

# EXECUTIVE BRIEF

The most recent data available on governance in Africa shows growing demands for better economic opportunities and more accountability with respect to public policies. Priorities for businesses include better access to electricity, financing and competition policies.

Regarding the policy-making processes, key challenges remain in most countries.

- Commitment to accountability within key policy-making institutions is still below citizens' expectations. The same is true of performance of public administrations.
- Opinion surveys show limited trust in key political institutions and lead policy agencies, in particular regarding their commitment to guaranteeing a transparent policy arena.

Recent policy initiatives show good examples of achieving results in public service delivery.

- African countries are taking the reform of their business environments seriously.
- Regulatory reforms and digital innovations are enhancing the effective use of public resources while improving the provision of services.
- A few new initiatives are currently aiming to address business development priorities.

Looking forward, stronger accountability and oversight processes will be crucial to identifying and solving cross-cutting challenges. Good oversight can also help reduce institutional fragmentation and duplication of effort across governments.

## Did you know?

- Cabo Verde, Kenya, Morocco and Rwanda are notably improving public services through policy reforms and digital innovations.
- 30 African countries improved their budgetary management scores between 2005 and 2015.
- In 2014/15, 5 African countries ranked among the 10 best reformers in doing business.
- One-third of public protests between 2014 and 2016 focused on salaries, working conditions and unemployment.

Top 3 easily accessed services  easy!

Services provision and the use of public resources are improving



Education



Health




ID documents

# How are Africa's public institutions meeting citizens' demands?

Connectivity to the electrical network is improving

Villages connected to electricity in Morocco / Households in South Africa



E-government mechanisms are taking root within public administrations in Africa



## The most recent data on governance in Africa shows growing demands for better economic opportunities and more accountability

The objective of this section is to document public demands for improvements in political and economic governance in Africa and what these reveal about the challenges facing governments and public institutions across the continent. The main question of interest is: What do we know about citizens' demands for improvements in political and economic governance in Africa, and how do they vary across the continent? The approach has been to identify and track public demands through data from opinion surveys as well as fact-based indicators on public protests and the motivations behind them (Box 5.1). Enterprise surveys and macroeconomic indicators have been examined to supplement this information by reflecting the major economic factors that indirectly drive public opinion.

### Box 5.1. Analysing public demands for better quality of governance: The conceptual framework

This chapter considers the quality of governance in terms both of outcomes and the underlying processes and regulatory policies that may have contributed to these outcomes. Governance outcomes are the ability of governments and other public institutions to achieve results and meet citizens' expectations with regard to the delivery of public goods, services and economic opportunities.

The motivation to do so is the following: When societies are more demanding about the quality of governance, their governments and other public institutions need to adjust their policies and take actions to meet these demands. A chapter on governance is therefore included in the *African Economic Outlook* as a way not only to better understand the current economic situation but also to obtain clues as to whether the economy is evolving in a sustainable way. Indeed, the ability of governing institutions to respond to people's expectations through credible policy commitments is crucial for a country in achieving long-lasting economic and political progress.

Governance, according to David Levi-Faur, is not only about the architecture of formal and informal institutions but also the "processes, mechanisms and strategies" of policy making (Levi-Faur, 2012: 4; Rhodes, 2012). This refers to the processes of decision making, the mechanisms of compliance and control, and the strategies to steer institutions in ways that align with public preferences. This chapter acknowledges the importance of the political context and the complexity of the political bargaining among the elite. However, it does not aim to provide an in-depth analysis of these aspects of the political economy. Rather, it intends to document public demands for improvements to governance and assess the challenges within the policy-making process in meeting these demands.

Three sources of evidence are presented to document public demands for better quality governance in Africa: 1) opinion surveys; 2) the World Bank's Enterprise Surveys and macroeconomic indicators; and 3) a set of original indicators based on close monitoring of public protests. The OECD Development Centre is responsible for developing this last set of indicators, referred to as AEO Governance Indicators. These constitute a fact-based measure of public demands for better governance that tracks incidents of public protests, the motivations behind them and government response to protests. The indicators also track incidents reflecting changes in the quality of the interactions between governments, other political institutions and citizens. The methodology was first developed by Dessus, Lafay and Morrisson (1998).

**Box 5.1. Analysing public demands for better quality of governance:  
The conceptual framework (cont.)**

- Public protests are defined as strikes or any type of demonstration with political, economic or social motives. Each event is weighted by its duration (number of days or weeks) and by an intensity score based on the number of protesters. The detailed methodology for the intensity scores is presented in the statistical annex of this report.
- Different forms of civil tensions – defined as violence with political motives, inter-community conflicts and terrorist acts against populations – are also monitored and reflect escalations of public demands or discontent into violence. Each relevant event is counted and then weighted based on such factors as intensity, duration and number of casualties.
- Incidents of political hardening are collected. They are defined as an increase in government restrictions on the population’s ability to organise or express itself politically (e.g. bans on protests, curfews and states of emergency, arrests and violence perpetrated by government forces).

This detailed monitoring exercise is based on triangulation of newswires reported on a daily basis by a large network of journalists working for press agencies across Africa, Agence France-Presse (AFP) and Reuters. The use of reputable press agencies allows for the collection of news published in a multitude of newspapers, which is a good guarantor of their reliability. For instance, more than 65 000 relevant news reports across the whole continent are analysed each year for this report.

Finally, it is important to keep in mind that these indicators constitute a complementary insight into public demands and should be interpreted in light of the political freedom of the countries. For instance, a low level of protest is neither a sign of good nor poor governance. A country with few protests could be one in which there is general satisfaction with the ruling regime, but it could also be a case of a repressive regime successfully suppressing dissent. The existence of protests yields important information about public demands, which could help policy makers better understand them and improve policy responsiveness to citizens’ expectations.

**Priority demands expressed by citizens across Africa relate to jobs, while expectations for better public governance are growing**

The most recent data from several opinion surveys (from Afrobarometer, Gallup Organization and Pew Research Center) confirms that unemployment remains the most pressing issue for African citizens. Citizens think governments should address this issue and also spend more money on it. Healthcare and education are respectively the second and third most mentioned problems. At the same time, expectations for better infrastructure have been on the rise since 2008.

Despite these general trends, responses to surveys vary widely between African countries. They also do not show clear regional groupings, with some countries in the same region having very different priorities (Table 5.1).

African citizens tend to have low net satisfaction rates with their public services compared with the rest of the world. According to Gallup polls, on average the net satisfaction rates are negative for most of the key services in the African countries that were investigated (Figure 5.1). By contrast, in the rest of the world, the net satisfaction rates are positive for all these services, except for government efforts to fix unemployment.




