 52 | 22 | 29 | 54 | 24 | 52 | 115 | 142 | 93
Other countries | 1 176 | 891 | 663 | 532 | 586 | 773 | 768 | 844 | 1 270 | 1 352 | 1 120
Total | 3 220 | 2 254 | 1 920 | 1 871 | 2 358 | 3 855 | 4 905 | 3 803 | 6 132 | 7 526 | 14 774
Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.
StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395794

Table B.3. Inflows of asylum seekers by nationality
Estonia
| 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014
Ukraine | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 37
Other countries | 15 | 10 | 12 | 9 | 13 | 39 | 32 | 65 | 77 | 97 | 106
Total | 15 | 10 | 12 | 9 | 14 | 40 | 32 | 67 | 77 | 97 | 143
Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.
StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395794

Table B.3. Inflows of asylum seekers by nationality
Finland
| 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014
Iraq | 118 | 289 | 227 | 307 | 1 253 | 1 195 | 575 | 588 | 784 | 764 | 807
Somalia | 243 | 320 | 91 | 81 | 1 176 | 1 180 | 571 | 365 | 173 | 196 | 407
Ukraine | 30 | 14 | 11 | 5 | 10 | 7 | 10 | 9 | 16 | 5 | 298
Afghanistan | 164 | 237 | 96 | 70 | 249 | 461 | 265 | 292 | 188 | 172 | 198
Russian Federation | 210 | 233 | 168 | 172 | 208 | 602 | 436 | 294 | 199 | 219 | 167
Nigeria | 94 | 72 | 68 | 41 | 76 | 131 | 84 | 105 | 93 | 202 | 157
Syria | 15 | 11 | 21 | 8 | 24 | 36 | 41 | 109 | 180 | 148 | 146
Albania | 59 | 33 | 21 | 13 | 16 | 9 | 12 | 11 | 18 | 51 | 98
Serbia (and Kosovo: S/RES/1244 (1999)) | 772 | 457 | 283 | 142 | 161 | 340 | 325 | 160 | 167 | 119 | 88
Iran | 95 | 79 | 87 | 78 | 143 | 162 | 142 | 125 | 121 | 147 | 84
Algeria | 31 | 36 | 25 | 25 | 27 | 48 | 47 | 55 | 54 | 81 | 79
Morocco | 3 | 7 | 0 | 4 | 12 | 30 | 15 | 28 | 37 | 70 | 70
Gambia | 1 | 12 | 17 | 5 | 8 | 45 | 33 | 21 | 29 | 64 | 39
Stateless | 21 | 32 | 18 | 6 | 26 | 20 | 52 | 40 | 25 | 24 | 34
Cameroon | 7 | 40 | 28 | 11 | 20 | 24 | 21 | 21 | 22 | 37 | 29
Other countries | 1 756 | 1 668 | 1 113 | 461 | 580 | 1 655 | 1 348 | 824 | 723 | 647 | 816
Total | 3 619 | 3 540 | 2 274 | 1 429 | 3 989 | 5 945 | 3 977 | 3 047 | 2 829 | 2 946 | 3 517
Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.
StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395794

Table B.3. Inflows of asylum seekers by nationality
France
| 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014
Dem. Rep. of the Congo | 3 848 | 2 959 | 2 278 | 2 126 | 2 485 | 2 784 | 3 395 | 3 804 | 5 321 | 5 263 | 5 170
Russian Federation | 3 331 | 2 905 | 2 251 | 3 222 | 3 579 | 3 383 | 4 302 | 4 042 | 5 366 | 4 676 | 3 596
Syria | 52 | 32 | 21 | 45 | 32 | 61 | 192 | 119 | 629 | 1 303 | 3 129
Serbia (and Kosovo: S/RES/1244 [1999]) | 3 812 | 3 896 | 3 042 | 3 063 | 3 129 | 5 236 | 5 754 | 3 458 | 3 957 | 5 867 | 2 969
Albania | 595 | 456 | 307 | 198 | 335 | 534 | 478 | 475 | 2 647 | 5 016 | 2 843
China | 4 196 | 2 590 | 1 214 | 1 288 | 821 | 1 602 | 1 933 | 2 184 | 2 226 | 2 293 | 2 675
Bangladesh | 959 | 851 | 607 | 959 | 1 242 | 1 441 | 3 140 | 3 568 | 1 093 | 3 069 | 2 646
Guinea | 1 020 | 1 136 | 858 | 946 | 1 256 | 1 665 | 2 012 | 2017 | 1 884 | 2 445 | 2 166
Pakistan | 1 046 | 567 | 392 | 343 | 325 | 633 | 890 | 1 432 | 1 941 | 1 735 | 2 130
Sri Lanka | 2 246 | 2 044 | 2 143 | 2 130 | 2 304 | 3 097 | 2 827 | 3 183 | 3 122 | 2 325 | 2 129
Sudan | 286 | 402 | 452 | 403 | 397 | 812 | 812 | 783 | 752 | 840 | 1 948
Haiti | 3 133 | 5 035 | 1 840 | 673 | 925 | 1 451 | 1 992 | 2 010 | 1 602 | 1 473 | 1 854
Algeria | 4 209 | 2003 | 1 125 | 965 | 973 | 1 118 | 1 169 | 1 132 | 1 162 | 1 479 | 1 601
Armenia | 1 292 | 1 547 | 1 680 | 1 924 | 2 081 | 3 114 | 1 766 | 3 638 | 2 187 | 1 722 | 1 539
Mali | 859 | 566 | 153 | 607 | 2 664 | 701 | 702 | 733 | 938 | 1 663 | 1 473
Other countries | 27 591 | 21 704 | 12 233 | 10 107 | 12 446 | 14 231 | 16 297 | 19 225 | 20 312 | 19 166 | 21 173
Total | 58 475 | 48 693 | 30 596 | 28 999 | 34 994 | 41 863 | 47 661 | 51 803 | 55 139 | 60 335 | 59 041
Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.
StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395794

Table B.3. Inflows of asylum seekers by nationality
Germany
| 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014
Syria | 776 | 878 | 608 | 604 | 744 | 819 | 1 490 | 2 634 | 6 201 | 11 851 | 39 332
Serbia (and Kosovo: S/RES/1244 [1999]) | 3 878 | 4 818 | 3 107 | 1 871 | 1 511 | 1981 | 6 546 | 5 974 | 10 383 | 14 853 | 24 080
Eritrea | 453 | 347 | 278 | 335 | 247 | 346 | 642 | 632 | 650 | 3 616 | 13 198
Afghanistan | 912 | 685 | 525 | 329 | 650 | 3 375 | 5 905 | 7 767 | 7 498 | 7 735 | 9 115
Albania | 155 | 114 | 111 | 70 | 61 | 49 | 39 | 78 | 232 | 1 247 | 7 865
Bosnia and Herzegovina | 416 | 313 | 187 | 103 | 127 | 171 | 301 | 305 | 2 025 | 3 323 | 5 705
Former Yug. Rep. of Macedonia | 198 | 181 | 119 | 83 | 78 | 109 | 2 466 | 1 131 | 4 546 | 6 208 | 5 614
Somalia | 244 | 165 | 147 | 126 | 166 | 346 | 2 235 | 984 | 1 243 | 3 786 | 5 528
Iraq | 1 290 | 1 895 | 2 065 | 4 171 | 6 697 | 6 538 | 5 555 | 5 831 | 5 352 | 3 958 | 5 345
Russian Federation | 2 767 | 1 663 | 1 038 | 752 | 768 | 936 | 1 199 | 1 689 | 3 202 | 14 887 | 4 411
Pakistan | 1 064 | 520 | 451 | 293 | 309 | 481 | 840 | 2 539 | 3 412 | 4 101 | 3 968
Nigeria | 1 005 | 536 | 414 | 439 | 500 | 791 | 716 | 759 | 892 | 1 923 | 3 924
Iran | 1 374 | 916 | 609 | 616 | 804 | 1 170 | 2 475 | 3 352 | 4 348 | 4 424 | 3 194
Georgia | 793 | 480 | 235 | 183 | 233 | 560 | 664 | 471 | 1 298 | 2 336 | 2 873
Ukraine | 225 | 130 | 89 | 60 | 35 | 66 | 62 | 44 | 124 | 141 | 2 657
Other countries | 18 843 | 12 544 | 9 883 | 7 808 | 7 862 | 9 112 | 9 270 | 10 772 | 12 365 | 23 025 | 36 261
Total | 34 393 | 26 185 | 19 866 | 17 843 | 20 792 | 26 850 | 40 405 | 44 962 | 63 771 | 107 414 | 173 070
Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.
StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395794

Table B.3. Inflows of asylum seekers by nationality
Greece
| 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014
Afghanistan | 382 | 458 | 1 087 | 1 556 | 2 287 | 1 510 | 524 | 637 | 584 | 1 223 | 1 711
Pakistan | 247 | 1 154 | 2 378 | 9 144 | 6 914 | 3 716 | 2 748 | 2 309 | 2 339 | 1 358 | 1 623
Syria | 44 | 57 | 143 | 1 311 | 808 | 965 | 167 | 352 | 275 | 485 | 791
Bangladesh | 208 | 550 | 3 750 | 2 965 | 1 778 | 1 809 | 987 | 615 | 1 007 | 727 | 635
Albania | 23 | 21 | 20 | 51 | 202 | 517 | 693 | 276 | 384 | 579 | 570
Iran | 228 | 203 | 528 | 354 | 312 | 303 | 125 | 247 | 211 | 188 | 358
Georgia | 323 | 1 897 | 428 | 1 559 | 2 241 | 2 170 | 1 162 | 1 121 | 893 | 532 | 350
Sudan | 90 | 121 | 183 | 105 | 126 | 115 | 38 | 55 | 71 | 121 | 336
Nigeria | 325 | 406 | 391 | 390 | 746 | 780 | 393 | 362 | 267 | 256 | 332
Cameroon | 3 | 3 | 5 | 4 | 29 | 44 | 20 | 39 | 24 | 84 | 281
Egypt | 83 | 104 | 27 | 75 | 95 | 145 | 104 | 306 | 249 | 308 | 280
Eritrea | 10 | 17 | 28 | 26 | 47 | 47 | 59 | 37 | 138 | 157 | 258
Algeria | 27 | 48 | 17 | 19 | 18 | 44 | 79 | 79 | 105 | 144 | 187
Iraq | 936 | 971 | 1 415 | 5 474 | 1 760 | 886 | 342 | 257 | 315 | 145 | 175
Senegal | 1 | 7 | 66 | 219 | 386 | 336 | 381 | 375 | 373 | 100 | 110
Other countries | 1 369 | 2 657 | 1 594 | 1 728 | 2 034 | 2 441 | 2 390 | 2 180 | 2 342 | 1 803 | 1 435
Total | 4 299 | 8 674 | 12 060 | 24 980 | 19 783 | 15 828 | 10 212 | 9 247 | 9 577 | 8 210 | 9 432
Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.
StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395794

Table B.3. Inflows of asylum seekers by nationality
Hungary
| 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014
Serbia (and Kosovo: S/RES/1244 [1999]) | 180 | 243 | 384 | 723 | 1 593 | 2 322 | 637 | 238 | 246 | 6 155 | 21 206
Afghanistan | 38 | 23 | 13 | 35 | 116 | 1 194 | 796 | 649 | 880 | 2 279 | 8 539
Syria | 10 | 18 | 32 | 48 | 16 | 19 | 26 | 91 | 145 | 960 | 6 749
West Bank and Gaza Strip | 65 | 24 | 37 | 52 | 41 | 23 | 209 | 36 | 17 | 86 | 829
Iraq | 36 | 18 | 68 | 136 | 125 | 57 | 55 | 54 | 28 | 56 | 468
Pakistan | 54 | 40 | 18 | 15 | 246 | 41 | 41 | 121 | 327 | 3 052 | 296
Iran | 46 | 25 | 20 | 14 | 10 | 87 | 72 | 33 | 45 | 59 | 247
Bangladesh | 29 | 90 | 15 | 10 | 35 | 26 | 7 | 3 | 15 | 678 | 222
Cuba | 6 | 3 | 6 | 30 | 18 | 7 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 32 | 205
Somalia | 18 | 7 | 42 | 99 | 185 | 75 | 53 | 61 | 69 | 185 | 171
Nigeria | 73 | 89 | 109 | 86 | 56 | 66 | 42 | 22 | 27 | 441 | 169
Ghana | 2 | 4 | 2 | 4 | 3 | 5 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 264 | 157
Eritrea | 1 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 5 | 92 | 103
Turkey | 125 | 65 | 43 | 56 | 70 | 114 | 95 | 25 | 30 | 84 | 99
Mali | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 304 | 96
Other countries | 905 | 957 | 1 301 | 2 094 | 593 | 624 | 408 | 325 | 285 | 3 680 | 1 555
Total | 1 588 | 1 606 | 2 090 | 3 404 | 3 107 | 4 660 | 2 444 | 1 665 | 2 122 | 18 407 | 41 111
Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.
StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395794

Table B.3. Inflows of asylum seekers by nationality
Iceland
| 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014
Ukraine | 1 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 15
Albania | 5 | 2 | 1 | 5 | 5 | 3 | 0 | 2 | 11 | 22 | 10
Russian Federation | 3 | 10 | 6 | 5 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 7 | 3 | 5 | 10
Syria | 0 | 0 | 0 | 5 | 1 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 3 | 5 | 5
Iraq | 5 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 5 | 2 | 5 | 5 | 3 | 6 | 5
Belarus | 3 | 0 | 2 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 5
Georgia | 0 | 3 | 2 | 0 | 4 | 0 | 1 | 4 | 8 | 3 | 5
Colombia | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 5
Former Yug. Rep. of Macedonia | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 2 | 0 | 2 | 5
Other countries | 57 | 67 | 25 | 22 | 59 | 27 | 39 | 47 | 82 | 70 | 105
Total | 74 | 85 | 38 | 42 | 78 | 35 | 51 | 73 | 114 | 115 | 170
Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.
StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395794

Table B.3. Inflows of asylum seekers by nationality
Ireland
| 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014
Pakistan | 55 | 68 | 167 | 185 | 237 | 258 | 200 | 175 | 104 | 91 | 291
Nigeria | 1 776 | 1 276 | 1 037 | 1 028 | 1 008 | 569 | 387 | 182 | 158 | 129 | 139
Bangladesh | 7 | 20 | 5 | 24 | 47 | 29 | 51 | 22 | 21 | 29 | 93
Albania | 99 | 58 | 35 | 71 | 51 | 47 | 13 | 34 | 46 | 48 | 91
Zimbabwe | 69 | 51 | 77 | 87 | 114 | 91 | 48 | 67 | 48 | 70 | 74
Algeria | 66 | 32 | 49 | 47 | 65 | 71 | 32 | 48 | 29 | 51 | 73
Dem. Rep. of the Congo | 140 | 138 | 109 | 149 | 172 | 101 | 70 | 70 | 58 | 72 | 61
Malawi | 3 | 6 | 8 | 14 | 22 | 14 | 15 | 26 | 23 | 55 | 36
Ukraine | 68 | 31 | 35 | 25 | 20 | 17 | 5 | 9 | 14 | 9 | 34
South Africa | 45 | 33 | 38 | 39 | 75 | 54 | 53 | 45 | 33 | 28 | 33
Venezuela | 0 | 1 | 0 | 2 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 25
Iran | 72 | 202 | 205 | 85 | 65 | 38 | 36 | 13 | 24 | 8 | 16
Iraq | 38 | 55 | 215 | 285 | 203 | 76 | 29 | 18 | 11 | 27 | 12
China | 152 | 96 | 139 | 259 | 180 | 194 | 228 | 142 | 32 | 22 | 12
Mauritius | 1 | 2 | 0 | 19 | 19 | 15 | 19 | 12 | 17 | 16 | 11
Other countries | 2 174 | 2 252 | 2 193 | 1 666 | 1 585 | 1 115 | 753 | 426 | 321 | 287 | 447
Total | 4 765 | 4 321 | 4 312 | 3 985 | 3 865 | 2 689 | 1 939 | 1 290 | 939 | 942 | 1 448
Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.
StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395794

Table B.3. Inflows of asylum seekers by nationality
Israel
| 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014
Côte d’Ivoire | 74 | 43 | 91 | 751 | 507 | 20 | 289 | 173 | 438 | .. | ..
South Sudan | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 285 | .. | ..
Eritrea | 31 | 4 | 20 | 1 766 | 3 067 | 0 | 2 | 75 | 261 | .. | ..
Nigeria | 100 | 160 | 448 | 567 | 418 | 198 | 168 | 209 | 194 | .. | ..
Ethiopia | 316 | 56 | 13 | 45 | 495 | 16 | 148 | 94 | 138 | .. | ..
Ghana | 34 | 25 | 74 | 192 | 233 | 113 | 189 | 148 | 108 | .. | ..
Guinea | 7 | 181 | 151 | 23 | 24 | 10 | 35 | 4 | 70 | .. | ..
Sudan | 14 | 102 | 164 | 1 402 | 2 142 | 0 | 4 | 37 | 37 | .. | ..
Colombia | 28 | 23 | 31 | 67 | 92 | 40 | 75 | 36 | 23 | .. | ..
Nepal | 6 | 0 | 8 | 7 | 3 | 6 | 0 | 2 | 14 | .. | ..
Togo | 21 | 10 | 8 | 22 | 13 | 0 | 15 | 2 | 7 | .. | ..
China | 0 | 0 | 3 | 11 | 11 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 6 | .. | ..
Chad | 0 | 0 | 1 | 5 | 19 | 1 | 17 | 7 | 4 | .. | ..
Myanmar | 25 | 12 | 14 | 20 | 8 | 0 | 0 | 11 | 3 | .. | ..
Guinea-Bissau | 1 | 1 | 6 | 3 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 1 | 2 | .. | ..
Other countries | 265 | 292 | 316 | 501 | 706 | 402 | 506 | 4 945 | 409 | .. | ..
Total | 922 | 909 | 1 348 | 5 382 | 7 738 | 809 | 1 448 | 5 745 | 1 999 | .. | ..
Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.
Information on data for Israel: http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932315602.
StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395794

Table B.3. Inflows of asylum seekers by nationality
Italy
| 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014
Mali | .. | .. | .. | .. | 490 | 170 | 67 | 3 017 | 785 | 1 714 | 9 758
Nigeria | .. | .. | .. | .. | 5 333 | 3 720 | 1 385 | 7 758 | 1 613 | 3 170 | 9 689
Gambia | .. | .. | .. | .. | 373 | 285 | 80 | 366 | 321 | 1 701 | 8 492
Pakistan | .. | .. | .. | .. | 920 | 1 250 | 929 | 2 559 | 2 601 | 3 175 | 7 095
Senegal | .. | .. | .. | .. | 117 | 130 | 162 | 904 | 939 | 988 | 4 661
Bangladesh | .. | .. | .. | .. | 1 322 | 1 200 | 222 | 1 788 | 566 | 460 | 4 524
Afghanistan | .. | .. | .. | .. | 2 005 | 620 | 873 | 1 429 | 1 495 | 2 049 | 3 104
Ghana | .. | .. | .. | .. | 1 674 | 850 | 278 | 3 648 | 846 | 478 | 2 102
Ukraine | .. | .. | .. | .. | 13 | 0 | 21 | 18 | 37 | 34 | 2 071
Côte d’Ivoire | .. | .. | .. | .. | 1 844 | 570 | 235 | 2 167 | 629 | 237 | 1 481
Guinea | .. | .. | .. | .. | 468 | 200 | 167 | 609 | 183 | 153 | 933
Somalia | .. | .. | .. | .. | 4 473 | 1 495 | 84 | 1 376 | 807 | 2 761 | 807
Iraq | .. | .. | .. | .. | 803 | 405 | 380 | 353 | 403 | 552 | 781
Egypt | .. | .. | .. | .. | 104 | 30 | 41 | 308 | 445 | 905 | 678
Syria | .. | .. | .. | .. | 36 | 95 | 48 | 541 | 354 | 634 | 504
Other countries | .. | .. | .. | .. | 10 889 | 4 530 | 4 957 | 13 481 | 5 018 | 6 575 | 6 977
Total | .. | .. | .. | .. | 30 864 | 15 550 | 9 929 | 40 322 | 17 042 | 25 586 | 63 657
Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.
StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395794

Table B.3. Inflows of asylum seekers by nationality
Japan
| 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014
Nepal | 3 | 5 | 11 | 4 | 20 | 29 | 110 | 250 | 320 | 544 | 1 293
Turkey | 131 | 40 | 149 | 76 | 156 | 94 | 127 | 235 | 422 | 655 | 845
Sri Lanka | 9 | 7 | 27 | 43 | 90 | 233 | 173 | 226 | 255 | 346 | 485
Myanmar | 138 | 212 | 626 | 500 | 979 | 570 | 345 | 489 | 368 | 380 | 434
Viet Nam | 4 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 5 | 3 | 2 | 5 | 7 | 30 | 287
Bangladesh | 33 | 33 | 15 | 14 | 33 | 51 | 27 | 98 | 169 | 190 | 284
India | 7 | 0 | 2 | 2 | 17 | 58 | 82 | 51 | 125 | 163 | 225
Pakistan | 12 | 10 | 12 | 27 | 37 | 91 | 83 | 170 | 298 | 241 | 212
Thailand | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 5 | 3 | 18 | 123
Nigeria | 2 | 2 | 10 | 6 | 10 | 17 | 34 | 51 | 112 | 68 | 79
Philippines | 2 | 5 | 3 | 1 | 4 | 10 | 9 | 15 | 18 | 57 | 73
Cameroon | 11 | 1 | 5 | 12 | 29 | 11 | 20 | 48 | 58 | 99 | 56
Iran | 18 | 16 | 27 | 19 | 38 | 40 | 35 | 48 | 46 | 51 | 56
Ghana | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 4 | 3 | 13 | 15 | 104 | 111 | 50
China | 16 | 16 | 13 | 17 | 18 | 18 | 17 | 20 | 32 | 35 | 43
Other countries | 39 | 37 | 54 | 91 | 155 | 154 | 132 | 141 | 206 | 262 | 455
Total | 426 | 384 | 954 | 816 | 1 598 | 1 384 | 1 210 | 1 867 | 2 543 | 3 250 | 5 000
Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.
StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395794

Table B.3. Inflows of asylum seekers by nationality
Korea
| 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014
Egypt | 1 | 1 | 4 | 3 | 1 | 3 | 0 | 4 | 6 | 97 | 568
Pakistan | 0 | 1 | 5 | 4 | 47 | 95 | 129 | 434 | 244 | 275 | 396
China | 64 | 145 | 28 | 29 | 30 | 19 | 7 | 8 | 3 | 46 | 359
Syria | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 146 | 295 | 204
Nigeria | 1 | 26 | 16 | 100 | 27 | 16 | 19 | 39 | 102 | 206 | 203
Yemen | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 1 | 34 | 127
Cameroon | 0 | 4 | 2 | 2 | 5 | 10 | 11 | 6 | 30 | 77 | 104
Ghana | 0 | 2 | 4 | 68 | 29 | 4 | 3 | 0 | 9 | 22 | 87
Nepal | 2 | 8 | 78 | 275 | 12 | 2 | 6 | 14 | 43 | 90 | 79
Uganda | 8 | 46 | 20 | 50 | 21 | 15 | 12 | 78 | 56 | 28 | 76
South Africa | 0 | 1 | 0 | 9 | 3 | 4 | 0 | 4 | 17 | 74 | 68
Liberia | 8 | 11 | 6 | 15 | 15 | 1 | 4 | 20 | 28 | 42 | 59
Bangladesh | 1 | 9 | 8 | 24 | 30 | 41 | 41 | 38 | 32 | 45 | 52
Morocco | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 4 | 37
India | 0 | 2 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 2 | 6 | 15 | 7 | 2 | 34
Other countries | 62 | 152 | 107 | 136 | 144 | 110 | 184 | 347 | 420 | 237 | 90
Total | 148 | 409 | 278 | 717 | 364 | 324 | 423 | 1 011 | 1 145 | 1 574 | 2 543
Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.
StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395794

Table B.3. Inflows of asylum seekers by nationality
Luxembourg
| 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014
Serbia (and Kosovo: S/RES/1244 [1999]) | 362 | 215 | 207 | 225 | 219 | 149 | 301 | 1 097 | 587 | 184 | 145
Bosnia and Herzegovina | 34 | 36 | 17 | 24 | 31 | 35 | 13 | 51 | 286 | 139 | 144
Montenegro | 0 | 0 | 0 | 15 | 14 | 6 | 0 | 103 | 297 | 91 | 97
Albania | 48 | 33 | 20 | 16 | 14 | 26 | 23 | 27 | 302 | 70 | 80
Syria | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 19 | 11 | 14 | 24 | 78
Algeria | 69 | 36 | 8 | 11 | 4 | 12 | 43 | 30 | 33 | 38 | 26
Tunisia | 1 | 2 | 3 | 1 | 0 | 2 | 4 | 42 | 46 | 52 | 18
Nigeria | 330 | 45 | 15 | 7 | 5 | 6 | 5 | 11 | 24 | 53 | 15
Eritrea | 1 | 2 | 6 | 0 | 11 | 10 | 12 | 12 | 7 | 5 | 15
Spain | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 10
Brunei Darussalam | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 9
Belarus | 40 | 16 | 5 | 8 | 6 | 14 | 15 | 11 | 19 | 24 | 9
Malawi | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 9
Switzerland | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 7
Equatorial Guinea | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 7
Other countries | 689 | 414 | 243 | 119 | 159 | 243 | 309 | 767 | 435 | 306 | 304
Total | 1 577 | 799 | 524 | 426 | 463 | 505 | 745 | 2 162 | 2 051 | 986 | 973
Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.
StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395794

Table B.3. Inflows of asylum seekers by nationality
Mexico
| 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014
Honduras | 67 | 51 | 39 | 31 | 55 | 184 | 135 | 168 | 272 | 529 | ..
El Salvador | 46 | 31 | 31 | 45 | 51 | 119 | 159 | 181 | 200 | 308 | ..
Cuba | 26 | 80 | 65 | 27 | 7 | 42 | 42 | 48 | 77 | 101 | ..
India | 10 | 27 | 5 | 2 | 3 | 37 | 271 | 36 | 8 | 87 | ..
Guatemala | 23 | 29 | 20 | 15 | 18 | 39 | 59 | 69 | 54 | 46 | ..
Colombia | 40 | 40 | 52 | 57 | 41 | 62 | 82 | 43 | 41 | 40 | ..
Nigeria | 0 | 2 | 1 | 13 | 1 | 8 | 23 | 27 | 21 | 39 | ..
Nicaragua | 11 | 14 | 4 | 7 | 9 | 29 | 15 | 6 | 11 | 20 | ..
Haiti | 11 | 20 | 17 | 41 | 61 | 65 | 39 | 38 | 25 | 14 | ..
Ghana | 0 | 0 | 2 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 9 | 14 | 7 | 13 | ..
Syria | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 11 | ..
Bangladesh | 8 | 3 | 4 | 29 | 0 | 1 | 5 | 7 | 3 | 9 | ..
United States | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 4 | 10 | 4 | 0 | 7 | ..
Cameroon | 1 | 6 | 8 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 4 | 5 | 6 | ..
Dominican Republic | 3 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 16 | 4 | 5 | 5 | ..
Other countries | 157 | 383 | 230 | 100 | 64 | 84 | 172 | 104 | 80 | 61 | ..
Total | 404 | 687 | 480 | 374 | 317 | 680 | 1 039 | 753 | 811 | 1 296 | 1 524
Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.
StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395794

Table B.3. Inflows of asylum seekers by nationality
Netherlands
| 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014
Syria | 180 | 280 | 293 | 36 | 48 | 101 | 125 | 168 | 454 | 2 673 | 8 748
Eritrea | 148 | 204 | 175 | 153 | 236 | 475 | 392 | 458 | 424 | 978 | 3 833
Stateless | 183 | 147 | 200 | 70 | 77 | 115 | 83 | 65 | 40 | 216 | 2 704
Iraq | 1 043 | 1 620 | 2 766 | 2 004 | 5 027 | 1 991 | 1 383 | 1 435 | 1 391 | 1 094 | 616
Iran | 450 | 557 | 921 | 187 | 322 | 502 | 785 | 929 | 834 | 728 | 505
Afghanistan | 689 | 902 | 932 | 143 | 395 | 1 281 | 1 364 | 1 885 | 1 022 | 673 | 452
Mongolia | 66 | 118 | 110 | 96 | 103 | 237 | 227 | 128 | 110 | 99 | 445
Somalia | 792 | 1 315 | 1 462 | 1 874 | 3 842 | 5 889 | 3 372 | 1 415 | 877 | 3 078 | 349
Georgia | 73 | 213 | 156 | 66 | 64 | 412 | 587 | 189 | 226 | 209 | 319
Serbia (and Kosovo: S/RES/1244 [1999]) | 395 | 336 | 607 | 24 | 32 | 75 | 106 | 120 | 170 | 316 | 247
Ukraine | 17 | 44 | 44 | 16 | 13 | 18 | 24 | 38 | 25 | 36 | 241
Nigeria | 224 | 154 | 243 | 179 | 97 | 151 | 168 | 129 | 106 | 136 | 223
Pakistan | 66 | 82 | 117 | 22 | 46 | 42 | 60 | 94 | 150 | 150 | 181
Sudan | 255 | 339 | 320 | 57 | 53 | 116 | 166 | 162 | 121 | 139 | 177
Russian Federation | 206 | 285 | 254 | 81 | 95 | 151 | 207 | 451 | 743 | 263 | 163
Other countries | 4 106 | 4 538 | 4 826 | 1 875 | 2 647 | 2 842 | 3 744 | 3 365 | 2 627 | 3 123 | 2 608
Total | 8 893 | 11 134 | 13 426 | 6 883 | 13 097 | 14 398 | 12 793 | 11 031 | 9 320 | 13 911 | 21 811
Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.
StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395794

Table B.3. Inflows of asylum seekers by nationality
New Zealand
| 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014
Pakistan | 9 | 8 | 11 | 8 | 3 | 18 | 7 | 22 | 24 | 18 | 10
Fiji | 2 | 12 | 10 | 10 | 6 | 45 | 65 | 29 | 21 | 37 | 10
Sri Lanka | 29 | 6 | 28 | 25 | 26 | 30 | 23 | 19 | 25 | 41 | 6
China | 49 | 19 | 30 | 26 | 24 | 20 | 22 | 20 | 33 | 21 | 6
Ukraine | 4 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 5
Syria | 16 | 11 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 8 | 3 | 2 | 13 | 10 | 5
Slovak Republic | 0 | 9 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 13 | 4 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 5
Other countries | 471 | 283 | 194 | 175 | 188 | 201 | 201 | 212 | 205 | 165 | 241
Total | 580 | 348 | 276 | 248 | 253 | 335 | 325 | 304 | 323 | 292 | 288
Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.
StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395794

Table B.3. Inflows of asylum seekers by nationality
Norway
| 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014
Eritrea | 110 | 177 | 316 | 777 | 1 772 | 2 605 | 1 609 | 1 292 | 1 600 | 3 766 | 2 805
Syria | 71 | 79 | 49 | 48 | 114 | 271 | 110 | 189 | 312 | 868 | 1978
Sudan | 33 | 45 | 36 | 36 | 114 | 241 | 171 | 206 | 486 | 622 | 792
Stateless | 298 | 209 | 237 | 496 | 919 | 1 216 | 403 | 246 | 255 | 543 | 782
Somalia | 958 | 667 | 632 | 169 | 1 259 | 1 827 | 1 227 | 2 165 | 2 803 | 2 530 | 756
Afghanistan | 1 059 | 466 | 224 | 206 | 1 320 | 3 802 | 930 | 948 | 987 | 720 | 549
Ethiopia | 148 | 100 | 143 | 233 | 351 | 696 | 495 | 289 | 221 | 356 | 365
Nigeria | 205 | 94 | 54 | 108 | 427 | 553 | 318 | 219 | 331 | 480 | 318
Serbia (and Kosovo: S/RES/1244 [1999]) | 859 | 468 | 369 | 536 | 615 | 352 | 397 | 200 | 218 | 304 | 214
Albania | 112 | 79 | 43 | 29 | 42 | 26 | 24 | 39 | 167 | 179 | 202
Russian Federation | 937 | 545 | 548 | 811 | 1 025 | 794 | 557 | 309 | 294 | 339 | 172
Iraq | 412 | 671 | 1 002 | 1 176 | 3 064 | 1 154 | 419 | 318 | 229 | 179 | 165
Bangladesh | 30 | 24 | 20 | 11 | 5 | 20 | 17 | 73 | 222 | 124 | 154
Morocco | 21 | 19 | 23 | 16 | 39 | 68 | 85 | 78 | 136 | 110 | 132
Ukraine | 43 | 20 | 12 | 6 | 16 | 25 | 9 | 14 | 29 | 24 | 126
Other countries | 2 649 | 1 739 | 1 612 | 1 518 | 2 851 | 2 913 | 2 452 | 2 099 | 2 395 | 2 131 | 1 463
Total | 7 945 | 5 402 | 5 320 | 6 176 | 13 933 | 16 563 | 9 223 | 8 684 | 10 685 | 13 275 | 10 973
Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.
StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395794

Table B.3. Inflows of asylum seekers by nationality
Poland
| 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014
Ukraine | 72 | 49 | 45 | 29 | 25 | 36 | 45 | 46 | 58 | 32 | 2 147
Russian Federation | 7 180 | 5 015 | 3 772 | 6 536 | 6 647 | 5 726 | 4 796 | 3 170 | 4 940 | 11 933 | 2 079
Georgia | 47 | 40 | 16 | 14 | 54 | 4 182 | 1 083 | 1 442 | 2 960 | 1 057 | 561
Tajikistan | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 9 | 5 | 107
Armenia | 18 | 10 | 32 | 22 | 32 | 147 | 107 | 179 | 380 | 150 | 99
Syria | 7 | 6 | 3 | 3 | 8 | 7 | 8 | 10 | 107 | 255 | 98
Kyrgyzstan | 19 | 15 | 6 | 7 | 5 | 13 | 37 | 40 | 30 | 53 | 96
Viet Nam | 16 | 24 | 22 | 44 | 57 | 67 | 47 | 26 | 50 | 32 | 33
Pakistan | 211 | 36 | 39 | 31 | 15 | 19 | 27 | 9 | 34 | 24 | 22
Iraq | 6 | 12 | 32 | 29 | 66 | 21 | 27 | 25 | 25 | 24 | 19
Kazakhstan | 30 | 16 | 7 | 5 | 17 | 5 | 11 | 17 | 120 | 76 | 18
Stateless | 11 | 8 | 5 | 10 | 11 | 19 | 21 | 13 | 35 | 25 | 17
Afghanistan | 57 | 3 | 8 | 9 | 4 | 14 | 25 | 33 | 88 | 43 | 14
Turkmenistan | 5 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 6 | 7 | 4 | 13
Uzbekistan | 3 | 2 | 2 | 5 | 22 | 19 | 14 | 5 | 13 | 5 | 6
Other countries | 395 | 199 | 232 | 369 | 238 | 311 | 292 | 239 | 324 | 209 | 212
Total | 8 077 | 5 436 | 4 223 | 7 114 | 7 202 | 10 588 | 6 540 | 5 260 | 9 180 | 13 927 | 5 541
Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.
StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395794

Table B.3. Inflows of asylum seekers by nationality
Portugal
| 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014
Ukraine | 6 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 5 | 0 | 7 | 2 | 2 | 154
Mali | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 26 | 7
Somalia | 0 | 1 | 0 | 15 | 2 | 0 | 2 | 26 | 10 | 7 | 6
Sri Lanka | 1 | 0 | 0 | 6 | 27 | 8 | 4 | 1 | 14 | 3 | 6
Morocco | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 5 | 4 | 15 | 6
Syria | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 20 | 146 | 6
Libya | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 4 | 0 | 5
Angola | 8 | 9 | 6 | 5 | 4 | 4 | 12 | 5 | 4 | 2 | 5
Other countries | 92 | 101 | 121 | 194 | 125 | 122 | 142 | 230 | 235 | 305 | 247
Total | 107 | 113 | 128 | 221 | 161 | 139 | 160 | 275 | 295 | 506 | 442
Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.
StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395794

Table B.3. Inflows of asylum seekers by nationality
Russian Federation
| 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014
Ukraine | 6 | 4 | 10 | 20 | 19 | 10 | 17 | 11 | 11 | 13 | 5 789
Syria | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 18 | 6 | 3 | 31 | 197 | 1 073 | 473
Afghanistan | 638 | 674 | 827 | 2 211 | 2 047 | 1 577 | 884 | 540 | 493 | 382 | 301
Georgia | 24 | 27 | 138 | 586 | 2 684 | 3 580 | 641 | 314 | 238 | 137 | 106
Egypt | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 31 | 3 | 13 | 73 | ..
Uzbekistan | 72 | 102 | 37 | 63 | 90 | 136 | 96 | 70 | 69 | 54 | ..
Dem. People’s Rep. of Korea | 0 | 1 | 7 | 11 | 26 | 59 | 21 | 67 | 32 | 27 | ..
Sudan | 0 | 3 | 4 | 18 | 10 | 13 | 3 | 2 | 6 | 20 | ..
Kyrgyzstan | 0 | 12 | 0 | 5 | 3 | 7 | 246 | 39 | 29 | 16 | ..
Dem. Rep. of the Congo | 10 | 7 | 2 | 34 | 23 | 11 | 15 | 14 | 14 | 14 | ..
Tajikistan | 23 | 3 | 7 | 43 | 48 | 29 | 20 | 19 | 17 | 14 | ..
Lebanon | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 7 | 1 | 2 | 5 | 1 | 12 | ..
Pakistan | 0 | 1 | 0 | 13 | 8 | 14 | 2 | 7 | 6 | 10 | ..
Iraq | 18 | 20 | 13 | 36 | 61 | 37 | 6 | 12 | 11 | 8 | ..
Azerbaijan | 9 | 5 | 21 | 31 | 48 | 4 | 16 | 8 | 2 | 6 | ..
Other countries | 110 | 100 | 104 | 298 | 326 | 217 | 178 | 123 | 104 | 103 | 311
Total | 910 | 960 | 1 170 | 3 369 | 5 418 | 5 701 | 2 181 | 1 265 | 1 243 | 1 962 | 6 980
Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.
StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395794

Table B.3. Inflows of asylum seekers by nationality
Slovak Republic
| 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014
Afghanistan | 396 | 109 | 41 | 66 | 75 | 51 | 76 | 65 | 63 | 84 | 67
Syria | 48 | 24 | 6 | 39 | 8 | 11 | 5 | 5 | 4 | 13 | 27
Viet Nam | 154 | 99 | 63 | 58 | 41 | 56 | 32 | 7 | 2 | 0 | 15
Bangladesh | 548 | 270 | 183 | 108 | 42 | 15 | 7 | 4 | 3 | 1 | 5
Other countries | 10 208 | 2 981 | 2 577 | 2 371 | 744 | 689 | 420 | 238 | 473 | 183 | 114
Total | 11 354 | 3 483 | 2 870 | 2 642 | 910 | 822 | 540 | 319 | 545 | 281 | 228
Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.
StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395794

Table B.3. Inflows of asylum seekers by nationality
Slovenia
| 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014
Syria | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 10 | 32 | 56 | 77
Afghanistan | 4 | 4 | 2 | 12 | 10 | 11 | 23 | 57 | 50 | 14 | 58
Pakistan | 14 | 28 | 6 | 11 | 4 | 6 | 0 | 26 | 6 | 19 | 20
Somalia | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 8 | 17 | 20 | 6 | 14
Iran | 6 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 11 | 9 | 9 | 8 | 2 | 6 | 6
Serbia (and Kosovo: S/RES/1244 [1999]) | 379 | 520 | 243 | 234 | 69 | 39 | 28 | 35 | 28 | 37 | 6
Nigeria | 1 | 2 | 1 | 4 | 7 | 9 | 11 | 5 | 6 | 5 | 5
Turkey | 187 | 230 | 62 | 39 | 72 | 12 | 27 | 39 | 26 | 11 | 5
Egypt | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 5 | 1 | 1 | 5
Other countries | 575 | 791 | 188 | 116 | 62 | 94 | 102 | 104 | 93 | 87 | 165
Total | 1 168 | 1 581 | 505 | 418 | 235 | 180 | 211 | 306 | 264 | 242 | 361
Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.
StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395794

Table B.3. Inflows of asylum seekers by nationality
Spain
| 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014
Syria | 39 | 35 | 15 | 31 | 97 | 30 | 19 | 97 | 255 | 725 | 1 666
Ukraine | 27 | 10 | 6 | 5 | 4 | 8 | 4 | 12 | 21 | 14 | 937
Mali | 252 | 273 | 25 | 6 | 11 | 29 | 14 | 41 | 101 | 1 478 | 619
Algeria | 988 | 406 | 230 | 243 | 151 | 181 | 175 | 122 | 202 | 351 | 302
West Bank and Gaza Strip | 0 | 0 | 0 | 58 | 0 | 59 | 101 | 131 | 78 | 130 | 208
Nigeria | 1 030 | 726 | 632 | 674 | 801 | 459 | 237 | 259 | 204 | 173 | 161
Pakistan | 25 | 7 | 23 | 22 | 52 | 57 | 63 | 78 | 88 | 102 | 137
Venezuela | 30 | 22 | 20 | 41 | 48 | 29 | 19 | 52 | 28 | 35 | 122
Iraq | 57 | 41 | 42 | 1 564 | 61 | 36 | 21 | 19 | 20 | 43 | 114
Somalia | 13 | 24 | 10 | 152 | 195 | 104 | 39 | 59 | 98 | 132 | 107
Colombia | 632 | 1 655 | 2 239 | 2 437 | 753 | 247 | 123 | 104 | 60 | 62 | 91
Morocco | 20 | 55 | 281 | 258 | 119 | 72 | 116 | 37 | 47 | 46 | 91
Afghanistan | 14 | 10 | 7 | 15 | 50 | 43 | 41 | 30 | 46 | 66 | 89
Cameroon | 69 | 99 | 83 | 53 | 70 | 112 | 155 | 129 | 121 | 86 | 88
Côte d’Ivoire | 110 | 162 | 236 | 313 | 498 | 304 | 119 | 550 | 106 | 72 | 69
Other countries | 2 049 | 1 726 | 1 457 | 1 565 | 1 517 | 1 226 | 1 490 | 1 692 | 1 104 | 986 | 1 146
Total | 5 355 | 5 251 | 5 306 | 7 437 | 4 427 | 2 996 | 2 736 | 3 412 | 2 579 | 4 501 | 5 947
Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.
StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395794

