Chapter 6

RETAINING EFFECTIVE TEACHERS IN SCHOOLS

Summary

Teacher policy needs to ensure that teachers work in an environment which facilitates success and that effective teachers wish to continue in teaching. This chapter reviews the trends that are raising concerns about retaining effective teachers in schools. It examines the policy tools that are potentially available to maintain effective teachers in schools, reviews the evidence on the main causal factors involved and develops policy options for countries to consider.

There is concern in a number of countries that the rates at which teachers are leaving their positions are compounding school staffing problems and leading to a loss of teaching expertise. However, countries also observe that a certain level of teacher attrition is inevitable and that a low rate of attrition does not necessarily indicate that all is well with teaching and the schools. Whether a given level of teacher attrition is a positive or a negative indicator will be influenced by which teachers are leaving and which ones are staying, and the factors that lie behind their decisions.

Although attractive salaries are clearly important in improving teaching's appeal, the analysis suggests that policy needs to address more than pay. Teachers place a lot of emphasis on the quality of their relations with students and colleagues, on feeling supported by school leaders, on good working conditions, and on opportunities to develop their skills.

There needs to be a stronger emphasis on teacher evaluation for improvement purposes which, while designed mainly to enhance classroom practice, would provide opportunities for teachers' work to be recognised and celebrated and help both teachers and schools to identify professional development priorities. It can also provide a basis for rewarding teachers for exemplary performance.

The analysis also reveals that the teaching career can benefit from greater diversification, which would help meet school needs and also provide more opportunities and recognition for teachers. Greater emphasis on school leadership would help address the need for teachers to feel valued and supported in their work. In addition, well-trained professional and administrative staff can help reduce the burden on teachers, better facilities for staff preparation and planning would help build collegiality, and more flexible working conditions, especially for more experienced teachers, would prevent career-burnout and retain important skills in schools.

Policies to attract, develop and recruit teachers need to be complemented by strategies ensuring that teachers work in an environment which facilitates success, and that effective teachers wish to continue in teaching. If school systems are to ensure a quality teaching workforce, not only will they need to attract able people to the teaching profession they will also need to retain and further develop the teachers currently employed in schools.

There is a close connection between the issues of retaining existing teachers in the profession and attracting new teachers. Because the teaching workforce is so large, even quite small changes in the attrition rate can have major consequences for the demand for new teachers. The issues of teacher retention and teacher recruitment are also linked in that the factors which make a profession attractive to new entrants are also likely to encourage people to stay. Competitive salaries, good working conditions, job satisfaction and opportunities for development will increase the appeal of teaching for new entrants and existing staff alike.

This chapter reviews the trends and developments that are raising concerns about retaining effective teachers in schools. It then examines the policy tools that are potentially available to maintain effective teachers in schools, reviews the evidence on the main causal factors involved, and discusses those that are most open to policy influence. The chapter includes descriptions of policy initiatives in participating countries, and develops policy options for countries to consider. In terms of the teacher labour market model outlined in Section 2.5, the chapter focuses on those who are currently in the teaching profession.

6.1. Concerns about Retaining Effective Teachers in Schools

There is concern in a number of countries that rising teacher attrition and turnover rates[1] are compounding school staffing problems and leading to a loss of teaching expertise.[2] However, countries also observe that a certain level of teacher attrition is inevitable. As the background report prepared for Australia notes: “in an increasingly global employment market and where career mobility becomes part of the normal discourse of the labour market, should, or can, teaching be regarded as typically a lifetime career?”

Correspondingly, a low rate of teacher attrition does not necessarily indicate that all is well with teaching and the schools. If few people are leaving teaching it may indicate that new ideas and energy are not coming into the profession. Whether a given level of teacher attrition is a positive or a negative indicator will be influenced by which teachers are leaving and which ones are staying, and the factors that lie behind their decisions.

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[1] As used in this report, “turnover” refers to those teachers who leave their current teaching position, including those who transfer to different teaching jobs in other schools, while “attrition” refers to those teachers who leave the teaching profession altogether. Attrition is a subset of turnover.

[2] Unless otherwise indicated, references to country data and developments are taken from the background reports prepared by countries participating in the OECD teacher policy project. To save space, the background reports are not individually cited. Appendix 1 provides information on the background reports, their authors, and availability.

Table 6.1A. **Teacher attrition rate**

Percentage of teachers who left the teaching profession, primary and secondary public schools, 2001

Below 3%	Between 3% and 6%		Above 6%	
Italy Japan Korea	Australia Canada (Qb.) France, Germany	Ireland Netherlands Scotland	Belgium (Fl.) Israel Sweden	England and Wales United States

General note: This table was derived from data supplied by countries participating in the project. Data were requested in areas that are not already available through the OECD's Indicators of Education Systems (INES) project. Countries drew on existing data sets to meet the request, and did not engage in any new data collections. Not all countries were able to supply data in the form requested. The table should be interpreted as providing broad indications only, and not strict comparability across countries.

Definition: (for the purpose of supplying data in this area, countries were requested to follow this definition): The attrition rate is defined as the annual rate at which public school teachers leave the teaching profession altogether. It includes: teachers who retire; teachers who leave the teaching profession for employment in other occupations; teachers who leave the teaching profession for family or personal reasons; teachers who are dismissed; and teachers who leave to teach overseas. It excludes those public school teachers who obtain a position in another public school, or in a private school, or who go on leave from their position.

Specific notes: The reference year is 1998 for Israel, 1999 for Canada (Qb.) and 2000 for Scotland. Data for Belgium (Fl.), Germany and Sweden include both public and private institutions.

Table 6.1B. **Teacher attrition rate, by school sector**

Differences between primary and secondary public school teachers, 2001

Attrition greater in primary schools	Similar rates of attrition	Attrition greater in secondary schools	
France Scotland	Belgium (Fl.) England and Wales United States, Israel	Australia Canada (Qb.) Ireland, Italy	Japan Korea Netherlands

General note: See Table 6.1A.

Definition: See Table 6.1A for definition of attrition rate. Attrition rates are considered similar if the difference between them is less than one fifth of the value of the lowest of the two.

Specific notes: See Table 6.1A.

Table 6.1C. **Teacher attrition rate, by gender**

Differences between male and female public school teachers, 2001

Attrition greater for males		Similar rates of attrition	Attrition greater for females
Germany Japan	Korea Israel	Netherlands Sweden United States	Belgium (Fl.) England and Wales Scotland

General note: See Table 6.1A.

Definition: See Table 6.1A for definition of attrition rate.

Specific note: See Table 6.1A.

Table 6.1D. **Teacher attrition rates, changes from 1995 to 2001**

	Decreased	Little change	Increased	
Countries with 1995 attrition rates below 5%	Italy	Canada (Qb.) Japan	France Germany Ireland	Korea Netherlands
Countries with 1995 attrition rates above 5%	Scotland	Sweden England and Wales United States	Israel	

General note: See Table 6.1A.

Definition: See Table 6.1A for definition of attrition rate. Little change occurs in attrition rates between 1995 and 2001 if the change is less than one fifth of the 1995 value.

Specific notes: See Table 6.1A. The 1995 reference year is 1996 for Ireland and Scotland, 1997 for Italy and 1998 for Korea.

Figure 6.1A. **Proportion of public school teacher *leavers* and *movers*, by selected school and teacher characteristics, United States, for various school years**



Definitions: Movers are teachers who were still teaching in the current school year but had moved to a different school after the previous school year. *Leavers* are teachers who left the teaching profession after the previous school year.

Source: Luekens *et al.* (2004).

Figure 6.1B. **Proportion of public school teacher *leavers* and *movers*, by selected school and teacher characteristics, United States, 1999/2000 to 2000/01**



Definitions: Movers are teachers who were still teaching in the current school year but had moved to a different school after the previous school year. *Leavers* are teachers who left the teaching profession after the previous school year.

Source: Luekens *et al.* (2004).

Attrition and turnover rates are rising in some countries

There are wide variations among participating countries in the proportion of teachers in public schools who leave the teaching profession each year. As Table 6.1A shows, there is a small group of countries (Italy, Japan and Korea) in which the 2001 attrition rate was less than 3%. In five of the countries with broadly comparable data, however, the 2001 attrition rate was at least 6% (Flemish Community in Belgium, England and Wales, Israel, Sweden and the United States). Between 1995 and 2001, though, the attrition rate declined in only two countries (Italy and Scotland) from the group of 13 countries with broadly comparable data (Table 6.1D). In five of the countries there had been little change between 1995 and 2001, but in three (England and Wales, Sweden and the United States) attrition rates were already relatively high (above 5%). In six of the countries the attrition rates for public school teachers increased between 1995 and 2001, and in one of these countries (Israel) the 1995 rates were already relatively high.

National survey data provide more detailed information on rising teacher attrition and turnover rates in England and the United States. Figure 6.1A indicates that teacher attrition ("leavers") in the United States increased from 5.1% in the early 1990s to 7.4% in the late 1990s. Similarly, Figure 6.2 shows that between 1999/2000 and 2001/02 teacher attrition rates in England rose from about 8% to 10%, and that turnover (which includes attrition) increased from about 15% to 19%.

Figure 6.2. **Teacher turnover and attrition rates, England, all schools for full-time service in the maintained school sector, 2000/01**



Definitions: Attrition is defined as all teachers in full-time service in the English maintained schools sector on March 31, 2000 who were not in full-time service anywhere in the English maintained schools sector on March 31, 2001. This includes teachers leaving to part-time service. *Turnover* is defined as all teachers in full-time service in the English maintained schools sector on March 31, 2000 who were not in full-time service in the same establishment on March 31, 2001. Turnover therefore includes attrition, transfers to other establishments within the maintained schools sector and teachers leaving to part-time service. Not all employers record all movements between schools so rates are underestimated.

Source: Department for Education and Skills (2004).

Since age-related retirements are included in the definition of teacher attrition, it could reasonably be expected that attrition would be rising as teacher workforces are generally ageing and more teachers are reaching retirement age. However, as Table 6.2B shows, the proportion of all public school teachers who leave the teaching profession for retirement reasons actually fell between 1995 and 2001 in two-thirds of the countries with broadly comparable data. This suggests that reasons other than retirement are becoming more significant in accounting for the broad overall trend towards higher attrition among public school teachers. Table 6.2A indicates that relatively high proportions of teachers leave teaching for reasons other than retirement in countries such as Australia, England and Scotland, Sweden and the United States. By contrast, retirement accounts for the majority of those leaving the profession in Canada (Quebec), France, Italy and Japan. As was noted in Chapter 5, in the latter group of countries teaching is generally part of a "career-based" public service in which long tenure is the norm.

It is also important to assess whether a significant number of teachers retire before the regular retirement age. Table 6.3 indicates that this is the case in some countries. In Australia, Germany and the Netherlands, where 65 is the retirement age to obtain full benefits, the average age of teacher retirement is 58, 59 and 61 years, respectively. Other countries in similar circumstances are Canada (Quebec), Israel, and Korea.

Table 6.2A. **Proportion of teachers retiring among those leaving the profession**

Primary public schools, 2001

Below 30%	Between 30% and 60%	Above 60%
Australia England Scotland Sweden United States	Ireland	Canada (Qb.) France Italy Japan

General note: This table was derived from data supplied by countries participating in the project. Data were requested in areas that are not already available through the OECD's Indicators of Education Systems (INES) project. Countries drew on existing data sets to meet the request, and did not engage in any new data collections. Not all countries were able to supply data in the form requested. The table should be interpreted as providing broad indications only, and not strict comparability across countries.

Definition: Leaving the teaching profession is defined as covering the same categories as the attrition rate in Table 6.1A.

Specific notes: The reference year is 1999 for Canada (Qb.) and 2000 for Scotland. Data for Sweden include both public and private institutions. Data for England include both primary and secondary education and data for Sweden include both primary and lower secondary education.

Table 6.2B. **Proportion of teachers retiring among those leaving the profession**

Changes from 1995 to 2001

	Decreased	Little change	Increased
Countries with a 1995 proportion below 50%	England Sweden (primary and lower secondary ed.) United States (primary ed.)	Sweden (upper sec. ed.)	United States (secondary ed.)
Countries with a 1995 proportion above 50%	Canada (Qb.) Ireland Italy Scotland	France Japan	

General note: See Table 6.2A.

Definition: See Table 6.2A. Little change occurs in proportion of teachers retiring among those leaving the profession between 1995 and 2001 if the change is less than one tenth of the 1995 value.

Specific notes: See Table 6.2A. The 1995 reference year is 1996 for Ireland, 1997 for Italy, and 1996 for Scotland.