Table 5.1. The most important problems cited by African citizens by country  
(Afrobarometer 2014/15 survey)

Was this topic among the three issues most often cited as the most important problem by residents of the country in 2015?										
Country	Most often cited issue	Unemployment	Health	Education	Concern for poverty alleviation	Infrastructure/ roads	Water supply	Crime and security	Access to food (shortage risks)	Other issues*
Algeria	Unemployment	✓			✓					✓
Benin	Infrastructure/ roads		✓			✓	✓			
Botswana	Unemployment	✓		✓	✓					
Burkina Faso	Water supply		✓				✓		✓	
Burundi	Concern for poverty alleviation				✓				✓	✓
Cameroon	Unemployment	✓	✓			✓				
Cabo Verde	Unemployment	✓			✓			✓		
Côte d'Ivoire	Unemployment	✓	✓			✓				
Egypt	Unemployment	✓	✓		✓					
Ghana	Unemployment	✓		✓						✓
Guinea	Water supply		✓			✓	✓			
Kenya	Crime and security	✓		✓				✓		
Lesotho	Unemployment	✓				✓	✓			
Liberia	Unemployment	✓				✓				✓
Madagascar	Crime and security	✓				✓		✓		
Malawi	Access to food (shortage risks)		✓				✓		✓	
Mali	Access to food (shortage risks)		✓						✓	✓
Mauritius	Unemployment	✓			✓			✓		
Namibia	Unemployment	✓		✓	✓					
Niger	Water supply		✓				✓		✓	
Nigeria	Unemployment	✓			✓					✓
Senegal	Health	✓	✓	✓						
Sierra Leone	Education		✓	✓		✓				
South Africa	Unemployment	✓						✓		✓
Sudan	Unemployment	✓			✓					✓
Swaziland	Unemployment	✓		✓	✓					
Tanzania	Health		✓	✓			✓			
Togo	Health	✓	✓	✓						
Tunisia	Unemployment	✓			✓			✓		
Uganda	Health		✓	✓			✓			
Zambia	Health		✓	✓			✓			
Zimbabwe	Unemployment	✓				✓				✓
<b>Count of number of countries citing this problem</b>		<b>21</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>9</b>

Note: \*Other issues include management of the economy (Liberia, Sudan and Zimbabwe), housing (Algeria and South Africa), electricity (Ghana and Nigeria), farming/agriculture (Burundi) and political instability/ethnic tensions (Mali).

Source: Adapted from Afrobarometer (2016), [www.afrobarometer.org/](http://www.afrobarometer.org/).

Figure 5.1. Net survey satisfaction rating for key services in Africa, high-income countries and the rest of the world, 2013-15




Source: Gallup polls in 2013, 2014 and 2015 (42 African countries, 49 high-income countries and 59 other countries are represented here) (Gallup, 2016), <http://gallup.com/services/170945/world-poll.aspx>.

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### Intensity of public protests reverted to their pre-2011 trends, but discontent with the economy and accountability remains widespread

Public protests in Africa in the form of strikes and demonstrations dropped after a few years of unusually high protests. That uptick was due in part to the Arab Spring. The year 2016 saw a slight increase in the intensity of those events (Figure 5.2), while remaining in line with the 2000-10 trend.

Figure 5.2. Index of public protests in Africa, 2000-16




Note: Public protests refer to strikes and any demonstration with political, economic or social motives. Each event is weighted by its duration, and by an intensity score based on the number of protesters. See the methodological annex for more details.

Source: AEO indicators based on news reports from AFP, Reuters and press agencies across Africa.

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Discontent with the economy remains widespread and has taken the lead role in motivating protests. Protests motivated by economic concerns have been relatively unchanged since 2014 and have made up most public protest in Africa (Figure 5.3). This is in line with other research showing that discontent with the economy remains widespread in African countries (Wike et al., 2017). The most important economic issues driving protests were demands for better wages and work conditions. When it comes to politically-driven protests, strikes and demonstrations motivated by issues around the political process have declined sharply in recent years. In 2011, these kinds of protests made up most of the public protests in Africa.

Figure 5.3. Motivations behind public protests in Africa:  
Political matters versus economic issues, 2011-16



Note: Public protests refer to strikes and any demonstration with political, economic or social motives. Each event is weighted by its duration, and by an intensity score based on the number of protesters. See the methodological annex for more details.

Source: AEO indicators based on news reports from AFP, Reuters and press agencies across Africa.


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Overall more than 3 600 public protests with economic and political motivations have been reported in the AEO database between 2011 and 2016. These widespread democratic and peaceful forms of public demands often indicate both vibrant civil societies as well as progress in political freedom across the continent. Only three countries (Cabo Verde, Lesotho and Seychelles) had no public protest reported in the database between 2011 and 2016, while 41 countries had more than 10 public protests reported. The maximum number of protests was observed in Tunisia (416), followed by South Africa (356). It is important to note here that a low level of protests is neither a sign of good nor poor governance. They should be interpreted in light of the political freedom of the countries (Box 5.1). A country with few protests could be one in which there is general satisfaction with the ruling regime, but it could also be a case of a repressive regime successfully suppressing dissent.

The motivations behind protests have been recorded and analysed in detail. About 33% from 2014-16 were job-related issues, such as salaries, working conditions and unemployment. Protests around political issues mostly consisted of demands for more accountability from public officials and a desire to replace the governing leadership (Figure 5.4).




Figure 5.4. Top 15 drivers of public protests in Africa, 2011-13 versus 2014-16



Note: Public protests refer to strikes and any demonstration with political, economic or social motives. Each event is weighted by its duration and by an intensity score based on the number of protesters. See the methodological annex for more details.

Source: AEO indicators based on news reports from AFP, Reuters and press agencies across Africa.

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## Priorities for businesses include better access to electricity, better financing and better competition policies

### The demand for electricity goes beyond the issue of limited access to the electrical grid

Though access to electrical grids has improved for entrepreneurs, electricity is still frequently cited by business owners as a main challenge for their operations. In 2008, more than 50% of the firms and entrepreneurs in sub-Saharan Africa had access to electricity (Fjose et al., 2010: 24-25). Today, 39% of African businesses see lack of access to electricity as a major constraint (Enterprise Surveys, 2016). This number is 20% in high-income OECD countries (Enterprise Surveys, 2016). Electrical outages and their durations are major issues in sub-Saharan Africa. This data source also shows the number of electrical outages in a typical month is about 8.5 for sub-Saharan Africa, and the duration of a typical electrical outage is about 4.1 hours, compared to 0.4 outages per month and 0.4 hours per outage for high-income OECD countries.

An unreliable electricity supply affects economic opportunities in most African countries (Oyuke et al., 2016). Power networks in 25 countries on the continent experience frequent crises characterised by power outages, irregular supply and high electricity costs (World Bank, 2013). On top of that, the price of electricity has been increasing due to demand outgrowing power capacity. Current transmission lines across the continent are overexploited, which increases the frequency of power outages, diminishing the prospects for economic growth (Fjose et al., 2010). Due to the lack of investment in energy and electricity infrastructure, most firms are generating their own power using diesel aggregates or generators, increasing production costs. According to the Enterprise Surveys, more than 50% of firms in sub-Saharan Africa own or share a generator, compared to 11% in high-income OECD countries. These frequent crises are the result of poor maintenance policies in the energy sector over the past decades. The good news is that several new initiatives are currently being taken to rectify this issue.

### Finance for development suffers from limited regulatory support

Risk-premiums on lending are high and prevent small businesses from accessing adequate loans. About 20% of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) across Africa consider access to finance the most important challenge in doing business (ACET/World





Bank, 2016). As shown in Table 5.2, the difference in Africa between the lending rates to the private sector and the rates for treasury bills are higher than in the rest of the world. The depth of credit information is also low.

