

Chapter 5

RECRUITING, SELECTING AND EMPLOYING TEACHERS

Summary

Teacher policy needs to ensure that the best available teachers are selected for employment, and that individual schools have the teachers they need. This chapter outlines concerns about recruiting, selecting and employing teachers and develops policy options for countries to consider.

Teachers are generally employed as public servants, and in a number of countries this is associated with tenured employment once permanency is obtained. There may not be sufficient incentives for all teachers to continuously review their skills and improve their practice, especially where there are only limited mechanisms for teacher evaluation and accountability. Policy options include the requirement that teachers renew their teacher certificates every five to seven years, built on an open, fair and transparent system of teacher evaluation.

The selection criteria for new teachers need to be broadened to ensure that the applicants with the greatest potential are identified. Some countries are reducing the weight accorded to seniority in determining which candidates are appointed to teaching vacancies, so as to avoid beginning teachers being assigned to the more difficult and unpopular schools. The evidence suggests that greater school involvement in teacher selection and personnel management helps to improve educational quality.

There is considerable evidence that some beginning teachers, no matter how well prepared and supported, struggle to perform well or find that the job does not meet their expectations. A formal probationary process can provide an opportunity for both new teachers and their employers to assess whether teaching is the right career for them.

In some countries the limited mobility of teachers between schools, and between teaching and other occupations, restricts the spread of new ideas and approaches, and results in teachers having few opportunities for diverse career experiences. The lack of mobility may mean that teacher shortages in some regions are paralleled by oversupply in others. Providing incentives for greater mobility and removing barriers are important policy responses.

As well as ensuring that teaching is an attractive career option, and that prospective teachers have appropriate skills and knowledge, teacher policy needs to ensure that the best available teachers are selected for employment, and that individual schools have the teachers they need.

These are major tasks with a workforce as large as teaching. For example, in France in 2002 there were about 150 000 candidates for about 27 000 new teaching positions.¹ Due to increasing numbers of teacher retirements, France expects to need to fill about 37 000 new teaching positions annually over the next decade.

Aside from the administrative and logistical challenges of managing such large numbers, the mechanisms that countries use to select and recruit teachers, and the policies governing their terms of employment, have potentially strong implications for educational quality. For instance, if hiring practices do not ensure the selection of the best available candidates, then increases in teacher salaries will not necessarily lead to improvements in the quality of the teacher workforce (Ballou and Podgursky, 1998).

In most school systems there are further processes concerned with the assignment of teachers to individual schools, and the movement of teachers between schools. In the United States, for example, between the 1999/2000 and 2000/01 school years about 8% of public school teachers changed schools and 7% left the teaching profession altogether (Luekens *et al.*, 2004). In that year, therefore, there was an average teacher turnover of about 15%, and in a number of schools the figure would have been much higher.

The processes by which teachers are assigned to and employed in different schools can affect the equity of the distribution of teaching resources and the extent to which schools are meeting student needs. Countries differ markedly in their approach to such personnel decisions, particularly in regard to the role played by individual schools. There is emerging evidence from international studies of student performance that countries in which schools have relatively high levels of responsibility for personnel selection and management tend to be associated with better student outcomes (OECD, 2001; Wößmann, 2003).

This chapter reviews the policy concerns about recruiting, selecting and employing teachers. It includes descriptions of initiatives in participating countries, and develops policy options for countries to consider. In terms of the analytical framework developed in Section 2.4, this chapter is primarily concerned with the structures and processes through which teacher demand and supply interact to determine which teachers are selected for employment, and the schools in which they teach.

5.1. Teaching and Public Service Employment

Teachers' employment is fundamentally shaped by government policies and practices. Schooling is principally a public sector activity in most countries. Governments either directly provide schools themselves, or provide much of the funding that other organisations use for their schools. On average in OECD countries, about 97% of primary and secondary students are enrolled either in public schools (about 87% of all students) or in government-dependent private schools (about 10% of students). Only about 3% of

¹ Unless otherwise indicated, references to country data and developments are taken from the background reports prepared by countries participating in the OECD teacher policy project. To save space, the background reports are not individually cited. Appendix 1 provides information on the background reports, their authors, and availability.

students are in independent private schools (OECD, 2004a). On average, about 92% of all expenditure on primary and secondary schools is from public sources.

Most teachers are either civil servants or are employed under conditions similar to those in the civil service, and teachers usually constitute a large share of public sector employment.² Thus, teachers' employment conditions must be considered in light of public sector employment as a whole, which may be either a driving force for change in teacher employment, or a constraint on the extent to which change is possible. Nevertheless, the nature of public service employment differs markedly from country to country, and within the public sector teachers' employment often differs from that of other public servants.

There are two basic models of public sector employment in OECD countries: "career-based" or "position-based"³, and these are both evident in teachers' employment in different countries.

In career-based systems, public servants are generally expected to stay in the public service throughout their working life. Initial entry normally occurs at a young age, it is based on academic credentials and/or a civil service entry examination, the entry criteria are usually demanding, and there are generally many more applicants than vacancies. Once recruited, people are normally allocated to posts according to internal rules, and are moved among departments throughout their career. Promotion is based on a system of grades attached to the individual rather than to a specific position. Starting salaries are often relatively low, but there is a clear pathway to higher earnings, and pension schemes are usually relatively generous. This sort of system is characterised by limited possibilities for entering the civil service mid-career, and a strong emphasis on career development. France, Japan, Korea and Spain are countries with many of the characteristics of career-based public services.

Position-based public services tend to focus on selecting the best-suited candidate for each position, whether by external recruitment or internal promotion. The criteria for appointment emphasise specialised qualifications or skills rather than more general measures of all-around competence. Position-based systems generally allow more open access at a wide range of ages, and entry from other careers is relatively common, as is movement from the public service to other jobs. Starting salaries are often relatively high, in part because they are not necessarily viewed as "starting", but rather because they reflect market rates for the skills needed in the position. Career advancement tends to depend on competing for vacant positions with higher levels of skills or responsibilities, rather than upon grades attached to the individual. For many people, therefore, salaries tend to plateau relatively early in their career since the number of higher level vacancies is usually restricted. In such systems, the main impetus for professional and career development tends to come from the individual, whereas in career-based systems career development is usually nurtured in more structured ways. Canada, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom illustrate many of the features of position-based public service employment.

No country provides a "pure" example of either the career-based or position-based type of public service, and within countries teaching tends to differ somewhat from the mainstream public service model in any case. For example, in career-based systems teachers are often recruited on the basis of specialised subject matter or grade-level skills in

² As one indicator of this, public expenditure on primary, secondary and post-secondary non-tertiary education averages around 9% of total public expenditure in OECD countries (OECD, 2004a).

³ The discussion of different models of public sector employment is based on OECD (2004b).

addition to general academic criteria, teachers are generally not moved to work in other government departments or *vice versa*, and the role of local government authorities and/or schools in candidate selection means there is less reliance on regulations governing staff mobility. In position-based public service systems teachers often have a salary schedule that provides largely automatic incremental steps over a long period, irrespective of whether new positions are taken on, and there can be some institutionalisation of professional development through teachers having entitlements to time release, for example. There are also some countries which have mixed characteristics of both models. Nevertheless, the two broad models provide a useful means of characterising teacher employment in different countries.

5.2. Features of Teachers' Employment Conditions

Employment status

Table 5.1 summarises key employment conditions of public school teachers among the participating countries. In two-thirds of the countries public sector teachers are employed by a local or municipal education authority, while a central or regional government authority is the employer in seven countries (Australia, Austria, France, Greece, Israel, Italy and Korea). The division of responsibility for teacher employment generally reflects the structure of government in the country concerned. The role of the individual school governing authority in teacher employment is significant in seven countries (Belgium, Hungary, Ireland, Netherlands, England, Northern Ireland and Wales).

In three-quarters of the countries public school teachers are employed as civil servants, that is, under conditions applicable to public sector employment in general. Such conditions normally include legislation or regulations specifying criteria for employment selection, salary and other benefits, and career advancement. Civil servants generally have lifelong tenure, and their employment can usually only be terminated under exceptional circumstances. In all but three countries (Australia, Chile and Finland), teachers with civil servant status cannot be hired on fixed-term contracts. Teachers in public schools generally do not have civil servant status in Quebec, the Netherlands, the Slovak Republic, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, or Ireland (where they have a similar public service status). Box 5.1 outlines the recent changes to teachers' employment status in Switzerland.

Box 5.1. A new employment status for teachers in Switzerland

A marked feature of the teaching labour market in Switzerland is that, throughout the country, teachers are no longer civil servants. In the last few years, in most cantons and at confederation level, the employment status of public workers has moved from that of civil servant to that of salaried employee. However, it is important to note that, as a general rule, the previous civil servant status was not associated with an appointment for life but instead with contracts of a given duration. In most cantons the new salaried employee status goes along with indefinite, terminable contractual arrangements regulated by public law, which are similar to those offered in the private sector. These contracts can generally be terminated within a few months if: (i) the employee fails to follow the regulations; (ii) the employee performs unsatisfactorily; or (iii) the post becomes redundant. In the cantons where this reform has not been undertaken, teachers are employed with a renewable contract of a typical duration of four to six years, regardless of whether they benefit from a civil servant status or not. In these cases dismissals are only possible in extraordinary circumstances. Lifetime contracts are not offered to teachers in any Swiss canton.