Table B.3. Inflows of asylum seekers by nationality
Sweden
| 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014
Syria | 411 | 392 | 433 | 440 | 551 | 587 | 427 | 646 | 7 814 | 16 317 | 30 313
Eritrea | 395 | 425 | 608 | 878 | 857 | 1 000 | 1 444 | 1 649 | 2 356 | 4 844 | 11 057
Stateless | 1 578 | 806 | 815 | 1 312 | 1 051 | 912 | 1 026 | 1 105 | 2 289 | 6 921 | 7 539
Somalia | 905 | 422 | 1 066 | 3 349 | 3 361 | 5 874 | 5 560 | 3 979 | 5 644 | 3 901 | 3 783
Afghanistan | 903 | 435 | 594 | 609 | 784 | 1 694 | 2 397 | 4 120 | 4 755 | 3 011 | 2 882
Serbia (and Kosovo: S/RES/1244 (1999)) | 4 022 | 2 944 | 2 000 | 2 500 | 1 989 | 1 806 | 7 907 | 3 915 | 3 639 | 2 878 | 2 578
Iraq | 1 456 | 2 330 | 8 951 | 18 559 | 6 083 | 2 297 | 1 978 | 1 634 | 1 322 | 1 476 | 1 743
Albania | 221 | 169 | 95 | 118 | 118 | 114 | 61 | 263 | 1 490 | 1 156 | 1 636
Ukraine | 211 | 93 | 90 | 68 | 60 | 139 | 118 | 194 | 133 | 173 | 1 278
Iran | 660 | 582 | 494 | 485 | 799 | 1 144 | 1 183 | 1 118 | 1 529 | 1 172 | 799
Georgia | 403 | 183 | 134 | 204 | 211 | 359 | 291 | 280 | 748 | 625 | 735
Morocco | 44 | 38 | 52 | 75 | 62 | 78 | 99 | 153 | 381 | 648 | 714
Russian Federation | 1 288 | 1 057 | 755 | 788 | 933 | 1 058 | 987 | 930 | 941 | 1 036 | 712
Mongolia | 346 | 326 | 461 | 519 | 791 | 753 | 727 | 773 | 463 | 487 | 546
Libya | 419 | 451 | 318 | 420 | 646 | 367 | 311 | 404 | 352 | 399 | 478
Other countries | 9 652 | 6 755 | 7 307 | 5 649 | 5 601 | 5 707 | 6 871 | 8 202 | 9 347 | 8 651 | 8 303
Total | 22 914 | 17 408 | 24 173 | 35 973 | 23 897 | 23 889 | 31 387 | 29 365 | 43 203 | 53 695 | 75 096
Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.
StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395794

Table B.3. Inflows of asylum seekers by nationality
Switzerland
| 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014
Eritrea | 193 | 175 | 880 | 1 502 | 2 827 | 1 625 | 1 708 | 3 224 | 4 295 | 2 490 | 6 820
Syria | 109 | 82 | 125 | 285 | 357 | 370 | 387 | 688 | 1 146 | 1 852 | 3 768
Sri Lanka | 270 | 251 | 320 | 594 | 1 194 | 1 363 | 892 | 433 | 443 | 455 | 906
Nigeria | 642 | 363 | 290 | 319 | 964 | 1 725 | 1 597 | 1 303 | 2 353 | 1 574 | 848
Somalia | 635 | 543 | 331 | 431 | 1 988 | 727 | 302 | 558 | 762 | 552 | 769
Afghanistan | 206 | 241 | 229 | 314 | 382 | 719 | 632 | 1 006 | 1 349 | 863 | 727
Morocco | 41 | 29 | 46 | 33 | 32 | 33 | 113 | 429 | 860 | 974 | 666
Tunisia | 134 | 108 | 82 | 80 | 59 | 194 | 291 | 2 324 | 1 993 | 1 565 | 664
Serbia (and Kosovo: S/RES/1244 (1999)) | 1 460 | 1 113 | 979 | 763 | 991 | 1 020 | 1 358 | 1 539 | 2 084 | 826 | 471
Georgia | 699 | 399 | 279 | 184 | 389 | 536 | 531 | 281 | 614 | 565 | 402
China | 72 | 91 | 344 | 227 | 208 | 327 | 333 | 688 | 801 | 671 | 376
Gambia | 37 | 20 | 27 | 24 | 201 | 172 | 192 | 295 | 533 | 441 | 371
Algeria | 454 | 171 | 146 | 114 | 195 | 258 | 313 | 464 | 681 | 714 | 337
Ethiopia | 188 | 109 | 161 | 148 | 157 | 136 | 142 | 184 | 293 | 221 | 312
Iraq | 603 | 434 | 770 | 885 | 1 321 | 801 | 501 | 378 | 382 | 351 | 279
Other countries | 6 932 | 4 779 | 3 922 | 3 410 | 3 285 | 4 020 | 3 953 | 5 389 | 7 064 | 4 948 | 4 397
Total | 12 675 | 8 908 | 8 931 | 9 313 | 14 550 | 14 026 | 13 245 | 19 183 | 25 653 | 19 062 | 22 113
Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.
StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395794

Table B.3. Inflows of asylum seekers by nationality
Turkey
| 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014
Iraq | 949 | 1 036 | 724 | 3 471 | 6 904 | 3 763 | 3 656 | 7 912 | 6 942 | 25 280 | 50 510
Afghanistan | 353 | 359 | 259 | 705 | 2 642 | 1 009 | 1 248 | 2 486 | 14 146 | 8 726 | 15 652
Syria | 15 | 10 | 7 | 21 | 22 | 46 | 37 | 188 | 24 | 108 | 8 366
Iran | 2 052 | 1 715 | 2 297 | 1 687 | 2 116 | 1 981 | 2 881 | 3 411 | 3 589 | 5 897 | 8 202
Pakistan | 8 | 2 | 3 | 12 | 9 | 36 | 42 | 29 | 24 | 528 | 1 597
Somalia | 311 | 473 | 680 | 1 124 | 647 | 295 | 448 | 744 | 776 | 1 276 | 642
West Bank and Gaza Strip | 24 | 29 | 51 | 157 | 74 | 72 | 64 | 157 | 236 | 686 | 367
Uganda | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 48 | 13 | 218 | 359
Congo | 0 | 1 | 0 | 4 | 1 | 0 | 2 | 5 | 4 | 44 | 238
Dem. Rep. of the Congo | 10 | 12 | 28 | 76 | 72 | 41 | 66 | 76 | 77 | 114 | 184
Uzbekistan | 28 | 24 | 24 | 42 | 35 | 38 | 101 | 147 | 76 | 181 | 162
Turkmenistan | 4 | 8 | 6 | 2 | 3 | 3 | 8 | 14 | 44 | 103 | 143
Yemen | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 72 | 58 | 192 | 123
Bangladesh | 2 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 3 | 21 | 14 | 5 | 16 | 148 | 108
Ethiopia | 19 | 32 | 57 | 54 | 17 | 23 | 36 | 29 | 51 | 100 | 103
Other countries | 150 | 196 | 410 | 285 | 434 | 504 | 622 | 698 | 394 | 1 206 | 1 064
Total | 3 926 | 3 897 | 4 548 | 7 642 | 12 980 | 7 834 | 9 226 | 16 021 | 26 470 | 44 807 | 87 820
Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.
StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395794

Table B.3. Inflows of asylum seekers by nationality
United Kingdom
| 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014
Pakistan | 3 028 | 2 258 | 1 807 | 1 765 | 2 011 | 2036 | 2 116 | 4 005 | 4 783 | 4 576 | 3 976
Eritrea | 1 263 | 1 892 | 2 727 | 1 907 | 2 343 | 1 406 | 761 | 827 | 764 | 1 431 | 3 291
Iran | 3 992 | 3 480 | 2 673 | 2 509 | 2 585 | 2 127 | 2 209 | 3 051 | 3 155 | 2 967 | 2 499
Syria | 412 | 388 | 179 | 188 | 181 | 173 | 158 | 508 | 1 289 | 2 020 | 2 353
Albania | 343 | 187 | 169 | 189 | 163 | 219 | 202 | 439 | 987 | 1 641 | 1 972
Afghanistan | 1 605 | 1 773 | 2 648 | 2 815 | 3 731 | 3 533 | 1 835 | 1 529 | 1 234 | 1 456 | 1 753
Sri Lanka | 402 | 478 | 599 | 1 248 | 1 840 | 1 428 | 1 623 | 2 142 | 2 128 | 2 278 | 1 715
Sudan | 1 445 | 999 | 753 | 401 | 289 | 250 | 639 | 793 | 732 | 834 | 1 615
Nigeria | 1 209 | 1 154 | 940 | 906 | 968 | 822 | 1 100 | 1 105 | 1 428 | 1 450 | 1 519
China | 2 411 | 1 761 | 1 968 | 2 187 | 1 491 | 1 417 | 1 216 | 1 026 | 859 | 1 086 | 1 117
India | 1 485 | 1 022 | 734 | 602 | 759 | 689 | 601 | 615 | 1 180 | 1 111 | 922
Bangladesh | 550 | 463 | 487 | 590 | 501 | 491 | 497 | 671 | 1 155 | 1 246 | 919
Iraq | 1 878 | 1 605 | 1 304 | 2 074 | 2 030 | 992 | 477 | 377 | 411 | 450 | 911
Libya | 185 | 182 | 128 | 56 | 69 | 101 | 117 | 1 204 | 408 | 497 | 733
Somalia | 3 295 | 2 099 | 2 157 | 1 962 | 1 576 | 1 078 | 675 | 660 | 663 | 520 | 412
Other countries | 17 073 | 10 670 | 8 532 | 7 979 | 9 653 | 12 845 | 7 855 | 6 939 | 6 221 | 6 296 | 5 726
Total | 40 576 | 30 411 | 27 805 | 27 378 | 30 190 | 29 607 | 22 081 | 25 891 | 27 397 | 29 859 | 31 433
Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.
StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395794

Table B.3. Inflows of asylum seekers by nationality
United States
| 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014
Mexico | 1 563 | 1 665 | 1 830 | 2 487 | 2 751 | 2 422 | 4 225 | 8 186 | 11 067 | 10 077 | 13 987
China | 5 624 | 7 932 | 9 781 | 8 637 | 10 029 | 11 732 | 12 850 | 15 450 | 15 884 | 12 295 | 13 716
El Salvador | 1 421 | 2 076 | 2 801 | 3 168 | 2 641 | 2 439 | 2 703 | 4 011 | 4 587 | 5 692 | 10 093
Guatemala | 1 508 | 1 590 | 1 758 | 2 221 | 1 842 | 1 891 | 2 235 | 3 363 | 4 152 | 4 865 | 9 098
Honduras | 585 | 773 | 1 094 | 950 | 885 | 902 | 1 036 | 1 528 | 2 115 | 3 165 | 6 798
Ecuador | 50 | 75 | 84 | 119 | 157 | 209 | 458 | 789 | 1 394 | 1 848 | 3 545
India | 767 | 571 | 563 | 629 | 737 | 809 | 720 | 2 457 | 1 998 | 1 633 | 3 395
Venezuela | 1 444 | 1 094 | 903 | 745 | 611 | 423 | 686 | 757 | 716 | 882 | 3 113
Haiti | 4 989 | 5 344 | 4 490 | 2 726 | 1 934 | 1 755 | 1 074 | 1 348 | 1 612 | 1 879 | 2 196
Syria | 65 | 71 | 84 | 55 | 68 | 48 | 63 | 262 | 704 | 1 583 | 1 701
Ethiopia | 1 049 | 850 | 1 177 | 1 146 | 1 267 | 1 287 | 1 163 | 1 056 | 1 145 | 1 493 | 1 456
Egypt | 358 | 330 | 398 | 375 | 431 | 391 | 545 | 1 131 | 2 285 | 2 855 | 1 407
Iraq | 276 | 382 | 544 | 735 | 841 | 460 | 409 | 480 | 592 | 951 | 1 389
Nepal | 331 | 397 | 551 | 515 | 829 | 1 002 | 1 063 | 1 384 | 1 666 | 1 507 | 1 316
Ukraine | 255 | 278 | 260 | 220 | 178 | 284 | 285 | 314 | 358 | 398 | 1 271
Other countries | 20 015 | 15 475 | 15 623 | 14 646 | 13 878 | 13 759 | 14 283 | 16 650 | 15 907 | 15 385 | 18 769
Total | 40 300 | 38 903 | 41 941 | 39 374 | 39 079 | 39 813 | 43 798 | 59 166 | 66 182 | 66 508 | 93 250
Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.
StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395794

Metadata related to Tables A.3 and B.3. Inflows of asylum seekers

Totals in Table A.3 might differ from the tables by nationality (Tables B.3) because the former totals get revised retroactively while the origin breakdown does not. Data for Table A.3 generally refer to first instance/new applications only and exclude repeat/review/appeal applications while data by origin (Tables B.3) may include some repeat/review/appeal applications.

Comments on countries of asylum:

France: Data include unaccompanied minors.

Germany: Germany has a pre-registration system (EASY system). Asylum requests officially registered and presented in this section are lower than the pre-registrations in the EASY system (1.1 million in 2015).

United Kingdom: All figures are rounded to the nearest multiple of 5.

United States: Data are a combination of the United States Citizenship and Immigration Service (USCIS – number of cases) affirmative asylum applications, and of the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR – number of persons) defensive asylum applications, if the person is under threat of removal. Factors have been applied to 2010-2014 totals in Table A.3 to reflect the estimated number of cases.

Comments on countries of origin:

Serbia (and Kosovo): Data may include asylum-seekers from Serbia, Montenegro, Serbia and Montenegro, and/or Former Yugoslavia.

Sources for all countries: Governments, compiled by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Population Data Unit, popstats.unhcr.org/en/overview.

Stocks of foreign and foreign-born populations

Stocks of foreign and foreign-born populations

Who is an immigrant?

There are major differences in how immigrants are defined across OECD countries. Some countries have traditionally focused on producing data on foreign residents (European countries, Japan and Korea) whilst others refer to the foreign-born (settlement countries, i.e. Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United States). This difference in focus relates in part to the nature and history of immigration systems and legislation on citizenship and naturalisation.

The foreign-born population can be viewed as representing first-generation migrants, and may consist of both foreign and national citizens. The size and composition of the foreign-born population is influenced by the history of migration flows and mortality amongst the foreign-born. For example, where inflows have been declining over time, the stock of the foreign-born will tend to age and represent an increasingly established community.

The concept of foreign population may include persons born abroad who retained the nationality of their country of origin but also second and third generations born in the host country. The characteristics of the population of foreign nationals depend on a number of factors: the history of migration flows, natural increase in the foreign population and naturalisations. Both the nature of legislation on citizenship and the incentives to naturalise play a role in determining the extent to which native-born persons may or may not be foreign nationals.

Sources for and problems in measuring the immigrant population

Four types of sources are used: population registers, residence permits, labour force surveys and censuses. In countries which have a population register and in those which use residence permit data, stocks and flows of immigrants are most often calculated using the same source. There are exceptions, however, with some countries using census or labour force survey data to estimate the stock of the immigrant population. In studying stocks and flows, the same problems are encountered whether population register or permit data are used (in particular, the risk of underestimation when minors are registered on the permit of one of the parents or if the migrants are not required to have permits because of a free movement agreement). To this must be added the difficulty of purging the files regularly to remove the records of persons who have left the country.

Census data enable comprehensive, albeit infrequent analysis of the stock of immigrants (censuses are generally conducted every five to ten years). In addition, many labour force surveys now include questions about nationality and place of birth, thus providing a source of annual stock data. The OECD produces estimates of stocks for some countries

Some care has to be taken with detailed breakdowns of the immigrant population from survey data since sample sizes can be small. Both census and survey data may underestimate the number of immigrants, because they can be missed in the census or because they do not live in private households (labour force surveys may not cover those living in collective dwelling such as reception centres and hostels for immigrants). Both these sources may cover a portion of the unauthorised population, which is by definition excluded from population registers and residence permit systems.

Table A.4. Stocks of foreign-born population in OECD countries and the Russian Federation
Thousands and percentages
| 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014
Australia | 4 753.1 | 4 877.3 | 5 031.9 | 5 233.5 | 5 478.2 | 5 730.1 | 5 881.6 | 6 018.4 | 6 209.8 | 6 410.2 | 6 600.8
% of total population | 23.8 | 24.2 | 24.6 | 25.1 | 25.8 | 26.4 | 26.7 | 26.9 | 27.3 | 27.7 | 28.1
Austria | 1 154.8 | 1 195.2 | 1 215.7 | 1 235.7 | 1 260.3 | 1 275.5 | 1 294.7 | 1 323.1 | 1 364.8 | 1 414.6 | 1 484.6
% of total population | 14.1 | 14.5 | 14.7 | 14.9 | 15.1 | 15.3 | 15.5 | 15.8 | 16.2 | 16.7 | 17.4
Belgium | 1 220.1 | 1 268.9 | 1 319.3 | 1 380.3 | 1 443.9 | 1 503.8 | 1 628.8 | 1 643.6 | 1 689.5 | 1 725.4 | 1 811.7
% of total population | 11.7 | 12.1 | 12.5 | 13.0 | 13.5 | 13.9 | 14.9 | 15.0 | 15.3 | 15.5 | 16.1
Canada | 5 872.3 | 6 026.9 | 6 187.0 | 6 331.7 | 6 471.9 | 6 617.6 | 6 777.6 | 6 775.8 | 6 913.6 | 7 029.1 | 7 155.9
% of total population | 18.4 | 18.7 | 19.0 | 19.2 | 19.4 | 19.6 | 19.9 | 19.6 | 19.8 | 20.0 | 20.1
Chile | 235.5 | 247.4 | 258.8 | 290.9 | 317.1 | 352.3 | 369.4 | 388.2 | 415.5 | 441.5 | ..
% of total population | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.6 | 1.8 | 1.9 | 2.1 | 2.2 | 2.3 | 2.4 | 2.5 | ..
Czech Republic | 499.0 | 523.4 | 566.3 | 636.1 | 679.6 | 672.0 | 661.2 | 745.2 | 744.1 | 744.8 | ..
% of total population | 4.9 | 5.1 | 5.5 | 6.2 | 6.5 | 6.4 | 6.3 | 7.1 | 7.1 | 7.1 | ..
Denmark | 343.4 | 350.4 | 360.9 | 378.7 | 401.8 | 414.4 | 428.9 | 441.5 | 456.4 | 476.1 | 501.1
% of total population | 6.4 | 6.5 | 6.6 | 6.9 | 7.3 | 7.5 | 7.7 | 7.9 | 8.2 | 8.5 | 8.9
Estonia | 235.5 | 228.6 | 226.5 | 224.3 | 221.9 | 217.9 | 212.7 | 210.8 | 132.0 | 132.6 | 133.2
% of total population | 17.3 | 16.9 | 16.8 | 16.7 | 16.6 | 16.3 | 16.0 | 15.9 | 10.0 | 10.1 | 10.1
Finland | 166.4 | 176.6 | 187.9 | 202.5 | 218.6 | 233.2 | 248.1 | 266.1 | 285.5 | 304.3 | 322.0
% of total population | 3.2 | 3.4 | 3.6 | 3.8 | 4.1 | 4.4 | 4.6 | 4.9 | 5.3 | 5.6 | 5.9
France | 6 748.9 | 6 910.1 | 7 017.2 | 7 129.3 | 7 202.1 | 7 287.8 | 7 372.7 | 7 474.7 | 7 555.6 | 7 680.8 | 7 920.8
% of total population | 11.1 | 11.3 | 11.4 | 11.5 | 11.6 | 11.6 | 11.7 | 11.8 | 11.9 | 12.0 | 12.4
Germany | .. | 10 399.0 | 10 431.0 | 10 529.0 | 10 623.0 | 10 582.0 | 10 591.0 | 9 832.0 | 10 127.0 | 10 490.0 | 10 689.0
% of total population | .. | 12.6 | 12.7 | 12.8 | 12.9 | 12.9 | 13.0 | 12.0 | 12.4 | 12.8 | 13.2
Greece | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 828.4 | 750.7 | 729.9 | .. | 727.5
% of total population | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 7.4 | 6.7 | 6.6 | .. | 6.6
Hungary | 319.0 | 331.5 | 344.6 | 381.8 | 394.2 | 407.3 | 443.3 | 402.7 | 424.2 | 447.7 | 476.1
% of total population | 3.2 | 3.3 | 3.4 | 3.8 | 3.9 | 4.1 | 4.4 | 4.0 | 4.3 | 4.5 | 4.8
Iceland | 20.7 | 24.7 | 30.4 | 35.9 | 37.6 | 35.1 | 34.7 | 34.7 | 35.4 | 37.2 | 39.2
% of total population | 7.1 | 8.3 | 10.0 | 11.5 | 11.8 | 11.0 | 10.9 | 10.9 | 11.0 | 11.5 | 12.0
Ireland | 461.8 | 520.8 | 601.7 | 682.0 | 739.2 | 766.8 | 772.5 | 752.5 | 749.2 | 754.2 | ..
% of total population | 11.4 | 12.6 | 14.2 | 15.6 | 16.5 | 16.9 | 17.0 | 16.4 | 16.3 | 16.4 | ..
Israel | 1 960.8 | 1 947.6 | 1 930.0 | 1 916.2 | 1 899.4 | 1 877.7 | 1 869.0 | 1 850.0 | 1 835.0 | 1 821.0 | 1 817.0
% of total population | 28.8 | 28.1 | 27.4 | 26.7 | 26.0 | 25.1 | 24.5 | 23.8 | 23.2 | 22.6 | 22.1
Italy | .. | .. | .. | .. | 5 813.8 | 5 787.9 | 5 759.0 | 5 715.1 | 5 695.9 | 5 737.2 | 5 805.3
% of total population | .. | .. | .. | .. | 9.8 | 9.7 | 9.6 | 9.5 | 9.4 | 9.5 | 9.6
Japan | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | ..
% of total population | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | ..
Korea | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | ..
% of total population | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | ..
Luxembourg | 160.4 | 168.3 | 175.4 | 183.7 | 194.5 | 197.2 | 205.2 | 215.3 | 226.1 | 237.7 | 248.9
% of total population | 35.0 | 36.2 | 37.1 | 38.3 | 39.8 | 39.6 | 40.5 | 41.5 | 42.6 | 43.7 | 45.3
Mexico | .. | 611.8 | 631.2 | 722.6 | 772.5 | 885.7 | 961.1 | 966.8 | 973.7 | 991.2 | 939.9
% of total population | .. | 0.6 | 0.6 | 0.7 | 0.7 | 0.8 | 0.8 | 0.8 | 0.8 | 0.8 | 0.8
Netherlands | 1 736.1 | 1 734.7 | 1 732.4 | 1 751.0 | 1 793.7 | 1 832.5 | 1 868.7 | 1 906.3 | 1 927.7 | 1 953.4 | 1 996.3
% of total population | 10.7 | 10.6 | 10.6 | 10.7 | 10.9 | 11.1 | 11.2 | 11.4 | 11.5 | 11.6 | 11.8
New Zealand | 796.7 | 840.6 | 879.5 | 898.3 | 916.6 | 931.0 | 945.7 | 956.3 | 965.0 | 1 001.8 | 1 050.2
% of total population | 19.5 | 20.3 | 21.0 | 21.2 | 21.5 | 21.6 | 21.6 | 21.7 | 21.8 | 22.4 | 23.3
Norway | 361.1 | 380.4 | 405.1 | 445.4 | 488.8 | 526.8 | 569.1 | 616.3 | 663.9 | 704.5 | 741.8
% of total population | 7.9 | 8.2 | 8.7 | 9.5 | 10.3 | 10.9 | 11.6 | 12.4 | 13.2 | 13.9 | 14.4
Poland | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 674.9 | .. | .. | ..
% of total population | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 1.8 | .. | .. | ..
Portugal | 774.8 | 742.1 | 753.0 | 769.6 | 790.3 | 834.8 | 851.5 | 871.8 | 902.5 | 879.6 | 885.4
% of total population | 7.4 | 7.1 | 7.2 | 7.3 | 7.5 | 7.9 | 8.1 | 8.3 | 8.6 | 8.2 | 8.1
Russia | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 11 194.7 | .. | .. | .. | ..
% of total population | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 7.8 | .. | .. | .. | ..
Slovak Republic | 207.6 | 249.4 | 301.6 | 366.0 | 442.6 | .. | .. | .. | 158.2 | 174.9 | 177.6
% of total population | 3.9 | 4.6 | 5.6 | 6.8 | 8.2 | .. | .. | .. | 2.9 | 3.2 | 3.3
Slovenia | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 228.6 | 271.8 | 299.7 | 331.0 | 341.2
% of total population | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 11.2 | 13.2 | 14.6 | 16.1 | 16.6
Spain | 4 391.5 | 4 837.6 | 5 250.0 | 6 044.5 | 6 466.3 | 6 604.2 | 6 677.8 | 6 737.9 | 6 618.2 | 6 263.7 | 6 154.7
% of total population | 10.2 | 11.1 | 11.8 | 13.4 | 14.1 | 14.2 | 14.3 | 14.4 | 14.2 | 13.4 | 13.2
Sweden | 1 100.3 | 1 125.8 | 1 175.2 | 1 227.8 | 1 281.6 | 1 338.0 | 1 384.9 | 1 427.3 | 1 473.3 | 1 533.5 | 1 603.6
% of total population | 12.2 | 12.5 | 12.9 | 13.4 | 13.9 | 14.4 | 14.8 | 15.1 | 15.5 | 16.0 | 16.6
Switzerland | 1 737.7 | 1 772.8 | 1 811.2 | 1 882.6 | 1 974.2 | 2 037.5 | 2 075.2 | 2 158.4 | 2 218.4 | 2 289.6 | 2 354.8
% of total population | 23.5 | 23.8 | 24.2 | 24.9 | 25.8 | 26.3 | 26.5 | 27.3 | 27.7 | 28.3 | 28.8
Turkey | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | ..
% of total population | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | ..
United Kingdom | 5 338.0 | 5 557.0 | 5 757.0 | 6 192.0 | 6 633.0 | 6 899.0 | 7 056.0 | 7 430.0 | 7 588.0 | 7 860.0 | 8 482.0
% of total population | 8.9 | 9.2 | 9.5 | 10.1 | 10.7 | 11.1 | 11.2 | 11.7 | 11.9 | 12.3 | 13.3
United States | 34 257.7 | 35 769.6 | 37 469.4 | 38 048.5 | 38 016.1 | 38 452.8 | 39 916.9 | 40 381.6 | 40 738.2 | 41 347.9 | 42 390.7
% of total population | 11.7 | 12.1 | 12.6 | 12.6 | 12.5 | 12.5 | 12.9 | 13.0 | 13.0 | 13.1 | 13.3
Notes: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of Tables B.4.
Estimates are in italic.
Information on data for Israel: http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932315602.
StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395756

Table B.4. Stock of foreign-born population by country of birth
Thousands
Australia
| 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | Of which: Women 2014 (%)
United Kingdom | 1 115.7 | 1 119.4 | 1 133.5 | 1 150.6 | 1 168.5 | 1 182.8 | 1 187.9 | 1 196.0 | 1 212.2 | 1 222.8 | 1 221.3 | 49
New Zealand | 414.0 | 423.6 | 437.9 | 458.0 | 483.7 | 504.4 | 517.8 | 544.0 | 577.1 | 602.7 | 617.0 | 49
China | 205.2 | 227.6 | 252.0 | 278.3 | 313.0 | 345.0 | 371.6 | 387.4 | 401.6 | 422.5 | 447.4 | 55
India | 132.8 | 149.0 | 169.7 | 204.4 | 251.2 | 307.6 | 329.5 | 337.1 | 354.1 | 375.0 | 397.2 | 46
Philippines | 128.6 | 134.6 | 141.9 | 151.2 | 163.1 | 175.0 | 183.8 | 193.0 | 206.2 | 218.0 | 225.1 | 61
Viet Nam | 172.0 | 174.4 | 178.0 | 182.7 | 189.5 | 197.8 | 203.8 | 207.6 | 211.7 | 218.1 | 223.2 | 54
Italy | 223.0 | 220.6 | 218.0 | 215.0 | 211.3 | 208.1 | 204.7 | 201.7 | 199.9 | 200.2 | 201.8 | 48
South Africa | 108.4 | 114.2 | 119.5 | 127.6 | 138.3 | 150.7 | 156.0 | 161.6 | 168.0 | 173.1 | 176.3 | 50
Malaysia | 97.6 | 101.4 | 105.7 | 111.5 | 118.4 | 124.8 | 129.9 | 134.1 | 139.5 | 145.2 | 153.9 | 53
Germany | 121.8 | 123.0 | 124.7 | 125.8 | 126.5 | 126.4 | 126.3 | 125.8 | 125.8 | 126.1 | 129.0 | 52
Greece | 129.0 | 129.0 | 129.0 | 127.5 | 125.8 | 124.2 | 122.5 | 121.2 | 121.2 | 121.1 | 120.0 | 51
Sri Lanka | 67.8 | 70.6 | 73.8 | 78.9 | 85.6 | 92.1 | 96.5 | 99.7 | 103.9 | 108.0 | 110.5 | 48
United States | 67.5 | 70.5 | 74.7 | 78.9 | 80.7 | 82.2 | 85.3 | 90.1 | 95.6 | 100.3 | 104.1 | 50
Korea | 47.2 | 51.2 | 56.0 | 64.7 | 73.8 | 81.4 | 84.2 | 85.9 | 89.7 | 95.2 | 102.2 | 52
Hong Kong, China | 78.3 | 79.9 | 81.4 | 82.3 | 83.3 | 84.4 | 85.5 | 86.0 | 86.4 | 89.1 | 94.4 | 52
Other countries | 1 644.2 | 1 688.5 | 1 736.2 | 1 796.0 | 1 865.6 | 1 943.2 | 1 996.6 | 2 047.2 | 2 117.0 | 2 193.0 | 2 277.4 |
Total | 4 753.1 | 4 877.3 | 5 031.9 | 5 233.5 | 5 478.2 | 5 730.1 | 5 881.6 | 6 018.4 | 6 209.8 | 6 410.2 | 6 600.8 | 51
Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.
StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395805

Table B.4. Stock of foreign-born population by country of birth
Thousands
Austria
| 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | Of which: Women 2014 (%)
Germany | 155.5 | 163.0 | 169.8 | 178.7 | 186.2 | 191.2 | 196.9 | 201.4 | 205.9 | 210.7 | 215.0 | 53
Turkey | 147.9 | 152.5 | 154.1 | 155.1 | 156.6 | 157.8 | 158.5 | 158.7 | 159.2 | 160.0 | 160.0 | 47
Bosnia and Herzegovina | 128.8 | 131.2 | 132.1 | 149.4 | 149.9 | 149.6 | 149.7 | 150.5 | 151.7 | 155.1 | 158.9 | 50
Serbia | 181.5 | 187.7 | 188.5 | 133.7 | 132.8 | 131.9 | 132.4 | 131.7 | 132.4 | 134.2 | 136.4 | 52
Romania | 46.6 | 47.8 | 48.2 | 53.0 | 57.0 | 60.0 | 64.5 | 69.1 | 73.9 | 79.3 | 91.3 | 55
Poland | 47.8 | 51.8 | 54.2 | 56.4 | 57.1 | 57.0 | 57.8 | 60.5 | 63.2 | 66.8 | 69.9 | 52
Hungary | 32.5 | 33.2 | 33.9 | 34.7 | 36.2 | 37.6 | 39.3 | 42.6 | 48.1 | 55.0 | 61.5 | 54
Croatia | 35.0 | 35.2 | 35.1 | 40.3 | 40.0 | 39.7 | 39.3 | 39.1 | 39.0 | 39.8 | 41.7 | 53
Czech Republic | 54.2 | 52.9 | 51.5 | 47.8 | 46.4 | 45.0 | 43.6 | 42.5 | 41.6 | 40.8 | 40.3 | 63
Slovak Republic | 16.8 | 18.3 | 19.3 | 22.5 | 24.5 | 25.3 | 26.0 | 27.7 | 30.0 | 32.6 | 35.5 | 64
Russian Federation | 18.0 | 21.2 | 22.8 | 23.5 | 25.1 | 25.9 | 26.4 | 27.5 | 29.4 | 30.2 | 31.7 | 59
Italy | 25.9 | 25.7 | 25.5 | 25.1 | 25.0 | 25.0 | 25.2 | 25.3 | 26.2 | 27.7 | 29.3 | 48
Former Yug. Rep. of Macedonia | 16.4 | 17.3 | 17.6 | 20.0 | 20.5 | 20.7 | 21.1 | 21.3 | 21.7 | 22.4 | 23.2 | 47
Bulgaria | 9.9 | 10.2 | 10.3 | 11.5 | 12.7 | 13.5 | 14.6 | 15.7 | 17.0 | 18.5 | 21.6 | 56
Slovenia | 16.4 | 16.2 | 16.0 | 19.2 | 19.0 | 18.7 | 18.4 | 18.5 | 18.9 | 19.7 | 21.1 | 55
Other countries | 221.5 | 230.9 | 236.7 | 264.7 | 271.4 | 276.6 | 280.9 | 290.9 | 306.5 | 321.8 | 347.2 |
Total | 1 154.8 | 1 195.2 | 1 215.7 | 1 235.7 | 1 260.3 | 1 275.5 | 1 294.7 | 1 323.1 | 1 364.8 | 1 414.6 | 1 484.6 | 52
Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.
StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395805

Table B.4. Stock of foreign-born population by country of birth
Thousands
Belgium
| 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | Of which: Women 2014 (%)
Morocco | 141.3 | 147.9 | 155.1 | 162.6 | 170.2 | 178.9 | 189.1 | 197.1 | 201.9 | 204.8 | 208.1 | 48
France | 154.2 | 156.2 | 159.3 | 164.6 | 169.0 | 171.3 | 175.0 | 177.0 | 179.3 | 180.9 | 182.8 | 55
Netherlands | 107.7 | 111.6 | 115.8 | 120.4 | 123.8 | 124.8 | 126.4 | 127.0 | 127.6 | 128.1 | 128.8 | 50
Italy | 126.7 | 125.1 | 123.6 | 122.2 | 121.4 | 120.5 | 120.2 | 119.7 | 119.7 | 119.9 | 120.4 | 49
Turkey | 81.0 | 83.8 | 86.4 | 89.0 | 91.4 | 93.6 | 97.0 | 97.4 | 99.0 | 98.9 | 98.6 | 48
Democratic Republic of the Congo | 66.8 | 68.5 | 70.5 | 72.4 | 74.2 | 76.2 | 81.3 | 80.0 | 84.3 | 84.7 | 84.7 | 54
Germany | 83.5 | 83.6 | 83.6 | 83.8 | 84.2 | 84.1 | 84.2 | 83.8 | 83.4 | 82.6 | 81.7 | 55
Poland | 25.2 | 29.0 | 33.7 | 40.5 | 45.5 | 51.7 | 57.7 | 63.1 | 68.0 | 71.1 | 73.8 | 56
Romania | 10.6 | 12.6 | 15.3 | 20.4 | 26.2 | 30.6 | 37.7 | 45.0 | 53.1 | 58.2 | 65.9 | 48
Former USSR | 25.1 | 17.6 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 54.6 | 54.3 | 54.7 | 60
Former Yugoslavia | 27.9 | 30.3 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 41.0 | 47.9 | 47.1 | 46.6 | 49
Spain | 35.7 | 35.5 | 35.4 | 35.5 | 36.1 | 37.0 | 38.8 | 40.5 | 42.9 | 44.8 | 46.5 | 54
Portugal | 22.8 | 23.3 | 24.0 | 25.0 | 26.5 | 27.5 | 28.3 | 29.5 | 31.6 | 33.4 | 34.5 | 49
Bulgaria | .. | .. | .. | 8.2 | 11.7 | 14.4 | 18.7 | 21.0 | 24.2 | 26.4 | 29.1 | 50
Algeria | 17.7 | 18.5 | 19.4 | 20.3 | 21.2 | 22.4 | 24.3 | 24.6 | 25.7 | 25.8 | 26.0 | 43
Other countries | 293.7 | 325.5 | 397.1 | 415.6 | 442.5 | 470.8 | 550.1 | 496.9 | 505.2 | 514.6 | 529.5 |
Total | 1 220.1 | 1 268.9 | 1 319.3 | 1 380.3 | 1 443.9 | 1 503.8 | 1 628.8 | 1 643.6 | 1 748.3 | 1 775.6 | 1 811.7 | 51
Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.
StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395805

Table B.4. Stock of foreign-born population by country of birth
Thousands
Canada
| 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | Of which: Women 2011 (%)
India | .. | .. | 443.7 | .. | .. | .. | .. | 547.9 | .. | .. | .. | 50
China | .. | .. | 466.9 | .. | .. | .. | .. | 545.5 | .. | .. | .. | 55
United Kingdom | .. | .. | 579.6 | .. | .. | .. | .. | 537.0 | .. | .. | .. | 52
Philippines | .. | .. | 303.2 | .. | .. | .. | .. | 454.3 | .. | .. | .. | 58
United States | .. | .. | 250.5 | .. | .. | .. | .. | 263.5 | .. | .. | .. | 56
Italy | .. | .. | 296.9 | .. | .. | .. | .. | 256.8 | .. | .. | .. | 49
Hong Kong, China | .. | .. | 215.4 | .. | .. | .. | .. | 205.4 | .. | .. | .. | 53
Viet Nam | .. | .. | 160.2 | .. | .. | .. | .. | 165.1 | .. | .. | .. | 53
Pakistan | .. | .. | 133.3 | .. | .. | .. | .. | 156.9 | .. | .. | .. | 49
Germany | .. | .. | 171.4 | .. | .. | .. | .. | 152.3 | .. | .. | .. | 53
Poland | .. | .. | 170.5 | .. | .. | .. | .. | 152.3 | .. | .. | .. | 55
Portugal | .. | .. | 150.4 | .. | .. | .. | .. | 138.5 | .. | .. | .. | 51
Sri Lanka | .. | .. | 105.7 | .. | .. | .. | .. | 132.1 | .. | .. | .. | 50
Jamaica | .. | .. | 123.4 | .. | .. | .. | .. | 126.0 | .. | .. | .. | 58
Iran | .. | .. | 92.1 | .. | .. | .. | .. | 120.7 | .. | .. | .. | 49
Other countries | .. | .. | 2 523.8 | .. | .. | .. | .. | 2 821.2 | .. | .. | .. |
Total | .. | .. | 6 187.0 | .. | .. | .. | .. | 6 775.8 | .. | .. | .. | 52
Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.
StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395805

Table B.4. Stock of foreign-born population by country of birth
Thousands
Chile
| 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | Of which: Women 2012 (%)
Peru | 53.7 | 58.4 | 66.1 | 83.4 | 107.6 | 130.9 | 138.5 | 146.6 | 157.7 | .. | .. | 57
Argentina | 51.9 | 53.8 | 57.7 | 59.7 | 59.2 | 60.6 | 61.9 | 63.2 | 64.9 | .. | .. | 49
Bolivia | 13.0 | 13.5 | 14.7 | 20.2 | 22.2 | 24.1 | 25.1 | 26.7 | 30.5 | .. | .. | 54
Ecuador | 10.9 | 11.8 | 13.3 | 14.7 | 17.5 | 19.1 | 20.0 | 20.9 | 21.9 | .. | .. | 55
Colombia | 5.5 | 6.6 | 7.7 | 9.2 | 10.9 | 12.9 | 14.4 | 16.1 | 19.1 | .. | .. | 59
Spain | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 11.0 | 11.3 | 11.6 | 12.1 | .. | .. | 46
Brazil | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 9.6 | 10.1 | 10.5 | 11.2 | .. | .. | 55
United States | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 9.7 | 10.0 | 10.4 | 10.9 | .. | .. | 46
Germany | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 6.5 | 6.7 | 6.9 | 7.1 | .. | .. | 50
China | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 4.6 | 5.2 | 5.9 | 6.6 | .. | .. | 47
Other countries | 100.5 | 103.3 | 99.3 | 103.8 | 99.8 | 63.2 | 66.2 | 69.4 | 73.5 | .. | .. |
Total | 235.5 | 247.4 | 258.8 | 290.9 | 317.1 | 352.3 | 369.4 | 388.2 | 415.5 | 441.5 | .. | 53
Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.
StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395805

Table B.4. Stock of foreign-born population by country of birth
Thousands
Czech Republic
| 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | Of which: Women 2011 (%)
Slovak Republic | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 289.6 | .. | .. | .. | 53
Ukraine | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 138.0 | .. | .. | .. | 45
Viet Nam | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 52.4 | .. | .. | .. | 40
Russian Federation | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 35.7 | .. | .. | .. | 57
Poland | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 26.0 | .. | .. | .. | 62
Germany | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 16.7 | .. | .. | .. | 32
Romania | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 12.8 | .. | .. | .. | 51
Moldova | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 9.4 | .. | .. | .. | 38
Bulgaria | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 9.2 | .. | .. | .. | 39
United States | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 7.0 | .. | .. | .. | 45
Kazakhstan | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 6.7 | .. | .. | .. | 51
Mongolia | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 5.6 | .. | .. | .. | 59
China | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 4.9 | .. | .. | .. | 45
Hungary | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 4.8 | .. | .. | .. | 57
United Kingdom | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 4.8 | .. | .. | .. | 24
Other countries | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 121.7 | .. | .. | .. |
Total | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 745.2 | .. | .. | .. | 48
Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.
StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395805

Table B.4. Stock of foreign-born population by country of birth
Thousands
Denmark
| 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | Of which: Women 2014 (%)
Poland | 11.3 | 12.4 | 14.7 | 18.5 | 24.4 | 25.4 | 26.6 | 28.0 | 29.9 | 32.0 | 34.5 | 49
Turkey | 30.9 | 31.0 | 31.1 | 31.4 | 31.8 | 32.3 | 32.5 | 32.4 | 32.2 | 32.4 | 32.4 | 48
Germany | 22.6 | 23.0 | 23.9 | 25.8 | 27.8 | 28.2 | 28.5 | 28.6 | 28.7 | 28.7 | 28.7 | 52
Iraq | 20.8 | 20.7 | 20.7 | 21.2 | 21.3 | 21.3 | 21.3 | 21.2 | 21.2 | 21.1 | 21.2 | 45
Romania | 2.3 | 2.5 | 2.6 | 3.3 | 4.6 | 5.9 | 7.7 | 10.1 | 12.9 | 15.7 | 18.7 | 44
Bosnia and Herzegovina | 17.9 | 17.7 | 17.6 | 18.0 | 18.0 | 17.9 | 17.8 | 17.6 | 17.4 | 17.3 | 17.3 | 50
Norway | 14.0 | 14.1 | 14.2 | 14.3 | 14.5 | 14.7 | 14.7 | 14.9 | 14.9 | 14.9 | 15.1 | 65
Iran | 11.7 | 11.7 | 11.8 | 11.9 | 11.9 | 12.1 | 12.5 | 12.9 | 13.3 | 14.1 | 14.9 | 42
Pakistan | 10.6 | 10.6 | 10.5 | 10.6 | 10.8 | 11.2 | 11.7 | 12.1 | 12.3 | 12.9 | 13.5 | 46
Sweden | 12.3 | 12.5 | 12.7 | 12.9 | 13.2 | 13.2 | 13.2 | 13.1 | 13.1 | 13.2 | 13.4 | 62
United Kingdom | 10.7 | 10.8 | 11.1 | 11.4 | 11.8 | 11.8 | 12.1 | 12.2 | 12.5 | 12.8 | 13.0 | 35
Afghanistan | 9.4 | 9.5 | 9.6 | 9.6 | 9.7 | 10.0 | 10.6 | 11.1 | 11.6 | 12.1 | 12.6 | 44
Lebanon | 12.1 | 12.0 | 12.0 | 12.0 | 12.0 | 12.0 | 12.1 | 12.0 | 12.1 | 12.2 | 12.3 | 46
Syria | .. | .. | .. | 1.8 | 1.9 | 2.0 | 2.4 | 3.1 | 4.0 | 5.8 | 11.6 | 37
Somalia | 11.2 | 10.7 | 10.4 | 10.4 | 10.2 | 10.1 | 10.1 | 10.0 | 10.2 | 10.7 | 11.4 | 47
Other countries | 145.6 | 151.4 | 158.1 | 165.7 | 177.8 | 186.2 | 195.3 | 202.3 | 210.1 | 220.1 | 230.5 |
Total | 343.4 | 350.4 | 360.9 | 378.7 | 401.8 | 414.4 | 428.9 | 441.5 | 456.4 | 476.1 | 501.1 | 51
Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.
StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395805