Table 6.3. **Retirement age of teachers, public schools, 2002**

	Retirement age to obtain full benefits	Early retirement: minimum age at which teachers can retire and obtain some benefits	Actual average age of retirement	Can teachers work in public schools beyond the retirement age?
Australia	65	55	58	yes
Belgium (Fl.)	60	58	m	yes
Belgium (Fr.)	60	55	m	m
Canada (Quebec)	60	55	56	yes
Chile	M: 65; F: 60	a	m	yes
Denmark	65	60	m	yes, until 70
Finland	60 - 65	58	m	yes
France	60 (with a minimum of 40 years of contributions)	Minimum of 15 years of service	P: 56; S: 61	yes, until 65
Germany	65	a	59	m
Greece[1]	65 (with 35 years of experience) or 37 years of experience	60 (with 30 years of experience)	60	no
Hungary	M: 62; F: 58	M: 50; F: 45	(M: 59; F: 56)[2]	yes
Israel	M: 65; F: 60 (with 35 years of experience)	40 with at least 10 years of service working at least 1/3 of workload	54	yes, up to 30% of workload
Italy	60 (with 40 years of contributions)	60 (with a minimum of 20 years of contributions)	61	yes
Korea	62	minimum of 20 years of service	(P: 47; S: 53)[3]	no
Netherlands	65	61	61	yes
Norway	67	62	m	yes, until 70
Slovak Republic	M: 60; F: 53-57 (with a minimum of 25 years of experience)	m	m	yes
Spain	65	60	m	no
Sweden	65	61	64	yes, until 67
United Kingdom	60	55	m	yes

Notes:
1. Primary education only.
2. Secondary education only.
3. The low figures are due to recent early retirement policies which boosted retirements during the period covered by the data.

Symbols:
M: Males; F: Females.
P: Primary education; S: Secondary education.
m: Information not available.
a: Not applicable.

Source : Data supplied by countries participating in the project.

Teacher attrition rates are highest early in the career

Teacher attrition rates tend to be higher in the first few years of teaching, and to decline the longer that teachers are in the profession, before they increase approaching the retirement age. For example, as Figure 6.1B shows for the United States, about 9% of teachers with one to three years experience left the profession in the transition between the 1999/2000 and 2000/01 school years, compared to 6% of teachers with 10-19 years experience. The cumulative effect can be substantial. For example, a survey of temporary teachers (most of whom are beginning teachers) undertaken in the Flemish Community of Belgium revealed that 24% left teaching between 1995 and 1999. In the United States, 18% of those who started teaching in 1994 had left by 1997 (U.S. Department of Education, 2001).

Some of those who leave teaching will eventually return to the job, but high attrition rates suggest that large private and social costs have been incurred in preparing people for a profession which they found did not meet their expectations, or was insufficiently rewarding, or which they found difficult, or some combination of all three factors. Since beginning teachers tend to leave the profession at a higher rate, this can mean that the schools lose many teachers before they gain the experience necessary to become effective. The schools and systems concerned have to incur the costs of training, recruiting and inducting large numbers of new teachers. The students in the schools are faced with a high turnover of teachers and possibly some loss of programme continuity. To the extent that teacher attrition rates are higher in disadvantaged locations, this suggests that educational problems become compounded and inequalities between schools increase.

Although attrition rates are generally highest early in the career, in some countries reasonably large numbers of more experienced teachers leave before retirement. For example, in a sample of Australian teachers across all age ranges, 33% intended to leave teaching within the next three years, of whom only 7% were intending to retire (Dempster *et al*., 2000). The other 26% (a quarter of the workforce) intended either to seek employment outside teaching or to leave employment altogether (*e.g.* for family reasons or travel). There were large numbers of teachers in the 30-50 age range who indicated such intentions, which suggests a potentially large loss of experienced teachers from the profession.

Attrition rates are higher for some types of teachers than others

Research indicates that leaving the profession for reasons other than retirement is more common for some types of teachers than others. The higher attrition rates among beginning teachers have already been noted. There is also some evidence that attrition rates are higher for secondary teachers than for primary teachers. The data collected as part of this study supports this broad conclusion. As Table 6.1B shows, secondary teacher attrition rates were higher in 7 of the 13 countries with broadly comparable data, primary teacher attrition rates were higher in 2 of the countries, while in 4 others the rates were similar between the two sectors. The general reason advanced for higher attrition rates among secondary teachers is that their skills and qualifications tend to provide more opportunities in other occupations relative to primary teachers.

The research also suggests that attrition rates tend to be higher among male than female teachers. For example, Dolton *et al.* (2003) showed that in the United Kingdom at least, male teachers were much more likely to leave in response to improved employment conditions and salaries outside teaching than were female teachers. However, the data collected for this activity shows a much more mixed picture in terms of the relationship between gender and attrition (see Table 6.1C), and no clear pattern is evident. Interpretation of the gender patterns needs to pay attention to differences in the distribution of males and females between primary and secondary schools, and among different age groups.

A disturbing aspect of differential attrition rates among teachers is the research which indicates higher attrition rates among teachers with relatively strong academic backgrounds and higher qualifications. In the United States, Murnane and Olsen (1990) have demonstrated that teachers who are paid more stay longer in teaching, and that teachers with higher "opportunity costs", as measured by their academic record, test scores, or subject specialisation, are more likely to leave teaching than other teachers. More recently in the USA, Stinebrickner (2001) showed that teachers with higher academic ability spend less time working as teachers. Dolton and van der Klaauw (1999) reached similar conclusions in the United Kingdom. Murnane *et al.* (1988), studying a sample of North Carolina teachers, showed that chemistry and physics teachers tended to leave teaching sooner than did secondary school teachers with other subject specialities. In addition, they were less likely to return to teaching once they had left the system. Figure 6.1B further indicates that, for the United States, attrition rates in the late 1990s were highest for teachers whose main field was mathematics. Such findings raise concerns about the capacity of schools to retain teachers whose skills are in demand elsewhere.

It is important to note, however, that not all of those who resign from teaching do so to obtain paid employment. In the Australian sample cited earlier, about half of those who intended to leave for reasons other than retirement planned to be at home with children or to travel. In the United States, Stinebrickner (1999a) found that about 60% of all exiting

teachers leave the workforce altogether, mostly for family reasons. This finding is significant because a large proportion of starting teachers are both young and female, and it suggests that a comprehensive teacher policy framework will include means to assist teachers with families by providing opportunities to continue teaching (*e.g.* through child-care support and part-time work) and to return to teaching later on. As was noted in Chapter 3, the Equal Opportunities Commission in the United Kingdom has expressed concern that many women who leave teaching for family reasons do not return because of the lack of suitable part-time positions, job-sharing, or other "family-friendly" employment policies.

Teacher attrition is higher in disadvantaged areas

The evidence suggests that attrition and turnover rates are not uniform across schools, but tend to be higher in schools located in areas that are disadvantaged to some extent. For example, Figure 6.2 shows that in England teacher turnover rates are substantially higher in inner London (21% in 2000/01) than in the north of the country (14%). Inner London has high living costs and a highly diverse student population. Similar geographic variations in teacher turnover have been reported in the Netherlands, with vacancies harder to fill in the large cities. Figure 6.1B provides an indication that, in the United States, attrition and turnover rates are higher in schools where the enrolment of minorities is greater. As noted earlier, the differential patterns of teacher turnover and attrition are likely to exacerbate inequalities among schools.

6.2. Factors in Retaining Effective Teachers in Schools

6.2.1. Sources of job satisfaction and dissatisfaction

Studies of the features that bring job satisfaction to teachers confirm the importance of the intrinsic benefits of the job. However, compared to those starting in teaching as a career (see Chapter 3), experienced teachers put greater weight on their personal circumstances, and identify factors that hinder job satisfaction such as a lack of recognition, inadequate working conditions, and few career prospects.

For example, Figure 6.3A uses a survey of secondary teachers in the French Community of Belgium to contrast their views on the "main reason for becoming a teacher" with the "most important factor while on the job" for current job satisfaction. Intrinsic aspects, namely "working with children" and "interest in subject matter", are dominant factors at both stages of the career, but considerably less so once the teacher is working (*e.g.* about 22% of teachers cite "interest in pedagogy" as the main reason for becoming a teacher while only 7% of the same group cite it as the most important factor while on the job). Those factors more closely related to teachers' personal circumstances become more important once the teacher is on the job. This is the case for "compatibility with private life" (13% of teachers cite it as the most important factor while on the job, while 11% do so as the main reason for becoming a teacher), "vacation time" (9% against 3%), "job stability" (4% against 3%), and "schedule flexibility" (4% against 1%). Notably, Figure 6.3A shows that the factors cited least as the "most important factor while on the job" are related to recognition and career opportunities. They include "social recognition" (about 3%), "remuneration" (3%), "pension benefits" (1%) and "career possibilities" (1%).

The reasons that teachers give for leaving the profession (other than retirement) confirm the pivotal role of working conditions. Figure 6.3B shows that, in England, strenuous working conditions head the list of reasons surveyed teachers give for leaving: "workload too heavy" (among the reasons to leave for 52% of primary teachers and 39% of secondary

teachers), "government initiatives" (39% and 35%), "stress" (37% and 34%), and "poor pupil behaviour" (34% in secondary schools). The survey also reveals that career-related factors such as "attracted by another job", "better career prospects", "school salary too low", and "offered higher salary" are of lesser importance. A substantial number of teachers indicate that feeling "undervalued" (22% in primary schools and 32% in secondary schools) has contributed to the decision to leave teaching. Personal circumstances were cited as important by around one-third of the teachers. An interesting pattern which emerges is that secondary teachers give greater weight to career-related factors (*e.g.* "attracted by another job", "better career prospects", "salary too low", "offered higher salary") than do primary teachers, while the latter tend to give greater emphasis to working conditions (*e.g.* "workload too heavy", "government initiatives", "stress").

Similar results are reported in the Background Report from Switzerland. A survey conducted by the Swiss teachers' nationwide union organisation (ECH/LCH) indicates that the major factors causing dissatisfaction are the erosion of teachers' public image; the frequent educational reforms; the excessive administrative burden on the teachers; salary levels; class sizes; unsatisfactory support from the supervisory bodies; and the limited involvement of teachers in school decision-making.

The Background Report from the Flemish Community of Belgium also notes teachers' concerns about the effects of consecutive educational reforms: "According to a number of respondents, some teachers are leaving teaching because they are tired of changes. There have been enormous changes in the last ten years, but according to the respondents, these were on such a large scale that the schools and teachers did not have the opportunity to implement the innovations. This means that many teachers lack job satisfaction because they can no longer prepare for changes. They constantly have to switch from one change to the next."

Figure 6.3A. **Main reason for becoming a teacher and main source of current job satisfaction, secondary teachers in the private Catholic grant-aided sector, French Community of Belgium, 1999**



Note: Figures are based on a survey of 3 600 secondary teachers from the private Catholic grant-aided sector in the French Community of Belgium.

Source: Maroy (2002).

Figure 6.3B. **Reasons given by teachers for leaving the profession, England, Summer 2002**



Note: Based on a survey of teachers leaving schools in England during the calendar year 2002 (sample size of 480 teachers for primary education and 530 teachers for secondary education). Retirement or maternity are not considered. Respondents could indicate more than one reason and so figures add up to more than 100%.

Source: Smithers and Robinson (2003).

Figure 6.3C distinguishes among the reasons given by new teachers (one to three years experience) and other teachers for leaving the profession in the United States. Career-related factors such as "to pursue another career", "better salary or benefits" and further study are rated as the top reasons for leaving (excluding retirement) for both groups of teachers, and generally have a greater weight than in the Belgian and English surveys. Personal circumstances (such as "pregnancy or child rearing") emerge as the second most important group, while reasons related to working conditions (such as "dissatisfied with job responsibilities" and "did not agree with new reform measures") are of lesser importance for the United States survey group, although still significant, especially for beginning teachers.

Figure 6.3C. **Percentage of public school teacher *leavers* who rated various reasons as very important or extremely important in their decision to leave the teaching profession, United States, 2000/01**



Source: Luekens *et al.* (2004).

6.2.2. Salaries and job prospects

There is substantial evidence that teachers' relative earnings are an important influence on career decisions – whether to join the profession and whether to stay. In general, the stronger are employment prospects outside teaching, the fewer qualified people who will stay long-term in teaching. In particular, those people with skills that are likely to command the best job prospects elsewhere are less likely to remain in teaching for very long. As was documented in Section 3.3.2, in 14 of the 19 countries with relevant data, the salary of a teacher with 15 years experience grew more slowly than GDP *per capita* between 1994 and 2002. Although this is a limited indicator, it does suggest that in many countries teachers' relative earning position has declined in recent years.

Research commissioned for this project indicated that teacher resignation rates are likely to rise when teachers' relative earnings fall – especially for male teachers and those with higher levels of qualifications (Dolton *et al.*, 2003). Dolton and van der Klaauw (1999) provide evidence on the importance of teacher salaries and relative forgone earnings in decisions about leaving teaching. Higher salaries elsewhere increase the tendency among teachers to switch careers. However, the likelihood of leaving teaching for family reasons or to leave work altogether tended to be more affected by teacher salary levels themselves, rather than teachers' salaries relative to other salaries. In the case of the United States, Stinebrickner (1999b) concludes that relative salaries are a more important influence on whether to leave teaching than working conditions as indicated by the student-teacher ratio.

