

Chapter 2

Labour market outcomes of migrants and integration policies in OECD countries

This chapter examines the development of the labour market outcomes of OECD migrants during the period 2011-16. Taking a longer view, it then considers the evolution of unemployment among migrants since the 2007/08 global economic crisis looking out how the patterns of migrant employment have adapted in the intervening period. The chapter then turns to an analysis of the potential impact of technological change, with a consideration of how the automation of routine tasks may impact on future demand for migrant workers. Finally, the chapter discusses recent changes in integration policies in OECD countries, with a focus on those that directly target the integration of asylum seekers and refugees.

The statistical data for Israel are supplied by and under the responsibility of the relevant Israeli authorities. The use of such data by the OECD is without prejudice to the status of the Golan Heights, East Jerusalem and Israeli settlements in the West Bank under the terms of international law.

Introduction

Close to a decade following the onset of the financial crisis, the slow labour market recovery has left large parts of the labour force facing extended periods of unemployment. In this context, the significant increase in migration flows to OECD countries seen in 2015-16 has pushed the employment of migrants to the forefront of public debate. This chapter looks at the recent evolution of key labour market outcomes of migrants in the OECD, before turning to the policy changes undertaken in OECD countries to better foster the integration of these migrants and their children.

Main findings

- The employment rate of the migrant population of the OECD remained relatively stable in 2016, rising, on average, from 66.4% in 2015 to 67.4%. On average the unemployment rate of foreign born workers reached 8.3% in 2016 in the OECD and 12.4% in European OECD countries; this is 1.8 and 4.3 percentage points higher, respectively, than the rate of native-born workers. These headline figures mask, however, substantial heterogeneity across countries.
- In the OECD area, foreign-born workers are moving out of declining industries, such as construction where the concentration of foreign-born workers has fallen by over 20% in the past seven years.
- Some migrant groups are recovering from the crisis relatively well. In Canada and the United States unemployment rates among low-skilled migrants fell by 1.8 and 4.1 percentage points respectively between 2011 and 2016. Employment rates among older workers have experienced a strong recovery, growing in the United States, in European OECD countries, and in Canada by 3.6, 6.7 and 5.4 percentage points respectively.
- Other migrant groups are still suffering the consequences of the crisis. In Europe, where the recovery has been slower, low-skilled workers are struggling to recover from the downturn and have experienced rising unemployment rates and falling participation rates concurrently. Migrant youth have had a particularly hard time recovering from the crisis and have seen their participation rates fall by more than 10% since 2007 in both the United States and in European OECD countries.
- In the majority of OECD countries, migrants are more concentrated than natives in jobs involving routine tasks. This renders them more at risk for job loss as automation progresses. In European OECD countries, 47% of foreign-born workers are working in occupations that primarily involve routine tasks. Moreover, this appears to be increasing over time.
- To the extent that migrants experience more difficulties in developing their skills and retraining in response to changes in what employers are seeking, they are likely to be disproportionately affected by the adjustment costs that automation implies. And, in the absence of specific policies to address this situation, they may be at risk of becoming more vulnerable to long-term unemployment.

- Much effort has gone into designing appropriate policy responses to facilitate the integration of recently-arrived refugees and asylum seekers into the labour markets and societies of OECD countries:
 - ❖ Many governments seek to distribute humanitarian migrants evenly across the country;
 - ❖ Governments are increasingly turning to tailor-made measures and on aligning integration measures with labour market needs;
 - ❖ Efforts have been made, in many OECD countries, to streamline the integration process grouping all relevant information in a single place accessible from an early stage and improving co-ordination among stakeholders;
 - ❖ Many countries are experimenting with ways to speed up the integration process, including by curtailing the duration of programmes and, in many countries, by making integration offers compulsory;
 - ❖ Across the OECD, policy makers continue to place emphasis on the need for recognition of qualifications and assessing skills;
 - ❖ In a growing number of OECD countries, employers and social partners are actively involved in integration of refugees;
 - ❖ Efforts to improve communication on migration and integration policies with the public have been expanded.

Recent changes in labour market outcomes of migrants in the OECD area


This section looks at the trends in the labour market outcomes of the foreign-born in OECD countries. It compares the outcomes of the foreign-born, both across time, and in relation to the native-born populations of OECD countries in an attempt to understand what may be underpinning these trends. The section also examines how labour market outcomes are associated with the demographic characteristics of the foreign-born population, and how the employment of different migrant groups has responded to changing labour market conditions. Finally it looks at how migrant workers may be affected by the changing nature of labour demand in the medium term.

In some OECD countries the employment rates of the foreign-born are recovering from the intense impact of the financial crisis

The labour market performance of the migrant population of the OECD slightly improved in 2016, with the employment rate rising on average from 66.4% in 2015 to 67.4% in 2016. This headline figure, however, masks a large degree of heterogeneity across countries. While the employment rates of the foreign born in Australia, New Zealand and Canada have increased such that they now exceed their pre-crisis levels, the employment rate of the foreign born in the United States remains, despite a 0.8 percentage point increase between 2015 and 2016, close to two percentage points below its 2007 level. In European OECD countries, the picture is generally less positive still, although the situation again differs from country to country. In some European countries, such as the United Kingdom, Switzerland, and Sweden, the employment rates of foreign-and native-born alike have improved. In some of the countries in which employment rates – particularly those of the foreign-born – were hit hard by the downturn – such as Ireland, Spain and Greece – the employment rates of the foreign-born have been recovering well. In these countries, the foreign-born are making progress towards narrowing the employment gap with the native-born that had widened during the depths of the crisis. In other countries, including, France


and Germany, 2016 was marked by an increasing gap between the two groups (see Figure 2.1 and Annex 2.A1 for an indexed evolution of employment rates).

Figure 2.1. **Employment rates by place of birth, 2007, 2011 and 2016**



Note: The population refers to the working-age population (15-64). The data for Canada and Turkey refer to 2008 instead of 2007. The data for Chile refer to 2015 instead of 2016. The data for European countries and Turkey refer to the first three quarters only, except for Norway, Portugal and Spain where it refers to the full year. Countries are ranked by increasing order of the 2016 values of the foreign-born employment rates.

Source: European countries and Turkey: Labour Force Surveys (Eurostat); Australia, Canada, Israel and New Zealand: Labour Force Surveys; Chile: Encuesta de Caracterización Socioeconómica Nacional (CASEN); United States: Current Population Surveys; Mexico: Encuesta Nacional de Ocupación y Empleo (ENOE).


StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933497958>

In many OECD countries, the foreign-born experienced the immediate impact of the downturn with more intensity than did their native-born counterparts. On average the unemployment of foreign-born workers reached 8.3% in 2016 in the OECD area and 12.4% in European OECD countries, which is 1.8 and 4.3 percentage points higher than for the native-born respectively. The unemployment rate of immigrants has declined by 0.9 percentage points in the OECD and 1.2 in European OECD countries between 2015 and 2016. In total there are 519 000 unemployed immigrants fewer in 2016 than the previous year but still 905 000 more than in 2008.

Figure 2.2 presents the longer-term evolution of unemployment rates of the native and foreign-born in the years following the economic downturn. The rates are indexed to those of 2007, prior to the onset of the recession, in order to highlight disparate patterns in the evolution of the rates. For the United States, the unemployment rate has been indexed to the year 2006 to reflect the earlier onset of the crisis in comparison with the other countries. In many OECD countries, after a forceful initial shock, in the ensuing years the unemployment rates of migrants have made progress towards recovering to their pre-crisis levels rather faster than those of the native-born.


In European OECD countries, the unemployment rates of migrants rose by 40% between 2007 and 2009, compared to an increase of 20% among natives.¹ Since then, however, while unemployment rates among natives continued to rise sharply until 2013, the deterioration in the unemployment rates of migrants was more tempered. Furthermore, since 2013 the falling unemployment rates among the foreign-born have kept pace with those of natives. Nevertheless, the gap which already existed has widened somewhat since 2007. At the

Figure 2.2. **Evolution of unemployment rates by country of birth, selected countries, 2006-16**
Index 100 = 2007, unless otherwise stated




Note: Data refer to the active population aged 15-64. The United States data has been indexed to the year 2006 to reflect the earlier onset of the crisis.

Source: European countries: Labour Force Surveys (Eurostat); Australia, Canada, New Zealand: Labour Force Surveys; Chile: Encuesta de Caracterización Socioeconómica Nacional (CASEN); United States: Current Population Surveys.

StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933497961>

national level, unemployment rates continue to differ sharply across European countries, as does the gap between the rates of unemployment among migrants, and among their native-born peers. In countries, such as Finland, France, Sweden, Austria, the Netherlands, and Norway, an already large gap has been widened by the crisis – where unemployment rates among the foreign-born have continued to rise or, in the case of Sweden, have failed to fall alongside the unemployment rates of natives (Figure 2.3). In settlement countries (e.g. Australia, Canada and New Zealand) unemployment disparities have fallen. This is also true in the United Kingdom and, to a lesser extent in Germany. The relative importance of labour migration, including in the context of intra-European movements, partly explains this favourable outcome.

Figure 2.3. Unemployment rates by place of birth, 2007, 2011 and 2016



Note: The population refers to the active population aged 15-64. The data for Canada and Turkey refer to 2008 instead of 2007. The data for Chile refer to 2015 instead of 2016. The data for European countries and Turkey refers to the first three quarters of each year only, except for Norway, Portugal and Spain where it refers to the full year. Countries are ranked by increasing order of the 2016 values of the foreign-born unemployment rates.

Source: European countries and Turkey: Labour Force Surveys (Eurostat); Australia, Canada, Israel and New Zealand: Labour Force Surveys; Chile: *Encuesta de Caracterización Socioeconómica Nacional* (CASEN); United States: Current Population Surveys; Mexico: *Encuesta Nacional de Ocupación y Empleo* (ENOE).

StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933497973>

The pattern of unemployment rates to some extent mirrors that of employment rates. This is because, thus far, participation rates in the majority of OECD countries have remained relatively robust in the face of the crisis. However, in some countries – such as Germany – that received a large number of new arrivals in 2015 and 2016 the widening gap between the employment rates of migrants and natives is not yet reflected in unemployment rates.


Migrant workers and changing labour demand

When examining the trends in employment and unemployment rates, it is important to bear in mind that fluctuations occur, not only as a response to changes in labour demand, but also to adjustments in labour supply which can be more marked in the case of migrants.