Table B.4. Stock of foreign-born population by country of birth
Thousands
Estonia
| 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | Of which: Women 2014 (%)
Russian Federation | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 83.8 | 81.7 | 79.5 | 77.5 | 59
Ukraine | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 15.7 | 15.5 | 15.4 | 15.6 | 46
Belarus | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 9.1 | 8.8 | 8.6 | 8.4 | 57
Finland | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 4.1 | 4.7 | 5.4 | 5.9 | 33
Latvia | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 2.7 | 3.0 | 3.3 | 3.5 | 48
Kazakhstan | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 2.6 | 2.6 | 2.6 | 2.6 | 49
Germany | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 1.5 | 1.7 | 2.0 | 2.2 | 43
Lithuania | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.6 | 1.7 | 51
Azerbaijan | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 1.2 | 1.2 | 1.2 | 1.2 | 38
Italy | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 0.5 | 0.7 | 0.9 | 1.0 | 32
France | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 0.5 | 0.6 | 0.8 | 0.9 | 38
Georgia | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 0.8 | 0.8 | 0.8 | 0.9 | 41
Poland | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 0.6 | 0.7 | 0.8 | 0.9 | 40
United Kingdom | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 0.6 | 0.6 | 0.7 | 0.8 | 21
Uzbekistan | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 0.7 | 0.7 | 0.7 | 0.7 | 46
Other countries | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 6.4 | 7.1 | 8.4 | 9.4 |
Total | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 132.3 | 132.0 | 132.6 | 133.2 | 52
Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.
StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395805

Table B.4. Stock of foreign-born population by country of birth
Thousands
Finland
| 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | Of which: Women 2014 (%)
Former USSR | 38.5 | 40.2 | 41.9 | 43.8 | 45.8 | 47.3 | 48.7 | 50.5 | 52.3 | 53.7 | 54.7 | 63
Estonia | 11.2 | 12.6 | 14.5 | 16.7 | 19.2 | 21.8 | 25.0 | 29.5 | 35.0 | 39.5 | 42.7 | 51
Sweden | 29.2 | 29.5 | 29.8 | 30.2 | 30.6 | 31.0 | 31.2 | 31.4 | 31.6 | 31.8 | 31.9 | 48
Russian Federation | 4.3 | 4.7 | 5.3 | 5.9 | 6.7 | 7.3 | 8.0 | 9.0 | 10.0 | 11.1 | 12.0 | 55
Somalia | 4.8 | 5.1 | 5.3 | 5.8 | 6.4 | 7.1 | 8.1 | 8.8 | 9.1 | 9.6 | 10.1 | 48
Iraq | 4.3 | 4.4 | 4.4 | 4.8 | 5.3 | 6.2 | 7.2 | 7.9 | 8.4 | 9.3 | 10.0 | 37
China | 3.5 | 4.1 | 4.6 | 5.3 | 6.0 | 6.6 | 7.0 | 7.7 | 8.3 | 8.9 | 9.4 | 59
Thailand | 3.1 | 3.6 | 4.1 | 4.8 | 5.4 | 6.1 | 6.7 | 7.4 | 8.1 | 8.7 | 9.2 | 79
Former Yugoslavia | 4.9 | 5.0 | 5.2 | 5.5 | 5.8 | 6.1 | 6.3 | 6.4 | 6.5 | 6.7 | 6.9 | 44
Germany | 4.3 | 4.6 | 4.9 | 5.3 | 5.6 | 5.8 | 5.9 | 6.1 | 6.2 | 6.4 | 6.5 | 44
Turkey | 3.1 | 3.4 | 3.7 | 4.1 | 4.5 | 4.9 | 5.1 | 5.4 | 5.7 | 6.1 | 6.3 | 30
Viet Nam | 3.1 | 3.3 | 3.4 | 3.7 | 4.0 | 4.3 | 4.5 | 4.8 | 5.2 | 5.5 | 6.0 | 56
Iran | 3.0 | 3.2 | 3.4 | 3.6 | 3.8 | 3.9 | 4.1 | 4.4 | 4.9 | 5.3 | 5.8 | 43
United Kingdom | 3.4 | 3.5 | 3.7 | 4.0 | 4.2 | 4.4 | 4.5 | 4.8 | 5.1 | 5.3 | 5.5 | 28
India | 1.8 | 2.1 | 2.5 | 2.8 | 3.2 | 3.6 | 4.0 | 4.3 | 4.6 | 4.9 | 5.4 | 39
Other countries | 44.0 | 47.4 | 51.1 | 56.4 | 62.2 | 66.9 | 71.8 | 77.8 | 84.5 | 91.5 | 99.5 |
Total | 166.4 | 176.6 | 187.9 | 202.5 | 218.6 | 233.2 | 248.1 | 266.1 | 285.5 | 304.3 | 322.0 | 49
Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.
StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395805

Table B.4. Stock of foreign-born population by country of birth
Thousands
France
| 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | Of which: Women 2011 (%)
Algeria | .. | 1 356.6 | 1 359.3 | 1 366.5 | 1 361.0 | 1 364.5 | 1 357.5 | 1 359.8 | .. | .. | .. | 50
Morocco | .. | 846.9 | 859.0 | 870.9 | 881.3 | 888.0 | 895.6 | 907.8 | .. | .. | .. | 49
Portugal | .. | 592.0 | 598.0 | 604.7 | 608.6 | 614.2 | 618.3 | 625.2 | .. | .. | .. | 49
Tunisia | .. | 365.8 | 368.5 | 370.6 | 370.7 | 374.7 | 377.3 | 381.2 | .. | .. | .. | 45
Italy | .. | 372.3 | 364.4 | 357.0 | 350.2 | 343.3 | 337.5 | 331.7 | .. | .. | .. | 52
Spain | .. | 307.0 | 300.0 | 295.9 | 290.3 | 286.2 | 282.5 | 282.5 | .. | .. | .. | 56
Turkey | .. | 237.4 | 243.4 | 246.8 | 251.1 | 255.8 | 257.6 | 259.5 | .. | .. | .. | 47
Germany | .. | 225.6 | 224.6 | 223.5 | 221.7 | 219.0 | 217.6 | 213.8 | .. | .. | .. | 57
United Kingdom | .. | 148.8 | 158.0 | 164.0 | 166.8 | 169.1 | 169.9 | 170.1 | .. | .. | .. | 51
Belgium | .. | 139.0 | 140.5 | 143.6 | 145.8 | 146.9 | 148.2 | 148.5 | .. | .. | .. | 55
Viet Nam | .. | 119.6 | 119.8 | 120.1 | 119.7 | 118.9 | 119.4 | 120.2 | .. | .. | .. | 55
Madagascar | .. | 108.5 | 110.7 | 112.5 | 114.5 | 115.8 | 118.1 | 120.1 | .. | .. | .. | 59
Senegal | .. | 103.3 | 106.1 | 108.3 | 112.1 | 114.0 | 116.4 | 119.6 | .. | .. | .. | 47
Poland | .. | 101.6 | 101.7 | 102.6 | 102.9 | 102.4 | 102.8 | 102.5 | .. | .. | .. | 62
China | .. | 75.4 | 80.3 | 85.3 | 90.2 | 95.4 | 98.5 | 102.2 | .. | .. | .. | 59
Other countries | .. | 1 810.3 | 1 882.9 | 1 957.0 | 2 015.2 | 2 079.6 | 2 155.7 | 2 229.9 | .. | .. | .. |
Total | .. | 6 910.1 | 7 017.2 | 7 129.3 | 7 202.1 | 7 287.8 | 7 372.7 | 7 474.7 | 7 555.6 | 7 680.8 | 7 920.8 | 52
Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.
StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395805

Table B.4. Stock of foreign-born population by country of birth
Thousands
Germany
| 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | Of which: Women 2014 (%)
Turkey | .. | 1 472 | 1 477 | 1 511 | 1 508 | 1 489 | 1 497 | 1 318 | 1 314 | 1 338 | 1 491 | 49
Poland | .. | 719 | 723 | 532 | 508 | 1 103 | 1 112 | 1 077 | 1 145 | 1 194 | 1 137 | 55
Russian Federation | .. | 1 005 | 875 | 513 | 445 | 992 | 977 | 958 | 948 | 946 | 1 004 | 54
Kazakhstan | .. | .. | 340 | 206 | 140 | 628 | 696 | 732 | 725 | 719 | 747 | 52
Italy | .. | 437 | 431 | 431 | 433 | 434 | 420 | 377 | 377 | 423 | 425 | 37
Romania | .. | 317 | 318 | 209 | 168 | 386 | 372 | 378 | 422 | 461 | 392 | 54
Ukraine | .. | .. | 202 | 193 | 181 | 228 | 227 | 205 | 205 | 209 | 233 | 58
Greece | .. | 233 | 229 | 240 | 232 | 227 | 231 | 201 | 214 | 223 | 227 | 46
Croatia | .. | 268 | 256 | 251 | 256 | 249 | 226 | 200 | 205 | 208 | 227 | 53
Serbia | .. | .. | .. | 334 | 321 | 209 | 204 | 177 | 192 | 203 | 203 | 53
Austria | .. | 191 | 191 | 194 | 198 | 199 | 197 | 170 | 185 | 194 | 188 | 51
Bosnia and Herzegovina | .. | 237 | 225 | 217 | 207 | 176 | 154 | 134 | 148 | 148 | 155 | 50
Netherlands | .. | 107 | 103 | 115 | 123 | 128 | 133 | 125 | 135 | 136 | 143 | 47
Former USSR | .. | .. | .. | 77 | 56 | 286 | 218 | 139 | 139 | 131 | 142 | 53
France | .. | 99 | 99 | 103 | 110 | 118 | 120 | 107 | 112 | 119 | 118 | 49
Other countries | .. | 5 314 | 4 962 | 5 403 | 5 737 | 3 730 | 3 807 | 3 534 | 3 661 | 3 838 | 3 857 |
Total | .. | 10 399 | 10 431 | 10 529 | 10 623 | 10 582 | 10 591 | 9 832 | 10 127 | 10 490 | 10 689 | 51
Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.
StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395805

Table B.4. Stock of foreign-born population by country of birth
Thousands
Greece
| 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | Of which: Women 2014 (%)
Albania | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 384.6 | 346.2 | 357.1 | .. | 337.7 | 49
Georgia | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 62.6 | 53.0 | 54.2 | .. | 45.1 | 60
Russian Federation | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 55.7 | 44.4 | 37.8 | .. | 43.0 | 67
Bulgaria | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 45.7 | 43.9 | 35.0 | .. | 40.9 | 65
Romania | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 32.4 | 34.9 | 32.7 | .. | 27.2 | 60
Germany | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 29.3 | 25.1 | 21.2 | .. | 25.7 | 63
Pakistan | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 20.1 | 22.5 | 24.0 | .. | 18.0 | 3
Poland | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 10.8 | 7.3 | 9.4 | .. | 16.6 | 61
Turkey | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 9.5 | 6.1 | 9.4 | .. | 12.5 | 68
Cyprus¹, 2 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 10.2 | 12.8 | 10.3 | .. | 10.9 | 56
United Kingdom | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 5.2 | 7.0 | 8.8 | .. | 10.7 | 64
Ukraine | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 13.3 | 13.5 | 11.5 | .. | 10.7 | 89
Egypt | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 10.2 | 13.6 | 11.4 | .. | 9.8 | 44
Bangladesh | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 14.2 | 10.5 | 7.5 | .. | 8.4 | 9
Syria | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 7.5 | 8.2 | 10.0 | .. | 8.3 | 30
Other countries | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 117.1 | 101.7 | 89.7 | .. | 102.0 |
Total | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 828.4 | 750.7 | 729.9 | .. | 727.5 | 53
Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

1. Note by Turkey: The information in this document with reference to “Cyprus” relates to the southern part of the Island. There is no single authority representing both Turkish and Greek Cypriot people on the Island. Turkey recognizes the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). Until a lasting and equitable solution is found within the context of the United Nations, Turkey shall preserve its position concerning the “Cyprus issue”

2. Note by all the European Union member states of the OECD and the European Union: The Republic of Cyprus is recognised by all members of the United Nations with the exception of Turkey. The information in this document relates to the area under the effective control of the Government of the Republic of Cyprus.

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395805

Table B.4. Stock of foreign-born population by country of birth
Thousands
Hungary
| 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | Of which: Women 2014 (%)
Romania | 152.7 | 155.4 | 170.4 | 196.1 | 202.2 | 198.2 | 201.9 | 183.1 | 190.9 | 198.4 | 203.4 | 51
Ukraine | .. | .. | 4.9 | 4.9 | 4.6 | 6.5 | 13.4 | 25.5 | 28.8 | 33.3 | 42.0 | 54
Serbia | .. | .. | 0.1 | 0.2 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 8.6 | 24.4 | 27.4 | 30.3 | 32.6 | 47
Germany | 18.8 | 21.9 | 24.5 | 27.4 | 28.7 | 31.3 | 29.4 | 25.7 | 27.3 | 29.2 | 30.2 | 47
Slovak Republic | .. | .. | 2.1 | 3.0 | 3.2 | 3.3 | 5.7 | 21.1 | 21.3 | 21.3 | 21.1 | 62
China | 4.2 | 4.5 | 4.7 | 5.0 | 5.4 | 5.6 | 10.9 | 9.0 | 9.9 | 11.1 | 14.8 | 48
Former USSR | 32.2 | 31.9 | 27.4 | 28.5 | 30.1 | 31.2 | 30.7 | 13.1 | 14.1 | 13.5 | 13.2 | 65
Austria | 4.7 | 5.4 | 6.2 | 6.9 | 7.3 | 7.9 | 7.8 | 7.6 | 8.1 | 8.8 | 9.3 | 45
United Kingdom | .. | .. | 3.2 | 3.8 | 4.3 | 4.8 | 4.7 | 4.9 | 5.6 | 6.8 | 7.9 | 44
United States | 3.0 | 3.4 | 4.0 | 4.3 | 4.6 | 5.0 | 6.9 | 7.0 | 7.2 | 7.4 | 7.8 | 47
Former Yugoslavia | 29.9 | 29.6 | 28.6 | 28.5 | 28.0 | 33.7 | 33.2 | 10.9 | 8.5 | 7.3 | 7.1 | 43
Former Czechoslovakia | 31.4 | 32.6 | 30.4 | 29.6 | 28.5 | 28.5 | 24.1 | 5.6 | 5.8 | 6.0 | 6.2 | 65
Italy | .. | .. | 2.6 | 3.0 | 3.3 | 3.6 | 3.5 | 3.4 | 3.9 | 4.3 | 4.7 | 36
France | 2.2 | 2.7 | 3.1 | 3.6 | 3.9 | 4.1 | 3.6 | 3.5 | 3.7 | 3.9 | 4.2 | 47
Russian Federation | .. | .. | 0.7 | 0.7 | 0.7 | 0.7 | 2.8 | 3.1 | 3.2 | 3.2 | 3.7 | 61
Other countries | 39.9 | 44.1 | 31.5 | 36.2 | 39.1 | 42.6 | 55.8 | 54.9 | 58.5 | 62.7 | 67.9 |
Total | 319.0 | 331.5 | 344.6 | 381.8 | 394.2 | 407.3 | 443.3 | 402.7 | 424.2 | 447.7 | 476.1 | 50
Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.
StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395805

Table B.4. Stock of foreign-born population by country of birth
Thousands
Iceland
| 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | Of which: Women 2014 (%)
Poland | 2.2 | 3.6 | 6.6 | 10.5 | 11.6 | 10.1 | 9.5 | 9.3 | 9.4 | 10.2 | 11.0 | 47
Denmark | 2.6 | 2.7 | 2.8 | 2.9 | 3.0 | 2.9 | 2.9 | 3.0 | 3.1 | 3.2 | 3.3 | 51
United States | 1.6 | 1.7 | 1.8 | 1.9 | 1.8 | 1.9 | 1.8 | 1.8 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 46
Sweden | 1.7 | 1.8 | 1.8 | 1.9 | 1.9 | 1.8 | 1.8 | 1.9 | 1.9 | 1.9 | 1.9 | 51
Germany | 1.2 | 1.5 | 1.6 | 1.8 | 1.8 | 1.7 | 1.7 | 1.6 | 1.5 | 1.6 | 1.6 | 61
Philippines | 1.1 | 1.2 | 1.3 | 1.3 | 1.4 | 1.4 | 1.4 | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.6 | 66
Lithuania | 0.3 | 0.5 | 0.9 | 1.4 | 1.6 | 1.4 | 1.5 | 1.4 | 1.4 | 1.5 | 1.5 | 51
United Kingdom | 0.8 | 0.9 | 0.9 | 1.0 | 1.1 | 1.1 | 1.1 | 1.2 | 1.2 | 1.2 | 1.3 | 40
Thailand | 0.8 | 0.9 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 1.1 | 1.1 | 1.1 | 1.1 | 1.1 | 1.2 | 1.2 | 74
Norway | 0.9 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 53
Latvia | 0.1 | 0.2 | 0.3 | 0.5 | 0.6 | 0.6 | 0.7 | 0.7 | 0.7 | 0.7 | 0.7 | 52
Viet Nam | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.6 | 0.6 | 0.6 | 55
China | 0.4 | 0.8 | 0.9 | 0.6 | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.6 | 0.6 | 69
Portugal | 0.3 | 0.4 | 0.7 | 0.9 | 0.8 | 0.6 | 0.5 | 0.4 | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.6 | 37
Spain | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.4 | 0.5 | 41
Other countries | 6.2 | 6.9 | 7.9 | 8.4 | 8.6 | 8.2 | 8.3 | 8.5 | 8.8 | 9.1 | 9.7 |
Total | 20.7 | 24.7 | 30.4 | 35.9 | 37.6 | 35.1 | 34.7 | 34.7 | 35.4 | 37.2 | 39.2 | 51
Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.
StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395805

Table B.4. Stock of foreign-born population by country of birth
Thousands
Ireland
| 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | Of which: Women 2011 (%)
United Kingdom | .. | .. | 266.1 | .. | .. | .. | .. | 281.1 | .. | .. | .. | 51
Poland | .. | .. | 62.5 | .. | .. | .. | .. | 114.3 | .. | .. | .. | 48
Lithuania | .. | .. | 24.6 | .. | .. | .. | .. | 34.6 | .. | .. | .. | 52
United States | .. | .. | 24.6 | .. | .. | .. | .. | 26.9 | .. | .. | .. | 54
Latvia | .. | .. | 13.9 | .. | .. | .. | .. | 19.8 | .. | .. | .. | 56
Nigeria | .. | .. | 16.3 | .. | .. | .. | .. | 19.4 | .. | .. | .. | 54
Romania | .. | .. | 8.5 | .. | .. | .. | .. | 17.8 | .. | .. | .. | 49
India | .. | .. | 9.2 | .. | .. | .. | .. | 17.7 | .. | .. | .. | 46
Philippines | .. | .. | 9.4 | .. | .. | .. | .. | 13.6 | .. | .. | .. | 58
Germany | .. | .. | 11.5 | .. | .. | .. | .. | 12.7 | .. | .. | .. | 55
China | .. | .. | 11.0 | .. | .. | .. | .. | 11.3 | .. | .. | .. | 52
Slovak Republic | .. | .. | 8.1 | .. | .. | .. | .. | 10.6 | .. | .. | .. | 47
France | .. | .. | 9.1 | .. | .. | .. | .. | 9.9 | .. | .. | .. | 50
Brazil | .. | .. | 4.7 | .. | .. | .. | .. | 9.2 | .. | .. | .. | 50
Pakistan | .. | .. | 5.8 | .. | .. | .. | .. | 8.2 | .. | .. | .. | 35
Other countries | .. | .. | 116.3 | .. | .. | .. | .. | 145.4 | .. | .. | .. |
Total | .. | .. | 601.7 | .. | .. | .. | .. | 752.5 | .. | .. | .. | 50
Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.
StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395805

Table B.4. Stock of foreign-born population by country of birth
Thousands
Israel
| 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | Of which: Women 2014 (%)
Former USSR | 941.0 | 935.1 | 929.1 | 921.7 | 913.8 | 877.5 | 875.5 | 867.0 | 862.4 | 858.7 | 859.4 | 55
Morocco | 157.5 | 155.4 | 153.2 | 150.7 | 148.5 | 154.7 | 152.0 | 149.6 | 147.2 | 145.4 | 143.1 | 53
United States | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 82.7 | 84.8 | 86.2 | 88.0 | 90.5 | 52
Ethiopia | 69.4 | 72.8 | 76.1 | 79.4 | 80.8 | 77.4 | 78.9 | 81.9 | 84.6 | 85.9 | 85.6 | 50
Romania | 110.4 | 106.9 | 103.7 | 100.2 | 96.9 | 96.4 | 93.1 | 90.0 | 87.0 | 84.0 | 80.8 | 56
Iraq | 69.9 | 68.3 | 66.7 | 65.1 | 63.5 | 63.7 | 61.8 | 60.0 | 58.5 | 56.8 | 54.9 | 53
France | 33.2 | 35.4 | 37.6 | 39.6 | 40.9 | 41.4 | 42.9 | 43.5 | 44.2 | 46.3 | 51.1 | 54
Iran | 49.4 | 48.8 | 48.2 | 47.6 | 46.8 | 49.8 | 48.9 | 48.1 | 47.4 | 46.7 | 46.0 | 51
Poland | 64.4 | 60.6 | 57.0 | 53.4 | 50.1 | 54.0 | 50.7 | 48.0 | 45.0 | 42.2 | 39.7 | 57
Argentina | 38.9 | 38.2 | 37.7 | 37.2 | 36.7 | 37.6 | 37.5 | 37.6 | 36.8 | 36.3 | 36.0 | 53
Tunisia | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 29.9 | 29.2 | 28.8 | 28.4 | 28.6 | 54
United Kingdom | 19.8 | 20.3 | 21.1 | 21.7 | 22.2 | 21.8 | 22.5 | 23.0 | 23.0 | 23.2 | 23.5 | 53
Turkey | 28.2 | 27.5 | 26.9 | 26.2 | 25.6 | 26.1 | 25.6 | 24.9 | 24.1 | 23.4 | 22.8 | 53
Yemen | 32.7 | 31.8 | 30.8 | 29.9 | 28.9 | 28.9 | 27.9 | 26.9 | 24.1 | 25.4 | 22.5 | 56
Germany | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 21.4 | 20.7 | 20.2 | 19.7 | 19.2 | 57
Other countries | 346.2 | 346.8 | 341.9 | 343.3 | 344.3 | 348.8 | 217.7 | 214.8 | 215.4 | 210.9 | 213.4 |
Total | 1 961.0 | 1 948.0 | 1 930.0 | 1 916.0 | 1 899.0 | 1 878.0 | 1 869.0 | 1 850.0 | 1 835.0 | 1 821.0 | 1 817.0 | 55
Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.
StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395805

Table B.4. Stock of foreign-born population by country of birth
Thousands
Italy
| 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | Of which: Women 2012 (%)
Romania | .. | .. | .. | .. | 1 021.4 | 1 016.9 | 1 011.7 | 1 003.7 | 1 000.1 | .. | .. | 57
Albania | .. | .. | .. | .. | 443.2 | 440.6 | 438.0 | 434.3 | 432.7 | .. | .. | 48
Morocco | .. | .. | .. | .. | 419.0 | 416.8 | 414.5 | 411.1 | 409.6 | .. | .. | 43
Germany | .. | .. | .. | .. | 223.7 | 222.7 | 221.5 | 219.9 | 220.0 | .. | .. | 57
Ukraine | .. | .. | .. | .. | 214.7 | 213.6 | 212.4 | 210.8 | 210.0 | .. | .. | 79
Switzerland | .. | .. | .. | .. | 195.5 | 194.5 | 193.5 | 192.1 | 191.5 | .. | .. | 54
China | .. | .. | .. | .. | 195.7 | 194.7 | 193.5 | 192.0 | 191.3 | .. | .. | 49
Moldova | .. | .. | .. | .. | 160.7 | 159.9 | 159.0 | 157.7 | 157.1 | .. | .. | 67
France | .. | .. | .. | .. | 138.2 | 137.7 | 137.3 | 136.5 | 136.7 | .. | .. | 60
Philippines | .. | .. | .. | .. | 138.6 | 137.8 | 137.0 | 135.9 | 135.4 | .. | .. | 61
India | .. | .. | .. | .. | 129.7 | 129.0 | 128.3 | 127.3 | 126.8 | .. | .. | 39
Poland | .. | .. | .. | .. | 125.3 | 124.7 | 124.1 | 123.1 | 122.7 | .. | .. | 75
Peru | .. | .. | .. | .. | 115.7 | 115.0 | 114.4 | 113.4 | 113.0 | .. | .. | 62
Tunisia | .. | .. | .. | .. | 113.2 | 112.6 | 112.0 | 111.1 | 110.7 | .. | .. | 36
Brazil | .. | .. | .. | .. | 111.0 | 110.5 | 110.0 | 109.2 | 108.9 | .. | .. | 63
Other countries | .. | .. | .. | .. | 2 068.2 | 2 060.7 | 2 051.7 | 2 036.9 | 2 029.3 | .. | .. |
Total | .. | .. | .. | .. | 5 813.8 | 5 787.9 | 5 759.0 | 5 715.1 | 5 695.9 | 5 737.2 | 5 805.3 | 54
Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.
StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395805

Table B.4. Stock of foreign-born population by country of birth
Thousands
Luxembourg
| 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | Of which: Women 2010 (%)
Portugal | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 60.9 | .. | .. | .. | .. | 48
France | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 28.1 | .. | .. | .. | .. | 49
Belgium | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 16.8 | .. | .. | .. | .. | 47
Germany | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 14.8 | .. | .. | .. | .. | 55
Italy | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 13.2 | .. | .. | .. | .. | 43
Cabo Verde | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 4.6 | .. | .. | .. | .. | 53
Serbia | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 4.6 | .. | .. | .. | .. | 49
United Kingdom | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 4.2 | .. | .. | .. | .. | 44
Netherlands | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 3.5 | .. | .. | .. | .. | 47
Spain | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 2.9 | .. | .. | .. | .. | 53
Poland | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 2.9 | .. | .. | .. | .. | 59
Bosnia and Herzegovina | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 2.2 | .. | .. | .. | .. | 50
Romania | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 1.9 | .. | .. | .. | .. | 64
China | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 1.9 | .. | .. | .. | .. | 54
Brazil | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 1.8 | .. | .. | .. | .. | 63
Other countries | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 40.8 | .. | .. | .. | .. |
Total | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 205.2 | .. | .. | .. | .. | 50
Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.
StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395805

Table B.4. Stock of foreign-born population by country of birth
Thousands
Mexico
| 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | Of which: Women 2010 (%)
United States | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 738.1 | .. | .. | .. | .. | 49
Guatemala | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 35.3 | .. | .. | .. | .. | 53
Spain | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 18.9 | .. | .. | .. | .. | 45
Colombia | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 13.9 | .. | .. | .. | .. | 57
Argentina | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 13.7 | .. | .. | .. | .. | 47
Cuba | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 12.1 | .. | .. | .. | .. | 49
Honduras | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 11.0 | .. | .. | .. | .. | 54
Venezuela | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 10.1 | .. | .. | .. | .. | 56
El Salvador | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 8.1 | .. | .. | .. | .. | 52
Canada | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 7.9 | .. | .. | .. | .. | 49
France | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 7.2 | .. | .. | .. | .. | 47
China | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 6.7 | .. | .. | .. | .. | 45
Germany | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 6.2 | .. | .. | .. | .. | 43
Peru | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 5.9 | .. | .. | .. | .. | 48
Chile | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 5.3 | .. | .. | .. | .. | 47
Other countries | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 60.8 | .. | .. | .. | .. |
Total | .. | 611.8 | 631.2 | 722.6 | 772.5 | 885.7 | 961.1 | 966.8 | 973.7 | 991.2 | 939.9 | 49
Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.
StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395805

Table B.4. Stock of foreign-born population by country of birth
Thousands
Netherlands
| 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | Of which: Women 2014 (%)
Turkey | 195.9 | 196.0 | 195.4 | 194.8 | 195.7 | 196.7 | 197.4 | 197.4 | 196.5 | 195.1 | 192.7 | 49
Suriname | 190.1 | 189.2 | 187.8 | 187.0 | 186.7 | 186.8 | 186.2 | 185.5 | 184.1 | 182.6 | 181.0 | 55
Morocco | 168.5 | 168.6 | 168.0 | 167.2 | 166.9 | 167.4 | 167.7 | 168.3 | 168.2 | 168.5 | 168.6 | 48
Indonesia | 156.0 | 152.8 | 149.7 | 146.7 | 143.7 | 140.7 | 137.8 | 135.1 | 132.0 | 129.2 | 126.4 | 56
Germany | 117.7 | 116.9 | 116.4 | 117.0 | 119.2 | 120.5 | 122.3 | 122.8 | 121.8 | 120.5 | 119.1 | 58
Poland | 25.0 | 30.0 | 35.3 | 42.1 | 51.1 | 58.1 | 66.6 | 78.2 | 86.5 | 96.2 | 108.5 | 54
Former USSR | 34.5 | 35.3 | 36.0 | 37.4 | 39.4 | 41.9 | 45.6 | 49.2 | 51.8 | 53.7 | 56.4 | 63
Belgium | 47.1 | 47.1 | 47.4 | 47.9 | 48.6 | 49.2 | 50.0 | 50.9 | 51.9 | 52.8 | 54.0 | 55
Former Yugoslavia | 54.5 | 53.7 | 53.0 | 52.8 | 52.7 | 52.8 | 52.7 | 52.7 | 52.5 | 52.5 | 52.6 | 52
China | 33.5 | 34.8 | 35.5 | 37.1 | 40.0 | 42.5 | 44.7 | 47.5 | 49.7 | 51.3 | 52.5 | 57
United Kingdom | 47.5 | 46.6 | 45.8 | 45.8 | 46.7 | 47.1 | 47.2 | 47.5 | 47.8 | 48.4 | 49.1 | 45
Iraq | 35.9 | 35.3 | 34.8 | 35.7 | 38.7 | 40.9 | 41.0 | 40.8 | 40.6 | 40.5 | 40.7 | 44
Afghanistan | 32.4 | 32.0 | 31.3 | 31.0 | 30.7 | 31.1 | 31.8 | 32.6 | 32.8 | 33.1 | 33.1 | 47
Iran | 24.1 | 23.8 | 23.8 | 24.2 | 24.8 | 25.4 | 26.2 | 27.2 | 28.0 | 28.7 | 29.2 | 46
United States | 22.6 | 22.8 | 23.0 | 23.3 | 24.0 | 24.3 | 24.9 | 25.7 | 26.3 | 26.5 | 27.5 | 52
Other countries | 550.9 | 549.9 | 549.3 | 561.2 | 584.8 | 607.1 | 626.6 | 644.8 | 657.1 | 673.7 | 705.0 |
Total | 1 736.1 | 1 734.7 | 1 732.4 | 1 751.0 | 1 793.7 | 1 832.5 | 1 868.7 | 1 906.3 | 1 927.7 | 1 953.4 | 1 996.3 | 52
Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.
StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395805

Table B.4. Stock of foreign-born population by country of birth
Thousands
New Zealand
| 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | Of which: Women 2013 (%)
United Kingdom | .. | .. | 243.6 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 255.0 | .. | 50
China | .. | .. | 78.1 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 89.1 | .. | 54
India | .. | .. | 43.3 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 67.2 | .. | 44
Australia | .. | .. | 62.7 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 62.7 | .. | 53
South Africa | .. | .. | 41.7 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 54.3 | .. | 51
Fiji | .. | .. | 37.7 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 52.8 | .. | 52
Samoa | .. | .. | 50.6 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 50.7 | .. | 52
Philippines | .. | .. | 15.3 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 37.3 | .. | 57
Korea | .. | .. | 28.8 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 26.6 | .. | 53
Tonga | .. | .. | 20.5 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 22.4 | .. | 50
United States | .. | .. | 18.3 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 22.1 | .. | 53
Netherlands | .. | .. | 22.2 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 19.9 | .. | 49
Malaysia | .. | .. | 14.5 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 16.4 | .. | 54
Cook Islands | .. | .. | 14.7 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 13.0 | .. | 53
Germany | .. | .. | 10.8 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 12.9 | .. | 56
Other countries | .. | .. | 176.6 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 199.5 | .. |
Total | .. | .. | 879.5 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 1 001.8 | .. | 52
Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.
StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395805

Table B.4. Stock of foreign-born population by country of birth
Thousands
Norway
| 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | Of which: Women 2014 (%)
Poland | 8.3 | 11.2 | 18.0 | 30.8 | 42.7 | 49.5 | 57.1 | 67.6 | 76.9 | 84.2 | 91.2 | 35
Sweden | 33.1 | 33.9 | 35.0 | 36.8 | 39.4 | 41.8 | 44.6 | 47.0 | 47.8 | 48.6 | 49.2 | 49
Lithuania | 1.3 | 1.9 | 3.0 | 5.0 | 7.3 | 9.9 | 15.6 | 22.7 | 28.6 | 33.0 | 35.9 | 41
Germany | 14.1 | 15.2 | 16.7 | 19.7 | 23.0 | 24.9 | 26.2 | 27.3 | 27.8 | 27.9 | 28.2 | 47
Somalia | 12.8 | 13.5 | 14.5 | 16.0 | 16.9 | 18.0 | 19.4 | 20.7 | 23.7 | 25.9 | 27.0 | 47
Denmark | 22.2 | 22.3 | 22.3 | 22.5 | 22.6 | 22.7 | 22.9 | 23.3 | 23.8 | 24.4 | 25.3 | 48
Iraq | 15.4 | 16.7 | 17.4 | 18.2 | 19.4 | 20.6 | 21.4 | 22.0 | 22.1 | 22.1 | 22.2 | 44
Philippines | 8.0 | 8.7 | 9.6 | 10.9 | 12.3 | 13.5 | 14.7 | 16.3 | 17.8 | 19.5 | 20.6 | 77
Pakistan | 15.2 | 15.6 | 15.9 | 16.2 | 16.7 | 17.2 | 17.6 | 18.0 | 18.6 | 19.0 | 19.4 | 48
United Kingdom | 14.6 | 14.7 | 15.1 | 15.6 | 16.2 | 16.9 | 17.5 | 18.1 | 18.6 | 19.0 | 19.3 | 39
Thailand | 7.3 | 8.3 | 9.3 | 10.5 | 11.8 | 13.1 | 14.1 | 15.2 | 16.4 | 17.3 | 18.0 | 81
United States | 14.5 | 14.6 | 14.8 | 15.2 | 15.7 | 16.0 | 16.3 | 16.6 | 17.0 | 17.3 | 17.5 | 51
Russian Federation | 8.9 | 10.1 | 10.9 | 12.2 | 13.1 | 13.8 | 14.6 | 15.3 | 16.2 | 16.8 | 17.2 | 66
Iran | 11.6 | 11.8 | 12.0 | 12.3 | 12.6 | 13.1 | 13.6 | 14.4 | 15.1 | 15.9 | 16.2 | 46
Eritrea | 1.8 | 2.1 | 2.4 | 2.7 | 3.3 | 4.8 | 6.6 | 8.2 | 10.1 | 12.4 | 14.8 | 42
Other countries | 171.9 | 179.8 | 188.3 | 200.8 | 215.8 | 231.1 | 246.9 | 263.8 | 283.3 | 301.2 | 319.7 |
Total | 361.1 | 380.4 | 405.1 | 445.4 | 488.8 | 526.8 | 569.1 | 616.3 | 663.9 | 704.5 | 741.8 | 48
Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.
StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395805

Table B.4. Stock of foreign-born population by country of birth
Thousands
Poland
| 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | Of which: Women 2011 (%)
Ukraine | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 227.5 | .. | .. | .. | ..
Germany | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 84.0 | .. | .. | .. | ..
Belarus | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 83.6 | .. | .. | .. | ..
Lithuania | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 55.6 | .. | .. | .. | ..
United Kingdom | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 38.0 | .. | .. | .. | ..
Ireland | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 8.4 | .. | .. | .. | ..
Other countries | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 177.8 | .. | .. | .. |
Total | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 674.9 | .. | .. | .. | ..
Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.
StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395805

Table B.4. Stock of foreign-born population by country of birth
Thousands
Portugal
| 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | Of which: Women 2011 (%)
Angola | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 162.6 | .. | .. | .. | 54
Brazil | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 139.7 | .. | .. | .. | 58
France | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 94.5 | .. | .. | .. | 54
Mozambique | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 73.1 | .. | .. | .. | 54
Cabo Verde | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 62.0 | .. | .. | .. | 53
Guinea-Bissau | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 29.6 | .. | .. | .. | 44
Germany | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 28.0 | .. | .. | .. | 52
Venezuela | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 25.2 | .. | .. | .. | 54
Romania | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 23.7 | .. | .. | .. | 49
United Kingdom | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 19.1 | .. | .. | .. | 50
Sao Tome and Principe | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 18.6 | .. | .. | .. | 56
Spain | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 16.5 | .. | .. | .. | 57
Switzerland | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 16.5 | .. | .. | .. | 49
South Africa | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 11.5 | .. | .. | .. | 53
China | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 10.9 | .. | .. | .. | 48
Other countries | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 140.5 | .. | .. | .. |
Total | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 871.8 | .. | .. | .. | 53
Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.
StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395805

Table B.4. Stock of foreign-born population by country of birth
Thousands
Russian Federation
| 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | Of which: Women 2010 (%)
Ukraine | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 2 942.0 | .. | .. | .. | .. | 54
Kazakhstan | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 2 481.9 | .. | .. | .. | .. | 54
Uzbekistan | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 1 111.7 | .. | .. | .. | .. | 47
Azerbaijan | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 743.9 | .. | .. | .. | .. | 44
Belarus | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 740.9 | .. | .. | .. | .. | 57
Kyrgyzstan | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 573.3 | .. | .. | .. | .. | 51
Armenia | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 511.2 | .. | .. | .. | .. | 44
Tajikistan | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 452.2 | .. | .. | .. | .. | 41
Georgia | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 436.4 | .. | .. | .. | .. | 46
Moldova | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 285.3 | .. | .. | .. | .. | 47
Turkmenistan | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 180.0 | .. | .. | .. | .. | 52
Germany | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 137.7 | .. | .. | .. | .. | 50
Latvia | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 86.7 | .. | .. | .. | .. | 53
Lithuania | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 68.9 | .. | .. | .. | .. | 53
Estonia | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 57.0 | .. | .. | .. | .. | 53
Other countries | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 385.8 | .. | .. | .. | .. |
Total | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 11 194.7 | .. | .. | .. | .. | 51
Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.
StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395805

Table B.4. Stock of foreign-born population by country of birth
Thousands
Slovak Republic
| 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | Of which: Women 2014 (%)
Czech Republic | 107.7 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 86.4 | 88.2 | 88.0 | 55
Hungary | 22.5 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 16.6 | 17.3 | 17.1 | 51
Ukraine | 13.3 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 9.8 | 9.9 | 10.1 | 61
Romania | 4.4 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 5.3 | 8.1 | 8.3 | 38
Poland | 7.2 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 4.6 | 6.7 | 6.7 | 54
United Kingdom | 1.8 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 4.9 | 4.8 | 5.5 | 44
Germany | 4.7 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 3.0 | 4.6 | 4.8 | 33
Austria | 3.9 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 2.6 | 3.1 | 3.4 | 40
France | 3.4 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 2.3 | 2.9 | 2.9 | 47
Italy | 1.6 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 1.9 | 2.7 | 2.8 | 25
Russian Federation | 5.8 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 2.3 | 2.7 | 2.8 | 65
Bulgaria | 1.7 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 1.3 | 2.2 | 2.2 | 32
United States | 3.5 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 2.3 | 2.1 | 2.2 | 47
Viet Nam | 2.4 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 1.6 | 2.1 | 2.1 | 39
Serbia | 0.8 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 1.6 | 1.9 | 2.0 | 36
Other countries | 23.0 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 11.6 | 15.7 | 16.7 |
Total | 207.6 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 158.2 | 174.9 | 177.6 | 50
Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.
StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395805

Table B.4. Stock of foreign-born population by country of birth
Thousands
Slovenia
| 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | Of which: Women 2014 (%)
Bosnia and Herzegovina | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 96.9 | 106.8 | 112.0 | 115.1 | 119.1 | 40
Croatia | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 49.2 | 56.6 | 63.3 | 62.2 | 61.6 | 51
Serbia | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 29.2 | 34.7 | 36.7 | 38.4 | 39.5 | 43
Germany | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 15.4 | 21.5 | 21.7 | 22.0 | 50
Former Yug. Rep. of Macedonia | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 13.7 | 16.0 | 17.5 | 18.5 | 19.2 | 40
Italy | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 4.6 | 8.5 | 9.1 | 9.5 | 45
Austria | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 5.9 | 8.4 | 8.7 | 9.1 | 51
Argentina | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 0.4 | 4.6 | 4.8 | 5.0 | 51
Switzerland | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 2.0 | 3.7 | 3.8 | 4.0 | 48
France | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 1.8 | 3.6 | 3.6 | 3.6 | 50
Russian Federation | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 1.3 | 1.9 | 2.5 | 3.0 | 58
Canada | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 0.5 | 2.4 | 2.5 | 2.5 | 53
Ukraine | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 1.8 | 1.9 | 2.1 | 2.4 | 66
United States | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 0.9 | 1.9 | 2.0 | 2.1 | 39
Australia | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 0.5 | 1.9 | 1.9 | 2.0 | 50
Other countries | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 39.7 | 22.6 | 9.9 | 34.1 | 36.6 |
Total | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 228.6 | 271.8 | 299.7 | 331.0 | 341.2 | 45
Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.
StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395805