The banking system in sub-Saharan Africa plays a less prominent role in giving credit to firms than in other world regions (Fjose et al., 2010; AfDB, 2013; IMF, 2016a). Use of bank loans and credits in sub-Saharan Africa is lower than in other developing regions of the world, even though there is variation between countries (Enterprise Surveys, 2016). This financing gap has the most impact on medium-sized enterprises, as their needs exceed the maximum loans provided by microfinance institutions, and yet they are also lower than the minimum loans available from commercial banks (UNIDO/GTZ, 2008; Beck, 2013). These firms – often also referred to as the missing middle – usually have high growth potential, including on the manufacturing export markets, as documented by a joint report by the OECD and the World Bank (2015).

**Table 5.2. Selected indicators on access to finance in Africa, high-income countries and the rest of the world, 2011-15**

Dimensions of credit access	Group of countries	Average value (2011-15)	Median value	Number of countries
Risk premium on lending (lending interest rate minus treasury bill rate)	Africa	9.6	7.4	22
	Rest of world (excl. high-income countries)	6.4	5.0	37
	High-income countries	3.7	3.7	21
Domestic credit to private sector by banks (% of GDP)	Africa	26.5	21.4	49
	Rest of world (excl. high-income countries)	47.0	43.9	80
	High-income countries	98.0	88.2	45
Depth of credit information index (0=low to 8=high)	Africa	2.4	0.0	52
	Rest of world (excl. high-income countries)	4.8	6.0	86
	High-income countries	5.8	6.0	49
Borrowers from commercial banks (per 1 000 adults)	Africa	66.6	36.6	36
	Rest of world (excl. high-income countries)	222.1	205.3	51
	High-income countries	515.2	524.3	14
Domestic credit to private sector (% of GDP)	Africa	28.5	21.6	49
	Rest of world (excl. high-income countries)	49.7	45.2	80
	High-income countries	103.0	92.1	45

Source: Adapted from World Development Indicators database, World Bank (2017a), <http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators> (accessed in January 2017).

The policy and legal instruments needed to overcome information asymmetry remain underdeveloped, and the coverage of knowledge sharing systems such as public credit registries is low. The public credit registry coverage is the number of individuals and firms listed in a public credit registry with current information on repayment history, unpaid debts or credit outstanding. As of 2016, only five African countries have a public registry that covers more than 15% of adults: Mauritius (82.6%), Gabon (52%), Seychelles (47.5%), Tunisia (28.9%) and Cabo Verde (17.8%). Looking forward, key areas for better policy making include: 1) enhancing the availability of financial risk mitigation and guarantee instruments; and 2) strengthening national identification systems and data-coupling methods for credit registries.

### Competition policies are still lagging far behind expectations

Getting firms to comply with regulations may require changing incentives. Competition with large informal actors is a challenge for formal firms in Africa. The majority of the actors in the informal sector produce goods and services that are not always in conformity with procedural requirements (ILO, 2014). Many SMEs stay in the informal economy to avoid taxation and regulation while still being able to adapt to the market. This situation may be profitable to them but prevents them from accessing formal credit and decreases their opportunities to expand (Chapter 8). Moreover, the informal competition seriously constrains the formal sector, in particular in countries where compliant firms need to go through time-consuming regulations or pay high taxes.

If small companies are to be encouraged to join the formal sector, bureaucratic complexity is a major problem to tackle, not only in terms of the time taken by procedures but also in terms of the number of documents required. The fact that bureaucratic and legal procedures are often complicated and lengthy reduces the possibility for small firms to upgrade their standards in domestic markets or enter international markets. For example, firms across the continent see customs and trade regulations as obstacles to business operations because they cause delays in imports and exports, which in turn damages supply chains and has a negative effect on production. As a result, it is particularly important to continue easing procedures in order to allow more firms to move to the formal economy (Chapter 6).

Governments need officials with integrity to enforce state laws and regulations. Corruption can cripple a state's effectiveness in maintaining the formal economy, as well as impose additional costs on firms in the form of bribery payments and misallocated resources. Corruption is mentioned as one of the main challenges for 40.0% of enterprises in Africa (Beck and Cull, 2014; Enterprise Surveys, 2016). This percentage is roughly the same as the level observed in Latin America (43.4 %) and in South Asia (40.1 %). Entrepreneurs report having to pay bribes to obtain legal documents, registrations or licenses (Enterprise Surveys, 2016).

### **The current capacity and credibility of public institutions to improve policy responses are below expectations and consequently have limited credibility**

The ability of governing institutions to respond to people's expectations is a key determinant of long-lasting economic and political progress (OECD, 2014). The main focus in this section is therefore to assess the magnitude of this challenge and identify the most important constraints on the ability of public institutions to address demands for better policies. It looks at opinion surveys and evidence-based assessments of the following:

- commitment of public institutions to promote the public interest
- trust in the institutions and feedback mechanisms
- separation of powers and strength of oversight mechanisms.

#### **Commitment to accountability is still below citizens' expectations**

Dissatisfaction with political arrangements was among the main drivers of public protests in Africa from 2011 to 2016. The majority of these protests called for more "accountability and justice in the public management systems" and for fairer elections (Figure 5.4). This is an indication of demand for higher standards of integrity within public institutions. The geographic spread across the continent, however, was unequal:

- Protests against executive overreach were the biggest driver of public protests in 7 of 41 countries.
- Demands for fairer and more competitive elections were the biggest drivers in 4 countries, and in another 4 countries it was demands for change of government.
- Demands for more political rights were the biggest driver in 3 countries, the same number as for partisan politics.
- More accountability was the top driver in 2 countries.


An assessment of the institutional setting shows significant gaps between governance objectives and outcomes in the policy arena. The *Africa Integrity Indicators* constitute a well-documented expert assessment of the strength of current legal frameworks in terms of promoting integrity and de facto practice in the country. All indicators are scored by in-country researchers, lawyers, journalists and academics. The dataset is produced by Global Integrity in collaboration with the Mo Ibrahim Foundation to "assess key social, economic, political and anti-corruption mechanisms at the national level across Africa". Indicators on transparency and accountability are broken down into six thematic areas:




rule of law, accountability, elections, public management, civil service integrity, and access to information and openness. These indicators are divided into the categories of “in law” (referring to laws and regulations) and “in practice” (referring to current practice).

- The Africa Integrity Indicators show that most of African countries score better on “in law” indicators than “in practice” (Figure 5.5, panel A). This means that the legal framework to promote transparency and accountability already exists in most of the countries but that the results expected are not always entirely attained.
- A few countries across the continent are doing quite well overall. In 2015, the African countries with the best integrity scores were South Africa, followed by Benin, Mauritius, Kenya and Liberia. These are followed by Ghana and Uganda. Most other countries in Africa had much lower scores.
- On average commitment to the application of existing rules for competitive bidding in public procurement is low, while the audit institutions need stronger empowerment in the legal frameworks. For instance, de facto practices in public procurement or public bidding processes are the farthest below existing legal standards, and supreme audit institutions are the least protected by law, especially when compared to non-African countries (Figure 5.5, panel B).

Figure 5.5. Average integrity scores “in law” versus “in practice” around the world: Africa in 2016 compared to 22 other countries in 2011



Source: Adapted from Global Integrity/Mo Ibrahim Foundation (2016), *African Integrity Indicators* (database), [www.globalintegrity.org/africa-integrity-indicators/](http://www.globalintegrity.org/africa-integrity-indicators/) (accessed in January 2017).

