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Third-country nationals in the European Union and European OECD countries

This chapter considers the full set of “Zaragoza indicators” for third-country nationals (TCN) in the European Union and other European OECD countries, along with additional pertinent indicators. It compares their outcomes with those of nationals of the country of residence and other EU nationals. The chapter looks first at their size and composition (8.1) as well as duration of stay and origin (8.2). It then analyses outcomes in employment and activity (8.3), unemployment (8.4), self-employment (8.5), overqualification (8.6), educational attainment (8.7), income (8.8), poverty (8.9), housing tenure (8.10), health (8.11), long-term resident status (8.12), participation in voting (8.13), the acquisition of nationality (8.14), and perceived discrimination (8.15).

In Brief

- In the European Union (EU), rights and regulations of foreigners differ by nationality. While those with a foreign EU nationality enjoy equal access to the labour market and social support as nationals, nationals of a non-EU country do not. Assessing integration outcomes in Europe thus benefits from a distinction between EU and non-EU foreign nationality. Foreigners are not identical to the foreign-born, as individuals can naturalise. Also, in some countries, individuals born to foreigners are not automatically nationals even if born in the country.

EU mobile citizens and non-EU foreigners are two distinct and growing groups

- In 2020, the EU was home to 36 million foreign nationals. Close to two-thirds of these foreigners were third-country nationals (TCNs). TCNs thus represented 5% of the total EU population – close to 23 million individuals. The remaining third of foreigners were EU mobile citizens, accounting for about 3% of the total EU population – about 13.4 million people.
- In almost every EU country, shares of both groups increased over the last decade. Particularly the TCN population with the nationality of an Asian country has doubled in size EU-wide, mainly due to a surge in humanitarian migration from this region. However, the most important origin region of TCNs of working age remains Europe outside of the EU, at 35%.
- TCNs tend to be younger than nationals on average. The bulk of TCNs are between 25 and 54 years old. Many non-EU foreigners arrive in the EU at prime working age, and likeliness of obtaining nationality increases with time. Nevertheless, EU-wide, half of TCNs have lived in their host country for 10 years or longer. Shares are even higher in Spain, Italy and Greece.

Non-EU nationals have worse labour market outcomes than nationals and EU mobile citizens, a finding only partly linked to education

- In the EU, 56% of TCNs have a job, compared with 68% of nationals and 70% of EU mobile citizens. Labour market outcomes of TCNs increase with duration of residence. Fewer than half of recently arrived TCNs have jobs, against 61% of those who have been in the country for at least 10 years. Less than 50% of female TCNs have jobs in half of EU countries, especially in longstanding destinations (e.g. Belgium) and most Nordic and Southern European countries.
- Most non-EU nationals who settled in the EU over the last decade have much higher education levels than previous cohorts. Still, almost half of TCNs, EU-wide, are low educated, against only one-fifth among their national peers. In turn, only 23% of TCNs EU-wide are tertiary educated, while 32% of nationals are.
- In one-third of countries (especially in Southern Europe and the Czech Republic), low-educated TCNs have higher employment rates than their national peers.
- Only 68% of tertiary educated TCNs in the EU are employed, against 87% of their national peers. Differences between nationals and TCNs are wider among the highly than the low-educated in virtually all countries, especially Austria and Switzerland.
- Around two in five tertiary educated TCNs are overqualified for their job, compared with roughly only one in five nationals. In Italy and Portugal, tertiary educated TCNs are around 4 times as likely as nationals to be overqualified. While overqualification rates are lower among TCNs with host-country degrees, TCNs continue to fare worse than nationals in virtually all countries. EU-wide, TCN women experience a particularly high overqualification rate of 44%.

Alongside worse labour market outcomes, third country nationals face more difficult living conditions than EU mobile citizens and nationals across the EU

- EU-wide, two TCNs in five live in relative poverty. They are more than 1.5 times as likely to be poor as EU mobile citizens and 2.5 times as likely as nationals. Poverty rates have increased among TCNs and EU mobile citizens in around half of all countries, while remaining stable among nationals in most countries.
- Almost one in four TCNs belong to the lowest household income decile, rising to one in three in countries such as Austria, Belgium and France. Overall, gaps in median income between non-EU and national households widened over the last decade.
- Given their weaker economic position, only 24% of third-country nationals own their homes, compared with 73% of nationals. Surprisingly, TCNs are also underrepresented in accommodation rented at a reduced rate.

In part due to national legislation, political participation and take up of nationality differs strongly by country for both EU-born and non-EU migrants, though a larger share of people born outside the EU acquire citizenship

- Non-EU migrants are more likely to acquire host-country citizenship than those born in another EU country. Across the EU, 57% of non-EU migrants with 10 years of residence have host-country citizenship, against 44% of EU-born. Exceptions are some Central and Eastern European countries, where the immigrant populations have been shaped by national minorities.
- In virtually all countries, highly educated non-EU migrants are more likely to naturalise. In part, this relates to host-country language skills and economic self-sufficiency requirements.
- Voter turnout in the most recent election among nationals born in a third country is lower than among their native-born peers in most EU countries. However, they were more likely to vote in national elections in 2010-18 than in the previous decade, while native-born were slightly less likely to do so.

Self-reported discrimination is more widespread among non-EU foreigners than EU mobile citizens

- EU-wide, 20% of TCNs feel that they belong to a group that is discriminated against on the grounds of ethnicity, nationality, or race. That share is only 10% among EU mobile citizens. While the share among non-EU foreigners decreased between 2002-08 and 2012-18, it remains high, especially in Belgium (34%) and France (29%).
- The incidence is higher among male and low-educated TCNs. Perceived discrimination is largest among TCNs from Sub-Saharan Africa (30%) and North Africa (31%).

8.1. Size and composition by age and gender

Indicator context

A third-country national (TCN) in this chapter is a foreign citizen who resides in an EU country and has the nationality of a non-EU-27 country.

In 2020, almost two-thirds (23 million) of the 36 million foreign nationals living in EU countries – 5.1% of the total EU population of all ages – were third-country nationals (TCNs), also termed non-EU nationals. More than one-quarter of all TCNs in EU countries reside in Germany and over 15% in Spain, France and Italy. TCNs account for a comparatively high proportion of the population (over 7%) in longstanding European immigrant destinations, such as Luxembourg and Austria, as well as in most of the Southern European countries. However, the largest share resides in Latvia and Estonia, where many Soviet nationals did not obtain host-country citizenship in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union. At the other end of the spectrum lie the Central European countries where, except for Slovenia and the Czech Republic, less than 2% of residents are of non-EU nationality. In most other EU countries, though, TCNs actually outnumber nationals from other EU countries. There are, however, exceptions: Belgium hosts twice as many EU mobile citizens as TCNs, the Slovak Republic three times more, and Luxembourg five times.