In most countries, teachers can also be employed on a contractual basis under the conditions of general employment legislation. This applies in 20 of the 25 countries that supplied data for Table 5.1, and indicates a moving away from a single, lifetime model of public sector employment. Contract employment of public school teachers does not seem to be used in Chile, Finland, Italy, Korea or the United States.

Processes for determining employment conditions

In three-quarters of the countries teachers' employment conditions are defined by collective agreements reached between the government employing authority and teacher unions. France, Germany, Japan and Korea, which are examples of "career-based" public services do not use collective bargaining to define employment conditions, while in England and Wales, where public service employment reflects the "position-based model", such employment conditions are based on recommendations of an independent review body (see Box 5.2). Where collective agreements exist, they tend to be reached at the central/regional level (11 of 17 countries for which information is available) or within a framework that is agreed at central level and with specifics determined at the local or municipal government level (6 countries).

Box 5.2. The School Teachers Review Body in England and Wales

The School Teachers Review Body (STRB) was established under the *School Teachers' Pay and Conditions Act* in 1991, following the abolishment of the former system of national collective bargaining over pay. It is an independent advisory body that examines the pay, duties and other conditions of employment of school teachers in England and Wales, and makes reports to the government. Since its creation, the salary scales for teachers are nationally determined by the Secretary of State for Education and Skills, usually following the advice of the STRB. Unless there are compelling reasons to the contrary, the government has undertaken to implement the recommendations of the STRB.

The STRB consists of 5 to 9 members. The chairperson is appointed by the Prime Minister and the other members are appointed by the Secretary of State. The members, in general, cover areas of expertise such as labour market economics, human resources and industrial relations, financial management and education.

The Secretary of State may give the STRB some elements to consider, such as budgetary restrictions or the government's policy on public sector pay. But it cannot impose limits on what the STRB may recommend, or the cost of its recommendations. The recommendations from the review body are based on inputs from major stakeholders including the government, unions and employers. Before reporting, the STRB is required to take evidence from interested parties, including bodies representing teachers, the employers' organisation of local educational authorities, school administrators, the Secretary of State and others the STRB deems appropriate.

The STRB may also advise on other specific issues such as teacher workload. In October 2000, for example, the STRB presented a special report on the standards for promotion in the context of the "Performance Threshold" system.

Collective bargaining between teacher employers and teacher unions is likely to lead to different outcomes than negotiations by individual teachers or government regulations stipulating resource levels and teachers' working conditions. The impact of teacher unions on school resources and student outcomes has been extensively analysed in the United States, where there is a tradition of collective bargaining and the extent of unionisation

varies between school districts and has changed over time. (Santiago, 2004, includes a review of this literature.)

The research has produced mixed results. For example, Hoxby (1996) concluded that strong teacher unions lead to higher per-student spending, and increase the share of spending devoted to inputs that have potential benefits for teachers but lower student achievement by decreasing the productivity of these inputs, in part because of greater standardisation in teaching approaches in unionised workplaces. Standardisation is likely to assist the middle band of students but not those who are high or low performers. She also concluded that the potential effects of unions on public schools are likely to be greater in areas where there is little competition either from private schools or from alternatives within the public sector. On the other hand, Steelman *et al.* (2000) found a statistically significant and positive relationship between state teacher unionisation rates and student test scores, which they attribute in part to the beneficial effects of higher resource levels in unionised districts and a stronger focus on school-wide improvement strategies. There are considerable conceptual and methodological difficulties with this type of research. Nevertheless, the contrasting findings reinforce the basic point that collective bargaining agreements, like any other mechanism for determining school resource levels and their uses, ultimately need to be assessed in terms of their impact on student outcomes.

Box 5.3. Individual teacher pay system in Sweden

In Sweden, the centrally bargained fixed-pay scheme for teachers was abolished in 1995 as part of a package designed to enhance local autonomy and flexibility in the school system. The government committed itself to substantially lift teacher salaries over a five-year period, but on the condition that not all teachers received the same rise. This means that there is no fixed upper limit and only a minimum basic salary is centrally negotiated, along with the aggregate rise in the teacher salary bill. Salaries are negotiated when a teacher is hired, and teacher and employer agree on the salary to be paid on commencement of the term of employment. The individual negotiation involves the following dimensions:

1. Teachers' qualification areas: teachers in upper secondary schools have higher salaries than teachers in compulsory schools or teachers in pre-schools.
2. The labour market situation: in regions where teacher shortages are more acute, teachers get higher salaries; the same occurs for certain subjects like mathematics or science.
3. The performance of the teacher: the collective central agreement requires that pay raises be linked to improved performance, allowing schools to differentiate the pay of teachers with similar tasks.
4. Range of responsibilities of teachers: principals can reward teachers if they work harder and take up more tasks than what is generally expected.

There is now much greater variety in teachers' pay, with those in areas of shortage and with higher demonstrated performance able to negotiate more. The scheme is underpinned by a system of central government grants to ensure that low-income municipalities are able to compete effectively for teachers and other staff in the service sectors of the municipality.

Sweden, with its individual teacher pay system introduced in 1995, provides an interesting example of a country that has attempted to combine a strong tradition of teacher unionism and consultative processes with opportunities for flexible responses and non-standardised working conditions at the school level (see Box 5.3). Although the evidence is not clear cut, given the range of other changes in Swedish schools and the labour market since the mid-1990s, the impression is that the individualised approach to teacher pay has

helped schools overcome some teacher shortages and improved the match between teachers and school needs. There is evidence that the competition for teachers has increased both between public and private schools, and between municipalities (Björklund *et al.*, 2004). The probability of teachers changing municipalities has doubled since the mid-1990s, and schools appear to be tailoring their compensation packages (salaries, class sizes, working conditions) to attract the teachers they need. Nevertheless, the scope for overcoming teacher shortages through individual pay and tailored compensation packages is dependent on the economic situation in the municipalities.

Teacher dismissal

As Table 5.1 shows, in all countries, public school teachers can be dismissed for disciplinary reasons, and in over half the systems (15 out of 26) for reasons of redundancy, such as when enrolments decline or subjects are no longer offered. About two-thirds of the countries also report that teachers can be dismissed because of chronic underperformance. However, based on information from the Country Background Reports and the country review visits, it appears that public school teachers are rarely dismissed on performance grounds.

Some of the Country Background Reports have identified this as a particular problem. For example, Korea, where teacher employment reflects a career-based model, notes that “both the teacher evaluation and the institutional mechanism for ousting the ineffective teachers remain very weak. The strong status protection of the teaching profession prevents such disciplinary mechanism from being truly operational.” The Slovak Republic, where teacher employment can be characterised more as a position-based system and therefore potentially more flexible, nevertheless notes that “owing to the fact that there are no criteria of teachers’ efficiency set ... it is not possible to officially identify an inefficient teacher. In addition, the Labour Code exceedingly protects the employees tenured and consequently, the only legal procedure – action in court – [is lengthy and complex].” This has led to one perhaps unanticipated outcome, which works against teachers’ interests and innovation: “The principals thus use various internal organisation changes that allow them to dismiss redundant teachers. This instrument may be also used (and is used) against able teachers [who] become ‘uncomfortable’ for the school management [and] the social certainty of innovative teachers substantially diminishes.”

The Country Background Reports do not indicate that there are large numbers of ineffective teachers in schools. The issue seems to be more that the lack of simple, transparent and accepted procedures for dealing with ineffective teachers means that the problem is often not tackled, and that this has adverse consequences for the reputation of schools and the teaching profession. Approaches to identifying and responding to poorly performing teachers are discussed further in Chapter 6.