Figure 2.4 (Panel A) shows that, in European OECD countries, foreign-born workers tend to be more concentrated than native workers in industries – such as health and social work, financial intermediation, and public administration – that have experienced employment growth between 2008 and 2015. At the same time, they are also concentrated in some industries that have experienced contractions in employment – notably in construction. In the United States (Panel B) migrants are also concentrated in industries that experienced heavy employment losses – notably private households, construction, manufacturing – as well as in some growing ones, such as agriculture, hotels and restaurants, and real estate.

The sectorial concentration of the foreign-born has increased or remains stable in sectors in which employment remained relatively resilient to the downturn, such as education, but also in some sectors which were negatively affected such as wholesale and retail trade-repair (Figure 2.5). In European OECD countries however, the concentration of

Figure 2.4. Concentration of foreign born in growing sectors, 2007/08 and 2015/16




Note: The population refers to the foreign-born population aged 15-64. Concentration of the foreign-born in a specific sector is measured as the percentage of the foreign-born in that sector (out of total foreign-born employment) over the percentage of native-born in that sector (out of total native-born employment).

Source: European countries: Labour Force Surveys (Eurostat) 2008 and 2015; United States: Current Population Surveys 2007 and 2016.

StatLink <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933497981>

Figure 2.5. Changes in foreign born concentration in growing sectors, 2007/08 and 2015/16



Note: The population refers to the foreign-born population aged 15-64. Concentration of the foreign-born in a specific sector is measured as the percentage of the foreign-born in that sector (out of total foreign-born employment) over the percentage of native-born in that sector (out of total native-born employment). The change is the difference between the ratio at the end of the period and the ratio at the beginning of the period.

Source: European countries: Labour Force Surveys (Eurostat) 2008 and 2015; United States: Current Population Surveys 2007 and 2016.

StatLink <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933497994>


foreign-born in the construction sector which was hard hit by the economic crisis of 2007/08 is quite noticeable. The same holds for the United States where the adjustment seems to have been even more marked in domestic services. Conversely, in hotels and restaurants in Europe and in the transport sector in the United States, the share of migrant labour increased while total employment was decreasing. This observation could be explained by selective exits of employment in these sectors.

The risk of over-qualification increased for migrant workers

Given the fewer alternatives available to migrants – in terms of family support, unemployment insurance, or returning to education – foreign-born workers are likely to have a lower reservation wage and this implies that they are more likely to accept lower quality jobs when the economic situation worsens. This may imply that migrant workers are more likely to be in temporary, part time and lower skilled jobs during economic crises (OECD, 2009).

This is true for migrant workers in general but also for those with tertiary-level education, who make up more than a third of the migrant workforce in OECD countries on average. It has been widely documented that education and experience obtained by migrants, outside their host country, is valued less on the labour market (see for example OECD, 2007 and 2014; Nordin, 2007; Ferrer and Riddell, 2008; or Dustmann and Preston, 2012 and 2013 among many other references). Figure 2.6 illustrates the extent to which tertiary educated migrants are more frequently found in jobs for which they are overqualified than natives in selected OECD countries. Disparities in the prevalence of over-qualification, between native-born and foreign-born workers, are particularly high in Nordic countries, such as Denmark and Sweden as well as in Southern European countries, notably in Italy, Greece and Spain.

Figure 2.6. **Differences in over-qualification rates between foreign- and native-born workers, 2015**




Note: Data for the United States refer to 2016. The reference population are persons with a high education level aged 15-64 who are not in education.

Source: European countries: Labour Force Survey 2015 (Eurostat); United States: Current Population Survey 2016.

StatLink <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933498005>

In the majority of OECD countries, over-qualification rates among migrants appear to be particularly elevated during their first five years in their host country (Figure 2.7). This may be because with time spent in the host country, they are more able to move into more appropriate employment.


Figure 2.7. **Over-qualification rates of recent and settled migrants, 2015**

Note: Data for the United States refer to 2016. The reference population are persons with a high education level aged 15-64 who are not in education.

Source: European countries: Labour Force Survey 2015 (Eurostat); United States: Current Population Survey 2016.

StatLink <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933498012>

In the face of the weak labour demand that has characterised the labour markets of many OECD countries in the past years, newly-arrived migrants may struggle to find work appropriate to their level of education. Indeed, Figure 2.8 illustrates that over-qualification was more prevalent among migrants arriving in the five years preceding 2014/15, than it was among those arriving in the five years preceding 2006/07. More specifically, over-qualification among recently-arrived migrants was more than 10 percentage points higher in 2014/15 than it was in 2006/07 among a number of OECD countries including Austria, Denmark, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. This pattern of higher over-qualification rates among migrants arriving since the onset of the crisis does not, however, hold for some of those countries in which employment was hit

Figure 2.8. **Over-qualification rates among recent migrants, 2006-07 and 2014-15**

Note: Data for the United States refer to 2016. The reference population are persons aged 15-64 who are not in education.

Source: European countries: Labour Force Surveys (Eurostat); United States: Current Population Surveys.

StatLink <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933498028>

hardest by the crisis; countries such as Spain, Greece, Ireland and Portugal. This may be because migrant flows into these countries fell substantially during these years and few new migrants were able to find employment irrespective of their skill level.

Certain migrant groups are doing better than others

To examine the extent to which the demographic composition of the migrant population influences aggregate labour market indicators, Figure 2.9 breaks out changes in employment, unemployment and participation rates by demographic groups – by gender, education and age.


In the United States, the employment rates of the foreign-born have increased by 2.5 percentage points between 2011 and 2016. This increase, however, has been primarily driven by an increase in the employment rates among men. While the improvement in female employment rates has been more subdued than for their male counterparts among both foreign- and native-born women, foreign-born women have seen particularly weak growth. Indeed, while employment rates among foreign-born men have increased at a faster rate than among native-born men (plus half a percentage point), among women the inverse is true, and improvements among foreign-born women have trailed their native-born counterparts by half a percentage point. This may result from the fact that employment rates of foreign-born men were hit harder by the crisis and, as such, have more ground to recover (see Annex 2.A1.2) or it may point to the fact that there may be other factors impeding employment among female migrants beyond slack in the labour market in the years since the crisis. In Canada, the pattern is the same, while in Australia and in Europe the differing growth patterns in the employment rates of foreign-born men and women are more limited. In Australia, though, employment appears more robust among female foreign-born workers whose employment has held constant, unlike that of their male counterparts.

Unemployment rates have decreased for migrants in both the United States and in Canada. However, while in the United States the fall in unemployment rates among male migrants outpaced the fall among women by 2.4 percentage points, in Canada the fall in unemployment rates was more profound among female migrants. Furthermore, in the United States the fall in female unemployment rates was partially driven by falling participation among foreign-born women whereas in Canada, female migrants achieved both falling unemployment and an increase in participation concurrently – as did their male peers.

The employment rates of highly educated foreign-born workers are increasing in Canada, in the United States and in Europe. In both Canada and the United States, this improvement in the employment rates is observed among migrants across all levels of education and has been resilient to the labour market changes that have reduced employment levels among low- and medium-educated native-born workers in Canada. In Europe, the employment rates of migrants have been increasing only among those with a high level of education, while those holding a lower level of education have seen their employment rates decline.

Unemployment rates fell in both Canada and the United States, or remained roughly constant, between 2011 and 2016, across all levels of education. These falling unemployment rates were particularly marked among low and medium educated migrants in the United States, with a fall of 4.1 and 3.9 percentage points respectively. The unemployment rates of low and medium educated migrants in Canada exhibited a similar trend and fell by 1.8 and 0.9 percentage points, respectively. Among low and medium

Figure 2.9. **Changes in labour market outcomes by demographic group and country of birth, in selected OECD countries, 2016 compared to 2011**



Note: The reference population is the working-age population (15-64), including for unemployment rates. Thus the sum of the employment rate and the unemployment rate gives the participation rate. “Low-educated” here refers to less than upper secondary attainment, “Medium-educated” to upper secondary and post-secondary non-tertiary, “Highly educated” to tertiary. The data for European countries refer to the first three quarters only.

Source: Panel A: Labour Force Surveys (Eurostat). Panel B: Current Population Surveys. Panel C: Labour Force Surveys. Panel D: Labour Force Surveys.

StatLink <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933498030>

educated migrants, the fall in unemployment rates was partially driven by declining participation rates as discouraged workers stopped searching for employment. Foreign-born workers in Canada with a medium level of education – who, like their highly-educated peers, achieved falling unemployment rates alongside increasing participation rates – were an exception to this. In Europe, low-skilled migrant workers are struggling to recover from the downturn and have experienced rising unemployment rates and falling participation rates concurrently.

Figure 2.9 reveals some clear patterns, particularly in participation rates, that were masked at the aggregate level. In Canada, in the United States, in Europe and, to a lesser extent, in Australia, the employment and participation rates of older foreign-born workers have been increasing since the crisis, perhaps driven by the need for older workers to stay in work longer in order to support other family members. In Europe and in Canada, participation rates among this group increased by 6.1 and 5.7 percentage points respectively.

Foreign-born youth are leaving the labour market


The deep recession of 2007/08 hit young people hard and foreign-born youth were among the most exposed. The prolonged downturn meant that many struggled to gain a foothold on the labour market and now, almost ten years later, many are finding, not only that they remain unemployed, but are becoming unemployable. The difficulties faced by young jobseekers are exacerbated among foreign-born youth, many of whom, in addition to having limited labour market experience, hold foreign qualifications that are not familiar to employers and may have had limited exposure to their host country language. Figure 2.10 illustrates the evolution of unemployment (Panel A) and participation (Panel B) rates for youth aged 15-24 in selected OECD countries. In the United States and in European OECD countries, the unemployment rates of foreign-born youth suffered a significant blow following the crisis. This is true in absolute terms as illustrated here, but also in relative terms compared to all foreign-born (see Figure 2.2).

High unemployment rates among the foreign born appear to have had a profound impact upon participation rates. As shown in Figure 2.9, foreign-born youth participation rates have fallen by over 2 percentage points in the United States, whereas they have marginally increased for their native-born peers since 2011. In Australia, participation rates among young migrants fell by as much as 3.7 percentage points. While this fall in participation may partially be driven by some foreign-born youth choosing to stay in education, it may also indicate that some have been discouraged from the job search. The foreign-born youth in Australia and Canada do not appear to have experienced the same unemployment rise and while youth unemployment among migrants rose dramatically in New Zealand, participation rates do not yet appear to have been adversely affected.