The typical structure of teachers' salary scales suggests that it is unlikely that individual teachers are able to rapidly improve their earnings position. As Figure 6.4 shows, in 70% of the countries it takes at least 20 years for lower secondary teachers to move from the bottom to the top of the statutory salary scale (the country average is 24 years). On average, the top salary point is about 70% greater than the starting salary (although, as Figure 6.5 shows, this ratio varies widely from 13% in Denmark to 178% in Korea). This implies that each additional year of teaching leads to a pay rise of about 3%, on average. It is worth noting that while generally longer salary scales result in teachers earning proportionately more when they eventually reach the top, this is not always the case. For example, while in Hungary and Spain the salary scales are very long (almost 40 years) the teachers who reach that point do not earn substantially more than those at the bottom of the scale (Figure 6.5). On the other hand, teachers in New Zealand and Scotland have the shortest salary scales (7 years), but the ratio of the top to the bottom salary is relatively high.

The distinction drawn in Chapter 5 between "career-based" and "position-based" models of public sector employment is reflected in the structure of teacher salary scales. As Figure 6.6 shows, there is a group of countries where salaries start relatively low, but climb steadily over a long scale, with the earnings peak occurring when people reach their fifties. The other broad model is where starting salaries are relatively high, and climb rapidly, but the salary scale is short and most classroom teachers find that their salaries plateau in their 30s. These two models are likely to be associated with different patterns of career entry and attrition. The former may lack appeal to those who are unsure about whether they wish to be a lifetime teacher. The latter may make it harder to retain a core of experienced teachers.

In recognition of the relationship between salary structure and attracting and retaining teachers, there is evidence that some countries are moving away from uniform salary rises for all teachers towards more targeted increases. For example, as described in Chapter 3, between 1996 and 2001 salaries for beginning teachers rose much more rapidly than for other teachers in countries such as Australia, Denmark, England and Norway. Correspondingly, in some countries whose main concern has been retaining experienced

teachers in schools, faster rises have been allocated to more experienced teachers (*e.g.* Hungary).

As Table 6.4 shows, all countries use allowances of various sorts to increase the base salary of at least some teachers. Three-quarters of the countries provide allowances for management responsibilities in addition to teaching duties, a similar number provide extra pay for teaching more classes or hours than required by a full-time contract, and about half provide allowances for teaching students with special educational needs. In total, such allowances can be substantial. For example, it has been estimated that for experienced teachers in Hungary bonuses and allowances above base salary amount to 20–25% of total compensation (Galasi and Varga, 2003). In Korea, the various sorts of allowances constitute about 60% of total remuneration for most teachers. Only about one-third of the countries, though, provide salary adjustments for teaching courses in a particular field or, as described below, for outstanding teaching performance.

Figure 6.4. **Years from starting to top salary, lower secondary education, 2002**



Note: Data refer to annual statutory salaries in public institutions. Year of reference for Chile is 2001.

Source: OECD (2004a).

Figure 6.5. **Ratio of salary of teachers at the top of the scale and after 15 years of experience to starting salary, lower secondary education, public institutions, 2002**



Note: Data refer to annual statutory salaries in public institutions.

Source: OECD (2004a).

Figure 6.6. **Structure of the statutory salary scale of teachers, selected countries, lower secondary education, public institutions, 2002**



Note: The construction of this figure uses the values for the starting salary, salary after 15 years of experience, salary at the top of the scale, and years from starting to top salary. Salary progression over time within each phase was assumed to be linear.

Source: Derived from OECD (2004a).

6.2.3. Recognition and reward

Teachers' rewards generally comprise salaries, allowances, leave benefits and future pension benefits. Few countries have introduced instruments such as signing bonuses, provision of child care, time allowances, sabbatical periods, fee support for post-graduate courses, or opportunities for ongoing professional development activities as ways of recognising the work of teachers. In addition, the level of teachers' compensation is typically associated with qualifications, school sector and years of experience. Incentive structures are often not closely related to the wide variety of tasks that schools are now required to perform and are limited in the way they reward the accomplishment of teachers. A survey in Finland revealed that 91% of teachers felt that the outcomes of their work did not influence their salary levels. Three out of four teachers perceived that the amount of work not recognised in the pay system has increased in recent years (Korhonen, 2000).

Table 6.4 **Adjustments to base salary for teachers in public institutions, 2002**

Types of criteria to adjust base salary awarded to teachers in public institutions

	Criteria based on teaching conditions/responsibilities							Criteria related to teachers' qualifications, training and performance			Criteria based on demography	
	Management responsibilities in addition to teaching duties	Teaching more classes or hours than required by full-time contract	Special tasks (career guidance or counselling)	Teaching in a disadvantaged, remote or high-cost area (location allowance)	Special activities (sports and drama clubs, homework clubs, summer school)	Teaching students with special educational needs (in regular schools)	Teaching courses in a particular field	Holding an initial educational qualification higher than the minimum qualification required to enter the teaching profession	Outstanding performance in teaching	Successful completion of professional development activities	Family status (married, number of children)	Age (independent of years of teaching experience)
Australia	●		●	●		●		●				
Austria	●	●	●		●						●	●
Belgium (Fl.)		●										
Belgium (Fr.)												
Czech Republic	●	●	●			●			●			●
Denmark	●	●	●		●		●	●	●	●		
England	●	●		●	●	●	●	●	●			
Finland	●	●	●	●	●			●				
France	●		●	●	●	●					●	
Germany	●	●									●	●
Greece		●	●	●				●			●	
Hungary	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●		●
Iceland	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●		●		●
Ireland	●			●				●				
Italy		●	●	●	●						●	●
Japan	●	●		●	●	●					●	
Korea	●	●		●		●					●	
Mexico	●	●	●	●			●	●	●	●		
Netherlands						●						
New Zealand	●		●	●	●	●	●		●			
Norway	●	●	●	●			●	●	●			
Portugal	●	●	●		●	●		●	●	●	●	
Scotland	●			●				●			●	
Slovak Republic		●		●					●			
Spain	●			●						●	●	
Sweden	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●		
Switzerland	●	●	●		●	●					●	
Turkey		●	●		●				●	●	●	
United States	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●		●		

Source: Derived from Table D3.2.a of OECD (2004a). See Annex 3 of OECD (2004a) for notes.

There are few countries in which teachers' rewards are related to reviewed performance and evidence of ongoing professional development. As shown in Table 6.4, only 11 out of 29 countries provided an adjustment to the base salary for outstanding teaching performance. The lack of financial recognition of teaching performance is likely to contribute to teachers leaving the profession, especially for those with attractive job prospects elsewhere. Nonetheless, in recent years countries have enlarged the criteria for adjusting the base salary to account for special tasks such as career guidance or counselling (two-thirds of countries offer related salary supplements); teaching in a disadvantaged, remote or high-cost area (two-thirds of countries); or special activities such as summer school or school clubs (half of the countries).

The issues surrounding developing a closer relationship between teacher performance and reward are controversial in all countries.[3] There are three main models of performance-based reward systems: "merit pay", which generally involves providing individual teachers with higher pay based on student performance on standardised tests, and classroom observation; "knowledge- and skill-based" compensation, which generally involves higher pay for extra qualifications or professional development, and demonstrated knowledge and skills, which are believed to increase student performance; and "school-based compensation", which generally involves group-based financial rewards, typically based on student performance for a grade level or whole school. Many of the earlier programmes tended to focus on individual performance, in particular merit pay (Richardson, 1999), with recent debates more likely to consider group-based reward programmes, or knowledge- and skill-based rewards (Odden, 2000; Odden and Kelley, 2002).

Arguments in support of performance-based rewards typically include: it is fairer to reward teachers who perform well rather than paying all equally; performance-based pay motivates teachers and improves student performance; and a clearer connection between spending on schools and student performance builds public support. The arguments typically used to oppose performance-based pay include: fair and accurate evaluation is difficult because performance cannot be determined objectively; co-operation among teachers is reduced; teachers are not motivated by financial rewards; teaching becomes narrowly focused on the criteria being used; and the costs of implementation are too high.

Research in this field is difficult and there are few reliable studies. The limited evidence suggests that there are some benefits from group-based performance pay programmes, but less so from individual performance pay programmes.

There is a wide consensus that previous attempts at introducing performance-based reward programmes have been poorly designed and implemented (Mohrman *et al.* 1996; Ramirez, 2001). Problems in developing fair and reliable indicators, and the training of evaluators to fairly apply these indicators have undermined attempts to implement programmes (Storey, 2000). One problem identified is poor goal clarity because of a large number of criteria, which restricts teachers' understanding of the programme and makes implementation difficult (Richardson, 1999). Explanations of how, and on what criteria, teachers are assessed may be difficult to articulate. When this occurs, it is almost impossible to give constructive feedback and maintain teacher support for the programme (Chamberlin *et al.*, 2002).

[3] This section is based on a review prepared for the OECD project by Harvey-Beavis (2003).

It has also been argued that previous financial bonuses have been comparatively small, which undermines the motivational value of the programmes (Malen, 1999). When funding is limited, quotas are established, only a few teachers benefit and administrators find it difficult to explain why others missed out (Chamberlin *et al.,* 2002). Other explanations for difficulties in implementing performance-based reward programmes include: opposition from teacher unions, particularly in relation to merit pay; opposition from teachers, particularly related to concerns about unfair evaluation; and opposition from public school management systems to what are perceived as market-based models. In the United States, most attempts to implement merit pay for public school teachers have failed over the past 75 years, and most such schemes have either been dropped or heavily modified within five years of introduction (Murnane, 1996).

The results from group and school-based performance incentive schemes have been more promising. For example, Lavy (2002) studied the impact of a rewards programme implemented in 1995 in 62 Israeli secondary schools. The programme offered a substantial grant to the one-third of schools which achieved the highest value-added gains over time on a range of performance measures (student graduation rates, drop-out rates, and scholastic achievement). The measures were structured to encourage schools to direct more efforts towards low-performing students. Three-quarters of the grant for each school was allocated among teachers and all other school staff in proportion to their salaries; the other one-quarter was used to improve general facilities, such as the teachers' common rooms. The schools' performance incentives led to significant gains on all five student outcome measures. The study also contrasted the effects of this programme with a programme that provided another group of secondary schools with more resources in the form of extra teachers and support for potential drop-outs and low-performing students. This programme also led to improved student outcomes, although to a lesser extent than the schools' incentive approach. Under both programmes schools were given complete control over the additional resources and the freedom to develop effective interventions. However, the schools' performance-based incentives programme proved to be more cost-effective.

The debate on the link between reward and performance is also evident in the health sector. Countries are showing increasing interest in paying physicians in the public health sector by results (Simoens and Hurst, 2004). For instance, in the United Kingdom about 20% of general practitioner's income is now based on a wide range of performance quality indicators. However, there is not much evidence, so far, that merit pay improves quality in public health delivery, and there remain many difficulties in designing objective performance appraisal systems (Simoens and Hurst, 2004). The concerns about performance-based pay in health include: whether it will distort practice between areas where quality can be measured and areas where it cannot; whether it will encourage the selection of less risky patients; and whether it could lead to distorted record keeping. Similar concerns are evident in the debate on performance-based pay in teaching.

Ballou (2001), among others, has reopened the issue by comparing teachers' pay in public and private schools in the United States, and using this to test the notion that merit pay is inherently ill-suited to teaching. He concludes that because, compared to public schools, private schools generally differentiate teachers' salaries more on the basis of teacher performance and are more likely to dismiss ineffective teachers, the concept of linking teacher pay to performance is not inherently flawed, and indeed is beneficial, but rather that its implementation has been hampered in most public school systems.

Certainly within the countries taking part in this project there is extensive discussion about introducing greater teacher salary differentiation, including moving towards a stronger link with performance. In general, though, the schemes underway or proposed are

not based on a single measure, such as student performance on tests. Rather, they involve assessments of teachers' performance and contributions inside and outside classrooms using a variety of measures. The column on "pay rise" in Table 6.5 provides, for participating countries, examples of programmes which link pay to teacher performance. The individual teacher pay system that Sweden introduced in the mid-1990s, and which includes elements of performance-based pay, was detailed in Box 5.3. As another example, in Finland the collective bargaining agreement for 2003/04 includes elements for assessing the standards of teachers' work, and provides scope for municipalities to pay bonuses on the basis of individual professional proficiency and performance. In the cantons of St. Gallen and Zürich in Switzerland teachers can move up to the next grade on the pay scale only if they are given a positive assessment, based on a process of self-evaluation and external assessment (see Box 6.1).

Box 6.1. **Links between teaching performance and salaries in Switzerland**

Two Swiss cantons, Zürich and St. Gallen, have introduced links between teaching performance and pay, as components of quality monitoring and improvement initiatives. In both schemes, salary increments are provided over a period of years, rather than applied on the basis of the assessment of a year's work.

In 2000 St. Gallen introduced a link between teachers' performance assessment and their pay scale through the "Systematic salary-effective qualification" (SLQ: *Systematische Lohnwirksame Qualifikation*). The St. Gallen scheme links performance to promotion (with influence on pay levels) but not directly to pay. The pay scale is made up of four grades, and moving up to the next grade is only possible if the teacher is given a positive assessment. Movement from increment to increment within a grade occurs largely automatically. Teachers are assessed every time they reach the top of a grade, and are not able to receive a salary increase unless their performance appraisal is positive. The assessment criteria are jointly agreed by the teacher and the evaluator. The assessment focuses on three skill areas: organisation and delivery of lessons; interactions with students, teachers and parents; and participation in in-service training. The assessment is based on self-assessment and external assessment. The external assessment is the responsibility of one of the members of the school committee/commission.