Table 5.1. Employment and dismissal of teachers, public schools, 2004

	Employer of teachers	Employment status of teachers		Can teachers be employed on fixed-term contracts (please indicate in parentheses the maximum period of time a teacher can be employed on fixed-term contracts)?		Are employment conditions of teachers defined by collective agreements?	Under what circumstances can teachers be dismissed from their teaching post?
		Civil servant status	Employed on a contractual basis under general employment legislation (salaried employee status)	Teachers with civil servant status	Teachers with salaried employee status		
Australia	Central/regional educational authority	Yes, often	Yes, often	Generally yes, it varies from 12 months to 7 years	Generally yes, generally 1 year	Yes, at the central/regional government level	Disciplinary Underperformance Sometimes redundancy
Austria	Central/regional educational authority	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes, at the central/regional level	Disciplinary
Belgium (Fl.)	Central/regional educational authority Municipal/local educational authority School governing authority	Yes	Yes	No	Yes (1 year but renewable)	Yes, with a central framework agreed at central level and details negotiated at more localised levels	Disciplinary Underperformance
Belgium (Fr.)	Central/regional educational authority Municipal/local educational authority School governing authority	Yes	Yes (for temporary teachers)	No	Yes (1 year but renewable)	Yes, at the central/regional level	Disciplinary Underperformance
Canada (Qt.)	Local educational authority	No	Yes	^a	Yes (1 year)	Yes, at the central/regional and local levels	Disciplinary Redundancy Underperformance
Chile	Municipal educational authority	Yes	No	Yes (no limit)	^a	Yes, at the central level	Disciplinary Redundancy ¹
Denmark	Municipal/local educational authority	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes, with a central framework agreed at central level and details negotiated at more localised levels	Disciplinary Redundancy Underperformance
Finland	Municipal educational authority	Yes	No	Yes (legislation establishes that it should not be used repeatedly)	^a	Yes, at the central level	Disciplinary Redundancy Underperformance
France	Central educational authority	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	Disciplinary Criminal
Germany	Regional educational authority Local educational authority	Yes	Yes	No	Yes (5 years)	No	Disciplinary Redundancy Criminal
Greece	Central educational authority	Yes	Yes	No	Yes (10 months)	Yes, at the central level	Disciplinary
Hungary	School governing authority (principal)	Yes	Yes	Yes (typically 1 year but it can be 5 years if it is a substitution)	Yes (typically 1 year but it can be 5 years if it is a substitution)	Yes, with a central framework agreed at more localised levels	Disciplinary Redundancy Underperformance
Ireland	School governing authority Local educational authority	No ²	Yes	^a	Yes (in general until the end of the school year) ³	Yes ⁴	Disciplinary Underperformance
Israel	Central educational authority (primary and lower sec. teachers); Local educational authority or educational networks (upper sec. teachers)	Yes ⁵	Yes	No	No	Yes, at the central level	Disciplinary Redundancy Underperformance
Italy	Central/regional educational authority	Yes	No	No ⁶	^a	Yes, with a central framework agreed at central level and details negotiated at more localised levels	Disciplinary
Japan	Municipal/local educational authority	Yes	Yes	No	Yes (1 year)	No	Disciplinary Disciplinary Criminal
Korea	Regional educational authority	Yes	No	No	^a	No	Disciplinary Disciplinary Criminal

Table 5.1. (continued) **Employment and dismissal of teachers, public schools, 2004**

	Employer of teachers	Employment status of teachers		Can teachers be employed on fixed-term contracts (please indicate in parentheses the maximum period of time a teacher can be employed on fixed-term contracts)?	Are employment conditions of teachers defined by collective agreements?	Under what circumstances can teachers be dismissed from their teaching post?
		Civil servant status	Employed on a contractual basis under general employment legislation (salaried employee status)			
Netherlands	School governing authority Local education authority	No	Yes	<i>a</i> Only for replacements	Yes, at the central level for primary education. For secondary education, fringe benefits are negotiated at local level	Disciplinary Redundancy
Slovak Republic	<i>m</i>	No	Yes	<i>a</i> Yes (3 years)	Yes	Disciplinary Redundancy Organisational changes Underperformance
Sweden	Municipal/local educational authority	No	Yes	<i>a</i> Yes (1 year)	Yes, at the municipal authority level	Disciplinary Redundancy
Switzerland	Municipal/local educational authority (all levels of education) Regional educational authority (upper sec. education)	No	Yes	<i>a</i> Yes (depends on the Canton)	Yes, at the regional level	Disciplinary Redundancy Underperformance
United Kingdom (Eng.)	School governing body or local education authority	No	Yes	<i>a</i> At the discretion of the school	Statutory pay and conditions of service based on recommendations of independent pay review body. Non-statutory conditions of service by collective agreement.	Disciplinary Redundancy Underperformance
United Kingdom (N.Ir.)	School governing body	No	Yes	<i>a</i> Yes (1 year)	Yes	Disciplinary Underperformance
United Kingdom (Scot.)	Local educational authority	No	Yes	<i>a</i> Yes (2 years)	Yes, with a central framework agreed at central level and details negotiated at more localised levels	Disciplinary Redundancy Underperformance
United Kingdom (Wal.)	School governing body or local education authority	No	Yes	<i>a</i> At the discretion of the school	Statutory pay and conditions of service based on recommendations of independent pay review body. Non-statutory conditions of service by collective agreement.	Disciplinary Redundancy Underperformance
United States	Local educational authority (school district)	Yes	No	<i>m</i>	In most states	Disciplinary Underperformance (rarely used)

Definition: The term "employer of teachers" refers to the authority with direct responsibility for appointing teachers, specifying their working conditions and ensuring that these conditions are met. This includes ensuring the payment of teachers' salaries, although funds for this purpose may not necessarily derive directly from the budget of the "employer of teachers".

Notes: *a* Information not applicable because the category does not apply. *m* Information not available.

- From 2006 on underperformance will be used as a basis for dismissal.
- Teachers have public service rather than civil service status.
- However, contracts may be renewed for the following year if a vacancy remains. The system is now effectively moving towards 'fixed-purpose' contracts whereby teachers are contracted for a purpose (e.g. to replace a teacher on maternity leave or on career break). These contracts may extend beyond the end of the school year.
- Collective agreements are under the auspices of the Teachers' Conciliation Council. Party to the agreements are central government (Department of Education and Science, Department of Finance), teacher unions, managerial bodies and the local educational authority in certain circumstances. Pay agreements are negotiated at national level.
- Within compulsory education but do not receive all rights of civil servants.
- Temporary teachers can be employed on a fixed-term contract for up to one school year.

Source: Derived from information supplied by countries participating in the project. The table should be interpreted as providing broad indications only, and not strict comparability across countries.

5.3. Teacher Recruitment and Selection

Recruitment and selection practices are essential mechanisms, which potentially tie incentives to the quality of the teaching workforce. If hiring practices are inefficient in linking teacher compensation to teacher quality – by not leading to the selection of the best candidates from a given pool of applicants – increases in salaries will not lead to improvements in the quality of the teaching workforce.

Table 5.2 summarises the processes and criteria used to recruit and select individuals for their first appointment into the public school teacher workforce. Virtually all countries use eligibility criteria involving certification/qualification, citizenship, proficiency in the language of instruction, medical and security checks. In addition, Germany (for civil servants) and Korea have maximum age restrictions; England requires candidates to pass skills tests in literacy, numeracy and ICT; a number of school districts in the United States set literacy and numeracy tests; and registration with a Teaching Council is required in most Australian states, England, Scotland and Wales.

Recruitment practices include interviews with candidates in 18 out of 23 countries – the exceptions are countries with centralised recruitment approaches such as Austria, France (where an oral competitive examination is conducted), Germany, Greece and Italy. In most countries (17 out of 23), the academic background or performance of the candidate is taken into account, but only 12 out of 23 countries report that teaching skills are a criterion used in the selection of teachers for public school employment.

Central versus school involvement in teacher recruitment and selection

The question of school involvement in teacher selection is growing in importance. As noted in the background report prepared by Hamburg (Germany): “The assignment of personnel from a central office less and less meets the needs of the schools as well as the applicants for teaching posts and it falls short of the goal of matching the schools’ requirements and candidates’ qualifications with a view to the special profile of schools.” The process of teacher selection is often highly impersonal, and it is hard for teachers to build a sense of commitment to the schools where they are appointed. This is particularly the case in those countries where the authority responsible for recruitment is highly centralised. This raises concerns about whether schools have the teachers that fit their particular needs.

As Table 5.2 indicates, in most countries teacher recruitment is the responsibility of the level of government (central, regional or local) which is responsible for employing teachers. In eight countries there is a very high level of individual school involvement in teacher recruitment into public schools: Belgium (Flemish Community); Denmark; England and Wales; Hungary; Ireland; the Netherlands; the Slovak Republic; and Sweden. Box 5.4 outlines the processes of school involvement in teacher recruitment and selection in Denmark and Ireland.

In more than half of the systems (14 out of 24), “open recruitment” is the main procedure used to recruit teachers to their first appointment, meaning that responsibility for advertising vacancies is decentralised to local authority or school level, and involves matching applicants with specific vacancies. A direct interaction with the applicants takes place, typically through interviews, and allows the use of a more complete set of criteria that match with the school’s educational approach. This process of open recruitment also offers advantages to applicants since they can more directly choose the school and have close contact with the school before the decision is taken.