Figure 2.11 illustrates the proportion of young people aged 15-24 that are not in employment or education and training (NEET). In the majority of OECD countries the foreign-born are over-represented in NEET with the result that the average NEET rate among foreign-born youth in OECD countries is 30% (or six percentage points) higher than that among native-born youth. However, this masks quite some variation across countries and, while in the Slovak Republic, Turkey, Greece, Slovenia, Germany, Austria, and Italy, the gap between foreign- and native-born NEET rates is above 10 percentage points, elsewhere – notably in Poland, the United Kingdom, Hungary, Israel and Canada – NEET rates among migrants, are similar or below those among natives.

Figure 2.10. **Evolution of unemployment and participation rates of youth (15-24) by country of birth in selected OECD countries, 2007-16**

Index 100 = 2007



Source: European countries: Labour Force Surveys (Eurostat); Australia, Canada, New Zealand: Labour Force Surveys; United States: Current Population Surveys.




StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933498048>

Figure 2.11. **NEET rates by place of birth in selected OECD countries, 2016 or latest year available**
Share of the 15-24 population which is not in employment nor in education or training



Note: The data for European countries and Turkey refer to 2015.

Source: European countries and Turkey: Labour Force Surveys (Eurostat); Canada, Israel: Labour Force Survey; Mexico: Encuesta Nacional de Ocupación y Empleo (ENOE); United States: Current Population Surveys.

StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933498050>

Being unemployed when young, particularly for an extended time, can result in lower pay, higher unemployment, as well as negative health implications in the long-term (see for example OECD, 2016; Bell and Blanchflower, 2011; and Strandh et al., 2014). The weak and sporadic recovery of employment in several European OECD countries has not been sufficient to enable many migrant youth to overcome the multiple disadvantages they face. High unemployment rates accompanied by falling participation rates and high inactivity among foreign-born NEET, have the potential, if left unaddressed, to impose costs – at the individual and at the societal level – well into the future.

In the longer term, migrant workers may be vulnerable to the effects of increasing automation

Though prime-age foreign-born workers are experiencing a stronger recovery from the crisis than other migrant groups, in the longer-term, these workers may be more vulnerable to structural change and displacement than younger migrants who are potentially still able to get additional education and training. Indeed, while much ink has been spent on investigating the link between migrant labour, and the wages and employment prospects of native-born workers, the widespread public debate on this question misses the potentially larger and more fundamental forces that are shaping the demand for both migrant and native labour – those that are driven by technological change.

As the changing nature of labour demand has evolved from a tendency to favour more educated workers to job polarisation, talk of skill-biased technical change has given way to a focus on routine-biased technological change (OECD, 2017). Under this hypothesis, jobs that largely involve routine tasks are disappearing as technology is increasingly able to perform these tasks. At the same time, however, technology can complement human labour in other, complex tasks, increasing productivity and, in turn, strengthening demand for workers performing the tasks that computers cannot. Such routine-biased technological change

prompts those workers without the training required to take on more complex jobs, to reallocate from middle-income manufacturing jobs to low-income service occupations.

In this context, foreign-born workers may be more at risk of displacement due to their observed set of skills and occupational concentration in certain types of jobs. Indeed, on the basis of occupational data from the United States, Peri and Sparber (2009) demonstrate that, whereas native-born workers are more concentrated in jobs requiring the performance of communication-language tasks, foreign-born workers tend to specialise in occupations requiring more manual-physical skills. In more recent work focussing on occupations requiring graduate degrees, Peri and Sparber (2011) again found the native-born specialising in occupations valuing interactive and communication skills while the foreign-born were concentrated in fields demanding more quantitative and analytical skills.

Box 2.1. Measuring the routine employment share

The analysis of this chapter is based upon the summary index of routine task activities, routine task intensity (RTI), developed by Autor, Levy and Murnane (2003) and mapped to United Nations occupational classifications (ISCO) used in Europe by Goos et al. (2014). The RTI index is based upon a combination of job task requirements, as detailed in the US Department of Labour's Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT), which enables census occupation classifications to be ranked according to the composition and intensity of their routine, abstract and manual task content. These measures are then combined into a summary measure of routine task-intensity by occupation. This measure is increasing relative to the importance of routine tasks in occupational content, and decreasing relative to the importance of abstract and manual tasks.


The drawbacks of this method include the necessity of the assumption that the task content of occupations is similar across countries, as well as the difficulties involved in mapping occupational classifications across countries. Lastly Arntz et al. (2016) have argued that task structures and intensities differ within occupations.

Source: See Autor, Levy and Murnane (2003), Autor and Dorn (2013) and Goos et al. (online appendix) for further details, and Arntz et al. (2016) for an alternative approach.


Figure 2.12 illustrates that, across the vast majority of OECD countries, foreign-born workers are disproportionately concentrated in occupations dominated by routine tasks – those that are most at risk of automation. In Southern European countries such as Greece, Spain and Italy, where low-skilled migration has dominated in recent years, these routine task occupations account for over 40% of all foreign-born employment (i.e. 5 to 10 percentage points more than for natives). In parts of Western Europe, however, and in the Nordic countries, where automation is already more advanced, the role played by routine-task dominated occupations is more limited among the foreign-born – particularly in those countries such as the United Kingdom and Luxembourg, where the education attainment of the migrant population is more closely aligned with that of the native-born population.

The binary dichotomy into occupations requiring the performance of routine and non-routine tasks, however, masks quite some variation in the prevalence of foreign-born workers within these occupations.² As a result, Figure 2.13 plots the migrant concentration in medium-low wage occupations alongside an index of routine task intensity, compiled by Autor and Dorn (2013), which gives an indication of the extent to which these occupations involve routine tasks (see Box 2.1 for a description of the contents of this index). Figure 2.13

Figure 2.12. **Total employment share, and share of foreign-born employment in routine occupations in selected European OECD countries, 2015**



Note: Routine jobs defined as those with a routine task intensity greater than zero (see Box 2.1). Occupations in which employment occurs in only a small number of country year cells were dropped (ISCO 11, 92 and 61) – see Goos et al. (2014) online appendix for further details. Source: Labour Force Surveys (Eurostat); Routine task intensity (RTI) from Goos et al. (2014).

StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933498066>

highlights the extent to which the majority of foreign-born individuals working in routine task occupations are working in those occupations in which the tasks undertaken are classed as only marginally routine. Migrant concentration (defined as the ratio of the weight of the occupation in total foreign-born employment over the weight of the occupation in native-born employment) is highest among cleaners and helpers, an occupation group in which the routine task index is close to zero.


Indeed, migrants are heavily represented in this occupation in many OECD countries. In both Switzerland and Luxembourg over half of all workers employed as cleaners or helpers were born outside the country (Figure 2.14).

The concentration of employment in routine task occupations is declining over time as these tasks are increasingly automated (Autor and Dorn, 2013, for the United States; and Goos et al., 2014, for an analysis in Europe). Workers moving out of these roles tend to have two alternatives available to them; in the first place they may upskill and move into occupations requiring the use of more the more complex skills that are complementary to new technologies, or alternatively they may move into low-skilled service occupations.


While there is some evidence that automation is pushing native-born workers to move into more complex and communicative roles, migrants, who in many cases have an imperfect mastery of the host country language, culture and norms and have more limited labour market related networks, may be at a disadvantage. This may be particularly true for those with a lower educational attainment who are concentrated in more routine jobs. Figure 2.15 shows the evolution of the employment share of routine employment, mid-low paying non-routine employment, and high-paying non-routine employment among both the native and the foreign-born in European OECD countries. While routine employment has been falling over the previous 15 years for all workers, among the foreign-born, the employment share accounted for by routine occupations fell only marginally. At the same time, native-born workers are increasingly concentrated in highly paid jobs involving non-

Figure 2.13. **Foreign born employment concentration and routine task intensity**

A. European OECD countries



B. United States



- 41 General and Keyboard Clerks
- 42 Customer Services Clerks
- 51 Personal Services Workers
- 52 Sales Workers
- 71 Building and Related Trades Workers
- 72 Metal, Machinery and Related Trades Workers
- 73 Handicraft and Printing Workers
- 74 Electrical and Electronic Trades Workers
- 81 Stationary Plant and Machine Operators
- 82 Assemblers
- 83 Drivers and Mobile Plant Operators
- 91 Cleaners and helpers
- 93 Labourers in Mining, Construction, Manufacturing and Transport


- 11 Healthcare support
- 12 Protective service
- 13 Food preparation and serving related
- 14 Building and grounds cleaning and maintenance
- 15 Personal care and service
- 16 Sales and related
- 17 Office and administrative support
- 18 Farming, fishing, and forestry
- 19 Construction and extraction
- 20 Installation, maintenance, and repair
- 21 Production
- 22 Transportation and material moving

Note: The population refers to the foreign-born population aged 15-64. Concentration of the foreign-born in a specific occupation is measured as the percentage of the foreign-born in that occupation (out of total foreign-born employment) over the percentage of native-born in that occupation (out of total native-born employment).

Source: European Union Labour Force Survey (Eurostat) 2015; United States: Current Population Survey 2016.


StatLink <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933498071>

Figure 2.14. **Concentration of foreign-born in cleaners and helpers occupations, 2015**




Source: Labour Force Survey (Eurostat).

StatLink <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933498089>

Figure 2.15. **Employment by occupational type in European OECD countries, 2000-15**

Note: Excludes Switzerland and countries accessing the European Union in 2004 or later. Routine jobs defined as those with a routine task intensity greater than zero (see Box 2.1). Low, mid and high paying occupations defined according to their mean wage rank as ranked in Goos et al. (2014) using the European Community Household Panel (ECHP) and the European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC). Following Goos et al. (2014), data for the following 16 European countries is used in the analysis: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. In addition occupations in which employment occurs in only a small number of country year cells were dropped (ISCO 11, 92 and 61) – see Goos et al. (2014) online appendix for further details.

Source: Labour Force Surveys (Eurostat), Routine task intensity (RTI) from Goos et al. (2014).

StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933498093>

routine tasks. This adjustment is not apparent among migrant workers, who instead are increasingly concentrated in mid and low paying non-routine jobs.

This preliminary analysis suggests that migrants are overly represented in jobs involving routine tasks, rendering them more at risk from displacement as automation progresses. Moreover, this over-representation appears to be increasing over time. Yet “occupational category” captures jobs requiring a wide array of tasks, and many of the routine task occupations in which the foreign-born are concentrated are those in which routine intensity is relatively low. Task content is likely to adapt and evolve in response to technological advances and as a result it is unlikely that routine-type occupations will disappear entirely.

