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Maintaining and building new infrastructure that delivers agglomerative benefits is crucial for promoting sustainable economic growth. Capital needs for infrastructure investment are massive. This capital could be sourced especially from pension funds and other institutional investors for whom infrastructure funds are attractive investment vehicles. But in order to mobilise such private capital, the public sector needs to provide the right framework, e.g. by promoting a “Regulated Asset Base” model to improve capital expenditure, by avoiding undue solvency rules and other regulatory obstacles to long-term investment, and by closing the knowledge gap with regard to infrastructure investments. Governments should also avoid crowding out private sector investment, confining interventions to projects where public risk sharing is necessary, and refrain from making frequent short-term changes to the regulatory framework.

Corruption undermines productivity growth. Fundamentally, these negative effects of corruption on productivity operate through the corruptly biased decisions in both the public and the private sector over the use of resources. More specifically, this paper argues that corruption affects three key determinants of productivity growth: innovation and diffusion of new technologies, an enabling market environment, and resource allocation. The available evidence suggests that investing into the mitigation of corruption risks through reforms of the public integrity system contributes to offset these negative effects of corruption and ensures a country’s path towards sustainable and inclusive development. In particular, governments can strengthen their public integrity systems by reducing the scope for corrupt practices initiated by public officials, e.g. the extortion of bribes to obtain licences or permits, by mitigating corruption in public procurement, by ensuring meritocratic hiring processes in order to avoid favouritism and nepotism, by averting policy capture by narrow interest groups through adequate levels of transparency and stakeholder engagement, managing conflicts of interest situations, and instilling transparency in lobbying activities and political finance, as well as by providing guidance to public officials, e.g. through clear codes of conduct and guidance.

Favourable demographics has boosted Indonesia’s economic growth in recent decades, but its contribution will wane over time. Skills and competences will therefore become increasingly important to raise living standards. Educational attainment has improved considerably, but the quality of education remains disappointing. At the same time, technological changes, new organisational business models and evolving worker preferences make upskilling and reskilling increasingly important. This warrants continuous investment in improving education and lifelong training, in terms of both quality and quantity, with an enhanced role for social partners. Tackling existing and rising skill shortages requires more participation from women, older adults, internal migrants, disadvantaged groups, and foreign workers. Expanding access to early childhood education would provide all children with better opportunities and bring significant benefits. Reducing informality is key to encouraging investment in skills. The COVID-19 crisis has highlighted workers’ insufficient protection against shocks, underlining the need for unemployment insurance. It is also an opportunity to boost digitalisation and innovate with smart practices. School closures are already penalising learning outcomes and will reduce future earnings.

COVID-19 is the most significant public health emergency in more than a century, causing a global economic crisis, and with long-term repercussions across society. COVID-19 continues to claim lives, many are suffering ill health (physical and/or mental) due to the virus, and health systems struggle to recover from the massive disruption. This unprecedented crisis has highlighted the urgent need for smart investments to strengthen health system resilience – to protect people’s underlying health, through enhanced preventive care and the ability to reinforce defences in acute times, to fortify the foundations of health systems by ensuring adequate core equipment and exploiting the potential of health information, and to bolster health professionals working on the frontline by building and maintaining sufficient numbers of doctors and nurses – thereby providing countries with the agility to respond not only to evolving pandemics but also to other health and societal shocks. This report identifies a set of priority investment areas needed to strengthen health system resilience. It then produces order-of-magnitude estimates of the expected costs of such investments, drawing extensively from existing OECD data and analytical studies.

COVID-19 is the most significant public health emergency in more than a century, caused a global economic crisis, and has long-term repercussions across society. This unprecedented crisis has highlighted the urgent need for smart investments to strengthen health system resilience. There is a need to protect people’s underlying health; fortify the foundations of health systems; and bolster health professionals working on the frontline. This report identifies a set of priority investment areas needed to strengthen health system resilience. It then produces order-of-magnitude estimates of the expected costs of such investments, drawing extensively from existing OECD data and analytical studies. These priority investments represent an estimated 1.4% of GDP, on average across OECD countries (and ranging from 0.6-2.5%), as compared with pre-pandemic expenditure of 8.8%. A combination of targeted spending and measures to reduce wasteful spending could mitigate the overall increases in health spending in the medium to long term.