Table 5.2. Teacher recruitment procedures and selection criteria, public schools, 2004

	Eligibility criteria	Recruitment procedures		What criteria are used in the selection of teachers?
		Level responsible for recruitment	Procedure (competitive examination, candidate list, open recruitment)	
Australia	Registration with relevant State Teaching Council	It varies, usually either central authority or school or a combination of both	Depending on the position, a combination of candidate list and open recruitment	Varies according to jurisdiction including a combination of interpersonal and other skills assessed in interview, teaching skills, subject speciality, academic performance, qualitative analysis of past experience (usually including written applications addressing various selection criteria), location prepared to work in, date of application
Austria	None	Central/regional school authority	Candidate list	Subject speciality and teaching skills
Belgium (Fl.)	None	School governing authority	Open recruitment	At the discretion of school
Belgium (Fr.)	None	Central/regional education authority Municipal/local education authority School governing authority	Candidate list	Subject speciality; date of application; interpersonal and other skills assessed in interview
Canada (Qb.)	Sometimes, ICT skills	Local education authority	Open recruitment by local education authority	Academic performance; prior experience as an intern; subject speciality; teaching skills; interpersonal skills
Chile	None	Municipal education authority	Open recruitment	At the discretion of the employer
Denmark	None	Municipal/local education authority School governing authority	Open recruitment	Qualitative analysis of past experience; interpersonal skills; subject speciality; postgraduate qualifications
Finland	None	Municipal education authority	Open recruitment	Criteria decided by the municipal educational authority and school principals, but likely to include: academic performance, teaching skills, teaching experience, and interpersonal skills
France	None	Primary level: Regional education authority Sec. level: Central education authority	Competitive examination	Results on (written and oral) competitive examination
Germany ¹	Age restriction (for civil servants, maximum age of 50)	Regional education authority Local education authority	Candidate list	Academic performance; subject speciality
Greece	None	Central education authority	Competitive examination and candidate list ²	Academic performance (grade of university degree and qualification examinations); postgraduate qualifications; teaching experience; and date of application for candidate list process
Hungary	None	School principal	Open recruitment	Academic performance; qualitative analysis of past experience; subject speciality; and interpersonal and other skills assessed in interview
Ireland	Registration with Registration Council (for voluntary secondary sector)	Local education authority School governing authority	Open recruitment	Selection on the basis of an interview, which considers the following: academic achievement, past experience, subject speciality, teaching skills (e.g. as assessed during initial teacher education or probationary process), postgraduate qualifications, interpersonal and other skills
Israel	None	Central education authority Local education authority School governing authority	Candidate list; Open recruitment (upper sec. education only)	Academic performance; qualitative analysis of past experience; subject speciality; teaching skills; interpersonal and other skills assessed in interview
Italy	None	Central/regional school authority	Competitive examination and candidate list	Qualification examinations; teaching experience
Japan	None	Municipal/local education authority	Competitive examination Candidate list Open recruitment	Academic performance; teaching skills; interpersonal and other skills assessed in interview
Korea	Age restriction	Regional school authority	Competitive examination	Academic performance (including qualification examinations); teaching skills; subject speciality; interpersonal and other skills assessed in interview; professional certificates (e.g. English, ICT)
Netherlands	None	School authority (principal)	Open recruitment	Interpersonal and other skills assessed in interview
Slovak Republic	None	School principal	Open recruitment	Teaching and pedagogical skills; interpersonal and other skills
Sweden	None	School principal	Open recruitment	Academic performance; qualitative analysis of past experience; subject speciality; postgraduate qualifications; interpersonal and other skills assessed in interview
Switzerland	None	Municipal/local education authority	Candidate list	Grade obtained at teacher education institution; qualification examinations; qualitative analysis of past experience; subject speciality; teaching skills; interpersonal and other skills assessed in interview; postgraduate qualifications (less often)
United Kingdom (Eng.)	Skills tests in literacy, numeracy and ICT; Registration with General Teaching Council	School governing authority for voluntary aided and foundation schools; local education authority for all other schools	Open recruitment	Matter for employer but likely to include past experience, interpersonal skills, qualifications and subject specialism. Could include teaching skills in demonstration class
United Kingdom (N.Ir.)	<i>m</i>	<i>m</i>	At the discretion of the employer	<i>m</i>
United Kingdom (Scot.)	Registration with Teaching Council	Municipal/local education authority	Open recruitment	Academic performance; qualitative analysis of past experience; subject speciality; teaching skills (e.g. as assessed in demonstration class or from initial teacher education); postgraduate qualifications; interpersonal and other skills assessed in interview
United Kingdom (Wal.)	Registration with Teaching Council	School governing bodies or local education authorities depending on type of school	Open recruitment	Matter for employer but likely to include past experience, interpersonal skills, qualifications and subject specialism. Could include teaching skills in demonstration class.
United States ³	Skills tests in literacy and numeracy	Local education authority (school district), occasionally the school	Open recruitment; some states require a licensing exam	Review of university coursework; possession of a degree in subject matter to be taught; performance during an interview; academic credentials (grade of university degree and qualification exams) are given less consideration

Definitions: This table deals with the formal procedures used to recruit and select individuals into the teaching profession, for a first appointment. It includes the application process, the recruitment method and the criteria used to select new teachers from a pool of applicants. *Eligibility criteria* refer to the criteria that individuals need to meet to become eligible for a teaching post. The difference vis-à-vis the selection criteria of the last column is that eligibility criteria are specific to the candidate (*i.e.* criteria that need to be met regardless of the characteristics of other candidates) while selection criteria are used to compare characteristics of the different candidates. Only eligibility criteria other than the following were entered: qualifications to be a teacher; citizenship criteria; proficiency in the language(s) of instruction; personal integrity (e.g. no criminal record); and good medical condition.

The term "competitive examination" is used to designate public, centrally organised examinations and other assessments that are held to select candidates for the teaching profession. A candidate list is a system whereby applications for employment as a teacher are made through submitting candidates' names and qualifications to a central or local educational authority, candidates being ranked on the basis of a number of criteria. The term "open recruitment" refers to the method of recruitment where responsibility for publicising posts open for recruitment, requesting applications and selecting candidates is decentralised. In this case, recruitment is usually the responsibility of the school, sometimes in conjunction with the local authority; the process of matching those teachers seeking employment with available teaching posts taking place on a school-by-school basis.

Notes: *m* Information not available.

1. Information refers to the majority of posts, for which recruitment procedures are centralised. A growing number of posts are being filled through the direct involvement from the school.

2. 75% of *permanent* teachers are selected by competitive examination and 25% by candidate list. Temporary and hourly-based teachers are selected from candidate lists.

3. Policies vary by school district (municipal education agencies) and it is difficult to express the average for the country as there are 15 000 school districts and no uniform policies.

Source: Derived from information supplied by countries participating in the project. The table should be interpreted as providing broad indications only, and not strict comparability across countries.

Box 5.4. Recruitment and selection of teachers in Denmark and Ireland

Denmark

The recruitment of teachers is the responsibility of municipal authorities. As a result of greater decentralisation of decision-making, many municipalities have, however, delegated the power to appoint teachers to the schools, either for all teachers or for teachers on fixed-term contracts. At the school level, a Selection Committee is appointed to examine the applications for teaching posts. The committee includes the principal, and the union and parents representatives to the school Board of Governors. It selects a number of applicants, conducts job interviews and assesses the qualifications of the applicants, after which the Board of Governors or the principal makes a decision and sends the recommendation to the head of the municipal administration (if the power to appoint is not delegated to the school). Applicants are expected to have familiarised themselves with the school's values and profile. Many principals also expect the applicants to make an exploratory visit to the school before the application is sent.

Ireland

With the exception of schools operating under Vocational Education Committees at secondary level, teachers in Ireland are not assigned to schools by a central agency. Teachers apply directly to schools for positions, at their own discretion. The school management board, as the appointing body, makes the arrangements for appointment. The Department of Education and Science sets out the general regulations regarding the quota of teachers which schools can employ and guidelines on appointment procedures. It does not exercise a direct role in the deployment of teachers among schools. Applications and *curriculum vitae* are submitted after advertisement. A selection committee is appointed by the school Board of Management. Short-listing of candidates occurs, according to agreed criteria. The interview process is conducted according to due process guidelines. It typically includes an assessment of academic achievement, qualitative analysis of past experience, teaching skills (*e.g.* as assessed during demonstration class at initial teacher education level or as reported during the probationary process), interpersonal and other skills. The Board of Management makes the appointment in accordance with the order of merit recommended by the committee. Whenever an appointment is made, unsuccessful candidates have a variety of mechanisms through which they can appeal the decision of the Board of Management. Appeals can be made to the Equality Authority, the Employment Appeals Tribunal, or directly to the Minister for Education and Science.

Figure 5.1 provides principals' perceptions of school responsibility for hiring and dismissing teachers in schools attended by 15-year-old students. It clearly shows a divide among countries. While schools have full or substantial influence in teacher selection in about half of the countries (*e.g.* Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Hungary, Iceland, Israel, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States), in the remaining countries there is a very limited school role (*e.g.* Austria, Chile, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Portugal, and Spain).


In practice the extent of school autonomy in teacher recruitment might be restricted by a complex set of rules. For instance, in the Flemish Community of Belgium, the school principal plays a major role in the recruitment of teaching and administrative staff, often directly contacting a potential candidate for a position in the school. However, in practice schools must follow a number of rules in making appointments. Priority has to be given to the candidate with the highest level of seniority, and teachers with permanent status have priority over temporary teachers. Other rules require that priority be given to those who have worked for a certain number of years and, where two candidates are equal in this

regard, priority is given to those who have worked in the same network of schools, or been employed by the same organising authority.