Nevertheless, to the extent that migrants may experience more difficulties in upskilling and retraining in response to changes in labour demand (due to language barriers or more limited access to professional training and lifelong learning), they are likely to be disproportionately affected by the adjustment costs that automation implies. And, in the absence of policies to offset this risk, they may become more vulnerable to long-term unemployment.

Recent changes in integration policies in OECD countries

Throughout 2016 and into 2017, integration policy has evolved along many lines in various OECD countries. Several changes in this area have been related to the refugee crisis and the large flows of asylum seekers and refugees, which has put pressure on the integration systems of many OECD countries, particularly those in Europe. But while much of the policy innovation has been designed in the context of the recent refugee surge, the schemes it gave rise to are often open to other migrant groups as well and will shape the way OECD countries handle the integration of immigrants in general. This section provides

an update on recent integration policy changes in OECD countries as well as in Bulgaria, Lithuania, Romania and the Russian Federation.

More and more countries place an emphasis on providing tailor-made measures for migrants

Immigrants arrive with different education backgrounds, experiences, socio-economic profiles and family characteristics. No one integration programme fits the needs of all. An increasing number of countries have therefore developed targeted integration pathways to fit individual needs. Language training – a principal component of integration programmes in all OECD countries – is, for example offered on a modular basis in at least half of OECD countries. In 2016, France introduced more targeted language training pathways, as it divided its language programme for new arrivals into three different tracks with different paces of progression and thematic focuses. In a similar vein, Latvia divided language training into three subsequent courses each composed of two sublevels to ensure a more gradual language acquisition. Moreover, the government plans to put in place additional support courses for those who do not pass the language exam. Likewise, Finland and the Czech Republic recently revised their integration programmes with a view to design more personalised language training options.

Countries with longstanding targeted integration programmes continue to adjust their frameworks to better fit the needs of new arrivals. Sweden, for example, introduced in 2016 specific supplementary courses for tertiary-educated new arrivals, to speed up their entry into skilled employment. Israel recently developed specific integration measures for specific groups of permanent immigrants, namely those from France, Belgium and Ethiopia. Norway divided its Job Opportunity Programme into three different sub-schemes to better target different migrant groups. Moreover, it made primary and secondary education for adult migrants more flexible and expanded the possibilities to use and combine primary and lower secondary education, upper secondary education and work-related measures in its Introduction Programme.

Finally, to fit the needs of different migrant groups, integration courses must be organised at times and locations that are accessible for migrants with time constraints. Online learning options provide flexibility in this regard. Belgium recently developed a digital platform, “Netbox”, for Dutch language training.

Aligning integration measures with labour market needs

Getting migrants as quickly as possible into employment is one of the main objectives of most integration schemes. However, in the past, many integration measures, including most notably language courses, were not particularly aligned with the needs of the labour market. This is gradually changing as countries across the OECD area are increasingly focused on employment-related aspects in their integration schemes. A case in point: language courses that are tailored to a specific vocation or provided directly on the job. Finland, for instance, launched a trial project in 2016, which offers labour-market oriented training to 2 000 immigrants with the objective of moving them into employment within four months. After this period, the training continues on the job and focuses on language, culture and professional skills. Germany offers various formats of vocation-specific language courses that include an internship and site visits. The budget for vocational language learning more than doubled from EUR 179 million in 2016 to EUR 470 million in 2017.

Under the guiding principle of “work from day one”, the Danish Government has made a series of amendments to its Integration Act in 2016 with a view to facilitating the labour market integration of newly-arrived family and humanitarian migrants. Danish courses now have an even greater focus on the labour market and can be organised at the workplace or outside working hours. New arrivals are generally considered “job-ready” and expected to participate in job training unless considered ineligible due to health or other issues. For migrants whose skills are not yet sufficient to enter the labour market, a two-year basic education scheme was introduced, which combines classroom education with a remunerated internship. In addition, the amendment introduced financial incentives for municipalities, who now receive a bonus of DKK 25 000 (about EUR 3 400) for every migrant who enters regular employment in 2016 and 2017, while social benefits for recently-arrived migrants were cut with a view to enhancing incentives for taking up employment. In Norway, the Introduction Act was amended to better align job-related training schemes with individual integration plans. Finally, Latvia is currently discussing supporting Latvian language training in the workplace.

Streamlining the integration process by regrouping relevant information in one place and providing it at an early stage

Regrouping relevant information in one place renders the integration process more transparent and helps directing newly-arrived migrants to the services they need. Recently, a number of countries have developed innovative technological solutions to provide such information on a large scale early upon arrival. Finland, for example, designed a smartphone application (TEMWISIT) to guide newly-arrived immigrants to the right services and help public servants advise their clients. In a similar vein, Sweden launched the platform “Setel.in”, which brings existing applications and websites relevant to new arrivals together in one place. Similar initiatives have recently been developed in Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and several other OECD countries.

Other countries have opted for more traditional information channels. In Estonia, the Police and Border Guard Board started to notify recently-arrived migrants about the possibility of attending integration programmes to ease their settlement in the country. Portugal prepared a welcome guide for new arrivals, and Latvia established in May 2016 a number of Information Centres for Immigrants across the country. The centres act as one-stop agencies and provide information and support to all recently-arrived nationals from non-EU countries, including asylum seekers.

Improving co-ordination among stakeholders

Integration policy is a cross-cutting issue that involves many different areas and levels of government. As a consequence, designing and implementing effective integration policy responses requires co-ordination among different levels of government, service providers and civil society associations. Recently, a number of countries have stepped up efforts to improve co-operation among relevant stakeholders. In Canada, the federal department for Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship advanced federal-provincial-territorial collaboration with a view to reach a more strategic and co-ordinated approach to the design and delivery of language training in Canada. In Austria, the three Ministries of European, Foreign Affairs and Integration; of the Interior and of Employment, Social Affairs and Consumer Protection, developed a joint strategy in April 2016 to support the acquisition of German language skills for new arrivals and agreed to better co-ordinate and align their respective language course

offers. In Norway, the Ministries of Education; of Labour; and of Children and Equality developed a joint strategy to co-ordinate their efforts for adult learning. Among other issues, the strategy foresees better co-ordination in the realm of the Norwegian language and Social Studies courses provided in the framework of the introduction programme for new arrivals. Other countries have used regional and local networks to co-ordinate local stakeholders and manage funds more effectively. The Czech Republic, for example, set up a network of 12 regional integration support centres to co-ordinate the efforts of local authorities, NGOs and other stakeholders, to provide information, advice, and integration courses and co-ordinate the development of local integration projects co-funded by the European Social Fund. In Ireland, local community development committees co-ordinate local guidance and training providers under the Social Inclusion and Community Activation Programme. Greece and Switzerland, on the other hand, have strengthened co-ordination capacity at the central level. While Greece established in late 2016 a Ministry of Migration Policy, set up a central co-ordinating body for the management of the refugee crisis and appointed a special secretary on migration communication, Switzerland put in place a new secretariat for the co-ordination of, and quality assurance in, language training. On the European level, the new EU Action Plan on Integration (Box 2.2) also foresees a more co-ordinated approach for the use of EU funds to support national integration measures.

Box 2.2. **The European Commission's Action Plan on Integration**

In June 2016, the European Commission presented an Action Plan on Integration as part of a broad package of actions announced in the European Agenda on Migration. The plan provides a common policy framework and supporting measures to assist EU member countries in developing and strengthening their national integration policies for third-country (i.e. non-EU) nationals. While integration policies remain a national competence, the plan seeks to co-ordinate EU member countries' actions and policies on integration and sets out policy, operational and financial measures to provide incentives and support for EU member countries in their efforts to promote integration of third-country nationals. Actions are proposed in a number of key areas including:

- pre-departure and pre-arrival integration measures, in particular for people in clear need of international protection who are being resettled;
- education, employment and vocational training;
- access to basic services; and
- active participation and social inclusion.

The plan also proposes a more strategic and co-ordinated approach for the use of EU funds to support national integration measures. In addition, under the New Skills Agenda for Europe, the European Commission plans to support labour market integration with various tools to improve migrants' skills and to recognise and benefit from their existing qualifications. On a general note, the action plan stresses that support for the integration of third-country nationals need not, and should not, be at the expense of measures to benefit other vulnerable or disadvantaged groups or minorities.

Countries are trying to speed up integration, including by curtailing the duration of programmes

Alongside efforts to improve information about, and co-ordination of, integration measures, several countries have attempted to accelerate the integration process throughout

2016. In France, reforms to the reception and integration contract for non-EU nationals shortened the maximum duration of language training provided by the French Office for Immigration and Integration from 400 hours to 200 hours. Following tripartite agreements in 2016, Denmark changed the duration of its integration programme for new arrivals from three years to one year, with a possibility to continue for an additional four years if migrants cannot enter employment. Municipalities are obliged to start integration training within one month of arrival and the time period between different active labour market policy measures is now limited to six weeks. Following a similar logic, Finland's new integration pilot aims to move new arrivals into employment within four months. Latvia shortened the maximum period for state-financed Latvian language training from two years to one year with a view of encouraging efficiency. Likewise, Lithuania shortened the period of state support for integration in municipalities to a maximum of 12 months.

A continuing trend to make integration measures compulsory

Over the course of 2016, and with the rising concern about the integration of migrants, several European countries adopted integration measures that are compulsory for new arrivals. In the Flemish part of Belgium, as of 2016, candidates require a certificate of civic integration at the end of the integration programme and need to pass a test to demonstrate they have reached a certain level of Dutch. Similarly, in Wallonia, the integration programme for new arrivals became compulsory in 2016. The Brussels region also announced the beginning of a compulsory integration pathway as of 2017. Recent reforms in France have made attendance of language training and civic education, as well as acquisition of French language at the A1 level, mandatory in order to obtain a multiannual residence permit after one year of residence. Obtaining A2 level is required to obtain a permanent residence card after five years of residence. The Netherlands introduced a compulsory "declaration of participation" for new permit holders in 2016, which is expected to become part of a compulsory civic integration programme in 2017. In Denmark, non-participation in the recently intensified integration programme can entail a reduction in cash benefits. In early 2017, the Austrian Government agreed on a new legislative proposal that foresees the introduction of an obligatory "integration year" for refugees and certain asylum seekers. Participation will be obligatory for a minimum of 12 months or until participants enter employment.