French

This paper synthesises the main policy implications of OECD work focusing on the interplay between participation and positioning in global value chains (GVCs), employment demand and supply and workforce’s skills endowment. They relate to: the way innovation, technology and participation in GVCs shape employment in routine intensive and non-routine jobs; the relationship between participation in GVCs and polarisation of employment; the way the skill composition of a country’s workforce – both the type of skills and their distribution – shapes specialisation and positioning along GVCs; and the complementarities emerging between GVC participation and investment in knowledge-based capital, especially organisational capital and ICT.

Poor adherence to medications affects approximately half of the patient population, leading to severe health complications, premature deaths, and an increased use of healthcare services. The three most prevalent chronic conditions – diabetes, hypertension, and hyperlipidaemia – stand out regarding the magnitude of avoidable health complications, mortality, and healthcare costs. There are three broad reasons behind these low rates of adherence to chronic disease medications. Firstly,the problem of poor adherence has rarely been explicitly included in national health policy agendas. Secondly, interventions tend to attribute the problem exclusively to patients, while the evidence suggests that health system characteristics – in particular the quality of patient-provider interaction, procedures for refilling prescriptions, or out-of-pocket costs – are lead drivers. Thirdly, patients with chronic conditions frequently feel left out of the decision about their therapy and are inclined to rebuff. This paper identifies enablers that are needed for improving adherence to medication at the system level.

In preparation for the 2002 meeting of the OECD Working Party of Senior Budget Officials, an ad hoc Meeting on Investing in Private Financial Assets to Address Longer Term Needs was held in Paris on 4-5 April 2002.

Eight countries participated in the meeting with case studies of their national experiences: Australia, Canada, Chile, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, the United Kingdom and the United States. France attended the meeting as well. The meeting was chaired by Mr. Paul Posner, Managing Director, General Accounting Office, United States...

French

Lifelong learning is especially important for immigrants, who are often at a disadvantage in terms of the languages and skills that are valued in the labour market of their host country. Yet foreign-born adults are less likely to participate in training than native-born ones, and face higher financial and non-financial barriers to training. Policy efforts should focus not only on providing more training opportunities, but also on removing barriers to participation.

French
The downturn in fixed investment among advanced economies from the onset of the global crisis was unusually severe, widespread and long-lasting relative to comparable episodes in the past. As a result, investment gaps are large in many countries, not only in relation to past norms but also relative to projected future steady-state levels, with a gap of 2 percentage points of GDP or more in several countries. A significant proportion of this investment shortfall is attributable to soft demand conditions (the accelerator effect) but financial factors and heightened uncertainty have also played a role. In addition to continued support to demand from macroeconomic policies, the recovery in investment could be boosted by tackling longer-term policy issues that bear on investment decisions indirectly, by reducing financial fragmentation in the euro area and by undertaking growth-friendly structural reforms.

This policy note explores the different ways in which the digital economy affects investment promotion. As foreign direct investment (FDI) can be a key driver of digital growth and transformation, investment promotion agencies (IPAs) are increasingly seeking to attract firms operating in digital sectors or activities. In turn, IPAs also need to undergo their own digitalisation to become more efficient and improve their performance. Investment promotion practices need to respond to the challenges posed by new technologies and adapt new business models – particularly in the COVID-19 context.

Reports on trends in international direct investment tend to focus on recent developments. While such information is clearly of most relevance for policymakers and others interested in the pace and scale of globalisation, it fails to provide any perspective on the nature of globalisation itself. By their nature, recent developments give more weight to the cyclical element in global investment flows. A country’s performance in terms of annual inflows is often taken as a measure of the appropriateness of its policies and, by extension, of its relative attractiveness as a location for investment. Such important issues can only be assessed over a long time period and relying on more sources of information than simply flows of foreign direct investment (FDI). This study focuses on such long-term trends and includes, where appropriate, other estimates of multinational activity.

By focusing on long-term patterns, this paper demonstrates how FDI has evolved from an activity largely ...