As for age, 77% of TCNs EU-wide are of working age (15 to 64 years old), compared to 63% for nationals. The gap is even wider when only TCNs in the primary working age bracket (25-54 years old) are considered. Indeed, they account for the bulk of the TCN population. As many non-EU nationals arrive in the EU at prime working age, and as the chances of obtaining host-country nationality increase with time, they are on average much younger people. While 1 in 5 nationals is over 64, only 1 in 14 TCNs is. Notable exceptions are Latvia and Estonia, where non-EU citizens are older than the national population, with more than one-third aged 65 and over. In most countries, the offspring of TCNs cannot apply for host-country nationality until they are 12, and in some countries until they are 18. Therefore, among children, non-EU nationals are overrepresented before the age of 10 years only.


In almost every EU country, shares of both TCNs and EU mobile citizens have increased over the last decade. While in most Southern and Central European countries, the rise in the share of TCNs was below 1 percentage point, it exceeded 1.5 points in countries with large non-EU populations, such as Germany and France. Even steeper increases were observed in Sweden, Ireland and Luxembourg, where the number of non-EU nationals almost doubled. In Latvia and Estonia, by contrast, the non-EU population declined, due mainly to natural deaths. United Kingdom citizens are TCNs in 2020 but EU mobile citizens in 2010. This impacts the time comparison, but only slightly as the UK citizens are a small share of TCNs EU-wide (3.5%), and only significantly in Ireland, which as a result was excluded from all time comparisons.

Main findings

- The EU was home to 23 million TCNs in 2020. They account for higher proportions of the population in longstanding and Southern European destinations and lower proportions in most Central and Eastern European countries.
- TCNs are overrepresented in the working-age population and tend to be of younger average age than nationals.
- The share of non-EU27 nationals increased slightly over the decade to 2020 in almost every EU country. In that year, they made up 5% of the EU population in 2020, compared to 4% in 2010.

Figure 8.1. Proportion of third-country nationals

All ages, 2010 and 2020





StatLink  <https://stat.link/45cynb>

Figure 8.2. Age distribution in the EU, by citizenship

All ages, 2020



StatLink  <https://stat.link/4ybo98>

Notes and sources are to be found in the respective StatLinks.

8.2. Duration of stay and regions of nationality

Indicator context

Duration of stay denotes the length of time that a TCN has spent in a country since his or her arrival. Region of nationality refers to five broad regions, namely Asia, Africa, Europe (including Türkiye), Latin America and the Caribbean, and Canada/United States/Oceania.

In the EU, 35% of TCNs of working age are nationals of non-EU European countries. Next comes Asia, which accounts for the slightly lower share of 30%. Around one in five TCNs is the national of an African country, and one in six of a country in the remaining regions of origin. In Central and Eastern European countries (except Romania), most TCNs are nationals of non-EU European countries. The same holds true of Germany, Austria and Luxembourg, where many TCNs are Turks or nationals of former Yugoslavia. By contrast, TCNs are predominantly Asian nationals in the Nordic countries, which are home to comparatively high proportions of humanitarian migrants. In other European countries, post-colonial ties shape the make-up of TCN populations. For instance, nationals of African countries form the largest group of TCNs in Belgium and France, while in Spain and Portugal Latin American nationals do.

When it comes to gender, African TCNs in the EU are mostly men (60%), as are Asian nationals (55%). A likely reason is that men form the bulk of labour and humanitarian migrants who, in turn, form the bulk of TCNs from these regions. Women, by contrast, are overrepresented among TCNs with Latin American nationalities. Over the last decade, the number of TCNs with the nationality of a country in Asia has doubled EU-wide, mainly due to the surge in the intake of humanitarian migrants from Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan. Albeit to a lesser extent, the number of African nationals has also increased, while the size of TCN populations from other regions has remained stable. EU-wide, more than one in two TCNs has lived in their host country for 10 years or longer. Shares are even higher in some individual countries, e.g. Spain, Italy and Greece. As for the Slovak Republic, Sweden and Portugal, most TCNs have been residents less than five years.

As the native-born offspring of TCN parents tend to acquire the citizenship of their country of birth in most countries under certain conditions (e.g. age, status of their parents), native-born account for less than 2% of TCNs in most EU countries. In Germany and the Netherlands, however, the native-born comprised over 11% of the non-EU population in 2020. That share is falling in Germany, which now grants nationality to children whose parents are permanent foreign residents and who were born in the country since 2000. Shares of native-born offspring of TCNs in Latvia and Estonia are even higher, as many were not naturalised after independence.

Main findings

- In the EU, 35% of TCNs of working age are nationals of a European country outside the EU.
- Over the last decade, the TCN population with the nationality of an Asian country has doubled in size EU-wide, mainly due to a surge in humanitarian migration from the Asian region.
- More than half of TCNs in the EU have lived in their host country for 10 years or longer. Shares are even higher in Spain, Italy and Greece.

Figure 8.3. Third-country nationals by region of citizenship and country of destination

15-64 year-olds, 2020





Figure 8.4. Third-country nationals by duration of stay

15-64 year-olds (Total = 100), 2020



Notes and sources are to be found in the respective StatLinks.

8.3. Educational attainment

Indicator context

The International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED) divides educational attainment into three levels: i) low, no higher than lower-secondary (ISCED levels 0-2); ii) medium, upper-secondary and post-secondary non-tertiary (ISCED Levels 3-4); iii) high, tertiary education (ISCED Levels 5-8). See Indicator 3.1 for further details.

Across the EU, TCNs show much lower educational attainment than nationals: almost half of TCNs are low-educated, against one-fifth of their national peers. What is more, one non-EU national in five went no further than primary school, five times the share among nationals. More than 39% of TCNs have low levels of education in countries of longstanding immigration, recent Southern European destinations, and in Sweden and Denmark. By contrast, over 57% of non-EU nationals are highly educated in Ireland, Poland and Luxembourg – twice the share of their national peers. They also fare better than nationals in terms of education in most Central and Eastern European countries, which began only recently to take in TCNs. As for EU mobile citizens, they are more likely to be both poorly and highly educated than nationals in most countries. In Southern European countries, Germany and France, for example, their levels of educational attainment are lower than among nationals.