The issue of recognising foreign qualifications and assessing skills remains high on the policy agenda

Having foreign qualifications formally recognised significantly improves the employment prospects of skilled migrants. This has been a key area of recent policy developments, and throughout 2016 many further changes were made to credential recognition frameworks across OECD countries. In July 2016, Austria implemented a comprehensive Act on the Recognition of Foreign Qualifications. The Act established a right to the assessment of all levels of educational certificates and diplomas, and simplified the procedure – from secondary education through post-secondary and apprenticeship up to higher education qualifications. Similarly, Norway complemented its system of foreign credential recognition with new assessment procedures for secondary and tertiary vocational education. As of 2016, foreign-trained immigrants in the Netherlands have the possibility of undergoing a credentials recognition procedure, free of charge, as part of the civic integration programme. Luxembourg recently introduced a law in parliament to

implement the European Directive 2013/55/EU on the recognition of professional qualifications, and since 2016 in Chile, legally resident migrants have had the possibility to have their professional competencies recognised by ChileValora, the Commission for the National System of Certification of Labour Competencies. In March 2016, Israel introduced a new regulation allowing foreign-trained dentists with at least five years of professional experience to practice in Israel. Moreover, doctors with specialisations that are in-demand in Israel can now work under supervision in Israeli hospitals and obtain a license without passing examinations. By contrast, in 2016 Poland imposed stricter language requirements for the recognition of medical qualifications completed in a language other than Polish.

Sweden recently made significant efforts to cater to the growing demand for evaluations of foreign qualifications. Among other measures, it enhanced funding for the Swedish Council for Higher Education, the public agency responsible for the recognition of foreign qualifications. Sweden also invested significant funds to increase the availability of bridging programmes that enable migrants with foreign credentials in law, medicine, nursing, dentistry, teaching, and – as of 2017 – pharmaceuticals, to complete the training required to practice their occupation in Sweden. To this end, the government invested SEK 25 million in 2016 and estimates spending a further SEK 75 million in 2017, SEK 220 million in 2018 and SEK 340 million in 2019 (i.e. respectively EUR 2.7 million, EUR 7.8 million, EUR 22.9 million and EUR 35.4 million).

Finally, a number of countries concluded bi- or multi-lateral mutual recognition agreements. Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg, for instance, decided to recognise each other's high school and master degrees, while Poland and Lithuania each concluded agreements on mutual recognition of higher education qualifications with China.

Several countries have taken measures to combat discrimination against migrants

Throughout 2015-16 and into 2017, many OECD countries have adopted new or enhanced existing frameworks to combat discrimination against migrants. In Finland, a new Discrimination Act came into force in 2015, which provides more extensive protection against discrimination. The new act also extended the requirement to draw-up plans to promote equality beyond public authorities, to also encompass education providers, educational institutes and employers. Israel set up a new inter-ministerial plan to increase awareness and combat discrimination of Jewish migrants from Ethiopia and to take measures aimed at raising the share of Ethiopian Jews among government employees. Following a review of Sweden's equal treatment provisions, the Swedish Government introduced in 2017 active measures to combat discrimination at the workplace and in education. The Netherlands announced in 2016 a new action plan to combat discrimination. The plan pays particular attention to specific groups, such as Muslim, Black or Jewish communities, and focuses on prevention and awareness, enhanced co-operation and infrastructure, the role of the local level, and promoting further research. Austria implemented a telephone hotline for victims of discrimination, and Spain developed programmes to educate pupils about diversity in schools.

New measures to facilitate the integration of migrant children in education have been introduced

A number of OECD countries have made efforts to assist schools in more effectively meeting the needs of migrant students. Portugal, for instance, has provided schools with an intercultural school kit containing online educational material for teachers.

Norway launched a website with teaching support for primary and secondary education in seven languages. In Denmark, consultants from the Ministry of Education have worked with schools to improve the academic development of bilingual children. In the school year 2016/17 this work has focused on the reception, integration, and teaching of newly-arrived immigrant children. Since August 2016, municipalities in Denmark have the opportunity to establish special primary education for recently-arrived migrant children. Along similar lines, Poland introduced in 2016 the possibility for municipalities to organise specific reception classes in public schools for recently-arrived children of migrants and Polish emigrants with Polish language needs. Reception classes last one or – in exceptional cases – two years. Austria, too, introduced language support classes for newly-arrived students in May 2016, which run in addition to regular education. Furthermore, the government raised the minimum age for the achievement of the compulsory school leaving certificate to 18 years, with a view to reducing the number of migrant youth without such a certificate. In a similar vein, Norway adjusted its Education Act in 2016 to enable students to attend more primary or lower secondary education prior to, or in combination with, upper secondary education. This regulation is expected to particularly benefit migrant students who arrive towards the end of primary or lower secondary education. Sweden enabled migrant youth enrolled in the youth guarantee scheme to participate in Swedish language training. Finally, Norway introduced four free hours per day of kindergarten for all 3 to 5 year-old children from low-income families.

A range of countries have eased access to citizenship

Obtaining the host country's nationality is often regarded as the ultimate result of a successful integration pathway. At the same time, the very fact of having the host country's citizenship can facilitate integration in itself, namely by signalling motivation and an intention to stay, to employers and society at large. Naturalisation is thus an important instrument of integration policy.

Over the course of 2016, a number of OECD countries eased access to citizenship – in particular for migrant children. Following a referendum, Switzerland facilitated, under certain conditions, access to citizenship for youth who were born and educated in Switzerland and whose family lives in Switzerland in the third generation. Chile lowered the age at which foreigners can ask for Chilean citizenship from 21 to 18 years. In addition, it encourages children born between 1996 and 2014 to claim Chilean citizenship. Lithuania abolished the requirement of having to choose between two nationalities at age 21 for persons who acquired dual nationalities by birth. In Estonia, a number of changes in citizenship policy are underway which concern children, in order to reduce the number of people with undetermined citizenship.

Alongside specific measures for children, conditions have also been eased for other migrant groups. Poland, for example, shortened the period after which people of Polish origin and holders of the “Card of the Pole” can ask for Polish citizenship from two years to one year of legal residence. Romania facilitated the acquisition of citizenship for persons who have significantly contributed to preserve and promote Romanian culture.

Finally, some countries plan to ease access to citizenship for migrants more generally. Canada proposed in early 2016 an amendment to its Citizenship Act, which makes it easier for immigrants to fulfil the conditions of obtaining citizenship and removes the possibility to revoke the citizenship of dual citizens on the grounds of national interest. In Luxembourg, the government proposed to reduce the duration of residence required for

naturalisation from seven to five years after an earlier proposal to extend voting rights to foreign residents was rejected in a popular referendum.

An ongoing trend to restrict citizenship access and to introduce measures for revoking it

Against the general trend to facilitate access to citizenship, some countries have decided to restrict access, or to facilitate the revocation of citizenship, based on certain conditions. Regarding the latter, in 2016, Australia and the Netherlands introduced provisions to strip persons involved in terrorist activities of nationality. While Portugal introduced justifications for the refusal of citizenship requests from persons involved in terrorist practices.

The Netherlands decided to extend the minimum residence period required for naturalisation from five to seven years, and Norway introduced in 2017 an oral test in the Norwegian language and civics as a condition for citizenship.

Improving communication on migration and integration policies with the public

Against the backdrop of the refugee crisis, public opinion has become increasingly sensitive to migration policy and several OECD countries have responded to this. The Government of Canada, for example, launched, in July 2016, a national conversation on immigration to ensure that Canada's immigration policy reflects the views and ideas of the Canadian people. Canadians are asked to share their views on immigration via an on-line written submission as well as in the framework of wide-ranging consultations, including cross-Canada round-table discussions led by the Minister and Parliamentary Secretary; stakeholder engagement by departmental officials; and, public opinion research. The Czech Ministry of Interior launched a special website on migration and set up a "Media Working Group on Migration" to improve communication with the public on migration and integration-related issues. Greece appointed in September 2016 a Special Secretary to co-ordinate official communication on refugee and migration policy.

In the United Kingdom, a frequently expressed concern is that refugees are being served first, before other groups in need. In the education realm, for example, services for humanitarian migrants are often perceived as compromising the quality of measures and services available to nationals. To counter this idea, a coalition of more than 30 educational institutions and NGOs developed the "Equal Access" campaign to advocate equal rights of asylum seekers and native students to access to education. In Finland, the Ministries of Justice and Employment jointly launched the "TRUST – Good Relations in Finland" initiative to counter discrimination and strengthen good relations and mutual respect between refugees and the resident population in municipalities with reception centres.

Recent policy changes to foster the integration of refugees and their children

While OECD countries have received the arrival of an unprecedented number of asylum seekers throughout the past two years, countries have been affected very unevenly. Much effort has gone into designing adequate policy responses to facilitate the integration of these newcomers into the labour market and society. This section provides an update on recent integration policy changes targeted at persons who are in the process of applying for asylum (asylum seekers) or have been granted refugee status or other forms of international protection (for the sake of simplicity, these are all referred to as "refugees" or "humanitarian migrants" in the following).

Additional funding is being put towards enhancing existing integration measures and developing new ones

Significant changes in refugee-specific integration policies were seen in 2016. Existing programmes were adapted to better fit the needs of refugees and new measures were rolled out, often on an ad-hoc basis. Many countries invested significant funds to consolidate and enhance these measures and to complement initial measures with new initiatives. Not surprisingly, the investment was generally strongest in countries that experienced large inflows.

For example, Germany with 440 000 asylum applications in 2015 and 720 000 in 2016, has increased federal funding for general language tuition from EUR 244 million in 2015 to EUR 559 million in 2016 and EUR 610 million in 2017. The budget for vocational language learning was increased from EUR 179 million in 2016 to EUR 470 million in 2017. Moreover, salaries for language teachers were augmented. Since January 2016, Federal states obtain EUR 670 per asylum seeker per month. In December 2016, an additional EUR 2 billion was allocated to the federal states per year for 2017 and 2018, earmarked for integration measures.

Sweden, which accommodated the highest per capita inflow of asylum seekers ever registered in the OECD area in 2015, spent close to 1% of its GDP on its response to the refugee crisis in 2016. This includes SEK 534 million (EUR 57.8 million) for integration measures, such as new language initiatives and reforms of the “Swedish for Immigrants” scheme, skills assessments and validation for asylum seekers. Moreover, the compensation paid to municipalities per new arrival has been raised, with an estimated additional budget cost of SEK 1.1 billion in 2016 (EUR 119 million) and SEK 2.6 billion in 2017 (EUR 272 million).