In 1999 Zürich introduced a similar link through the "Salary-effective qualification system" (LQS: *Lohnwirksames Qualifikationssystem*). Teacher assessments affect salaries only for teachers in the "principal phase" of their careers (beyond the initial years, and short of the late career years when only truly exceptional appraisals will lead to salary increments). Salary increments, on the basis of favourable assessments, are provided on the order of 1-3% for the four years following the assessment. If an assessment is unsatisfactory, promotion is delayed for a year and measures are agreed upon to overcome deficiencies. The assessment is undertaken by a team formed of representatives of the school committee, all of whom receive special training. The assessment includes class observation, an interview with the teacher, and the preparation by the teacher of a report describing his or her pedagogical approach.

Chile has introduced a "Pedagogical Excellence Reward" that recognises and rewards teachers with outstanding skills (see Box 6.2), among other initiatives. In Mexico, on the basis of voluntary applications, teachers can request a salary increment to reflect their teaching performance through the *Carrera Magisterial* and *Escalafón Vertical* programmes. Similarly, in England and Wales special evaluation procedures undertaken on a voluntary basis (*Threshold Assessment* and *Advanced Skills Teacher*) provide teachers with the possibility of linking their performance to salary levels. Other countries that have introduced similar programmes include Australia, Hungary and the Slovak Republic.

Box 6.2. **Rewarding teaching excellence in Chilean schools**

The *Pedagogical Excellence Reward* (AEP, *Asignación de Excelencia Pedagógica*), introduced in 2002 following an agreement between the Ministry of Education and the Teachers Association of Chile, aims to recognise and reward teachers with outstanding knowledge and skills. Teachers voluntarily apply for an assessment, and those who are certified as excellent classroom teachers receive extra pay. Teachers are classified according to their years of teaching experience into four groups, and are able to apply for the Excellence Reward twice within each group. Applicants are assessed against the performance standards defined by the Ministry of Education. Two instruments are used in the procedure: (i) a written test that measures pedagogical and subject knowledge; and (ii) a portfolio of classroom teaching which includes a video of their teaching practices. Every year, the Ministry establishes the quota of teachers for each region of the country who are awarded the Excellence Reward. Quotas fluctuate as a result of budget constraints. In 2002, about 6 000 teachers applied for the Excellence Reward out of a total teaching workforce of about 125 000 teachers. Successful applicants are paid an extra allowance twice a year, which continues while the teacher remains in the original teaching experience group and performance remains at satisfactory levels (to a maximum of 10 years).

Teachers are also rewarded collectively when they work in schools which are identified as performing at high levels by the National Performance Evaluation System of Subsidised Schools (SNED). This programme, which was established in 1995, is based on the amount of improvement in school performance on a variety of indicators, including student achievement on standardised tests; it assesses schools against other schools within a socio-economic cluster. Every two years, the SNED awards a monetary bonus to all teachers who work in the top-performing schools within each group. This reward was awarded to about 1 900 schools in 2002/03 to the benefit of 34 000 teachers (about one-third of the workforce), who received an average annual bonus of US$ 430 (about 4% of the average annual teacher salary).

Another initiative consists of the *National Teaching Excellence Awards*. The objective is to grant wide public recognition to the most outstanding teachers in the country. Every year 50 teachers representing all regions of the country are the recipients of this prize. Teachers are recommended on the basis of their merit through a pyramidal process that involves the schools, the communes and the different regions of the country.

The United States offers another model of teacher recognition and reward through the non-governmental National Board for Professional Teaching Standards (NBPTS). This is a voluntary scheme in which experienced teachers apply for an extensive evaluation process based on criteria developed from research and consultation with teachers' professional associations (see Box 6.3).

Box 6.3. **Certifying teaching excellence in the United States**

In the United States, experienced teachers may voluntarily seek national certification through the privately run, but largely government-funded, National Board for Professional Teaching Standards (NBPTS). This credential, known as *National Board Certification*, is designed to provide recognition to teachers who demonstrate superior knowledge and teaching skills. Teachers enter an extensive application process which consists of two major parts: the portfolio of their work including a videotape of a lesson they have taught; and the assessment centre exercises where teachers address a set of questions that relate to the specific content of their field.

The assessment is undertaken against detailed teaching standards established by NBPTS.

These are based on NBPTS' five core propositions: (i) teachers are committed to students and their learning; (ii) teachers know the subjects they teach and how to teach those subjects to students; (iii) teachers are responsible for managing and monitoring student learning; (iv) teachers think systematically about their practice and learn from experience; and (v) teachers are members of learning communities. The standards are developed and reviewed by teachers and other experts. National Board Certification is issued for a period of 10 years but can be renewed on the basis of the preparation of a *Profile of Professional Growth*.

Over 30 states now offer financial incentives to teachers who earn National Board Certification, including subsidisation of teachers' application fees, and financial bonuses and higher pay. As of November 2002, the National Board had certified 24 000 teachers nationwide, and more than 15 000 applicants were seeking certification in 2002/03. Between 1999 and 2002, about 50% of first-time applicants were certified.

Some criticise the National Board approach on the basis of the absence of a link with student achievement gains and a lack of external validity of teaching practices (*e.g.* Podgursky, 2001). There is some recent evidence, based on data from North Carolina primary schools, that teachers certified by the Board were more effective than their non-certified colleagues at increasing student achievement and that NBPTS is successfully identifying the more effective teachers among applicants (Goldhaber and Anthony, 2004). The authors note, however, that since the process is relatively costly in terms of both evaluation process and the higher salaries that certified teachers generally earn, its effectiveness should be judged against other means of identifying and rewarding quality teaching.

6.2.4. Teacher evaluation

Table 6.5 summarises the main features of teacher evaluation schemes in the countries participating in the study. When teachers apply for a higher position, or if they are the subject of a complaint, there is generally a process of formal evaluation, either by the principal, external staff or some combination of the two. However, in half of the countries (13 out of 26) all public school teachers have some form of periodic evaluation as part of their regular work. In nine countries – Austria, Canada (Quebec), Denmark, Finland, Germany, Greece, Israel, Italy and Spain – teachers are normally not regularly evaluated once tenure is granted. In Ireland, Norway and Sweden, the emphasis is on school evaluation rather than individual teacher evaluation; in Hungary evaluation of teachers is mostly at the discretion of the school principal; in Japan some prefectural boards of education are now introducing teacher evaluation; and in Mexico evaluation occurs when teachers voluntarily apply.

In most cases, regular teacher evaluations involve the school principal and other senior school staff. In three of the countries (the French Community of Belgium, France, Switzerland), the evaluation is conducted by a panel involving both the principal and external members. Criteria typically include the subject and pedagogical knowledge of the teacher, some assessment of teaching performance, levels of in-service training and, in some cases, measures of student performance. Classroom observation, interviews, and documentation prepared by the teacher are the typical methods used in the evaluation. In Mexico, the Slovak Republic and Spain (for teachers applying for promotion) student surveys also sometimes form part of the evaluation.

Table 6.5. **Teacher evaluation in public cchools, 2002**

	Are all teachers evaluated periodically?	Scope of evaluation procedures described	Recipients and frequency	Evaluator	Criteria	Tools	Pay rise: Base salary or allowance	Pay rise: Quota	Pay rise: Duration	Linkage to professional development	Response to ineffective teachers
Australia	Generally, yes	State of Victoria Performance and development plan	All teachers, annually	Internal (principals) and senior teachers	State-wide performance standards appropriate to the teachers' career stage	Demonstrated performance (e.g. student learning, data, documentation agreed with principal	Annual salary increment	No	Permanent	Helps set priorities	Salary increment withheld; Improvement plan; Further evaluation
Austria[1]	No, only for changes in employment status, for promotion, or as a result of a complaint	Summative performance evaluations	Teachers for promotion, or conversion to permanent contract	Internal; External (Inspection)	Student performance; Subject and pedagogical knowledge of teacher; Teaching performance; In-service training; Other skills	Classroom observation	Base salary	No	Permanent	No	Permanent contract not granted; Improvement plan; Further evaluation
Belgium (Flemish)[2]	Yes	Public-authority schools provided by the Flemish government	All teachers, periodically	Internal (principals)	m	m	No Pay Rise			No	Dismissal
Belgium (French)	Yes	Whole country	All teachers, with no fixed periodicity	Internal (principals); External	m	m	No Pay Rise			No	m
Canada (Quebec)[3]	No, only when teachers are the subject of a complaint or for changes in employment status	Complaint procedure	Teachers who are the subject of a complaint	Internal (school administration)	m	m	a			Advice	Improvement plan
Chile	Yes, both individually and as part of school evaluation; Monetary rewards possible as a result of special evaluation procedures undertaken either on a voluntary or mandatory basis	National Teaching Excellence Award	50 teachers, national annual competition	Peer assessment, school community, external	Community acknowledgment of performance throughout career	Teacher test; Documentation on performance throughout career	Fixed allowance	Yes	Once	Yes	*a*
		National Performance Evaluation System	All teachers in a given school based on school performance, every 2 years	External	Mostly student performance but taking account of school's socioeconomic cluster	Set of indicators agreed upon by Ministry	Allowance	Yes	2 years	No	*a*
		Teaching Performance Evaluation System	All teachers, every 4 years	Self assessment, peer assessment, principal and external	Subject and pedagogical knowledge, teaching performance and other skills (Good teaching framework)	Portfolio, interviews, classroom videos	Allowance	Yes	4 years, paid every 3 months	Yes	Improvement plan Further evaluation Dismissal
		Pedagogical excellence reward	Teachers on a voluntary basis, annually if teachers wish	External	Subject and pedagogical knowledge, teaching performance and other skills	Written test, portfolio, video	Allowance	Yes	From 2 to 10 years	Yes	*a*
Denmark[4]	No, only when teachers are the subject of a complaint	Complaint procedure	Teachers who are the subject of a complaint	Internal (principals)	Teaching performance; Other skills	Classroom observation; Interview	a			Compulsory training	Improvement plan; Compulsory training; Further evaluation; Suspension; Dismissal
Finland	No, only when teachers are the subject of a complaint	No regulation exists at national level. Evaluation is at school, regional or national levels and individual teachers are generally not evaluated. The local education provider has the responsibility for evaluation. Based on an official complaint, individual techers may be assessed by the provincial government.									
France[5]	Yes	Administrative grade in secondary schools	All teachers, annually	Internal (principals)	Authority, punctuality, among others	m	m			m	Deferral of promotion
		Pedagogical grade in secondary schools	All teachers, with no fixed periodicity	External	Subject and pedagogic knowledge; teaching performance	Classroom observation; Interview	m			m	Deferral of promotion
Germany[6]	Generally not, only for promotion or as a result of a complaint	Land of Baden-Württemberg	All teachers	Internal (principals)	m	m	Base salary	Yes	Permanent	m	m
Greece	No	Under a Law enacted in 2002, all individual teachers should be periodically evaluated by external evaluators and principals. However, this scheme has not yet been implemented. Currently no systematic teacher evaluation exists.									
Hungary[7]	At the discretion of the school	School evaluation	Teachers as part of school evaluation, periodically	External	m	m	m			m	m
		Individual teacher evaluation	m	Internal (principals)	m	m	Allowance	No	m	m	m
Ireland	All teachers are evaluated periodically but in the context of a whole school approach	School evaluation	Teachers as part of whole school evaluation	External	Student performance; Subject and pedagogical knowledge of teacher; Teaching performance	Classroom observation	No Pay Rise			Advice	In primary and vocational education sectors: Improvement plan Further evaluation Dismissal

Table 6.5 **Teacher evaluation in public schools, 2002** (continued)