Most non-EU nationals who have settled in the EU over the last decade are educated to higher levels than previous cohorts. As for nationals, their level of educational attainment has also improved in all EU countries. The share of highly educated TCNs has not grown in destinations with significant intakes of low-educated labour migrants like Italy and Greece, or of low-educated humanitarian migrants like Finland or Sweden. In Sweden, the share of highly educated nationals was below that of TCNs in 2010, but exceeded it in 2020.

The share of poorly educated non-EU nationals fell EU-wide by 5 percentage points. The drop, however, was smaller than among nationals in most countries. The same trend was observed among people educated to very low levels (no further than primary education), with shares declining among TCNs in most countries, albeit to a lesser extent than among nationals. Between 2010 and 2020, the greatest drops (of 8 percentage points or more) in shares of very low-educated non-EU nationals came in Portugal, France and Spain. By contrast, shares of very low-educated TCNs climbed in the Nordic countries (bar Finland), Germany and the Netherlands.

Main findings

- Educational attainment among TCNs has improved virtually everywhere.
- Almost half of TCNs EU-wide are low-educated, a share that is over twice as high as among their national peers. The difference is particularly pronounced in Sweden, longstanding destinations, and Southern Europe.
- In the longstanding immigration countries with large numbers of non-EU migrants, around one fourth of TCNs are very low-educated, a share at least four times more than among their national peers.

Figure 8.5. Low- and highly educated, by citizenship

15-64 year-olds, 2020





Figure 8.6. How shares of the highly educated have evolved, by citizenship

15-64 year-olds, between 2010 (EU28/non-EU28 nationals) and 2020 (EU27/non-EU27 nationals)



Notes and sources are to be found in the respective StatLinks.

8.4. Employment and labour market participation

Indicator context

The employment rate is the share of 15-64 year-olds who, during the reference week, worked at least one hour, or who had a job but were absent from work (ILO definition). The participation/activity rate is the share of that population which is active (employed and unemployed). See Indicator 3.4 for further details.

EU-wide, 56% of working-age TCNs are in employment, against 68% of nationals. Gaps are widest in longstanding immigration countries (e.g. Belgium) and in Nordic countries with large recent intakes of humanitarian migrants (e.g. Sweden). If TCNs educated to the same level as nationals had the same employment rate, overall rates would rise by at least 0.8 percentage point in 9 countries and by over 1 point in Spain, Austria, Latvia and Germany. At 6 percentage points, the labour market participation gap between nationals and non-EU nationals is narrower than the employment gap. As for EU mobile citizens, 70% work and 77% participate in the labour market EU-wide. They lag behind nationals in less than two countries in five in terms of employment and in 1 out of 12 in terms of participation.

In the first year of the COVID-19 pandemic in the EU, TCNs experienced a sharper decline in their employment rates than nationals. Notwithstanding this, the EU-wide employment rate increased among both TCNs and nationals between 2010 and 2020. In most countries, the increases were highest among TCNs, especially in the Baltic countries and in Central Europe. By contrast, TCN employment rates dropped in Southern European countries and Austria, while their labour participation rates also fell in one-third of countries, especially in Southern Europe, where the impact was particularly large. With regard to gender, TCN employment and participation rates are particularly low among women. Less than 50% of female TCNs have jobs in half of EU countries, especially in longstanding destinations and most Nordic and Southern European countries.

Although TCN men participate in the EU-wide labour market at the same rate as their national peers, their employment rate is 7 percentage points lower, partly due to lower levels of education (see Indicator 8.3). However, except for the Netherlands, the greatest employment gaps are observed at tertiary level, where employment among highly educated TCNs lags behind those of their national peers in all EU countries. In one-third of countries (especially in Southern Europe and the Czech Republic), low-educated TCNs are more widely employed than their national peers. Employment levels increase with duration of residence. Fewer than half of recently arrived TCNs have jobs –14 percentage points less than their settled peers EU-wide, and over 25 points less in Sweden and Italy. However, settled TCNs still lag behind nationals, with exceptions such as Greece, Italy and Luxembourg. Employment among settled TCNs is 8 percentage points lower than for nationals in the EU, with gaps of over 19 percentage points in the Netherlands and Belgium.

Main findings

- In the EU, 56% of TCNs have a job, compared with 68% of nationals.
- Less than 50% of female TCNs have jobs in half of EU countries, especially in longstanding destinations (e.g. Belgium) and most Nordic and Southern European countries.
- EU-wide, the employment rate among highly educated TCNs is lower than among their national peers. The gap is wider than between low-educated TCNs and nationals, except in the Netherlands.

Figure 8.7. Employment and participation rates, by citizenship

15-64 year-olds, 2020





Figure 8.8. Employment rates of third-country nationals, by level of education

15-64 year-olds not in education, difference with nationals, 2020



Notes and sources are to be found in the respective StatLinks.

8.5. Unemployment

Indicator context

An unemployed person is one without, but available for, work and who has been seeking work during the reference week (ILO definition). The unemployment rate is the percentage of unemployed in the labour force (the sum of employed and unemployed individuals). See Indicator 3.5 for further details.

Almost 17% of TCNs are unemployed in the EU, against only 7% of nationals and 10% of EU mobile citizens. Over one unemployed person in ten EU-wide is a non-EU national, over one in five in Austria and Germany, and almost one in four in Sweden. In longstanding destinations with many non-EU migrants, as well as in Nordic countries, TCN unemployment rates are over twice those of nationals. In Sweden, which has many humanitarian migrants among its TCNs, one-third of TCNs are unemployed, five times more than among their national peers. Differences in unemployment rates between EU mobile citizens and their national peers are narrower – less than 5 percentage points – in most countries.

Although unemployment rose in most of the European Union with the onset of COVID-19, it was still lower in 2020 than in 2010 in two-thirds of countries. Non-EU nationals, who suffered disproportionately from the 2008-09 economic downturn, have recovered better than other groups. Nevertheless, TCNs are still significantly more likely to be jobless than a decade ago in Greece, Sweden, Luxembourg and Austria.

TCN men recovered more strongly from the 2008-09 economic crisis. While the EU-wide TCN unemployment rate was higher among men than women in 2010, TCN men fared better than their female peers in 2020. By comparison, male and female unemployment rates are similar among nationals. TCN unemployment gender gaps of 11 percentage points and more are to be found in Greece (where even among nationals the gender gap is wide), Sweden, Luxembourg and Slovenia. By contrast, gender disparities among TCNs are much smaller or absent in longstanding destinations.