While many countries have become ever more open and welcoming for foreign investment, the awareness of risks for national security stemming from or related to international investment has increased. Many governments have thus introduced policies that seek to protect their national security with the smallest possible impact on investment flows. Guidelines for recipient country investment policies relating to national security adopted at the OECD in 2009 provide recommendations for the design and implementation of such policies. This paper reviews commonalities and differences of policies implemented in 54 countries with a special focus on arrangements in 17 economies that have explicit policies in this area. It offers a comparative analysis of countries’ investment policy approaches to address national security concerns stemming from foreign investment; classifies the different forms of restrictions to address these concerns; identifies differences between restrictions on ownership and acquisitions; and presents how countries define the scope of application of their policies. The study also assesses how countries have implemented some of the key principles set out in the 2009 Guidelines in actual policy in order to meet their need to safeguard national security while reducing the impact of these policies on international investment.
This paper assesses the impact of different quantitative approaches to regulate investment risk on the retirement income stemming from defined contribution (DC) pension plans. It looks at how such regulations affect the spectrum of investment policies available and, through this channel, how they affect the retirement income that an individual may expect from a DC pension plan. The analysis shows that there is a trade-off between potential retirement income and protection from bad outcomes. Reducing the downside risk on retirement income from DC pension plans requires moving into relatively conservative investment policies where the share of assets allocated to bonds may be quite large. However, this comes at the cost of renouncing potentially higher replacement rates that are attainable but at a higher risk of unfavourable retirement income outcomes. Less risk adverse regulators and supervisors would aim at lower probability requirements as regard the downside risk, which will increase the range of investment policies available and thus the share of riskier assets.
This paper explores how uncertainty over investment returns affects pension systems. This issue is becoming more important because of the dramatic spread of defined-contribution pension provision around the world. It has also been highlighted by the recent financial crisis: the OECD estimates that pension funds lost 23% of their value in 2008, worth a heady USD 5.4 trillion. The scale of investment risk is measured in this paper using historical data on returns on equities and bonds in major OECD economies over the past quarter century. The results show a median real return of 7.3% a year on a portfolio equally weighted between equities and bonds (averaging across the countries studied). It might be expected that, over a very long period, the degree of uncertainty in investment returns is small. After all, a few bad years in the market are likely to be offset by boom years. Nevertheless, the degree of uncertainty, even with the relatively long investment horizons of pensions, is found to be large. In 10% of cases, an annual return of less than 5.5% would be expected, while in 10% of cases, this should exceed 9.0%. Compounded over the time horizon for pension savings of 40 years or more, such differences in rates of return amount to enormous sums of money. However, there is a series of reasons why returns achieved by individuals on their pension funds are less than the market return (as measured by conventional indices). These factors include administrative charges, agency and governance effects and demographic change, depressing investment returns below the high levels recorded over the past two decades. As a result, a more conservative assumption for future investment returns than the record over the past quarter century is appropriate. Settling on a median of 5.0% annual real return net of charges implies that 80% of the time, the investment return on pension savings should be between 3.2% and 6.7% a year.
The current financial and economic crisis has highlighted the importance of investment risk for pension systems. In particular, the dramatic spread of defined-contribution pension provision around the world means that investment risk has a direct effect on living standards in old age. This paper explores how uncertainty over investment returns affects individuals’ retirement incomes and government budgets. The key finding is that public pensions, old-age safety net benefits and the tax system act as “automatic stabilisers” of retirement incomes in the face of investment risk in defined-contribution pension plans. However, the degree of protection offered by these policies, and therefore the exposure of individuals’ retirement incomes to investment risk, varies significantly between countries. The paper uses the OECD pension models to explore the implications of a range of possible outcomes for investment returns. (The distribution of investment returns used is derived from historical data in D’Addio, Seisdedos and Whitehouse, 2009.) The analysis begins with the individual pension-scheme member. The results demonstrate that the overall design of the retirement-income package must be taken into account when assessing exposure of individual incomes in old age to investment performance. Many elements of pension systems are not subject to investment risk. And resource-tested benefits can act to mitigate investment risk by paying a larger benefit when returns are poor. Analysis of net pensions shows how taxes can also act to offset the effect of investment risk on living standards in retirement. The differences between countries in the extent to which these different factors affect exposure to investment risk are huge. Together, taxes and meanstested benefits can be termed “automatic stabilisers” for retirement incomes in the face of investment risk. Secondly, the paper uses the OECD pension models to look at the impact of investment risk on the public finances. The corollary of the reduction in investment risk for individuals through tax and transfer policies is exposure to investment risk of the public finances. In countries with resource-tested benefits, the government has a “contingent liability” that depends on investment returns. Better performance means lower expenditure on safety-net benefits. Similarly, the tax system means that the government is effectively a “co-investor”, with the individual retiree, in the defined-contribution plan. Higher returns mean more tax revenues. This effect is particularly large where the tax burden on pensions in payment is high. Adding these two effects together, governments (and so taxpayers) are in many countries significantly exposed to investment risk. This demonstrates how it is impossible to make risks go away: it is only possible to reallocate the risk between different actors in the pension system.
Corporate law in advanced domestic legal systems on the one hand, and typical treaties for the protection of foreign investment on the other hand, treat claims for damages by company shareholders differently. Advanced domestic systems generally bar shareholders from claiming for reflective loss – loss that arises from injury to "their" company (such as a decline in the value of shares). The claim for the loss belongs to the injured company and not to its shareholders. In contrast, shareholder claims for reflective loss have been widely permitted under typical investment treaties over the last 10 years. Ongoing OECD-hosted inter-governmental dialogue on investment law is considering whether there are policy reasons justifying the different approaches to shareholder claims for reflective loss.