Table B.4. Stock of foreign-born population by country of birth
Thousands
Spain
| 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | Of which: Women 2014 (%)
Morocco | 557.2 | 606.0 | 621.3 | 683.1 | 737.8 | 760.2 | 769.1 | 779.5 | 777.6 | 774.5 | 774.3 | 42
Romania | 312.1 | 397.3 | 511.0 | 706.2 | 762.2 | 784.8 | 810.3 | 833.8 | 801.4 | 726.1 | 678.1 | 51
Ecuador | 487.2 | 456.6 | 434.7 | 458.4 | 479.1 | 484.6 | 480.6 | 471.6 | 456.2 | 439.0 | 422.1 | 53
Colombia | 288.2 | 287.0 | 291.7 | 330.4 | 358.8 | 371.1 | 374.0 | 375.5 | 370.8 | 363.7 | 356.2 | 58
United Kingdom | 238.2 | 283.7 | 322.0 | 358.3 | 379.3 | 390.0 | 392.9 | 398.3 | 385.6 | 303.5 | 286.0 | 50
Argentina | 260.4 | 271.4 | 273.0 | 290.3 | 295.4 | 291.7 | 286.4 | 280.3 | 271.1 | 259.9 | 252.6 | 49
France | 188.7 | 199.4 | 208.8 | 220.2 | 227.1 | 229.7 | 228.1 | 226.1 | 221.9 | 209.0 | 204.9 | 52
Peru | 108.0 | 123.5 | 137.0 | 162.4 | 188.2 | 197.6 | 198.1 | 198.6 | 195.5 | 191.7 | 188.3 | 55
Germany | 193.1 | 208.9 | 222.1 | 237.9 | 246.7 | 251.0 | 251.1 | 250.9 | 236.0 | 196.1 | 186.5 | 51
China | 87.0 | 104.8 | 108.3 | 127.0 | 146.3 | 154.1 | 160.8 | 168.3 | 170.7 | 173.2 | 177.2 | 53
Bolivia | 99.5 | 140.7 | 200.7 | 240.9 | 229.4 | 213.9 | 202.7 | 193.6 | 185.2 | 177.1 | 171.1 | 60
Venezuela | 116.2 | 124.9 | 130.6 | 144.6 | 152.4 | 155.1 | 159.3 | 162.1 | 162.1 | 160.6 | 165.7 | 54
Dominican Republic | 78.0 | 87.1 | 96.7 | 114.7 | 129.7 | 136.8 | 141.2 | 149.4 | 155.4 | 158.5 | 161.1 | 61
Bulgaria | 93.0 | 100.8 | 120.2 | 150.7 | 160.0 | 163.6 | 165.7 | 168.1 | 160.2 | 142.6 | 133.0 | 49
Cuba | 76.5 | 79.2 | 83.1 | 92.6 | 100.5 | 104.5 | 111.2 | 120.3 | 125.2 | 128.6 | 131.1 | 55
Other countries | 1 208.2 | 1 366.4 | 1 489.0 | 1 726.7 | 1 873.4 | 1 915.5 | 1 946.3 | 1 983.5 | 1 965.5 | 1 879.5 | 1 866.5 |
Total | 4 391.5 | 4 837.6 | 5 250.0 | 6 044.5 | 6 466.3 | 6 604.2 | 6 677.8 | 6 759.8 | 6 640.5 | 6 283.7 | 6 154.7 | 51
Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.
StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395805

Table B.4. Stock of foreign-born population by country of birth
Thousands
Sweden
| 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | Of which: Women 2014 (%)
Finland | 186.6 | 183.7 | 180.9 | 178.2 | 175.1 | 172.2 | 169.5 | 166.7 | 163.9 | 161.1 | 158.5 | 60
Iraq | 70.1 | 72.6 | 82.8 | 97.5 | 109.4 | 117.9 | 121.8 | 125.5 | 127.9 | 128.9 | 130.2 | 46
Poland | 43.5 | 46.2 | 51.7 | 58.2 | 63.8 | 67.5 | 70.3 | 72.9 | 75.3 | 78.2 | 81.7 | 56
Iran | 54.0 | 54.5 | 55.7 | 56.5 | 57.7 | 59.9 | 62.1 | 63.8 | 65.6 | 67.2 | 68.4 | 48
Former Yugoslavia | 74.6 | 74.0 | 73.7 | 72.9 | 72.3 | 71.6 | 70.8 | 70.1 | 69.3 | 68.6 | 67.9 | 50
Syria | 16.2 | 16.8 | 17.8 | 18.2 | 18.8 | 19.6 | 20.8 | 22.4 | 27.5 | 41.7 | 67.7 | 43
Somalia | 15.3 | 16.0 | 18.3 | 21.6 | 25.2 | 31.7 | 37.8 | 40.2 | 44.0 | 54.2 | 57.9 | 50
Bosnia and Herzegovina | 54.5 | 54.8 | 55.5 | 55.7 | 56.0 | 56.1 | 56.2 | 56.3 | 56.6 | 56.8 | 57.3 | 51
Germany | 40.8 | 41.6 | 43.0 | 45.0 | 46.9 | 47.8 | 48.2 | 48.4 | 48.7 | 49.0 | 49.4 | 53
Turkey | 35.0 | 35.9 | 37.1 | 38.2 | 39.2 | 40.8 | 42.5 | 43.9 | 45.1 | 45.7 | 46.1 | 45
Denmark | 41.7 | 42.6 | 44.4 | 45.9 | 46.2 | 46.0 | 45.5 | 45.0 | 44.2 | 43.2 | 42.4 | 47
Norway | 45.0 | 44.8 | 44.7 | 44.6 | 44.3 | 43.8 | 43.4 | 43.1 | 42.9 | 42.5 | 42.3 | 56
Thailand | 16.3 | 18.3 | 20.5 | 22.9 | 25.9 | 28.7 | 31.4 | 33.6 | 35.6 | 37.0 | 38.1 | 78
China | 11.9 | 13.3 | 14.5 | 16.0 | 18.3 | 21.2 | 24.0 | 25.7 | 26.8 | 27.9 | 28.7 | 60
Afghanistan | 7.8 | 8.3 | 9.9 | 10.6 | 11.4 | 12.7 | 14.4 | 17.5 | 21.5 | 25.1 | 28.4 | 40
Other countries | 387.1 | 402.5 | 424.6 | 445.6 | 471.2 | 500.2 | 526.2 | 552.4 | 578.4 | 606.3 | 638.5 |
Total | 1 100.3 | 1 125.8 | 1 175.2 | 1 227.8 | 1 281.6 | 1 338.0 | 1 384.9 | 1 427.3 | 1 473.3 | 1 533.5 | 1 603.6 | 51
Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.
StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395805

Table B.4. Stock of foreign-born population by country of birth
Thousands
Switzerland
| 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | Of which: Women 2014 (%)
Germany | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 318.9 | 330.0 | 337.4 | 343.6 | 348.1 | 50
Italy | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 233.1 | 241.0 | 244.7 | 251.3 | 258.3 | 44
Portugal | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 172.3 | 187.4 | 199.2 | 211.5 | 218.7 | 45
France | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 132.3 | 138.4 | 141.4 | 146.8 | 153.1 | 52
Turkey | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 76.0 | 76.9 | 77.4 | 77.9 | 78.2 | 47
Spain | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 53.5 | 57.2 | 59.8 | 64.1 | 67.1 | 49
Serbia | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 59.1 | 61.7 | 62.7 | 65.6 | 66.2 | 51
Austria | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 58.8 | 59.2 | 59.7 | 5.8 | 60.0 | 61
Former Yug. Rep. of Macedonia | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 51.7 | 53.5 | 55.1 | 57.0 | 59.2 | 48
Bosnia and Herzegovina | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 51.1 | 52.4 | 53.2 | 54.1 | 55.4 | 52
United Kingdom | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 41.1 | 43.7 | 44.2 | 44.8 | 45.2 | 47
Brazil | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 32.3 | 33.4 | 34.4 | 35.5 | 36.6 | 71
United States | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 33.7 | 34.9 | 35.4 | 35.9 | 36.3 | 52
Poland | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 21.5 | 24.0 | 26.2 | 28.1 | 31.6 | 56
Sri Lanka | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 28.6 | 29.6 | 30.0 | 30.6 | 31.3 | 47
Other countries | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 711.2 | 734.9 | 757.7 | 837.0 | 809.6 |
Total | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 2 075.2 | 2 158.4 | 2 218.4 | 2 289.6 | 2 354.8 | 51
Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.
StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395805

Table B.4. Stock of foreign-born population by country of birth
Thousands
United Kingdom
| 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | Of which: Women 2014 (%)
India | .. | .. | 570 | 553 | 601 | 661 | 687 | 686 | 750 | 746 | 784 | 50
Poland | .. | .. | 229 | 423 | 495 | 540 | 534 | 617 | 658 | 650 | 783 | 51
Pakistan | .. | .. | 274 | 357 | 422 | 427 | 382 | 441 | 432 | 476 | 510 | 46
Ireland | .. | .. | 417 | 410 | 420 | 401 | 401 | 429 | 429 | 400 | 372 | 57
Germany | .. | .. | 269 | 253 | 273 | 296 | 301 | 292 | 303 | 343 | 252 | 56
Romania | .. | .. | 16 | 26 | 39 | 55 | 77 | 82 | 118 | 151 | 220 | 93
Nigeria | .. | .. | 117 | 147 | 137 | 166 | 167 | 203 | 162 | 202 | 206 | 52
Bangladesh | .. | .. | 221 | 202 | 193 | 199 | 193 | 219 | 191 | 184 | 198 | 49
South Africa | .. | .. | 198 | 194 | 204 | 220 | 227 | 208 | 208 | 224 | 178 | 54
France | .. | .. | 111 | 134 | 129 | 144 | 122 | 132 | 146 | 128 | 174 | 52
Lithuania | .. | .. | 47 | 55 | 70 | 62 | 91 | 118 | 117 | 140 | 171 | 51
Italy | .. | .. | 86 | 102 | 108 | 117 | 130 | 150 | 135 | 142 | 168 | 45
United States | .. | .. | 169 | 162 | 173 | 160 | 193 | 159 | 203 | 216 | 158 | 49
Philippines | .. | .. | 95 | 107 | 101 | 134 | 110 | 140 | 134 | 129 | 150 | 57
Jamaica | .. | .. | 135 | 173 | 142 | 130 | 134 | 123 | 151 | 140 | 149 | 60
Other countries | .. | .. | 2 803 | 2 894 | 3 126 | 3 187 | 3 307 | 3 431 | 3 451 | 3 589 | 4 009 |
Total | .. | .. | 5 757 | 6 192 | 6 633 | 6 899 | 7 056 | 7 430 | 7 588 | 7 860 | 8 482 | 52
Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.
StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395805

Table B.4. Stock of foreign-born population by country of birth
Thousands
United States
| 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | Of which: Women 2014 (%)
Mexico | 10 256.9 | 10 993.9 | 11 535.0 | 11 739.6 | 11 451.3 | 11 478.2 | 11 746.5 | 11 691.6 | 11 489.4 | 11 556.5 | 11 714.5 | ..
India | 1 372.3 | 1 410.7 | 1 505.4 | 1 514.0 | 1 626.9 | 1 665.1 | 1 796.5 | 1 855.7 | 1 974.3 | 2 036.3 | 2 205.9 | ..
China | 1 218.4 | 1 202.9 | 1 357.5 | 1 367.8 | 1 339.1 | 1 425.8 | 1 604.4 | 1 651.5 | 1 719.8 | 1 786.1 | 1 929.5 | ..
Philippines | 1 509.8 | 1 594.8 | 1 634.1 | 1 708.5 | 1 685.1 | 1 733.9 | 1 766.5 | 1 814.9 | 1 862.0 | 1 863.5 | 1 926.3 | ..
El Salvador | 931.9 | 988.0 | 1 042.2 | 1 108.3 | 1 078.3 | 1 157.2 | 1 207.1 | 1 245.5 | 1 254.5 | 1 247.5 | 1 315.5 | ..
Viet Nam | 1 052.0 | 1 072.9 | 1 116.2 | 1 102.2 | 1 154.7 | 1 149.4 | 1 243.8 | 1 253.9 | 1 264.2 | 1 308.2 | 1 291.8 | ..
Cuba | 925.0 | 902.4 | 932.6 | 980.0 | 987.8 | 982.9 | 1 112.1 | 1 090.6 | 1 114.9 | 1 138.2 | 1 172.9 | ..
Korea | 955.4 | 993.9 | 1 021.2 | 1 050.7 | 1 034.7 | 1 012.9 | 1 086.9 | 1 095.1 | 1 105.7 | 1 081.2 | 1 079.8 | ..
Dominican Republic | 716.5 | 708.5 | 764.9 | 747.9 | 779.2 | 791.6 | 879.9 | 878.9 | 960.2 | 1 010.7 | 997.7 | ..
Guatemala | 585.2 | 644.7 | 741.0 | 683.8 | 743.8 | 790.5 | 797.3 | 844.3 | 880.9 | 900.5 | 915.6 | ..
Canada | 808.5 | 830.3 | 847.2 | 816.4 | 824.3 | 814.1 | 785.6 | 787.5 | 799.1 | 841.1 | 806.4 | ..
Colombia | 499.3 | 554.8 | 589.1 | 603.7 | 603.3 | 617.7 | 648.3 | 655.1 | 705.0 | 679.6 | 706.8 | ..
Jamaica | 590.1 | 579.2 | 643.1 | 587.6 | 631.7 | 645.0 | 650.8 | 694.6 | 668.8 | 705.3 | 705.8 | ..
United Kingdom | 658.0 | 676.6 | 677.1 | 678.1 | 692.4 | 688.3 | 676.6 | 684.6 | 686.7 | 706.0 | 679.1 | ..
Haiti | 445.3 | 483.7 | 495.8 | 544.5 | 545.8 | 536.0 | 596.4 | 602.7 | 616.0 | 599.6 | 628.0 | ..
Other countries | 11 733.2 | 12 132.2 | 12 567.1 | 12 815.5 | 12 837.6 | 12 964.4 | 13 318.2 | 13 535.1 | 13 636.9 | 13 883.9 | 14 315.1 |
Total | 34 257.7 | 35 769.6 | 37 469.4 | 38 048.5 | 38 016.1 | 38 452.8 | 39 916.9 | 40 381.6 | 40 738.2 | 41 344.4 | 42 390.7 | 51
Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.
StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395805

Metadata related to Tables A.4 and B.4. Stocks of foreign-born population
| Comments | Source
Australia | ® Estimated residential population. Reference date: 30 June. | Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS).
Austria | ® Stock of foreign-born residents recorded in the population register. Revised data for 2002-07 to be consistent with the results of the 2006 census. Reference date: 31 December. | Population Register, Statistics Austria.
Belgium | ® Stock of foreign-born recorded in the population register. Includes asylum seekers from 2012 on. | Population Register, Directorate for Statistics and Economic Information (DGSIE).

Canada

® 2006 and 2011: National Household Survey.

The foreign-born population covers all persons who are or have ever been a landed immigrant/permanent resident in Canada. The foreign-born population does not include non-permanent residents, on employment or student authorizations, or who are refugee claimants.

ε PM for other years.

Statistics Canada.

Chile | ® Register of residence permits. | Department of Foreigners and Migration, Ministry of the Interior.
Czech Republic | ® 2011 Census. Numbers of persons born abroad, of foreign or Czech nationality. ε CM for other years. | Czech Statistical Office.
Denmark | ® Immigrants according to the national definition, e.g. persons born abroad to parents both foreigner or born abroad. When no information is available on the parents’ nationality/country of birth, foreign-born persons are classified as immigrants. | Statistics Denmark.
Estonia | ® Population Register. | Ministry of the Interior.
Finland | ® Population register. Includes foreign-born persons of Finnish origin. | Central Population Register, Statistics Finland.
France | From 2005 on, annual censuses. Including persons who were born French abroad. 2012 to 2014 estimated totals are based on Eurostat data. Series break in 2014. | National Institute for Statistics and Economic Studies (INSEE).
Germany | ® Microcensus. | Federal Statistical Office.
Greece | ® From 2010 on: Labour Force Surveys. Prior to 2014: 4th quarter; 2014: 2nd quarter. | Hellenic Statistical authority.
Hungary | ® Includes foreigners and nationals. From 2010 on, includes third-country nationals holding a temporary residence permit (for a year or more). From 2011 on, includes persons under subsidiary protection. Data for 2011 were adjusted to match the October census results. Reference date: 31 December. | Office of Immigration and Nationality; Central Office Administrative and Electronic Public Services (Central Population Register); Central Statistical Office.
Iceland | ® National population register. Numbers from the register are likely to be overestimated. Reference date: 31 December. | Statistics Iceland.
Ireland | ® 2006 and 2011 Censuses. Persons usually resident and present in their usual residence on census night. ε PM for other years. | Central Statistics Office.

Israel

Estimates are based on the results of the Population Censuses and on the changes that occurred in the population after the Censuses, as recorded in the Population Register. They include Jews and foreign-born members of other religions (usually family members of Jewish immigrants).

The statistical data for Israel are supplied by and under the responsibility of the relevant Israeli authorities. The use of such data by the OECD is without prejudice to the status of the Golan Heights, East Jerusalem and Israeli settlements in the West Bank under the terms of international law.

Central Bureau of Statistics.

Italy | ® Population register. | National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT).
Luxembourg | ® 2010: Census. ε CM for other years. | Central Office of Statistics and Economic Studies (Statec).
Mexico | ® 2010 census. ε Other years, estimation from the National Survey on Occupation and Employment (ENOE). | National Institute of Statistics and Geography (INEGI).
Netherlands | ® Reference date: 1 January of the following year. | Population register, Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS).
New Zealand | ® 2006 and 2013 Censuses. ε PM for other years. | Statistics New Zealand.
Norway | ® Reference date: 31 December. | Central Population Register, Statistics Norway.
Poland | ® 2011 Census. Excluding foreign temporary residents who, at the time of the census, had been staying at a given address in Poland for less than 12 months. Country of birth in accordance with administrative boundaries at the time of the census. | Central Statistical Office.
Portugal | ® 2011 censuses. ε CM for other years. | National Statistical Institute (INE)
Russian Federation | ® 2010 Census. | Federal state statistics service (Rosstat).
Slovak Republic | ® Population Register. | Ministry of the Interior.
Slovenia | ® Central Population Register. | Ministry of the Interior.
Spain | ® Population register. Foreign-born recorded in the Municipal Registers irrespective of their legal status. Reference date: 1 January of the following year. | Municipal Registers, National Statistics Institute (INE).
Sweden | ® Reference date: 31 December. | Population Register, Statistics Sweden.
Switzerland | ® 2010 Population Register of the Confederation. ε CM for other years. | Federal Statistical Office.
United Kingdom | ® From 2006 on: Labour Force Survey. Foreign-born residents. ε PM for other years. Figures are rounded. | Office for National Statistics.
United States | ® Includes persons who are naturalised and persons who are in an unauthorised status. Excludes children born abroad to US citizen parents. | American Community Survey, Census Bureau.
Legend:
® Observed figures.
ε Estimates (in italic) made by means of the component method (CM) or the parametric method (PM). For more details on the method of estimation, please refer to http://www.oecd.org/migration/foreignborn. No estimate is made by country of birth (Tables B.4).
Note: Data for Serbia may include persons born in Montenegro or in Serbia and Montenegro.
Some statements may refer to figures prior to 2004 or to nationalities/countries of birth not shown in this annex but available on line at: http://stats.oecd.org/.

Table A.5. Stocks of foreign population by nationality in OECD countries and the Russian Federation
Thousands and percentages
| 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014
Austria | 774.4 | 796.7 | 804.8 | 829.7 | 860.0 | 883.6 | 913.2 | 951.4 | 1 004.3 | 1 066.1 | 1 146.1
% of total population | 9.5 | 9.7 | 9.7 | 10.0 | 10.3 | 10.6 | 10.9 | 11.3 | 11.9 | 12.6 | 13.5
Belgium | 870.9 | 900.5 | 932.2 | 971.4 | 1 013.3 | 1 057.7 | 1 119.3 | 1 169.1 | 1 257.2 | 1 268.1 | 1 304.7
% of total population | 8.4 | 8.6 | 8.8 | 9.1 | 9.5 | 9.8 | 10.2 | 10.6 | 11.4 | 11.4 | 11.6
Canada | .. | .. | 1 758.9 | .. | .. | .. | .. | 1 957.0 | .. | .. | ..
% of total population | .. | .. | 5.4 | .. | .. | .. | .. | 5.7 | .. | .. | ..
Czech Republic | 254.3 | 278.3 | 321.5 | 392.3 | 437.6 | 432.5 | 424.3 | 434.2 | 435.9 | 439.2 | 449.4
% of total population | 2.5 | 2.7 | 3.1 | 3.8 | 4.2 | 4.1 | 4.0 | 4.1 | 4.1 | 4.2 | 4.3
Denmark | 267.6 | 270.1 | 278.1 | 298.5 | 320.2 | 329.9 | 346.0 | 358.9 | 374.7 | 397.3 | 422.6
% of total population | 5.0 | 5.0 | 5.1 | 5.5 | 5.8 | 6.0 | 6.2 | 6.4 | 6.7 | 7.1 | 7.5
Estonia | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 211.1 | 210.9 | 211.7 | 211.4
% of total population | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 15.9 | 15.9 | 16.1 | 16.1
Finland | 108.3 | 113.9 | 121.7 | 132.7 | 143.3 | 155.7 | 168.0 | 183.1 | 195.5 | 207.5 | 219.7
% of total population | 2.1 | 2.2 | 2.3 | 2.5 | 2.7 | 2.9 | 3.1 | 3.4 | 3.6 | 3.8 | 4.0
France | .. | 3 541.8 | 3 696.9 | 3 731.2 | 3 773.2 | 3 821.5 | 3 892.8 | 3 980.6 | 4 129.4 | 4 198.6 | 4 395.4
% of total population | .. | 5.8 | 6.0 | 6.0 | 6.1 | 6.1 | 6.2 | 6.3 | 6.5 | 6.6 | 6.9
Germany | 6 717.1 | 6 755.8 | 6 751.0 | 6 744.9 | 6 727.6 | 6 694.8 | 6 753.6 | 6 930.9 | 7 213.7 | 7 633.6 | 8 153.0
% of total population | 8.1 | 8.2 | 8.2 | 8.2 | 8.2 | 8.2 | 8.3 | 8.5 | 8.8 | 9.3 | 10.1
Greece | 533.4 | 553.1 | 570.6 | 643.1 | 733.6 | 839.7 | 810.0 | 757.4 | 768.1 | 687.1 | 706.7
% of total population | 4.8 | 5.0 | 5.1 | 5.8 | 6.6 | 7.5 | 7.3 | 6.8 | 6.9 | 6.2 | 6.4
Hungary | 142.2 | 154.4 | 166.0 | 174.7 | 184.4 | 197.8 | 209.2 | 143.4 | 141.4 | 140.5 | 146.0
% of total population | 1.4 | 1.5 | 1.6 | 1.7 | 1.8 | 2.0 | 2.1 | 1.4 | 1.4 | 1.4 | 1.5
Iceland | 10.6 | 13.8 | 18.6 | 23.4 | 24.4 | 21.7 | 21.1 | 21.0 | 21.4 | 22.7 | 24.3
% of total population | 3.6 | 4.7 | 6.1 | 7.5 | 7.6 | 6.8 | 6.6 | 6.6 | 6.7 | 7.0 | 7.4
Ireland | .. | .. | 413.2 | 519.6 | 575.6 | 575.4 | 560.1 | 537.0 | 550.4 | 554.5 | 564.3
% of total population | .. | .. | 9.8 | 11.9 | 12.8 | 12.7 | 12.3 | 11.7 | 12.0 | 12.1 | 12.2
Italy | 2 402.2 | 2 670.5 | 2 938.9 | 3 432.7 | 3 402.4 | 3 648.1 | 3 879.2 | 4 052.1 | 4 387.7 | 4 921.3 | 5 014.4
% of total population | 4.2 | 4.6 | 5.0 | 5.8 | 5.7 | 6.1 | 6.5 | 6.7 | 7.3 | 8.1 | 8.3
Japan | 1 973.7 | 2 011.6 | 2 083.2 | 2 151.4 | 2 215.9 | 2 184.7 | 2 132.9 | 2 078.5 | 2 033.7 | 2 066.4 | 2 121.8
% of total population | 1.5 | 1.6 | 1.6 | 1.7 | 1.7 | 1.7 | 1.7 | 1.6 | 1.6 | 1.6 | 1.7
Korea | 491.4 | 510.5 | 660.6 | 800.3 | 895.5 | 920.9 | 1 002.7 | 982.5 | 933.0 | 985.9 | 1 091.5
% of total population | 1.0 | 1.1 | 1.4 | 1.6 | 1.8 | 1.9 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 1.9 | 2.0 | 2.2
Luxembourg | 183.7 | 191.3 | 198.3 | 205.9 | 215.5 | 216.3 | 220.5 | 229.9 | 238.8 | 248.9 | 258.7
% of total population | 40.1 | 41.1 | 41.9 | 42.9 | 44.1 | 43.5 | 43.5 | 44.3 | 45.0 | 45.8 | 47.1
Mexico | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 262.7 | 281.1 | 303.9 | 296.4 | .. | 326.0
% of total population | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.3 | 0.3 | .. | 0.3
Netherlands | 699.4 | 691.4 | 681.9 | 688.4 | 719.5 | 735.2 | 760.4 | 786.1 | 796.2 | 816.0 | 847.3
% of total population | 4.3 | 4.2 | 4.2 | 4.2 | 4.4 | 4.4 | 4.6 | 4.7 | 4.8 | 4.9 | 5.0
Norway | 213.3 | 222.3 | 238.3 | 266.3 | 303.0 | 333.9 | 369.2 | 407.3 | 448.8 | 483.2 | 512.2
% of total population | 4.6 | 4.8 | 5.1 | 5.7 | 6.4 | 6.9 | 7.6 | 8.2 | 8.9 | 9.5 | 10.0
Poland | .. | .. | 54.9 | 57.5 | 60.4 | 49.6 | .. | 55.4 | .. | .. | ..
% of total population | .. | .. | 0.1 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.1 | .. | 0.1 | .. | .. | ..
Portugal | 449.2 | 415.9 | 420.2 | 435.7 | 440.6 | 454.2 | 445.3 | 436.8 | 417.0 | 401.3 | 395.2
% of total population | 4.3 | 4.0 | 4.0 | 4.1 | 4.2 | 4.3 | 4.2 | 4.1 | 4.0 | 3.7 | 3.6
Russia | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 490.3 | 621.0 | 715.8 | 872.6
% of total population | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 0.3 | 0.4 | 0.5 | 0.6
Slovak Republic | 22.3 | 25.6 | 32.1 | 40.9 | 52.5 | 62.9 | 68.0 | 70.7 | 72.9 | 59.2 | 61.8
% of total population | 0.4 | 0.5 | 0.6 | 0.8 | 1.0 | 1.2 | 1.3 | 1.3 | 1.3 | 1.1 | 1.1
Slovenia | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 99.8 | 95.7 | 101.9 | 103.3 | 110.9 | 117.7
% of total population | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 4.9 | 4.7 | 5.0 | 5.0 | 5.4 | 5.7
Spain | 3 730.6 | 4 144.2 | 4 519.6 | 5 268.8 | 5 648.7 | 5 747.7 | 5 751.5 | 5 736.3 | 5 546.2 | 5 023.5 | 4 718.9
% of total population | 8.7 | 9.5 | 10.2 | 11.6 | 12.3 | 12.4 | 12.4 | 12.3 | 11.9 | 10.8 | 10.2
Sweden | 481.1 | 479.9 | 492.0 | 524.5 | 562.1 | 602.9 | 633.3 | 655.1 | 667.2 | 694.7 | 739.4
% of total population | 5.3 | 5.3 | 5.4 | 5.7 | 6.1 | 6.5 | 6.8 | 6.9 | 7.0 | 7.2 | 7.6
Switzerland | 1 495.0 | 1 511.9 | 1 523.6 | 1 571.0 | 1 638.9 | 1 680.2 | 1 720.4 | 1 772.3 | 1 825.1 | 1 886.6 | 1 947.0
% of total population | 20.2 | 20.3 | 20.4 | 20.8 | 21.4 | 21.7 | 22.0 | 22.4 | 22.8 | 23.3 | 23.8
Turkey | .. | .. | .. | 98.1 | 103.8 | 167.3 | 175.4 | 235.1 | 272.8 | .. | ..
% of total population | .. | .. | .. | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.3 | 0.4 | .. | ..
United Kingdom | 2 857.0 | 3 035.0 | 3 392.0 | 3 824.0 | 4 186.0 | 4 348.0 | 4 524.0 | 4 785.0 | 4 788.0 | 4 941.0 | 5 592.0
% of total population | 4.8 | 5.0 | 5.6 | 6.2 | 6.8 | 7.0 | 7.2 | 7.6 | 7.5 | 7.7 | 8.8
United States | 21 115.7 | 21 159.7 | 21 696.3 | 21 843.6 | 21 685.7 | 21 641.0 | 22 460.6 | 22 225.5 | 22 115.0 | 22 016.4 | 22 017.4
% of total population | 7.2 | 7.2 | 7.3 | 7.3 | 7.1 | 7.1 | 7.3 | 7.1 | 7.0 | 7.0 | 6.9
Note: For details on definitions and sources, refer to the metadata at the end of Tables B.5.
StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395763

Table B.5. Stock of foreign population by nationality
Thousands
Austria
| 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | Of which: Women 2014 (%)
Germany | 91.2 | 100.4 | 109.2 | 118.9 | 128.7 | 136.0 | 144.1 | 150.9 | 157.8 | 164.8 | 170.5 | 50
Turkey | 116.5 | 113.1 | 108.2 | 108.8 | 110.0 | 111.3 | 112.5 | 112.9 | 113.7 | 114.7 | 115.4 | 49
Serbia | 136.8 | 137.9 | 135.8 | 123.6 | 123.1 | 110.3 | 111.4 | 111.4 | 112.2 | 113.5 | 115.4 | 49
Bosnia and Herzegovina | 90.9 | 88.3 | 86.2 | 92.6 | 91.8 | 90.5 | 89.6 | 89.6 | 89.9 | 91.0 | 92.5 | 46
Romania | 21.3 | 21.9 | 21.9 | 27.7 | 32.2 | 36.0 | 41.6 | 47.3 | 53.3 | 59.7 | 73.4 | 53
Croatia | 58.6 | 58.1 | 56.8 | 59.2 | 58.9 | 58.5 | 58.3 | 58.3 | 58.6 | 62.0 | 66.5 | 47
Hungary | 15.1 | 16.3 | 17.4 | 19.2 | 21.3 | 23.3 | 25.6 | 29.8 | 37.0 | 46.3 | 54.9 | 52
Poland | 26.6 | 30.6 | 33.3 | 35.3 | 36.6 | 37.2 | 38.6 | 42.1 | 46.0 | 50.3 | 54.3 | 48
Slovak Republic | 11.3 | 13.0 | 14.2 | 15.8 | 17.9 | 19.2 | 20.4 | 22.5 | 25.3 | 28.6 | 32.1 | 62
Russian Federation | 14.2 | 17.2 | 18.8 | 21.1 | 22.5 | 23.4 | 24.2 | 25.5 | 27.3 | 28.8 | 30.0 | 57
Italy | 11.7 | 12.2 | 12.7 | 13.2 | 13.9 | 14.5 | 15.4 | 16.2 | 17.8 | 20.2 | 22.5 | 42
Former Yug. Rep. of Macedonia | 16.0 | 16.3 | 16.3 | 17.5 | 17.9 | 18.1 | 18.6 | 18.9 | 19.4 | 20.1 | 20.9 | 47
Bulgaria | 6.3 | 6.5 | 6.4 | 7.6 | 8.9 | 9.8 | 11.2 | 12.5 | 14.1 | 15.9 | 19.6 | 54
Afghanistan | 3.3 | 3.1 | 3.1 | 4.0 | 4.5 | 5.7 | 6.7 | 9.4 | 12.4 | 14.0 | 16.8 | 30
Slovenia | 6.5 | 6.6 | 6.7 | 7.5 | 7.7 | 7.8 | 8.0 | 8.6 | 9.6 | 11.3 | 13.5 | 44
Other countries | 148.0 | 155.3 | 157.8 | 157.6 | 164.1 | 181.8 | 187.1 | 195.7 | 209.8 | 224.9 | 247.9 |
Total | 774.4 | 796.7 | 804.8 | 829.7 | 860.0 | 883.6 | 913.2 | 951.4 | 1 004.3 | 1 066.1 | 1 146.1 | 49
Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.
StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395816

Table B.5. Stock of foreign population by nationality
Thousands
Belgium
| 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | Of which: Women 2014 (%)
France | 117.3 | 120.6 | 125.1 | 130.6 | 136.6 | 140.2 | 145.3 | 150.0 | 153.4 | 156.1 | 159.4 | 52
Italy | 179.0 | 175.5 | 171.9 | 169.0 | 167.0 | 165.1 | 162.8 | 159.7 | 157.4 | 156.6 | 157.0 | 46
Netherlands | 105.0 | 110.5 | 117.0 | 123.5 | 130.2 | 133.5 | 137.8 | 141.2 | 144.0 | 146.2 | 149.2 | 47
Morocco | 81.3 | 80.6 | 80.6 | 79.9 | 79.4 | 81.9 | 84.7 | 86.1 | 83.5 | 81.0 | 82.3 | 50
Poland | 14.0 | 18.0 | 23.2 | 30.4 | 36.3 | 43.1 | 49.7 | 56.1 | 61.5 | 65.1 | 68.4 | 52
Romania | 5.6 | 7.5 | 10.2 | 15.3 | 21.4 | 26.4 | 33.6 | 42.4 | 51.3 | 57.0 | 66.1 | 46
Spain | 43.2 | 42.9 | 42.8 | 42.7 | 43.6 | 45.2 | 48.0 | 50.9 | 54.4 | 57.4 | 60.4 | 49
Portugal | 27.4 | 28.0 | 28.7 | 29.8 | 31.7 | 33.1 | 34.5 | 36.1 | 38.8 | 41.2 | 42.8 | 48
Germany | 36.3 | 37.0 | 37.6 | 38.4 | 39.1 | 39.4 | 39.8 | 40.0 | 39.8 | 39.5 | 39.3 | 51
Turkey | 39.9 | 39.7 | 39.4 | 39.5 | 39.6 | 39.6 | 39.8 | 39.4 | 39.2 | 37.9 | 37.6 | 48
Bulgaria | 2.7 | 3.3 | 3.9 | 6.7 | 10.4 | 13.2 | 17.3 | 20.4 | 23.7 | 25.9 | 29.0 | 49
United Kingdom | 26.0 | 25.7 | 25.1 | 25.1 | 25.5 | 25.0 | 25.0 | 24.8 | 24.5 | 24.1 | 24.0 | 44
Democratic Republic of the Congo | 13.2 | 13.5 | 14.2 | 15.0 | 16.8 | 18.1 | 19.6 | 20.6 | 23.8 | 23.4 | 23.4 | 53
Russian Federation | 4.0 | 5.5 | 6.4 | 7.2 | 11.8 | 12.8 | 14.0 | 14.7 | 19.0 | 17.3 | 16.5 | 56
Greece | 16.6 | 16.3 | 15.7 | 15.2 | 14.9 | 14.8 | 14.8 | 15.0 | 15.5 | 15.9 | 16.3 | 50
Other countries | 159.5 | 175.9 | 190.3 | 203.3 | 208.9 | 226.3 | 252.6 | 271.7 | 327.2 | 323.4 | 333.0 |
Total | 870.9 | 900.5 | 932.2 | 971.4 | 1 013.3 | 1 057.7 | 1 119.3 | 1 169.1 | 1 257.2 | 1 268.1 | 1 304.7 | 49
Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.
StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395816

Table B.5. Stock of foreign population by nationality
Thousands
Czech Republic
| 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | Of which: Women 2014 (%)
Ukraine | 78.3 | 87.8 | 102.6 | 126.7 | 131.9 | 131.9 | 124.3 | 118.9 | 112.5 | 105.1 | 104.2 | 47
Slovak Republic | 47.4 | 49.4 | 58.4 | 67.9 | 76.0 | 73.4 | 71.8 | 81.3 | 85.8 | 90.9 | 96.2 | 46
Viet Nam | 34.2 | 36.8 | 40.8 | 51.1 | 60.3 | 61.1 | 60.3 | 58.2 | 57.3 | 57.3 | 56.6 | 44
Russian Federation | 14.7 | 16.3 | 18.6 | 23.3 | 27.1 | 30.3 | 31.8 | 32.4 | 33.0 | 33.1 | 34.4 | 57
Germany | 5.8 | 7.2 | 10.1 | 15.7 | 17.5 | 13.8 | 13.9 | 15.8 | 17.1 | 18.5 | 19.7 | 19
Poland | 16.3 | 17.8 | 18.9 | 20.6 | 21.7 | 19.3 | 18.2 | 19.1 | 19.2 | 19.5 | 19.6 | 50
Bulgaria | 4.4 | 4.6 | 4.6 | 5.0 | 5.9 | 6.4 | 6.9 | 7.4 | 8.2 | 9.1 | 10.1 | 38
Romania | 2.6 | 2.7 | 2.9 | 3.2 | 3.6 | 4.1 | 4.4 | 4.8 | 5.7 | 6.8 | 7.7 | 34
United States | 3.8 | 4.0 | 4.2 | 4.5 | 5.3 | 5.6 | 6.1 | 7.3 | 7.0 | 7.1 | 6.5 | 38
United Kingdom | 1.8 | 2.2 | 3.5 | 3.8 | 4.5 | 4.4 | 4.4 | 4.9 | 5.2 | 5.4 | 5.6 | 23
China | 3.4 | 3.6 | 4.2 | 5.0 | 5.2 | 5.4 | 5.5 | 5.6 | 5.6 | 5.5 | 5.6 | 48
Mongolia | .. | .. | .. | 6.0 | 8.6 | 5.7 | 5.6 | 5.4 | 5.3 | 5.3 | 5.5 | 58
Moldova | 4.1 | 4.7 | 6.2 | 8.0 | 10.6 | 10.0 | 8.9 | 7.6 | 6.4 | 5.7 | 5.3 | 45
Kazakhstan | .. | .. | .. | 3.0 | 3.4 | 3.9 | 4.2 | 4.5 | 4.8 | 4.8 | 5.0 | 56
Belarus | 2.9 | 3.0 | 3.2 | 3.7 | 3.9 | 4.0 | 4.2 | 4.2 | 4.3 | 4.3 | 4.4 | 61
Other countries | 34.7 | 38.3 | 43.3 | 44.9 | 52.1 | 53.1 | 53.9 | 56.8 | 58.6 | 60.6 | 63.0 |
Total | 254.3 | 278.3 | 321.5 | 392.3 | 437.6 | 432.5 | 424.3 | 434.2 | 435.9 | 439.2 | 449.4 | 43
Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.
StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395816

Table B.5. Stock of foreign population by nationality
Thousands
Denmark
| 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | Of which: Women 2014 (%)
Poland | 6.2 | 7.4 | 9.7 | 13.8 | 19.9 | 21.1 | 22.6 | 24.5 | 26.8 | 29.3 | 32.3 | 46
Turkey | 30.0 | 29.5 | 28.8 | 28.8 | 28.9 | 29.0 | 29.2 | 29.0 | 28.8 | 28.9 | 28.8 | 49
Germany | 13.6 | 14.2 | 15.4 | 18.0 | 20.4 | 21.1 | 21.6 | 22.1 | 22.4 | 22.7 | 23.0 | 49
Romania | .. | .. | .. | 2.4 | 3.7 | 5.1 | 6.9 | 9.5 | 12.4 | 15.4 | 18.8 | 43
United Kingdom | 12.8 | 12.9 | 13.2 | 13.7 | 14.2 | 14.3 | 14.7 | 15.0 | 15.4 | 15.8 | 16.1 | 35
Norway | 13.9 | 13.9 | 14.2 | 14.4 | 14.8 | 15.0 | 15.1 | 15.3 | 15.3 | 15.5 | 15.8 | 61
Sweden | 10.9 | 11.2 | 11.6 | 12.1 | 12.7 | 12.8 | 12.9 | 13.1 | 13.4 | 13.9 | 14.4 | 58
Iraq | 19.2 | 18.7 | 18.1 | 18.3 | 17.6 | 16.7 | 16.7 | 15.7 | 15.2 | 14.9 | 13.6 | 48
Bosnia and Herzegovina | 14.0 | 12.7 | 12.2 | 12.1 | 11.8 | 11.5 | 11.4 | 11.1 | 11.0 | 10.9 | 10.9 | 48
Lithuania | .. | .. | .. | 3.5 | 4.3 | 5.2 | 6.5 | 7.7 | 8.7 | 9.7 | 10.4 | 49
Afghanistan | 9.3 | 9.4 | 9.4 | 9.5 | 9.4 | 9.1 | 9.5 | 9.6 | 9.8 | 10.4 | 10.1 | 46
Syria | .. | .. | .. | 0.7 | 0.7 | 0.9 | 1.3 | 1.9 | 2.7 | 4.4 | 9.8 | 36
Pakistan | 6.9 | 6.7 | 6.6 | 6.7 | 6.9 | 7.1 | 7.8 | 8.2 | 8.6 | 9.2 | 9.8 | 49
Thailand | 5.6 | 5.9 | 6.2 | 6.7 | 7.3 | 7.7 | 8.3 | 8.6 | 8.8 | 9.2 | 9.5 | 84
Somalia | 11.3 | 9.8 | 9.0 | 8.8 | 8.5 | 8.3 | 8.2 | 8.0 | 8.2 | 8.8 | 9.3 | 47
Other countries | 114.0 | 117.9 | 123.7 | 129.0 | 139.1 | 144.9 | 153.3 | 159.6 | 167.4 | 178.4 | 190.0 |
Total | 267.6 | 270.1 | 278.1 | 298.5 | 320.2 | 329.9 | 346.0 | 358.9 | 374.7 | 397.3 | 422.6 | 50
Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.
StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395816

Table B.5. Stock of foreign population by nationality
Thousands
Estonia
| 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | Of which: Women 2014 (%)
Russian Federation | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 96.5 | 95.1 | 93.6 | 92.6 | 53
Finland | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 4.3 | 5.0 | 5.7 | 6.3 | 34
Ukraine | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 5.4 | 5.5 | 5.7 | 6.3 | 45
Latvia | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 2.6 | 2.9 | 3.3 | 3.6 | 47
Germany | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 1.4 | 1.7 | 1.9 | 2.2 | 42
Lithuania | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 1.8 | 1.8 | 2.0 | 2.1 | 45
Belarus | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 1.6 | 1.6 | 1.6 | 1.6 | 54
Italy | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 0.6 | 0.8 | 0.9 | 1.1 | 32
United Kingdom | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 0.7 | 0.8 | 0.9 | 0.9 | 22
France | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 0.5 | 0.6 | 0.8 | 0.9 | 38
Sweden | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 0.8 | 0.9 | 1.0 | 0.9 | 24
Poland | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 0.5 | 0.6 | 0.7 | 0.8 | 37
Spain | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 0.3 | 0.4 | 0.6 | 0.7 | 41
United States | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.5 | 0.6 | 34
Romania | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.4 | 0.5 | 19
Other countries | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 93.6 | 92.7 | 92.2 | 90.5 |
Total | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 211.1 | 210.9 | 211.7 | 211.4 | 48
Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.
StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395816

