OECD Journal: Competition Law and Policy
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This journal draws on the best of the recent work done for and by the OECD Committee on Competition Law and Policy. Its articles provide insight into the thinking a competition law enforcers, and focus on the practical application of competition law and policy. Here’s what Robert Pitofsky, Chairman of the US Federal Trade Commission said about this new journal when it was launched: “Global competition is the wave of the future, and comparative analysis of the laws and practices of various members of the worldwide community of nations is a necessary corollary. This new OECD Journal of Competition Law and Policy, compiled from OECD Round Table discussions, summaries of recent developments, and articles on topics of special interest, will introduce regulators, practitioners, and scholars to different regulatory approaches around the world and will allow us to consider in a more informed way the strengths and weaknesses of our own systems.”
Also available in: French
- 3 times a year
- ISSN: 16097521 (online)
- https://doi.org/10.1787/16097521
Loyalty and Fidelity Discounts and Rebates
As with other policies offering lower prices to at least some buyers, loyalty and fidelity discounts are generally pro-competitive and beneficial to consumers even though they may harm certain competitors. Potential problems exist, however, when such discounts are employed in ways that reduce price transparency, exclude or restrict a significant number of actual or potential competitors, or raise the probability of anticompetitive co-ordination.
The sometimes complex pro- and anti-competitive effects of loyalty and fidelity discounts are explored in the executive summary, background paper and summary of discussion pertaining to a June 2002 OECD Competition Committee roundtable discussion of the topic. While these documents reveal some interesting policy differences among various members of the Competition Committee, they also point to general agreement that loyalty and fidelity discounts are more likely to raise competition concerns when practised by firms enjoying substantial market power.
Also available in: French
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