As Figure 5.1 shows, in the majority of countries, principals tend to report a more prominent role for the school in appointing teachers than in dismissing them, the largest differences being found in Canada and Denmark (21 and 40 percentage points, respectively). In Belgium, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Iceland, the Netherlands, New Zealand, and the United States, more than 95% of the students are enrolled in schools whose principals report having some say in the dismissal of teachers (the country average is 54%).

Figure 5.1. **Principals' perceptions of school responsibility for hiring and dismissing teachers, 2000**

Percentage of 15-year-old students enrolled in schools where the principal states that hiring/firing teachers is not a school responsibility



Note: For the Netherlands, the response rate is too low to ensure comparability.

Source: OECD PISA Database, 2001.

Table 5.2 indicates that candidate lists are predominantly used by seven countries (Austria, Belgium [French Community], Germany, Israel, Italy, Japan, Switzerland), and involve a government authority ranking candidates according to specific criteria. Under this approach recruitment is generally first into a pool of eligible teachers and then allocation is made to schools. Six countries, which illustrate career-based teacher employment systems (France, Greece, Italy, Japan, Korea and Spain), use a variant of the candidate list in that centrally or regionally organised competitive examinations are used as a key means of determining which applicants are eligible to be recruited as teachers. The cut-off score for the examination is usually set in relation to the number of vacancies that need to be filled in the area concerned.

Although competitive entrance examinations are seen as important quality controls in countries with career-based public services, they are also open to criticism that they are not framed in terms of what teachers should know or be able to do as competent professionals. For example, in the case of Korea the Country Background Report notes: “The paper and pencil test of the employment examination is irrelevant to evaluating candidate’s ability and

aptitude for teaching ... Due to the absence of a standardised domain of the test questions and curricular differences among teacher education institutions, examinees have difficulty in systematically preparing for the examination. ... The interview is also criticised for its formalistic nature ... [and] cannot evaluate the capacity and character required for teaching. ... most students attending secondary teacher education institutions concentrate on studying [for] the employment examination. This is at the expense of sacrificing 'normal' learning through university courses, which were originally devised to nurture the capacity for the teaching profession." The heavy weight placed on the selection stage, and its highly formal nature, can also be barriers to those who want to enter teaching mid-career.

Research on school involvement in teacher selection

In general, the PISA results show that there is a positive correlation between the degree of school involvement in teacher appointments and student performance on reading literacy, although this correlation is not as strong as for other aspects of school autonomy such as deciding on which courses are offered and deciding on budget allocations within the school (OECD, 2001). In those countries where schools differ significantly in the extent of school decision-making autonomy (mainly between different school systems such as in Australia, Austria, Canada, Spain and Switzerland) there is also a strong and significant within-country relationship between school autonomy and student performance. Such findings cannot, of course, be interpreted in a causal sense as, for example, school autonomy and performance could well be mutually reinforcing or influenced by other factors.

While countries with greater levels of school autonomy in particular areas tend to perform better, a concern is that greater independence of schools might lead to greater inequalities in performance. However, the PISA results suggest that greater school autonomy is not necessarily associated with greater disparities in school performance. For example, Finland and Sweden, among the countries with the highest degree of school autonomy on many of the measures used in PISA 2000, display (together with Iceland) the smallest performance differences among schools.

Wößmann (2003) used data from the Third International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS) to examine the relationship between different aspects of centralised and school-level decision-making and student performance. He concluded that students in schools with autonomy in deciding on the hiring of teachers performed statistically significantly better in mathematics and science, as did students in schools that could determine teacher salaries themselves. On the other hand, students in schools that had primary responsibility for formulating the size of the school budget had lower scores in mathematics and science, as did those in schools with responsibility for determining their own curricula and setting examination standards. He concluded that, since school autonomy in setting standards and the size of the school budget seem to be negatively related to student performance, while school autonomy in personnel management and process decisions seem to be positively related to performance, school systems should ensure external control of resource levels and performance standards, but provide schools with freedom in the process areas, such as personnel management, where school-level knowledge is important.

The incentives that schools face are vital in this regard. Ballou (1996) and Ballou and Podgursky (1998) provide a comprehensive comparison of public and private school teachers in the United States. They found that private schools are more likely than public schools to select candidates whose academic background signals strong cognitive ability and command of subject matter. They also found that teacher pay, although on average

lower in private schools, is less compressed and more closely related to aptitude and scarce skills (such as mathematics and science teaching) in private schools than in public schools. Their overall conclusion was that public schools, which face little competition for students, do not invest sufficient effort in finding the best applicants for teaching jobs.

Hanushek and Rivkin (2003) use variation in the most common form of public school choice in the United States – parents choosing among schools by selecting their area of residence – to examine the effect of public school competition on teacher quality. The evidence suggests that more competition tends to increase teacher quality, particularly for schools serving predominantly lower-income students. Hoxby (1994) found that where public schools face competition for students from private schools, public school teacher salaries are higher and student outcomes better.

Boyd *et al.* (2003) show striking differences in the qualifications of teachers across public school districts in the United States. If school systems are to adopt a more decentralised approach to school choice and teacher employment, it is clear that schools in disadvantaged locations will need substantially more resources to enable them to compete on an equitable basis.

5.4. Probationary Periods for Beginning Teachers

Table 5.3 summarises the position regarding probationary periods for beginning teachers in public schools among the participating countries. In all, 20 of the 25 systems with relevant information use probationary periods for beginning teachers with either civil servant or salaried employee status. In 16 of these countries the probationary period begins when the teacher starts teaching employment, whereas in four others it forms part of initial teacher education for at least some teachers: Austria, Belgium (Flemish Community), Canada (Quebec) and France. Probationary periods do not exist in five countries: Belgium (French Community), Chile, Korea, the Netherlands and Northern Ireland.

Typically, where countries offer different employment status to teachers, they do not make a distinction regarding the probationary period requirement, with the exception of Japan (where only civil servants go through a probationary period). The duration of the probationary period varies between three months (Denmark, Hungary) and three years (in some cases in Germany, Israel, and some parts of the United States), but it is generally within the period of six months to one year in most countries.

Eleven systems supplied information on the proportion of teachers who do not pass the probationary stage. They indicated that the proportion was typically 1% or less. Scotland noted that about 2% of beginning teachers do not pass the induction period, although some candidates leave before receiving an adverse evaluation, and France indicated that it can reach 3%.

Generally, successfully passing the probationary criteria does not guarantee access to a permanent position; a vacancy needs to be available. Since the majority of the existing teaching force in most countries already has permanent status, the burden of adjustment to enrolment decline falls largely on beginning teachers who are not able to secure permanent employment, while those with permanent positions are reluctant to leave them. In some countries a teacher with permanency continues to be employed at the same school even if their job is lost due to falling student numbers. Thus, although the formal period of probation may be about 12 months, it can take much longer to obtain permanency; in these circumstances many newly qualified teachers are reluctant to start looking for teaching jobs, and there are high attrition rates among temporary teachers.

Table 5.3. Probationary period for beginning teachers, public schools, 2004

	Teachers with civil servant status			Teachers with salaried employee status		
	Existence of probationary period	Duration of probationary period	About what percentage of teachers do not pass the probationary stage?	Existence of probationary period	Duration of probationary period	About what percentage of teachers do not pass the probationary stage?
Australia	Yes, upon entering teaching	Usually between 6 and 12 months	Varies, usually less than 1%	Often yes	Sometimes 6 months-2 years, depending on jurisdiction	1% in some jurisdictions
Austria ¹	<i>a</i>	<i>a</i>	<i>a</i>	Yes, as part of initial teacher education, in upper secondary education only	1 year	Negligible
Belgium (Fl.)	Yes, as part of initial teacher education	<i>m</i>	<i>m</i>	Yes, as part of initial teacher education	<i>m</i>	<i>m</i>
Belgium (Fr.)	No	<i>a</i>	<i>a</i>	No	<i>a</i>	<i>a</i>
Canada (Qb.)	<i>a</i>	<i>a</i>	<i>a</i>	Yes, as part of initial teacher education	1 year	Negligible
Chile	No	<i>a</i>	<i>a</i>	<i>a</i>	<i>a</i>	<i>a</i>
Denmark	<i>m</i>	<i>m</i>	<i>m</i>	Yes, upon entering teaching	3 months	0-1%
Finland	At the discretion of employer	Maximum of 6 months	<i>m</i>	<i>a</i>	<i>a</i>	<i>a</i>
France	Yes, as part of initial teacher education	1 year	1-3%	Yes	Varies according to contract duration	<i>m</i>
Germany	Yes, upon entering teaching	Maximum of 3 years	<i>m</i>	Yes	6 months	<i>m</i>
Greece	Yes, upon entering teaching	2 years	0%	<i>a</i>	<i>a</i>	<i>a</i>
Hungary ²	Yes, upon entering teaching but it is not mandatory	Maximum of 90 days	<i>m</i> ³	Yes, upon entering teaching but it is not mandatory	Maximum of 90 days	<i>m</i>
Ireland ⁴	<i>a</i>	<i>a</i>	<i>a</i>	Yes	1 year	Less than 1%
Israel	Yes, upon entering teaching	2-3 years	<i>m</i>	Yes, upon entering teaching	2-3 years	<i>m</i>
Italy	Yes, upon entering teaching	1 year	1%	<i>a</i>	<i>a</i>	<i>a</i>
Japan	Yes, upon entering teaching	Between 6 months and 1 year	0.60%	No	<i>a</i>	<i>a</i>
Korea	No	<i>a</i>	<i>a</i>	<i>a</i>	<i>a</i>	<i>a</i>
Netherlands	<i>a</i>	<i>a</i>	<i>a</i>	No	<i>a</i>	<i>a</i>
Slovak Republic	<i>a</i>	<i>a</i>	<i>a</i>	Yes, but it is not mandatory	3 months	<i>m</i>
Sweden	<i>a</i>	<i>a</i>	<i>a</i>	Yes, upon entering teaching	1 year	<i>m</i>
Switzerland	<i>a</i>	<i>a</i>	<i>a</i>	Yes, upon entering teaching and for each job change	Between 3 and 6 months	<i>m</i>
United Kingdom (Eng.)	<i>a</i>	<i>a</i>	<i>a</i>	Yes	1 academic year	0.15%
United Kingdom (N.Irl.)	<i>a</i>	<i>a</i>	<i>a</i>	No	<i>a</i>	<i>a</i>
United Kingdom (Scot.)	<i>a</i>	<i>a</i>	<i>a</i>	Yes	1 year if within induction scheme context; otherwise, 1 year and one term	Around 2% in context of induction scheme, though some candidates quit before obtaining adverse evaluation
United Kingdom (Wal.)	<i>a</i>	<i>a</i>	<i>a</i>	Yes	one academic year	<i>m</i>
United States ⁵	Yes	1-3 years	<i>m</i> ³	<i>a</i>	<i>a</i>	<i>a</i>