Table B.5. Stock of foreign population by nationality
Thousands
Finland
| 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | Of which: Women 2014 (%)
Estonia | 14.0 | 15.5 | 17.6 | 20.0 | 22.6 | 25.5 | 29.1 | 34.0 | 39.8 | 44.8 | 48.4 | 50
Russian Federation | 24.6 | 24.6 | 25.3 | 26.2 | 26.9 | 28.2 | 28.4 | 29.6 | 30.2 | 30.8 | 30.6 | 56
Sweden | 8.2 | 8.2 | 8.3 | 8.3 | 8.4 | 8.5 | 8.5 | 8.5 | 8.4 | 8.4 | 8.3 | 41
China | 2.6 | 3.0 | 3.4 | 4.0 | 4.6 | 5.2 | 5.6 | 6.2 | 6.6 | 7.1 | 7.6 | 54
Somalia | 4.7 | 4.7 | 4.6 | 4.9 | 4.9 | 5.6 | 6.6 | 7.4 | 7.5 | 7.5 | 7.4 | 48
Thailand | 2.3 | 2.6 | 3.0 | 3.5 | 3.9 | 4.5 | 5.0 | 5.5 | 6.0 | 6.5 | 6.9 | 86
Iraq | 3.4 | 3.3 | 3.0 | 3.0 | 3.2 | 4.0 | 5.0 | 5.7 | 5.9 | 6.4 | 6.8 | 35
India | 1.3 | 1.6 | 2.0 | 2.3 | 2.7 | 3.2 | 3.5 | 3.8 | 4.0 | 4.4 | 4.7 | 39
Turkey | 2.4 | 2.6 | 2.9 | 3.2 | 3.4 | 3.8 | 4.0 | 4.2 | 4.3 | 4.4 | 4.5 | 33
United Kingdom | 2.7 | 2.8 | 2.9 | 3.1 | 3.2 | 3.3 | 3.5 | 3.7 | 3.9 | 4.0 | 4.3 | 20
Serbia | 3.3 | 3.3 | 3.4 | 3.5 | 3.5 | 3.6 | 3.8 | 3.9 | 3.9 | 3.9 | 4.1 | 43
Germany | 2.6 | 2.8 | 3.0 | 3.3 | 3.5 | 3.6 | 3.7 | 3.8 | 3.9 | 4.0 | 4.0 | 41
Viet Nam | 1.5 | 1.7 | 1.8 | 2.0 | 2.3 | 2.5 | 2.8 | 3.1 | 3.3 | 3.6 | 4.0 | 54
Poland | 0.8 | 0.9 | 1.1 | 1.4 | 1.9 | 2.1 | 2.2 | 2.5 | 2.9 | 3.3 | 3.7 | 42
Afghanistan | 1.6 | 1.8 | 2.0 | 2.2 | 2.2 | 2.3 | 2.5 | 2.8 | 3.0 | 3.2 | 3.5 | 47
Other countries | 32.3 | 34.5 | 37.5 | 41.7 | 45.9 | 49.8 | 53.8 | 58.4 | 61.9 | 65.4 | 71.0 |
Total | 108.3 | 113.9 | 121.7 | 132.7 | 143.3 | 155.7 | 168.0 | 183.1 | 195.5 | 207.5 | 219.7 | 47
Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.
StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395816

Table B.5. Stock of foreign population by nationality
Thousands
France
| 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | Of which: Women 2011 (%)
Portugal | .. | 490.6 | 491.0 | 492.5 | 493.9 | 497.6 | 501.8 | 509.3 | .. | .. | .. | 46
Algeria | .. | 481.0 | 475.3 | 471.3 | 469.0 | 466.4 | 466.6 | 469.6 | .. | .. | .. | 47
Morocco | .. | 460.4 | 452.0 | 444.8 | 440.7 | 435.2 | 433.4 | 436.4 | .. | .. | .. | 49
Turkey | .. | 223.6 | 223.4 | 220.1 | 220.7 | 221.2 | 219.8 | 217.8 | .. | .. | .. | 47
Italy | .. | 177.4 | 175.2 | 174.3 | 173.5 | 172.7 | 172.6 | 174.9 | .. | .. | .. | 45
United Kingdom | .. | 136.5 | 146.6 | 151.8 | 154.0 | 156.3 | 157.0 | 156.4 | .. | .. | .. | 49
Tunisia | .. | 145.9 | 144.2 | 143.9 | 144.0 | 147.1 | 150.4 | 155.0 | .. | .. | .. | 40
Spain | .. | 133.8 | 131.0 | 130.1 | 128.5 | 128.0 | 129.1 | 133.4 | .. | .. | .. | 51
Belgium | .. | 81.3 | 84.4 | 87.7 | 90.9 | 92.9 | 94.7 | 95.1 | .. | .. | .. | 51
China | .. | 66.2 | 72.1 | 76.7 | 81.4 | 86.2 | 90.1 | 93.8 | .. | .. | .. | 56
Germany | .. | 92.4 | 93.4 | 93.9 | 95.0 | 93.3 | 93.7 | 93.4 | .. | .. | .. | 55
Mali | .. | 56.7 | 59.5 | 59.7 | 62.2 | 63.3 | 64.9 | 66.8 | .. | .. | .. | 40
Romania | .. | 25.2 | 28.8 | 32.9 | 41.9 | 49.3 | 57.6 | 64.8 | .. | .. | .. | 51
Haiti | .. | 40.4 | 62.0 | 62.2 | 56.6 | 58.0 | 62.7 | 64.2 | .. | .. | .. | 54
Senegal | .. | 49.5 | 50.5 | 50.2 | 51.5 | 51.7 | 52.6 | 54.8 | .. | .. | .. | 44
Other countries | .. | 880.9 | 1 007.4 | 1 039.1 | 1 069.2 | 1 102.2 | 1 145.8 | 1 194.9 | .. | .. | .. |
Total | .. | 3 541.8 | 3 696.9 | 3 731.2 | 3 773.2 | 3 821.5 | 3 892.8 | 3 980.6 | 4 129.4 | 4 198.6 | 4 395.4 | 49
Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.
StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395816

Table B.5. Stock of foreign population by nationality
Thousands
Germany
| 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | Of which: Women 2014 (%)
Turkey | 1 764.3 | 1 764.0 | 1 738.8 | 1 713.6 | 1 688.4 | 1 658.1 | 1 629.5 | 1 607.2 | 1 575.7 | 1 549.8 | 1 527.1 | 48
Poland | 292.1 | 326.6 | 361.7 | 384.8 | 393.8 | 398.5 | 419.4 | 468.5 | 532.4 | 609.9 | 674.2 | 47
Italy | 548.2 | 540.8 | 534.7 | 528.3 | 523.2 | 517.5 | 517.5 | 520.2 | 529.4 | 552.9 | 574.5 | 41
Romania | 73.4 | 73.0 | 73.4 | 84.6 | 94.3 | 105.0 | 126.5 | 159.2 | 205.0 | 267.4 | 355.3 | 44
Greece | 316.0 | 309.8 | 303.8 | 294.9 | 287.2 | 278.1 | 276.7 | 283.7 | 298.3 | 316.3 | 328.6 | 45
Serbia | 125.8 | 297.0 | 316.8 | 330.6 | 319.9 | 298.0 | 285.0 | 267.8 | 258.8 | 258.5 | 271.4 | 49
Croatia | 229.2 | 228.9 | 227.5 | 225.3 | 223.1 | 221.2 | 220.2 | 223.0 | 225.0 | 240.5 | 263.3 | 49
Russian Federation | 178.6 | 185.9 | 187.5 | 187.8 | 188.3 | 189.3 | 191.3 | 195.3 | 202.1 | 216.3 | 221.4 | 63
Bulgaria | 39.2 | 39.2 | 39.1 | 46.8 | 54.0 | 61.9 | 74.9 | 93.9 | 118.8 | 146.8 | 183.3 | 45
Austria | 174.0 | 174.8 | 175.7 | 175.9 | 175.4 | 174.5 | 175.2 | 175.9 | 176.3 | 178.8 | 179.8 | 48
Bosnia and Herzegovina | 156.0 | 156.9 | 157.1 | 158.2 | 156.8 | 154.6 | 152.4 | 153.5 | 155.3 | 157.5 | 163.5 | 48
Hungary | 47.8 | 49.5 | 52.3 | 56.2 | 60.0 | 61.4 | 68.9 | 82.8 | 107.4 | 135.6 | 156.8 | 39
Spain | 108.3 | 107.8 | 106.8 | 106.3 | 105.5 | 104.0 | 105.4 | 110.2 | 120.2 | 135.5 | 146.8 | 48
Netherlands | 114.1 | 118.6 | 123.5 | 128.2 | 133.0 | 134.9 | 136.3 | 137.7 | 139.3 | 142.4 | 144.7 | 44
Portugal | 116.7 | 115.6 | 115.0 | 114.6 | 114.5 | 113.3 | 113.2 | 115.5 | 120.6 | 127.4 | 130.9 | 45
Other countries | 2 433.5 | 2 267.4 | 2 237.4 | 2 208.9 | 2 210.3 | 2 224.6 | 2 261.1 | 2 336.7 | 2 449.2 | 2 597.9 | 2 831.2 |
Total | 6 717.1 | 6 755.8 | 6 751.0 | 6 744.9 | 6 727.6 | 6 694.8 | 6 753.6 | 6 930.9 | 7 213.7 | 7 633.6 | 8 153.0 | 48
Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.
StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395816

Table B.5. Stock of foreign population by nationality
Thousands
Greece
| 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | Of which: Women 2014 (%)
Albania | 325.6 | 341.0 | 347.4 | 384.6 | 413.9 | 501.7 | 485.0 | 449.7 | 471.5 | 410.4 | 436.9 | 50
Bulgaria | 25.3 | 27.9 | 29.5 | 30.7 | 40.2 | 54.5 | 48.4 | 47.3 | 38.4 | 46.2 | 43.3 | 64
Romania | 16.2 | 18.9 | 18.9 | 25.7 | 29.5 | 33.8 | 33.3 | 40.6 | 38.5 | 30.9 | 28.8 | 56
Poland | 17.0 | 16.1 | 16.6 | 21.4 | 18.9 | 11.2 | 10.2 | 7.5 | 11.3 | 15.0 | 20.3 | 63
Georgia | 14.1 | 16.9 | 15.1 | 23.8 | 33.6 | 33.9 | 32.8 | 28.0 | 23.5 | 19.8 | 19.4 | 64
Pakistan | 4.2 | 5.5 | 6.7 | 13.9 | 18.0 | 23.0 | 21.2 | 24.1 | 24.5 | 17.0 | 19.0 | 5
United Kingdom | 7.1 | 7.7 | 7.6 | 8.0 | 7.5 | 7.5 | 7.3 | 7.6 | 9.5 | 8.7 | 12.0 | 61
Syria | 3.8 | 4.2 | 3.6 | 6.0 | 9.2 | 12.4 | 6.5 | 10.1 | 13.4 | 12.6 | 11.2 | 35
Russian Federation | 16.8 | 17.6 | 18.9 | 21.6 | 16.7 | 19.5 | 14.1 | 12.0 | 15.1 | 12.4 | 10.9 | 68
Cyprus¹, 2 | 12.2 | 11.0 | 10.6 | 11.2 | 14.2 | 11.8 | 9.9 | 12.1 | 11.2 | 12.0 | 10.4 | 43
Bangladesh | 1.8 | 3.2 | 2.1 | 2.6 | 14.1 | 12.5 | 14.6 | 10.5 | 7.5 | 6.7 | 8.4 | 9
Ukraine | 13.1 | 12.2 | 12.2 | 14.1 | 11.9 | 13.7 | 12.2 | 10.8 | 10.7 | 8.3 | 8.1 | 94
Philippines | 7.2 | 8.9 | 7.5 | 3.4 | 4.9 | 3.3 | 5.1 | 2.1 | 9.9 | 6.5 | 5.8 | 65
Egypt | 6.3 | 2.6 | 3.6 | 5.2 | 12.6 | 10.3 | 9.5 | 10.9 | 10.4 | 3.3 | 4.7 | 27
Germany | 3.8 | 5.6 | 6.7 | 7.1 | 8.1 | 7.3 | 9.6 | 6.2 | 5.2 | 6.8 | 4.6 | 77
Other countries | 58.7 | 53.5 | 63.6 | 63.6 | 80.2 | 83.3 | 90.4 | 77.8 | 67.4 | 70.5 | 62.9 |
Total | 533.4 | 553.1 | 570.6 | 643.1 | 733.6 | 839.7 | 810.0 | 757.4 | 768.1 | 687.1 | 706.7 | 50
Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

1. Note by Turkey: The information in this document with reference to “Cyprus” relates to the southern part of the Island. There is no single authority representing both Turkish and Greek Cypriot people on the Island. Turkey recognizes the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). Until a lasting and equitable solution is found within the context of the United Nations, Turkey shall preserve its position concerning the “Cyprus issue”

2. Note by all the European Union member states of the OECD and the European Union: The Republic of Cyprus is recognised by all members of the United Nations with the exception of Turkey. The information in this document relates to the area under the effective control of the Government of the Republic of Cyprus.

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395816

Table B.5. Stock of foreign population by nationality
Thousands
Hungary
| 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | Of which: Women 2014 (%)
Romania | 67.5 | 66.2 | 67.0 | 65.8 | 66.4 | 72.7 | 76.9 | 41.6 | 34.8 | 30.9 | 28.6 | 37
Germany | 6.9 | 10.5 | 15.0 | 14.4 | 16.7 | 18.7 | 20.2 | 15.8 | 17.4 | 18.7 | 18.8 | 44
China | 6.9 | 8.6 | 9.0 | 10.2 | 10.7 | 11.2 | 11.8 | 10.1 | 11.5 | 12.7 | 16.5 | 48
Slovak Republic | 1.2 | 3.6 | 4.3 | 4.9 | 6.1 | 6.4 | 7.3 | 6.7 | 7.6 | 8.3 | 8.7 | 60
Ukraine | 13.9 | 15.3 | 15.9 | 17.3 | 17.6 | 17.2 | 16.5 | 11.9 | 10.8 | 8.3 | 6.9 | 58
Russian Federation | 2.6 | 2.8 | 2.8 | 2.8 | 2.9 | 3.3 | 3.5 | 2.9 | 3.4 | 3.7 | 4.3 | 61
Austria | 0.5 | 1.5 | 2.2 | 2.6 | 3.0 | 3.7 | 3.9 | 3.3 | 3.7 | 3.9 | 4.0 | 36
United States | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1.9 | 2.3 | 2.4 | 3.1 | 3.3 | 3.1 | 3.1 | 3.0 | 3.1 | 45
Viet Nam | 2.5 | 3.1 | 3.1 | 3.0 | 3.3 | 3.1 | 3.1 | 2.6 | 3.1 | 3.1 | 3.1 | 51
United Kingdom | 0.4 | 1.5 | 1.9 | 2.1 | 2.4 | 2.4 | 2.5 | 2.1 | 2.4 | 2.6 | 2.8 | 34
Italy | 0.4 | 0.8 | 1.0 | 1.2 | 1.5 | 1.6 | 1.8 | 1.6 | 2.0 | 2.3 | 2.7 | 25
Netherlands | 0.2 | 0.7 | 1.1 | 1.2 | 1.4 | 1.7 | 1.9 | 1.9 | 2.2 | 2.4 | 2.5 | 40
Serbia | 13.6 | 8.4 | 8.5 | 13.7 | 13.7 | 11.5 | 10.7 | 8.2 | 4.9 | 3.1 | 2.5 | 36
France | 0.3 | 1.3 | 1.5 | 1.5 | 2.2 | 1.9 | 2.1 | 1.9 | 2.1 | 2.3 | 2.4 | 43
Poland | 2.2 | 2.4 | 2.7 | 2.6 | 2.8 | 2.5 | 2.7 | 1.4 | 1.6 | 1.9 | 2.0 | 61
Other countries | 22.8 | 27.8 | 28.2 | 28.9 | 31.3 | 36.7 | 40.9 | 28.3 | 30.9 | 33.4 | 37.1 |
Total | 142.2 | 154.4 | 166.0 | 174.7 | 184.4 | 197.8 | 209.2 | 143.4 | 141.4 | 140.5 | 146.0 | 44
Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.
StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395816

Table B.5. Stock of foreign population by nationality
Thousands
Iceland
| 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | Of which: Women 2014 (%)
Poland | 1.9 | 3.2 | 6.0 | 9.9 | 11.0 | 9.6 | 9.1 | 9.0 | 9.4 | 10.2 | 11.1 | 45
Lithuania | 0.4 | 0.6 | 1.0 | 1.5 | 1.7 | 1.5 | 1.6 | 1.6 | 1.6 | 1.7 | 1.7 | 49
Germany | 0.5 | 0.8 | 0.9 | 1.1 | 1.1 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 0.9 | 0.8 | 0.9 | 1.0 | 66
Denmark | 0.9 | 0.9 | 0.9 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 0.9 | 0.9 | 0.9 | 0.9 | 0.9 | 0.9 | 54
Latvia | 0.1 | 0.2 | 0.3 | 0.5 | 0.6 | 0.6 | 0.6 | 0.7 | 0.7 | 0.7 | 0.7 | 51
United Kingdom | 0.3 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.6 | 0.6 | 0.6 | 0.6 | 0.7 | 30
Portugal | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.7 | 0.9 | 0.8 | 0.6 | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.6 | 37
United States | 0.5 | 0.6 | 0.6 | 0.6 | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.6 | 0.6 | 0.6 | 43
Philippines | 0.6 | 0.8 | 0.8 | 0.7 | 0.7 | 0.6 | 0.6 | 0.6 | 0.6 | 0.6 | 0.5 | 55
Thailand | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.6 | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.5 | 69
Spain | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.3 | 0.5 | 40
France | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.4 | 45
Sweden | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 55
Romania | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.3 | 47
Norway | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 58
Other countries | 3.5 | 4.4 | 5.2 | 5.0 | 4.7 | 4.0 | 3.9 | 3.9 | 4.1 | 4.1 | 4.3 |
Total | 10.6 | 13.8 | 18.6 | 23.4 | 24.4 | 21.7 | 21.1 | 21.0 | 21.4 | 22.7 | 24.3 | 48
Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.
StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395816

Table B.5. Stock of foreign population by nationality
Thousands
Ireland
| 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | Of which: Women 2011 (%)
Poland | .. | .. | 62.7 | .. | .. | .. | .. | 121.7 | .. | .. | .. | 48
United Kingdom | .. | .. | 110.6 | 115.5 | 117.9 | 117.1 | 115.9 | 110.0 | 113.0 | 113.4 | 114.9 | 50
Lithuania | .. | .. | 24.4 | .. | .. | .. | .. | 36.4 | .. | .. | .. | 52
Latvia | .. | .. | 13.2 | .. | .. | .. | .. | 20.4 | .. | .. | .. | 56
Nigeria | .. | .. | 16.0 | .. | .. | .. | .. | 17.3 | .. | .. | .. | 54
Romania | .. | .. | 7.6 | .. | .. | .. | .. | 17.1 | .. | .. | .. | 49
India | .. | .. | 8.3 | .. | .. | .. | .. | 16.9 | .. | .. | .. | 46
Philippines | .. | .. | 9.3 | .. | .. | .. | .. | 12.6 | .. | .. | .. | 56
Germany | .. | .. | 10.1 | .. | .. | .. | .. | 11.1 | .. | .. | .. | 56
United States | .. | .. | 12.3 | .. | .. | .. | .. | 10.8 | .. | .. | .. | 57
China | .. | .. | 11.0 | .. | .. | .. | .. | 10.7 | .. | .. | .. | 50
Slovak Republic | .. | .. | 8.0 | .. | .. | .. | .. | 10.7 | .. | .. | .. | 48
France | .. | .. | 8.9 | .. | .. | .. | .. | 9.6 | .. | .. | .. | 51
Brazil | .. | .. | 4.3 | .. | .. | .. | .. | 8.6 | .. | .. | .. | 49
Hungary | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 8.0 | .. | .. | .. | 48
Other countries | .. | .. | 106.5 | .. | .. | .. | .. | 115.1 | .. | .. | .. |
Total | .. | .. | 413.2 | 519.6 | 575.6 | 575.4 | 560.1 | 537.0 | 550.4 | 554.5 | 564.3 | 50
Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.
StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395816

Table B.5. Stock of foreign population by nationality
Thousands
Italy
| 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | Of which: Women 2014 (%)
Romania | 248.8 | 297.6 | 342.2 | 625.3 | 658.8 | 726.2 | 782.0 | 834.5 | 933.4 | 1 081.4 | 1 131.8 | 57
Albania | 316.7 | 348.8 | 375.9 | 401.9 | 422.1 | 441.2 | 450.2 | 450.9 | 465.0 | 495.7 | 490.5 | 48
Morocco | 294.9 | 319.5 | 343.2 | 365.9 | 368.6 | 388.4 | 400.7 | 408.7 | 426.8 | 454.8 | 449.1 | 46
Ukraine | 93.4 | 107.1 | 120.1 | 132.7 | 134.4 | 150.5 | 171.6 | 180.1 | 191.7 | 219.1 | 226.1 | 79
Philippines | 82.6 | 89.7 | 101.3 | 105.7 | 105.4 | 112.6 | 120.0 | 129.2 | 139.8 | 162.7 | 168.2 | 56
India | 54.3 | 61.8 | 69.5 | 77.4 | 85.7 | 97.2 | 109.2 | 118.4 | 128.9 | 142.5 | 147.8 | 40
Moldova | 38.0 | 47.6 | 55.8 | 68.6 | 85.3 | 99.9 | 122.4 | 132.2 | 139.7 | 149.4 | 147.4 | 66
Bangladesh | 35.8 | 41.6 | 49.6 | 55.2 | 60.4 | 67.3 | 73.8 | 81.7 | 92.7 | 111.2 | 115.3 | 30
Peru | 53.4 | 59.3 | 66.5 | 70.8 | 72.3 | 80.5 | 88.9 | 93.8 | 99.2 | 109.9 | 109.7 | 58
Egypt | 52.9 | 58.9 | 65.7 | 69.6 | 54.8 | 58.6 | 62.4 | 66.9 | 76.7 | 96.0 | 103.7 | 33
Sri Lanka | 45.6 | 50.5 | 56.7 | 61.1 | 57.8 | 62.0 | 65.3 | 71.6 | 79.5 | 95.0 | 100.6 | 45
Poland | 50.8 | 60.8 | 72.5 | 90.2 | 77.9 | 81.6 | 83.2 | 84.7 | 88.8 | 97.6 | 98.7 | 73
Pakistan | 35.5 | 41.8 | 46.1 | 49.3 | 50.1 | 57.8 | 66.3 | 71.0 | 80.7 | 90.6 | 96.2 | 35
Tunisia | 78.2 | 83.6 | 88.9 | 93.6 | 79.2 | 80.5 | 81.1 | 83.0 | 88.3 | 97.3 | 96.0 | 38
Senegal | 53.9 | 57.1 | 59.9 | 62.6 | 60.4 | 63.9 | 69.5 | 73.7 | 80.3 | 90.9 | 94.0 | 27
Other countries | 867.3 | 944.7 | 1 025.0 | 1 102.7 | 1 029.3 | 1 080.0 | 1 132.9 | 1 171.6 | 1 276.2 | 1 427.3 | 1 439.4 |
Total | 2 402.2 | 2 670.5 | 2 938.9 | 3 432.7 | 3 402.4 | 3 648.1 | 3 879.2 | 4 052.1 | 4 387.7 | 4 921.3 | 5 014.4 | 53
Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.
StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395816

Table B.5. Stock of foreign population by nationality
Thousands
Japan
| 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | Of which: Women 2014 (%)
China | 487.6 | 519.6 | 560.7 | 606.9 | 655.4 | 680.5 | 687.2 | 674.9 | 652.6 | 649.1 | 654.8 | ..
Korea | 607.4 | 598.7 | 598.2 | 593.5 | 589.2 | 578.5 | 566.0 | 545.4 | 530.0 | 519.7 | 501.2 | ..
Philippines | 199.4 | 187.3 | 193.5 | 202.6 | 210.6 | 211.7 | 210.2 | 209.4 | 203.0 | 209.2 | 217.6 | ..
Brazil | 286.6 | 302.1 | 313.0 | 317.0 | 312.6 | 267.5 | 230.6 | 210.0 | 190.6 | 181.3 | 175.4 | ..
Viet Nam | 26.0 | 28.9 | 32.5 | 36.9 | 41.1 | 41.0 | 41.8 | 44.7 | 52.4 | 72.3 | 99.9 | ..
United States | 48.8 | 49.4 | 51.3 | 51.9 | 52.7 | 52.1 | 50.7 | 49.8 | 48.4 | 50.0 | 51.3 | ..
Peru | 55.8 | 57.7 | 58.7 | 59.7 | 59.7 | 57.5 | 54.6 | 52.8 | 49.2 | 48.6 | 48.0 | ..
Thailand | 36.3 | 37.7 | 39.6 | 41.4 | 42.6 | 42.7 | 41.3 | 42.8 | 40.1 | 41.2 | 43.1 | ..
Nepal | .. | .. | 7.8 | 9.4 | 12.3 | 15.3 | 17.5 | 20.4 | 24.1 | 31.5 | 42.3 | ..
Chinese Taipei | .. | .. | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 22.8 | 33.3 | 40.2 | ..
Indonesia | 23.9 | 25.1 | 24.9 | 25.6 | 27.3 | 25.5 | 24.9 | 24.7 | 25.5 | 27.2 | 30.2 | ..
India | 15.5 | 17.0 | 18.9 | 20.6 | 22.3 | 22.9 | 22.5 | 21.5 | 21.7 | 22.5 | 24.5 | ..
United Kingdom | 18.1 | 17.5 | 17.8 | 17.3 | 17.0 | 16.6 | 16.0 | 15.5 | 14.7 | 14.9 | 15.3 | ..
Pakistan | 8.6 | 8.8 | 9.1 | 9.3 | 9.9 | 10.3 | 10.3 | 10.8 | 10.6 | 11.1 | 11.8 | ..
Sri Lanka | 8.8 | 9.0 | 8.9 | 8.7 | 8.8 | 9.0 | 9.1 | 9.3 | 8.4 | 9.2 | 10.7 | ..
Other countries | 151.0 | 152.8 | 148.3 | 150.7 | 154.4 | 153.7 | 150.3 | 146.5 | 139.7 | 145.3 | 155.6 |
Total | 1 973.7 | 2 011.6 | 2 083.2 | 2 151.4 | 2 215.9 | 2 184.7 | 2 132.9 | 2 078.5 | 2 033.7 | 2 066.4 | 2 121.8 | ..
Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.
StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395816

Table B.5. Stock of foreign population by nationality
Thousands
Korea
| 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | Of which: Women 2014 (%)
China | 208.8 | 217.0 | 311.8 | 421.5 | 487.1 | 489.1 | 505.4 | 536.7 | 474.8 | 161.1 | 546.7 | 50
Viet Nam | 26.1 | 35.5 | 52.2 | 67.2 | 79.8 | 86.2 | 98.2 | 110.6 | 114.2 | 113.8 | 122.6 | 50
Philippines | 27.9 | 30.7 | 40.3 | 42.9 | 39.4 | 38.4 | 39.5 | 38.4 | 33.2 | 38.7 | 43.2 | 47
Indonesia | 26.1 | 22.6 | 23.7 | 23.7 | 27.4 | 25.9 | 27.4 | 29.6 | 29.8 | 33.2 | 38.7 | 8
Cambodia | 1.3 | 2.0 | 3.3 | 4.6 | 7.0 | 8.8 | 11.7 | 16.8 | 23.4 | 30.7 | 37.3 | 30
Uzbekistan | 11.5 | 10.8 | 11.6 | 10.9 | 15.0 | 15.9 | 20.8 | 24.4 | 28.0 | 30.7 | 34.7 | 27
Thailand | 21.9 | 21.4 | 30.2 | 31.7 | 30.1 | 28.7 | 27.6 | 26.0 | 21.4 | 26.2 | 26.8 | 25
Nepal | 5.3 | 4.9 | 5.0 | 4.6 | 5.9 | 7.4 | 9.2 | 12.6 | 17.8 | 20.7 | 25.5 | 11
United States | 39.0 | 41.8 | 46.0 | 51.1 | 56.2 | 63.1 | 57.6 | 26.5 | 23.4 | 24.0 | 24.9 | 40
Sri Lanka | 5.5 | 8.5 | 11.1 | 12.1 | 14.3 | 14.4 | 17.4 | 20.5 | 21.0 | 21.9 | 24.6 | 3
Japan | 16.6 | 17.5 | 18.0 | 18.4 | 18.6 | 18.6 | 19.4 | 21.1 | 22.6 | 23.1 | 23.2 | 71
Chinese Taipei | 22.3 | 22.2 | 22.1 | 22.1 | 27.0 | 21.7 | 21.5 | 21.4 | 21.2 | 21.2 | 21.0 | 49
Mongolia | 11.0 | 13.7 | 19.2 | 20.5 | 21.2 | 21.0 | 21.8 | 21.3 | 19.8 | 18.4 | 17.3 | 45
Myanmar | 3.6 | 2.3 | 3.4 | 3.2 | 2.9 | 3.6 | 3.8 | 5.6 | 8.3 | 11.5 | 14.7 | 3
Bangladesh | 13.1 | 9.1 | 8.6 | 7.8 | 7.7 | 7.3 | 9.3 | 10.6 | 10.8 | 10.9 | 12.1 | 5
Other countries | 51.5 | 50.8 | 54.2 | 57.8 | 56.0 | 70.8 | 112.1 | 60.6 | 63.3 | 399.9 | 78.2 |
Total | 491.4 | 510.5 | 660.6 | 800.3 | 895.5 | 920.9 | 1 002.7 | 982.5 | 933.0 | 985.9 | 1 091.5 | 42
Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.
StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395816

Table B.5. Stock of foreign population by nationality
Thousands
Luxembourg
| 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | Of which: Women 2014 (%)
Portugal | 67.8 | 70.8 | 73.7 | 76.6 | 80.0 | 79.8 | 82.4 | 85.3 | 88.2 | 90.8 | 92.1 | ..
France | 23.1 | 24.1 | 25.2 | 26.6 | 28.5 | 29.7 | 31.5 | 33.1 | 35.2 | 37.2 | 39.4 | ..
Italy | 19.0 | 19.1 | 19.1 | 19.1 | 19.4 | 18.2 | 18.1 | 18.1 | 18.3 | 18.8 | 19.5 | ..
Belgium | 16.3 | 16.5 | 16.5 | 16.5 | 16.7 | 16.8 | 16.9 | 17.2 | 17.6 | 18.2 | 18.8 | ..
Germany | 10.8 | 10.9 | 11.3 | 11.6 | 12.0 | 12.1 | 12.0 | 12.3 | 12.4 | 12.7 | 12.8 | ..
Serbia | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 6.0 | 6.5 | 6.4 | 6.3 | 6.3 | ..
United Kingdom | 4.7 | 4.8 | 4.9 | 5.0 | 5.3 | 5.5 | 5.5 | 5.6 | 5.7 | 5.9 | 6.0 | ..
Spain | 3.0 | 3.1 | 3.2 | 3.2 | 3.3 | 3.3 | 3.7 | 4.0 | 4.3 | 4.7 | 5.1 | ..
Netherlands | 3.7 | 3.7 | 3.8 | 3.8 | 3.9 | 3.9 | 3.9 | 3.9 | 3.9 | 4.0 | 4.0 | ..
Poland | 1.0 | 1.3 | 1.6 | 1.8 | 2.2 | 2.5 | 2.7 | 3.0 | 3.2 | 3.4 | 3.8 | ..
Romania | 0.4 | 0.5 | 0.6 | 0.9 | 1.1 | 1.3 | 1.6 | 1.9 | 2.2 | 2.5 | 3.2 | ..
Cabo Verde | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 2.5 | 2.5 | 2.6 | 2.7 | 2.9 | ..
China | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 1.6 | 1.7 | 1.8 | 2.2 | 2.5 | ..
Bosnia and Herzegovina | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 2.3 | 2.2 | 2.3 | 2.3 | 2.3 | ..
Greece | 1.2 | 1.3 | 1.4 | 1.4 | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.7 | 1.9 | 2.1 | 2.3 | ..
Other countries | 32.8 | 35.2 | 37.1 | 39.5 | 41.5 | 42.0 | 28.5 | 30.8 | 32.8 | 35.3 | 37.7 |
Total | 183.7 | 191.3 | 198.3 | 205.9 | 215.5 | 216.3 | 220.5 | 229.9 | 238.8 | 248.9 | 258.7 | 49
Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.
StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395816

Table B.5. Stock of foreign population by nationality
Thousands
Mexico
| 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | Of which: Women 2014 (%)
United States | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 60.0 | 64.9 | 68.5 | 63.4 | .. | 65.3 | 43
Spain | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 18.6 | 18.8 | 19.6 | 20.7 | .. | 24.7 | 41
China | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 10.2 | 12.5 | 15.2 | 15.6 | .. | 18.3 | 40
Colombia | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 14.6 | 15.5 | 16.9 | 16.7 | .. | 18.3 | 55
Cuba | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 10.3 | 11.8 | 14.0 | 14.5 | .. | 17.0 | 51
Argentina | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 15.2 | 15.6 | 15.8 | 15.3 | .. | 16.8 | 47
Venezuela | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 10.1 | 11.8 | 12.8 | 12.9 | .. | 15.3 | 53
Canada | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 10.9 | 12.7 | 13.6 | 12.9 | .. | 13.2 | 45
Guatemala | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 8.4 | 9.8 | 10.9 | 9.7 | .. | 10.3 | 56
France | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 9.4 | 9.1 | 9.1 | 9.0 | .. | 9.8 | 46
Germany | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 8.9 | 8.8 | 9.0 | 8.8 | .. | 9.5 | 44
Japan | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 4.9 | 5.1 | 5.2 | 5.6 | .. | 8.0 | 43
Honduras | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 4.9 | 6.3 | 7.6 | 6.9 | .. | 7.8 | 58
Italy | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 5.7 | 6.1 | 6.4 | 6.6 | .. | 7.7 | 33
Brazil | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 6.3 | 6.3 | 7.1 | 6.5 | .. | 7.2 | 54
Other countries | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 64.3 | 66.1 | 72.2 | 71.2 | .. | 76.7 |
Total | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 262.7 | 281.1 | 303.9 | 296.4 | .. | 326.0 | 47
Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.
StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395816

Table B.5. Stock of foreign population by nationality
Thousands
Netherlands
| 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | Of which: Women 2014 (%)
Poland | 11.0 | 15.2 | 19.6 | 26.2 | 35.5 | 43.1 | 52.5 | 65.1 | 74.6 | 85.8 | 99.6 | 51
Turkey | 100.6 | 98.9 | 96.8 | 93.7 | 92.7 | 90.8 | 88.0 | 84.8 | 81.9 | 80.1 | 77.5 | 49
Germany | 57.1 | 58.5 | 60.2 | 62.4 | 65.9 | 68.4 | 71.4 | 72.8 | 72.6 | 72.2 | 71.8 | 55
Morocco | 91.6 | 86.2 | 80.5 | 74.9 | 70.8 | 66.6 | 61.9 | 56.6 | 51.0 | 48.1 | 44.9 | 48
United Kingdom | 42.5 | 41.5 | 40.3 | 40.2 | 41.1 | 41.4 | 41.4 | 41.4 | 41.7 | 42.3 | 43.0 | 41
Belgium | .. | .. | .. | .. | 26.6 | 26.9 | 27.2 | 27.6 | 28.2 | 28.8 | 29.6 | 54
China | 14.7 | 15.0 | 15.3 | 16.2 | 18.1 | 19.8 | 21.4 | 23.9 | 25.9 | 27.2 | 28.2 | 53
Italy | 18.4 | 18.5 | 18.6 | 19.0 | 20.3 | 21.1 | 21.9 | 22.6 | 23.6 | 25.0 | 27.1 | 38
Spain | 17.1 | 16.9 | 16.5 | 16.5 | 17.3 | 18.1 | 19.2 | 20.3 | 21.9 | 23.9 | 25.3 | 51
Bulgaria | 1.9 | 2.1 | 2.2 | 6.4 | 10.2 | 12.3 | 14.1 | 16.8 | 17.6 | 17.8 | 19.8 | 51
France | 14.5 | 14.7 | 14.7 | 15.1 | 16.4 | 17.2 | 17.8 | 18.1 | 18.3 | 18.7 | 19.7 | 52
Portugal | 12.0 | 12.1 | 12.2 | 12.9 | 14.2 | 15.4 | 15.7 | 16.4 | 17.3 | 18.1 | 18.7 | 46
United States | 14.8 | 14.6 | 14.6 | 14.5 | 14.9 | 14.6 | 14.8 | 15.3 | 15.6 | 15.6 | 16.2 | 52
India | 3.7 | 4.3 | 5.4 | 6.4 | 8.0 | 8.7 | 9.6 | 10.8 | 11.7 | 13.1 | 14.7 | 40
Greece | 6.4 | 6.5 | 6.6 | 6.9 | 7.4 | 7.8 | 8.6 | 10.1 | 11.8 | 12.7 | 13.2 | 42
Other countries | 293.0 | 286.3 | 278.3 | 277.0 | 260.1 | 263.0 | 275.0 | 283.4 | 282.5 | 286.6 | 297.9 |
Total | 699.4 | 691.4 | 681.9 | 688.4 | 719.5 | 735.2 | 760.4 | 786.1 | 796.2 | 816.0 | 847.3 | 51
Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.
StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395816

Table B.5. Stock of foreign population by nationality
Thousands
Norway
| 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | Of which: Women 2014 (%)
Poland | 3.9 | 6.8 | 13.6 | 26.8 | 39.2 | 46.7 | 55.2 | 66.6 | 77.1 | 85.6 | 93.6 | 34
Sweden | 25.8 | 26.6 | 27.9 | 29.9 | 32.8 | 35.8 | 39.2 | 42.0 | 43.1 | 44.2 | 45.1 | 48
Lithuania | 1.3 | 1.9 | 3.0 | 5.1 | 7.6 | 10.4 | 16.4 | 24.1 | 30.7 | 35.8 | 39.5 | 41
Germany | 9.6 | 10.6 | 12.2 | 15.3 | 18.9 | 20.8 | 22.4 | 23.7 | 24.4 | 24.6 | 25.0 | 46
Denmark | 20.1 | 20.2 | 20.3 | 20.5 | 20.6 | 20.7 | 20.9 | 21.4 | 21.9 | 22.6 | 23.5 | 45
United Kingdom | 11.2 | 11.2 | 11.6 | 12.0 | 12.6 | 13.3 | 14.0 | 14.7 | 15.5 | 15.8 | 16.3 | 34
Eritrea | 0.5 | 0.8 | 1.0 | 1.4 | 2.1 | 3.8 | 5.7 | 7.6 | 10.0 | 12.7 | 15.2 | 43
Somalia | 10.5 | 10.6 | 10.8 | 10.6 | 10.9 | 10.8 | 11.1 | 10.8 | 13.0 | 14.4 | 15.1 | 47
Romania | 0.8 | 0.9 | 0.9 | 1.4 | 2.4 | 3.4 | 4.5 | 5.7 | 7.5 | 10.0 | 12.0 | 43
Philippines | 2.9 | 3.3 | 3.9 | 4.8 | 6.1 | 6.8 | 7.8 | 8.9 | 10.1 | 11.4 | 11.7 | 80
Russian Federation | 7.4 | 8.2 | 8.8 | 9.7 | 10.4 | 10.6 | 10.8 | 10.9 | 11.2 | 11.4 | 11.5 | 65
Thailand | 5.0 | 5.7 | 6.4 | 6.9 | 7.9 | 8.6 | 9.3 | 10.0 | 10.8 | 11.4 | 11.5 | 86
Latvia | 0.6 | 0.6 | 0.9 | 1.2 | 1.7 | 2.8 | 4.9 | 6.9 | 8.5 | 9.4 | 10.3 | 41
United States | 7.6 | 7.6 | 7.7 | 7.9 | 8.3 | 8.5 | 8.6 | 8.8 | 9.2 | 9.3 | 9.3 | 51
Iceland | 3.9 | 3.8 | 3.8 | 3.8 | 4.0 | 5.3 | 6.4 | 7.6 | 8.2 | 8.7 | 9.2 | 47
Other countries | 102.2 | 103.5 | 105.6 | 108.9 | 117.6 | 125.7 | 132.0 | 137.7 | 147.7 | 155.9 | 163.4 |
Total | 213.3 | 222.3 | 238.3 | 266.3 | 303.0 | 333.9 | 369.2 | 407.3 | 448.8 | 483.2 | 512.2 | 45
Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.
StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395816

Table B.5. Stock of foreign population by nationality
Thousands
Poland
| 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | Of which: Women 2014 (%)
Ukraine | .. | .. | 5.2 | 6.1 | 7.2 | 10.2 | .. | 13.4 | .. | .. | .. | ..
Germany | .. | .. | 11.4 | 11.8 | 12.2 | 4.4 | .. | 5.2 | .. | .. | .. | ..
Russian Federation | .. | .. | 3.3 | 3.4 | 3.5 | 4.2 | .. | 4.2 | .. | .. | .. | ..
Belarus | .. | .. | 1.5 | 1.8 | 2.2 | 3.2 | .. | 3.8 | .. | .. | .. | ..
Viet Nam | .. | .. | 1.9 | 2.0 | 2.2 | 2.9 | .. | 2.6 | .. | .. | .. | ..
Armenia | .. | .. | 0.8 | 0.8 | 0.9 | 1.4 | .. | 1.8 | .. | .. | .. | ..
Other countries | .. | .. | 30.8 | 31.5 | 32.3 | 23.3 | .. | 24.4 | .. | .. | .. |
Total | .. | .. | 54.9 | 57.5 | 60.4 | 49.6 | .. | 55.4 | .. | .. | .. | ..
Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.
StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395816

Table B.5. Stock of foreign population by nationality
Thousands
Portugal
| 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | Of which: Women 2014 (%)
Brazil | 66.7 | 63.7 | 68.0 | 66.4 | 107.0 | 116.2 | 119.4 | 111.4 | 105.6 | 92.1 | 87.5 | 61
Cabo Verde | 64.3 | 67.5 | 65.5 | 63.9 | 51.4 | 48.8 | 44.0 | 43.9 | 42.9 | 42.4 | 40.9 | 53
Ukraine | 65.8 | 43.8 | 41.5 | 39.5 | 52.5 | 52.3 | 49.5 | 48.0 | 44.1 | 41.1 | 37.9 | 51
Romania | 12.0 | 10.6 | 11.4 | 19.2 | 27.4 | 32.5 | 36.8 | 39.3 | 35.2 | 34.2 | 31.5 | 45
China | 9.2 | 9.3 | 10.2 | 10.4 | 13.3 | 14.4 | 15.7 | 16.8 | 17.4 | 18.6 | 21.4 | 47
Angola | 35.1 | 34.2 | 33.7 | 32.7 | 27.6 | 26.6 | 23.5 | 21.6 | 20.3 | 20.2 | 19.7 | 53
Guinea-Bissau | 25.3 | 24.7 | 23.8 | 23.7 | 24.4 | 22.9 | 19.8 | 18.5 | 17.8 | 17.8 | 18.0 | 45
United Kingdom | 18.0 | 19.0 | 19.8 | 23.6 | 15.4 | 16.4 | 17.2 | 17.7 | 16.6 | 16.5 | 16.6 | 48
Sao Tome and Principe | 10.5 | 11.5 | 10.8 | 10.6 | 11.7 | 11.5 | 10.5 | 10.5 | 10.4 | 10.3 | 10.2 | 55
Spain | 15.9 | 16.4 | 16.6 | 18.0 | 7.2 | 8.1 | 8.9 | 9.3 | 9.4 | 9.5 | 9.7 | 49
Germany | 13.1 | 13.6 | 13.9 | 15.5 | 8.2 | 8.6 | 9.0 | 9.1 | 8.6 | 8.6 | 8.8 | 49
Moldova | 13.7 | 14.0 | 14.4 | 14.1 | 21.1 | 20.8 | 15.6 | 13.6 | 11.5 | 10.0 | 8.5 | 53
Bulgaria | 3.6 | 3.1 | 3.3 | 5.0 | 6.5 | 7.2 | 8.2 | 8.6 | 7.4 | 7.6 | 7.0 | 48
France | 9.3 | 9.6 | 9.7 | 10.6 | 4.6 | 4.9 | 5.1 | 5.3 | 5.2 | 5.2 | 6.5 | 48
India | 5.2 | 3.7 | 3.8 | 4.1 | 5.5 | 5.8 | 5.3 | 5.4 | 5.7 | 6.0 | 6.4 | 31
Other countries | 81.5 | 71.5 | 73.7 | 78.4 | 56.8 | 57.3 | 56.8 | 57.9 | 58.9 | 61.1 | 64.7 |
Total | 449.2 | 415.9 | 420.2 | 435.7 | 440.6 | 454.2 | 445.3 | 436.8 | 417.0 | 401.3 | 395.2 | 52
Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.
StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395816