While the unemployment rate is higher among poorly educated nationals in all EU countries, the same is not always true of TCNs. EU-wide, unemployment among low-educated TCNs is 5 percentage points greater among those with tertiary degrees. However, in Greece, the Netherlands and Slovenia, low-educated TCNs show unemployment rates that are at least 5 percentage points lower than highly educated TCNs. Where unemployment is more common among TCNs than host-country nationals, gaps are wider among the highly than the poorly educated in most countries, especially in Greece and the Netherlands. Recently arrived TCNs are more likely to be unemployed than their settled peers in all countries, with the notable exception of Belgium – where settled TCNs show a 6 percentage points higher jobless rate – and some Central and Eastern European countries. In Sweden, for example, new non-EU arrivals (generally less well educated) are twice as likely to be without work than their settled peers.

Main findings

- The TCN unemployment rate is 17%, over twice that of nationals (7%) EU-wide. TCNs make up one unemployed person in ten, with rates even higher in Austria, Germany and Sweden.
- TCN men, hit hard by the 2008-09 economic downturn, recovered more strongly than other citizens. TCN women are now more likely to be unemployed than 10 years previously.
- Low-educated and recent migrants are generally more likely to be unemployed. Where unemployment is more common among TCN than host-country nationals, gaps are wider among the highly than the poorly educated in most countries

Figure 8.9. Unemployment rates, by citizenship and level of education


15-64 year-olds, 2020



StatLink <https://stat.link/6ec0sn>

Figure 8.10. How unemployment rates have evolved, by citizenship

15-64 year-olds, between 2010 (EU28 versus non-EU28 nationals) and 2020 (EU27 versus non-EU27 nationals)



StatLink <https://stat.link/yokz51>

Notes and sources are to be found in the respective StatLinks.

8.6. Self-employment

Indicator context

The self-employed create and work in their own activities or firms. They include entrepreneurs, the liberal professions, artisans, traders, and other freelancers (excluding agriculture). See Indicator 3.13 for further details.

Around 11% of the working age population is self-employed in the EU, regardless of citizenship. TCNs are more likely to be self-employed than nationals in two countries out of five, especially in those with small non-EU populations, as in some Central and Eastern European countries, as well as in Spain and Portugal. In Poland, Italy and Greece, by contrast, TCNs are at least 6 percentage points less likely than their national peers to be self-employed.

Despite a slowdown due to the COVID-19 pandemic in many countries, the share of self-employed among non-EU nationals has increased over the last decade in most EU countries, while it fell in more than half of countries among nationals and EU mobile citizens. The increase in self-employment among TCNs was particularly striking in Lithuania and the countries worst hit by the 2008-09 economic crisis. In Southern Europe, except for Italy, TCNs appeared to resort to self-employment to avoid being marginalised in the labour market. Indeed, the growth observed in self-employment in Southern European countries was partly driven by sole proprietors with no employees. Self-employment was more likely among recent TCN migrants in 2020 than in 2010 in three out of five countries, particularly in Southern Europe and Austria. By contrast, the share of self-employed TCNs dropped steeply in most Central European and Nordic countries (including among newcomers). In the EU, about one-quarter of self-employed TCNs and EU mobile citizens have employees, against one-third of their national peers. Differences in firm size between non-EU citizens and nationals shrunk in the EU between 2010 and 2020. That trend is not true, however, in Sweden, Belgium, the Czech Republic and the Baltic and Southern European countries.


The profiles of the self-employed vary greatly from country to country. On average, there are around 5 percentage points more self-employed men than women, irrespective of citizenship. There are exceptions among non-EU nationals, however, with similar shares of both men and women in Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Sweden. Highly educated workers are also more likely than the low-educated to be self-employed in most countries, though not among TCNs in countries such as Finland, Denmark and the Netherlands. Creating a business requires capital stock and professional networks, as well as adjusting to the host-country's business environment, regulations and language, all of which takes time. As a result, TCNs with at least 10 years of residence in the host country are twice as likely as new arrivals to be self-employed EU-wide: 15% versus 8%. One notable exception, though, is Portugal.

Main findings

- TCNs are more likely than nationals to be self-employed in two countries out of five. EU-wide, only about one-quarter of TCN entrepreneurs have employees, compared to one-third of their national peers.
- While the incidence of self-employment has fallen in most countries over the last decade, it has grown among TCNs, especially in countries worst hit by the 2008-09 economic crisis, where self-employment is often a strategy for avoiding labour market marginalisation.
- Self-employment is more likely among recent TCN migrants than 10 years previously in three out of five countries, particularly in Southern Europe and Austria.

Figure 8.11. Self-employed workers, by citizenship


15-64 year-olds in employment, excluding the agricultural sector, 2020



StatLink <https://stat.link/6184jt>

Figure 8.12. The self-employed, by firm size and citizenship

15-64 year-olds, excluding the agricultural sector (Total =100), 2020



Note: As this is a cumulative bar figure, the marker “National 11+ employees” is at 100%, thus not shown. The share of national entrepreneurs with 11 employees or more is between the marker “national with 10 employees or less” and 100%. Ex: In the EU, 68% of self-employed nationals have no employees, 27% have between 1 and 10 employees, and 5% have 11 employees or more.

StatLink <https://stat.link/vbufin>

Notes and sources are to be found in the respective StatLinks.

8.7. Overqualification

Indicator context

The overqualification rate is the share of the highly educated (see Indicator 8.3), who work in a job that is ISCO-classified as low- or medium-skilled – i.e. ISCO Levels 4-9. See Indicator 3.12 for further details.

EU-wide, TCNs are twice as likely to be overqualified as nationals: 41% of highly educated non-EU nationals work in jobs below their formal level of qualification, compared to 21% of highly educated nationals. Indeed TCN overqualification is more widespread than among nationals in all EU countries but Ireland and Lithuania. It is highest in the Southern European countries, which offer highly educated labour migrants predominantly low-skilled jobs. Disparities in overqualification between non-EU citizens and nationals are widest in Italy, Portugal, Belgium and Greece. In the first two, TCNs are around four times as likely to be overqualified as their national peers.

Overqualification is particularly prevalent among immigrants who graduate abroad. In the EU, overqualification rates are lower among both TCNs (30%) and nationals (20%) who hold host-country degrees than among their foreign-educated peers – 45% for both TCNs and nationals. TCNs with a domestic degree show significantly lower overqualification than their peers with foreign degrees, notably in France (-28 percentage points), Sweden and Italy (both -26 points). However, non-EU nationals with domestic qualifications remain more prone to overqualification than their national peers in all countries, except for Ireland and Sweden. TCN women have higher overqualification rates than men throughout the EU, except in Austria. This is especially evident in Portugal, where the gender gap is 42 percentage points, and Cyprus, where it is 24 points. Gender differences in overqualification rates between national men and women are less pronounced or reversed in almost all countries.