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## Trust in key political institutions and leading agents of policy change is limited

Political institutions are not trusted enough, in particular regarding their commitment to a transparent policy arena. Based on surveys by Afrobarometer, Bratton and Gyimah-Boadi (2016) found that formal public institutions are not trusted by their citizens. On average citizens express more trust in informal institutions such as religious and traditional leadership (72% and 61% respectively) than in formal executive agencies and the state (on average 54%). The legislative institutions and the electoral agencies – key players in a democracy – have even lower levels of trust. The least trusted institutions are the opposition political parties (36%), tax authorities (44%), electoral institutions (44%) and legislative institutions (47%). Low levels of trust in these last two types of institutions, which are responsible for a transparent policy arena, point to a real need for improvement. According to research, trust in electoral and judicial institutions is among the crucial enablers for a country's success with democracy (Dahlberg and Holmberg, 2016) and political stability.

Running a fair election still remains a challenge in many African countries. National elections took place in 18 African countries in 2016. All the official reports by election monitors from the African Union, Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the European Union (EU) and the Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa found at the time of writing the elections in 12 countries were explicitly declared as free and fair (Table 5.3). Cabo Verde and Ghana consolidated their position as the best performers in Africa in terms of the capacity to organise credible and competitive elections.

Table 5.3. Overview of national elections in Africa, 2016-18

Country	Voting for	Date	Comments
Benin	president	06-03-2016	"The electoral process proceeded under acceptable conditions of freedom and transparency overall." (ECOWAS Commission, 2016)
Cabo Verde	president	31-08-2016	"The presidential elections were free, fair and transparent." (African Union Election Observation Mission, 2016)
Central African Republic	president and national assembly	14-02-2016	"The twin elections took place in a calm, serene and transparent atmosphere." (African Union Election Observation Mission, 2016)
Chad	president	10-04-2016	"The Chadian people have demonstrated their commitment to the consolidation of democracy in their country [...] the election took place in a peaceful climate within the legal framework in force." (African Union Election Observation Mission, 2016)
Comoros	president	21-02-2016	"The vote counting process proceeded transparently and respectfully to the stated dispositions in the law." (African Union Election Observation Mission, 2016)
Republic of the Congo (Congo)	president	20-03-2016	"The Mission notes that in a general manner, voting took place in a calm atmosphere, [with] peace and stability." (African Union Election Observation Mission, 2016)
Côte d'Ivoire	national assembly	18-12-2016	"These elections took place in a peaceful climate according to the legal framework regulating legislative elections in Côte d'Ivoire and relevant international instruments." (African Union Election Observation Mission, 2016)
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)	president and national assembly	27-11-2016	Postponed (new dates to be agreed by the political actors)
Djibouti	president	08-04-2016	"Voting took place in peace and serenity [...] The Mission deems the vote was inclusive, free and transparent enough to be considered as the credible reflect of the Djiboutian people's will." (African Union Election Observation Mission, 2016)
Equatorial Guinea	president	30-11-2016	"The election proceeded in a calm and disciplined manner, [with] peace and transparency." (African Union Election Observation Mission, 2016)
Gabon	president and national assembly	16-08-2016	"The election was inclusive and competitive." (African Union Election Observation Mission, ECOWAS, 2016)
Gambia	president	01-12-2016	"Peaceful, free, fair and transparent elections were held in the country on 1st of December 2016." (ECOWAS, African Union and UN Statement, 2016)
Ghana	president and national assembly	07-11-2016	"The 2016 elections were conducted in a largely peaceful, transparent and credible manner." (African Union Election Observation Mission, 2016)
Morocco	national assembly	07-10-2016	"The poll was organised with integrity and in full transparency." (Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly Election Observation Mission, 2016)
Niger	president and national assembly	21-02-2016	"These elections allowed the Nigerian people to choose its president and members of parliament freely and transparently. [...] Integrity of the vote has been guaranteed and the secrecy of the vote has been preserved." (African Union Election Observation Mission, 2016)



Table 5.3. Overview of national elections in Africa, 2016-18 (cont.)

Country	Voting for	Date	Comments
Sao Tome and Principe	president	31-07-2016	"The electoral process has taken place generally in accordance with the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance and other instruments governing democratic elections in Africa, as well as the legal framework in force in Sao Tome and Principe." (African Union Election Observation Mission, 2016)
Seychelles	president and national assembly	31-10-2016	"The electoral process was transparent, credible and peaceful." (African Union Election Observation Mission, 2016)
Uganda	president and national assembly	18-02-2016	"The observed shortcomings were inconsistent with the requirements of the legal framework for elections in Uganda and international and continental principles and obligations for democratic elections." (Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa [EISA] Election Observation Mission, 2016)
Zambia	president and national assembly	11-08-2016	"The AUEOM commends ECZ (Electoral Commission of Zambia) for measures undertaken to enhance the integrity and credibility of the electoral process aimed at safeguarding the legitimacy of the election outcome in conformity with the 2003 African Peer Review Mechanism and the 2007 African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance." (African Union Electoral Observation Mission, 2016)
<b>ELECTIONS PLANNED IN 2017</b>			
Algeria	national assembly	05-2017	*
Angola	president and national assembly	08-2017	*
Chad	national assembly	2017	*
Congo	national assembly	2017	*
Gabon	national assembly	29-07-2017	*
Gambia	national assembly	06-04-2017	
Kenya	president, national assembly and senate	08-08-2017	*
Lesotho	national assembly	2017	*
Libya	president and national assembly	2017	*
Liberia	President and national assembly	10-10-2017	*
Madagascar	president	2017	*
Rwanda	president	04-08-2017	*
Senegal	national assembly	30-07-2017	*
Sierra Leone	president and national assembly	01-11-2017	*
Somalia	president	08-02-2017	
<b>ELECTIONS PLANNED IN 2018</b>			
Cameroon	president and national assembly	10-2018	*
Djibouti	national assembly	2018	*
Guinea	national assembly	2018	*
Madagascar	national assembly	2018	*
Mali	president and national assembly	2018	*

Note: \*Election dates to be confirmed.

Sources: African Union (2017), International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) (2017), International IDEA (2017), NDI (2017), EISA (2017).

Both the level of politically-motivated violence and political hardening across Africa have decreased slightly but risks remain high. The intensity of political violence by non-state actors is still about three times higher than the 2010 level (Figure 5.6) despite a decline from the peak it reached in 2013. Cross-border terrorism and insurrections continue to contribute to this political turmoil and undermine the capability of states to govern despite important military gains, for example, against Boko Haram (Box 5.2) and against the Islamic State in Libya in 2016. In addition, there were a few uncertain transitions of power when some heads of state attempted to remain in office in 2016 beyond their legal mandate but faced violent protests in response. Nevertheless, the intensity of political hardening – defined as government violence, arrests, bans, curfews and states of emergency – has slightly decreased (Figure 5.6).


### Box 5.2. Terrorism and cross-border risk

From 2013-15 the three major drivers of violence by non-state actors were 1) terrorism; 2) inter-community conflicts, often fuelled by clashes over scarce resources and ethnic resentments; and 3) protests over electoral processes where political parties have ignited or aggravated civil strife through violence.

In 2016, the intensity of violence by non-state actors decreased slightly in Africa (Figure 5.6). This is encouraging, as it is essentially due to large decreases in violent incidents in Nigeria, Egypt, Cameroon and the Central African Republic (Statistical Annex, Table 24).