Table B.5. Stock of foreign population by nationality
Thousands
Russian Federation
| 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | Of which: Women 2014 (%)
Ukraine | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 93.4 | 92.0 | 110.2 | 122.3 | 192.7 | 54
Uzbekistan | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 131.1 | 86.4 | 103.1 | 115.3 | 127.5 | 42
Armenia | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 59.4 | 73.0 | 90.0 | 102.3 | 115.0 | 46
Tajikistan | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 87.1 | 64.4 | 75.7 | 82.9 | 91.8 | 26
Kazakhstan | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 28.1 | 16.3 | 42.2 | 65.5 | 79.4 | 55
Azerbaijan | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 67.9 | 53.0 | 62.8 | 67.2 | 77.3 | 42
Moldova | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 33.9 | 28.2 | 36.3 | 41.2 | 51.6 | 45
Kyrgyzstan | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 44.6 | 4.4 | 14.0 | 22.4 | 30.8 | 51
Georgia | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 12.1 | 12.1 | 15.6 | 17.1 | 18.7 | 47
Belarus | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 27.7 | 6.1 | 9.8 | 14.0 | 17.7 | 52
Viet Nam | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 11.1 | 8.8 | 10.2 | 10.7 | 11.5 | 42
China | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 28.4 | 7.6 | 8.5 | 8.0 | 8.9 | 36
Turkmenistan | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 5.6 | 3.8 | 4.1 | 4.4 | 5.0 | 53
Turkey | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 5.4 | 3.4 | 3.8 | 4.2 | 4.4 | 5
Lithuania | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 2.6 | 4.2 | 4.6 | 4.9 | 4.0 | 45
Other countries | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 48.8 | 26.7 | 30.1 | 33.4 | 36.2 |
Total | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 687.0 | 490.3 | 621.0 | 715.8 | 872.6 | 45
Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.
StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395816

Table B.5. Stock of foreign population by nationality
Thousands
Slovak Republic
| 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | Of which: Women 2014 (%)
Czech Republic | 3.6 | 4.4 | 5.1 | 6.0 | 6.9 | 8.3 | 9.0 | 14.6 | 14.7 | 11.4 | 11.9 | 47
Hungary | .. | 1.8 | 2.1 | 2.7 | 3.6 | 4.6 | 5.3 | 9.3 | 9.9 | 8.1 | 8.6 | 34
Romania | .. | 0.4 | 0.7 | 3.0 | 5.0 | 5.4 | 5.8 | 5.7 | 6.0 | 4.9 | 5.3 | 29
Poland | 2.5 | 2.8 | 3.6 | 4.0 | 4.4 | 5.4 | 5.6 | 6.9 | 7.0 | 5.1 | 5.2 | 48
Germany | .. | 1.6 | 2.3 | 2.9 | 3.8 | 4.0 | 4.1 | 4.3 | 4.4 | 3.6 | 3.7 | 26
Ukraine | 4.0 | 3.7 | 3.9 | 3.7 | 4.7 | 5.9 | 6.3 | 3.9 | 3.9 | 2.7 | 2.8 | 66
Italy | .. | 0.5 | 0.7 | 1.0 | 1.1 | 1.5 | 1.7 | 2.1 | 2.2 | 2.0 | 2.1 | 18
Austria | .. | 0.9 | 1.2 | 1.5 | 1.7 | 2.1 | 2.2 | 2.3 | 2.3 | 1.8 | 1.9 | 26
Bulgaria | .. | 0.6 | 0.5 | 1.0 | 1.4 | 1.5 | 1.7 | 1.8 | 2.0 | 1.6 | 1.6 | 25
United Kingdom | .. | 0.5 | 0.7 | 1.0 | 1.2 | 1.4 | 1.5 | 1.8 | 1.9 | 1.6 | 1.6 | 29
Viet Nam | .. | 0.8 | 1.1 | 1.4 | 2.5 | 2.3 | 2.3 | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.4 | 1.4 | 44
France | .. | 0.6 | 0.9 | 1.1 | 1.3 | 1.6 | 1.7 | 1.6 | 1.6 | 1.4 | 1.4 | 29
Russian Federation | .. | 1.2 | 1.3 | 1.4 | 1.5 | 2.0 | 2.2 | 1.8 | 1.8 | 1.4 | 1.4 | 63
China | .. | 0.5 | 0.9 | 1.2 | 1.5 | 1.7 | 1.9 | 0.8 | 0.9 | 0.8 | 0.9 | 49
United States | .. | 0.6 | 0.7 | 0.8 | 0.8 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 0.9 | 0.9 | 0.7 | 0.8 | 40
Other countries | 12.1 | 4.6 | 6.3 | 8.3 | 11.1 | 14.1 | 15.7 | 11.5 | 11.8 | 10.6 | 11.2 |
Total | 22.3 | 25.6 | 32.1 | 40.9 | 52.5 | 62.9 | 68.0 | 70.7 | 72.9 | 59.2 | 61.8 | 38
Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.
StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395816

Table B.5. Stock of foreign population by nationality
Thousands
Slovenia
| 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | Of which: Women 2014 (%)
Bosnia and Herzegovina | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 42.5 | 41.7 | 42.7 | 45.0 | 46.8 | 50.2 | 27
Serbia | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 10.0 | 7.5 | 9.7 | 10.2 | 10.8 | 11.4 | 30
Former Yug. Rep. of Macedonia | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 10.1 | 9.5 | 10.0 | 10.2 | 10.6 | 10.9 | 43
Croatia | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 10.2 | 10.3 | 10.8 | 11.6 | 10.9 | 10.3 | 33
Bulgaria | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 1.6 | 2.3 | 3.1 | 1.1 | 3.5 | 3.9 | 23
Italy | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 0.9 | 1.1 | 1.2 | 1.5 | 1.8 | 2.1 | 33
Russian Federation | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 0.6 | 0.7 | 0.9 | 1.1 | 1.5 | 2.1 | 56
Ukraine | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 1.3 | 1.4 | 1.5 | 1.5 | 1.6 | 1.8 | 67
China | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 1.0 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 1.1 | 1.1 | 44
Germany | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 0.8 | 0.9 | 0.9 | 1.0 | 1.1 | 1.1 | 46
Slovak Republic | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 0.7 | 0.9 | 0.8 | 0.7 | 0.8 | 0.7 | 53
Romania | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 0.4 | 0.3 | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.6 | 0.6 | 44
Hungary | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 0.3 | 0.3 | .. | 0.3 | 0.4 | 0.5 | 39
United Kingdom | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 0.4 | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.5 | 36
Austria | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 0.4 | 0.5 | .. | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.5 | 40
Other countries | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 18.6 | 17.0 | 18.3 | 16.5 | 18.4 | 20.0 |
Total | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 99.8 | 95.7 | 101.9 | 103.3 | 110.9 | 117.7 | 29
Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.
StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395816

Table B.5. Stock of foreign population by nationality
Thousands
Spain
| 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | Of which: Women 2014 (%)
Romania | 317.4 | 407.2 | 527.0 | 731.8 | 798.9 | 831.2 | 865.7 | 897.2 | 870.3 | 797.1 | 751.2 | 51
Morocco | 511.3 | 563.0 | 582.9 | 652.7 | 718.1 | 754.1 | 774.0 | 788.6 | 792.2 | 774.4 | 749.3 | 43
United Kingdom | 227.2 | 274.7 | 315.0 | 353.0 | 375.7 | 387.7 | 391.2 | 397.9 | 385.2 | 300.3 | 282.1 | 50
China | 87.7 | 104.7 | 106.7 | 125.9 | 147.5 | 158.2 | 167.1 | 177.0 | 181.7 | 186.0 | 191.3 | 49
Italy | 95.4 | 115.8 | 135.1 | 157.8 | 175.3 | 184.3 | 188.0 | 191.9 | 192.4 | 181.0 | 179.1 | 43
Ecuador | 497.8 | 461.3 | 427.1 | 427.7 | 421.4 | 399.6 | 360.7 | 308.2 | 263.5 | 218.9 | 176.2 | 47
Colombia | 271.2 | 265.1 | 261.5 | 284.6 | 296.7 | 292.6 | 273.2 | 246.3 | 222.5 | 181.9 | 151.0 | 55
Bulgaria | 93.0 | 101.6 | 122.1 | 154.0 | 164.7 | 169.6 | 172.9 | 176.4 | 169.0 | 151.6 | 141.9 | 49
Germany | 133.6 | 150.5 | 164.4 | 181.2 | 191.0 | 195.8 | 196.0 | 196.9 | 181.9 | 140.5 | 130.5 | 51
Bolivia | 97.9 | 139.8 | 200.5 | 242.5 | 230.7 | 213.2 | 199.1 | 186.0 | 173.7 | 150.7 | 126.0 | 58
France | 77.8 | 90.0 | 100.4 | 112.6 | 120.5 | 123.9 | 122.5 | 121.6 | 117.8 | 103.6 | 99.3 | 50
Portugal | 66.2 | 80.6 | 100.6 | 127.2 | 140.9 | 142.5 | 140.8 | 138.7 | 129.1 | 109.7 | 98.4 | 41
Ukraine | 65.7 | 69.9 | 70.0 | 79.1 | 82.3 | 83.3 | 86.3 | 89.0 | 89.4 | 88.6 | 90.9 | 57
Pakistan | 31.9 | 42.1 | 42.1 | 47.0 | 54.1 | 56.9 | 70.2 | 80.0 | 81.4 | 79.6 | 77.5 | 26
Dominican Republic | 57.1 | 61.1 | 65.1 | 77.8 | 88.1 | 91.2 | 91.1 | 92.8 | 93.0 | 84.7 | 75.2 | 56
Other countries | 1 099.3 | 1 216.7 | 1 299.1 | 1 513.9 | 1 642.9 | 1 663.7 | 1 652.6 | 1 647.8 | 1 603.3 | 1 475.0 | 1 398.9 |
Total | 3 730.6 | 4 144.2 | 4 519.6 | 5 268.8 | 5 648.7 | 5 747.7 | 5 751.5 | 5 736.3 | 5 546.2 | 5 023.5 | 4 718.9 | 49
Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.
StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395816

Table B.5. Stock of foreign population by nationality
Thousands
Sweden
| 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | Of which: Women 2014 (%)
Finland | 90.3 | 87.1 | 83.5 | 80.4 | 77.1 | 74.1 | 70.6 | 67.9 | 65.3 | 62.8 | 59.7 | 58
Poland | 14.7 | 17.2 | 22.4 | 28.9 | 34.7 | 38.6 | 40.9 | 42.7 | 44.6 | 46.1 | 48.2 | 48
Somalia | 9.0 | 9.6 | 11.6 | 14.7 | 18.3 | 24.7 | 30.8 | 33.0 | 36.1 | 45.0 | 47.1 | 50
Syria | 4.2 | 3.6 | 3.2 | 3.1 | 3.1 | 3.4 | 4.1 | 5.0 | 9.1 | 20.5 | 42.2 | 40
Denmark | 31.2 | 32.9 | 35.8 | 38.4 | 39.7 | 40.3 | 40.5 | 40.5 | 40.2 | 39.3 | 38.4 | 43
Norway | 35.6 | 35.4 | 35.5 | 35.6 | 35.5 | 35.2 | 34.9 | 34.8 | 34.8 | 34.6 | 34.5 | 51
Germany | 19.9 | 21.0 | 22.5 | 24.7 | 26.6 | 27.5 | 27.6 | 27.8 | 28.0 | 28.1 | 28.2 | 49
Iraq | 39.8 | 31.9 | 30.3 | 40.0 | 48.6 | 55.1 | 56.6 | 55.8 | 43.2 | 31.2 | 25.9 | 46
Afghanistan | 6.8 | 6.9 | 7.7 | 7.9 | 8.2 | 8.6 | 9.8 | 12.7 | 16.7 | 20.3 | 23.6 | 38
United Kingdom | 14.6 | 14.7 | 15.1 | 15.7 | 16.5 | 17.3 | 17.4 | 18.1 | 18.4 | 18.8 | 19.4 | 30
Eritrea | 1.3 | 1.8 | 2.2 | 2.9 | 3.9 | 5.0 | 6.4 | 8.4 | 10.0 | 12.8 | 18.0 | 46
Thailand | 9.8 | 11.2 | 12.5 | 13.9 | 15.5 | 17.1 | 18.3 | 19.0 | 19.1 | 18.5 | 17.7 | 80
China | 6.2 | 6.7 | 6.9 | 7.7 | 9.4 | 11.8 | 14.1 | 15.5 | 16.3 | 17.1 | 17.5 | 53
Iran | 12.4 | 11.5 | 10.5 | 10.2 | 10.6 | 11.8 | 13.5 | 14.3 | 14.5 | 14.8 | 14.9 | 48
Romania | 2.4 | 2.4 | 2.3 | 4.4 | 6.5 | 7.7 | 8.8 | 10.2 | 11.2 | 12.0 | 13.0 | 47
Other countries | 183.1 | 186.1 | 190.0 | 195.9 | 207.8 | 224.6 | 239.0 | 249.4 | 259.7 | 272.9 | 291.3 |
Total | 481.1 | 479.9 | 492.0 | 524.5 | 562.1 | 602.9 | 633.3 | 655.1 | 667.2 | 694.7 | 739.4 | 47
Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.
StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395816

Table B.5. Stock of foreign population by nationality
Thousands
Switzerland
| 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | Of which: Women 2014 (%)
Italy | 300.2 | 296.4 | 291.7 | 289.6 | 290.0 | 289.1 | 289.1 | 290.5 | 294.4 | 301.3 | 308.6 | 42
Germany | 144.9 | 157.6 | 172.6 | 201.9 | 233.4 | 250.5 | 264.2 | 276.8 | 285.4 | 293.2 | 298.6 | 45
Portugal | 159.7 | 167.3 | 173.5 | 182.3 | 196.2 | 205.3 | 213.2 | 224.2 | 238.4 | 253.8 | 263.0 | 45
France | 67.0 | 69.0 | 71.5 | 77.4 | 85.6 | 90.6 | 95.1 | 99.5 | 103.9 | 110.2 | 116.8 | 46
Spain | 74.3 | 71.4 | 68.2 | 65.1 | 64.4 | 64.1 | 64.2 | 66.0 | 69.8 | 75.4 | 79.5 | 45
Serbia | 199.2 | 196.2 | 190.8 | 187.4 | 180.3 | 149.9 | 115.0 | 104.8 | 96.8 | 81.6 | 72.2 | 49
Turkey | 76.6 | 75.4 | 73.9 | 72.6 | 71.7 | 71.0 | 70.6 | 70.2 | 69.6 | 69.2 | 69.1 | 47
Former Yug. Rep. of Macedonia | 60.8 | 60.7 | 60.1 | 60.0 | 59.7 | 59.8 | 60.2 | 60.8 | 61.6 | 62.5 | 63.3 | 49
United Kingdom | 24.1 | 24.9 | 26.0 | 28.7 | 31.9 | 34.1 | 36.4 | 38.6 | 39.4 | 40.4 | 41.1 | 43
Austria | 32.5 | 32.8 | 32.9 | 34.0 | 35.5 | 36.5 | 37.2 | 38.2 | 39.0 | 39.6 | 40.4 | 46
Bosnia and Herzegovina | 44.8 | 43.2 | 41.3 | 39.3 | 37.5 | 35.8 | 34.6 | 33.5 | 32.9 | 32.2 | 31.8 | 48
Croatia | 41.8 | 40.6 | 39.1 | 37.8 | 36.1 | 34.9 | 33.8 | 32.8 | 31.8 | 30.7 | 30.2 | 50
Sri Lanka | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 24.6 | 23.9 | 23.7 | 24.5 | 47
Poland | 4.9 | 5.3 | 6.0 | 7.3 | 8.9 | 10.2 | 11.5 | 13.9 | 16.2 | 17.9 | 21.4 | 51
Netherlands | 15.4 | 15.8 | 16.1 | 17.0 | 18.1 | 18.5 | 19.1 | 19.4 | 19.6 | 20.1 | 20.5 | 45
Other countries | 248.9 | 255.4 | 259.9 | 270.6 | 289.8 | 329.9 | 376.4 | 378.5 | 402.4 | 434.8 | 465.8 |
Total | 1 495.0 | 1 511.9 | 1 523.6 | 1 571.0 | 1 638.9 | 1 680.2 | 1 720.4 | 1 772.3 | 1 825.1 | 1 886.6 | 1 947.0 | 47
Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.
StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395816

Table B.5. Stock of foreign population by nationality
Thousands
United Kingdom
| 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | Of which: Women 2014 (%)
Poland | 48.0 | 110.0 | 209.0 | 406.0 | 498.0 | 549.0 | 550.0 | 658.0 | 713.0 | 679.0 | 855.0 | 51
India | 171.0 | 190.0 | 258.0 | 258.0 | 294.0 | 293.0 | 354.0 | 332.0 | 359.8 | 336.0 | 379.0 | 46
Ireland | 368.0 | 369.0 | 335.0 | 341.0 | 359.0 | 344.0 | 344.0 | 386.0 | 356.0 | 345.0 | 329.0 | 53
Portugal | 83.0 | 85.0 | 81.0 | 87.0 | 95.0 | 96.0 | 104.0 | 123.0 | 106.0 | 138.0 | 235.0 | 53
Romania | .. | .. | 12.0 | 19.0 | 32.0 | 52.0 | 72.0 | 79.0 | 117.0 | 148.0 | 219.0 | 47
Italy | 121.0 | 88.0 | 76.0 | 95.0 | 96.0 | 107.0 | 117.0 | 153.0 | 125.0 | 138.0 | 212.0 | 43
Lithuania | .. | .. | 47.0 | 54.0 | 73.0 | 67.0 | 99.0 | 129.0 | 126.0 | 153.0 | 192.0 | 51
France | 95.0 | 100.0 | 110.0 | 122.0 | 123.0 | 148.0 | 116.0 | 114.0 | 132.0 | 132.0 | 189.0 | 53
Pakistan | 86.0 | 95.0 | 78.0 | 133.0 | 178.0 | 177.0 | 137.0 | 166.0 | 162.8 | 194.0 | 184.0 | 43
Spain | 40.0 | 61.0 | 45.0 | 58.0 | 66.0 | 52.0 | 61.0 | 55.0 | 82.0 | 75.0 | 167.0 | 56
United States | 133.0 | 106.0 | 132.0 | 109.0 | 117.0 | 112.0 | 133.0 | 109.0 | 146.0 | 149.0 | 132.0 | 58
China | .. | .. | 73.0 | 89.0 | 109.0 | 76.0 | 107.0 | 106.0 | 86.6 | 93.0 | 122.0 | 53
Germany | 96.0 | 100.0 | 91.0 | 88.0 | 91.0 | 121.0 | 129.0 | 132.0 | 137.0 | 153.0 | 119.0 | 60
Latvia | .. | .. | 14.0 | 13.0 | 29.0 | 19.0 | 44.0 | 62.0 | 81.0 | 78.0 | 117.0 | 56
Nigeria | 43.0 | 62.0 | 61.0 | 89.0 | 81.0 | 106.0 | 106.0 | 114.0 | 101.5 | 114.0 | 104.0 | 54
Other countries | 1 573.0 | 1 669.0 | 1 770.0 | 1 863.0 | 1 945.0 | 2 029.0 | 2 051.0 | 2 067.0 | 1 956.3 | 2 016.0 | 2 037.0 |
Total | 2 857.0 | 3 035.0 | 3 392.0 | 3 824.0 | 4 186.0 | 4 348.0 | 4 524.0 | 4 785.0 | 4 788.0 | 4 941.0 | 5 592.0 | 52
Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.
StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395816

Metadata related to Tables A.5 and B.5. Stocks of foreign population
| Comments | Source
Austria | Stock of foreign citizens recorded in the population register. Reference date: 31 December. | Population Register, Statistics Austria. Prior to 2002: Labour Force Survey, Statistics Austria.
Belgium | Stock of foreign citizens recorded in the population register. Includes asylum seekers from 2012 on. Reference date: 31 December. | Population Register, Directorate for Statistics and Economic Information.
Canada | 2006 and 2011 Censuses. | Statistics Canada.
Czech Republic | Numbers of foreigners residing in the country on the basis of permanent or temporary residence permits (i.e. long-term visa, long-term residence permit or temporary residence permit of EU nationals). Reference date: 31 December. | Ministry of the Interior, Directorate of Alien Police.
Denmark | Stock of foreign citizens recorded in the population register. Excludes asylum seekers and all persons with temporary residence permits. Reference date: 31 December. | Central Population Register, Statistics Denmark.
Estonia | Population register. Reference date: 31 December. | Ministry of the Interior.
Finland | Stock of foreign citizens recorded in the population register. Includes foreign persons of Finnish origin. Reference date: 31 December. | Central Population Register, Statistics Finland.
France | Foreigners with permanent residence in France. Including trainees, students and illegal migrants who accept to be interviewed. Excluding seasonal and cross-border workers. 2012 to 2014 totals are estimated based on Eurostat data. Series break in 2014. | Censuses, National Institute for Statistics and Economic Studies (INSEE).
Germany | Stock of foreign citizens recorded in the population register. Includes asylum seekers living in private households. Excludes foreign-born persons of German origin (Aussiedler). Reference date: 31 December. | Central Population Register, Federal Office of Statistics.
Greece | Includes some undocumented foreigners. Reference date: Prior to 2014: 4th quarter; 2014: 2nd quarter. | Labour Force Survey, Hellenic Statistical authority.

Hungary

Foreigners having a residence or a settlement document. From 2010 on, includes third-country nationals holding a temporary residence permit (for a year or more). From 2011 on, includes persons under subsidiary protection. Data for 2011 were adjusted to match the October census results.

Reference date: 31 December.

Office of Immigration and Nationality, Central Statistical Office.

Iceland | Data are from the National Register of Persons. It is to be expected that figures are overestimates. Reference date: 31 December. | Statistics Iceland.
Ireland | Census data for 2006 and 2011. | Central Statistics Office (CSO).
Italy | Data refer to resident foreigners (registered in municipal registry offices). Excludes children under 18 who are registered on their parents’ permit. Includes foreigners who were regularised following the 2009 programme. Reference date: 31 December. | Ministry of the Interior and National Statistical Institute (ISTAT).
Japan | Foreigners staying in Japan for the mid- to long-term with a resident status under the Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act. Reference date: 31 December. | Ministry of Justice, Immigration Bureau.
Korea | Foreigners staying in Korea more than 90 days and registered in the population registers. | Ministry of Justice.
Luxembourg | Stock of foreign citizens recorded in population register. Does not include visitors (staying for less than three months) and cross-border workers. Reference date: 31 December. 2010 figures are extracted from the February 2011 census. | Population Register, Central Office of Statistics and Economic Studies (Statec).

Mexico

Number of foreigners who hold a valid permit for permanent or temporary residence. Data until 2012 are estimates under the terms of the 1974 Act; they include immigrants FM2 “inmigrante” and “inmigrado” (boths categories refer to permanent residence) and non-immigrants FM3 with specific categories (temporary residence). Data for 2014 are estimates under the terms of the 2011 Migration Act.

Ministry of Interior, National Migration Institute (INM).

Netherlands | Stock of foreign citizens recorded in the population register. Figures include administrative corrections and asylum seekers (except those staying in reception centres). Reference date: 31 December. | Population Register, Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS).
Norway | Stock of foreign citizens recorded in the population register. It excludes visitors (staying for less than six months) and cross-border workers. Reference date: 31 December. | Central Population Register, Statistics Norway.
Poland | From 2006 on, data are from the Central Population Register. | Central Population Register, Central Statistical Office.

Portugal

Holders of a valid residence permit. Data for 2001-04 include stay permits delivered following the 2001 regularisation programme as well as foreigners who received a long-term permit (for temporary stay, study or work). Data for 2005-06 include holders of a valid residence or stay permit (foreigners who renewed their stay permits) and holders of long-term visas (both issued and renewed every year). Work visas issued after 2004 include a certain number of foreigners who benefited from the regularisation scheme and also from the specific dispositions applying to Brazilian workers following a bilateral agreement. From 2008 on, after the revision of the law and the suppression of the stay permits, figures include holders of a valid residence permit and holders of a renewed long-term visa.

Data for women do not include the holders of long-term visas.

Ministry of the Interior, National Statistical Institute (INE) and Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Russian Federation | 2010 Census: foreigners and stateless persons permanently residing in the Russian Federation. Since 2011, stocks of temporary and permanent residence permit holders on 31 December. | Federal state statistics service (Rosstat); Federal Migration Service.
Slovak Republic | Holders of a permanent or long-term residence permit. | Register of Foreigners, Ministry of the Interior.
Slovenia | Number of valid residence permits, regardless of the administrative status of the foreign national. Reference date: 31 December. | Central Population Register, Ministry of the Interior.
Spain | Data include all foreign citizens registered in the Municipal Registers independently of their legal status. Reference date: 1st January of the following year. | Municipal Registers, National Statistics Institute (INE)
Sweden | Stock of foreign citizens recorded in the population register. Reference date: 31 December. | Population Register, Statistics Sweden.
Switzerland | Stock of all those with residence or settlement permits (permits B and C, respectively). Holders of an L-permit (short duration) are also included if their stay in the country is longer than 12 months. Does not include seasonal or cross-border workers. Reference date: 31 December. | Register of Foreigners, Federal Office of Migration.
United Kingdom | Foreign residents. Those with unknown nationality from the New Commonwealth are not included (around 10 000 to 15 000 persons). Reference date: 31 December. | Labour Force Survey, Home Office.
United States | Foreigners born abroad. | Current Population Survey, Census Bureau.
Note: Data for Serbia may include persons from Montenegro or Serbia and Montenegro.
Some statements may refer to figures prior to 2004 or to nationalities/countries of birth not shown in this annex but available on line at: http://stats.oecd.org/.

Acquisitions of nationality

Acquisitions of nationality

Nationality law can have a significant impact on the measurement of the national and foreign populations. In France and Belgium, for example, where foreigners can fairly easily acquire the nationality of the country, increases in the foreign population through immigration and births can eventually contribute to a significant rise in the population of nationals. On the other hand, in countries where naturalisation is more difficult, increases in immigration and births among foreigners manifest themselves almost exclusively as growth in the foreign population. In addition, changes in rules regarding naturalisation can have significant impact. For example, during the 1980s, a number of OECD countries made naturalisation easier and this resulted in noticeable falls in the foreign population (and rises in the population of nationals).

However, host-country legislation is not the only factor affecting naturalisation. For example, where naturalisation involves forfeiting citizenship of the country of origin, there may be incentives to remain a foreign citizen. Where the difference between remaining a foreign citizen and becoming a national is marginal, naturalisation may largely be influenced by the time and effort required to make the application, and the symbolic and political value individuals attach to being citizens of one country or another.

Data on naturalisations are usually readily available from administrative sources. The statistics generally cover all means of acquiring the nationality of a country. These include standard naturalisation procedures subject to criteria such as age or residency, etc. as well as situations where nationality is acquired through a declaration or by option (following marriage, adoption or other situations related to residency or descent), recovery of former nationality and other special means of acquiring the nationality of the country.

Table A.6. Acquisitions of nationality in OECD countries and the Russian Federation
Numbers and percentages
| 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014
Australia | 88 470 | 94 164 | 104 333 | 137 493 | 119 811 | 86 654 | 119 383 | 95 235 | 83 698 | 123 438 | 162 002
% of foreign population | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | ..
Austria | 41 645 | 34 876 | 25 746 | 14 010 | 10 258 | 7 978 | 6 135 | 6 690 | 7 043 | 7 354 | 7 570
% of foreign population | 5.5 | 4.5 | 3.2 | 1.7 | 1.2 | 0.9 | 0.7 | 0.7 | 0.7 | 0.7 | 0.7
Belgium | 34 754 | 31 512 | 31 860 | 36 063 | 37 710 | 32 767 | 34 635 | 29 786 | 38 612 | 34 801 | 18 727
% of foreign population | 4.0 | 3.6 | 3.5 | 3.9 | 3.9 | 3.2 | 3.3 | 2.7 | 3.3 | 2.8 | 1.5
Canada | 194 130 | 201 062 | 263 460 | 202 037 | 178 437 | 159 001 | 145 620 | 184 105 | 114 573 | 131 093 | 268 359
% of foreign population | .. | .. | .. | 11.5 | .. | .. | .. | .. | 5.9 | .. | ..
Chile | 376 | 519 | 498 | 698 | 619 | 812 | 741 | 874 | 1 225 | 677 | 980
% of foreign population | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | ..
Czech Republic | 5 020 | 2 626 | 2 346 | 1 877 | 1 837 | 1 621 | 1 495 | 1 936 | 2 036 | 2 514 | 5 114
% of foreign population | 2.1 | 1.0 | 0.8 | 0.6 | 0.5 | 0.4 | 0.3 | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.6 | 1.2
Denmark | 14 976 | 10 197 | 7 961 | 3 648 | 5 772 | 6 537 | 3 006 | 3 911 | 3 489 | 1 750 | 4 747
% of foreign population | 5.5 | 3.8 | 2.9 | 1.3 | 1.9 | 2.0 | 0.9 | 1.1 | 1.0 | 0.5 | 1.2
Estonia | 6 523 | 7 072 | 4 753 | 4 230 | 2 124 | 1 670 | 1 189 | 1 518 | 1 340 | 1 330 | 1 614
% of foreign population | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 0.6 | 0.6 | 0.8
Finland | 6 880 | 5 683 | 4 433 | 4 824 | 6 682 | 3 413 | 4 334 | 4 558 | 9 087 | 8 930 | 8 260
% of foreign population | 6.4 | 5.2 | 3.9 | 4.0 | 5.0 | 2.4 | 2.8 | 2.7 | 5.0 | 4.6 | 4.0
France | 168 826 | 154 827 | 147 868 | 131 738 | 137 452 | 135 852 | 143 261 | 114 569 | 96 051 | 97 276 | 105 613
% of foreign population | .. | .. | 4.2 | 3.7 | 3.7 | 3.6 | 3.8 | 3.0 | 2.5 | 2.4 | 2.5
Germany | 127 153 | 117 241 | 124 566 | 113 030 | 94 470 | 96 122 | 101 570 | 106 897 | 112 348 | 112 353 | 108 422
% of foreign population | 1.7 | 1.7 | 1.8 | 1.7 | 1.4 | 1.4 | 1.5 | 1.6 | 1.6 | 1.6 | 1.4
Greece | .. | .. | .. | 10 806 | 16 922 | 17 019 | 9 387 | 17 533 | 20 302 | 29 462 | ..
% of foreign population | .. | .. | .. | 1.9 | 2.6 | 2.3 | 1.1 | 2.2 | 2.7 | 3.8 | ..
Hungary | 5 432 | 9 870 | 6 172 | 8 442 | 8 104 | 5 802 | 6 086 | 20 554 | 18 379 | 9 178 | 8 745
% of foreign population | 4.2 | 6.9 | 4.0 | 5.1 | 4.6 | 3.1 | 3.1 | 9.8 | 12.8 | 6.5 | 6.2
Iceland | 671 | 726 | 844 | 647 | 914 | 728 | 450 | 370 | 413 | 597 | 595
% of foreign population | 6.6 | 6.8 | 6.1 | 3.5 | 3.9 | 3.0 | 2.1 | 1.7 | 2.0 | 2.8 | 2.6
Ireland | 3 784 | 4 079 | 5 763 | 6 656 | 4 350 | 4 594 | 6 387 | 10 749 | 25 039 | 24 263 | 21 090
% of foreign population | .. | .. | .. | 1.6 | 0.8 | 0.8 | 1.1 | 1.9 | 4.7 | 4.4 | 3.8
Italy | 19 140 | 28 659 | 35 266 | 45 485 | 53 696 | 59 369 | 65 938 | 56 153 | 65 383 | 100 712 | 129 887
% of foreign population | 1.0 | 1.2 | 1.3 | 1.5 | 1.6 | 1.7 | 1.8 | 1.4 | 1.6 | 2.3 | 2.6
Japan | 16 336 | 15 251 | 14 108 | 14 680 | 13 218 | 14 785 | 13 072 | 10 359 | 10 622 | 8 646 | 9 277
% of foreign population | 0.9 | 0.8 | 0.7 | 0.7 | 0.6 | 0.7 | 0.6 | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.4 | 0.4
Korea | 9 262 | 16 974 | 8 125 | 10 319 | 15 258 | 26 756 | 17 323 | 18 400 | 12 528 | .. | ..
% of foreign population | 2.0 | 3.5 | 1.6 | 1.6 | 1.9 | 3.0 | 1.9 | 1.8 | 1.3 | .. | ..
Luxembourg | 841 | 954 | 1 128 | 1 236 | 1 215 | 4 022 | 4 311 | 3 405 | 4 680 | 4 411 | 4 991
% of foreign population | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.6 | 0.6 | 0.6 | 1.9 | 2.0 | 1.5 | 2.0 | 1.8 | 2.0
Mexico | 6 429 | 5 610 | 4 175 | 5 470 | 4 471 | 3 489 | 2 150 | 2 633 | 3 590 | 3 581 | 2 341
% of foreign population | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 0.8 | 0.9 | 1.2 | 1.2 | ..
Netherlands | 26 173 | 28 488 | 29 089 | 30 653 | 28 229 | 29 754 | 26 275 | 28 598 | 30 955 | 25 882 | 32 578
% of foreign population | 3.7 | 4.1 | 4.2 | 4.5 | 4.1 | 4.1 | 3.6 | 3.8 | 3.9 | 3.3 | 4.0
New Zealand | 22 227 | 24 462 | 29 248 | 29 916 | 23 623 | 18 005 | 15 173 | 19 287 | 27 230 | 28 467 | 28 757
% of foreign population | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | ..
Norway | 8 154 | 12 655 | 11 955 | 14 877 | 10 312 | 11 442 | 11 903 | 14 637 | 12 384 | 13 223 | 15 336
% of foreign population | 4.0 | 5.9 | 5.4 | 6.2 | 3.9 | 3.8 | 3.6 | 4.0 | 3.0 | 2.9 | 3.2
Poland | 1 937 | 2 866 | 989 | 1 528 | 1 054 | 2 503 | 2 926 | 2 325 | 3 792 | 3 462 | 4 518
% of foreign population | .. | .. | .. | 2.8 | 1.8 | 4.1 | 5.9 | .. | 6.8 | .. | ..
Portugal | 1 346 | 939 | 3 627 | 6 020 | 22 408 | 24 182 | 21 750 | 23 238 | 21 819 | 24 476 | 21 124
% of foreign population | 0.3 | 0.2 | 0.9 | 1.4 | 5.1 | 5.5 | 4.8 | 5.2 | 5.0 | 5.9 | 5.3
Russia | 330 419 | 504 518 | 366 488 | 367 699 | 361 363 | 394 137 | 111 298 | 134 980 | 95 737 | 117 381 | 157 791
% of foreign population | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 19.5 | 18.9 | 22.0
Slovak Republic | 4 016 | 1 393 | 1 125 | 1 478 | 680 | 262 | 239 | 272 | 255 | 282 | 233
% of foreign population | 13.8 | 6.3 | 4.4 | 4.6 | 1.7 | 0.5 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 0.4
Slovenia | .. | .. | .. | 841 | 1 468 | 1 706 | 1 829 | 1 812 | 768 | 1 470 | 1 262
% of foreign population | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 1.8 | 1.9 | 0.8 | 1.4 | 1.1
Spain | 38 335 | 42 829 | 62 339 | 71 810 | 84 170 | 79 597 | 123 721 | 114 599 | 115 557 | 261 295 | 93 714
% of foreign population | 1.3 | 1.1 | 1.5 | 1.6 | 1.6 | 1.4 | 2.2 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 4.7 | 1.9
Sweden | 28 893 | 39 573 | 51 239 | 33 629 | 30 461 | 29 525 | 32 457 | 36 634 | 50 179 | 50 167 | 43 510
% of foreign population | 6.1 | 8.2 | 10.7 | 6.8 | 5.8 | 5.3 | 5.4 | 5.8 | 7.7 | 7.5 | 6.3
Switzerland | 35 685 | 38 437 | 46 711 | 43 889 | 44 365 | 43 440 | 39 314 | 36 757 | 34 121 | 34 332 | 33 325
% of foreign population | 2.4 | 2.6 | 3.1 | 2.9 | 2.8 | 2.7 | 2.3 | 2.1 | 1.9 | 1.9 | 1.8
Turkey | 8 238 | 6 901 | 5 072 | 4 359 | 5 968 | 8 141 | 9 488 | 9 216 | .. | .. | ..
% of foreign population | .. | .. | .. | .. | 6.1 | 7.8 | 5.7 | 5.3 | .. | .. | ..
United Kingdom | 148 273 | 161 699 | 154 018 | 164 637 | 129 377 | 203 789 | 195 046 | 177 785 | 194 209 | 207 989 | 125 653
% of foreign population | 5.4 | 5.7 | 5.1 | 4.9 | 3.4 | 4.9 | 4.5 | 3.9 | 4.1 | 4.3 | 2.5
United States | 537 151 | 604 280 | 702 589 | 660 477 | 1046 539 | 743 715 | 619 913 | 694 193 | 757 434 | 779 929 | 653 416
% of foreign population | 2.6 | 2.9 | 3.3 | 3.0 | 4.8 | 3.4 | 2.9 | 3.1 | 3.4 | 3.5 | 3.0
Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of Tables B.6.
StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395776

Table B.6. Acquisition of nationality by country of former nationality
Thousands
Australia
| 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | Of which: Women 2014 (%)
India | 3 748 | 5 167 | 7 638 | 13 026 | 9 119 | 9 124 | 17 788 | 12 948 | 10 076 | 19 217 | 27 827 | 43
United Kingdom | 17 569 | 20 510 | 22 637 | 26 922 | 27 032 | 18 206 | 22 284 | 19 101 | 16 401 | 20 478 | 25 884 | 48
Philippines | 3 163 | 3 738 | 3 825 | 5 187 | 3 841 | 3 453 | 4 505 | 4 051 | 5 592 | 9 090 | 11 628 | 56
South Africa | 4 996 | 5 181 | 5 111 | 6 760 | 5 538 | 4 162 | 5 218 | 4 389 | 4 206 | 7 900 | 9 286 | 49
China | 5 966 | 6 507 | 7 406 | 11 173 | 8 407 | 6 700 | 11 109 | 8 898 | 6 876 | 8 979 | 9 203 | 57
New Zealand | 13 237 | 9 549 | 7 745 | 7 531 | 6 835 | 3 761 | 4 165 | 4 304 | 3 458 | 3 794 | 5 361 | 51
Sri Lanka | 1 651 | 1 741 | 2 002 | 3 613 | 2 937 | 2 203 | 3 412 | 2 520 | 1 671 | 2 746 | 3 957 | 47
Viet Nam | 2 268 | 2 108 | 2 146 | 2 634 | 2 177 | 1 522 | 2 000 | 1 688 | 1 929 | 2 568 | 3 514 | 63
Iraq | 1 289 | 2 147 | 2 151 | 1 926 | 4 208 | 2 150 | 1 538 | 875 | 1 103 | 2 739 | 3 150 | 53
Ireland | 924 | 1 094 | 1 236 | 1 442 | 1 423 | 881 | 1 280 | 1 302 | 1 145 | 1 796 | 2 843 | 40
Malaysia | 1 876 | 1 863 | 2 046 | 2 974 | 2 42 | 1 778 | 2 216 | 2 207 | 1 487 | 1 841 | 2 788 | 53
Korea | 957 | 1 146 | 1 770 | 2 491 | 2 395 | 1 211 | 2 409 | 2 321 | 1 570 | 2 109 | 2 746 | 53
Pakistan | 885 | 913 | 1 091 | 1 468 | 1 190 | 1 194 | 1 728 | 1 057 | 990 | 2 100 | 2 739 | 42
Bangladesh | 392 | 586 | 797 | 1 202 | 1 072 | 1 756 | 2 940 | 1 178 | 1 183 | 1 946 | 2 650 | 47
Afghanistan | 522 | 707 | 1 212 | 2 794 | 3 210 | 1 733 | 1 342 | 941 | 889 | 1 253 | 2 620 | 39
Other countries | 29 027 | 31 207 | 35 520 | 46 350 | 37 685 | 26 820 | 35 449 | 27 455 | 25 122 | 34 882 | 45 806 |
Total | 88 470 | 94 164 | 104 333 | 137 493 | 119 811 | 86 654 | 119 383 | 95 235 | 83 698 | 123 438 | 162 002 | 50
Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.
StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395826

Table B.6. Acquisition of nationality by country of former nationality
Thousands
Austria
| 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | Of which: Women 2014 (%)
Bosnia and Herzegovina | 8 657 | 7 026 | 4 596 | 3 329 | 2 207 | 1 457 | 1 278 | 1 174 | 1 131 | 1 039 | 1 120 | 57
Turkey | 13 004 | 9 545 | 7 542 | 2 076 | 1 664 | 1 242 | 937 | 1 178 | 1 198 | 1 108 | 885 | 43
Serbia | 7 245 | 6 681 | 4 825 | 4 254 | 2 595 | 2 003 | 1 268 | 1 092 | 723 | 834 | 678 | 59
Russian Federation | 194 | 235 | 228 | 128 | 127 | 135 | 137 | 296 | 316 | 427 | 431 | 52
Romania | 1 373 | 1 128 | 981 | 455 | 382 | 246 | 114 | 223 | 275 | 224 | 244 | 66
Afghanistan | 322 | 454 | 261 | 43 | 106 | 108 | 113 | 157 | 179 | 28 | 232 | 39
Former Yug. Rep. of Macedonia | 803 | 991 | 716 | 414 | 377 | 281 | 150 | 182 | 163 | 182 | 210 | 53
India | 562 | 421 | 159 | 137 | 122 | 90 | 84 | 82 | 171 | 165 | 207 | 49
China | 545 | 323 | 182 | 57 | 67 | 76 | 58 | 97 | 110 | 95 | 192 | 61
Egypt | 616 | 506 | 382 | 100 | 121 | 124 | 94 | 97 | 152 | 174 | 189 | 48
Germany | 135 | 135 | 122 | 113 | 67 | 174 | 132 | 117 | 110 | 127 | 187 | 52
Croatia | 2 212 | 2 276 | 2 494 | 1 349 | 824 | 440 | 456 | 363 | 401 | 224 | 184 | 56
Iran | 411 | 432 | 253 | 88 | 99 | 103 | 111 | 138 | 168 | 18 | 159 | 50
Nigeria | 343 | 318 | 189 | 35 | 54 | 36 | 57 | 50 | 57 | 15 | 158 | 50
Ukraine | 230 | 182 | 145 | 81 | 70 | 80 | 75 | 106 | 99 | 134 | 136 | 83
Other countries | 4 993 | 4 223 | 2 671 | 1 351 | 1 376 | 1 383 | 1 071 | 1 338 | 1 790 | 2 560 | 2 358 |
Total | 41 645 | 34 876 | 25 746 | 14 010 | 10 258 | 7 978 | 6 135 | 6 690 | 7 043 | 7 354 | 7 570 | 54
Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.
StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395826