Before the COVID-19 crisis struck, TCN overqualification had fallen by 6 percentage points between 2010 and 2019 in the EU. The pandemic further reduced it, as the overqualified were first to be laid off. Indeed, the EU-wide overqualification gap between TCNs and nationals narrowed, due both to a drop in overqualification among non-EU nationals and a slight rise among nationals. Overqualification among TCNs fell most steeply in Portugal. By contrast, in Austria and Belgium the opposite trend prevailed. EU mobile citizens, unlike their TCN peers, saw an overall increase in their overqualification rates.

Main findings

- Overall, highly educated TCNs are twice as likely to be overqualified as nationals (around 4 times more in Italy and Portugal). While overqualification rates are lower among TCNs with host-country degrees, TCNs continue to fare worse than nationals in virtually all countries.
- TCN women generally experience greater overqualification rates than their male peers. EU-wide, overqualification gender gaps between TCNs are wider than among nationals.
- Over the last decade, gaps in overqualification between TCNs and nationals as well as TCNs and EU mobile citizens have narrowed. The COVID-19 crisis accelerated the decline further, as overqualified workers are the first to be affected by layoffs in times of economic crisis.

Figure 8.13. Overqualification rates, by citizenship and gender

Highly educated 15-64 year-olds, 2020





Figure 8.14. How overqualification rates have evolved, by citizenship

Highly educated 15-64 year-olds, between 2010 (EU28/non-EU28 nationals) and 2020 (EU27/non-EU27 nationals)



Notes and sources are to be found in the respective StatLinks.

8.8. Household income

Indicator context

A household's annual equivalised disposable income is total earnings per capita from labour and capital, adjusted by the square root of household size. Median income separates households into two halves: one receives less and the other more. The 10% of the population with the lowest income are in the first decile and the 10% with the highest income are in the tenth. See Indicator 4.1 for further details.

The median annual disposable income of a TCN household in the EU is around EUR14 600, well below the figures for EU mobile citizens (EUR19 200) and nationals (EUR19 600). In fact, outside Central and Eastern Europe, it is lower than the household income of nationals in all EU countries. In France, Sweden, Belgium and Spain, it stands at even less than 65% of the median income in national households. As non-EU nationals are disproportionately overqualified for their jobs (Indicator 8.7), median income gaps between non-EU citizens and nationals tend to be widest among the highly educated.

Across the EU, non-EU nationals are overrepresented in the lowest income decile, where they account for 24% of households EU-wide, and underrepresented in the highest decile, at 8%. And, at one in three, shares of TCN households in the lowest decile are even greater in longstanding EU destinations (except Germany and Luxembourg). Furthermore, in these longstanding destinations (except for the Netherlands), as well as in most Southern European countries, the top income decile comprises less than 5% of TCNs. In the vast majority of EU countries, TCN household income in the highest decile is around three to six times greater than in the lowest. Indeed, income inequality tends to be wider among TCNs than nationals. It is worst in Lithuania, Bulgaria and Hungary, where TCN household income in the top decile is sevenfold that in the bottom decile. Among nationals it is between four- and sixfold. In countries such as the Czech Republic and Finland, by contrast, income inequality between non-EU nationals is lower than among nationals.


Across the EU, median TCN household income in 2020 had recovered slightly since the 2007/08 economic downturn, though by much less than among nationals, further widening the pre-crisis income differential. At the country level, however, there were considerable differences. For instance, median income gaps between TCNs and nationals widened significantly in the Netherlands and Austria, but narrowed in Greece.

Main findings

- TCNs have lower annual disposable household incomes than nationals in virtually every country. In France, Sweden, Belgium and Spain, the median income in TCN households is nearly 65% of median income in national households.
- Almost one in four TCNs belong to the lowest household income decile, rising to one in three in countries such as Austria, Belgium and France.
- Across the EU, gaps in median income between non-EU and national households widened over the last decade.

Figure 8.15. Third-country national income deciles


16-year-olds and above, 2020



StatLink <https://stat.link/c93ahl>

Figure 8.16. Equivalised median annual disposable household income, by citizenship

Purchasing power parities in national currencies per euro (EU=1.00), 2020



StatLink <https://stat.link/rt4pnw>

Notes and sources are to be found in the respective StatLinks.

8.9. Relative poverty

Indicator context

The relative poverty rate (or at-risk-of-poverty rate) is the proportion of individuals living below the country's poverty threshold. The Eurostat definition of the poverty threshold used here is 60% of the median equivalised disposable income in each country. See Indicator 4.2 for further details.

Across the EU, two in five TCNs live in relative poverty. Overall, they are more than 1.5 times as likely to be poor as EU mobile citizens and 2.5 times more than nationals. With the exceptions of Portugal and the Czech Republic, poverty is more widespread among TCNs than EU mobile citizens and nationals throughout the EU. Gaps in poverty rates between non-EU citizens and nationals are narrowest in Central and Eastern European countries, where less than one-fifth of TCNs live in relative poverty. However, in countries where many are low-educated – such as Sweden, Spain and Belgium – TCNs are three times more likely to be poor than nationals. The widest gaps come in France and Austria, where TCNs are around four times as likely to be poor.

Over the last decade, poverty rates among nationals remained stable in most countries. When it comes to TCNs, however, countries painted different pictures, with some seeing significant poverty alleviation and others the opposite. Overall, the greatest reductions in relative poverty among TCNs came in Portugal and Finland, where rates roughly halved. Greece also saw a steep poverty decline of 15 percentage points among TCNs. However, as median incomes also fell significantly, there was no real improvement in the standard of living of the Greek TCN population. By contrast, TCNs experienced strong rises in relative poverty in countries like Switzerland, Austria and the Netherlands. In the Netherlands, the rate more than doubled. Different country-specific trends were also observed among EU mobile citizens. Their relative poverty rates dropped sharply in most Central and Eastern European countries, and even more so in Portugal, but rose significantly in countries such as France.


