Executive Summary

Economic policies reacted swiftly and strongly to the crisis, and activity has rebounded quickly. The recession associated with the pandemic was severe. From March 2020 to end-June 2021, sanitary restrictions tightly constrained economic activity, although their impact gradually declined, leading to a steep rebound (Figure 1).

Strong public support measures limited the economic and social shock. Since 2020, the short-time work scheme has protected employment and household incomes. The solidarity fund, tax deferrals, and state-backed loans have supported corporate liquidity and profitability, reducing bankruptcies. Direct fiscal support for economic activity reached 3.1% of GDP in 2020 and 4.1% in 2021. In a welcome move, the measures are becoming more selective as the recovery gains traction, and the EUR 100 billion recovery plan and the 2030 investment plan rightly focus on environmental and digital transitions.

Domestic demand is driving the recovery (Table 1). With the economy reopening, domestic demand and employment bounced back rapidly in 2021. The emergency measures and the recovery plan, combined with accommodative monetary policy, are adding support to consumption and investment. In 2022, the gradual reduction of savings accumulated during the crisis is set to sustain consumption, while exports and investment should benefit from improving external demand.

Risks remain high. Demand for some services and transport equipment depends on the health situation. The negative risks associated with private debt have also increased for some businesses and households. However, growth could surprise on the upside if household confidence improved more rapidly than expected and encouraged a greater reduction in accumulated savings.

The marked and impressive acceleration of the vaccination campaign will support a steady recovery. Yet, poor municipalities and the eldery have still comparatively low vaccination rates and efforts to reach the most exposed and vulnerable should be strengthened.

Ensuring a swift and effective implementation of the recovery plan should allow the economic rebound to turn into durable growth. For the same reason, a premature withdrawal of support for households and businesses should be avoided as it could push viable businesses into bankruptcy. However, fiscal support needs to become increasingly selective as the recovery gains traction.

High corporate debt and heterogeneous businesses’ conditions could eventually put some firms into difficulties. This calls for strengthening businesses’ equity, and ensuring early and swift resolution processes for non-viable firms. Simplified preventive procedures introduced in 2021 will facilitate earlier and more effective restructuring. However, insolvency proceedings were lengthy before the crisis and strengthening the capacity of commercial courts would speed up the restructuring of distressed firms.

Boosting training and job transition support is crucial. Despite a high unemployment rate, labour market shortages have risen. Recent reforms have improved access to professional training and its quality, but the crisis has delayed their implementation. The 2021 strategy for retraining workers is welcome. Yet, even before the crisis, the school-to-work transition was difficult (Figure 2). The foreseen expansion of the youth guarantee scheme will have to combine a financial allowance for those who need it, greater support to enter the labour market and streamlined procedures. At the same time, the financing of unemployment insurance and activation programmes appears pro-cyclical and measures should ensure that their financing is better in line with economic conditions.

Public debt has increased markedly during the crisis. Developing a strategy to stabilise and gradually lower public debt is necessary to put it on a sustainable path since ageing-related expenditures are expected to increase.

Public spending is high (Figure 3) and some expenditures are not effective. Educational outcomes largely reflect the family environment and business innovation does not fully reflect high R&D support. Moreover, tax expenditures such as those on overtime, reduced rates of value-added tax or fossil-fuel subsidies do not support long-term growth. It is necessary to lower gradually and significantly public spending through a medium-term consolidation strategy based on spending reviews and improved expenditure allocation.

The pension system requires further reforms. The effective age of exit from the labour market is the second lowest of all OECD countries and has an adverse effect on potential growth. At the same time, life expectancy at age 65 is the second highest of the OECD. Increasing the minimum retirement age in line with life expectancy, and better integrating older workers into firms would encourage a rise in the effective age of exit from the labour market.

The governance of public finance is fragmented across sectors and levels of government. It does not allow a full evaluation of some policies. A multiannual expenditure rule that encompasses the entire public sector, whose implementation would be assessed by the fiscal council (HCFP), would make for better coordination of sectoral expenditures. Additionally, the current debt projections are limited to 5 years and publishing long-term debt projections, whose assumptions would be validated by the HCFP, would raise awareness around sustainability issues.