This paper examines shareholder claims for reflective loss under investment treaties in light of comparative analysis of advanced systems of corporate law. The paper considers the impact of allowing shareholder claims for reflective loss on key characteristics of the business corporation. The paper also explores possible responses by different categories of investors to the availability of shareholder claims for reflective loss under investment treaties.

Advanced systems of domestic corporate law generally apply a “no reflective loss” principle to shareholder claims. Shareholder claims are permitted for direct injury to shareholder rights (such as voting rights). But shareholders generally cannot bring claims for reflective loss incurred as a result of injury to "their" company (such as loss in value of shares). Only the directly-injured company can claim.

In contrast, shareholder claims for reflective loss have consistently been permitted under typical bilateral investment treaties (BITs) in recent years. This paper analyses investment treaty provisions relating to shareholder claims. It addresses (i) treaty regimes for shareholder recovery and company recovery of damages, including their consequences for investor protection and government liability; (ii) the interaction of reflective loss claims with treaty provisions that seek to limit multiple claims; and (iii) treaty provisions applicable to government objections to shareholder claims for reflective loss.

Claims by company shareholders seeking damages from governments for so-called "reflective loss" now make up a substantial part of the investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) caseload. (Shareholders’ reflective loss is incurred as a result of injury to “their” company, typically a loss in value of the shares; it is generally contrasted with direct injury to shareholder rights, such as interference with shareholder voting rights.) This paper considers the consistency issues raised by shareholder claims for reflective loss in ISDS. The paper first compares the approach to shareholder claims in ISDS with advanced systems of national corporate law (and other international law). ISDS arbitrators have consistently found that shareholders can claim individually for reflective loss in ISDS under typical BITs. This can be seen as a success story from the point of view of consistency of legal interpretation and improves investor protection for potential claimant shareholders in many cases. In contrast, however, advanced national systems and international law generally apply what has been called a "no reflective loss" principle to shareholder claims. Second, the paper analyses the policy issues relating to consistency that are raised by shareholder claims for reflective loss in ISDS. National and international law barring shareholder claims for reflective loss is often explicitly driven by policy considerations relating to consistency, predictability, avoidance of double recovery and judicial economy. Limiting recovery to the company is seen as both more efficient and fairer to all interested parties. In contrast, ISDS tribunals and commentators have generally given limited consideration to the policy consequences of allowing shareholder claims for reflective loss. The third part of the paper addresses the issue of company recovery (including two different existing systems which expand the ability of foreign-controlled companies to recover in ISDS) and its relevance to shareholder claims for reflective loss. The paper also contains a series of questions for discussion and has been discussed by governments participating in an OECD-hosted investment roundtable.
Investment treaty law reflects a permanent tension between stability and flexibility. Stability nurtures predictability, while flexibility helps legal systems stay in alignment with changing circumstances and evolving needs. This paper establishes an inventory of the mechanisms in investment treaty law that provide flexibility and surveys relevant treaty practice.

The paper: analyses the drivers of change in investment treaty law; provides an inventory of countries’ options – and limits – to alter their positioning vis-à-vis investment treaty law through ‘exit’ and ‘voice’; and analyses treaty provisions on, and States’ use of, flexibility in investment treaty law.

The paper finds that most treaties provide for little or no mechanism for countries to influence the use and interpretation of investment treaty law. The paper further finds that treaty provisions for ‘exit’ are likewise geared to provide stability rather than flexibility. Analysis of State practice presented in the paper shows that States rarely make use of the mechanisms available to them to influence treaty use and interpretation and that ‘exit’ from the system has likewise been rare so far.

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