The low-educated are especially at risk of poverty, regardless of their nationality. In fact, one-half of low-educated TCNs live in relative poverty in the EU, compared to one in three with medium or high levels of educational attainment. Significantly, poverty rates are only slightly lower (2 percentage points) among highly educated TCNs than among those educated to a medium level. Highly educated nationals across the EU are less than half as likely (8 points) as their medium-educated peers to be poor. Besides educational attainment, length of stay in the host country is linked to a reduction in TCNs' exposure to the risk of poverty. EU-wide, the poverty rate of recently arrived non-EU nationals is 8 percentage points higher than among those with at least 10 years of residence.

Main findings

- Across the EU, two in five TCNs live in relative poverty. They are more than 1.5 times as likely to be poor as EU mobile citizens and 2.5 times as likely as nationals. Higher poverty rates than those of nationals are observed everywhere, bar the Czech Republic and Portugal.
- Poverty rates have increased significantly among TCNs and EU mobile citizens in around half of all countries, while remaining stable among nationals in most countries. In the Netherlands, poverty among TCNs has more than doubled.
- EU-wide, the poverty rate among recently arrived non-EU nationals is higher than among those with at least 10 years of residence.

Figure 8.17. Relative poverty rates, by citizenship


16-year-olds and above, 2020



StatLink <https://stat.link/7uj3d1>

Figure 8.18. How relative poverty rates have evolved, by citizenship

16-year-olds and above, between 2010 and 2020



StatLink <https://stat.link/m690nc>

Notes and sources are to be found in the respective StatLinks.

8.10. Housing tenure

Indicator context

This indicator relates to the share of homeowners among individuals aged 16 and over, to tenants who rent accommodation at the market rate, and to those who rent at reduced rates. See Indicator 4.4 for further details.

In the EU, TCNs are three times less likely than nationals to own their own homes (24% versus 73%). In virtually all EU countries, most nationals own the dwellings they reside in, while only a minority of TCNs do so. The sole exceptions are the Czech Republic, Croatia and Lithuania where over 54% of TCNs are homeowners. EU mobile citizens, too, are less likely than nationals (by 37 percentage points) to own their own homes, but still 13 points more likely than TCNs. Across the EU, only 1% of homeowners are non-EU nationals, although they represent 4% of the adult population (16 years old and over). Overall, the gap between TCNs and nationals are widest (i.e. over 50 percentage points) in countries where most citizens are homeowners – such as Spain, Italy, Ireland, Greece and Portugal. Disparities in homeownership rates between nationals and foreigners, particularly TCNs, are attributable to factors like unfamiliarity with the host country's housing market, language barriers, discrimination, and lower income.

Shares of TCN homeowners do, though, increase with educational attainment – around one-third of highly educated non-EU nationals own their homes in the EU, compared to 19% of their low-educated peers. However, being highly educated does not close the gap in homeownership rate between TCNs and nationals in all countries.

Over the last decade, the EU-wide TCN homeownership rate fell, while remaining stable among nationals. In most countries, TCNs are less likely to own a home than a decade ago. In Sweden, the share of non-EU homeowners fell by almost one-quarter, possibly due to the inflow of humanitarian migrants, for whom finding accommodation is generally a greater struggle.

Analysis of non-owner tenants across the EU shows that (with the exception of Finland) TCNs are also less likely than their national peers to reside in subsidised accommodation – 13% versus 19%. That trend is true regardless of levels of education. Indeed, TCNs may usually not access subsidised housing until they have lived in the host country for several years. However, even with 10 years of residence, TCNs are still under-represented in dwellings rented at a reduced rate. The overall gap between nationals and non-EU citizens living in subsidised accommodation is widest in Ireland, at 49 percentage points.

Main findings

- Across the EU, only 1% of homeowners are non-EU nationals, even though they represent 4% of the adult population. Only 24% of third-country nationals own their homes, while 73% of nationals do.
- Gaps in homeownership are widest in countries where it is particularly widespread among nationals (e.g. Southern Europe and Ireland).
- TCNs are underrepresented in housings rented at a reduced rate, even after living in their country of residence for many years.

Figure 8.19. Rates of home ownership, by citizenship

16-year-olds and above, 2020





Figure 8.20. How home ownership rates have evolved, by citizenship

16-year-olds and above, between 2010 and 2020



Notes and sources are to be found in the respective StatLinks.

8.11. Reported health status

Indicator context

Self-reported health status is measured by the share of individuals who rate their health as “good” or better. As health status is strongly age-dependent, the share of foreign nationals who report good health is adjusted to estimate outcomes as if the foreigners’ age structure were the same as those of the nationals. See Indicator 4.9 for further details.

Across the EU, three in five TCNs perceived in 2020 their health as good or very good. The share, which is adjusted by age, is lower than among nationals and EU mobile citizens (around 65%). Indeed, in Spain and all long-standing immigrant destinations, TCNs are less likely to report good health than nationals, even after controlling for age differences between the two groups. In Austria, TCNs are as much as 14 percentage points less likely to consider themselves in good health, and 12 points less so in France. By contrast, in most European countries with a smaller immigrant population, TCNs are more likely to feel healthy than their national peers, particularly in Portugal and the Central and Eastern European countries. As for EU mobile citizens, they express similar or better self-perceived health outcomes than nationals in most European countries. However, the opposite is true of Spain, France and Denmark, where EU mobile citizens are at least 5 percentage points less likely than nationals to say they are in good health.

In most EU countries, the proportion of TCNs and nationals reporting good health rose between 2010 and 2020. As the increase was more pronounced among TCNs than nationals in countries such as Belgium and Austria, self-reported health disparities between non-EU foreigners and nationals narrowed significantly in these countries. A climb in the proportion of non-EU nationals in self-perceived good health also came in Portugal, where the gap in favour of TCNs widened. By contrast, self-perceptions of health among EU mobile citizens and TCNs deteriorated in France, the Czech Republic and Spain between 2010 and 2020.


Factors such as gender, socio-economic status, lifestyle and satisfaction with the healthcare system shape self-perceived health status. For example, men tend to report better health than women. Across the EU, the self-perceived gender gap is widest among TCNs and EU mobile citizens. An even more important determinant of reported health status is educational attainment. EU-wide, the highly educated – who are generally better paid, enjoy better health insurance coverage, and tend to be more fully aware of lifestyle choices – are more than 20 percentage points more likely to report good health than the low-educated. The education-related gap holds true for TCNs, EU mobile citizens and nationals, though it is widest (at 26 points) among nationals.

Main findings

- Across the EU, three in five TCNs report that they are in good health. That share, adjusted for age, is lower than among nationals and EU mobile citizens (65%). However, in Central and Southern European countries (bar Spain) TCNs are more likely to report good health.
- The share of TCNs and nationals who report good health has grown in most countries between 2010 and 2020.
- More men than women report being in good health, particularly among TCNs and EU mobile citizens.