Boosting employment and productivity is a priority. Welcome reforms have lowered labour costs and increased the in-work bonus for low-paid workers, while also improving the financing and targeting of education and vocational training. However, too many workers have inadequate skills and their employment rate remains low. The measures proposed in this Survey to improve employment and productivity further could increase GDP per capita by 1.2% after 10 years.

Early and initial education are key to strengthen skills and equity. Limited school closures have helped to maintain learning outcomes during the crisis, but they have weighed more on less performant children. Disadvantaged households have also less access to formal childcare, which calls for speeding up the development of additional childcare services for low-income households and in the poorest neighbourhoods. Action must be taken to lower the risk of school dropouts, as well as to improve the relationships between business and the education system. Apprenticeship could be developed further, as planned in the reform of vocational education, by increasing the share of work-based training.

The diffusion of digital technologies remains unequal, hindering productivity gains (Figure 4). Many small businesses lags behind the adoption of these new digital technologies and will require additional support for training their workers.

Efforts to support vulnerable regions and households should be stepped up. The crisis risks widening social and territorial inequalities. Providing equitable access to essential services, notably through the “France Services” network, would require to strengthen outreach and accessibility schemes by implementing a quantitative follow-up of local access to public services. The short supply of housing in dynamic areas also prevents higher housing mobility, especially for young people. Focusing support for housing supply on very densely populated areas would raise mobility and employment opportunities.

Investment in the green transition should continue to reduce greenhouse gases and pollution. The pace of transition towards a greener economy must accelerate. Even though France is one of the lowest greenhouse-gas-emitting countries in the OECD, its emissions have fallen slowly. Artificial areas, transport demand and waste are steadily increasing. Intensive agriculture and the use of chemical inputs have reduced biodiversity and deteriorated air quality (Figure 5).

The environmental transition is one of the main pillar of the recovery plan. It allocates EUR 30 billion (1.2% of 2019 GDP) to green investment. However, the transition will be successful only if the mechanisms that are put in place are effective.

Green private investment must increase, and further incentives would boost households and businesses behavioural changes. Phasing-out tax breaks and reduced rates, and subsequently rising green tax rates, notably carbon prices, are needed. To prevent an increase in inequality and to promote the social acceptability of such measures, support should be provided to the most vulnerable households and businesses. In particular, developing generous and targeted help-to-buy schemes, for cleaner equipments, would effectively complement environmental taxes.

Containing the growing demand for transport and the associated pollution should be a priority. The recent increase in electric car sales has not been sufficient to curb the rise in road transport emissions. Schemes to support the purchase of less polluting vehicles are not ambitious enough. The eligibility criteria for the conversion premium and the ecological malus scale should become more stringent.

Improving the energy efficiency of buildings would reduce energy consumption. Emissions from buildings have barely evolved. Policies to support building energy renovation works do not encourage efficient overall energy renovations. Public support should be conditional on achieving a minimum energy efficiency standard and tight controls on major projects.

Production of renewable energies must increase. France plans to reduce the share of nuclear power, which does not emit greenhouse gases. In order to comply with emission-reduction targets, renewable energies must be developed further, notably though higher support for renewable thermal energy.

Land use should take better into account the benefits of biodiversity. The environmental offset required for major development projects is not demanding enough. Land use taxes should also be reconsidered to encourage sustainable land use. In the agriculture sector, public support often comes without meaningful environmental condition. Reallocating agricultural support towards payments for agri-environmental services would encourage more sustainable practices.

Disclaimers

This document, as well as any data and map included herein, are without prejudice to the status of or sovereignty over any territory, to the delimitation of international frontiers and boundaries and to the name of any territory, city or area.

The statistical data for Israel are supplied by and under the responsibility of the relevant Israeli authorities. The use of such data by the OECD is without prejudice to the status of the Golan Heights, East Jerusalem and Israeli settlements in the West Bank under the terms of international law.

Note by Turkey
The information in this document with reference to “Cyprus” relates to the southern part of the Island. There is no single authority representing both Turkish and Greek Cypriot people on the Island. Turkey recognises the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). Until a lasting and equitable solution is found within the context of the United Nations, Turkey shall preserve its position concerning the “Cyprus issue”.

Note by all the European Union Member States of the OECD and the European Union
The Republic of Cyprus is recognised by all members of the United Nations with the exception of Turkey. The information in this document relates to the area under the effective control of the Government of the Republic of Cyprus.

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