Table B.6. Acquisition of nationality by country of former nationality
Thousands
Belgium
| 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | Of which: Women 2014 (%)
Morocco | 8 704 | 7 977 | 7 753 | 8 722 | 8 427 | 6 919 | 7 380 | 7 035 | 7 879 | 5 926 | 2 408 | ..
Italy | 2 271 | 2 086 | 2 360 | 2 017 | 1 762 | 1 700 | 2 833 | 3 697 | 3 203 | 1 856 | 1 199 | ..
Romania | 314 | 332 | 429 | 554 | 480 | 362 | 395 | 356 | 777 | 1 155 | 824 | ..
Poland | 465 | 470 | 550 | 586 | 619 | 640 | 523 | 394 | 729 | 888 | 742 | ..
Democratic Republic of the Congo | 2 566 | 1 917 | 1 567 | 1 793 | 1 795 | 1 555 | 1 603 | 1 158 | 1 936 | 1 526 | 713 | ..
Netherlands | 665 | 672 | 692 | 668 | 683 | 608 | 641 | 495 | 961 | 1 272 | 705 | ..
Turkey | 4 467 | 3 602 | 3 204 | 3 039 | 3 182 | 2 763 | 2 760 | 2 359 | 2 517 | 1 857 | 691 | ..
Russian Federation | 244 | 297 | 487 | 1 533 | 2 599 | 1 647 | 1 641 | 1 032 | 1 439 | 1 525 | 641 | ..
France | 780 | 772 | 820 | 836 | 838 | 792 | 717 | 638 | 903 | 973 | 586 | ..
Cameroon | 266 | 242 | 250 | 317 | 463 | 401 | 490 | 600 | 924 | 915 | 546 | ..
Guinea | 173 | 162 | 144 | 229 | 278 | 233 | 291 | 228 | 757 | 941 | 416 | ..
Iraq | 164 | 154 | 113 | 236 | 251 | 298 | 322 | 184 | 397 | 612 | 377 | ..
Armenia | 366 | 253 | 206 | 197 | 291 | 274 | 374 | 277 | 360 | 583 | 361 | ..
Bulgaria | 183 | 170 | 193 | 185 | 188 | 213 | 208 | 185 | 338 | 514 | 326 | ..
Algeria | 826 | 739 | 658 | 687 | 744 | 739 | 739 | 584 | 863 | 638 | 325 | ..
Other countries | 12 300 | 11 667 | 12 434 | 14 464 | 15 110 | 13 623 | 13 718 | 10 564 | 14 629 | 13 620 | 7 867 |
Total | 34 754 | 31 512 | 31 860 | 36 063 | 37 710 | 32 767 | 34 635 | 29 786 | 38 612 | 34 801 | 18 727 | ..
Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.
StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395826

Table B.6. Acquisition of nationality by country of former nationality
Thousands
Canada
| 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | Of which: Women 2014 (%)
Philippines | 9 022 | 11 037 | 15 570 | 12 197 | 11 668 | 11 069 | 11 608 | 16 160 | 10 553 | 14 827 | 27 993 | 59
India | 21 826 | 22 068 | 33 974 | 25 796 | 20 837 | 17 398 | 18 970 | 22 235 | 13 468 | 15 418 | 26 557 | 51
China | 25 138 | 25 803 | 34 602 | 24 431 | 21 079 | 16 059 | 13 473 | 15 640 | 10 444 | 10 147 | 21 789 | 58
Iran | 4 616 | 4 986 | 8 087 | 5 331 | 4 988 | 3 829 | 3 585 | 4 954 | 3 530 | 3 383 | 9 421 | 52
Pakistan | 10 676 | 12 433 | 17 120 | 11 623 | 9 433 | 7 839 | 8 063 | 9 936 | 5 633 | 5 291 | 9 080 | 52
Morocco | 1 190 | 2 339 | 3 872 | 2 728 | 2 225 | 3 371 | 2 031 | 2 732 | 1 476 | 1 893 | 7 505 | 48
United States | 5 288 | 5 059 | 5 120 | 4 271 | 4 134 | 3 738 | 3 717 | 5 092 | 3 835 | 4 472 | 7 359 | 54
United Kingdom | 7 452 | 7 001 | 6 654 | 5 259 | 4 722 | 4 370 | 4 510 | 6 060 | 4 345 | 4 778 | 7 355 | 47
Algeria | 1 500 | 2 146 | 3 331 | 2 552 | 2 150 | 3 161 | 2 453 | 3 321 | 1 586 | 1 849 | 7 278 | 50
Colombia | 1 510 | 2 086 | 3 136 | 3 784 | 4 671 | 4 289 | 3 812 | 4 079 | 2 540 | 3 371 | 7 101 | 53
Korea | 5 909 | 5 434 | 7 559 | 5 862 | 5 252 | 3 841 | 3 166 | 4 097 | 3 072 | 3 166 | 5 936 | 53
France | 1 683 | 2 335 | 2 688 | 2 191 | 1 884 | 2 688 | 1 972 | 2 727 | 1 450 | 2 110 | 5 830 | 48
Iraq | 1 908 | 2 023 | 2 977 | 1 756 | 1 504 | 1 187 | 1 056 | 1 593 | 1 312 | 2 399 | 4 625 | 53
Bangladesh | 2 053 | 2 860 | 3 415 | 2 023 | 1 873 | 2 140 | 2 281 | 2 892 | 1 484 | 1 689 | 4 321 | 50
Sri Lanka | 5 151 | 4 582 | 5 650 | 4 705 | 3 691 | 3 187 | 2 918 | 3 347 | 2 009 | 2 453 | 4 145 | 52
Other countries | 89 208 | 88 870 | 109 705 | 87 528 | 78 326 | 70 835 | 62 005 | 79 240 | 47 836 | 53 847 | 112 064 |
Total | 194 130 | 201 062 | 263 460 | 202 037 | 178 437 | 159 001 | 145 620 | 184 105 | 114 573 | 131 093 | 268 359 | 53
Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.
StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395826

Table B.6. Acquisition of nationality by country of former nationality
Thousands
Chile
| 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | Of which: Women 2013 (%)
Peru | 84 | 123 | 117 | 196 | 174 | 170 | 156 | 214 | 305 | 153 | .. | 55
Colombia | 13 | 16 | 19 | 44 | 26 | 61 | 54 | 75 | 149 | 105 | .. | 56
Ecuador | 12 | 20 | 21 | 43 | 62 | 72 | 89 | 97 | 173 | 95 | .. | 60
Cuba | 55 | 88 | 92 | 109 | 115 | 107 | 119 | 137 | 159 | 88 | .. | 57
Bolivia | 59 | 99 | 93 | 95 | 69 | 114 | 93 | 119 | 115 | 55 | .. | 69
Argentina | 13 | 15 | 7 | 11 | 10 | 20 | 16 | 23 | 33 | 21 | .. | 52
China | 40 | 18 | 25 | 24 | 16 | 46 | 29 | 24 | 29 | 18 | .. | 44
Pakistan | 2 | 9 | 7 | 10 | 4 | 17 | 15 | 16 | 17 | 12 | .. | 17
Uruguay | 2 | 4 | 6 | 5 | 2 | 2 | 5 | 6 | 6 | 10 | .. | 40
Chinese Taipei | 16 | 45 | 46 | 44 | 35 | 60 | 39 | 15 | 29 | 9 | .. | 78
Venezuela | 1 | 2 | 3 | 9 | 8 | 14 | 17 | 22 | 21 | 8 | .. | 75
Spain | 2 | 4 | 5 | 10 | 5 | 10 | 9 | 5 | 14 | 8 | .. | 37
India | 11 | 10 | 7 | 13 | 16 | 11 | 9 | 16 | 15 | 8 | .. | 12
Syria | 7 | 6 | 9 | 9 | 9 | 6 | 1 | 6 | 6 | 7 | .. | 43
France | .. | .. | 1 | .. | .. | .. | 2 | 1 | 3 | 5 | .. | 40
Other countries | 59 | 60 | 40 | 76 | 68 | 102 | 88 | 98 | 151 | 75 | .. |
Total | 376 | 519 | 498 | 698 | 619 | 812 | 741 | 874 | 1 225 | 677 | 980 | ..
Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.
StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395826

Table B.6. Acquisition of nationality by country of former nationality
Thousands
Czech Republic
| 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | Of which: Women 2014 (%)
Ukraine | 446 | 239 | 425 | 424 | 398 | 520 | 396 | 501 | 518 | 948 | 2 075 | ..
Slovak Republic | 1 741 | 1 259 | 786 | 625 | 521 | 431 | 377 | 378 | 331 | 270 | 574 | ..
Russian Federation | 86 | 134 | 107 | 102 | 84 | 58 | 50 | 68 | 173 | 162 | 463 | ..
Romania | 101 | 143 | 131 | 36 | 83 | 35 | 36 | 76 | 70 | 30 | 311 | ..
Viet Nam | 47 | 62 | 43 | 40 | 42 | 44 | 52 | 86 | 80 | 166 | 298 | ..
Moldova | 1 | 11 | 9 | 33 | 21 | 23 | 15 | 32 | 25 | 41 | 175 | ..
Armenia | 23 | 32 | 61 | 28 | 19 | 16 | 11 | 47 | 74 | 46 | 144 | ..
Belarus | 21 | 35 | 27 | 39 | 27 | 20 | 15 | 38 | 49 | 53 | 137 | ..
Kazakhstan | 89 | 43 | 129 | 18 | 121 | 21 | 17 | 48 | 30 | 65 | 122 | ..
Poland | 298 | 167 | 86 | 50 | 53 | 58 | 63 | 198 | 180 | 176 | 105 | ..
Bosnia and Herzegovina | 62 | 63 | 37 | 19 | 11 | 9 | 9 | 16 | 27 | 11 | 59 | ..
Serbia | 42 | 26 | 31 | 28 | 25 | 17 | 7 | 11 | 9 | 26 | 57 | ..
Bulgaria | 62 | 48 | 48 | 14 | 11 | 12 | 21 | 28 | 19 | 27 | 52 | ..
Syria | 10 | 5 | 4 | 5 | 12 | 6 | 4 | 8 | 19 | 23 | 28 | ..
Algeria | 5 | 9 | 9 | 12 | 4 | .. | 10 | 17 | 22 | 22 | 26 | ..
Other countries | 1 986 | 350 | 413 | 404 | 405 | 351 | 412 | 384 | 410 | 448 | 488 |
Total | 5 020 | 2 626 | 2 346 | 1 877 | 1 837 | 1 621 | 1 495 | 1 936 | 2 036 | 2 514 | 5 114 | ..
Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.
StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395826

Table B.6. Acquisition of nationality by country of former nationality
Thousands
Denmark
| 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | Of which: Women 2014 (%)
Iraq | 1 015 | 961 | 1 113 | 515 | 1 166 | 1 201 | 368 | 838 | 730 | 356 | 1 588 | 45
Afghanistan | 367 | 282 | 260 | 178 | 359 | 790 | 354 | 576 | 463 | 151 | 917 | 47
Somalia | 2 022 | 1 709 | 923 | 317 | 527 | 264 | 142 | 233 | 185 | 58 | 404 | 53
Turkey | 732 | 878 | 1 125 | 527 | 581 | 511 | 239 | 227 | 300 | 166 | 150 | 51
Iran | 505 | 317 | 203 | 89 | 207 | 155 | 63 | 113 | 127 | 23 | 130 | 49
China | 339 | 382 | 281 | 162 | 181 | 199 | 103 | 103 | 97 | 19 | 105 | 59
Bosnia and Herzegovina | .. | .. | 519 | 224 | 270 | 265 | 131 | 110 | 82 | 39 | 59 | 53
Thailand | 180 | 114 | 95 | 61 | 79 | 96 | 64 | 57 | 52 | 29 | 54 | 46
Viet Nam | 318 | 232 | 213 | 129 | 78 | 144 | 86 | 58 | 58 | 23 | 52 | 60
Morocco | 244 | 147 | 114 | 40 | 119 | 104 | 46 | 34 | 66 | 17 | 50 | 58
Sri Lanka | 678 | 332 | 148 | 73 | 127 | 74 | 20 | 58 | 45 | 13 | 48 | 56
Sweden | .. | .. | 66 | 48 | 39 | 52 | 58 | 64 | 57 | 33 | 47 | 47
Philippines | .. | .. | 82 | 27 | 71 | 74 | 22 | 32 | 25 | 8 | 43 | 70
Former Yugoslavia | 835 | 324 | 594 | 165 | 196 | 228 | 83 | 62 | 58 | 54 | 39 | 38
Pakistan | 332 | 305 | 172 | 93 | 191 | 214 | 21 | 73 | 89 | 77 | 38 | 58
Other countries | 7 409 | 4 214 | 2 053 | 1 000 | 1 581 | 2 166 | 1 206 | 1 273 | 1 055 | 684 | 1 023 |
Total | 14 976 | 10 197 | 7 961 | 3 648 | 5 772 | 6 537 | 3 006 | 3 911 | 3 489 | 1 750 | 4 747 | 50
Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.
StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395826

Table B.6. Acquisition of nationality by country of former nationality
Thousands
Estonia
| 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | Of which: Women 2014 (%)
Russian Federation | 152 | 412 | 355 | 269 | 138 | 87 | 77 | 156 | 174 | 169 | 204 | 63
Ukraine | 11 | 3 | 15 | 19 | 16 | 20 | 18 | 10 | 24 | 18 | 30 | 53
Pakistan | .. | 1 | .. | .. | 1 | .. | 1 | .. | .. | 1 | 4 | 0
Latvia | 3 | 1 | 3 | 2 | .. | .. | .. | 1 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 100
Belarus | .. | 7 | 5 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 5 | 2 | 3 | 67
Kazakhstan | .. | 2 | 1 | .. | 1 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 100
India | .. | 2 | .. | 1 | .. | .. | 2 | .. | 5 | 1 | 2 | 0
Turkey | .. | .. | .. | 1 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 1 | 0
Sweden | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 1 | 0
Moldova | .. | 1 | 1 | .. | 2 | .. | 2 | .. | .. | .. | 1 | 0
Iraq | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 1 | 0
Georgia | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 100
China | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 1 | .. | .. | 1 | 1 | 0
Other countries | 6 357 | 6 643 | 4 373 | 3 937 | 1 963 | 1 560 | 1 083 | 1 346 | 1 128 | 1 135 | 1 360 |
Total | 6 523 | 7 072 | 4 753 | 4 230 | 2 124 | 1 670 | 1 189 | 1 518 | 1 340 | 1 330 | 1 614 | 55
Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.
StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395826

Table B.6. Acquisition of nationality by country of former nationality
Thousands
Finland
| 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | Of which: Women 2014 (%)
Russian Federation | 2 313 | 2 094 | 1 399 | 1 665 | 2 211 | 1 026 | 1 925 | 1 652 | 2 477 | 2 103 | 2 317 | 65
Somalia | 165 | 414 | 445 | 464 | 595 | 290 | 131 | 96 | 609 | 814 | 834 | 46
Iraq | 447 | 346 | 405 | 443 | 379 | 207 | 78 | 106 | 457 | 521 | 405 | 36
Estonia | 690 | 291 | 176 | 182 | 262 | 166 | 243 | 302 | 521 | 436 | 382 | 61
Turkey | 171 | 128 | 110 | 102 | 195 | 94 | 132 | 166 | 278 | 271 | 257 | 39
Afghanistan | 14 | 48 | 101 | 102 | 279 | 186 | 108 | 100 | 510 | 479 | 251 | 40
Iran | 225 | 233 | 213 | 218 | 329 | 180 | 137 | 145 | 451 | 341 | 219 | 47
Sweden | 149 | 198 | 178 | 163 | 274 | 126 | 104 | 196 | 190 | 146 | 186 | 51
China | 95 | 60 | 57 | 68 | 84 | 53 | 85 | 88 | 124 | 154 | 161 | 66
Serbia | 338 | 346 | 248 | 240 | 371 | 173 | 122 | 133 | 374 | 316 | 160 | 46
India | 53 | 32 | 8 | 26 | 28 | 27 | 73 | 76 | 117 | 99 | 152 | 58
Democratic Republic of the Congo | 21 | 14 | 43 | 48 | 35 | 18 | 25 | 20 | 100 | 122 | 150 | 50
Ukraine | 130 | 65 | 46 | 45 | 62 | 53 | 92 | 95 | 148 | 157 | 141 | 57
Myanmar | 3 | 10 | 0 | 5 | 18 | 7 | 3 | 9 | 56 | 177 | 141 | 60
Thailand | 90 | 31 | 15 | 30 | 34 | 24 | 41 | 50 | 75 | 104 | 125 | 82
Other countries | 1 976 | 1 373 | 989 | 1 023 | 1 526 | 783 | 1 035 | 1 324 | 2 600 | 2 690 | 2 379 |
Total | 6 880 | 5 683 | 4 433 | 4 824 | 6 682 | 3 413 | 4 334 | 4 558 | 9 087 | 8 930 | 8 260 | 54
Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.
StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395826

Table B.6. Acquisition of nationality by country of former nationality
Thousands
France
| 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | Of which: Women 2014 (%)
Morocco | .. | 37 848 | .. | .. | 28 699 | 26 353 | 28 919 | 22 612 | 18 325 | 16 662 | 18 051 | 49
Algeria | .. | 25 435 | .. | .. | 20 256 | 20 757 | 21 299 | 15 527 | 12 991 | 13 408 | 15 142 | 47
Tunisia | .. | 12 012 | .. | .. | 9 471 | 9 476 | 9 008 | 6 828 | 5 546 | 5 569 | 6 274 | 44
Turkey | .. | 13 618 | .. | .. | 10 202 | 9 259 | 9 667 | 8 277 | 6 920 | 5 873 | 5 835 | 47
Portugal | .. | 8 888 | .. | .. | 7 778 | 6 583 | 5 723 | 4 720 | 4 294 | 3 887 | 3 345 | 48
Mali | .. | 1 365 | .. | .. | 2 237 | 2 786 | 3 214 | 2 616 | 2 201 | 2 645 | 3 345 | 49
Côte d’Ivoire | .. | 1 987 | .. | .. | 2 197 | 2 582 | 3 096 | 2 257 | 1 766 | 2 513 | 3 055 | 55
Senegal | .. | 2 345 | .. | .. | 3 038 | 3 443 | 3 839 | 3 168 | 2 755 | 2 823 | 3 048 | 49
Russian Federation | .. | 1 132 | .. | .. | 3 530 | 4 157 | 4 507 | 3 390 | 2 203 | 2 517 | 3 040 | 68
Cameroon | .. | 2 081 | .. | .. | 2 014 | 2 425 | 2 890 | 2 425 | 1 926 | 2 579 | 3 010 | 60
Democratic Republic of the Congo | .. | 2 631 | .. | .. | 2 402 | 2 375 | 2 562 | 1 946 | 1 599 | 1 585 | 2 335 | 52
Haiti | .. | 2 744 | .. | .. | 2 922 | 3 070 | 3 166 | 2 204 | 1 799 | 2 121 | 2 181 | 51
Comoros | .. | 817 | .. | .. | 1 049 | 1 373 | 1 546 | 1 828 | 1 778 | 2 307 | 2 175 | 49
China | .. | 1 054 | .. | .. | 1 122 | 1 425 | 1 403 | 1 336 | 1 331 | 1 497 | 1 835 | 55
Congo | .. | 2 390 | .. | .. | 2 933 | 3 309 | 3 417 | 2 018 | 1 326 | 1 808 | 1 797 | 54
Other countries | .. | 38 480 | .. | .. | 37 602 | 36 479 | 39 005 | 33 417 | 29 291 | 29 482 | 31 145 |
Total | 168 826 | 154 827 | 147 868 | 131 738 | 137 452 | 135 852 | 143 261 | 114 569 | 96 051 | 97 276 | 105 613 | 51
Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.
StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395826

Table B.6. Acquisition of nationality by country of former nationality
Thousands
Germany
| 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | Of which: Women 2014 (%)
Turkey | 44 465 | 32 661 | 33 388 | 28 861 | 24 449 | 24 647 | 26 192 | 28 103 | 33 246 | 27 970 | 22 463 | 43
Poland | 7 499 | 6 896 | 6 907 | 5 479 | 4 245 | 3 841 | 3 789 | 4 281 | 4 496 | 5 462 | 5 932 | 72
Croatia | 1 689 | 1 287 | 1 729 | 1 224 | 1 032 | 542 | 689 | 665 | 544 | 1 721 | 3 899 | 55
Italy | 1 656 | 1 629 | 1 558 | 1 265 | 1 392 | 1 273 | 1 305 | 1 707 | 2 202 | 2 754 | 3 245 | 46
Iraq | 3 564 | 4 136 | 3 693 | 4 102 | 4 229 | 5 136 | 5 228 | 4 790 | 3 510 | 3 150 | 3 172 | 45
Ukraine | 3 844 | 3 363 | 4 536 | 4 454 | 1 953 | 2 345 | 3 118 | 4 264 | 3 691 | 4 539 | 3 142 | 62
Afghanistan | 4 077 | 3 133 | 3 063 | 2 831 | 2 512 | 3 549 | 3 520 | 2 711 | 2 717 | 3 054 | 3 000 | 50
Greece | 1 507 | 1 346 | 1 657 | 2 691 | 1 779 | 1 362 | 1 450 | 2 290 | 4 167 | 3 498 | 2 800 | 47
Russian Federation | 4 381 | 5 055 | 4 679 | 4 069 | 2 439 | 2 477 | 2 753 | 2 965 | 3 167 | 2 784 | 2 743 | 61
Morocco | 3 820 | 3 684 | 3 546 | 3 489 | 3 130 | 3 042 | 2 806 | 3 011 | 2 852 | 2 710 | 2 689 | 43
Romania | 1 309 | 1 789 | 1 379 | 3 502 | 2 137 | 2 357 | 2 523 | 2 399 | 2 343 | 2 504 | 2 566 | 71
Iran | 6 362 | 4 482 | 3 662 | 3 121 | 2 734 | 3 184 | 3 046 | 2 728 | 2 463 | 2 560 | 2 546 | 51
Serbia | 3 539 | 8 824 | 12 601 | 10 458 | 6 484 | 4 309 | 3 405 | 2 978 | 2 746 | 2 714 | 2 358 | 52
Viet Nam | 1 371 | 1 278 | 1 382 | 1 078 | 1 048 | 1 513 | 1 738 | 2 428 | 3 299 | 2 459 | 2 196 | 53
Syria | 1 070 | 1 061 | 1 226 | 1 108 | 1 156 | 1 342 | 1 401 | 1 454 | 1 321 | 1 508 | 1 820 | 43
Other countries | 37 000 | 36 617 | 39 560 | 35 298 | 33 751 | 35 203 | 38 607 | 40 123 | 39 584 | 42 966 | 43 851 |
Total | 127 153 | 117 241 | 124 566 | 113 030 | 94 470 | 96 122 | 101 570 | 106 897 | 112 348 | 112 353 | 108 422 | 52
Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.
StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395826

Table B.6. Acquisition of nationality by country of former nationality
Thousands
Greece
| 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | Of which: Women 2014 (%)
Albania | .. | .. | .. | 5 688 | 9 996 | 14 271 | 6 059 | 15 452 | 17 396 | 25 830 | .. | 44
Serbia | .. | .. | .. | 4 | 10 | 39 | 25 | 282 | 209 | 378 | .. | 61
Georgia | .. | .. | .. | 489 | 1 285 | 550 | 763 | 252 | 152 | 359 | .. | 52
Ukraine | .. | .. | .. | 68 | 167 | 129 | 178 | 130 | 235 | 246 | .. | 72
Bulgaria | .. | .. | .. | 105 | 89 | 62 | 70 | 101 | 75 | 192 | .. | 60
Armenia | .. | .. | .. | 80 | 165 | 137 | 199 | 150 | 210 | 189 | .. | 48
Turkey | .. | .. | .. | 223 | 212 | 175 | 71 | 49 | 70 | 167 | .. | 27
Moldova | .. | .. | .. | 22 | 29 | 32 | 44 | 91 | 131 | 159 | .. | 69
Romania | .. | .. | .. | 83 | 79 | 63 | 57 | 56 | 76 | 129 | .. | 53
United States | .. | .. | .. | 105 | 175 | 127 | 189 | 83 | 84 | 126 | .. | 45
Cyprus¹, 2 | .. | .. | .. | 109 | 68 | 87 | 61 | 46 | 41 | 118 | .. | 53
Israel | .. | .. | .. | 82 | 81 | 40 | 32 | 25 | 62 | 116 | .. | 45
Lebanon | .. | .. | .. | 34 | 15 | 15 | 51 | 16 | 59 | 100 | .. | 38
Swaziland | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 82 | .. | 21
Germany | .. | .. | .. | 39 | 85 | 105 | 113 | 57 | 27 | 74 | .. | 49
Other countries | .. | .. | .. | 3 675 | 4 466 | 1 187 | 1 475 | 743 | 1 475 | 1 197 | .. |
Total | .. | .. | .. | 10 806 | 16 922 | 17 019 | 9 387 | 17 533 | 20 302 | 29 462 | .. | 44
Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

1. Note by Turkey: The information in this document with reference to “Cyprus” relates to the southern part of the Island. There is no single authority representing both Turkish and Greek Cypriot people on the Island. Turkey recognizes the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). Until a lasting and equitable solution is found within the context of the United Nations, Turkey shall preserve its position concerning the “Cyprus issue”.

2. Note by all the European Union member states of the OECD and the European Union: The Republic of Cyprus is recognised by all members of the United Nations with the exception of Turkey. The information in this document relates to the area under the effective control of the Government of the Republic of Cyprus.

StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395826

Table B.6. Acquisition of nationality by country of former nationality
Thousands
Hungary
| 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | Of which: Women 2014 (%)
Romania | 3 605 | 6 890 | 4 303 | 6 052 | 5 535 | 3 805 | 3 939 | 15 658 | 14 392 | 6 999 | 6 200 | 46
Ukraine | .. | 828 | 541 | 834 | 857 | 558 | 646 | 2 189 | 1 765 | 894 | 858 | 67
Serbia | .. | 949 | 357 | 757 | 758 | 672 | 721 | 1 678 | 1 330 | 647 | 411 | 42
Slovak Republic | .. | 161 | 206 | 116 | 106 | 97 | 97 | 414 | 307 | 202 | 310 | 68
Russian Federation | .. | 162 | 111 | 7 | 156 | 119 | 111 | 168 | 151 | 97 | 170 | 66
Egypt | .. | 2 | 1 | 4 | 2 | 5 | 3 | 2 | 6 | 9 | 81 | 31
Viet Nam | .. | 53 | 40 | 53 | 95 | 39 | 75 | 38 | 29 | 15 | 67 | 63
Germany | .. | 25 | 22 | 28 | 33 | 35 | 25 | 55 | 67 | 35 | 59 | 46
Turkey | .. | 7 | 4 | 6 | 13 | 10 | 9 | 12 | 8 | 20 | 58 | 5
Syria | .. | 13 | 13 | 22 | 17 | 11 | 10 | 7 | 11 | 10 | 57 | 25
Poland | .. | 26 | 10 | 10 | 14 | 13 | 9 | 27 | 18 | 11 | 45 | 73
Croatia | .. | 50 | 148 | 26 | 34 | 25 | 26 | 61 | 50 | 22 | 27 | 30
United States | .. | 3 | 4 | 12 | 11 | 9 | 2 | 17 | 13 | 9 | 25 | 32
Mongolia | .. | 11 | 14 | 10 | 4 | 14 | 16 | 18 | 9 | 8 | 20 | 90
Algeria | .. | 11 | 10 | 11 | 7 | 4 | 12 | 1 | 5 | 1 | 19 | 16
Other countries | 1 827 | 679 | 388 | 494 | 462 | 386 | 385 | 209 | 218 | 199 | 338 |
Total | 5 432 | 9 870 | 6 172 | 8 442 | 8 104 | 5 802 | 6 086 | 20 554 | 18 379 | 9 178 | 8 745 | 48
Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.
StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395826

Table B.6. Acquisition of nationality by country of former nationality
Thousands
Iceland
| 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | Of which: Women 2014 (%)
Poland | 133 | 184 | 222 | 162 | 164 | 153 | 50 | 35 | 30 | 89 | 149 | 57
Philippines | 59 | 45 | 105 | 69 | 126 | 106 | 67 | 35 | 49 | 89 | 52 | 69
Thailand | 48 | 50 | 54 | 45 | 62 | 40 | 28 | 27 | 26 | 26 | 43 | 81
Viet Nam | 19 | 23 | 41 | 16 | 52 | 51 | 39 | 14 | 8 | 39 | 33 | 52
Lithuania | 9 | 7 | 5 | 23 | 23 | 9 | 11 | 8 | 6 | 7 | 16 | 62
United States | 33 | 31 | 34 | 33 | 20 | 15 | 19 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 71
Russian Federation | 33 | 23 | 24 | 17 | 38 | 17 | 21 | 12 | 21 | 18 | 13 | 77
Ukraine | 18 | 6 | 9 | 13 | 18 | 18 | 15 | 10 | 21 | 18 | 12 | 75
Germany | 5 | 8 | 7 | 9 | 7 | 4 | 5 | 1 | 4 | 4 | 12 | 83
Romania | 2 | 10 | 12 | 4 | 12 | 12 | 4 | 2 | 12 | 7 | 10 | 50
Portugal | 1 | 12 | 6 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 2 | 6 | 3 | 3 | 10 | 40
Bulgaria | 9 | 2 | 9 | 5 | 6 | 10 | 9 | 1 | 5 | 10 | 10 | 20
Morocco | 7 | 7 | 4 | 9 | 22 | 3 | 8 | 5 | 9 | 7 | 9 | 44
Nepal | 1 | 7 | 10 | 5 | 8 | 10 | 4 | 9 | 4 | 9 | 8 | 50
France | 6 | 9 | 3 | 5 | 2 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 8 | 62
Other countries | 288 | 302 | 299 | 230 | 351 | 275 | 165 | 193 | 200 | 257 | 196 |
Total | 671 | 726 | 844 | 647 | 914 | 728 | 450 | 370 | 413 | 597 | 595 | 60
Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.
StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395826

Table B.6. Acquisition of nationality by country of former nationality
Thousands
Ireland
| 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | Of which: Women 2014 (%)
Nigeria | .. | 155 | 189 | 142 | 319 | 454 | 1 012 | 1 204 | 5 689 | .. | 3 293 | 49
India | .. | 144 | 126 | 119 | 166 | 339 | 443 | 944 | 2 617 | .. | 2 939 | 53
Philippines | .. | 43 | 70 | 37 | 84 | 410 | 630 | 1 755 | 3 830 | .. | 2 184 | 54
Pakistan | .. | 213 | 239 | 189 | 196 | 201 | 306 | 428 | 1 288 | .. | 1 244 | 43
Romania | .. | 92 | 81 | 46 | 74 | 117 | 143 | 135 | 457 | .. | 1 029 | 50
Poland | .. | 20 | 37 | 7 | 10 | 13 | 29 | 25 | 359 | .. | 939 | 51
China | .. | 57 | 85 | 45 | 102 | 131 | 258 | 403 | 798 | .. | 576 | 57
South Africa | .. | 257 | 363 | 219 | 205 | 318 | 343 | 418 | 708 | .. | 563 | 54
Ukraine | .. | 31 | 25 | 34 | 97 | 153 | 202 | 432 | 815 | .. | 536 | 49
Brazil | .. | 31 | 37 | 36 | 14 | 21 | 31 | 86 | 203 | .. | 459 | 44
Democratic Republic of the Congo | .. | .. | 0 | 0 | 57 | 82 | 79 | 7 | 179 | .. | 422 | 50
Moldova | .. | 21 | 22 | 11 | 67 | 72 | 115 | 278 | 636 | .. | 356 | 53
Russian Federation | .. | 81 | 109 | 86 | 160 | 246 | 253 | 288 | 464 | .. | 320 | 65
United States | .. | 890 | 1 518 | 1 841 | 875 | 156 | 112 | 148 | 263 | .. | 304 | 57
Thailand | .. | 29 | 60 | 18 | 33 | 28 | 53 | 139 | 209 | .. | 274 | 72
Other countries | .. | 2 015 | 2 802 | 3 826 | 1 891 | 1 853 | 2 378 | 4 059 | 6 524 | .. | 5 652 |
Total | 3 784 | 4 079 | 5 763 | 6 656 | 4 350 | 4 594 | 6 387 | 10 749 | 25 039 | 24 263 | 21 090 | 51
Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.
StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395826

Table B.6. Acquisition of nationality by country of former nationality
Thousands
Italy
| 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | Of which: Women 2014 (%)
Morocco | 1 046 | .. | 3 295 | 3 850 | 9 156 | 9 096 | 11 350 | 10 732 | 14 728 | 25 421 | .. | 45
Albania | 882 | .. | 2 330 | 2 605 | 4 546 | 9 523 | 9 129 | 8 101 | 9 493 | 13 671 | .. | 49
India | .. | .. | .. | 188 | 672 | 894 | 1 261 | 1 051 | 2 366 | 4 863 | .. | 31
Romania | 847 | .. | 2 775 | 3 509 | 2 857 | 2 735 | 4 707 | 3 921 | 3 272 | 4 386 | .. | 71
Pakistan | .. | .. | .. | 91 | 219 | 349 | 535 | 601 | 1 522 | 3 532 | .. | 36
Tunisia | 258 | .. | 371 | 920 | 1 666 | 2 066 | 2 003 | 2 067 | 2 555 | 3 521 | .. | 42
Bangladesh | .. | .. | .. | 68 | 405 | 839 | 822 | 972 | 1 460 | 3 511 | .. | 35
Ghana | .. | .. | 213 | 301 | 1 121 | 1 061 | 790 | 801 | 1 288 | 2 838 | .. | 45
Senegal | .. | .. | .. | 191 | 289 | 592 | 689 | 797 | 1 070 | 2 263 | .. | 34
Egypt | 283 | .. | 217 | 704 | 1 228 | 1 394 | 1 431 | 2 352 | 1 342 | 2 130 | .. | 40
Former Yug. Rep. of Macedonia | .. | .. | .. | 204 | 697 | 954 | 923 | 1 141 | 1 219 | 2 089 | .. | 39
Peru | 253 | .. | .. | 883 | 1 064 | 1 947 | 2 235 | 1 726 | 1 589 | 2 055 | .. | 69
Ukraine | 209 | .. | .. | 1 389 | 1 601 | 1 131 | 1 820 | 1 199 | 1 580 | 1 806 | .. | 87
Brazil | 579 | .. | 1 751 | 1 928 | 1 930 | 1 579 | 2 099 | 1 960 | 1 442 | 1 786 | .. | 73
Nigeria | 166 | .. | .. | 490 | 607 | 658 | 747 | 646 | 938 | 1 611 | .. | 59
Other countries | 14 617 | .. | 24 314 | 28 164 | 25 638 | 24 551 | 25 397 | 18 086 | 19 519 | 25 229 | .. |
Total | 19 140 | 28 659 | 35 266 | 45 485 | 53 696 | 59 369 | 65 938 | 56 153 | 65 383 | 100 712 | 129 887 | 51
Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.
StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395826

Table B.6. Acquisition of nationality by country of former nationality
Thousands
Japan
| 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | Of which: Women 2014 (%)
Korea | 11 031 | 9 689 | 8 531 | 8 546 | 7 412 | 7 637 | 6 668 | 5 656 | 5 581 | 4 331 | 4 744 | ..
China | 4 122 | 4 427 | 4 347 | 4 740 | 4 322 | 5 392 | 4 816 | 3 259 | 3 598 | 2 845 | 3 060 | ..
Other countries | 1 183 | 1 135 | 1 230 | 1 394 | 1 484 | 1 756 | 1 588 | 1 444 | 1 443 | 1 470 | 1 473 |
Total | 16 336 | 15 251 | 14 108 | 14 680 | 13 218 | 14 785 | 13 072 | 10 359 | 10 622 | 8 646 | 9 277 | ..
Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.
StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395826

Table B.6. Acquisition of nationality by country of former nationality
Thousands
Korea
| 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | Of which: Women 2014 (%)
China | 7 443 | 14 881 | 7 156 | 8 178 | 12 545 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | ..
Viet Nam | 147 | 362 | 243 | 461 | 1 147 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | ..
Philippines | 1 074 | 786 | 317 | 335 | 579 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | ..
Mongolia | 36 | 109 | 32 | 82 | 134 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | ..
Uzbekistan | 34 | 79 | 38 | 60 | 80 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | ..
Thailand | 53 | 69 | 39 | 57 | 73 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | ..
Pakistan | 58 | 66 | 18 | 34 | 27 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | ..
Other countries | 417 | 622 | 282 | 1 112 | 673 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
Total | 9 262 | 16 974 | 8 125 | 10 319 | 15 258 | 26 756 | 17 323 | 18 400 | .. | .. | .. | ..
Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.
StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395826

Table B.6. Acquisition of nationality by country of former nationality
Thousands
Luxembourg
| 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | Of which: Women 2014 (%)
Belgium | 83 | 101 | 87 | 97 | 77 | 224 | 258 | 450 | 1 581 | 1 577 | 1 346 | 47
Portugal | 188 | 252 | 338 | 352 | 293 | 1 242 | 1 351 | 1 085 | 1 155 | 982 | 1 211 | 50
France | 44 | 51 | 74 | 75 | 76 | 277 | 342 | 314 | 462 | 639 | 860 | 47
Italy | 111 | 97 | 161 | 138 | 109 | 362 | 665 | 425 | 411 | 314 | 418 | 53
Germany | 62 | 79 | 74 | 95 | 76 | 322 | 333 | 208 | 201 | 195 | 209 | 53
Serbia | 0 | 2 | 55 | 67 | 115 | 425 | 412 | 229 | 194 | 148 | 197 | 48
United States | 2 | 2 | 0 | 2 | 3 | 47 | 44 | 32 | 42 | 48 | 80 | 45
United Kingdom | 3 | 1 | 8 | 5 | 0 | 62 | 53 | 44 | 56 | 37 | 66 | 50
Bosnia and Herzegovina | 22 | 29 | 46 | 72 | 76 | 270 | 202 | 114 | 74 | 60 | 56 | 59
Netherlands | 6 | 7 | 20 | 10 | 20 | 31 | 50 | 38 | 54 | 27 | 54 | 52
Spain | 8 | 9 | 7 | 17 | 10 | 48 | 58 | 35 | 38 | 30 | 48 | 50
Russian Federation | 5 | 8 | 13 | 10 | 10 | 40 | 50 | 30 | 17 | 22 | 30 | 77
Cabo Verde | 41 | 33 | 45 | 46 | 49 | 77 | 40 | 60 | 41 | 44 | 27 | 63
Ukraine | 3 | 4 | 5 | 5 | 11 | 25 | 22 | 23 | 35 | 17 | 23 | 91
Switzerland | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 30 | 29 | 20 | 30 | 14 | 23 | 65
Other countries | 262 | 279 | 195 | 245 | 290 | 540 | 402 | 298 | 289 | 257 | 343 |
Total | 841 | 954 | 1 128 | 1 236 | 1 215 | 4 022 | 4 311 | 3 405 | 4 680 | 4 411 | 4 991 | 50
Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.
StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395826

Table B.6. Acquisition of nationality by country of former nationality
Thousands
Mexico
| 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | Of which: Women 2014 (%)
Colombia | 901 | 813 | 689 | 892 | 690 | 390 | 305 | 486 | 634 | 601 | 397 | 54
Cuba | 661 | 666 | 429 | 660 | 459 | 307 | 240 | 408 | 579 | 531 | 287 | 46
Venezuela | 107 | 197 | 185 | 316 | 309 | 159 | 126 | 162 | 279 | 334 | 259 | 59
Argentina | 328 | 372 | 400 | 450 | 400 | 265 | 170 | 178 | 271 | 304 | 130 | 41
United States | 215 | 286 | 334 | 287 | 246 | 266 | 117 | 79 | 108 | 119 | 120 | 41
Spain | 218 | 301 | 239 | 286 | 251 | 227 | 121 | 152 | 180 | 163 | 119 | 34
Peru | 320 | 191 | 215 | 292 | 213 | 166 | 107 | 138 | 182 | 159 | 100 | 51
El Salvador | 243 | 235 | 137 | 159 | 118 | 163 | 81 | 82 | 99 | 109 | 66 | 55
Guatemala | 1 624 | 247 | 114 | 185 | 141 | 209 | 95 | 117 | 196 | 141 | 62 | 55
China | 310 | 324 | 188 | 211 | 241 | 154 | 145 | 58 | 76 | 56 | 62 | 58
Honduras | 118 | 156 | 59 | 123 | 98 | 131 | 55 | 92 | 143 | 129 | 60 | 52
Dominican Republic | 38 | 43 | 47 | 69 | 48 | 50 | 29 | 22 | 75 | 59 | 53 | 42
France | 105 | 93 | 105 | 71 | 77 | 82 | 37 | 41 | 48 | 63 | 46 | 50
Russian Federation | 82 | 108 | 97 | 86 | 74 | 55 | 24 | 36 | 42 | 36 | 44 | 73
Ecuador | 64 | 67 | 52 | 83 | 63 | 41 | 41 | 46 | 63 | 59 | 40 | 52
Other countries | 1 095 | 1 511 | 885 | 1 300 | 1 043 | 824 | 457 | 536 | 615 | 718 | 496 |
Total | 6 429 | 5 610 | 4 175 | 5 470 | 4 471 | 3 489 | 2 150 | 2 633 | 3 590 | 3 581 | 2 341 | 48
Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.
StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395826

Table B.6. Acquisition of nationality by country of former nationality
Thousands
Netherlands
| 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | Of which: Women 2014 (%)
Morocco | 5 873 | 7 086 | 6 896 | 6 409 | 5 034 | 5 508 | 5 797 | 6 824 | 6 238 | 3 886 | 4 251 | 54
Turkey | 4 026 | 3 493 | 3 407 | 4 073 | 3 147 | 4 167 | 4 984 | 5 029 | 4 292 | 2 872 | 3 119 | 52
Iraq | 489 | 333 | 331 | 501 | 866 | 674 | 288 | 289 | 525 | 929 | 1 331 | 49
Afghanistan | 801 | 550 | 562 | 662 | 584 | 596 | 402 | 371 | 567 | 1 341 | 1 027 | 57
Suriname | 1 421 | 2 031 | 1 636 | 1 285 | 1 006 | 1 142 | 967 | 934 | 875 | 659 | 828 | 64
India | 117 | 187 | 214 | 214 | 153 | 263 | 193 | 292 | 406 | 415 | 794 | 42
Iran | 122 | 184 | 225 | 221 | 273 | 279 | 217 | 281 | 361 | 848 | 690 | 53
China | 739 | 1 291 | 799 | 638 | 539 | 559 | 490 | .. | 437 | 494 | 628 | 62
Ghana | 74 | 199 | 296 | 314 | 283 | 411 | 367 | 519 | 540 | 435 | 575 | 58
Thailand | 161 | 160 | 171 | 195 | 220 | 383 | 413 | 571 | 602 | 371 | 534 | 86
Nigeria | 69 | 139 | 189 | 214 | 220 | 300 | 271 | 267 | 336 | 352 | 462 | 51
Philippines | 129 | 198 | 209 | 226 | 209 | 308 | 263 | 330 | 381 | 263 | 457 | 80
Russian Federation | 242 | 521 | 466 | 413 | 436 | 400 | 275 | .. | 427 | 291 | 446 | 74
Poland | 212 | 347 | 238 | 268 | 237 | 271 | 202 | 296 | 360 | 237 | 421 | 67
Brazil | 131 | 159 | 189 | 173 | 201 | 307 | 272 | 307 | 408 | 238 | 389 | 80
Other countries | 11 567 | 11 610 | 13 261 | 14 847 | 14 821 | 14 186 | 10 874 | 12 288 | 14 200 | 12 251 | 16 626 |
Total | 26 173 | 28 488 | 29 089 | 30 653 | 28 229 | 29 754 | 26 275 | 28 598 | 30 955 | 25 882 | 32 578 | 55
Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.
StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395826