Austria has allocated a special budget of EUR 250 million annually for the integration of refugees, mostly to finance German language training and to support the education and training of refugee children. In 2016, an additional EUR 70 million has been earmarked to support the labour market integration of refugees. The Norwegian Government augmented budgeted expenditures on immigration and integration by NOK 1.3 billion and allocated NOK 59 million (EUR 6.4 million) to integration measures in the revised national budget, presented in May 2016. Funding will support a range of new policies to support the settlement of refugees, among which early integration measures for asylum seekers. Moreover, municipalities receive extra grants for the settlement of refugees as of 2017. Finland, which has seen a 9-fold increase in asylum applications between 2014 and 2015, granted EUR 20 million of additional funding for adult immigrants’ integration training, among other measures.

In Luxembourg, the *Œuvre Nationale de Secours Grande-Duchesse Charlotte*, a public institution which manages the National Lottery, allocated EUR 12 million to support associations and non-governmental organisations in their efforts to integrate asylum seekers and refugees. Funding extends to a total of 80 projects covering various domains of integration, including health, psychological support, sports, culture, training, work, intercultural exchange and housing.

A number of countries that have been less strongly affected by the refugee crisis also stepped up funding to support the integration of humanitarian migrants. Spain, for example, enhanced the national budget for the reception and integration of asylum seekers and humanitarian migrants to EUR 253 million in 2016. Of that, EUR 24 million was allocated to NGOs, a 150% increase on the planned figure for 2015. In Denmark, the 2016

Finance Act budgeted expenditures worth DKK 6.5 billion (EUR 874 million) on integration, more than triple the 2013 budget. An additional DKK 1 billion (EUR 134 million) has been allocated over 2017 and 2018 for municipal integration efforts, mainly to provide adequate housing. Moreover, funds worth DKK 30 million (EUR 4 million) were granted to municipalities with high integration potential to strengthen local labour market integration efforts. Poland increased financial support for humanitarian migrants during the one-year integration programme and extended access to the programme, as well as to the associated benefits, to family members who arrived via family reunification, while the Netherlands increased funding for municipalities to organise social guidance for new permit holders.

Outside of Europe, the United States spent USD 1.56 billion during the fiscal year 2015 on administering one of the largest resettlement programmes in the OECD area. The Canadian Government estimates the cost of resettling and welcoming Syrian refugees at CAD 385 million (EUR 254 million) in 2015-16 and New Zealand announced in 2016 its support of the arrival of 500 Syrian refugees with funding worth NZD 17.2 million (EUR 10.8 million).

At the same time, some countries reduced benefits and allowances for refugees during the period of state support for integration. This has been the case in Lithuania and Latvia. Denmark reduced benefits for asylum seekers and Slovenia imposed administrative fees for language certificates.

For those who have prospects to stay, early intervention remains a priority

An increasing number of OECD countries have facilitated access to integration measures at an early stage for asylum seekers with good prospects to remain (for an overview see OECD, 2016). The idea behind such measures is to use the time period during the asylum procedure for language training, skills assessments and labour market preparation in order to shorten the time it takes to enter employment and become self-sufficient. However, in most countries, upfront support measures are not yet widely available; and where they are, waiting times, for instance for language training, can be long. Throughout 2016, much effort has therefore gone into making language training more widely available for asylum seekers.

The new German Integration Act, for example, aims to provide more integration courses to asylum seekers with good prospects of being allowed to stay. Norway has set up special “integration reception centres”, in which asylum seekers whose claims for asylum are likely to be accepted, participate in a full-time qualification programme that includes language training and a 50-hour orientation course to Norwegian culture and society. In addition, these centres pilot the use of an online self-registration tool to map the skills and qualifications of asylum seekers and, based on the results, provide individualised career advice. In Sweden, the “Swedish from day one” scheme provides funds to study associations and folk high schools to organise language and civic integration training for asylum seekers and refugees living in reception centres.

Skills assessment is a key element

Early skill assessments enable a better profiling of asylum seekers and can improve labour market matching and inform relocation decisions. While many countries have incorporated elements of skills assessment into their integration programmes for humanitarian migrants, fewer already assess their skills during the asylum procedure.

In addition to Norway and Germany, where upfront skills assessments provided through the model programme “Early Intervention”, have recently been anchored in legislation, Denmark took steps in 2016 to ensure systematic identification and recognition of refugees’ qualifications and competences. During the asylum process, asylum seekers are already interviewed about their educational background in accommodation centres and, if asylum is granted, this information is shared with the municipality, where they are settled. To assist accommodation centres with skill assessments, the Danish Agency for Higher Education has set up a hotline to advise on foreign qualifications recognition. Sweden has also been active in this regard and started providing additional funds to the public employment service in June 2016 to map the educational background and work experience of asylum seekers. One example is the “ABO integration pilot”, which enables asylum seekers to undergo preliminary skills checks and create electronic portfolios using a smartphone application.

Some upfront measures are directed at refugee children. In September 2016, Greece presented a plan to organise pre-school education in reception centres and to facilitate access to local schools for school-aged children living in accommodation centres. Luxembourg decided to waive fees for asylum seekers in higher education, while Chile facilitated access to education and school benefits for children of irregular migrants.

The overriding objective is to get new arrivals into employment as quickly as possible

Humanitarian migrants often face barriers over and above those encountered by other migrants in making the successful transition into employment and without targeted policy responses, the time it takes refugees to enter employment can be long. Against this backdrop, many OECD countries have made sustained efforts to speed up the labour market integration of recent humanitarian arrivals, for instance by reducing waiting periods for asylum seekers to access the labour market. In Germany, where asylum seekers can enter the labour market after three months under certain conditions, the majority of districts now temporarily exempt such asylum seekers from passing a “priority check” that assesses whether there is a German or EU citizen registered as job seeking and eligible for the position. Similarly, Greece adopted a law in April 2016 which abolished the requirement to obtain a work permit and pass a labour market test for registered asylum seekers. In contrast to asylum seekers, refugees usually enjoy full and immediate access to their host country labour market. Yet, persons under temporary protection are often an exception. In Turkey, prior to 2016, such persons could only apply for a work permit if they held a residence permit, which was very rarely the case. Since 2016, Syrian refugees in Turkey can apply for a work permit, valid in the locality of registration, six months after being registered under temporary protection.

A number of countries have opened active labour market policy tools for asylum seekers and refugees. In Finland, NGOs are allowed to support start-up projects of asylum seekers in welcoming centre facilities. Regional authorities are encouraged to identify, develop and retain talents, with emphasis on contribution to local innovation and business creation. The United Kingdom provided loans to 2 500 humanitarian migrants in 2015-16 to finance VET and work-based learning programmes with clear employability or re-qualification purpose. Sweden opened its trainee jobs and vocational introduction jobs scheme to recently-arrived refugees, to allow those with incomplete education to earn a vocational certificate while working part-time. In Germany, the new Integration Act allows tolerated persons (i.e. persons with a negative asylum decision but who cannot be deported due to specific obstacles) and asylum seekers enrolled in vocational education and training to remain in the country for the duration of their training. If they find employment after their training, they

receive a two-year residence permit. Otherwise, they have six months to search for a job. The Act also provided for a planned 100 000 subsidised “work opportunities”, where participants receive EUR 0.80 an hour, in addition to the social benefits which they continue to receive. Furthermore, Germany introduced a special programme for asylum seekers and refugees within its Federal Volunteering Service. Participants receive a means-tested monthly support and may follow a four-week intensive language course in the beginning, as well as additional language tuition, during their volunteer placement.

Finally, for those who arrive with skills that are in demand, so-called fast-track integration pathways are becoming more prominent. Pioneered by Sweden, the idea to combine an assessment of professional competencies with a tailored bridging programme and work experience to award a national licence has recently also been introduced in Norway. Sweden, for its part, has meanwhile developed a new fast-track for recently-arrived migrant entrepreneurs.

New measures to recognise the attainments of migrants lacking proof of their qualifications

Educated refugees frequently have no proof of their qualifications or had their studies cut short by persecution or war. This poses a challenge to regular recognition procedures, which generally rely on an assessment of education credentials. To tackle this problem, a growing number of countries have developed specific assessment procedures for refugees with no formal documentation of their qualifications. The assessment procedures are based on interviews, aptitude tests, workplace observations or reviews of work samples. In Austria, such a procedure is currently developed under the auspices of the new Recognition Act. In Belgium, special procedures for asylum seekers and refugees have been put in place to deal with incomplete documentation, to allow for validation of relevant competences free of charge. The Norwegian Agency for Quality Assurance in Education (NOKUT) is currently piloting how to evaluate the formal education of persons who claim to have higher education. In a similar vein, the Swedish Council for Higher Education is piloting a special measure that enables persons with insufficiently documented or incomplete foreign qualifications to have their real competencies assessed by a higher education institution. Poland made it easier for refugees to access or continue higher education if they have graduated from university but do not have an academic diploma and are unable to obtain it due to the political situation in their country of origin. Likewise, in Luxembourg an interdisciplinary working group composed of academics and government representatives worked out a proposal to evaluate the academic qualifications of refugees without certificates and ensure they can register and continue their studies at the University of Luxembourg.

Social partners as well as employers are becoming increasingly involved in integration measures

Employers and social partners are important stakeholders in the integration of refugees. Not surprisingly, therefore, in a growing number of OECD countries they are actively involved in integration, especially in countries where social partnership is strong. In Austria, the public employment service, NGOs, sector councils and employers gather labour market information and promote good matching via career guidance and effective work placements in the framework of the competence check programme for the occupational integration of refugees. Piloted in 2015, the programme has been gradually rolled out over 2016. In Germany, local chambers of commerce provide advice and training

to small and medium enterprises on issues related to the implementation of work-based learning programmes, employment and internships involving refugees. The initiative is supported by a network of enterprises experienced in the training and hiring of refugees, who share their experiences and provide advice to peers.

There have also been various new initiatives to support employers who agree to train or hire refugees. One example is an Italian pathways programme, which provides financial support to employers to develop internship programmes for refugees. In Austria, employment of refugees is promoted through allowances for work placements paid to employers. Moreover, a draft law, proposed by the Austrian Government in early 2017, plans to support employers who hire refugees while they participate in a new mandatory “integration year”. Sweden has instructed 200 central government agencies to provide work experience for new arrivals during 2016-18. Larger private sector employers, who take in at least 100 refugees, receive tailored support and package solutions from the public employment service in the framework of the “100 Club” initiative.