Definition: This table addresses the trial period (*probationary period*) teachers often undergo to assess their aptitude for teaching. Its successful completion leads them to access a permanent (or regular) teaching post or a provisional/temporary position.

Notes: *a* Information not applicable because the category does not apply; *m* Information not available

1. Teachers can only obtain civil servant status after some years of teaching experience. Upon entering the profession, they have a salaried employee status.

2. In addition to the probationary period described, the civil servant status is only granted after at least one 1-year fixed term contract.

3. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the rate is low.

4. Teachers have public service rather than civil servant status.

5. Policies vary by school district (local municipal education agencies) and it is difficult to express the average for the country as there are 15 000 school districts and no uniform policies across the country.

Source: Derived from information supplied by countries participating in the project. The table should be interpreted as providing broad indications only, and not strict comparability across countries.

5.5. Responses to Short-term Staffing Needs

In some countries, schools face difficulties in the temporary replacement of teachers, as no prompt mechanisms for teacher substitution are available. In addition, the extra financial means are often not available to provide schools with extra teacher resources. The lack of a systematic response to replacement needs is potentially disruptive to school programmes, and can make it harder for teachers to participate in professional development activities.

Table 5.4 summarises the ways the countries handle short-term teacher replacements in public schools. In 70% of the countries there is a limit on the period for which a replacement teacher can be hired, most commonly for a maximum of one school year. By contrast, in seven countries a maximum period is not specified (Austria, Chile, Denmark, England and Wales, Finland the Slovak Republic and Switzerland). However, when there is a time limit specified, countries generally provide the possibility of renewing a replacement appointment.

A little over one-half of the countries (13 out of 24) use some form of replacement pool, whereby teachers are recruited on a contract basis by the relevant education authority, to cover for short-term absences. Box 5.5 outlines the replacement pool system used in the Flemish Community of Belgium, which also serves to provide a form of guaranteed employment for beginning teachers as well as route back into teaching for former teachers. Some countries (Denmark, England and Wales, and the Netherlands) also make use of private employment agencies to obtain short-term replacements.⁴

Box 5.5. The Replacement Pool of Teachers in the Flemish Community of Belgium

During the late 1990s it became evident that, in the Flemish Community of Belgium, new teachers faced difficulties in obtaining secure appointments as the number of permanent positions declined. This was discouraging for beginning teachers, and led to many leaving teaching altogether. The Replacement Pool was introduced in the 2000/01 school year as one response to this problem. The Pool is a group of teachers whose salary is paid by the Ministry of Education and who supply short-term teaching for schools. The teachers specify the particular geographic area in which they wish to work, and are available to work in all the schools that register for the pool (*i.e.* they are not restricted to employment in a single network). The Flemish Employment Services and Vocational Training Agency (VDAB) manages the scheme. Successful applicants are assigned to an “anchor school,” and work there when they are not required to replace teachers in other schools. Schools therefore find it easier to locate replacements for absent teachers, and beginning teachers have job security and a salary for at least one year. It also provides an opportunity for schools to assess the suitability of new teachers for longer-term posts. Teachers returning to the profession or other employees who are considering a teaching career can also register for the pool.

Over two-thirds of Flemish schools participate in the pool, and in 2003/04 about 4 100 teachers took part. These are significant numbers relative to the total number of beginning teachers in the system. Despite the widespread support for the scheme, there are concerns that the total number of places paid for by the government is too limited for schools’ replacement needs.

⁴ The role of such agencies in the United Kingdom is explored in Morrison (1999).

Table 5.4. Short-term teacher replacements, public schools, 2004

	For how long can a replacement teacher be hired?	Do replacement pools or intermediary agencies to provide schools with replacement teachers exist?	Can an increase in the hours of teachers be used to respond to the temporary absence of a teacher?	Can an increase in class size be used to respond to the temporary absence of a teacher?
Australia	Varies, depending on circumstances and jurisdictions, typically from 20 days up to one school year	Yes, usually a replacement pool	Sometimes yes, but with conditions, e.g. not exceeding a full-time teacher's hours	It varies, in instances when no suitable replacement teacher is available this may happen
Austria	No limit exists	No	No	No
Belgium (Fl.)	Maximum until the end of the school year	Yes, a replacement pool	Yes, with a maximum fixed extra hours with no extra pay and additional extra hours with extra pay	Yes
Belgium (Fr.)	Maximum of one school year	No	No	No
Canada (Qb.)	Maximum of one school year	Yes, local replacement pools	Yes, extra hours with extra pay	No
Chile	No limit exists	No	Yes, extra hours with extra pay	No
Denmark	No limit exists	Yes, intermediary agencies, municipal and team pools	Yes, extra hours with extra pay	Yes
Finland	No limit exists	No	Yes, extra hours with extra pay	At the discretion of the school principal and local education authority
France	Maximum of one school year but renewable	Yes, replacement pools exist	Yes, extra hours with extra pay	Yes
Germany	Maximum of one school year	Yes, replacement pools exist in some of the Länder	Yes, with a maximum fixed extra hours with no extra pay (on average, 4 hours per week) and additional extra hours with extra pay	Yes
Greece	Maximum until the end of the school year	Yes, replacement pools exist	Yes, with a maximum fixed extra hours with no extra pay	Yes, up to the legislated maximum class size
Hungary	Maximum of 5 school years, with some exceptions	No ¹	Yes, extra hours with extra pay	Yes, as a provisional solution with extra pay for the teacher
Ireland	Maximum until the end of the school year, but might be for 5 to 10 years if led by a career break or a secondment	Typically, no ²	No	Only in primary education in a limited way, for short absences and when no substitute teacher is available
Israel	Maximum until the end of the school year	No	Yes, extra hours with extra pay for 1 year at most	Typically not
Italy	Maximum until the end of the school year	Yes, replacement pools exist	Yes, extra hours with extra pay	No
Japan	Maximum of one school year	No	No	No
Korea	Maximum of three years	No	No	No, with some exceptions (e.g. in small or rural schools)
Netherlands	Maximum of one school year	Yes, both replacement pools and intermediary agencies exist	Yes, extra hours with extra pay	Yes
Slovak Republic	No limit exists	No	Yes	Yes, up to a maximum class size
Sweden	Maximum of one school year	No	Yes, extra hours with extra pay	Yes
Switzerland	No limit exists	Some replacement pools in some cantons	Yes, extra hours with extra pay	Yes
United Kingdom (Eng. and Wal.)	No limit exists	Yes, both replacement pools and intermediary agencies exist	No	Yes
United Kingdom (N.Irl.)	Maximum of one school year	m	At the discretion of the employer and following the agreement of the teacher	At the discretion of the employer
United Kingdom (Scot.)	Maximum of one school year	Yes, replacement pools exist	Yes, with a maximum fixed extra hours with no extra pay	Yes, up to maximum class size authorised
United States ³	Maximum until the end of the school year	Yes, replacement pools exist	Generally yes	Generally yes

Definitions: This table addresses the responses of school systems to the need to temporarily replace teachers. Absences of various lengths – from very short periods (due, for example, to sick leave or a short professional development activity), to periods of a school year or even longer (as in the case of a maternity leave, a sabbatical or another form of extended absence), are considered. *Replacement pools* refer to schemes in which teachers are recruited on a contractual basis by the education authority (at central or local level) to cover for temporary absences of teachers. *Intermediary agencies* are private employment agencies which operate as an intermediary between schools/local education authorities and potential replacement teachers.