Table B.6. Acquisition of nationality by country of former nationality
Thousands
New Zealand
| 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | Of which: Women 2014 (%)
United Kingdom | 2 369 | 2 431 | 2 901 | 3 571 | 3 473 | 2 958 | 2 592 | 4 420 | 5 611 | 4 967 | 4 597 | 49
South Africa | 2 411 | 2 433 | 2 805 | 3 119 | 2 413 | 1 808 | 1 339 | 2 105 | 2 784 | 3 387 | 3 834 | 50
Philippines | 704 | 846 | 1 135 | 1 170 | 718 | 696 | 848 | 663 | 2 218 | 2 784 | 2 721 | 53
Samoa | 1 069 | 1 161 | 1 375 | 1 447 | 1 433 | 1 549 | 1 908 | 2 034 | 2 957 | 2 936 | 2 591 | 48
Fiji | 1 456 | 1 551 | 1 693 | 1 729 | 1 938 | 1 536 | 1 307 | 1 212 | 2 081 | 2 094 | 2 237 | 52
India | 2 136 | 2 926 | 4 346 | 5 211 | 3 431 | 2 246 | 1 567 | 1 649 | 2 271 | 2 206 | 2 221 | 47
China | 2 856 | 3 339 | 3 901 | 3 084 | 1 919 | 1 131 | 676 | 846 | 1 159 | 1 184 | 1 243 | 55
United States | 360 | 289 | 372 | 418 | 392 | 331 | 327 | 437 | 573 | 630 | 659 | 51
Zimbabwe | 415 | 585 | 817 | 902 | 653 | 368 | 265 | 632 | 703 | 630 | 587 | 51
Tonga | 199 | 169 | 193 | 260 | 279 | 315 | 378 | 337 | 460 | 522 | 502 | 51
Malaysia | 345 | 284 | 334 | 453 | 423 | 449 | 456 | 403 | 485 | 414 | 401 | 55
Korea | 1 098 | 1 528 | 1 644 | 1 454 | 887 | 585 | 457 | 444 | 559 | 405 | 382 | 45
Australia | 121 | 105 | 147 | 151 | 142 | 122 | 127 | 111 | 179 | 239 | 340 | 51
Sri Lanka | 514 | 441 | 435 | 482 | 393 | 296 | 235 | 158 | 202 | 263 | 330 | 48
Thailand | 279 | 290 | 253 | 210 | 166 | 165 | 131 | 222 | 255 | 298 | 305 | 70
Other countries | 5 895 | 6 084 | 6 897 | 6 255 | 4 963 | 3 450 | 2 560 | 3 614 | 4 733 | 5 508 | 5 807 |
Total | 22 227 | 24 462 | 29 248 | 29 916 | 23 623 | 18 005 | 15 173 | 19 287 | 27 230 | 28 467 | 28 757 | 51
Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.
StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395826

Table B.6. Acquisition of nationality by country of former nationality
Thousands
Norway
| 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | Of which: Women 2014 (%)
Iraq | 619 | 2 141 | 2 142 | 2 577 | 1 072 | 1 267 | 1 338 | 947 | 1 642 | 1 663 | 1 418 | 50
Afghanistan | 23 | 75 | 194 | 674 | 877 | 857 | 1 054 | 1 281 | 1 013 | 1 005 | 1 371 | 31
Somalia | 526 | 1 250 | 1 281 | 2 196 | 1 315 | 1 737 | 1 528 | 2 131 | 1 571 | 1 667 | 1 138 | 53
Philippines | 249 | 322 | 246 | 421 | 233 | 445 | 322 | 421 | 341 | 479 | 851 | 75
Myanmar | 0 | 7 | 0 | 5 | 4 | 33 | 103 | 260 | 325 | 533 | 838 | 50
Eritrea | 20 | 50 | 60 | 88 | 67 | 63 | 248 | 254 | 199 | 323 | 563 | 54
Thailand | 234 | 299 | 263 | 427 | 247 | 483 | 267 | 380 | 265 | 346 | 547 | 78
Pakistan | 568 | 694 | 590 | 544 | 773 | 469 | 430 | 526 | 478 | 424 | 503 | 54
Russian Federation | 365 | 548 | 458 | 436 | 515 | 622 | 673 | 644 | 629 | 418 | 401 | 65
Ethiopia | 83 | 116 | 140 | 313 | 341 | 216 | 225 | 341 | 236 | 195 | 362 | 53
Iran | 508 | 832 | 535 | 740 | 495 | 785 | 554 | 539 | 297 | 307 | 336 | 54
Poland | 171 | 126 | 112 | 31 | 74 | 77 | 50 | 96 | 138 | 166 | 324 | 62
Congo | 5 | 15 | 9 | 38 | 46 | .. | 142 | 189 | 222 | 258 | 320 | 53
India | 207 | 223 | 187 | 235 | 141 | 185 | 152 | 209 | 130 | 132 | 313 | 48
Sweden | 221 | 276 | 376 | 241 | 211 | 184 | 248 | 300 | 213 | 229 | 253 | 47
Other countries | 4 355 | 5 681 | 5 362 | 5 911 | 3 901 | 4 019 | 4 569 | 6 119 | 4 685 | 5 078 | 5 798 |
Total | 8 154 | 12 655 | 11 955 | 14 877 | 10 312 | 11 442 | 11 903 | 14 637 | 12 384 | 13 223 | 15 336 | 55
Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.
StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395826

Table B.6. Acquisition of nationality by country of former nationality
Thousands
Poland
| 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | Of which: Women 2014 (%)
Ukraine | 538 | 759 | 417 | 662 | 369 | 877 | 992 | 800 | 1 196 | 908 | 1 911 | ..
Belarus | 129 | 316 | 101 | 126 | 152 | 357 | 418 | 320 | 456 | 390 | 741 | ..
Russian Federation | 145 | 257 | 129 | 114 | 64 | 162 | 215 | 200 | 244 | 171 | 370 | ..
Armenia | 6 | 18 | 27 | 30 | 16 | 79 | 101 | 103 | 163 | 111 | 367 | ..
Viet Nam | 11 | 36 | 29 | 47 | 12 | 64 | 97 | 104 | 150 | 105 | 289 | ..
Germany | 62 | 156 | 1 | 39 | 37 | 47 | 92 | 106 | 171 | 389 | 38 | ..
Kazakhstan | 38 | 62 | 10 | 10 | 18 | 41 | 38 | 42 | 44 | 41 | 36 | ..
Turkey | 11 | 19 | 36 | 11 | 1 | 35 | 33 | 12 | 72 | 17 | 33 | ..
Syria | 37 | 57 | 5 | 12 | 5 | 22 | 18 | 22 | 43 | 20 | 33 | ..
Mongolia | .. | .. | .. | .. | 8 | 9 | 12 | 11 | 24 | 15 | 29 | ..
Iraq | 5 | 7 | 0 | 7 | 6 | 6 | 10 | 8 | 17 | 6 | 27 | ..
Bulgaria | 32 | 54 | 8 | 16 | 8 | 21 | 21 | 38 | 29 | 25 | 27 | ..
United States | 41 | 59 | 8 | 23 | 27 | 47 | 50 | 53 | 75 | 86 | 26 | ..
Hungary | 12 | 16 | 0 | 1 | 5 | 7 | 8 | 5 | 17 | 14 | 25 | ..
Romania | 3 | 13 | 4 | 7 | 5 | 9 | 8 | 9 | 17 | 11 | 25 | ..
Other countries | 867 | 1 037 | 214 | 423 | 321 | 720 | 813 | 492 | 1 075 | 1 153 | 541 |
Total | 1 937 | 2 866 | 989 | 1 528 | 1 054 | 2 503 | 2 926 | 2 325 | 3 792 | 3 462 | 4 518 | ..
Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.
StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395826

Table B.6. Acquisition of nationality by country of former nationality
Thousands
Portugal
| 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | Of which: Women 2014 (%)
Brazil | 307 | 162 | 491 | 415 | 4 080 | 3 993 | 4 007 | 5 352 | 4 596 | 5 102 | 4 656 | 61
Ukraine | 2 | 2 | 12 | .. | 484 | 978 | 1 358 | 2 336 | 3 322 | 4 007 | 3 310 | 48
Cabo Verde | 274 | 132 | 1 047 | 2 189 | 6 013 | 5 368 | 3 982 | 3 502 | 3 230 | 3 821 | 3 200 | 56
Guinea-Bissau | 95 | 36 | 873 | 1 602 | 2 754 | 2 442 | 1 847 | 1 815 | 1 753 | 2 082 | 1 915 | 49
Angola | 63 | 38 | 336 | 738 | 2 075 | 2 113 | 1 953 | 1 870 | 1 857 | 2 131 | 1 630 | 56
Moldova | 2 | 3 | 6 | .. | 2 230 | 2 896 | 2 675 | 2 324 | 2 043 | 1 816 | 1 363 | 53
Sao Tome and Principe | 22 | 7 | 134 | 448 | 1 391 | 1 289 | 1 097 | 1 156 | 869 | 1 027 | 938 | 54
Romania | 4 | 5 | 20 | .. | 209 | 258 | 303 | 469 | 492 | 796 | 687 | 50
India | 3 | 6 | 25 | 32 | 417 | 1 055 | 919 | 860 | 628 | 539 | 490 | 34
Russian Federation | 9 | 6 | 21 | 31 | 259 | 535 | 580 | 590 | 506 | 515 | 395 | 65
Pakistan | 2 | 4 | 21 | 32 | 74 | 200 | 388 | 476 | 443 | 346 | 333 | 34
Morocco | .. | .. | .. | .. | 203 | 203 | 188 | 175 | 132 | 201 | 192 | 49
Senegal | .. | .. | .. | .. | 111 | 120 | 193 | 163 | 145 | 188 | 174 | 26
Guinea | .. | .. | .. | .. | 450 | 717 | 475 | 313 | 193 | 208 | 171 | 28
Mozambique | 17 | 4 | 57 | 155 | 262 | 253 | 208 | 204 | 193 | 199 | 148 | 64
Other countries | 546 | 534 | 584 | 378 | 1 396 | 1 762 | 1 577 | 1 633 | 1 417 | 1 498 | 1 522 |
Total | 1 346 | 939 | 3 627 | 6 020 | 22 408 | 24 182 | 21 750 | 23 238 | 21 819 | 24 476 | 21 124 | 53
Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.
StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395826

Table B.6. Acquisition of nationality by country of former nationality
Thousands
Russian Federation
| 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | Of which: Women 2014 (%)
Kazakhstan | 106 613 | 123 286 | 68 087 | 64 831 | 58 736 | 50 628 | 27 130 | 29 986 | 14 585 | 20 582 | 32 293 | ..
Ukraine | 50 593 | 94 133 | 66 502 | 55 424 | 58 500 | 62 025 | 5 715 | 7 783 | 12 803 | 15 646 | 24 141 | ..
Uzbekistan | 29 676 | 73 315 | 67 021 | 53 109 | 43 982 | 49 784 | 4 788 | 7 906 | 13 409 | 17 937 | 22 363 | ..
Armenia | 23 139 | 39 330 | 34 860 | 39 328 | 45 253 | 54 828 | 6 261 | 7 847 | 13 176 | 16 550 | 20 922 | ..
Tajikistan | 10 749 | 16 148 | 12 198 | 16 444 | 21 891 | 39 214 | 4 393 | 6 152 | 9 773 | 12 476 | 14 638 | ..
Moldova | 7 283 | 13 727 | 12 809 | 13 876 | 15 782 | 20 429 | 1 992 | 2 802 | 5 252 | 8 878 | 10 297 | ..
Kyrgyzstan | 27 449 | 38 422 | 33 166 | 61 239 | 51 210 | 48 720 | 37 348 | 52 362 | 8 415 | 7 177 | 9 754 | ..
Azerbaijan | 24 555 | 35 720 | 22 045 | 24 885 | 29 643 | 34 627 | 5 265 | 5 635 | 6 440 | 6 856 | 9 243 | ..
Georgia | 20 695 | 25 225 | 14 008 | 12 156 | 11 110 | 9 876 | 2 513 | 2 405 | 3 082 | 2 849 | 4 398 | ..
Belarus | 10 179 | 12 943 | 7 919 | 6 572 | 7 099 | 6 062 | 3 888 | 3 993 | 1 547 | 2 559 | 3 566 | ..
Russian Federation | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 1 937 | ..
Turkmenistan | 5 358 | 7 713 | 5 577 | 4 737 | 4 444 | 4 026 | 482 | 544 | 753 | 825 | 1 162 | ..
Turkey | 50 | 44 | 51 | 60 | 105 | 129 | 144 | 146 | 201 | 218 | 254 | ..
Viet Nam | 7 | 46 | 58 | 77 | 94 | 75 | 90 | 112 | 105 | 170 | 240 | ..
Latvia | 954 | 1 062 | 756 | 516 | 466 | 469 | 135 | 169 | 178 | 178 | 189 | ..
Other countries | 13 119 | 23 404 | 21 431 | 14 445 | 13 048 | 13 245 | 11 154 | 7 138 | 6 018 | 4 480 | 2 394 |
Total | 330 419 | 504 518 | 366 488 | 367 699 | 361 363 | 394 137 | 111 298 | 134 980 | 95 737 | 117 381 | 157 791 | ..
Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.
StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395826

Table B.6. Acquisition of nationality by country of former nationality
Thousands
Slovak Republic
| 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | Of which: Women 2014 (%)
Ukraine | 549 | 450 | 377 | 704 | 203 | 35 | 44 | 61 | 60 | 70 | 62 | 66
Viet Nam | 619 | 40 | 40 | 62 | 37 | 7 | 15 | 5 | 11 | 15 | 49 | 61
Czech Republic | 775 | 167 | 121 | 158 | 93 | 39 | 45 | 45 | 36 | 24 | 37 | 46
Romania | 442 | 220 | 147 | 100 | 31 | 10 | 10 | 18 | 25 | 9 | 7 | 57
Iraq | 2 | 1 | .. | 1 | .. | .. | 1 | .. | .. | .. | 7 | 29
Serbia | 506 | 185 | 42 | 112 | 53 | 46 | 57 | 53 | 56 | 67 | 5 | 40
United States | 136 | 64 | 113 | 110 | 93 | 9 | 7 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 5 | 60
Russian Federation | 96 | 37 | 35 | 42 | 31 | 4 | 8 | 8 | 3 | 22 | 5 | 20
Former Yug. Rep. of Macedonia | 143 | 12 | 4 | 10 | 3 | 1 | .. | .. | .. | 1 | 5 | 20
Belarus | 14 | 5 | 5 | 8 | 9 | 1 | .. | 4 | 4 | 3 | 5 | 100
Egypt | 5 | .. | 2 | 1 | .. | .. | 1 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 4 | 25
Armenia | 39 | 3 | 3 | 5 | 4 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 4 | 75
Bulgaria | 42 | 24 | 35 | 19 | 7 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 3 | ..
Syria | 15 | .. | 1 | 1 | .. | 2 | .. | .. | .. | .. | 2 | ..
Poland | 26 | 14 | 20 | 18 | 7 | 1 | 5 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 2 | 50
Other countries | 607 | 171 | 180 | 127 | 109 | 102 | 42 | 62 | 45 | 56 | 31 |
Total | 4 016 | 1 393 | 1 125 | 1 478 | 680 | 262 | 239 | 272 | 255 | 282 | 233 | 53
Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.
StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395826

Table B.6. Acquisition of nationality by country of former nationality
Thousands
Slovenia
| 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | Of which: Women 2014 (%)
Bosnia and Herzegovina | .. | .. | .. | 368 | 445 | 467 | 556 | 622 | 305 | 545 | 579 | 37
Serbia | .. | .. | .. | 159 | 452 | 396 | 289 | 211 | 100 | 219 | 164 | 44
Former Yug. Rep. of Macedonia | .. | .. | .. | 45 | .. | 140 | 194 | 177 | 59 | 122 | 122 | 45
Italy | .. | .. | .. | 72 | 116 | 179 | 206 | 205 | 97 | 186 | 92 | 52
Croatia | .. | .. | .. | 56 | 203 | 181 | 115 | 162 | 52 | 93 | 47 | 53
Russian Federation | .. | .. | .. | 5 | 7 | 19 | 6 | 17 | 6 | 12 | 25 | 56
Ukraine | .. | .. | .. | .. | 6 | 13 | 23 | 31 | 14 | 35 | 17 | 76
Argentina | .. | .. | .. | 15 | 21 | 59 | 77 | 56 | 24 | 32 | 16 | 37
Moldova | .. | .. | .. | .. | 1 | 2 | 4 | 10 | 6 | 7 | 10 | 30
Brazil | .. | .. | .. | 3 | 4 | 5 | 25 | 36 | 5 | 17 | 9 | 67
United States | .. | .. | .. | .. | 11 | 14 | 19 | 19 | 14 | 29 | 8 | 50
Germany | .. | .. | .. | 8 | 12 | 3 | 10 | 12 | 7 | 14 | 8 | 50
China | .. | .. | .. | .. | 11 | 1 | 11 | 7 | .. | 1 | 7 | 86
Australia | .. | .. | .. | 6 | 24 | 13 | 13 | 23 | 12 | 18 | 7 | 29
Congo | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 5 | ..
Other countries | .. | .. | .. | 104 | 155 | 214 | 281 | 224 | 67 | 140 | 146 |
Total | .. | .. | .. | 841 | 1 468 | 1 706 | 1 829 | 1 812 | 768 | 1 470 | 1 262 | 42
Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.
StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395826

Table B.6. Acquisition of nationality by country of former nationality
Thousands
Spain
| 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | Of which: Women 2014 (%)
Morocco | 8 036 | 5 555 | 5 690 | 7 864 | 8 615 | 6 683 | 10 703 | 14 427 | 16 163 | 46 547 | 19 730 | 39
Colombia | 4 194 | 7 334 | 12 720 | 13 852 | 15 409 | 16 527 | 23 995 | 19 803 | 19 396 | 38 215 | 10 945 | 61
Ecuador | 6 370 | 10 031 | 19 477 | 21 371 | 25 536 | 25 769 | 43 091 | 32 026 | 23 763 | 41 612 | 10 783 | 55
Bolivia | 218 | 289 | 648 | 709 | 1 103 | 1 813 | 4 778 | 5 333 | 7 424 | 23 414 | 9 130 | 67
Peru | 3 958 | 3 645 | 4 713 | 6 490 | 8 206 | 6 368 | 8 291 | 9 255 | 12 008 | 20 788 | 6 131 | 57
Dominican Republic | 2 834 | 2 322 | 2 805 | 2 800 | 3 496 | 2 766 | 3 801 | 4 985 | 6 028 | 13 985 | 5 260 | 62
Cuba | 1 889 | 2 506 | 2 703 | 2 466 | 2 870 | 2 696 | 3 546 | 3 088 | 2 921 | 6 843 | 2 894 | 56
Argentina | 1 746 | 2 293 | 3 536 | 4 810 | 5 188 | 4 629 | 6 395 | 5 482 | 5 217 | 9 880 | 2 760 | 54
Brazil | 683 | 695 | 782 | 779 | 1 049 | 943 | 1 738 | 1 854 | 2 540 | 5 572 | 2 178 | 72
Venezuela | 703 | 752 | 908 | 1 324 | 1 581 | 1 744 | 2 730 | 2 596 | 2 823 | 6 347 | 2 055 | 61
Paraguay | 42 | 60 | 87 | 78 | 179 | 298 | 766 | 864 | 1 297 | 3 799 | 1 643 | 77
Pakistan | 153 | 147 | 147 | 176 | 208 | 262 | 375 | 491 | 596 | 2 751 | 1 347 | 14
Uruguay | 327 | 408 | 624 | 839 | 1 201 | 1 451 | 2 219 | 1 978 | 1 819 | 3 362 | 1 229 | 54
Honduras | 131 | 135 | 148 | 151 | 185 | 241 | 473 | 440 | 578 | 2 135 | 1 217 | 75
Chile | 484 | 620 | 844 | 838 | 1 141 | 1 090 | 1 688 | 1 556 | 1 589 | 3 176 | 1 194 | 53
Other countries | 6 567 | 6 037 | 6 507 | 7 263 | 8 203 | 6 317 | 9 132 | 10 421 | 11 395 | 32 869 | 15 218 |
Total | 38 335 | 42 829 | 62 339 | 71 810 | 84 170 | 79 597 | 123 721 | 114 599 | 115 557 | 261 295 | 93 714 | 53
Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.
StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395826

Table B.6. Acquisition of nationality by country of former nationality
Thousands
Sweden
| 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | Of which: Women 2014 (%)
Iraq | 5 298 | 11 544 | 12 895 | 5 950 | 4 224 | 3 180 | 4 367 | 6 191 | 16 621 | 14 354 | 7 293 | 57
Finland | 2 703 | 2 588 | 2 975 | 2 757 | 2 535 | 2 432 | 2 971 | 2 230 | 2 247 | 2 259 | 3 033 | 68
Somalia | 840 | 688 | 931 | 655 | 787 | 885 | 1 076 | 1 091 | 1 552 | 2 489 | 2 935 | 49
Poland | 990 | 793 | 1 000 | 762 | 686 | 824 | 1 487 | 1 791 | 1 649 | 2 482 | 2 425 | 54
Thailand | 500 | 585 | 876 | 1 007 | 1 261 | 1 314 | 1 429 | 1 547 | 1 908 | 2 043 | 2 081 | 83
Iran | 1 296 | 1 889 | 2 796 | 1 459 | 1 113 | 1 110 | 967 | 1 028 | 1 418 | 1 319 | 1 134 | 50
Turkey | 1 269 | 1 702 | 2 921 | 1 456 | 1 125 | 1 200 | 1 049 | 1 343 | 1 325 | 1 156 | 1 035 | 44
Eritrea | 121 | 199 | 297 | 202 | 253 | 356 | 327 | 398 | 743 | 842 | 1 000 | 54
Serbia | 2 124 | 3 254 | 3 073 | 27 | 61 | 132 | 367 | 842 | 1 225 | 1 038 | 963 | 49
Germany | 244 | 294 | 457 | 386 | 606 | 700 | 923 | 778 | 661 | 852 | 939 | 53
Romania | 282 | 311 | 397 | 279 | 269 | 268 | 245 | 206 | 356 | 749 | 786 | 53
Afghanistan | 361 | 623 | 1 062 | 777 | 812 | 1 180 | 848 | 636 | 853 | 778 | 786 | 53
Russian Federation | 535 | 886 | 1 510 | 919 | 759 | 865 | 769 | 948 | 957 | 940 | 724 | 70
Denmark | 335 | 329 | 431 | 388 | 404 | 409 | 485 | 393 | 477 | 565 | 605 | 46
Bosnia and Herzegovina | 1 469 | 1 788 | 2 627 | 2 081 | 1 764 | 1 146 | 919 | 1 123 | 946 | 702 | 543 | 49
Other countries | 10 526 | 12 100 | 16 991 | 14 524 | 13 802 | 13 524 | 14 228 | 16 089 | 17 241 | 17 599 | 17 228 |
Total | 28 893 | 39 573 | 51 239 | 33 629 | 30 461 | 29 525 | 32 457 | 36 634 | 50 179 | 50 167 | 43 510 | 55
Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.
StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395826

Table B.6. Acquisition of nationality by country of former nationality
Thousands
Switzerland
| 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | Of which: Women 2014 (%)
Italy | 4 196 | 4 032 | 4 502 | 4 629 | 4 921 | 4 804 | 4 111 | 4 109 | 4 045 | 4 401 | 4 495 | 43
Germany | 639 | 773 | 1 144 | 1 361 | 3 022 | 4 035 | 3 617 | 3 544 | 3 401 | 3 835 | 4 120 | 52
Portugal | 1 199 | 1 505 | 2 383 | 2 201 | 1 761 | 2 336 | 2 217 | 2 298 | 2 110 | 2 201 | 2 458 | 56
Serbia | 7 854 | 9 503 | 11 721 | 10 441 | 10 252 | 8 453 | 6 859 | 4 359 | 3 463 | 2 611 | 1 913 | 53
France | 1 181 | 1 021 | 1 260 | 1 218 | 1 110 | 1 314 | 1 084 | 1 325 | 1 229 | 1 580 | 1 750 | 48
Turkey | 3 565 | 3 467 | 3 457 | 3 044 | 2 866 | 2 593 | 2 091 | 1 886 | 1 662 | 1 628 | 1 399 | 46
Former Yug. Rep. of Macedonia | 1 981 | 2 171 | 2 596 | 2 210 | 2 287 | 1 831 | 1 586 | 1 337 | 1 223 | 1 272 | 1 288 | 47
Spain | 823 | 975 | 1 283 | 1 246 | 1 096 | 1 245 | 1 120 | 1 091 | 1 055 | 1 054 | 1 071 | 51
Bosnia and Herzegovina | 2 371 | 2 790 | 3 149 | 3 008 | 2 855 | 2 408 | 1 924 | 1 628 | 1 163 | 1 173 | 966 | 53
Croatia | 1 616 | 1 681 | 1 837 | 1 660 | 2 046 | 1 599 | 1 483 | 1 273 | 1 201 | 1 126 | 838 | 57
Sri Lanka | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 781 | 52
Brazil | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 455 | 79
United Kingdom | 289 | 287 | 323 | 353 | 319 | 365 | 298 | 351 | 396 | 328 | 449 | 49
Russian Federation | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 397 | 397 | 80
United States | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | 364 | 48
Other countries | 9 971 | 10 232 | 13 056 | 12 518 | 11 830 | 12 457 | 12 924 | 13 556 | 13 173 | 12 726 | 10 581 |
Total | 35 685 | 38 437 | 46 711 | 43 889 | 44 365 | 43 440 | 39 314 | 36 757 | 34 121 | 34 332 | 33 325 | 53
Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.
StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395826

Table B.6. Acquisition of nationality by country of former nationality
Thousands
Turkey
| 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | Of which: Women 2014 (%)
Bulgaria | 3 528 | 3 299 | 1 769 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | ..
Azerbaijan | 1 541 | 780 | 563 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | ..
Russian Federation | 700 | 346 | 287 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | ..
Afghanistan | 233 | 312 | 245 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | ..
Kazakhstan | 398 | 272 | 195 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | ..
Syria | 135 | 124 | 175 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | ..
Iraq | 153 | 146 | 143 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | ..
Iran | 178 | 156 | 137 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | ..
Greece | 119 | 104 | 107 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | ..
United Kingdom | 26 | 61 | 93 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | ..
Kyrgyzstan | 140 | 129 | 88 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | ..
Uzbekistan | 109 | 76 | 87 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | ..
Ukraine | 87 | 58 | 85 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | ..
Former Yug. Rep. of Macedonia | 72 | 82 | 80 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | ..
Romania | 52 | 84 | 76 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | ..
Other countries | 767 | 872 | 942 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |
Total | 8 238 | 6 901 | 5 072 | 4 359 | 5 968 | 8 141 | 9 488 | 9 216 | .. | .. | .. | ..
Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.
StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395826

Table B.6. Acquisition of nationality by country of former nationality
Thousands
United Kingdom
| 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | Of which: Women 2014 (%)
India | 13 598 | 14 137 | 15 134 | 14 507 | 11 835 | 26 541 | 29 405 | 26 290 | 28 352 | 36 351 | 22 425 | ..
Pakistan | 14 094 | 12 605 | 10 260 | 8 143 | 9 442 | 20 945 | 22 054 | 17 641 | 18 445 | 21 655 | 13 000 | ..
Nigeria | 6 242 | 6 622 | 5 874 | 6 031 | 4 531 | 6 953 | 7 873 | 7 932 | 8 881 | 9 275 | 8 076 | ..
South Africa | 6 366 | 7 046 | 7 665 | 8 149 | 5 266 | 8 367 | 7 446 | 6 351 | 6 924 | 6 448 | 5 289 | ..
Bangladesh | 5 786 | 3 637 | 3 724 | 2 257 | 3 633 | 12 041 | 7 966 | 5 149 | 5 702 | 8 902 | 3 892 | ..
China | 1 918 | 2 425 | 2 601 | 3 117 | 2 677 | 6 041 | 7 581 | 6 966 | 7 198 | 7 289 | 3 530 | ..
Poland | 794 | 559 | 580 | 562 | 251 | 458 | 1 419 | 1 863 | 3 043 | 6 066 | 3 166 | ..
Ghana | 3 217 | 3 307 | 2 989 | 3 373 | 3 134 | 4 662 | 4 551 | 3 931 | 4 744 | 4 675 | 3 134 | ..
Zimbabwe | 1 814 | 2 128 | 2 556 | 5 592 | 5 707 | 7 703 | 6 301 | 4 877 | 5 647 | 4 412 | 3 103 | ..
Philippines | 2 011 | 3 797 | 8 839 | 10 844 | 5 382 | 11 751 | 9 429 | 7 133 | 8 122 | 10 374 | 3 095 | ..
Australia | 3 044 | 3 350 | 3 377 | 2 836 | 1 990 | 2 890 | 2 593 | 2 449 | 2 792 | 2 683 | 3 054 | ..
Nepal | 190 | 655 | 916 | 1 047 | 929 | 1 551 | 2 118 | 3 468 | 4 282 | 7 447 | 2 667 | ..
Jamaica | 3 161 | 3 520 | 2 526 | 3 165 | 2 715 | 3 148 | 2 958 | 2 514 | 3 005 | 2 874 | 2 372 | ..
Sri Lanka | 4 530 | 6 997 | 5 717 | 6 496 | 3 284 | 4 762 | 4 944 | 5 886 | 6 163 | 3 855 | 2 335 | ..
Somalia | 11 164 | 8 297 | 9 029 | 7 450 | 7 163 | 8 139 | 5 817 | 4 664 | 5 143 | 5 688 | 2 106 | ..
Other countries | 70 344 | 82 617 | 72 231 | 81 068 | 61 438 | 77 837 | 72 591 | 70 671 | 75 766 | 69 995 | 44 409 |
Total | 148 273 | 161 699 | 154 018 | 164 637 | 129 377 | 203 789 | 195 046 | 177 785 | 194 209 | 207 989 | 125 653 | ..
Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.
StatLink  http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933395826

Table B.6. Acquisition of nationality by country of former nationality
Thousands
United States
| 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | Of which: Women 2014 (%)
Mexico | 63 840 | 77 089 | 83 979 | 122 258 | 231 815 | 111 630 | 67 062 | 94 783 | 102 181 | 99 385 | 94 889 | 54
India | 37 975 | 35 962 | 47 542 | 46 871 | 65 971 | 52 889 | 61 142 | 45 985 | 42 928 | 49 897 | 37 854 | 51
Philippines | 31 448 | 36 673 | 40 500 | 38 830 | 58 792 | 38 934 | 35 465 | 42 520 | 44 958 | 43 489 | 34 591 | 65
China | 27 309 | 31 708 | 35 387 | 33 134 | 40 017 | 37 130 | 33 969 | 32 864 | 31 868 | 35 387 | 30 284 | 58
Cuba | 11 236 | 11 227 | 21 481 | 15 394 | 39 871 | 24 891 | 14 050 | 21 071 | 31 244 | 30 482 | 24 092 | 55
Dominican Republic | 15 464 | 20 831 | 22 165 | 20 645 | 35 251 | 20 778 | 15 451 | 20 508 | 33 351 | 39 590 | 23 775 | 57
Viet Nam | 27 480 | 32 926 | 29 917 | 27 921 | 39 584 | 31 168 | 19 313 | 20 922 | 23 490 | 24 277 | 18 837 | 63
Colombia | 9 819 | 11 396 | 15 698 | 12 089 | 22 926 | 16 593 | 18 417 | 22 693 | 23 972 | 22 196 | 16 478 | 61
El Salvador | 9 602 | 12 174 | 13 430 | 17 157 | 35 796 | 18 927 | 10 343 | 13 834 | 16 685 | 18 401 | 15 598 | 54
Haiti | 8 215 | 9 740 | 15 979 | 11 552 | 21 229 | 13 290 | 12 291 | 14 191 | 19 114 | 23 480 | 13 676 | 55
Korea | 17 184 | 19 223 | 17 668 | 17 628 | 22 759 | 17 576 | 11 170 | 12 664 | 13 790 | 15 786 | 13 587 | 56
Jamaica | 12 271 | 13 674 | 18 953 | 12 314 | 21 324 | 15 098 | 12 070 | 14 591 | 15 531 | 16 442 | 13 547 | 59
Iraq | 3 646 | 3 273 | 3 614 | 2 967 | 5 057 | 4 197 | 3 489 | 3 360 | 3 523 | 7 771 | 12 377 | 51
Pakistan | 8 744 | 9 699 | 10 411 | 9 147 | 11 813 | 12 528 | 11 601 | 10 655 | 11 150 | 12 948 | 11 210 | 50
Iran | 11 781 | 11 031 | 11 363 | 10 557 | 11 813 | 12 069 | 9 337 | 9 286 | 9 627 | 11 623 | 9 620 | 55
Other countries | 241 137 | 267 654 | 314 502 | 262 013 | 382 521 | 316 017 | 284 743 | 314 266 | 334 022 | 328 775 | 283 001 |
Total | 537 151 | 604 280 | 702 589 | 660 477 | 1 046 539 | 743 715 | 619 913 | 694 193 | 757 434 | 779 929 | 653 416 | 55
Note: For details on definitions and sources, please refer to the metadata at the end of the tables.

Metadata related to Tables A.6 and B.6. Acquisitions of nationality
| Comments | Source
Australia | Data from 2004 to 2010 are based on the former Reporting Assurance Section. Data from 2011 are sourced from Citizenship Programme Management. From 2014, figures inferior to 5 individuals are not shown. | Department of Immigration and Border Protection.
Austria | Data refer to persons living in Austria at the time of acquisition. | Statistics Austria and BMI (Ministry of the Interior).
Belgium | Data refer to all acquisitions of Belgian nationality, irrespective of the type of procedure. Data only take into account those residing in Belgium at the time of the acquisition. | Directorate for Statistics and Economic Information (DGSEI) and Ministry of Justice.
Canada | Data refer to country of birth, not to country of previous nationality. Persons who acquire Canadian citizenship may also hold other citizenships at the same time if allowed by the country of previous nationality. | Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada.
Chile | Register of residence permits. | Department of Foreigners and Migration, Ministry of the Interior.
Czech Republic | Acquisitions of nationality by declaration or by naturalisation. | Ministry of the Interior.
Denmark | The decrease in 2013 can be explained by the change in the naturalisation conditions that year. | Statistics Denmark.
Estonia | Acquisitions of Estonian citizenship by naturalisation. | Ministry of the Interior.
Finland | Includes naturalisations of persons of Finnish origin. | Central Population Register, Statistics Finland.
France | Data by former nationality for naturalisations by “anticipated declaration” is unknown for the years 2004, 2006 and 2007. | Ministry of the Interior and Ministry of Justice.
Germany | Figures do not include ethnic Germans (Aussiedler). | Federal Office of Statistics.
Greece | Data refer to all possible types of citizenship acquisition: naturalisation, declaration (for Greek descents), adoption by a Greek, etc. | Ministry of Interior and Administrative Reconstruction.

Hungary

Person naturalised in Hungary: naturalisation (the person was born foreign) or renaturalisation (his/her former Hungarian citizenship was abolished). The rules of naturalisation in Hungary were modified by the Act XLIV of 2010. The act introduced the simplified naturalisation procedure from 1 January 2011, and made it possible to obtain citizenship without residence in Hungary for the foreign citizens who have Hungarian ancestors. This data refer only to those new Hungarian citizens who have an address in Hungary.

Central Office Administrative and Electronic Public Services (Central Population Register), Central Statistical Office.

Iceland | Includes children who receive Icelandic citizenship with their parents. | Statistics Iceland.
Ireland | From 2005 on, figures include naturalisations and Post nuptial citizenship figures. | Department of Justice and Equality.
Italy |  | Ministry of the Interior.
Japan |  | Ministry of Justice, Civil Affairs Bureau.
Korea |  | Ministry of Justice.
Luxembourg | Excludes children acquiring nationality as a consequence of the naturalisation of their parents. | Ministry of Justice.
Mexico |  | Ministry of Foreign Affairs (SRE).
Netherlands | Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS).
New Zealand | The country of origin refers to the country of birth if birth documentation is available. If not, the country of origin is the country of citizenship as shown on the person’s passport. | Department of Internal Affairs.
Norway | The statistics are based on population register data. | Statistics Norway.
Poland | Data include naturalisations by marriage and acknowledgment of persons of Polish descent, in addition to naturalisation by ordinary procedure. | Office for Repatriation and Aliens.

Portugal

From 2008 on, following the modification of the law on Portuguese citizenship in 2006 and 2007, the data include every foreigner who used to have a foreign citizenship and obtained Portuguese citizenship in the given year.

Until 2007, data exclude acquisitions of nationality due to marriage or adoption.

National Statistical Office (INE) and Ministry of Justice (Central register).

Russian Federation

Naturalisations obtained through various simplified procedures benefiting mainly to participants to the Repatriation Programme of Compatriots; to persons who married a Russian citizen; to citizens from Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakstan, countries which signed a bilateral agreement on naturalisations with the Federation of Russia); plus a few persons who got their Russian citizenship restored (less than a thousand per year). Excludes citizenship acquired through consulates.

Federal Migration Service.

Slovak Republic | Data refer to persons living in Slovak Republic at the time of acquisition. | Ministry of the Interior.
Slovenia | Include all grounds on which the citizenship was obtained. | Internal Administrative Affairs, Migration and Naturalisation Directorate, Ministry of the Interior.

Spain

Includes only naturalisations on the ground of residence in Spain. Excludes individuals recovering their former (Spanish) nationality. The large increase in the number of naturalisations in 2013 is due to the Intensive File Processing Nationality Plan (Plan Intensivo de tramitación de expedientes de Nacionalidad) carried out by the Ministry of Justice.

Ministry of Employment and Social Security, based on naturalisations registered by the Ministry of Justice.

Sweden |  | Statistics Sweden.
Switzerland | Federal Office of Migration.
Turkey |  | Ministry of Interior, General Directorate of Population and Citizenship Affairs.
United Kingdom | The increase in 2009 is partly due to the processing of a backlog of applications filled prior to 2009. | Home Office.
United States | Data by country of birth refer to fiscal years (October to September of the year indicated). | Department of Homeland Security.
Note: Data for Serbia may include persons from Montenegro or Serbia and Montenegro.
Some statements may refer to figures prior to 2004 or to nationalities/countries of birth not shown in this annex but available on line at: http://stats.oecd.org/.

List of the members of the OECD expert group on migration

AUSTRALIA

David SMITH, Department of Immigration and Citizenship, Canberra

AUSTRIA

Gudrun BIFFL, Danube University, Krems

BELGIUM

Frédéric POUPINEL de VALENCÉ, Belgian Federal Public Service Employment, Labour and Social Dialogue, Brussels

BULGARIA

Daniela BOBEVA, Academy of Sciences, Sofia

CANADA

Martha JUSTUS, Citizenship and Immigration Canada, Ottawa

CHILE

Reginaldo FLORES and René CATALAN, Ministry of Interior, Santiago

CZECH REPUBLIC

Jarmila MAREŠOVÁ, Czech Statistical Office, Prague

DENMARK

Jeevitha YOGACHCHANDIRAN, Ministry for Immigration, Integration and Housing, Copenhagen

ESTONIA

Mari TILLMAN and Mari NELJAS, Police and Border Guard Board, Tallinn

FINLAND

Arja SAARTO, Ministry of Interior, Helsinki

FRANCE

Gérard BOUVIER, Ministry of the Interior, Paris

GERMANY

Farid EL KHOLY, Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, Berlin

GREECE

Anna TRIANDAFYLLIDOU, Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy, Athens

HUNGARY

Orsolya KISGYÖRGY, Ministry of National Economy, Budapest

IRELAND

Philip O’CONNELL, The Economic and Social Research Institute, Dublin

ISRAEL

Gilad NATHAN, Ruppin Academic Center, Jerusalem

ITALY

Carla COLLICELLI, CENSIS, Rome and Ugo MELCHIONDA, Centro Studi e Ricerche IDOS, Rome

JAPAN

Masaki SUGAMIYA, Ministry of Justice, Tokyo and Mari YAMAMOTO, Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare, Tokyo

KOREA

Yongjin NHO, Seoul National University of Science and Technology, Seoul

LATVIA

Aija LULLE, Centre for Diaspora and Migration Research, University of Latvia, Riga

LITHUANIA

Audra SIPAVIČIENE, International Organization for Migration, Vilnius Office

LUXEMBOURG

Cynthia JAERLING, Luxembourg Reception and Integration Agency, Luxembourg

MEXICO

Rafael FERNÁNDEZ DE CASTRO, Mexico Autonomous Institute of Technology, Mexico

NETHERLANDS

Arend ODÉ and Jeanine KLAVER, Regioplan Policy Research, Amsterdam

NEW ZEALAND

Michael EGLINTON, Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment, Wellington

NORWAY

Espen THORUD, Ministry of Children, Equality and Social Inclusion, Oslo

POLAND

Pawel KACZMARCZYK, University of Warsaw

PORTUGAL

Jorge MALHEIROS, University of Lisbon

ROMANIA

Mihaela MATEI, Bucharest

RUSSIAN FEDERATION

Olga CHUDINOVSKIKH, Centre for Population Studies, Moscow

SLOVAK REPUBLIC

Martina LUBYOVA, Slovak Academy of Sciences, Bratislava

SLOVENIA

Sonja MALEC, Ministry of Labour, Family and Social Affairs, Ljubljana

SPAIN

Diego NUÑO GARCIA, Ministry for Foreign Affairs and Co-operation, Madrid

SWEDEN

Michael HAGOS, Ministry of Employment, Stockholm

SWITZERLAND

Clovis VOISARD and Kathrin GÄUMANN, State Secretariat for Migration, Bern

TURKEY

Ahmet ICDUYGU, Koç University, Istanbul

UNITED KINGDOM

John SALT, University College London, Department of Geography, London

UNITED STATES

Michael HOEFER, Department of Homeland Security, Washington

List of OECD Secretariat members involved in the preparation of this publication

International Migration Division

Jean-Christophe DUMONT, Head of Division

Thomas LIEBIG, Principal Administrator

Theodora XENOGIANI, Principal Administrator

Jonathan CHALOFF, Administrator

Emily FARCHY, Administrator

Friedrich POESCHEL, Administrator

Cécile THOREAU, Administrator

Véronique GINDREY, Statistician

Philippe HERVÉ, Statistician

Yves BREEM, Analyst

Charlotte LEVIONNOIS, Temporary Junior Analyst

Dimitris MAVRIDIS, Junior Analyst

Jeffrey MO, Junior Analyst

Anne-Sophie SCHMIDT, Junior Analyst

Eva DEGLER, Intern

Karolin KILLMEIER, Intern

Ciara KEESHAN, Assistant

Mireia SIROL CARRILLO, Assistant

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