- Cross-border co-ordination and co-operation against Boko-Haram paid off in 2016. After the kidnapping of more than 200 schoolgirls in Chibok in 2014, Multi-National Joint Task Force (MNJTF) was established by Benin, Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria. After taking office on 29 May 2015, Nigeria's president increased the pace of this regional co-operation, engaging more actively with his counterparts.
- Insecurity driven by inter-community conflicts is still a threat to political stability. A further decrease in politically-motivated violence is strongly needed to reduce the fragility of African countries. In 2016, out of 56 contexts classified as fragile, 37 are located in Africa (OECD, 2016). The root causes of the conflicts in 2015-16 seem more often linked to land disputes and access to mining resources (see Chapter 5 of AfDB/OECD/UNDP, 2016). The latest Afrobarometer survey showed there is a general African tolerance and acceptance of people from different ethnic or religious groups, and immigrants particularly (Dulani, Sambo and Dionne, 2016).

Figure 5.6. Political hardening and civil violence, 1996-2016




### The current performance of public administrations does not fulfil citizens' expectations, in particular in terms of their responsiveness to top-priority demands

On average when respondents were asked if their greatest concerns were being handled well by the government, 61% said they were not (Figure 5.7). The issues about which respondents expressed the greatest dissatisfaction were those related to economic opportunity. Within this category of responses, the highest dissatisfaction was expressed around job opportunities and the fight against corruption.




Figure 5.7. The percentage of respondents not satisfied with their government’s handling of various high-priority issues (Afrobarometer 2014/15 survey)



Source: Adapted from Afrobarometer (2016), [www.afrobarometer.org/](http://www.afrobarometer.org/).  
 StatLink <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933475351>

Despite several waves of public sector reforms, progress on public management has been slow. Public sector reforms in Africa were initiated in the 1980s, followed by a second wave of reforms in the 1990s and a third in the 2000s (Aye, 2006; AfDB/OECD/UNDP, 2015: 189-193). The *Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA)* by the African Development Bank (AfDB) shows that about 30 countries improved their budgetary management scores between 2005 and 2015. Despite this fact, scores on transparency and accountability in the public sector remain below the middle score of 3.5 out of 7 for 24 countries out of 40 (AfDB, 2016a). Figure 5.8, showing World Bank CPIA scores, confirms that only 4 African countries – Cabo Verde, Ethiopia, Rwanda and Senegal – have achieved scores above 3.5. A well-functioning public administration is a necessary condition to establish and implement the strategies and policies that effectively address citizens’ demands.

Figure 5.8. Public sector management versus tax-GDP ratio



Note: Countries are named by their international ISO3-Alpha codes. The public sector management and institutions cluster includes property rights and rule-based governance, quality of budgetary and financial management, efficiency of revenue mobilisation, quality of public administration, transparency, accountability and corruption in the public sector.

Source: Adapted from World Bank (2016a), <http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/CPIA>, and IMF (2016b).  
 StatLink <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933475360>



Information on the central government's budget and financial activities needs to be more open and accessible. In principle, this may be possible to achieve, as the planning and budgeting systems are already digitised though integrated financial management information systems in most African countries (Diamond and Khemani, 2005). However, informal budgeting practices can sometimes continue even despite the implementation of these changes (see Box 5.3). But so far only South Africa has extensive capacity in all pillars of budget transparency, including the strength of the formal oversight institutions (IBP, 2015).

### Box 5.3. Improving the planning and budgeting systems in African countries

The World Bank supported the implementation of integrated financial management information systems (IFMIS) in several countries in order to promote transparency and accountability in public budgets (Dener and Min, 2013). A report by Deloitte (2012) found that a number of African countries have also implemented IFMIS relatively successfully, including Mauritius, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Tanzania and Uganda.

Such systems need strong oversight controls to ensure success, however. Malawi provides a good cautionary tale. In 2008, IFMIS was extended to local authorities. Subsequently, a mobile data service was launched, additional national operators were selected, and the fibre backbone was extended to the countryside. In principle, this allowed the central government to plan and manage the budgets and to automate the public financial operations in a more transparent manner. However, the massive Cashgate scandal in 2013 revealed the weaknesses within the oversight mechanisms when it was discovered that public employees were moving massive amounts of public money outside the IFMIS system. A report by Baker Tilly found that the government of Malawi had lost about USD 30 million between April and December 2013 (Baker Tilly, 2014; The Economist, 2014). Despite this setback, information on the central government's budget and financial activities has slightly improved in Malawi (see the *Open Budget Database*, IBP [2015]).

## A review of recent policy initiatives shows good examples of achieving results in public service delivery, but this must be built on moving forward

The objective of this section is to review successful policy initiatives and related governance strategies recently adopted in Africa. The initiatives of interest can be divided into the following areas:

- provision of public goods and services through the effective management and optimisation of financial resources
- regulatory reforms addressing priority needs for business development.

The purpose of highlighting such cases is to model success and to demonstrate what can be achieved when political commitments and public sector effectiveness converge. This should be taken as a set of good examples rather than best practices. The replication of policy successes in different countries is unrealistic when they are not adapted to the mechanisms of change within the countries in question. The wide heterogeneity of African governments, societies and policy arenas makes it more likely that policies developed in one country are unsuitable for others.


### Policy reforms and digital innovations are improving the effective use of public resources

Many public administrations across Africa have improved service delivery. Afrobarometer respondents were asked how easy or difficult it was for them to obtain




services they had sought from their governments over the previous 12 months. Education services were reported as the easiest to access in the period 2014/15, followed by access to medical treatment and identity documents. On the other hand, getting assistance from courts or accessing water, sanitation and electricity were more often considered difficult than easy.

**Figure 5.9. Ease or difficulty accessing public services according to African citizens, 2005 and 2015**



Notes: The questions asked in 2005 were, “Based on your experience, how easy or difficult is to obtain the following services? Or do you never try and get these services from government?”. The questions posed in 2014/15 were, “In the past 12 months have you \_\_\_\_\_? How easy or difficult was it to obtain \_\_\_\_\_?”

Source: Adapted from Afrobarometer (2016), [www.afrobarometer.org/](http://www.afrobarometer.org/).

StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933475379>

### E-government mechanisms are taking root within public administrations in Africa

In recent years, new technological approaches have been used to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of public services. Several African countries have launched e-government projects to overcome limited capacity in the public sector and facilitate the accessibility of their services (UNDP/PIWA, 2009; Deloitte, 2012; World Bank, 2016b). The first African countries to launch successful digital strategies were Cabo Verde, Kenya, Morocco and Rwanda.

#### The E-Fez project in Morocco automatised local government services

In 2004, the municipality of Fez in Morocco launched E-Fez, an e-government project automating 12 out of the 33 local government offices for the delivery of municipal services. The Canadian government, through the International Development Research Centre, funded the setup of information and communication technologies (ICTs) in local government offices. A web portal for citizens was created and adapted for illiterate users (IDRC, 2016). This initiative sped up the quality of delivery procedures for frequently used services such as school registration and birth, marriage and death certificates. In 2009, a survey revealed that E-Fez decreased the error rates of government offices while increasing their productivity, from 689 certificates delivered daily to 828 on average after the project (Kettani and El Mahidi, 2009). It also increased the transparency and accountability of the municipalities. However, the requirement for IT equipment and skills created bottlenecks.