In March 2016, Denmark concluded tripartite agreements with the social partners and 98 municipalities on more than 80 labour market integration measures in the framework of its “United for better Integration” initiative. Most measures have been implemented by amendments to the Integration Act and by a new Act on so-called “Integration Basic Education” (IGU), which came into force on 1 July 2016. Companies that recruit refugees or individuals who arrived to reunite with family within one year of residency receive a bonus worth EUR 5 300, while those who recruit refugees in their second year of residence receive EUR 4 000.

Civil society is taking an active role in integration

Without the support of citizens and welcoming local communities, integration policies are likely to be ineffective – both from a technical implementation and a social cohesion perspective. With the refugee crisis, there has been a plethora of initiatives to involve citizens and community associations in supporting and integrating refugees. In Germany, 11% of the population stated that they have supported asylum seekers or refugees.

Community sponsorship programmes, which have been widely used in non-European OECD countries like Canada and Australia, are becoming more prominent and have recently been adopted by the United Kingdom and New Zealand. Launched in August 2016, the UK scheme encourages charities, faith groups, churches and businesses to support resettled refugees in the United Kingdom. Alongside this, an online service for donations exists, through which the public can make donations, including the use of vacant and self-contained housing available for a minimum of 12 months. Local authorities are able to specify the type of donations they need most in order to support refugees in their area.

France is proposing an annual EUR 1 500 per refugee to any charity with the capacity to find housing for 50 refugees or more. Those looking to host must be able to provide a private room and must be able to commit for at least five months. In Portugal, civil society organisations established a National Platform to support the resettlement of refugees in Portuguese municipalities. A WebPortal and a national campaign raise awareness and provide systematic and updated information. In Luxembourg, the Red Cross operates since April 2016 a Centre for Integration and Cohesion (LISKO) to accompany, guide and support refugees living in reception centres or social housing throughout their integration process into Luxembourgish society. Financed by the Ministry of Family and Integration, LISKO provides individual support with intercultural comprehension and translation and

connects refugees with social services, associations and the local population. Ten full-time social workers draw up individual integration plans focusing on language courses, finding accommodation and recognition of foreign qualifications. Specific needs are shared with municipal authorities, who then integrate them into a Communal Integration Plan.

Switzerland, Luxembourg and Sweden also recently promoted voluntary activities in the realm of integration among citizens. Switzerland, for example, launched a tripartite dialogue on refugee integration, and supports a range of projects across the country to encourage encounters between citizens and refugees. Luxembourg developed municipal information kits for residents that lay out volunteering options to help integrate newcomers. A hotline for volunteers complements the programme. Sweden has increased funds to involve citizens as refugee guides and family contacts.

Dispersing humanitarian migrants across municipalities remains a focus of policy measures

Settling refugees is costly and can place strain on local housing capacities and welcoming communities. Not surprisingly, therefore, many governments seek to distribute humanitarian migrants evenly across the country. However, not all regions and municipalities voluntarily take in new arrivals, which has led some governments to oblige local authorities to accept refugees. This has recently been the case in Sweden and in Austria, where the central government is authorised to build reception facilities in regions that have not fulfilled their reception quota. In Italy, the Ministry of Interior and the National Association of Municipalities agreed in 2016 on a dispersal mechanism for registered asylum seekers and humanitarian migrants. Participation remains voluntary for municipalities but is encouraged through financial incentives. The budget for 2016 allocated EUR 100 million for this purpose. In Luxembourg, the Reception and Integration Agency (OLAI) stepped up efforts to inform municipalities about the reception of asylum seekers in information sessions and via information material. In addition, OLAI launched a temporary programme to subsidise the rents paid by refugees and other residents on the waiting list of the National Housing Fund and hired additional staff to support the domain of housing.

Some countries, though the number remains limited, consider employment-related aspects, such as the skills profile of individual migrants and local labour market conditions, when dispersing humanitarian migrants across the country. This is the case in Estonia, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden and, recently, Denmark. Following an agreement with the social partners and local authorities in early 2016, the Danish distribution scheme for humanitarian migrants now increasingly focuses on matching individual competences with local labour demand. Finland, too, is currently piloting a new reception model, which takes refugees' socio-economic characteristics into consideration in order to ensure that they are placed in a location with suitable work or educational opportunities. In Germany, regional governments are now able to oblige refugees to remain in the region to which they were allocated during their asylum procedure for a duration of three years. However, this restriction can be lifted if refugees find employment or enter education.

Designing adequate and cost-efficient reception models for unaccompanied minors

Recent years have seen an unprecedented rise in the number of unaccompanied minors (UAMs) arriving in OECD countries. Most OECD countries have specific accommodation structures for this group, as UAMs are among the most vulnerable migrants. However, specific reception is costly and availability is limited, especially where inflows have been very

large. To remedy this, a number of countries have adjusted existing, or developed new, reception models for UAMs, making it easier for municipalities to find appropriate housing for this group.

One example is Sweden. After receiving the largest share of UAMs among European OECD countries in 2015, the country introduced “supported accommodation” as a new form of housing to supplement placements in foster and care homes in 2016. Moreover, a new allocation model was implemented to distribute UAMs more evenly across municipalities. In addition, as of mid 2017, further planned revisions to the central government compensation system will introduce differentiated reimbursements for different forms of UAM placements. The Netherlands implemented a new reception model in 2016, which places UAMs under the age of 15 in foster families, while those of 15 years and older are housed in small-scale supervised housing clusters. The model also aims at keeping UAMs in the same region to ensure continuity in health care and education. In a similar vein, the British Government is developing a strategy based upon supported lodgings, and foster homes and will provide training for foster workers. In the Slovak Republic, where UAMs have been lodged in asylum seeker facilities previously, an amendment of the asylum act introduced the possibility to place UAMs in children’s homes, including beyond the age of 18. Finally, Belgium facilitated access to individual integration programmes for UAMs and developed a guide to strengthen the information provided both to UAMs and their legal representatives.

Governments are strengthening health care services for refugees

Refugees are often traumatised or have endured physical injuries during their flight. Health issues can be a fundamental obstacle to integration, and various OECD countries have recently taken steps to address these concerns. In April 2016, Canada fully restored health care benefits for refugees, which had been significantly scaled back previously. Under the current scheme, refugees are entitled to the same health-care coverage as Canadians receiving social assistance. The same holds for refugees in many other OECD countries including Denmark, where refugees – once settled in a municipality – are assigned a local family doctor and have access to free medical treatment on the same terms as Danish nationals. Moreover, as of April 2016, Danish municipalities are obliged to provide medical screenings to new arrivals and their families at an early stage after settlement, to follow up on health concerns identified during the asylum application phase. New Zealand scaled up funding in 2016 to conduct initial health assessments and immunisation, and provide mental health and disability services to relocated Syrian refugees, while Sweden announced in 2016 increased access to mental health care for traumatised asylum seekers and new refugee arrivals, boosted by an annual investment of SEK 40 million (EUR 4.4 million).

Pilot schemes to test the effectiveness of new initiatives and ensure better usage of public funds

At a time when many countries are facing unprecedented integration challenges, evaluating the effectiveness of policy is essential. Sound evaluations are a precondition for scaling up existing measures. In the past two years, many countries have made substantial use of pilot schemes to inform the allocation of funds. An example is the German programme “Early Intervention”, which had been monitored before it was anchored in legislation as a principle for upfront skills assessments. More recently, Finland began to develop, with the aid of eight regional pilot projects, a service model for the initial integration stage for all adult immigrants. The “Good Start” service model is co-financed by

the European Social Fund and provides guidance and counselling, initial assessment of vocational and language skills, and initial integration training. It is organised in co-operation with municipalities, local employment economic offices and NGOs. Further pilot projects aim to develop a post-integration service model for those immigrants who have completed their integration training but have not found employment yet. Experiences gained from these pilot projects will inform the design of a new, nation-wide model for integration services, “Kotona Suomessa” (Home in Finland).

Canada implemented 35 small-scale pilots to support the social and labour market integration of over 2 000 Syrian refugees across the country. The pilots focused on informal language learning, community connections, employment, and leveraging technology. Activities, included skills assessments and employment referrals at temporary lodging sites; sessions on mental health, parenting and healthy relationships; children and family activities; and youth activities such as improving computer literacy.

Notes

1. Note that this figure is based upon Q1-Q3 only and, given that unemployment rates among the foreign born are frequently higher in Q1 among foreign-born workers these rates are not directly comparable to those elsewhere.
2. Indeed, the definition of what is a routine and non-routine occupation has been the subject of debate within the literature (see for example Frey and Osborne (2013) and Arntz et al. (2016) for alternative definitions of the routine-task content of occupations). This chapter, however, follows Goos et al. (2014) in favouring an off-the-shelf measure of occupational content and using the Routine Task Intensity index used by Autor and Dorn (2013) (see Box 2.1 for a description of the contents of this index).

References

- Autor, D. (2015), “Why Are There Still So Many Jobs? The History and Future of Workplace Automation”, *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, Vol. 29(3), pp. 3-30.
- Autor, D. and D. Dorn (2013), “Inequality and Specialization: The Growth of Low-Skill Service Jobs in the United States”, *American Economic Review*, Vol. 103(5), pp. 1553-1597.
- Autor, D., F. Levy and R. Murnane (2003), “The Skill Content of Recent Technological Change: An Empirical Exploration”, *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, Vol. 118(4), pp. 1279-1333.
- Acemoglu, A. and P. Restrepo (2016), “The Race between Machine and Man: Implications of Technology for Growth, Factor Shares and Employment”, *NBER Working Paper*, No. 22252.
- Bell, D. and D. Blanchflower (2011), “Young People and the Great Recession”, *Oxford Review of Economic Policy*, Vol. 27(2), pp. 241-267, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxrep/grr011>.
- Bessen, J. (2016), “How Computer Automation Affects Occupations: Technology, Jobs, and Skills”, *Boston University School of Law, Law and Economics Working Paper*, <http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2690435>.
- Frey, C. and M. Osborne (2013), “The Future of Employment: How Susceptible Are Jobs to Computerization?”, *Oxford Martin School Working Paper*, University of Oxford.
- Goos, M., A. Manning and A. Salomons (2014), “Explaining Job Polarization: Routine-Biased Technological Change and Offshoring”, *American Economic Review*, Vol. 104(8), pp. 2509-2526.
- Damas de Matos, A. and T. Liebig (2014), “The Qualifications of Immigrants and their Value in the Labour Market: A Comparison of Europe and the United States”, *Matching Economic Migration with Labour Market Needs*, OECD Publishing, Paris, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264216501-9-en>.
- D’Amuri, F. and G. Peri (2014), “Immigration, Jobs, and Employment Protection: Evidence from Europe Before and During the Great Recession”, *Journal of the European Economic Association*, European Economic Association, Vol. 12(2), pp. 432-464.