	Are all teachers evaluated periodically?	Scope of evaluation procedures described	Recipients and frequency	Evaluator	Criteria	Tools	Pay rise			Linkage to professional development	Response to ineffective teachers
							Base salary or allowance	Quota	Duration		
Israel	No, unless teacher is the subject of complaint	No regulation exists at national level. Once teachers obtain tenure, they are no longer evaluated. Inspectors make an individual assessment of a teacher at the request of the principal in case performance problems are identified.									
Italy	No, unless teacher is the subject of complaint	Complaint procedure	Teachers who are the subject of a complaint	External	m	Classroom observation		a		m	m
Japan	Generally not. Since 2000 some prefectural boards of education (such as Tokyo) introduced teacher evaluation	City of Tokyo	All teachers, periodically	Internal (principals); Self-evaluation	m	Documentation on teacher; Interview; Classroom observation	m	m	m	Advice	Deferral of promotion
Korea	Yes	Whole country	All teachers, periodically	Internal (principals); Self-evaluation	m	Classroom observation; Documentation on teacher		No Pay Rise		No	Deferral of promotion
Mexico	No, only through a voluntary application to *Carrera Magisterial* (CM) or *Escalafón Vertical* (EV), or as a result of a complaint. In practice, all the teachers are enrolled in EV and around 70% of them in CM	*Carrera Magisterial*	Teachers on a voluntary basis, periodically	Internal; External	Student performance; Subject and pedagogical knowledge of teacher; Teaching performance; In-service training; Other skills	Documentation on teacher; Student survey; Teacher test	Base salary	Yes	Permanent	No	Deferral of promotion
		Escalafón Vertical	Teachers on a voluntary basis, periodically	External	In-service training; Other skills	Documentation on teacher	Base salary	Yes	Permanent	No	Deferral of promotion
Netherlands	Generally, yes. No regulations exist at national level and school boards have responsibility for evaluation	Whole country	All teachers, periodically	Internal (principals)	Subject and pedagogical knowledge of teacher; Teaching performance; Other skills	Classroom observation; Interview	m	m	m	Advice	m
Norway	No, only when teachers request it, for promotion or as a result of a complaint - either rarely occurs. The emphasis is on school evaluation	Whole country	Teachers for promotion; Teachers who are the subject of a complaint	Internal (principals)	m	m	m	m	m	m	m
Slovak Republic	Yes, teachers are evaluated by school inspection, if they are the subject of a complaint, and for defining the level of allowances received	School inspection	Teachers as part of school evaluation	External	Subject and pedagogical knowledge of teacher; Teaching performance	m		No Pay Rise		m	m
		Allowance	m	m	m	m	Allowance	m	m	m	m
		Complaint procedure	Teachers who are the subject of a complaint	Internal (principals)	m	Classroom observation; Interview; Documentation on teacher; Student survey		a		m	Transfer; Salary reduction; Dismissal
Spain	No, evaluation occurs only when teachers want to become principals, apply for a study leave, and when they are the subject of a complaint	Application for study leave or complaint procedure	Teachers on a voluntary basis; Teachers who are the subject of a complaint	External	Student performance; Subject and pedagogical knowledge of teacher; Teaching performance	Classroom observation; Interview; Documentation on teacher; Student survey		a		No	m
Sweden	Yes, teachers are evaluated by principals and the discussion of performance includes decisions on rewards. This is in a context where the emphasis is on school evaluation	Whole country	Teachers as part of school evaluation	Internal (principals, peer review); External; Self-evaluation	Student performance; Subject and pedagogical knowledge of teacher; Teaching performance; In-service training; Other skills	Classroom observation; Interview; Documentation on teacher; Student survey	Base salary	No	Permanent	Advice	Improvement plan; Further evaluation; Deferral of promotion; Transfer

Table 6.5. **Teacher evaluation in public schools, 2002** (continued)

	Are all teachers evaluated periodically?	Scope of evaluation procedures described	Recipients and frequency	Evaluator	Criteria	Tools	Pay rise: Base salary or allowance	Pay rise: Quota	Pay rise: Duration	Linkage to professional development	Response to ineffective teachers
Switzerland	Generally, yes. The majority of cantons focuses on school evaluation. A few cantons link teachers' assessment with salaries	Canton of St. Gallen	Teachers for promotion	External; Self-evaluation	Subject and pedagogical knowledge of teacher; In-service training; Other skills	Classroom observation; Documentation on teacher	Base salary	No	Permanent	Advice	Deferral of promotion
		Canton of Zürich	Teachers for promotion	External; Self-evaluation	m	Classroom observation; Interview; Documentation on teacher	Base salary	No	Permanent	Advice	Improvement plan; Deferral of promotion
United Kingdom[8]	Yes. Links to salaries possible as a result of special evaluation procedures undertaken on a voluntary basis	England (Performance management)	All teachers, periodically	Internal (principals)	Subject and pedagogical knowledge of teacher; Student performance; Other skills	Classroom observation	No Pay Rise			Advice; Compulsory training	m
		England, Wales (Threshold assessment)	Teachers on a voluntary basis for promotion	External; Internal (principals)	Subject and pedagogical knowledge of teacher; Student performance; In-service training; Other skills;	Documentation on teacher	Base salary	No	Permanent	Advice	m
		England, Wales (Advanced Skills Teacher)	Teachers on a voluntary basis for promotion	External	Subject and pedagogical knowledge of teacher; Student performance; Other skills	Documentation on teacher; Interview; Classroom observation	Base salary	No	Permanent	m	m
United States[9]	Generally, yes. Several school districts have introduced schemes which link teachers' assessments to salaries	Whole country	All teachers	Internal (principals)	m	Classroom observation	No Pay Rise			Compulsory training	Compulsory training; Further evaluation
		Cincinnati	All teachers	m	Subject and pedagogical knowledge of teacher; Other skills	m	Base salary	No	Until next evaluation	m	Further evaluation; Salary loss
			All teachers as part of school evaluation	m	Student performance	m	Allowance	No	m	m	m
		Douglas County	All teachers	m	m	m	Base salary	No	Permanent	Compulsory training	Improvement plan
			Teachers on a voluntary basis	m	Subject and pedagogical knowledge of teacher; In-service training; Student performance; Other skills	m	Allowance	No	m	m	m
			Teachers on a voluntary basis as part of school evaluation	m	Student performance	m	Allowance	No	m	m	m
		Kentucky	All teachers periodically, as part of school evaluation	m	Student performance; Other skills	m	Allowance	No	m	m	m
		Charlotte-Mecklenburg	All teachers periodically, as part of school evaluation	m	Student performance	m	Allowance	No	m	m	m

Definitions: Regarding the *Evaluator*, *Internal* or *External* is relative to the school. The column on *Pay Rise* assesses the link between the results of the evaluation and pay levels. Where a link exists, it can be through the *base salary* or an *allowance*, a maximum number of teachers might benefit from pay rises (*Quota*), and *duration* of pay adjustments might differ (*e.g.* permanent, fixed term, until next evaluation, once).

***Notes*:** This table excludes evaluations of school principals and teachers in their probationary period.

a Information not applicable because the category does not apply; *m* Information not available.

1. There are two evaluation schemes: summative evaluation and formative evaluation. More emphasis is given to summative performance evaluation.
2. Job description describes the roles and tasks of teaching staff (currently for secondary teachers only). Teachers are evaluated against the job description.
3. The complaint procedure is not regulated at Province level. Apart from this procedure, teachers are evaluated only when they go through the probationary period or apply for tenure.
4. Evaluation of the individual performance of teachers rarely takes place, and it is mainly based on a complaint.
5. Promotion is based on a ranking of teachers for which the evaluation of performance is not the major factor. More dominant factors are years of experience and the ranking achieved at the entrance examination.
6. Teachers are rarely evaluated after they obtain tenure except for promotion decisions and when serious performance problems arise. Moving up to the next salary step depends essentially on years of experience.
7. There is no national scheme for the regular evaluation of individual teachers. Some forms of school-level evaluation in which teachers' performance is evaluated have been introduced. Teachers may be provided with allowances for outstanding performance, although this procedure is not regulated at national level.
8. An annual teacher evaluation has been introduced in England, Wales and Northern Ireland. In Scotland, annual appraisal is offered on a voluntary basis. Some evaluation schemes linked with promotion or monetary rewards have been introduced.
9. Practices in each state differ. The table indicates general trends and some innovative practices.

Source: Derived from the Background Reports prepared by countries participating in the project and other country-specific documents.

In most countries the regular teacher evaluations are used to identify priorities for professional development. Several countries use the evaluation to develop improvement plans, including professional development (*e.g.* some states in Australia, Sweden, and Switzerland) for teachers identified as performing ineffectively. It is also common for teachers assessed as ineffective to have salary increments deferred until performance improves.

Despite the fact that teacher evaluation takes place on a regular basis in half the countries, and generally appears to be becoming more common, the country review visits indicated that principals and other senior staff often lack the time, tools or training to perform teacher evaluations satisfactorily. Particularly in secondary schools, there appears to be little observation of classroom teaching by principals, and teachers often express concerns about whether principals and other senior staff are adequately equipped for evaluation tasks; teachers also question the criteria which are used. However, because a coherent and well-resourced system of teacher performance appraisal is lacking in a number of countries, including in some cases where regular evaluation is compulsory for all teachers, teachers do not receive appropriate recognition for their work, and there is little systematic information to guide professional development priorities. Apart from anything else, the lack of regular feedback to teachers about their work is likely to increase their sense of professional isolation and build the perception that their efforts are not appreciated.

Chile has recently introduced a broad teacher performance evaluation system following an extended period of consultation with teachers, and with clear links to rewards and improvement plans for teachers' practice (see Box 6.4). Surveys conducted in 1999 and 2000 by the Centre for Educational Research and Development (CIDE) revealed that over 70% of Chilean teachers strongly agreed with an individual evaluation of teaching performance. Another survey conducted in 2003 by CIDE further indicated that 64% of the teachers agreed with implementing a teaching performance evaluation system that includes both incentives and sanctions.

Box 6.4. **The Teaching Performance Evaluation System in Chile**

In Chile, since August 2003, all teachers in schools belonging to the municipal system are evaluated every four years via the Teaching Performance Evaluation System (*Evaluación del Desempeño Profesional Docente*) agreed upon by the Ministry of Education, the Teachers' Association, and the Chilean Association of Municipalities. The agreement followed two rounds of country-wide consultations, which resulted in over 10 000 written contributions by teachers.

The municipalities administer the evaluation process and take responsibility for teacher improvement plans. The Ministry of Education, through the Centre for Training, Experimentation and Research in Pedagogy (CPEIP) provides the legal framework, reviews and updates the teachers' performance standards, designs and validates the evaluation instruments, selects and trains the evaluators, and monitors the operation of the evaluation system. University experts assist the CPEIP in the production of evaluation tools and the training of evaluators.

Evaluation is based on criteria defined by the "Good Teaching Framework" (*Marco para la Buena Enseñanza*). The framework covers four domains: preparation of teaching; creation of a setting which promotes learning; teaching for the learning of all students; and professional responsibilities. Each domain takes into account between four and six criteria.

The evaluators must: (i) be teachers selected, accredited and trained by the CPEIP; (ii) belong to the same level and type of school as the teacher being evaluated; (iii) not work in the same school as the teacher concerned, although preferably work in the same community. The

evaluation uses four instruments: a portfolio of the teacher's work including a video with a sample of the teacher's classroom teaching; a written self-evaluation by the teacher; a peer interview structured according to the "Good Teaching Framework"; and a report on the teacher's performance by the principal or other senior staff member. The appraisal informs teachers about the strengths and weaknesses of their practice and the priorities for professional development actions they can take, and is also used to inform municipalities and teacher education institutions about overall training needs.

Teachers are ranked in four categories: *excellent, competent, basic* or *unsatisfactory.* Teachers evaluated as *excellent* or *competent* have preferential access to professional development opportunities, internships abroad, mentorship positions, and participation in conferences and seminars, among other things. Teachers rated with a *basic* or *unsatisfactory* performance follow a tailored professional development programme, and receive another evaluation a year later. If the second evaluation is still not satisfactory the teacher is removed from his or her teaching post and follows a second improvement plan, after which a third evaluation is organised one year later. A third unsatisfactory evaluation results in removal from the education system. In 2003, about 4 000 primary school teachers were evaluated with the following distribution of results: 9% were assessed as excellent, 57% competent, 30% basic and 4% unsatisfactory.

6.2.5. Recertification of teachers

Teacher recertification describes a process by which teachers who are already working in the school system renew their teaching licence at regular intervals. This renewal is typically based on proving that a teacher has obtained positive assessments in performance evaluation and/or has taken part in a required number of professional development courses based on core standards of teaching. Recertification of teachers is a comparatively rare practice across countries taking part in the project. Where it happens it tends to be based on the latter approach – teachers successfully completing designated professional development activities – rather than more direct assessments of their performance in the classroom.

Several states in the United States have passed laws that make renewing teaching licences at regular intervals mandatory. In February 2000, for example, the Illinois State Board of Education's new teacher recertification legislation became effective. The law now requires all teachers to renew their licences every five or ten years by engaging in high-quality professional growth activities. To maintain a teacher certificate as "valid and active", certificate holders must complete *Certificate Renewal Plans* that include: i) at least three personal goals for improvement; ii) a statement of the knowledge and skills to be enhanced, reflecting relevant professional teaching or content area standards for each goal; iii) the professional development activities to meet those goals; and iv) projected timelines for completing the activities within the five-year period of validity (*Standard*) or ten-year period (*Master*). Teachers must submit their plans to their district's *Local Professional Development Committee*. The committee approves the plans, verifies that activities have been completed, monitors progress, and recommends whether certificates should be renewed.

In June 2001, the Canadian Province of Ontario passed legislation requiring all teachers to earn 14 professional development credits every five years in seven core categories (curriculum, knowledge, student assessment, special education, teaching strategies, classroom management and leadership, use of technology, and communicating with parents and students) with accredited training institutions to maintain their certification. The Ontario College of Teachers, the teacher professional organisation, received information from approved providers whenever teachers had successfully completed approved courses.

Due to a highly controversial debate, however, the newly elected Ontario government repealed the recertification programme in December 2003.

Teacher recertification has certain clear benefits: It provides strong incentives for teachers to update their knowledge and skills continuously and it allows school systems to identify core areas in which teachers need to keep improving. If recertification is based on profession-wide standards of good practice, it enables a system to create a coherent understanding of what teacher professionalism means, and should help to build public confidence in the schools and teaching. However, it is not clear that recertification programmes based on teachers completing designated developmental activities are necessarily going to be cost-effective. Professional development is important, but there also needs to be a close link between recertification and what teachers are actually doing in schools and what their students are learning.