After E-Fez was running, the country launched a national strategy in 2009, known as *plan Maroc Numeric 2013* aiming to increase the automation of public administration. As with the E-Fez project, the government has inaugurated websites like *service-public.ma*. These platforms operate as an electronic counter and delivery system for administrative documents and procedures in Morocco.

***The Huduma Centres in Kenya constitute a citizen-centric approach to decentralisation policies***

Kenya is the first African country to launch a comprehensive open government data strategy. The initiative started with the new constitution of 2010, with Article 35 stating the citizens' right to government information. To operationalise this new article, the government launched the Kenya Open Data Initiative in partnership with the World Bank, Google and Ushaidi. Its aim is to enhance public integrity, transparency and accountability, while improving delivery of public services (Centre for Public Impact, 2016). In 2013, the government decided to replace the previous system of administration and transferred key functions and the financing of public services to the 47 counties. The devolution to the counties constitutes an entirely new level of sub-national government (AfDB/OECD/UNDP, 2016: 250-254).

The Huduma Centres programme was introduced by the Ministry of Devolution and Planning in 2013 as a key pillar of this ambitious decentralisation policy. The idea is to deploy decentralised services across the country through one-stop shops called Huduma Centres and through integrated online platforms. The centres are now available in most counties and pledge to promote accountability and foster national unity. Services provided include applying for student loans, birth certificates, marriage certificates, business permits, insurance and driving licences (Dalberg, 2015).

***Cabo Verde launched a citizens' centre, known as Casa do Cidadao or Maison du Citoyen***

The project launched in 2008 in the town of Praia on the island of Sal and made new administrative services, such as online forms, available to citizens. People in both the public and private sectors now benefit from a unique data portal for their administrative needs (e.g. certificates delivery, electronic tax payments and registering a new enterprise). This initiative reduced the time taken for administrative procedures, facilitated citizens' interaction with government and made information more accurate (AfDB/OECD/UNDP/UNECA, 2011; Deloitte, 2012). The portal provides convenient and easy access to government services, particularly for the Cabo Verdean diaspora, which represents about 50% of the population.

**Several countries have undertaken measures to enhance the provision and reliability of electricity**

Connectivity to the electrical network is improving, and countries like Morocco are leading the way. The global rural electrification programme (*Programme d'électrification rurale global* [PERG]) was launched in 1996, with the aim of supplying electricity to all the rural areas of Morocco, increasing the electricity transmission rate to 80.0% by 2010. This goal was attained ahead of schedule in 2005. By 2009, PERG had succeeded in transmitting electricity to 30 086 villages, with a transmission rate of 97.2% (ONE, 2016) and reached 99.1% by the end of July 2015. The programme has contributed to bridging the infrastructure gap between rural and urban areas and has also led to a higher quality of life in rural areas (AFD, 2012). The transmission of electricity to rural areas improved economic opportunities by encouraging the establishment of new industries, slowing down emigration by 5.0% and increasing the rate of returning emigrants by 1.5% (ONE, 2005).

In 2000, South Africa launched the integrated national electrification programme to increase electricity access, especially in rural areas. The programme became fully operational in 2002 with the aim of implementing the policy directives in South Africa's



1998 energy white paper and the National Energy Act, 2008 (Act No. 34). The share of South Africa's households connected to electricity increased to 90% in 2016 from 34% in 1994 (Republic of South Africa, 2016a). Though this programme has yet to achieve its main target of providing basic electricity to all households, the South African government is trying alternative options like hybrid mini-grids and non-grid technologies in the rural areas (Azimoh et al., 2016; Republic of South Africa, 2016b).

Several African countries are currently laying out big investments in power generation, with a special focus on rural electrification:

- Côte d'Ivoire plans to double power generation, and a dedicated rural electrification plan (PRONER adopted in July 2013) aims to connect all villages to the network by 2020.
- Since 2010, Ethiopia has been actively developing its power generation through several large projects, including the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, Gilgel Gibe III and Gilgel Gibe IV, which collectively have a capacity of 9.4 GW (IEA, 2014). Under its Growth and Transformation Plan II the country wants to increase capacity to 17 GW by 2020 (Republic of Ethiopia, 2016).
- In Tanzania, the government's power system master plan aims to increase the installed capacity from 1.6 GW in 2014 to 10 GW by 2025 and expand access for the rural population (OBG, 2017).

Kenya is leveraging digital technologies and satellite imaging systems to enhance the maintenance of its energy network. A geographic information system was also initiated in 2011. Piloted by the national electricity company, KPLC, geographic information about power lines, sub-stations, transformers and metres was digitised in 2015. These details were put onto a map with satellite images, which help monitor and resolve disturbances in the system more quickly. Companies can also obtain quotes through a streamlined approval process. They simply need to send the requested documents via the online platform to receive their quotes. This system considerably reduced the time and administrative procedures needed to access electricity.

In addition to these national plans, several international initiatives are currently addressing Africa's energy challenges. The AfDB's New Deal on Energy in Africa is one of the most ambitious programmes recently activated. Its aspirational goal is to achieve universal access to energy in Africa through a massive investment plan of USD 12 billion by 2025 (Table 5.4).

Table 5.4. Selected list of international initiatives for energy in Africa

Name of the programme	Funders	Time period	Targeted countries	Key objectives	Budget
The New Deal on Energy in Africa	AfDB	2015-25	Entire African continent	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✓ Increase on-grid generation to add 160 GW of new capacity</li> <li>✓ Increase on-grid transmission and grid connections that will create 130 million new connections</li> <li>✓ Increase off-grid generation to add 75 million connections</li> <li>✓ Increase access to clean cooking energy for 130 million households</li> </ul>	USD 12 billion from the AfDB
Africa-EU Renewable Energy Cooperation Programme	Multi-donor programme*	2007-20	Africa in general	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✓ Improve energy security</li> <li>✓ Increase use of renewable energy</li> <li>✓ Improve access to modern and sustainable energy</li> </ul>	n.a.
Africa Renewable Energy Initiative	Under the mandate of the African Union	Two phases: 2016-20 2020-30	Entire African continent	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✓ Achieve 10 GW of new and additional renewable energy generation capacity by 2020</li> <li>✓ Mobilise the African potential to generate 300 GW by 2030</li> <li>✓ Make use of all types renewable energy technologies</li> </ul>	n.a.

Table 5.4. Selected list of international initiatives for energy in Africa (cont.)