Figure 8.21. Self-reported good health status, by citizenship


16-year-olds and above, 2020



StatLink <https://stat.link/6s9t4d>

Figure 8.22. How the shares of individuals in self-reported good health have evolved, by citizenship

16-year-olds and above, between 2010 and 2020



StatLink <https://stat.link/2wf6kx>

Notes and sources are to be found in the respective StatLinks.

8.12. Long-term residents

Indicator context

A long-term resident is a third-country national who has been granted long-term resident status in accordance with Directive 2003/109/EC of 25 November 2003. The status may be granted to all non-EU citizens if they have resided legally and continuously for five years in an EU member state, have health insurance coverage, and enjoy sufficient financial resources not to rely on social assistance. Some countries may also have additional requirements, such as proficiency in the host-country language. Long-term residents enjoy the same rights of residence as EU nationals, particularly that of residing in an EU country other than the one where they were granted long-term residence. Having the same rights as EU nationals is a necessary requirement for TCNs if legal barriers are not to hamper their integration and if they are to enjoy greater equality of opportunity.

This indicator measures the share of long-term residents among third-country nationals who have a valid residence permit. Data include long-term residence permits under the EU framework, as well as other permanent residence permits under national frameworks, if the latter are more advantageous than the provisions in the Directive, even if they allow holders to live only in the EU country that delivered the permit (unlike long-term residence permits under the EU framework).

EU-wide, half of TCNs benefit from long-term resident status (under EU or national framework). However, at the country level shares vary greatly. In three-fifths of countries, under half of TCNs are long-term residents, with the ratio falling to less than one in five in Portugal, Romania, Croatia and Poland. By contrast, in Bulgaria, France, Austria and Sweden, over 60% of non-EU nationals enjoy long-term resident status, while that share exceeds 80% in Latvia and Estonia, where non-EU populations include national minorities.


The percentage of TCNs with long-term resident status fell between 2016 and 2021 in almost three-quarters of countries. Declines were steepest in countries with ageing non-EU populations, such as Lithuania and Croatia, which registered many deaths among their former non-EU migrant cohorts. That downward trend is also attributable to the growing share of recent arrivals from outside the EU – in Sweden or the Slovak Republic, for example. Indeed, they cannot benefit from long-term resident status until five years have elapsed and, as a rule, the more recent the TCN population, the lower the proportion of a country's long-term residents. The size of the third-country national population reflects changes in inflows from outside the EU, changes in outflows of TCNs, and changes in citizenship policies (naturalised TCNs are no longer considered foreigners). Such changes, together with the different lengths of time that countries have taken to implement Directive 2003/109/EC, prompt caution as to cross-country comparisons over time.


Main findings

- Half of third-country nationals have long-term resident status in the EU.
- The percentage of TCNs who have long-term resident status fell slightly between 2016 and 2021 in almost three-quarters of countries. The decline may be associated with the ageing and related rise in mortality of the non-EU population, as well as the growing share of recent non-EU migrants in the total number of TCNs.

Figure 8.23. Proportions of third-country nationals with long-term resident status

All ages, 2021



StatLink  <https://stat.link/rj97dw>

Notes and sources are to be found in the respective StatLinks.

8.13. Voter participation

Indicator context

Voter participation refers to the share of eligible voters (with host-country nationality) who report that they cast a ballot in the most recent national parliamentary election in the country of residence. See Indicator 5.2 for further details.

EU-wide, nationals born in a third country were slightly less likely to vote in national elections than their native-born peers between 2010 and 2018. Voter participation among non-EU born nationals was 71%, that of the native-born 79%, with that of nationals born in another EU country in between, at 77%. Turnout in national elections remained stable among naturalised non-EU migrants between 2002-10 and 2010-18, while dipping slightly among the native-born. Turnout did not change among the EU-born nationals.

Voter turnout is lower among nationals born outside the EU than the native-born in most EU countries – by more than 10 percentage points in countries with large recent intakes of non-EU migrants, such as Ireland, Southern European destinations and Nordic countries. Turnout is also considerably lower among non-EU born than native-born in some longstanding immigration countries, such as Germany, Austria and the Netherlands. By contrast, voter participation rates are similar among non-EU migrants and the native-born in France, Belgium, and in countries where the bulk of the non-EU born population is considered from a third country because of border changes or the presence of national minorities – as in Croatia and the Baltic countries. Nationals born in other EU countries show higher voter participation rates than their non-EU born counterparts, except in Ireland, Belgium, Spain and France. However, they vote less than the native-born in virtually all countries.

The highly educated are more likely to vote than the low-educated in virtually all EU countries, with at least 14 percentage points separating their voter turnout rates EU-wide, regardless of country of birth. At all levels of education voter participation among naturalised immigrants from third countries is around 8 percentage points lower than among the native-born. Notable exceptions include France and Lithuania, where highly educated nationals born in a non-EU country turn out in larger proportions than their native-born peers. In Belgium and Estonia, by contrast, naturalised non-EU migrants with low educational attainment are more likely to vote than the native-born educated to the same level.


The association between voter participation and gender is less clear-cut than with education. In the EU, men are more likely to vote than women. Voter participation among female nationals born in a third country is however 2 percentage points higher than among their male peers EU-wide, and by at least 5 percentage points in Estonia, Ireland, the Netherlands and Germany.

Main findings

- Voter turnout among nationals born in a third country is lower than among their native-born peers in most EU countries. EU-wide, their self-reported turnout in the most recent national election was 71%, against 79% among the native-born.
- Nationals born outside the EU were more likely to vote in national elections in 2010-18 than in the previous decade, while native-born were slightly less likely.
- While men are more likely to vote than women in the EU, voter turnout among women born in a third country is 2 percentage points higher than among their male peers EU-wide.

Figure 8.24. Self-reported participation of naturalised non-EU migrants in most recent national election, by place of birth


18-year-olds and above with host-country nationality, 2010-18



StatLink <https://stat.link/cipej8>

Figure 8.25. Self-reported participation of non-EU migrants with host-country citizenship in most recent national election, by level of education

18-year-olds and above, difference with native-born nationals, 2010-18



StatLink <https://stat.link/2mnuzj>

Notes and sources are to be found in the respective StatLinks.

8.14. Acquisition of nationality

Indicator context

This indicator relates to the share of immigrants who have resided in the host country for at least 10 years and hold its nationality. Indeed, although countries may require immigrants to reside for different lengths of time to be eligible for nationality in OECD and EU countries, that duration is generally no more than 10 years. See Indicator 5.1 for further details.