6.2.6. Promotion and career diversification

In most countries opportunities for promotion and new responsibilities are generally limited for teachers who want to stay in the classroom. Promotions generally involve teachers spending less time in classrooms, and therefore diminish one of the major sources of job satisfaction. Even for those who would like to take on more roles outside the classroom, the opportunities in many countries are still quite limited. As Figure 6.7 shows, in 2001, on average only about 5% of the staff working in upper secondary schools were classified as management personnel, and only 4% were classified as professional support personnel.

Figure 6.7. **Distribution of school staff by personnel category according to reports by school principals, upper secondary schools, 2001**

Full-time equivalents



Notes: For Ireland data should be interpreted with caution due to a possible slight inflation in the number of professional support personnel and other support personnel. The Netherlands did not meet international sampling requirements.

Management personnel includes professional personnel who are responsible for school management and administration, *i.e.* principals, assistant principals, headmasters, and assistant headmasters. *Teacher aids* includes non-professional personnel or students who support teachers providing instruction to students. *Professional support* personnel includes professional staff who provide student services, *e.g.* guidance counselors, librarians and psychologists. *Other support* personnel includes maintenance and operations personnel, *e.g.* receptionists, secretaries, plumbers, drivers, cleaning personnel, etc.

Source: OECD ISUSS database, 2003. Published in OECD (2004b).

Box 6.5. **Providing greater career diversity in Australia, England and Wales, Ireland, Quebec (Canada), and the United States**

In *Australia*, teachers typically have access to a career structure that involves two to four stages with annual salary increments within each stage. The stages normally range from beginning teacher to experienced teacher, to experienced teacher with responsibility (leading teacher) or learning area or grade level co-ordinator, assistant principal, principal, and regional/district office positions. Advancement from one stage to the next, especially at the higher levels, usually requires applying for widely advertised vacancies. Teachers, as they move up the scale, are expected to have deeper levels of knowledge, demonstrate more sophisticated and effective teaching, take on responsibility for co-curricular aspects of the school, assist colleagues and so on. By "leading teacher" stage, they are expected to demonstrate exemplary teaching, educational leadership, and the ability to initiate and manage change.

In *England and Wales*, the new career grade of Advanced Skills Teacher (AST), introduced in 1998, is designed to allow teachers who wish to stay in the classroom an alternative route for career development. Their role is to provide pedagogic leadership within their own and other schools; typically, they will spend 20% of their time in an "outreach" role supporting professional development of their colleagues, and teach in class for the remaining time. Teachers can take up an AST post at any point in their career but in order to do so must pass the AST assessment. They prepare a portfolio that shows how they meet the prescribed standards for the grade, which is evaluated by an external assessor. The assessor also interviews the applicants and observes their professional practice. In July 2004 some 5 000 teachers had passed AST assessment. The intention is that the grade will ultimately form between 3% and 5% of the workforce.

Ireland has introduced four categories of promotion posts: Principal; Deputy Principal; Assistant Principal; and Special Duties Teacher. They have each special management duties, and receive both salary and time allowances. In addition to classroom teaching, Assistant Principals and Special Duties Teachers have special responsibility for academic, administrative and pastoral matters, including timetabling arrangements, liaison with parents' associations, supervising the maintenance and availability of school equipment, and so on. They are selected by a panel, which consists of Principal, chair of the Board of Management and an independent external assessor. Over the course of their career about 50% of teachers can expect to receive one of these positions.

In *Quebec* experienced teachers can work as mentors for student teachers. Experienced teachers coach and guide the student teachers, undertake specific training, and they receive either additional pay or a reduction in classroom teaching responsibilities. About 12 000 teachers participate in the mentor programme. Some of these experienced teachers also have an opportunity to become co-researchers with university staff and to participate in collaborative studies on subjects such as teaching, learning, classroom management and student success or failure. In addition, experienced teachers may receive time release from their normal duties to provide support for less experienced colleagues.

In the *United States*, the Milken Family Foundation's Teacher Advancement Project (TAP) is a recent initiative that aims to create more opportunities for promotion and career advancement for classroom teachers. Each school adopting the TAP programme offers three levels of teacher positions: career teacher; mentor teacher and master teacher. Master and mentor teachers are selected through a competitive performance-based process. Successful applicants take on additional responsibility and authority, and are required to have a longer work year. Each level offers separate pay structures. The Foundation provides training and certification services to prepare master and mentor teachers to conduct professional growth activities and teacher evaluations. The programme is based on three additional elements: ongoing, applied professional growth; instructionally focused accountability; and performance-based compensation. In early 2004, over 70 schools were at different stages of TAP implementation.

Teaching is often characterised as a "flat" career, with few recognised roles outside of the classroom and few promotion and career diversification opportunities. Roles such as mentor of beginning and trainee teachers, co-ordinator of in-service training, school project co-ordinator and curriculum development staff would help meet school needs and introduce career diversity without necessarily making schools more hierarchical.

Some countries are moving to open more career opportunities for teachers, stimulated in part by the greater variety of roles in schools that have been delegated significant decision-making responsibilities. Such roles include departmental head, team leader, and manager of curriculum development and/or personnel development. Such posts, which represent the introduction of "middle management" positions in schools, normally involve higher pay, reduced classroom teaching hours, or some combination of both. Box 6.5 provides recent examples from Australia, England and Wales, Ireland, Quebec (Canada) and the United States.

Similar developments are evident in the health sector. For example, in the United Kingdom, the Department of Health has recently promoted career progression in the nursing profession by extending the roles of nurses, increasing the number of senior nurses and nurse consultants (Simoens and Hurst, 2004).

6.2.7. Leadership and school climate

Research has shown that school leadership is an important influence on teacher retention by helping to foster a stimulating and supportive school culture, as well as helping to buffer teachers against mounting and sometimes contradictory external pressures (Mulford, 2003). Skilled leaders can help foster a sense of ownership and purpose in the way that teachers approach their job, introduce shared leadership and build collegiality, provide professional autonomy to teachers and help teachers achieve job satisfaction and continue to develop professionally. Teachers who work together in meaningful and purposeful ways have been found to be more likely to remain in the profession because they feel valued and supported in their work.

In many countries, principals are no longer seen as "head teachers," but rather as leaders and managers of increasingly complex organisations. School principals and other school leaders are now often perceived as critical for the success or failure of a school. School leaders are increasingly expected to create a collaborative work ethos among staff members, to acquire and to allocate resources, to promote teacher professional development, to improve students' performance, to build effective community partnerships, and to manage innovation and reform (Drake and Roe, 2003; Pierce, 2000). These are demanding requirements, and this project activity has revealed major concerns within a number of countries about attracting and supporting effective leaders in schools, especially in the context of greater school decision-making responsibility.

Figure 6.8 gives an overview, for a number of countries, of the extent to which school leaders are involved in three particular domains of personnel management in public schools: hiring and dismissal of staff; determination of duties and conditions of service of staff; and fixing of staff salaries. In countries such as the Czech Republic, England, Hungary, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the Slovak Republic and Sweden most such personnel decisions are taken at the school level but with different degrees of autonomy. For instance in the Czech Republic, Hungary, New Zealand and the Slovak Republic, a majority of school-level personnel decisions are taken either in consultation with others or within a framework set by a higher authority. By contrast, schools have much more autonomy for personnel decisions in England, the Netherlands and Sweden. There seems to

be little school involvement in the designated areas of personnel management in Australia, Austria, Germany, Greece, Japan, Mexico, Spain and Turkey.

Figure 6.8. **Percentage of decisions relating to personnel management taken by schools by mode, lower secondary education, public schools, 2003**



Notes: Countries are ranked in descending order of the percentage of decisions taken at the school level. The domain "personnel management" considers the hiring and dismissal of staff; the duties and conditions of service of staff; and the fixing of salaries. The school level includes school administrators and teachers or a school board or committee established exclusively for individual schools. "In full autonomy" means that decisions are subject only to any constraints contained in the constitution or in legislation that is of a general nature and not specifically aimed at education. "In consultation with others" means that decisions are taken in consultation with bodies located at another level within the education system. "Within a framework" means that decisions are taken within a framework set by a higher authority *(e.g.*, a binding law, a pre-established list of possibilities, a budgetary limit, etc.). Data for Turkey refer to primary education. See OECD (2004a) for further details.

Source: OECD (2004a).

To help meet the enhanced expectations and responsibilities, many countries now provide school principals and senior staff with significantly more training, assistance and guidance than they received in the past. For instance, England has taken a number of initiatives such as the development of school leadership programmes (*e.g.* the Headship Induction Programme), the creation of the National Professional Qualification for Headship, and the establishment of the National College for School Leadership (see Box 6.6). In 2004 Australia established the National Institute for Quality Teaching and School Leadership which aims to support and advance the teaching profession and innovation in schools; the governing board is predominantly drawn from principal and teacher associations. Some countries offer specific university qualifications in school leadership, while others focus on on-the-job training opportunities.

Sweden has a long-standing four-step approach to principal training: recruitment of those who want to become principals; induction for those newly appointed; a national professional development programme after two years in the job; and ongoing career development, including university courses and extensive support from professional associations of school leaders (Johansson, 2002). In the United States, "New Leaders for New Schools" is a public-private partnership dedicated to recruiting and training inner-city principals. Prospective principals receive seven weeks of tuition-free training in educational leadership, a one-year paid "residency" under the tutelage of a master principal and, once in

charge of their own schools, two years of intensive professional development (Goldstein, 2001).

Box 6.6. **Leadership programmes for school principals in England**

In England, since 1995 there has been a rapid development in school leadership programmes. The *Headship Induction Programme*, which was launched on 1 September 2003, offers tailored training and support in a head teacher's first three years in post. A grant of £2 500 is available for head teachers taking part in the programme to purchase training.

The *National Professional Qualification for Headship* (NPQH) was introduced in 1997 and re-launched in 2000 following wide-ranging consultation. It is delivered through activities in school, training sessions, tutorials and e-learning. Over 8 600 individuals are currently undertaking NPQH and over 12 900 have completed the programme. From April 2004, all those taking up their first headship position in maintained schools must hold the NPQH or be working towards it.

The *Leadership Programme for Serving Heads*, established in 1998, is designed for current principals to reflect on and develop their leadership skills. These courses are administered by the *National College for School Leadership*, which was launched in 2000. It has developed a range of programmes to support groups that are under-represented in school leadership positions, such as women and cultural minorities.

The programme *Leading from the Middle,* which began in 2003, is training middle-level leaders, working in small teams within a school or group of schools to enhance their leadership skills, receive coaching and support from a senior colleague in school, and review the changing role of the middle leader. The aim is to have some 7 000 participants in the programme in 2004/05.

Evaluations by the Office for Standards in Education (Ofsted) and Earley *et al.* (2002) concluded that leadership and management have improved in schools, and that the programmes provided are generally effective, though they do not always meet the diverse needs of all participants. Recommendations for improvement state that leadership programmes should include strategies for managing workload, work-life balance and disseminating good practice.

Standards of professional performance are increasingly being used to measure the success of school leader development programmes. Leithwood *et al.* (2002) compared five sets of standards for educational leadership development from the United States, Australia, the United Kingdom and New Zealand. They found that all five sets had a common emphasis on: financial management including hiring appropriate staff; being a role model; establishing professional development as an ongoing school-wide activity; monitoring and evaluating teacher and pupil progress; using test scores to guide curriculum and instruction; wide consultation; parent and community involvement and effective communication with all stakeholders and valuing diversity. Areas that were less commonly covered in the lists, or were missing altogether, were teacher leadership, balancing the full range of duties expected of the school leader, teacher morale, implanting innovations, marketing, working effectively with school councils, outreach or entrepreneurial functions, and working effectively within wider political and social contexts.

Although a number of promising initiatives and programmes are now underway, the overall impression is that the relationship between school leadership, school climate and teacher job satisfaction should be higher up the policy agenda.

6.2.8. Working conditions

As seen earlier, the particular reasons that teachers give for leaving teaching vary somewhat from country to country, as does the weight that they attach to individual factors. But it is clear that, aside from the attraction of what are seen as better career opportunities elsewhere or the role of personal circumstances, poor working conditions are often the reason teachers give for leaving the profession. These are typically associated with concerns about a heavy workload, a lack of resources and support, and dealing with difficult students and, increasingly, difficult parents.

As Figure 6.9 shows, Australian teachers identified "lack of resources or time" as the single most important source of concern about their teaching (37% of teachers). Correspondingly, "increased resources /reduced workload" was the second most common suggestion for retaining teachers (23% of teachers), just behind "improved remuneration" (25%). As noted earlier in Figure 6.3B, a survey of teachers in England revealed that "workload too heavy" was the main reason for leaving the profession when retirement and maternity factors were excluded, and "stress" was also indicated as one of the main reasons to leave. The Background Report prepared for Finland notes that "teachers perceive that rush causes the most stress in their day-to-day teaching work, because they feel that they cannot perform their compulsory work assignments within the time restrictions". A study by Korhonen (2000) revealed that 88% of Finnish teachers perceived increasing time pressure as a problem in their work.