- Ferrer, A. and W.C. Riddell (2008), "Education, Credentials and Immigrant Earnings", *Canadian Journal of Economics*, Vol. 41, No. 1.
- Foged, M. and G. Peri (2016), "Immigrants' Effect on Native Workers: New Analysis on Longitudinal", *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics*, Vol 8(2), pp. 1-34, <http://pubs.aeaweb.org/doi/pdfplus/10.1257/app.20150114>.
- Goos, M., A. Manning and A. Salomons (2014), "Explaining Job Polarization: Routine-Biased Technological Change and Offshoring", *American Economic Review*, Vol. 104(8).
- Jauer, J. et al. (2014), "Migration as an Adjustment Mechanism in the Crisis? A Comparison of Europe and the United States", *OECD Social, Employment and Migration Working Papers*, No. 155, OECD Publishing, Paris, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5jzb8p51guhl-en>.
- Nordin, M. (2007), "Immigrants' Returns to Schooling in Sweden", *IFAU Working Paper*, No. 12.
- OECD (2017), *OECD Employment Outlook 2017*, OECD Publishing, Paris, http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/empl_outlook-2017-en.
- OECD (2016), *Society at a Glance 2016: OECD Social Indicators*, OECD Publishing, Paris, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264261488-en>.
- OECD (2014), *International Migration Outlook 2014*, OECD Publishing, Paris, http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/migr_outlook-2014-en.
- OECD (2013), *International Migration Outlook 2013*, OECD Publishing, Paris, http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/migr_outlook-2013-en.
- OECD (2007), *International Migration Outlook 2007*, OECD Publishing, Paris, http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/migr_outlook-2007-en.
- Peri, G., and C. Sparber (2009), "Task Specialization, Immigration, and Wages", *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics*, Vol. 1(3), pp. 135-169.
- Peri, G. and C. Sparber (2011), "Highly-educated Immigrants and Native Occupational Choice", *Industrial Relations*, Vol. 50(3), pp. 385-411.
- Strandh, M. et al. (2014), "Unemployment and Mental Health Scarring During the Life Course", *European Journal of Public Health*, Vol. 24(3), pp. 440-445, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/eurpub/cku005>.

ANNEX 2.A1

Supplementary tables and figures

Figure 2.A1.1. Evolution of employment rates by country of birth and gender in selected OECD countries, 2007-16

Index 100 = 2007



Note: Data refer to the active population aged 15-64. There are breaks in series in Ireland (2008/09), Switzerland (2009/10) and the United Kingdom (2008/09). The United States data has been indexed to the year 2006 to reflect the earlier onset of the crisis.

Source: European countries and Turkey: Labour Force Surveys (Eurostat); Australia, Canada, Israel, New Zealand: Labour Force Surveys; Chile: Encuesta de Caracterización Socioeconómica Nacional (CASEN); Mexico: Encuesta Nacional de Ocupación y Empleo (ENO); United States: Current Population Surveys.


StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933498105>


Table 2.A1.1. **Employment, unemployment and participation rates by region of birth in selected OECD countries in 2008 (2007 in the United States), 2011 and 2016**

Percentages

	Region of birth	Employment rate			Unemployment rate			Participation rate		
		2008	2011	2016	2008	2011	2016	2008	2011	2016
Australia	Oceania	77.5	76.9	77.3	4.6	6.1	6.1	81.3	81.9	82.3
	Europe	71.4	73.6	75.8	3.1	3.8	4.3	73.7	76.5	79.2
	North Africa and the Middle East	49.1	48.2	46.4	8.9	9.5	11.8	53.9	53.3	52.6
	Sub-Saharan Africa	75.0	76.2	73.3	5.1	5.3	7.9	79.1	80.5	79.6
	Asia	67.6	67.6	67.2	5.8	5.8	6.2	71.8	71.7	71.7
	Americas	74.1	73.9	74.8	4.5	5.3	6.2	77.6	78.1	79.7
	Foreign-born (total)	69.8	70.5	70.3	4.7	5.2	6.0	73.2	74.4	74.7
	Native-born	75.0	73.8	73.7	4.2	5.2	5.8	78.2	77.9	78.3
Canada	Sub-Saharan Africa	68.7	66.7	67.9	10.4	12.6	11.0	76.6	76.4	76.3
	North Africa	62.2	63.8	67.2	16.1	14.8	11.7	74.1	74.9	76.1
	Middle East	60.5	59.0	61.0	10.7	12.1	12.4	67.8	67.1	69.6
	Asia	69.9	67.7	72.2	7.1	8.8	6.4	75.3	74.2	77.1
	Europe	73.0	73.0	76.0	5.2	6.6	5.6	77.1	78.1	80.4
	Oceania	82.0	75.3	78.9	3.9	6.7	5.6	85.4	80.7	83.5
	North America	76.1	72.2	70.1	5.0	5.6	7.4	80.1	76.5	75.7
	Central and South America and Caribbean	72.3	70.2	72.8	8.5	10.6	10.0	79.0	78.5	80.9
	Foreign-born (total)	70.7	68.9	71.7	7.2	8.9	7.6	76.1	75.6	77.6
Native-born	74.3	72.7	72.8	6.0	7.2	6.9	79.0	78.3	78.3	
European OECD countries	EU28 + EFTA	70.0	68.3	70.9	7.3	11.0	9.7	75.6	76.8	78.6
	Other European countries	63.0	59.3	58.5	9.3	14.4	16.7	69.4	69.3	70.3
	North Africa	55.4	48.5	46.6	15.7	24.9	25.6	65.7	64.6	62.7
	Sub-Saharan Africa	67.7	60.7	62.3	11.8	18.5	16.5	76.7	74.4	74.6
	Middle East	54.2	51.3	50.1	15.5	21.8	21.4	64.1	65.7	63.8
	North America	69.8	67.5	70.0	4.7	6.9	4.8	73.2	72.4	73.6
	Central and South America and Caribbean	70.9	62.2	61.1	11.9	21.9	20.4	80.5	79.7	76.7
	Asia	63.2	62.4	64.5	7.5	9.8	8.1	68.3	69.1	70.1
	Other regions	65.8	63.8	65.0	6.3	9.5	12.4	70.3	70.4	74.2
	Foreign-born (total)	66.8	63.4	63.0	9.3	14.2	14.1	73.6	73.9	73.4
	Native-born	65.8	63.8	67.6	6.3	9.5	8.1	70.3	70.4	73.6
New Zealand	Other Oceania	68.3	65.7	72.5	5.7	8.7	5.4	72.4	72.0	76.6
	Europe	78.7	79.5	81.0	3.0	3.4	3.6	81.2	82.2	84.0
	North Africa and the Middle East	49.7	53.8	56.0	13.4	12.2	14.7	57.3	61.3	65.7
	Sub-Saharan Africa	75.3	76.5	80.7	5.1	6.5	5.1	79.4	81.8	85.0
	Asia	63.5	64.3	71.4	4.8	7.0	5.7	66.7	69.1	75.7
	North America	68.6	76.7	81.5	4.6	2.1	2.9	71.9	78.3	83.9
	Central and South America and Caribbean	64.5	78.8	81.9	6.8	6.0	3.3	69.2	83.8	84.7
	Foreign-born (total)	69.9	70.3	75.0	4.6	6.1	5.0	73.3	74.9	79.0
Native-born	76.3	73.4	75.8	4.0	6.2	5.5	79.4	78.3	80.2	
United States	Mexico	70.3	65.2	69.0	4.9	10.2	4.5	74.0	72.6	72.3
	Other Central American countries	77.0	69.9	73.0	4.7	10.7	4.3	80.8	78.3	76.3
	South America and Caribbean	73.2	68.6	71.5	4.9	10.7	5.4	76.9	76.8	75.7
	Canada	74.1	70.3	76.1	3.6	5.7	2.4	76.9	74.5	77.9
	Europe	73.4	71.1	73.1	3.6	7.4	3.6	76.1	76.8	75.8
	Africa	70.4	66.9	69.7	6.0	11.4	5.7	75.0	75.5	74.0
	Asia	70.9	67.4	68.1	3.4	7.0	3.6	73.4	72.5	70.6
	Other regions	68.5	63.0	66.2	4.7	10.1	7.0	71.8	70.1	71.2
	Foreign-born (total)	71.8	67.5	70.0	4.4	9.1	4.3	75.1	74.3	73.2
	Native-born	70.3	65.1	67.9	4.9	9.2	5.2	73.9	71.7	71.5

Note: The population refers to working-age population (15-64) for the employment and participation rates and to active population aged 15-64 for the unemployment rate. European OECD countries do not include Germany and Turkey because no data by region of birth are available for these countries. Among European OECD countries, the data for Switzerland in 2008 are based on the second quarter only. The regions of birth could not be more comparable across countries of residence because of the way aggregate data provided to the Secretariat are coded. The data for European countries refer to the first three quarters only.

Source: European countries: Labour Force Surveys (Eurostat); Australia, Canada, New Zealand: Labour Force Surveys 2008, 2011 and 2016; United States: Current Population Surveys 2007, 2011 and 2016.

StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933498474>



From:
International Migration Outlook 2017

Access the complete publication at:
https://doi.org/10.1787/migr_outlook-2017-en

Please cite this chapter as:

OECD (2017), “Labour market outcomes of migrants and integration policies in OECD countries”, in *International Migration Outlook 2017*, OECD Publishing, Paris.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1787/migr_outlook-2017-5-en

This work is published under the responsibility of the Secretary-General of the OECD. The opinions expressed and arguments employed herein do not necessarily reflect the official views of OECD member countries.

This document and any map included herein are without prejudice to the status of or sovereignty over any territory, to the delimitation of international frontiers and boundaries and to the name of any territory, city or area.

You can copy, download or print OECD content for your own use, and you can include excerpts from OECD publications, databases and multimedia products in your own documents, presentations, blogs, websites and teaching materials, provided that suitable acknowledgment of OECD as source and copyright owner is given. All requests for public or commercial use and translation rights should be submitted to rights@oecd.org. Requests for permission to photocopy portions of this material for public or commercial use shall be addressed directly to the Copyright Clearance Center (CCC) at info@copyright.com or the Centre français d'exploitation du droit de copie (CFC) at contact@cfcopies.com.