Across the EU, 57% of non-EU migrants with ten years of residence (settled migrants) have the citizenship of their country of residence. The share of EU-born migrant nationals is lower, at 44%. Among settled migrants born in a third country, shares of individuals with the host-country nationality are largest (over 90%) in Sweden, as well as in Croatia, the Slovak Republic and Lithuania, where the immigrant populations have been shaped by national minorities. As for the lowest citizenship rates (less than 50%), they come in the other Baltic countries, the Southern European countries (except Portugal), the Czech Republic and Luxembourg. These countries have stricter naturalisation procedures in place, do not allow dual citizenship, or have started to do so only recently (see Indicator 5.1).

As EU mobile citizens already benefit from the rights and privileges conferred by EU citizenship, they are less likely than their non-EU born peers to seek the nationality of the host country. They are particularly unlikely to do so in Ireland, Spain and Luxembourg, where less than one-fifth of settled EU-born have the host-country citizenship. In most Central and Eastern European countries, by contrast, well over five in six EU-born are nationals – a much higher share than among their non-EU born counterparts. The share of nationals born in the EU exceeds that of nationals born outside the EU by the greatest margin in the Czech Republic and Slovenia. Most EU-born in the Czech Republic were born in the Slovak Republic, obtaining the Czech citizenship after Czechoslovakia split. As for Slovenia, most residents were Croatian-born, becoming Slovenian nationals after the break-up of Yugoslavia.

Formal and informal requirements for naturalisation include a certain proficiency in the host-country language and a degree of economic self-sufficiency. Such requirements favour highly educated immigrants. Indeed, having the citizenship is more widespread among highly educated non-EU migrants than their low-educated peers in all EU countries (but Hungary) – 25 percentage points more widespread EU-wide. The gap is a much narrower – 2 percentage points – in Ireland and Sweden, where host-country language skills are not a requirement for naturalisation. For EU-born, however, a more mixed picture emerges. Again, the citizenship rate among highly educated EU-born exceeds the rate among their low-educated peers in many countries, although to a lesser extent. However, the reverse is true in Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands, Sweden and Denmark, as well as Central and Eastern European countries.

Main findings

- Across the EU, 57% of non-EU migrants with 10 years of residence have the host-country nationality.
- Non-EU migrants are more likely than their EU-born peers to have the nationality of the host country. Exceptions are most Central and Eastern European countries, where the immigrant populations have been shaped by national minorities.
- In virtually all countries, highly educated non-EU migrants are more likely to have the nationality of the host country than their low-educated peers.

Figure 8.26. Acquisition of nationality, by place of birth

15-year-olds and above, settled immigrants (more than 10 years of residence) who became host-country nationals, 2020





Figure 8.27. Acquisition of nationality, by level of education and place of birth

15-year-olds and above, gap between highly and low-educated settled immigrants who became host-country nationals, 2020



Notes and sources are to be found in the respective StatLinks.

8.15. Perceived discrimination

Indicator context

This indicator refers to the share of foreigners who consider themselves members of a group that is discriminated against on the grounds of ethnicity, nationality or race. See Indicator 5.6 for further details.

EU-wide, one in five TCNs feels that they belong to a group that is discriminated against on the grounds of ethnicity, nationality or race. That share is only one in twelve among EU mobile citizens. In around four out of five EU countries, self-perceived discrimination is more widespread among TCNs than their EU peers, with the lowest incidence in both groups in the Nordic countries and Ireland. Shares of non-EU nationals reporting discrimination are highest in France and Belgium, at one person in three – triple the share among EU-born foreigners.

Across the EU, the share of TCNs who feel part of a group subject to discrimination declined by 3 percentage points between 2002-08 and 2012-18, while the proportion of EU mobile citizens rose slightly. Perceived discrimination among TCNs has declined in all countries, except France and Belgium. In France, the share of TCNs self-reporting discrimination against their in-group increased by 3 percentage points and in Belgium by 17 points. As for EU mobile citizens, they reported a 3-point rise in France and 5-point in Belgium. By contrast, self-reported discrimination declined in Germany and Austria among both groups.

The grounds for perceived discrimination vary widely. On the grounds of origin, perceived discrimination is most widespread in the EU among TCNs from sub-Saharan Africa (30%) and North Africa (31%). Male TCNs, those close to retirement age, and those whose first language is not that of the host-country are more likely to report discrimination than their female TCNs, those who are younger and those whose first language is that of the host country. Labour market status does not seem to be a decisive factor – 21% of both employed and unemployed non-EU nationals feel discriminated against. However, the incidence of perceived discrimination abates with higher educational attainment – 25% among the low-educated versus 16% among the highly educated. EU-wide, it also declines with the length of stay, albeit only slightly.


EU mobile citizens report lower shares of discrimination than TCNs, regardless of the grounds. Although labour market status does not affect perceived discrimination among non-EU nationals, unemployed EU mobile citizens are twice as likely as those in work to report discrimination. Unlike their non-EU peers, shares of EU mobile citizens reporting discrimination are similar at all levels of educational attainment. Low-educated TCNs are twice as likely to feel discriminated against than their non-national peers with EU citizenship.

Main findings

- Across the EU, 20% of third-country nationals report belonging to a group that experiences discrimination on the grounds of their ethnicity, nationality or race. Among EU mobile citizens the share is 10%. Shares of TCNs who perceive discrimination are largest in Belgium and France, where differences between EU mobile citizens and TCNs are also particularly wide.
- The share of TCNs who feel discriminated against fell between 2002-08 and 2012-18, except in Belgium and France.
- Not all TCNs are equally likely to report belonging to a group prone to discrimination. The incidence is lower among some groups, like women or highly educated TCNs.

Figure 8.28. Self-reported discrimination, by citizenship


15-64 year-olds, 2012-18



StatLink <https://stat.link/xkqwp>


Figure 8.29. Self-reported discrimination by several characteristics and citizenship

15-64 year-olds, 2012-18



StatLink <https://stat.link/mrn2hv>

Notes and sources are to be found in the respective StatLinks.



From:
Indicators of Immigrant Integration 2023
Settling In

Access the complete publication at:
<https://doi.org/10.1787/1d5020a6-en>

Please cite this chapter as:

OECD/European Commission (2023), "Third-country nationals in the European Union and European OECD countries", in *Indicators of Immigrant Integration 2023: Settling In*, OECD Publishing, Paris.

DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1787/46d24e99-en>

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