Figure 6.9. **Factors identified by teachers as negatives of teaching, and teachers' suggestions for retaining teachers, Australia, 2002**



Note: Figures are based on a survey of 2 500 teachers from government and non-government schools, in metropolitan and non-metropolitan Australia, and from primary and secondary schools.

Source: Ministerial Council on Education, Employment, Training and Youth Affairs (2003).

One major challenge is that there is often a lack of any clear job profile or framework for a teacher's work at school. In some countries all that is specified is class teaching time, and this substantially understates the range of tasks teachers are expected to undertake. For example, Figure 6.10 shows the roles that secondary teachers in private Catholic grant-aided schools of the French Community of Belgium perform, but which they do not

consider appropriate given their training. These include "social worker" (identified by 55% of teachers), "supervisor" (59%), "parent" (64%) and "psychologist" (27%). The Australian survey data in Figure 6.9 also identified student welfare issues and community/parent attitudes as the second and third most important concerns that teachers have about teaching.

Figure 6.10. **Perceived roles of teachers in schools and assumed roles that they deem not appropriate for them, secondary teachers in the private Catholic grant-aided sector, French Community of Belgium, 1999**



Note: Figures are based on a survey of 3 600 secondary school teachers from the private Catholic grant-aided sector in the French Community of Belgium. Teachers were required to provide three answers only for each of the two aspects depicted above and so the percentage shown indicates the proportion of teachers who selected the corresponding option among the three answers provided.

Source: Maroy (2002).

Some of the additional tasks required of teachers stem from a lack of support staff. As shown in Figure 6.7 for upper secondary schools in a range of countries, "professional support" and "teacher aids" on average comprise only 4% and 2% of school staff members, respectively. On the basis of the country review visits, the number of support staff tends to be even more limited in primary schools.

England has recently launched an initiative that seeks to substantially expand the role and number of support staff in schools, and through this to improve teachers' working conditions (see Box 6.7).

Teachers also express concerns about regulations, which they perceive as both restricting their professional autonomy and also diverting time and energy from more important tasks. For example, as indicated by the Background Report prepared for the Flemish Community of Belgium "[Stakeholders] indicated that for some teachers an important reason for leaving teaching is that they are irritated by the far-reaching regulations, the restrictions of rules and the planning workload. Teachers are burdened with too many administrative tasks so that they can no longer carry out their core tasks." Similarly, the Danish Background Report notes that "The frustrations in a teacher's life are caused … especially by a working hours agreement, whose [excessive] inflexibility [diminishes] the professional liberty of action [of teachers]."

Box 6.7. **School Workforce Remodelling in England and Wales**

Raising Standards and Tackling Workload (the National Agreement with local authority employers, and support staff, teacher and head teacher unions) was signed in January in 2003. Remodelling is about helping teachers focus on their core teaching responsibilities. Teachers are no longer expected routinely to undertake administrative and clerical tasks. From September 2004 there are limits on the extent to which teachers have to take classes for absent colleagues and from 2005 they will have guaranteed time for planning, preparation and assessment.

At the heart of this reform is a wider role in schools for support staff. As well as expanding support staff numbers the programme improves training, qualifications and career opportunities. Developments include regulations which clarify the respective roles of teachers and support staff; guidance on the management and supervision of support staff; induction training for support staff; and expansion of the Teacher Training Agency's role to include support staff as well as teachers.

Implementation is being facilitated through the National Remodelling team (NRT) which assists schools to identify local solutions, manage change, and share experiences with other schools.

A primary school survey conducted for the Department for Education and Skills (DfES, 2004) showed that: use of support staff had increased in 70% of schools in the last three years;: 97% of respondents said teaching and learning improved; 57% of the respondents said teachers' stress was reduced; and about half of the respondents said the workload of teachers had decreased overall.

The country review visits indicated that in some countries schools often lack adequate facilities and resources to assist teachers in planning and preparation. Teachers often lack their own offices or work areas, and do not have access to information technology or to facilities to ensure that collaborative work is productive. One result is that in some countries teachers do not remain on school premises when they are not teaching, which can hinder collegiality and joint planning. For instance, full-time teachers in private Catholic grant-aided schools in the French Community of Belgium report that about two-thirds of their classroom preparation is done at home, and many indicate that they would stay longer at school if there were better staff facilities (Maroy, 2002). In this context, Korea provides an example of extensive ICT support available to teachers, as well as generally good staff facilities in schools (see Box 6.8).

Student discipline and school safety issues are additional causes of stress. For example, a study by Santavirta *et al.* (2001) reveals that 20% of Finnish teachers felt that student discipline problems caused them strain, and about 10% of teachers perceived bullying from students to be a daily source of stress. An evaluation by the State Provincial Offices carried out in Finnish compulsory schools in 2001 revealed that threats, violence and bullying directed at teachers had been reported in 20% of the schools. In the case of the United States, Ingersoll (2001) found that low salaries, inadequate support from the school administration, student discipline problems, and limited teacher input into school decision-making all contribute to higher rates of teacher turnover.

In countries where teacher incomes are low, such as Mexico and the Slovak Republic, teachers often have more than one job, either at another school or in a completely different field. The need to devote time to earning extra income makes it difficult for such teachers to become extensively involved in developing their school or working closely with their colleagues.

Box 6.8. **ICT support for teachers and students in Korea**

In 1996 Korea adopted the *Education Informatization Affirmative Master Plan* to develop ICT resources and support for students and teachers. All Korean teachers now have their own computer, classrooms are often equipped with big-screen TVs with an internet connection, all schools across the country are linked to the internet, and a high proportion of teachers have undertaken in-service training in ICT applications in schools.

In addition, two major online services have been launched. *Edunet* (www.edunet.net) is a comprehensive educational information service, which provides students, teachers, and the general public access to educational information and allows the creation of online learning communities. It is managed by the Korea Education and Research Information Service and in June 2002 had 5.3 million members. Among other services, it offers a "Teaching and Learning Resource Center". Teachers have access to multimedia teaching resources, designed to allow teachers to use ICT in their classes. Students have also access to a "Cyber Teacher" online service provided by qualified teachers and comprising "subject advice", "help in learning" and "questions and answers." Another innovative project is the *Teaching and Learning Center* (http://classroom.kice.re.kr) run by the Korea Institute of Curriculum and Evaluation. It provides comprehensive information on the new national curriculum, disseminates innovative teaching strategies and good practice, and provides extensive teaching materials, guidelines and assessment tools for teachers to use. Most schools have websites to improve communication among teachers, parents, students and the local community and to promote school programmes and teachers' work.

The research generally indicates that teachers who leave the profession often report that the factors which attracted them to teaching – working with students and colleagues, professional autonomy, and opportunities for personal and intellectual growth – were increasingly difficult to achieve in the day-to-day realities of the job. Although most keenly felt by young teachers, such factors are also cited by more experienced teachers as reasons for leaving the profession.

6.2.9. Retirement policies

Table 6.3 presented information about teachers' retirement age in a number of countries. The retirement age to obtain full pension benefits is generally about 60-65 years, with a range from 53 (for female teachers in the Slovak Republic) to 67 years (Norway). However, in all countries it is possible to retire earlier than this and receive some pension benefits. The actual average age of retirement among teachers is generally much lower, for example 54 years in Israel and 56 in Quebec. Some countries offer even more flexibility. For example, in Korea teachers can retire after 20 years of service regardless of age and in Israel teachers can retire at age 40 provided they have at least 10 years of service.

In almost all countries teachers are able to work in public schools beyond the regular "full" retirement age. In some cases there is an age limit for such arrangements (*e.g.* up to the age of 65 in France, 67 in Sweden and 70 in both Denmark and Norway). In Israel teachers above retirement age can only work up to 30% of the load of a full-time teacher. Among the countries covered in Table 6.3 only Greece, Korea and Spain prevent teachers from working in public schools beyond the legal retirement age.

The reasons for early retirement among teachers include the incentives offered by different pension schemes and the attraction of other non-work activities, but they also include stress and career burn-out. In the case of Germany for example, the average retirement age for teachers is 59 years, which is six years less than the regular full retirement age. In 2001 only 6% of German teachers worked until the age of 65. The Background Report prepared for Germany cited evidence from medical and psychological

studies indicating that up to one-third of teachers suffer from various physical, psychosomatic and psychological problems often described as the "burn-out syndrome".

In Germany, as in a number of other countries, the age structure of the teacher workforce indicates that the proportion of teachers retiring will rise over the next 5-10 years, and that this could put increased pressure on the teacher labour market. In addition to more recruitment difficulties, there will be a considerable loss of teaching experience and a potentially smaller pool of teachers from which to recruit the next generation of school leaders. As noted by the Australian Background Report "there are clearly important challenges to develop appropriate policies and strategies to ensure both a reasonable distribution of age bands overall and to ensure that, whatever the age of the teacher, the career itself is perceived to be attractive and have demonstrable benefits to students' education."

One part of the policy response concerns general policies towards retirement across the workforce as a whole and the public service in particular. In the light of increases in life expectancy, ageing populations, rising pension costs, and declining workforce participation among those aged 50 years and over, many countries are seeking to increase the normal age of retirement or at least remove some of the current incentives to retire early. Efforts are also underway to reform alternative pathways into early retirement (particularly long-term sick and unemployment benefits), assist older workers to stay in employment, provide more flexible working conditions and address age discrimination in employment (OECD, 2003).

A number of countries are seeking to encourage older teachers to stay in teaching by creating more opportunities to work part-time, take extended leave, and reduce their working hours without jeopardising their long-term employment and pension rights. Some countries have developed programmes focused particularly on senior teachers as a means of reducing career burn-out and retaining their skills in schools. Initiatives in Germany, the Netherlands and Norway are described in Box 6.9.

Box 6.9. **New opportunities for experienced teachers in Brandenburg (Germany), the Netherlands and Norway**

In *Brandenburg (Germany)*, experienced teachers are eligible for a part-time employment scheme, under which they can cut their workload in half by accepting a salary reduction of about 20%. About 10% of eligible teachers used this scheme in 2002/03. Also, almost all Länder in Germany offer a sabbatical year to teachers whereby the teacher works longer hours for same pay or same hours for lower pay during a given period which is then used to fund the sabbatical year (this programme is not exclusively for experienced teachers).

In the *Netherlands*, the *BAPO* (regulation to stimulate the labour market participation of experienced teachers) scheme launched in 1994 uses the reduction of required teaching time to reward long service. Teachers aged between 52 and 55 can reduce working hours by 10% with a salary reduction of 2.5%. For teachers aged 56 and over, a 20% reduction of working hours is possible with a 5% salary reduction. In 2002, 41% of all eligible teachers in primary education and 47% in secondary education participated in the programme.

In *Norway* some municipalities are implementing "senior policies" for older teachers, which include targeted professional development activities, reduced classroom teaching hours and reduced hours working overall, and new tasks including curriculum development, advising other schools and mentoring beginning teachers.

6.3. Priorities for Future Policy Development

Many of the factors which make teaching an attractive career choice for new entrants are also important in encouraging people to stay in the profession. The strategies outlined in Chapter 3 for improving teaching's appeal to recent graduates and people from other careers – such as improving the image and status of teaching, ensuring competitive salaries and working conditions, and providing flexible forms of employment – will also encourage teachers to stay. However, once people have been in the job for some time, other factors also start to become important in shaping their attitudes to teaching as a career, including workload, interactions with students, school climate, facilities, support staff, school leadership, and opportunities for career growth. Such factors can be difficult for prospective teachers to assess, but surveys of current and former teachers indicate their important influence on whether teachers stay or leave.

Policy makers also need to be concerned about the continuing effectiveness of the teacher workforce. The policy goal, after all, is retaining effective teachers, which implies not only that all teachers have the opportunities, support and incentives to continue to improve and perform at high levels, but also that ineffective teachers do not remain in the profession. Some groups in public discussion want to focus mainly on the latter issue, to the detriment of the image and achievements of the large majority of teachers. Others do not seem to want to acknowledge that this is a real problem.

Although attractive salaries are clearly important in improving teaching's appeal, policy needs to address more than pay. Surveys of teachers indicate that teachers place a lot of importance on the quality of their relations with students and colleagues, on feeling valued and supported by school leaders, on good working conditions, and on opportunities to develop their skills. Such factors go to the heart of the way that schools and teaching are organised.

The policy suggestions in this section are drawn from country experiences and initiatives as documented in the Country Background Reports, the country review visits, and other research. They do not necessarily apply to all of the participating countries since in some cases the policies are already well underway, while others differ in the nature of the teacher retention issues they face.

Evaluating and rewarding effective teaching

A number of countries seem to lack a solid basis for recognising and rewarding the work of teachers. Public school teachers are not evaluated on a regular basis in half the countries participating in the project. A limited focus on teacher evaluation runs the risk of sending teachers an implicit message that their work is not important. Regular appraisal should be considered as an integrated, routine part of professional life.

There needs to be a stronger emphasis on teacher evaluation for improvement purposes (*i.e.* formative evaluation). This can be low-key and low-cost, and include self-evaluation, informal peer evaluation, classroom observation, and structured conversations and regular feedback by the principal and experienced peers. Designed mainly to enhance classroom practice, such appraisal would provide regular opportunities for teachers' work to be recognised and celebrated, and help both teachers and schools to identify professional development priorities.