Notes: m Information not available.

1. A decree of 1997 makes the establishment of replacement pools at local level possible, but it has not become a general practice so far.

2. For primary education, a Teacher Supply Scheme exists in a limited number of urban locations for defined catchment areas. It is a limited service, not available to all schools.

3. Policies vary by school district (local municipal education agencies) and it is difficult to express the average for the country as there are 15 000 school districts and no uniform policies across the country.

Source: Derived from information supplied by countries participating in the project. The table should be interpreted as providing broad indications only, and not strict comparability across countries.

In most countries (18 out of 24), an increase in the hours of other teachers can be used to respond to the temporary absence of a teacher, and in most cases additional teaching hours above a specified level lead to extra pay. In over one-half of the countries (14 out of 23) the principal has the discretion to increase class size to respond to the temporary absence of a teacher, although this is usually seen as a temporary move.

5.6. Teacher Mobility

Mobility between schools

Another marked feature of the teacher labour market is the relatively low rate of teacher mobility within countries among schools and educational jurisdictions. While this can lead to schools having stable staffing, there are concerns that it can inhibit the introduction of fresh ideas and skills into schools. It can also worsen regional imbalances in teacher supply and demand.

For example, in Germany, statistics point to some mobility within Länder but very limited transfers across them. According to statistics from the KMK (Standing Conference of Ministers of Culture in Germany), which consider flows of full-time teachers for the 2001/02 academic year, about 9% of teachers left their initial teaching position. Of these, about one-third transferred to another school within the same Land while only about 2% of leavers transferred to a school in another Land. The same statistics reveal that, among the teachers staying in the profession, only 3% transferred to another school for the 2001/02 academic year.

Some countries in which education systems are highly decentralised are still affected by barriers to mobility, such as the limited recognition across the country of teaching qualifications from different provinces/states. For instance, in Germany, the limited mobility is not a surprise given that the KMK agreed only in 1999 that “the teaching career examinations carried out in accordance with the recommendations of the Standing Conference” should be reciprocally recognised by the different Länder. Yet the considerable differences across Länder in school system structures and the close linkage between these structures and initial teacher education systems are obstacles to the implementation of the agreement. It is clear that a full integration of the teacher labour market at the country level is far from being achieved.

In Japan, teachers are expected to periodically change schools throughout their career. This is intended to ensure that all schools have access to effective teachers and a balance of experienced and beginning teachers. It is also seen as a way of broadening teachers’ skills by giving them experience in different schools. The allocation of teachers is decided by the prefectural education authority, in consultation with principals and municipal authorities about their staffing needs. The opinion of each teacher is usually reflected during this process. The process varies from prefecture to prefecture, but usually teachers are required to move periodically to different schools within the prefecture, and the typical period of working at one school is five to seven years. For instance, some prefectures classify schools according to population characteristics, geographical situation, and programme type, and teachers are required to gain experience in the different school types throughout their career. Teachers receive allowances to cover their transport and living costs. A similar approach to teacher mobility is followed in Korea.

Mobility between teaching and other occupations

Entering the teaching profession with professional experience outside education is still a fairly limited phenomenon, although as Chapter 4 noted, it is growing in a number of countries. To date, however, the use of people from other backgrounds has tended to focus on meeting skills shortages; while this is clearly important, it can mean that other potentially important sources of new teachers are not being tapped. The major exception to this is in vocational education where experience in another profession is often a prerequisite and there are mechanisms for people to commence teaching without necessarily having first completed teaching qualifications. In most countries, the current incentive structure does not encourage mobility between education and other sectors of activity. In particular, the recognition of the qualifications, seniority and skills acquired in sectors other than education is limited (see Table 3.4), which reduces the extent to which new skills are brought into teaching to help meet the changing demands on schools.

In most countries there also seems to be little scope for movement in the other direction – there are few opportunities for teachers to spend time working outside of education as a structured part of their career development (an exception in Japan is described in Box 5.6). Part of the explanation lies in the benefits provided by career-based public service systems, and regulations which restrict recognition of external job experience for salaries and pension benefits. Greater portability of pension benefits among the public and private sectors would assist considerably in this regard. In addition, teaching qualifications that are structured to signal employability to other employers would give scope for a greater movement from education to other sectors, more easily adapting the system to periods of excess supply of teachers and permitting exchanges with other economic sectors with potential benefits for education.

Box 5.6. The Social Experience Training Programme for Teachers in Japan

In Japan, teachers are provided the opportunity to work outside schools for limited periods of time through the *Social Experience Training Programme* promoted by local education authorities (prefectures) with support from the Ministry of Education. The broad objective is that teachers improve their skills (*e.g.* interpersonal, social, entrepreneurial), broaden their views and understand what society expects from schools. It is expected that the impact of teachers' experiences is reflected in school activities through improvements in their teaching and in the communication with students, parents and the community.

A wide range of possibilities exists. Teachers can work in private companies (*e.g.* hotel, department store), social welfare facilities (*e.g.* nursing home, facility for people with special needs), institutions of public interest (*e.g.* civic centre, museum, library) or in the administration (*e.g.* local government office). The nature and structure of the programmes depends on each local education authority. Typically, two types of programmes exist: (i) short programmes which last less than a month and are generally part of the induction process for beginning teachers; and (ii) longer programmes with a duration ranging from one month to one year, and targeted at more experienced teachers.

The number of participants in the long type of programmes is rapidly increasing and reached 1 353 teachers in 2002 (907 in private companies, 240 in social welfare facilities, 71 in institutions of public interest and 135 in other types of placements). During the training period, participants are paid by the local education authority. Often participants are asked to report on the training in teacher workshops and disseminate their experience at the school. The experience has received positive appraisal by educational authorities and growing interest among teachers.

Mobility between countries

There are indications that the mobility of teachers between countries is growing. Regional organisations such as the European Commission support a variety of teacher exchange schemes and provide other opportunities for teachers from different countries to work together. A number of countries are also involved in bilateral teacher exchange and networking arrangements. There are also indications of countries actively recruiting teachers from abroad to help meet general teacher shortages or to provide language teaching to children from immigrant groups. For example, among the German-speaking countries there is evidence of teachers from Austria and Germany working in Switzerland, where salaries are generally higher and there have been more job vacancies.

At the present time the United Kingdom is perhaps the most active in recruiting teachers from overseas. There are about 100 private agencies involved in supplying teachers to local authorities and schools, and the larger ones tend to have recruitment offices in Australia, New Zealand, South Africa and Canada. It was estimated that about 10 000 overseas teachers were recruited to teach in the United Kingdom in 2000 (Barlin and Hallgarten, 2002); this amounts to a large proportion of new teachers – in the same year around 16 000 graduates of United Kingdom teacher education courses started teaching. The overseas recruits are generally located in the areas with the most severe staffing shortages, especially in London. While generally seen as a useful short-term measure, there have also been concerns about how well prepared the often inexperienced overseas teachers are for teaching in the United Kingdom, especially in disadvantaged areas, and the limited support that many receive.

New Zealand is another country that is active in overseas teacher recruitment. The incentives offered include relocation grants, waivers of immigration requirements, recognition of overseas teaching experience for salary purposes (correspondingly, New Zealand teachers who have taught overseas are entitled to full service credit when appointed to any New Zealand school), and reductions in the regular teaching load for their first year.

Concerns are being raised about the impact of recruiting teachers from developing countries that have a shortage of educated workers (Barlin and Hallgarten, 2002). In response to concerns that such recruitment can impose large costs on low-income countries and make it more difficult to achieve the objectives of *Education for All*, Commonwealth Ministers of Education have agreed on a set of protocols designed to mitigate any harmful impact of teacher recruitment between countries (Commonwealth Secretariat, 2004).

5.7. Priorities for Future Policy Development

Most teachers are employed in the public sector, but there are some significant differences in the models of public employment that structure their work, as well as the pressures for change. The predominant model in teaching has probably been the “career-based” public service in which entry is highly competitive, career development is extensively regulated, and lifetime employment is largely guaranteed. In such systems, career advancement is heavily dependent on adhering to organisational norms, which helps to ensure uniformity and predictability of service provision and a strong group ethos. On the other hand, such systems often lack flexibility and the capacity or even incentives to tailor services to meet diverse needs in different settings. New opportunities in the wider job market have made steady progression in a relatively regulated working environment less attractive to young people. “Position-based” public service systems offer more

flexibility and responsiveness, but also have risks: potentially high staff turnover and a staff focus on positions rather than careers can increase recruitment and management costs, and make it harder to develop shared values and provide consistent service. Both models are also under pressure from the general push to decrease public-sector spending, which has meant that employment reforms have often coincided with budget cuts.