Name of the programme	Funders	Time period	Targeted countries	Key objectives	Budget
SE4ALL Africa Hub	African Union Commission, New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), AfDB, UNDP	2011-30	44 African countries	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✓ Ensure universal access to modern energy services</li> <li>✓ Double the global rate of improvement in energy efficiency</li> <li>✓ Double the share of renewable energy in the global energy mix</li> </ul>	n.a.
Akon Lighting Africa	International Partners and Banks**	2014	15 African countries	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✓ Bring clean, renewable and affordable energy solutions primarily to rural and off-grid areas in Africa through solar energy</li> </ul>	USD 1 billion for launch
Energy Africa Campaign	UK Department for International Development	2015-30	14 African countries	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✓ Boost electricity in Africa by expanding the rural household solar market</li> </ul>	USD 46 million
Power Africa	US government through USAID	2013-18	For phase1 (2013-18): Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Liberia, Nigeria and Tanzania	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✓ Double access to electricity by 2018</li> <li>✓ Reach 60 million new electricity connections by 2030</li> <li>✓ Add 30 000 megawatts of new and cleaner power generation</li> </ul>	USD 7 billion of public funds
Energies pour l'Afrique	Public-private partnership: EDF, AFD (France), Schneider Electric and others	2014-25	Entire African continent	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✓ Create a support fund for electrification in Africa, with the aim of it being a co-ordination tool</li> <li>✓ Connect 600 million of people to electricity by 2025</li> </ul>	
Lighting Africa	Multi-donor programme*** managed by the World Bank Group	2007-30	Burkina Faso, DRC, Ethiopia, Kenya, Liberia, Mali, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Tanzania and Uganda	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✓ Connect 250 million of people to electricity with off-grid solar energy</li> </ul>	

Notes: \* European Commission, Austrian Development Cooperation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Finland, German Federal Ministry for Economy Cooperation and Development, Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands and Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida). \*\* China Jiangsu International Group, Solektra International, Nari Group and others. \*\*\* The World Bank Group in partnership with the International Finance Corporation, Energy Sector Management Assistance Programme, Global Environment Facility, Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States.

Sources: The New Deal on Energy for Africa (AfDB, 2016b), [www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Generic-Documents/Brochure\\_New\\_Deal\\_vf.pdf](http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Generic-Documents/Brochure_New_Deal_vf.pdf); Africa-EU Renewable Energy Cooperation Programme (EUEI, 2012), [www.euei-pdf.org/sites/default/files/field\\_publication\\_file/RECPstrategy2020en\\_lowres\\_0.pdf](http://www.euei-pdf.org/sites/default/files/field_publication_file/RECPstrategy2020en_lowres_0.pdf); Africa Renewable Energy Initiative (2016), [www.arei.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/AREI-Summary-english\\_web.pdf](http://www.arei.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/AREI-Summary-english_web.pdf); SE4ALL Africa Hub: the United Nations, [www.se4all.org/sites/default/files/l/2014/02/French.pdf](http://www.se4all.org/sites/default/files/l/2014/02/French.pdf); Akon Lighting Africa (2017), [akonlightingafrica.com/](http://akonlightingafrica.com/); Energy Africa Campaign (UK Government, 2015), [www.gov.uk/government/news/energy-africa-campaign](http://www.gov.uk/government/news/energy-africa-campaign); Power Africa (USAID, 2017), [www.usaid.gov/powerafrica](http://www.usaid.gov/powerafrica); Energies pour l'Afrique (L'Energie en questions, 2015), [www.lenergieenquestions.fr/la-fondation-borloo-pour-lenergie-en-afrique-entame-sa-quete-de-financements](http://www.lenergieenquestions.fr/la-fondation-borloo-pour-lenergie-en-afrique-entame-sa-quete-de-financements); Lighting Africa (World Bank, 2017c), [www.lightingafrica.org/](http://www.lightingafrica.org/).

## Regulatory reforms are aimed at addressing business development priorities

### African countries are among the top reformers in the World Bank's *Doing Business* report

African governments have been highly engaged in policy reforms meant to reduce the time and cost of interactions between businesses and governments. Many initiatives have taken the form of regulatory reforms to make starting or running a business easier and use digital technologies to reduce time spent on and the cost of bureaucracy.





Since 2010, African countries have regularly been among the ten best reformers globally (Table 5.5). Every year the World Bank compiles a set of indicators on the quality of business laws and regulations in countries around the world and publishes them in a report called *Doing Business* (World Bank, 2016c). There are indicators on ten aspects: starting a business, dealing with construction permits, obtaining electricity, registering property, obtaining credit, protecting minority investors, paying taxes, trading across borders, enforcing contracts and resolving insolvency.

Table 5.5. Top ten reformer countries worldwide in *Doing Business*, 2010-16

Order	2009/10	2010/11	2011/12	2012/13	2013/14	2014/15	2015/16
1	Kazakhstan	<b>Morocco</b>	Poland	Ukraine	Tajikistan	Costa Rica	Brunei Darussalem
2	<b>Rwanda</b>	Moldova	Sri Lanka	<b>Rwanda</b>	<b>Benin</b>	<b>Uganda</b>	Kazakhstan
3	Peru	Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia	Ukraine	Russian Federation	<b>Togo</b>	<b>Kenya</b>	<b>Kenya</b>
4	Viet Nam	<b>Sao Tome and Principe</b>	Uzbekistan	Philippines	<b>Côte d'Ivoire</b>	Cyprus	Belarus
5	<b>Cabo Verde</b>	Latvia	<b>Burundi</b>	Kosovo	<b>Senegal</b>	<b>Mauritania</b>	Indonesia
6	Tajikistan	<b>Cabo Verde</b>	Costa Rica	<b>Djibouti</b>	Trinidad and Tobago	Uzbekistan	Serbia
7	<b>Zambia</b>	<b>Sierra Leone</b>	Mongolia	<b>Côte d'Ivoire</b>	<b>Congo, Dem. Rep.</b>	Kazakhstan	Georgia
8	Hungary	<b>Burundi</b>	Greece	<b>Burundi</b>	Azerbaijan	Jamaica	Pakistan
9	Grenada	Solomon Islands	Serbia	Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia	Ireland	<b>Senegal</b>	United Arab Emirates
10	Brunei Darussalam	Korea	Kazakhstan	Guatemala	United Arab Emirates	<b>Benin</b>	Bahrain
African countries		3	2	1	4	5	5

Note by Turkey: The information in this document with reference to « Cyprus » relates to the southern part of the Island. There is no single authority representing both Turkish and Greek Cypriot people on the Island. Turkey recognises the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). Until a lasting and equitable solution is found within the context of the United Nations, Turkey shall preserve its position concerning the "Cyprus issue".

Note by all the European Union Member States of the OECD and the European Union: The Republic of Cyprus is recognised by all members of the United Nations with the exception of Turkey. The information in this document relates to the area under the effective control of the Government of the Republic of Cyprus.

Source: Adapted from the World Bank's *Doing Business* reports from 2010 to 2016, [www.doingbusiness.org/](http://www.doingbusiness.org/).

In the 2017 edition of the *Doing Business* report, 41 African countries improved their scores, while 13 saw a decline. Typical reforms included improvements for procedural simplification or reduced fees for public services. For instance, over the period 2015-16, 17 African countries were cited for implementing a simplified legal framework for conciliation procedures, dispute resolution processes or debt clearance procedures for small companies in financial difficulties (World Bank, 2016c). Some other countries introduced new technological innovations:

- Kenya is specifically flagged among the top ten reformers worldwide. The country implemented reforms in five separate categories of economic policy, including by removing stamp duty fees for certain articles, improving electricity provision and streamlining administrative procedures.
- Tanzania saw the largest increase in its score in 2015/16, largely due to an improvement to its credit registry system. It established new credit bureaus, which signed agreements with retailers and merchants to create a common credit registry of their customers. This system's borrower coverage has expanded to 6.48% from 4.97% of the adult population.

- Mauritania upgraded to the Automated SYstem for CUstoms Data (ASYCUDA) world Electronic Data Interchange (EDI) system, which reduced the time for preparation and submission of customs declarations for both exports and imports to improve cross-border trade.
- Mauritius digitised its land records.
- Morocco introduced an online platform to reserve company names.
- Rwanda made starting a business easier by improving the online registration and streamlining post-registration procedures. It also set up an online one-stop shop for company registration.
- South Africa started an online portal for company name searches.

