The system of third party liability for nuclear damage established in the 1960s has been the model for many national legal systems in countries with nuclear power programmes. However, this approach has been criticised. It is argued that, with compensation limited to certain types of damage and with limits set well below the possible consequences of an accident, not all damage arising from an accident might be compensated. Moreover, relatively low levels of operator liability mean that risks associated with nuclear power are borne by the general public and that the generation of nuclear electricity is effectively subsidised. Debate about nuclear liability and compensation arrangements increased markedly after the 1986 Chernobyl accident, which brought into stark relief numerous deficiencies in the existing regimes. The subsequent revision of the international nuclear liability and compensation conventions has sought to address this criticism by establishing higher liability amounts and broadening the range of compensable nuclear damage, whilst leaving much of the original 1960s liability and compensation structure unchanged.