As was discussed in Chapters 4 and 5, it is important for individual teacher appraisal to occur within a framework provided by profession-wide agreed statements of teachers' responsibilities and standards of professional performance. Principals and other senior

colleagues need to be trained in evaluation processes (and to be regularly evaluated themselves), and schools need to have the resources to meet identified needs in teachers' professional development. Evaluation frameworks and tools would assist principals and other senior staff, and also help teachers to better prepare for assessment –and to benefit from it.

Although the principal focus of formative assessment is on teacher improvement, it can also provide a basis for rewarding teachers for exemplary performance. For example, outstanding performance and contributions could enable teachers to progress two salary steps at once. Rewarding teachers with time allowances, sabbatical periods, opportunities for school-based research, support for post-graduate study, or opportunities for in-service education could be more appealing for many teachers and help to overcome the limited flexibility in raising salaries that applies in many systems.

Building a closer linkage between evaluation and reward, though, needs to ensure that the measures used to assess teacher performance are broadly based to reflect school objectives, and take account of the school and classroom contexts in which teachers are working. In many circumstances it may be more effective to focus on group recognition and rewards at the school or grade level rather than individual teacher rewards.

Ongoing, informal evaluation directed at teacher improvement must be distinguished from the evaluation needed at key stages in the teaching career, such as when moving from probationary status to established teacher, or when applying for promotion. Such evaluations, which are more summative in nature, need to have a stronger external component and more formal processes, as well as avenues for appeal for teachers who feel they have not been treated fairly.

Responding to ineffective teachers

There needs to be simple, transparent and accepted procedures for dealing with ineffective teachers. Although the number of such teachers is likely to be small, the problem is often not addressed, which causes difficulties not only for schools and the general teaching force, but also for the poorly performing teachers themselves.

Stronger systems of initial teacher education, more rigorous approaches to selection and probation before teachers are granted tenure, and ongoing, regular formative teacher evaluation will help to prevent poor teachers from entering and remaining in the profession. However, in such a large profession, preventive measures cannot be relied upon exclusively, and there are also likely to be individual cases where formerly competent teachers start to perform below expectations for a variety of reasons.

The initial focus needs to be on regular, ongoing teacher evaluation providing clear and constructive feedback to teachers on their performance, and jointly identifying appropriate developmental strategies. However, if improvements do not occur, processes should exist to move ineffective teachers either out of the school system or into non-teaching roles. At these stages it would be important for authorities external to the school, including representatives of the teaching profession, to become involved in decision-making and for appeals mechanisms to protect individual teachers' rights.

Providing more support for beginning teachers

The high attrition rates experienced by beginning teachers in some countries require special attention. As was proposed in Chapter 4, all beginning teachers should participate in structured induction programmes that involve a reduced teaching load, trained mentor teachers in schools, and close partnerships with teacher education institutions. In addition,

the criteria and processes used to allocate teachers to schools should ensure that new teachers are not concentrated in the more difficult and unpopular locations.

Providing more opportunities for career variety and diversification

The teaching career in a number of countries could benefit from diversification, which would help meet school needs and also provide more opportunities and recognition for teachers, including those who wish to remain focused on classroom teaching. For these objectives to be achieved, a dual approach is needed: (i) the creation of new positions associated with specific tasks and roles in addition to classroom teaching, which would lead to differentiation of a largely horizontal kind; and (ii) a competency-based teaching career ladder associated with extra responsibilities, which would lead to differentiation that is more vertical in nature.

The recognition that schools and teachers need to take on a greater range of tasks and responsibilities calls for the creation of roles such as mentor of beginning and trainee teachers, co-ordinator of in-service training, and school project co-ordinator. Such roles, which would not necessarily involve differentiated pay but instead release time from classroom teaching, could be for fixed periods to enable a wider group of teachers to take part and gain experience.

On the other hand, in order for teachers to build a career that reflects their developing skills, performance and responsibilities, there would be merit in considering a performance- and competency-based professional career ladder. Such systems define teacher competencies as a part of a lifelong learning continuum, make intensive use of formative evaluation, and generally have a minimum of three different stages moving from beginning teacher to established teacher and to advanced or expert teacher. Each stage progressively becomes more demanding with more responsibilities, and is open to fewer people, but involves a significant rise in status and compensation. Roles associated with extra responsibility include departmental head, team leader, and curriculum and/or personnel development manager.

A professional career ladder would be a marked departure from the current model of a teacher's career in most countries, which involves a steady, largely automatic progression for nearly everyone over a very long time scale. Not only does the latter approach lead to a steady increase in total system costs as the workforce ages, it may not be attractive to the skilled and motivated people that schools need to attract and retain as teachers.

Improving leadership and school climate

Given the critical role of school principals and other leaders in school and teacher development, it is disturbing that a number of countries report that they are struggling to attract well-qualified applicants to take on leadership roles. Priorities include improved training, selection and evaluation processes for school leaders, upgraded support services, and providing more attractive compensation packages.

Given the range of responsibilities that principals have, it is important that there be a leadership team in each school to share the load and ensure effective delivery. This would enable the principal to focus on educational leadership for improving learning and teaching of students and staff, rather than concentrating mainly on administrative tasks. In a number of countries principals need additional administrative support to gain more time for important tasks related to educational leadership, such as teacher performance appraisal, teacher coaching and designing professional development. The need for extra support seems to be a particular priority in primary schools.

In reflection of their importance in the school system, principals' positions should be openly advertised on the basis of clear criteria. Professional development activities, formal qualifications and leadership experience as a teacher should be taken into account when appointing principals. Selection of principals should be done through a broadly-based panel including external experts. The renewal of principals' terms of office should result from a formal evaluation, and thus be dependent on their continuing effectiveness. Fixed-term contracts would also offer an opportunity for those who did not want to continue as principals to return to classroom teaching or look for other positions.

A key requirement is that principals and other school leaders be trained and supported in conducting teacher evaluations and linking this to professional development planning. Teachers must be able to see that principals and other school leaders are themselves evaluated on a regular basis, and that they actively engage in professional development.

Improving working conditions

In a number of countries teachers' workload has traditionally been conceived in terms of classroom teaching hours. This has formed the basis of industrial negotiations about teachers' pay and conditions, and shaped school staffing provision. Yet class teaching time is actually only one aspect of a complex job profile. The lack of explicit recognition of the wide variety of tasks that teaching actually entails can create stress through uncertainty about who is responsible for what, and add to workload because adequate resources are not always made available. The breadth and complexity of teachers' roles and responsibilities need to be explicitly recognised in job profiles. These can then be used as the basis for industrial negotiations, and used to shape teacher education and professional development programmes.

It is clear that in a number of countries the lack of support staff and adequate school facilities means that teachers are over-worked, but students are not gaining as much as they should from teacher expertise. Schools are complex organisations, and many different tasks are involved in delivering quality education. Well-trained professional and administrative staff can help to reduce the burden on teachers and free them to concentrate on the tasks of teaching and learning, and helping young people to develop, for which teachers are specially trained and from which they derive great job satisfaction. Better facilities at schools for staff preparation and planning would also help considerably in building collegiality and in programme provision.

Providing more flexible working hours and conditions

To make continuing in teaching an attractive option for people from a wide variety of personal and family circumstances, and from across the age range, it is necessary to provide flexible working conditions. These can include programmes that enable teachers to work part-time, take more leave opportunities, and reduce their working hours without jeopardising their long-term employment and pension rights.

In a number of countries early teacher retirements cause staffing problems and mean the loss of valuable experience from the schools. Part of the response depends on more general policy changes concerning retirement ages, pension schemes and the financial incentives for early retirement. However, school systems could be more proactive in ensuring that schools provide attractive working environments for older teachers. There is no benefit if older teachers continue working for extended periods because they feel they have to, but many older teachers may want to continue making a contribution. Therefore, programmes aiming at preventing career burn-out and retaining important skills in schools would be beneficial. The elements could include professional development activities tailored to meet

the needs of older teachers, reduced classroom teaching hours and reduced hours overall, and new tasks including curriculum development, advising other schools and mentoring beginning teachers.

One possible model would be to offer older teachers the option of a gradual reduction in their working hours for a lower salary, but retaining their long-term pension benefits. This would amount to substituting a gradual move away from full-time work to part-time work, rather than the early retirement that seems to be common in a number of countries. Older teachers would earn less but also work less, and the "saved" hours of work could be used to recruit additional young teachers. Such an approach could be largely budget-neutral. This would also ensure that the experience of older teachers would not be lost prematurely from the school system.

Of course, it is possible that some older teachers who currently have managerial roles in schools or education authorities would appreciate the opportunity to leave those posts and to focus on classroom teaching and working with young people. Policies for senior teachers must be individually tailored to meet the needs of the people and schools concerned.

Developing a more comprehensive approach

There is no single strategy that will ensure that all teachers will continue to develop and improve, and that effective teachers will wish to remain in teaching. Action is needed on a wide variety of fronts, including career structure, evaluation, work environments, and funding. Similar challenges exist in the health profession where there are major concerns about attracting and retaining high-quality nurses. Box 6.10 illustrates an interesting example from the United States that involved workplace strategies aimed at retaining nurses by enhancing their skills and empowering them, and also by recognising those hospitals that were successful in retaining nurses.

Box 6.10. **Organisational and workplace change in nursing in the United States**

In the early 1980s, the American Academy of Nursing conducted a study to identify which hospitals were successful in retaining nurses and which organisational features were shared by these hospitals. As a result, 41 Magnet Hospitals were identified that had a number of common organisational features that promoted and sustained professional nursing practice. These included open and flexible organisational structures, staff autonomy and accountability for decision-making, and investments in the education and expertise of nurses. These organisational attributes of Magnet Hospitals are associated with better patient outcomes and higher levels of patient satisfaction. Nurses have experienced higher levels of job satisfaction, lower rates of burn-out, increased perceptions of productivity and quality of care, and higher nurse retention rates. Although Magnet Hospitals tended to have a higher nurse-to-patient ratio, their larger wage bill was more than offset by shorter lengths of patient stay, less need for intensive care treatment, and lower staff turnover and recruitment costs.

In the early 1990s, the American Nurses Association through the American Nurses Credentialing Center established the Magnet Nursing Services Recognition Program to recognise excellence in professional nursing practice. This programme is available to all hospitals and represents a voluntary form of external professional nurse peer review that is based on a hospital's ability to meet 14 standards of nursing care. Certification as a Magnet Hospital involves a multi-stage process of written documentation and on-site evaluation by nurse experts. The programme requires hospital recertification every four years. In 2003 there were 90 Magnet-designated hospitals. *Source*: Derived from Box 4.3 in Simoens and Hurst (2004).

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Table of contents

Foreword **3**

Executive Summary **7**

Chapter 1 Introduction: the Focus on Teachers **17**

1.1. The Growing Focus on Teacher Issues 18
1.2. Overview of the Broad Policy Directions 19
1.3. Methodology and Country Participation 20
1.4. Organisation of the Report 21

Chapter 2 Why is Teacher Policy Important? **23**

2.1. Quality Teaching is Vital for Improving Student Learning 24
2.2. Teachers are Significant in the Labour Force and in School Budgets 27
2.3. Teacher Policy Concerns are Intensifying 27
2.4. Analysing Teacher Policy 30
2.5. Analysing the Teacher Labour Market 33

Chapter 3 Making Teaching an Attractive Career Choice **39**

3.1. Concerns about Teaching's Attractiveness 40
3.2. Estimating the Future Demand for Teachers 60
3.3. Factors in the Attractiveness of Teaching as a Career 67
3.4. Priorities for Future Policy Development 86

Chapter 4 Developing Teachers' Knowledge and Skills **95**

4.1. Teachers' Roles are Changing 97
4.2. Implications of Research on Effective Teachers 99
4.3. Initial Teacher Education 102
4.4. Certification of New Teachers 114
4.5. Induction Programmes for New Teachers 117
4.6. Professional Development 121
4.7. Priorities for Future Policy Development 131

Chapter 5 Recruiting, Selecting and Employing Teachers **141**

5.1. Teaching and Public Service Employment 142
5.2. Features of Teachers' Employment Conditions 144
5.3. Teacher Recruitment and Selection 150
5.4. Probationary Periods for Beginning Teachers 155
5.5. Responses to Short-term Staffing Needs 157
5.6. Teacher Mobility 159
5.7. Priorities for Future Policy Development 161

Chapter 6 Retaining Effective Teachers in Schools **169**

6.1. Concerns about Retaining Effective Teachers in Schools 170
6.2. Factors in Retaining Effective Teachers in Schools 177
6.3. Priorities for Future Policy Development 204

Chapter 7 Developing and Implementing Teacher Policy 213

7.1. Engaging Teachers in Policy Development and Implementation 214
7.2. Improving the Knowledge Base to Support Teacher Policy 218

Appendix 1 How the Activity was Conducted..223

Background to the OECD Activity 223
Purposes of the OECD Activity 223
Methodology and Country Participation..224

Appendix 2 A Framework for Informing Teacher Policy..233



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