Even though the cost of administrative procedures has decreased in many countries, African countries still have relatively low scores in *Doing Business* compared to the rest of the world. In 2016, 6 countries out of 54 in Africa were above the global median value for this score, while 26 out of 37 of the countries in the bottom quintile were African. The highest-ranked African country was Mauritius, in 50th place out of 190 countries covered around the world.

#### **New initiatives tackle the issue of guarantee instruments in finance**

Some African countries have started implementing reforms or launching programmes to improve the efficiency of their finance and banking sectors. At least seven countries created initiatives to increase access to credit and financial services in 2015/16. These included reinforcing the legal framework and creating systems to register property and share credit information (World Bank, 2016c). Such policy efforts to increase access to financial tools available to entrepreneurs may bear fruits for greater business development. Evidence shows that opening access to credit through safe systems increases competition in financial services, in particular when non-banking institutions can also offer secured loans. As a result of a safer financial environment, banks are more willing to make credit available to more businesses (UNIDO/GTZ, 2008). This enhances public support for investment, in turn increasing the development of industries and market competition (Alvarez de la Campa, 2014).

#### **Ghana's Collateral Registry System**

The Collateral Registry System (CRS) established in Ghana in 2010 under the Borrowers and Lenders Act 2008 was the first of its kind in sub-Saharan Africa (Ouedraogo et al., 2012). As of late 2016, central banks of Ghana, Liberia, Malawi and Nigeria were using this system. The programme was put in place by the Bank of Ghana and the International Finance Corporation to set up a regulatory framework according to the international standards of Secured Transactions and Collateral Registries. The system was developed by a Ghanaian ICT firm (Bsystems Limited). It allows the borrowers to prove their creditworthiness, reducing the risk of non-repayments and increasing transparency and the transaction framework. Around 63% of banks and financial institutions use the registry (Ghana Trade, 2017).

The CRS initiative has increased access to loans and financial services for SMEs in Ghana. As of December 2012, 9 000 SMEs and 30 000 micro businesses had received loans of more than USD 6.0 billion, secured with movable property recorded on the registry. Using movable assets as collateral, USD 1.3 billion was issued to finance small enterprises and a total of USD 12 billion to finance the business sector (World Bank, 2016c). Such a secured transaction system reduces the management cost of the loans and enables financial institutions to increase the level of credit accessibility for small entrepreneurs (Making Finance Work for Africa, 2017). About 20% of the businesses that benefited from





the access to credit are owned by women (IFC/World Bank/MIGA, 2013). However, reaching out to rural regions and community banks remains a challenge (Oppong-Adusah, 2012).

#### *The Credit Reference System in Tanzania*

In 2012, Tanzania launched a Credit Reference System to promote access to finance. Under the Bank of Tanzania Act 2006, regulations were published in 2012, and two private companies received the license to operate as Credit Reference Bureaus (CRBs): Bradstreet Credit Bureau Tanzania Limited and Credit Info Tanzania. The CRBs collect and compile information coming from banks and non-bank financial institutions, including Tanzania's micro-finance sector. This includes information on clients' indebtedness, payment behaviours and credit activities (Bank of Tanzania, 2012). This system makes credit operations less risky and faster (Clyde & Co, 2013). To ensure safe credit business, the central bank controls the databank. It is also useful for internal controls in the banking system.

Other initiatives are taking root across the continent. Mozambique passed legislation allowing the establishment of a credit bureau. Burkina Faso and Togo also passed the uniform law of the West African Economic and Monetary Union, facilitating the organisation of activities of credit bureaus. This law already existed in Côte d'Ivoire, Mali, Niger and Senegal. The credit bureaus in Senegal opened in February 2016.

#### *The post-loan mentorship programme in Namibia*

In order to promote access to credit for SMEs in Namibia, two major commercial banks – Development Bank of Namibia and Bank Windhoek – created SMEs branches respectively in 2004 and 2005. Through this initiative, they provide credit access and business development services for SMEs. This includes mentorship and a post-loan assistance programme to improve entrepreneurs' business management skills and lower the risk of loan defaults. The Emerging Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises branch of Bank Windhoek has a 12-month mentorship programme, and the lending periods range from 3 to 5 years (Nakusera et al. 2008; UNIDO/GTZ, 2008). The Special Development Fund within Namibia's Development Bank also offers training, mentoring and monitoring programmes for SMEs (SME Finance Forum, 2015).

### **Stronger accountability and oversight processes will be crucial for the future**

While much progress has been achieved in the way of improving governance in Africa, current literature suggests that a more strategic and multidimensional approach to implementing reforms is required. Governance reforms need to go beyond the traditional approach of focusing on technical criteria (Brinkerhoff, 2017). Examples of the pitfalls of the old approach have been documented (Andrews, Pritchett and Woolcock, 2013; Brinkerhoff and Brinkerhoff, 2015). For instance, decentralisation strategies initiated through a standardised framework rather than through an approach carefully adapted to the political and socio-economic context have led to mediocre performances (AfDB/OECD/UNDP, 2015: 189-194; Smoke, 2015). Some management tasks are likely similar in all countries, but the impacts of reforms on subnational governments can lead to disparate results, particularly at the local level. Bringing about positive reforms requires the careful accumulation and application of knowledge, especially with regards to understanding relationships between different political actors in the country beyond the government, including relations with civil society (OECD, 2014; Chapter 7).

It is particularly important for countries to ensure that public institutions are capable of establishing and setting policies, delivering on those policy commitments and doing so in an inclusive way. The Sustainable Development Goal 16, which emphasises building "effective, accountable institutions", is essential for development. The quality and



legitimacy of a country's institutional arrangement determines a government's ability to deliver services and the way in which it performs in terms of effectiveness and stability. A deeper understanding of China's development outcomes – almost four decades of double-digit growth rates, with more than 700 million people lifted out of poverty – shows they were facilitated by deep changes with respect to mechanisms of accountability and collective leadership throughout the policy-making process (World Bank, 2017b: 3).

E-governments can be a great tool to enhance the proximity and the quality of public service delivery but should not be a substitute for making accountability systems better – in particular oversight, separation of powers and procurement systems – improving basic infrastructure and increasing human resources capacity. The content communicated using IT tools needs to fit the priorities of the population, including those with low ICT-literacy skills. IT systems also have minimum requirements in terms of reliable electricity supply. E-government projects in Africa have had to deal with inadequate staffing of IT centres and the limited capacity of online application systems (Kettani and El Mahidi, 2009; Chêne and Hodess, 2009; Mutuku and Mahihu, 2014; Abdalla et al., 2015; Open Data Research Symposium, 2015).

Furthermore, to upgrade the performance of public administrations, governments would benefit from promoting merit-based management systems, together with greater transparency. There is a clear demand for a public sector that is more accountable and responsive to citizens' priority needs (Bratton, 2012; Okeke-Uzodike and Chitakunye, 2014; Kilelo, 2015). Public administrations are invariably more efficient with skilled human resources. Training must be adapted to new challenges and to individual needs. A focus on skills also means that compensation and career advancement in the public sector should be based on merit to a greater extent. There is also a call for involving civil society in setting the agenda and making decisions, especially at the local level.

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
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