In response to the pressures for change, career-based systems with centralised staff recruitment and career development are introducing more contract or temporary employment positions, opening up possibilities for external recruitment, providing local managers with more scope for personnel decisions and instituting management by objectives. Position-based systems with more decentralised approaches to staff appointment and training are placing greater emphasis on system-wide criteria for staff selection, performance evaluation, and building career pathways.

The general experience of public sector reform is that it is not easy to graft features from a markedly different system onto a well-established employment model. Those in career-based systems who have met demanding entrance criteria and accepted relatively low starting salaries can feel threatened by a less predictable future in which more positions are opened up to internal and external competition. In position-based systems people often have a professional status and autonomy derived from their specialist skills, and may feel threatened by moves to institute system-wide standards. There can also be resistance to attempts to introduce more career-like structures if they are perceived to weaken the integrity of the competitive principle. Such tensions and uncertainties are clearly evident in regard to teachers' employment, and underscore the need for consultation and careful trial testing before major changes are implemented.

The policy suggestions in this section are drawn from the Country Background Reports, the country review visits, and other research. They do not necessarily apply to all of the participating countries because of their different circumstances and traditions of public service employment. However, some common themes are evident in the country reforms now underway, namely that students will be best served by the principles of open competition for teaching posts, and selection and career advancement based on demonstrated merit.

Using more flexible terms of employment

Teachers are generally employed as public servants, and in a number of countries this is associated with tenured employment once permanency is obtained. Under these circumstances there may not be sufficient incentives for all teachers to continuously review their skills and improve their practice, especially where there are only limited mechanisms for teacher evaluation and accountability. Tenured employment can also make it difficult to adjust teacher numbers when enrolments decline or curricula change, and may mean that the burden of adjustment falls on those who lack tenure, commonly teachers early in their career.

It may be worth considering a requirement that teachers renew their teacher certificates after a period of time, such as every five to seven years. The basis for renewal could be as simple as an attestation that the teacher is continuing to meet standards of performance that are agreed throughout the teaching profession. Such a change would require careful attention to ensuring an open, fair and transparent system of teacher evaluation involving teaching peers, school leaders and external experts who are properly trained and resourced for these tasks – and who are themselves evaluated on a regular basis. Underpinning this proposal is the view that the interests of students will be better served where teachers

achieve employment security by continuing to do a good job, rather than by regulation that effectively guarantees their employment. Periodic review also provides the opportunity to recognise and acknowledge quality teaching.

The introduction of more flexible forms of teacher employment would be a major change in many countries, and would require extensive consultation with teachers and teacher unions to ensure that the benefits are clearly understood and to avoid introducing approaches that may otherwise be unworkable. It also obliges employers to ensure that teachers have opportunities to improve their practice, thereby improving their capacity to secure the positions they want while responding to the changing needs of schools. Another important component is fair but speedy mechanisms to address ineffective teaching. Teachers in this situation should have the opportunity and support to improve but, if this does not eventuate, it should be possible to move these teachers either into other roles or out of the school system.

Providing schools with more responsibility for teacher personnel management

Successful enterprises often say that personnel selection is the most important set of decisions that they make. In the case of teaching, the evidence suggests that all too often the selection process follows rules about qualifications and seniority that bear little relationship to the qualities needed to be an effective teacher. The sheer size of school systems in many countries means that the process of teacher selection is often highly impersonal, and it is hard for teachers to build a sense of commitment to the schools where they are appointed – or for the schools to build a sense of commitment to them.

The school is emerging as the key agency within the education system for improving student learning, which implies that schools need to have more responsibility – and accountability – for teacher selection, working conditions, and development. School leaders will actively seek out and develop the best possible teachers where schools are judged on the quality of their learning outcomes. A more direct interaction through personal interviews and visits to schools by candidates is likely to improve the match between applicants and school needs. However, having schools play a greater role in teacher selection involves some complexity; there is the potential of an inequitable distribution of teachers, and the possibility of favouritism in teacher selection by schools. Such approaches seem to work best where parallel steps are taken to ensure that efficiency and equity are not jeopardised, for example by developing school leaders' skills in personnel management, providing disadvantaged schools with greater resources with which to recruit effective teachers, improving information availability in the teacher labour market, and monitoring the outcomes of a more decentralised approach and adjusting accordingly. Successful decentralisation of personnel management, and school decision-making more generally, requires that central and regional authorities play a strong role in ensuring an adequate and equitable distribution of teacher resources throughout the country. It is also important to have independent appeals procedures to ensure fairness and protect teachers' rights.

Broadening the criteria for teacher selection

The selection criteria for new teachers need to be broadened to ensure that the applicants with the greatest potential are identified. Broader selection processes typically include interviews, preparation of lesson plans, and demonstration of teaching skills. In order to address the concern that a seniority-based system results in beginning teachers being assigned to the more difficult and unpopular schools, with potentially adverse consequences for student learning and their own career development, the weight accorded

to seniority in determining which candidates are appointed to teaching vacancies has been reduced by some systems. Greater weight is given to characteristics which are harder to measure – enthusiasm, commitment and sensitivity to student needs – but which may be more directly related to the quality of teaching and learning than the traditional emphases on qualifications and years of experience.

For countries that rely on competitive examinations to select among large numbers of applicants for a teaching career, it is important that the selection process is based on clear, transparent and widely accepted standards of what beginning teachers need to know and be able to do to be effective practitioners. Such systems also need to provide appropriate avenues into teaching for mid-career entrants.

Making a probationary period mandatory

There is considerable evidence that some beginning teachers, no matter how well prepared and supported, struggle to perform well on the job or find that it does not meet their expectations. A formal probationary process can provide an opportunity for both new teachers and their employers to assess whether teaching is the right career for them. The satisfactory completion of a probationary period of one to two years teaching should be mandatory before full certification or a permanent teaching post is awarded. As was noted in Chapter 4, beginning teachers should be given every opportunity to work in a stable and well-supported school environment, and the decision about certification should be taken by a panel which is well trained and resourced for assessing new teachers. The successful completion of probation should be acknowledged as a major step in the teaching career.

Meeting short-term staffing needs

Schools often require teachers on a short-term basis to cover teachers who are absent due to illness or professional development, or who are working on special projects to assist the school. Without readily available replacement teachers and the budget flexibility to employ them, the workloads of other teachers increase and schools are often limited in the initiatives they can implement. Some countries are reporting success with the establishment of local/regional replacement pools, which can promptly respond to schools' short-term teacher needs. Such pools offer the potential to provide quick responses to imbalances between demand and supply, and relieve teachers of extra work to cover for absent colleagues. They also offer an opportunity for ongoing employment by beginning teachers who may be facing difficulties in obtaining regular teaching positions. A replacement pool of teachers is also potentially a good means to monitor local and regional labour markets and a way for municipalities/regions to co-operate in regard to teacher recruitment.

Encouraging greater teacher mobility

The limited mobility of teachers between schools, and between teaching and other occupations, restricts the spread of new ideas and approaches, and results in teachers having few opportunities for diverse career experiences. It can also mean an inequitable distribution of teachers where teachers do not move from the most favoured schools. In some cases the lack of mobility means that teacher shortages in some regions of the country are paralleled by oversupply in others. Providing incentives for greater mobility and removing barriers are important policy responses. In countries with different educational jurisdictions (such as federal systems) the mutual recognition of teaching qualifications is a fundamental step in that direction, as is ensuring the portability of entitlements to leave and retirement benefits. The recognition of skills and experience gained outside education is

also an important means of encouraging greater career mobility among teachers, as is the provision of flexible re-entry pathways to the profession.

It is likely that the teacher labour market will become increasingly internationalised in future years. Teachers, like other well-educated workers, are becoming more internationally mobile as transportation costs fall, national qualifications have greater international recognition, and there are country imbalances in teacher supply and demand. This has the potential to provide many benefits for the individual teachers concerned, as well as for the school systems in the receiving and sending countries. However, the growing internationalisation of the teacher labour market implies that countries will face a more complex policy environment with a wider range of potential sources of teacher supply, the need to address concerns about possible adverse effects on domestic as well as other countries' teacher workforces and possible pressures for greater coherence in teacher qualification and quality assurance systems.

Improving information flows and the monitoring of the teacher labour market

The efficiency of the teacher labour market is affected by information gaps. Given the large number of teachers and applicants involved in most school systems, it is often difficult and costly for employers to use extensive information in making selection decisions. Correspondingly, it can be difficult for candidates for teaching positions to have precise information on the schools to which they apply, or even about broad trends in the labour market and the available vacancies. Such information gaps and limitations imply that many application and selection decisions are sub-optimal.

The development of transparent and prompt systems to close the information gaps between teachers and schools is essential for an effective functioning of the teacher labour market, especially where schools are more directly involved in teacher recruitment and selection. Possible strategies are requiring all teaching vacancies to be posted, creating websites where the information is centralised or establishing a network of agencies to co-ordinate and foster recruitment activities. Since imbalances in the teacher labour market can take a long time to be rectified, tools for monitoring and projecting teacher demand and supply under different scenarios should be a particular priority.

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
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